The Orthodox Evangelist, Treatise · Chapter 5

The Orthodox Evangelist · Treatise · Chapter 5

p. 101CHAP. V. Of the Efficiency of God.

IN the Diſquiſition of this Subject, Conſider

1. What the Efficiency of God is.

2. The Diſtribution thereof.

3. What the Concurſe of the firſt Cauſe, with the ſecond, is.

4. The Neceſſity thereof in reſpect of the ſecond Cauſe.

5. The Manner of it.

6. The chief Objections againſt the All-efficiency of God.

6. The chief Objections againſt the All-governing Providence of God

7. The Uſe of this Doctrine

As God before time by one free, Eternal, and conſtant,The Efficiency of God, what. immanent Act, decreed the futurition of all things: ſo God in time, by many tranſient Acts, doth exactly execute the ſame; only what he did decree, all that he did decree, and according as he did decree.

The Decree is God willing the Futurition; i. e. The future being of all things. The external Efficiency of God, is Gods working all that he hath willed, according as he hath willed. In the Decree is Gods great deſigne of future action. The Efficiency is the execution of that deſigne. In the Decree is, as it were, the Councel of God; the Efficiency is, as p. 102it were, the Hand of God, working according to the Counſel of his Will. The Efficiency and Decree anſwer one another, as the Birth doth the Conception, the fruit the ſeed, as the pattern, and tabernacle, Exod. 25.40. And the Pattern and Temple were to anſwer one another, 1 Chron. 28.12. As the Idea and foreign, as the actual faſhioning of Davids body agreed with the platform thereof, drawn in Gods Book, Pſal. 139.16. As the letters printed upon the paper anſwer the printing type: Thoſe 700. that could ſling ſtones at an hairs bredth, and not miſs, Judg. 20.16. were not ſo exact in hitting their mark, as God is in anſwering of his Decree. His Efficiency adaequately, and exactly in all reſpects whatſoever, anſwering the Decree; and none of them varying from the platform thereof in the leaſt meaſure: here is no variation of the compaſs. The Efficiency of God will make good that concerning the Decree, which Chriſt fore-telleth concerning the Law: One jot, or one tittle ſhall in no wiſe paſs, till all be fulfilled.

The Efficiency of God is Creation.The Diſtribution of the Eſſciency of God. Upholding the Creature in its Being, Virtues, and Actions.

The Efficiency of God is Providence. Governing thereof.

Creation is the firſt external and tranſient Work of God, by which in the beginning he made all things of nothing, very good.

Actual Providence is that tranſient acting of God, whereby he upholdeth, and infallibly governeth all things, and the ſeveral natures of things according to the immutable Counſel of his own Will unto their beſt end, namely, the Manifeſtation of his own Glory.

The Parts of Providence, are the Conſervation of the creature in its Being, Virtues, and Operation, and the Government thereof.

Conſervation is a continued Creation. The Nurſe of the world, the Schoolmen call it Manu-tenentia, Heb. 1.3. upholding all things by the Word of his Power; where the p. 103creature is compared to a mighty Maſs, ſuppoſe of Lead, or of like heavy ſubſtance hanging in the air; whoſe weight would cauſe it to fall, were it not upholden by ſome extrinſecal power; the creature muſt needs return to its nothing, ſhould God but withhold his conſerving Power, Pſal. 104.29.

Government in general, is God's actual ordering of the creature according to his Decree, with ſuch reference unto the Rule, as keeps it continually in the right way to its end.

The creature is either unreaſonable, or reaſonable; the Rule of the unreaſonable creature, is the Law of Nature; the Rule of the reaſonable creature, is the Moral Law.

In the Government of the reaſonable creature, three things are to be obſerved.

1. An Obediential Power, That is, a capacity of the creature to become ſubject unto the Will of the Creator.

2. The Law of Nature, ſcil. The Impreſſion of the Will of the Creator concerning the creatures, ſtamped upon them from the beginning; by virtue of thoſe imperative, effectual words, Let there be, and it was ſo: Gen. 1.3.5.7.9. Hence, they are ſaid, to have received a Command, Job 38.12. To keep covenant with God, Jer. 31.6. and 33.20.25. Knoweſt thou the Ordinances of the Heaven, canſt thou ſet the Dominion thereof in the Earth? Job. 38.23. i.e. The conſtant Order and Reaſon of the Motion of the Heavens,foreign which their Maker hath fixed in them as a Law, or Statute, according to which they move, and act.

3. A Propenſneſs of Nature, which is a Principle to do according to that Law of Nature. In things that have not life, it is called an inclination, The Sparks flye upward, Job. 5.7. The Sun knoweth his going down, Pſal. 104.19. In things that have life, it is called an inſtinct; whereby ſome living creatures by inſtigation of nature, act; as if they had reaſon, Prov. 6.6. & 30.24.

God ordinarily governeth the creature according to the p. 104Law of Nature, extraordinarily; according to his good pleaſure, above the courſe of nature; i. e. anſwerable to the Decree, but not according to the Law of Nature, as in caſe of Miracles, and Monſters.

Gods Government of the reaſonable creature, is his actual ordering Angels and men, according to his Decree, with ſuch relation unto the Moral Law, as containeth them in the acknowledgement thereof by way of obedience, or in caſe of diſobedience, ſubjects them unto the curſe annexed thereunto. The creatures reaſonable, and unreaſonale, always are ordered according to the Decree; the unreaſonable creature ordinarily alſo is ordered according to its rule: man by reaſon of ſin often erreth from his rule.

God preſcribes unto the reaſonable creature a rule, having in the Creation enabled the Angels in their proper perſons; man in Adam, to yeild obedience unto that rule, rewarding obedience according to the Promiſe; either by way of Merit, as in the firſt; or by way of Grace, as in the ſecond Covenant: and puniſhing diſobedience according to the curſe.

Thoſe Nations who are without the Law, that is, without the written Word of God, owe obedience unto the Law, being in Adam the root of man-kind, created after the image of God,Quibus foreign, nunquam fuit revelatum, tales damrabuntur non propter fidem non praeſtiram, vel propter neglectam conditionem, ſed propter Legi…, vel Naturae, vel Scriptae violationem, vel propter peccatum ac reatum quibus ab utero ſunt abnoxii. Spanh. Ex de grat. Sect. 25. N. 13. and contained in the Covenant of Works. Such Nations ſhall be judged according to the Moral Law, for their diſobedience thereunto. For this cauſe the Prophets do not only denounce judgement to thoſe who have that Law written, (though unto ſuch the greater puniſhment is due: For he that knoweth his Lords will, and doth it not, ſhall be beaten with many ſtripes, Luke 12.47.) But alſo to the Gentiles, who had not the written Law, Jer. 10.25. Jeremiah cauſeth not only Jeruſalem, but every other Nation there mentioned, to drink of the Wine-cup of the Fury of the Lord, Jer. 15.15. Writs of Execution are given out againſt the Ammonites, Ezek. 21.28. and Chapt. 25.…. p. 105Againſt Moah, and Seir, ver. 8. Againſt Edom. 12. Againſt the Philiſtins, 12. Againſt Tyrus, Chap. 26, 27. Againſt Zidon, Chap. 28.20. Againſt Egypt, Chap. 29.32. Againſt Aſſyria, Chap. 31. Againſt Babylon, Jer. 50. & 51. Againſt Gog. Ezek. 38.

Whence alſo it is, That not only the Jews (ſuch as have heard of the written Word of God,) but likewiſe the Gentiles (which have not heard of the Word of God) are reſerved unto the Judgement of the great Day, Rom. 2.6.9. John 5.28, 29. and 1 Cor. 6.2. Do you not know that the Saints ſhall judge the world? then the World ſhall be judged.

Thoſe that have the Law and Goſpel written, owe obedience to the Law and Goſpel. As many as have ſinned in the Law, ſhall be judged by the Law, Rom. 2.12. that is, Their condemnation will be aggravated, becauſe they have ſinned againſt greater light, John 15.22. Matth. 11.22.

The Elect, who in this life, both diſobey, and obey the Rule: are for their diſobedience puniſhed in their Surety, according to the Curſe, annexed to the Precept, and chaſtened in themſelves. God truly teſtifieth againſt ſin, and unto duty makes due proviſion for his own glory; and juſt difference between obedience and diſobedience: ſo, as the diſobedient have always cauſe of repentance and fear; the obedient of encouragement: their obedience being rewarded according to the Promiſe annexed to the Precept.

So far as the Elect yeild obedience to the Rule, they are ordered according to the Decree and the Rule wherin the Elect and Reprobate tranſgreſs the Rule, even in thoſe violations thereof, they are contained in reſpective, and juſt ſubjection thereunto: and fulfil the Decree.

The reaſonable creatures obeying, is ordered and governed according to the Decree, and the Rule: The reaſonable creature diſobeying, is ordered, and governed according to the Decree.

The Effectual Concurſe of the firſt Cauſe with the ſecond,What the Concurſe of the firſt cauſe with the ſecond is ?is an external tranſient influence of God, upon the creature in time, exactly anſwering to the Decree of God p. 106before time: moving upon, co-working with, and aſſiſting of the ſecond cauſe to its operations. It is the clearer underſtood by conſidering on Gods part the Decree, which is an immanent and eternal act abiding in God; and his efficiency, which is an external and paſſing act put forth upon the creature in time.

For the better underſtanding of the Concurſe, Co-operation, and Co-working of the firſt cauſe, ſo far as it concerneth man (which alſo is reſpectively applicable to other Subjects) there are conſiderable two acts in reſpect of God, viz. an immanent and tranſient act: and two acts in reſpect of the ſoul; viz. a firſt, and a ſecond act. The immanent, and as it were indwelling Act in God, is his Decree: eternal, increated, and before time. The tranſient Act of Gods Efficiency, is a created, external, paſſing Act of the Spirit of God upon the ſoul in time touching man. The firſt act, is an active Principle, or inherent Habit in the ſoul. The operation is the ſecond act, proceeding from that Habit.

The Concurſe of the firſt cauſe, is unto the active principle in the ſecond cauſe; as the firſt mover is unto the inferiour Orbes: as an impulſe, thruſt, or put on, is unto a round body, of it ſelf propenſe to rowl: as the Nurſes lifting the child up the ſtairs, is unto the child inclined to go up; or as the leading power, put forth of him that goeth before, is to him that is inclined to follow after: as the Midwife is unto the deliverance of her that is in travail;The Neceſſithereof in reſpect of the ſecond cauſe. Vide Epiſt. ad Cteſiphontem adverſ. Pelagium. Item Dialog. adv. pelag. librum primum. Hiero, Epiſt. To. 2. as the wind is unto a veſſel under ſail, and ready upon the motion of the ſtream to lanch forth: as light is to an open eye, yet in the dark.

The Neceſſity of the concurrence of the firſt cauſe with the ſecond in the operations thereof, appears thus.

All creatures depend upon God in reſpect of their Being, Conſervation, and Operation: For in him we live, and move, and have our being, Acts 17.28. We have our being, there is our dependance in reſpect of our Creation; we live, there is our dependance in reſpect of our Conſervation; we move, there is our dependance in reſpect of our Operation. Creatures p. 107depend no leſs upon God in reſpect of operations, then in reſpect of their beings; becauſe the operations of things in both inſtants, viz. both of being and of operation, are equally beings of participation.

2. From the perfection of the firſt Cauſe; ſuch is the nature of the firſt Cauſe being God, and the nature of the ſecond cauſe being a creature, as that thence neceſſarily followeth the amplitude of Perfection in the firſt Cauſe, and a univerſal and ſubordinate dependance in the ſecond cauſe in reſpect of its efficiency. In this regard Plato called the ſecond cauſes the inſtruments of the firſt Cauſe; which though in ſome reſpect it holdeth not,Rhetorf. Ex. 3. c. 2. de effi. grat.Exod 3 becauſe inſtruments (properly ſo called) have no proper efficiency; yet ſo far it is a truth, as that every creature univerſally dependeth more upon God, then any creature upon its fellow-creature.

3. It implyeth a contradiction,Omnia pendent a Deo eſſentialiter immediatè intrinſicè, abſolutè, aeque ac aequalitèr. that the creature ſhould be able to act without dependancy upon the Creator. 1. Becauſe the agent being a creature is depending, therefore its power to act is depending; the power of acting holds proportion with the agent. 2. Becauſe the action proceeding from this agent, is a being by participation: it is impoſſible for the creature to have other then a depending being.

4. As the conſerving influence of God is unto the conſervation of the creature, ſo is the aſſiſting influence of God unto the operation of the creature: If God doth but meerly ceaſe his conſerving influence, the creature ceaſeth to be; if God ceaſeth his aſſiſting influence, the creature ceaſeth to act. The inſenſible ceſſation of the influence of the firſt Cauſe, without any further violence, or hurt done, puts a period to the being, or ſtoppeth the operation of the ſecond cauſe, reſpectively.

In the Concurſe of the firſt Cauſe,Of the manner of the concurrence of the firſt Cauſe with the ſecond. 1. Foregoing. the influence or concurence thereof, 1. Foregoeth the operation of the ſecond cauſe in order, though it be together with it in time.

The concurring influence of the Creator, is the action of the firſt Cauſe; the operation of the creature following thereupon, is the action of the ſecond cauſe, and an effect of that concurring influence. Now ſuch an operation of the ſecond p. 108cauſe muſt needs follow the concurrence of the firſt; becauſe of the order of Cauſes, the firſt is before the ſecond: Of the dignity of the firſt Cauſe, the firſt is more worthy then the ſecond: Of the dependance of the ſecond cauſe, the ſecond cauſe depends on the firſt: Of the eſſential ſubordination of the ſecond Cauſe, that which is eſſentially, i. e. by abſolute neceſſity of Nature, ſubordained, is conſequent to that whereto it is ſubordained: And laſtly, it is manifeſt in the operation of the creature as an effect thereof; the concurring influence of the Creator is the firſt Cauſe, the effect is after the cauſe.

2.2. Co-working. It is by way of Co-operation, or co-working with the ſecond cauſe in this co-operation: Concurſe (as was now intimated) is the action of the firſt Cauſe; the operation is the action of the ſecond cauſe; from both conjoyned proceedeth the effect. Though the effect wrought by means of the operation of the ſecond cauſe, and the operation by means whereof the effect is wrought, are both the effects of the firſt Cauſe: yet in the producing of ſuch effects, as are wrought by means of the creature; as the ſecond cauſe cannot produce ſuch an effect without the firſt Cauſe, ſo the firſt Cauſe will not produce ſuch effects-without the ſecond cauſe; the conjunction of the operation of the firſt Cauſe with the ſecond, in bringing forth ſuch effects, is the co-operation here ſpoken of.

In this Co-operation of the firſt Cauſe with the ſecond, neceſſary it is that the co-operation of the ſecond cauſe with the firſt (which neceſſarily followeth thereupon) is abſolutely ſubordinate, not co-ordinate with the firſt Cauſe.

A co-ordinate Cauſe worketh of it ſelf, not depending upon its co-working cauſe, or cauſes. A ſubordinate cauſe is that which dependeth upon its ſuperior Cauſe in reſpect of its working, as the Officer upon the Magiſtrate.

An abſolute ſubordinate Cauſe, is that which dependeth abſolutely upon its ſuperior Cauſe, in reſpect of its working: ſo all ſecond cauſes depend upon the firſt Cauſe.

The concurrence of the firſt Cauſe with the ſecond,3. Immediate is immediate, both in reſpect of the immediation of its virtue, p. 109and the immediation of his preſence.

When we ſay the firſt Cauſe concurreth immediately with the ſecond, the meaning is, that in the co-operation thereof, it ſo works with and upon the ſecond cauſe, as it intimately reacheth it; and ſo, as nothing is interpoſed: as it is with two things that touch one another, between which there is nothing.

Immediateneſs of preſence is, when things ſo act one upon another, as that the beings, or ſubſtances of the things, are preſent with one another, and touch one the other: So fire burning the ſtubble doth immediately touch it, not only with the immediation of its virtue, but alſo with the immediation of its preſent ſubſtance.

Immediateneſs of virtue, is, when notwithſtanding the things that act one upon another, touch not one another in reſpect of their beings; yet the virtue of the one reacheth, and as it were toucheth the other, (otherwiſe there could be no working of one thing upon another, all acting being by contact, i. e. mutual touching either really and virtually, or virtually, though not really:) So, the fire that warmeth, though it reacheth not him that ſitteth by it with its ſubſtance (for then it would burn him,Deus agit indiſtanter. Deus corporeus non eſt, ſed incorporeus. Et ubi que diffuſus omnia penetrans & ad omnē effectum, non mod, immediatione virtutis, ſed & immediati ne ſuppoſiti pertingens. Twi. Cr. 3. l. 2.) yet it reacheth him with its virtue, otherwiſe it could not warm him.

Now, though it be many times a truth concerning the working of ſecond cauſes one upon another, that they work immediately in reſpect of their virtue, but not in reſpect of the preſence of their beings themſelves; as appeared but now from the inſtance of fire, and may further be ſeen in the example of the Sun, which whileſt experience witneſſeth to warm and heat us upon Earth with the preſence of its virtue, yet Senſe and Reaſon ſhews to be far abſent in reſpect of its body, being in the Heavens: Yet ſuch is the nature of the firſt Cauſe, as that whereſoever it worketh it worketh immediately, both with the immediation of his virtue, without which there could be no effect; and with the immediation of his preſence, becauſe he is in every place.

Although the firſt Cauſe worketh immediately in reſpect of the immediation of its being and virtue; yet in reſpect of p. 110thoſe things, which it acts by means of ſecond cauſes, whether by the mediation of the beings themſelves,Ames Med. lib. 1. cap. 9. or of their virtues, into which things the ſecond agents do ſend their influence by virtue of their proper forms; I ſay, in reſpect of ſuch things it worketh mediately: whence the firſt Cauſe is ſaid to be a mediate cauſe in reſpect of the order of the ſecond cauſes.Ʋna eſtactio I ei & creaturae reſpectu operis, ſed non reſpectu modi agendi. 4. Determining. For though (as the beings, ſo) the operations of the ſecond cauſes, are from the firſt Cauſe efficiently; yet they are from their next cauſes formally. God cauſeth the burning of the fire, yet we do not ſay God burneth, but the fire burneth. God worketh repentance in the Soul, yet it is not a truth to ſay God repenteth, but man repenteth; God is the next efficient Cauſe, but not the next formal Cauſe.

4. The firſt Cauſe ſo concurreth, as it determineth the ſecond cauſe in its operation. This is readily granted in natural agents, in free-rational agents it is proved thus. If the futurition of the operation of the ſecond cauſe is determined by the Decree of God, then the operation it ſelf is determined by the Efficiency of God. 1. Becauſe the Efficiency is adequate to the Decree. 2. Becauſe there can be but one abſolute Determiner. 3. If the operation of the ſecond cauſe were not abſolutely determined by the Decree, God might ſuffer diſappointment in reſpect of the Decree.

Either the Will is determined by God in its operation, or elſe it would follow, either that there were not an eſſential ſubordination of the ſecond cauſe unto the firſt, that is, of man to God, which were repugnant to the nature of the ſecond cauſe (it being imperfect and dependent;) or that the firſt Cauſe were ſubordinate to the ſecond, which were repugnant to the nature of the firſt Cauſe, being perfect and univerſal.

If as often as the Will doth not will, it therefore doth not will, becauſe God hath not determined that it ſhould will: then as often as it willeth any thing, it therefore willeth, becauſe God hath determined that it ſhould will. But as often as the Will doth not will, it therefore doth not will, becauſe God hath not determined that it ſhould will. Therefore the Minor appeareth in two particulars.

p. 1111. As often as the Will doth not will, God hath not determined it to will.

2. The Non-determination, or Suſpenſion of the Determination of God, is the Antecedanious Cauſe in reſpect of God: this cauſe cannot be poſitive. A poſitive cauſe cannot be terminated in a Non-ens, ſuch as mans Non-volition; i. e. Not-willing is, it muſt therefore be ſuſpenſive. The meer Suſpenſion, or withholding of the Influence of God, without any poſitive action ſufficeth to the annihilation of the creature; that is,Twiſſ. lib. 2. crim. 3. therefore the Suſpenſion of the Determination of God, ſufficeth to the preventing of that operation of the creature, which yet is not.

Obj. 1. If All-efficiency be from the firſt cauſe,Againſt the All-Efficiency of God. then the ſecond cauſe hath no efficiency, it doth nothing, neither good, nor evil: man neither ſinneth, nor obeyeth; no difference between good and evil; the high way to confuſion: Thus the Libertines.

Anſ. Cauſes are either co-ordinate; namely, ſuch as in reſpect of their Efficiency depend not upon their co-working cauſe; or ſubordinate, namely, ſuch as in reſpect of their efficiency depend upon their co-working cauſe. In co-ordinate cauſes the Argument holds: but ſecond cauſes in reſpect of the firſt being ſubordinate: and therefore, as in their being, ſo alſo in their working, depending upon the firſt cauſe; the Argument is of no force.

To deny the Efficiency of the ſecond cauſe,Tho. Part. 1. q. 105. art. 5. Calvin. contra libert. c. 13, 14, 15, 16 Suarez. Metaph. Tem. 1. diſp. 17. S. 1. is to deny that which experience proclaimeth: namely, That the Sun ſhineth, or the fire burneth. The denyal of the proper, and formal efficiency or working of the ſecond cauſe, is repugnant to the whole Order of Nature. Things that have not life, it depriveth of their firſt qualities, which are nothing elſe but active principles; as power to heat in the fire, power to cool in the water. It diſinables us from collecting effects from ſecond cauſes, or ſecond cauſes from effects; becauſe it denyeth all ſuch cauſes and effects. It makes void all thoſe diſpoſitions in ſeveral creatures that tend to action. Vain is the diſpoſition in fire to aſcend, or in the earth to deſcend, if there be no motion of aſcent nor deſcent by them. p. 112It takes away all perfection from thoſe creatures (as alſo from all other) which conſiſts in action.

Laſtly, If action be only the firſt cauſe in the preſence of ſuch a creature, and not by the ſecond cauſe, we can no better conclude that the fire is hot from its burning, nor that the water is cold from its coolneſs, then we can conclude that the fire is cold, or that the water is hot, from ſuch operations of heat and cold. The reaſon is, the firſt cauſe can as well make hot in the preſence of water, or make cold in the preſence of fire, as the contrary.

It takes away all difference between things that have life, and things that have no life; that which takes away action, takes away life. Take away action from the ſecond cauſe, and you take away the vegetative ſoul, and its operations from living creatures. You take away the ſenſitive ſoul, and its operations from the ſenſitive creature. The reaſonable ſoul, and its operations from the reaſonable creature. There is no difference to be found between reaſonable creatures, and ſenſible creatures: between reaſonable, ſenſible, and thoſe creatures which are vegetative, only having life: Between reaſonable, ſenſible, and vegetative, and thoſe that are lifeleſs, in reſpect of their formal, and moſt noble difference, which is a principle of action, with the operations thereupon enſuing. There remains indeed a difference between them, in reſpect of their outward ſhape, but not in regard of the reſpect fore-mentioned.

It takes away the diſtinction between good and evil actions, for that which denyeth actions ſimply, denyeth all kind of actions whether good or evil; therefore, man in all his ways dothneither good, nor evil: He doth no good, therefore there is no Heaven, becauſe of a double incapacity.

Firſt, In reſpect of Nature; he that neither underſtandeth, willeth, remembreth, or is affected (all thoſe are action) is uncapable of bleſſedneſs: bleſſedneſs conſiſting in the viſion, and fruition of the chief good.

Secondly, In reſpect of the way to Heaven; namely, obedience, which man not being a ſubject of action, is uncapable of: without action there cannot be obedience; and p. 113as he doth no good, ſo neither doth he any evil, therefore ſinneth not: therefore, there ought to be no conſcience of ſin, nor puniſhment for ſin. The Sum is, from hence it followeth, That man may do what he liſts, he neither ſinneth, nor obeyeth: There is neither Heaven nor Hell, without the actions of man, there could be no obedience of man; if there could not be the obedience of man, there could not be the obedience of Chriſt, who is God-man: if there could be no obedience of Chriſt, Chriſt could be no Saviour: nay, if there were no actions of man, (the very reaſonable ſoul by juſt conſequence ſuppoſing action) it would infer, that there were no man, and conſequently no Chriſt, Chriſt being both God and man.

See then, and be aſtoniſhed at that heap of tranſgreſſion and confuſion in this opinion, that denyeth the Efficiency of the ſecond cauſe: It is againſt all experience, againſt the whole order of the creature; it takes away the vegetative, ſenſible, and rational ſouls, with all other operations; it takes away all difference between creatures in thoſe reſpects: it alloweth man and devils to do what they will: it denyeth that there is either obedience, or ſin; Heaven or hell:Sic ita que adminiſtrat omni … quae creavit, ut etiam ipſa proprios exercere, & agere actus ſinat. Aug. de Civit. Dei. cap. 30. Ʋna eſt actio Dei, & creaturaereſpeclu operis non a… tem modi agendi. Alſted. Tom. 3. Metaph. Pars 1. cap. 16. or that Chriſt is a Saviour: yea, upon point it denyeth that there is either man, or Angel, yea, or Chriſt himſelf.

Confuſion be upon that Tenet, that brings all unto ſuch confuſion. What more frequent in the Scripture then to aſcribe Efficiency unto ſecond cauſes? For we are Labourers together with God, 1 Cor. 3.9. So doth God adminiſter all things which he hath created, as that he alſo ſuffers them to exerciſe and act their proper Motions.

Obj. 2. Some operations of the ſecond cauſe cannot be aſcribed unto God: as faith, repentance, we neither do, nor may ſay, God believeth, or repenteth; but man belieheth, man repenteth: Therefore God doth not work all things.

Anſ. Actions are done either efficiently, or formally: The Work of repentance is wrought by God efficiently, 2 Tim. 2.25. by man formally. 'Tis God that worketh repentance, not man; 'tis man that repents, not God: the p. 114very formal efficiency of the ſecond cauſe in man, is the effect of the firſt cauſe. The formal efficiency of the ſecond cauſe being the effect of, and in all reſpects eſſentially depending upon the firſt cauſe, is ſo far from denying of, or detracting from the All-efficiency of the firſt cauſe, as that it much commends and ſets it forth.

The reaſon why works wrought by God efficiently, are yet aſcribed unto man; are, firſt, becauſe man (God not for want of power, but out of abundance of goodneſs being ſo far pleaſed to make uſe of him) co-worketh with God therein. Secondly, Becauſe man is the next formal, efficient cauſe; viz. in reſpect of the order of the aſcent, and deſcent of the cauſes. Thirdly, Becauſe many operations of the ſecond cauſe note imperfection, as faith, repentance, &c.

Obj. 3. If the ſecond cauſe be determined unto its operations by the concurſe of the firſt cauſe, then the ſecond cauſe is not free.

Anſ. 1. The Will cannot be compelled: to ſay, That which is done willingly, is done conſtrainedly, is to affirm a contradiction; namely, that which is willing, is unwilling.

God can determine the Will,Sic ita que adminiſtrat omnia quae creavit, ut etiam ipſa proprios exercere, & agere Motus ſinat, quamvis enim nihil eſſe poſſit ſine ipſo, non tamen ſunt ulla, quod ipſe. Aug. de Civit. Dei. lib. 7. cap. 30. Pertingit autem a fine uno ad alterum fortitèr, & diſponit omnia utilitèr, vel ſuavitèr. Sap. 8.1. and not prejudice the Nature of the Will, becauſe he is an infinite Cauſe.

God determineth the Will ſutably and agreeably to its own Nature; i. e. freely. He ſo determineth the Will, as the Will determineth it ſelf. God ſo determineth the Will, as a firſt free Agent, as that the Will determineth it ſelf, as a ſecond free Agent. The Efficiency of God offereth no violence, nor changeth the nature of things, but governeth them according to their own natures; it reacheth from one end to another mightily, and ſweetly ordereth all things.

The external, tranſient, efficacious Motion of God upon p. 115the Will, determineth the will with a real determination: the Will ſo moved, moveth it ſelf with a real, and formal determination.

The Will in the ſence of Compoſition (that is,Voluntas codem inſtanti quo agit habuit potentiā actum ſuum ſuſpendendi in ſenſu diviſo. Twiſſ. de permiſſ. lib. 2. crim. 3. conſidered as ſubordinate to the Decree and Efficiency of God) cannot but act in the inſtant of the determining Motion. The Will conſidered in the ſence of diviſion, (that is, as in it ſelf, without its ſubordination to the Decree, and Efficiency of God) may act, or not act, in the inſtant of the determining Motion.

The Will placed under this determining Motion of God, inclineth it ſelf freely to the Act, and to that only: whereunto it would have inclined it ſelf, if (upon a ſuppoſition of impoſſibility) there were no Decree, nor phyſical, or hyperphyſical Determination thereof by God.Deus ita utitur voluntate, ut ipſa voluntas ſeſe electivè vitalitèr, & expractico rationis judicio agat. Rhetorf. de gratia excercit. 3. cap. 3. Againſt the All-governing Providence of God.

If the Decree of God hindered not the liberty of the ſecond cauſe, (as we ſaw before) then the Efficiency of God hindereth not the Liberty of the ſecond cauſe: Gods Efficiency being nothing elſe but the Execution of the Decree. If the Decree of God be ſo far from being a hinderance unto liberty, as that liberty cannot be without it; nay, is the effect thereof, as its firſt cauſe: then the Efficiency of God (being but the Execution of the Decree) will alſo be found to be ſo far from being a prejudice unto liberty, as that liberty cannot be without it; nay, is the effect thereof as its next cauſe.

Obj. The Diſorder of the ſecond cauſe, is often ſuch as ſeemeth not to conſiſt with the All-governing Providence of God. Divine Government would not order things ſo diſorderly.

Anſ. Order is two-fold: either the Order of the Decree, or the Order of the Command; the whole creature both reaſonable and unreaſonable, is conſtantly and exactly governed according to the Order of the Decree, in the beſt way to the beſt end; viz. the Glory of the Creatour. This Order can no more be violated, then God can be diſappointed of his Will. Man, even in violating Gods Command, fulfilleth Gods Decree. The Order of the Command, is p. 116either the Law of Nature, the Rule of the unreaſonable creature: whoſe Government according thereunto, ſee in this Chapter a little after the beginning. Or the Moral Law, the Rule of the reaſonable creature: whoſe ſubjection thereunto, is the greateſt difficulty: Touching which, together with what the Reader may be pleaſed to recall, of that which hath been ſpoken to this purpoſe, immediately after the place fore-mentioned; it may ſuffice, at preſent to anſwer this Objection (which Anſwer is yet eaſily and readily upon occaſion applicable unto the Angels,) ſo far only as it concerneth the Government of ungoverned man.

The containing of man in ſubjection to the Rule, is Government.

The ſubjection of man to the Rule, is either obediential, i. e. active-obediential; or obligatory and penal: Obediential (in this ſence) conſiſts in our yeilding obedience unto the Command: Obligatory, conſiſts either in our bonds of duty, or guilt, whereby we ſtand bound over unto puniſhment in caſe of breach. Penal conſiſts in our ſuffering of the puniſhment denounced in the Curſe, for our diſobedience unto the Command.

As the obediential ſubjection of the Saints, ſatisfactory in their ſurety, and gratulatory in their own perſons (together with their caſtigative and obligatory obedience, reſpectively) demonſtrates Gods government of his Saints, on the one hand: ſo doth the obligatory and penal ſubjection of the Reprobate, demonſtrate Gods government of the wicked on the other hand; and of both, according to his Word.

Gods containing of the Saints in an obediential ſubjection to the Law, ſheweth his Government of them: Gods containing the wicked in obligatory and penal ſubjection to the Law, ſo as he reſerveth them all in the bond of duty, and priſon of guilt, unto the time of Judgment, then to ſuffer the puniſhment held forth in the Curſe, proportionable to their diſobedience unto the Rule, ſheweth his Government of them: Both ſhew his Government of all. More particularly.

The principal Objections againſt the divine Government p. 117of all things, taken from the pretended diſorder of the ſecond Cauſes, are either ſuch as ſtrike at the Wiſdom, or ſuch as ſtrike at the Juſtice of the Governor.

Touching that Objection taken from the ſeeming diſorder of the ſecond cauſes, as ſtriking at the Wiſdom of God.

We are to know, that Wiſdom is the diſcerning the right way unto the beſt End. Now that the way of God (conſiſting of Creation and Providence) is the beſt way to the beſt End, is clear, firſt, From the natural Juſtice of God; whereby, giving unto himſelf that which is his, it is neceſſary that he doth all his work as becometh ſuch an Agent; that is, by ſuch means, and in ſuch order, as is moſt ſuitable unto their End. Secondly, From the end of all things, and all events: The end of all things is either ſubordinate, viz. the good of the creature, looked at in it ſelf. Or ſupream, viz. the manifeſtation of the glory of the Creatour.

God ordereth things in ſuch a way, as though it ſerveth not moſt to the good of the creature conſidered in it ſelf, (though it be alſo a truth concerning the Elect, that their happineſs is included therein:) yet ſuch as ſerveth moſt unto their chief good, and laſt end: namely, the Manifeſtation of his own Glory.

We muſt diſtinguiſh between the Order of the Decree, and the Order of the Command: Diſorder in reſpect of the Command, is Order in reſpect of the Decree: Thus both order and diſorder in reſpect of the Command, are order in reſpect of the Decree. The Wiſdom of the firſt cauſe ſhineth in the folly of the ſecond cauſe. The Order of the Creatour diſpoſeth of, and runneth through the confuſion of the creature. The face of Providence is oftentimes like unto ſome picture, which if you look upon it on the one ſide caſteth a deformed ſhape: but if you behold it on the other ſide, it preſenteth you with a moſt grateful aſpect. Faith ſeeth beauty, where reaſon ſeeth only confuſion. What ſight more horrid then the ſufferings of Chriſt, if looked upon in the wiſdom of man? few more glorious, if beheld in the Wiſdom of God. He hath made every thing beautiful in its time, Eccleſ. 3.11. See more in the ſeventh Conſection p. 118of the Doctrine of the Decree, Chapter 4.

Man was not of the Counſel of God,foreign. at the making of the Decree: Who hath been his Counſeller? Rom. 11.34. Neither can man in this life trace God in innumerable ſteps of his Execution thereof; His ways are paſt finding out, ver. 33. The Path of a ſhip upon the Sea, after a ſmall ſpace of time, is not to be trackt by him that followeth it. The way of Providence is a deeper Sea; it is as high as Heaven, what canſt thou do? deeper then Hell, what canſt thou know? The meaſure thereof is larger then the Earth, and broader then the Sea, Job 11.8, 9. Then I beheld all the works of God, that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the Sun: becauſe though a man labour to ſeek it out, yea further, though a wiſe man think to know it, yet ſhall he not be able to find it, Eccleſ. 8.17.

Touching thoſe Objections that ſtrike at the Juſtice of the Governour, they are fetched from,

1. The Permiſſion of ſin: as ſuppoſe the ſin of Adam, or of any other hainous tranſgreſſions amongſt the Sons of men. Carnal reaſon ſeeing wickedneſs in the place of judgment, and iniquity in the place of righteouſneſs, thence inferreth that man hath no preheminence above a beaſt: God regardeth the death of the one, no more then of the other; that is, in way of Government, he regardeth neither, Eccleſs. 3.16, 18.

2. From the deferring of the puniſhment of man for ſin: which the wicked abuſe, as an argument that God taketh no judicial notice of their ſin. They ſlay the widow, and the ſtranger, and murther the fatherleſs; yet (the God to whom vengeance belongeth, not ſhewing himſelf) they ſay, The Lord ſhall not ſee it, neither doth the God of Jacob regard it, Pſal. 94.6.1.7.

3. From things falling out alike to thoſe who are alike: Eccleſ. 8.4. and 9.2. Hence carnal reaſon, ſuppoſing a man loſeth nothing by ungodlineſs, nor gets any thing by godlineſs: concludes all events are caſual; and that the only Compendium of relief unto man, againſt the temptation of ſo unequal adminiſtration of things, is, not to care for any p. 119thing, but to eat, drink, and to be merry, Eccleſiaſt. 8.15. and 9.3.

4. From the Adverſity of the godly: there is a righteous man that periſheth in his righteouſneſs; this was Aſaps temptation, Pſal. 73. If he were (according as ſome think) the Authour thereof, Verily I have cleanſed my heart in vain, &c. ver. 13, 14. Hereupon Job himſelf was overmuch diſquieted, Job 23.3, 4, 5. his friends concluded him an hypocrite. The Diſciples began to doubt, whether Chriſt were the very Chriſt, Luke 24.21.

5. The Proſperity of the wicked:Exigit Cato ut ipſi Deus rationem reddat cur Pompeium Caeſar vicerit, nam victrix cauſa … iis placuit, ſed victa Catoni. Mernae de verit. relig. cap. 12. which conſideration hath from time to time troubled the godly, Job 12.17.14. Pſal. 37.1. Pſal. 73.2.3. Jer. 12.1. Cato is unſatisfied until God give him a reaſon why Caeſar prevails againſt Pompey.

6. Things not falling out alike in this life in matter of ſuffering, with them who are alike in tranſgreſſion.

To theſe ſix Heads may be referred the chief Objections, ſtriking at the Juſtice of divine Government: the Anſwers whereunto take in order thus.

1. The Permiſſion of ſin for a much better good, then ſin is an evil (of which in the Doctrine of the Decree, Chap. 4.) is no way repugnant unto the Juſtice of God, held forth in the Law; whereby God hath not bound himſelf from the permiſſion of ſin. The puniſhment of tranſgreſſion contained in the curſe (in caſe of the commiſſion of ſin) is ſo far from oppoſing, as it rather ſuppoſeth the permiſſion thereof.

2. As God hath not bound himſelf by the Law from the permiſſion of ſin, ſo neither hath he bound himſelf to the puniſhing of it immediately upon the commiſſion thereof. The ſet ſeaſon for the full puniſhment of the ſins of the Reprobate, is not before the time of death, and the Day of judgement, till then God hath left himſelf arbitrary, and is various in his Diſpenſations; no man taxeth the Judge, becauſe the offender remaineth unpuniſhed, until the Aſſizes.

3. It is a truth that all things come alike to all; and that p. 120there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked; yet we are to conſider,

1. Though it be ſo oftentimes, yet it is not ſo always.

2. Though their outward condition at times is alike, yet their inward condition at ſuch times is not alike.

3. The principal difference which God makes between the good and the bad, the clean, and the unclean: between him that ſacrificeth, and him that ſacrificeth not: in this life, is, in things which are ſpiritual, and for ever: and not in reſpect of things that are outward, and but for a time.

4. Notwithſtanding Gods Diſpenſations unto the Sons of men, are various, and myſterious; many times paſt our finding out: yet in the end, the righteouſneſs of his Government ſhall be manifeſt. None ſhall be found loſers by godlineſs, none gainers by ungodlineſs: Sin ſhall appear to be the only evil, piety the only good: Every one ſhall receive according to their deeds.

4. Concerning the Adverſity of the godly: Here would be no place for ſo much ſin, as to queſtion Gods Juſtice; did we not forget, that his Saints in this life are ſinners; the beſt of them that ſuffer moſt, ſuffer leſs then they deſerve: Thou our God haſt puniſhed us, leſs then our iniquities deſerve, Ezra 9.13.

5. Though the ſins of the Saints deſerve why God may deny unto them temporal mercies; and why he may inflict upon them temporal croſſes; yet the ſins of the ungodly do not deſerve that God muſt deny unto them temporal mercies; or that he muſt inflict upon them ſuch temporal croſſes. The Juſtice of God in the Law, puniſhing the ſins of the Reprobate in their meaſure, and ſeaſon, for ever: reſtraineth not God from ſhewing common mercies unto them, according as he pleaſeth for a time. Adde hereunto, that their bleſſings are curſed.

6. That the various diſpenſation in ordering events, not falling out alike in point of affliction, with them who are alike in tranſgreſſion: is no way prejudicial to the Juſtice of God, may appear, 1. By conſidering the condition of p. 121men in general. 2. By comparing the ſeveral conditions of men one with another. If you look upon the condions of men in general; then, as notwithſtanding ſuch are the ſins of the Saints, as that they deſerve, (which alſo God may do in a way of trial of his ſervants, or for teſtimony to his truth, or upon the point of his meer Soveraignty) why God might viſit them with continuing temporal chaſtiſement: yet ſuch is the grace of God in Chriſt, whence he may not only ſpare them, but alſo confer ſpecial favour upon them: ſo notwithſtanding the ſins of the wicked are ſuch, why God might; yet doth not Juſtice require that God muſt always afflict them with temporal ſorrows: or that he may not at times, ſhine upon them with temporal bleſſings.

The ſame is further to be ſeen, by laying the ſeveral conditions of men one unto another.

1. If we compare wicked men with wicked men, their puniſhments are corporal, or ſpiritual; theſe temporal, or eternal: If God puniſheth not in the one, he neither doth, or will puniſh in the other, firſt, or laſt; more, or leſs, here, or hereafter, ſo, as in concluſion, each impenitent one ſhall ſuffer according to their deſerts, none more, none leſs.

2. If we compare the Saints with the Saints; their chaſtiſements are various, both inward, and outward: that which they ſuffer not one way, who can ſay they ſuffer not another? The concluſion alſo with them all will prove all ſin to end in loſs and grief; and all obedience to end in endleſs gain and joy. Their repentance ſhall hold proportion with their offence, and glory ſhall be anſwerable unto grace.

3. If we compare the wicked with the godly, (always remembring that the ſins of the wicked are fully puniſhed in Hell: the ſins of the Elect already puniſhed in their Surety, and in due time chaſtiſed in their own perſons) we are further to conſider, that the great difference between the godly, and ungodly, is not in things viſible, or pertaining to this life: but in their ſtate reſpectively after this life. The chaſtiſements of the Saints do not exceed, but are far p. 122ſhort of their deſerts: the puniſhment of the wicked ſhall be according to their deſerts. 'Tis not againſt juſtice, that the Saints ſuffer chaſtiſement, before the wicked ſuffer puniſhment: It is of mercy, that they ſo ſuffer chaſtiſement, as that they may not ſuffer puniſhment with the World, 1 Cor. 11.32.

Gods judicial acts of Providence are oftentimes ſuch in this life, whence he convinceth the beholders, that he governeth amongſt the moſt ungoverned of the ſons of men: ſo that a man ſhall ſay, Verily there is a reward for the righteous, verily he is a God that judgeth in the Earth, Pſal. 58.11.

Not mans reaſon, but Gods Word, is the Interpreter of Gods Works: Whence, in the Pſalmiſts temptation, we might attain the Pſalmiſts ſatisfaction, did we ſeek it with the like ſpirit: When I ſought to know this, it was too painful for me, till I entered into the ſanctuary of the L rd, Pſal. 73.16, 17.

If yet we cannot ſee that God governeth according to his Law, nor how his Word and Works of Providence do agree, the error is in our Judgment, not in his Government.

We know that God is juſt in all his ways, though the reaſon of the Juſtice of ſome of his ways, we know not. That Gods Word and his Works agree, is manifeſt unto us; though how they agree, is ſometimes hidden from us.

The ſeeming defects of Beauty, or Juſtice, in the Works of God, proceed from the error of our underſtanding, not from any want in Providence: The offence that man takes at the Providence of God, is taken, not given.

A preſervative againſt temptations, ariſing from difficulties concerning the Juſtice of the Government of God, is to captive Reaſon unto Faith; and to hold theſe three Concluſions firm, though we ſee not the reaſon of the premiſſes. 1. That God is righteous: Righteous art thou O Lord when I plead with thee, yet let me talk with thee of thy Judgments, Jer. 12.1. 2. That godlineſs doth us good, and no hurt: Truly God is good to Iſrael, even to ſuch as are of a clean heart, Pſal. 73.1. 3. That ſin doth us hurt, and no good: Though a ſinner doth evil an hundred times, and his days be prolonged; yet ſurely I know that it ſhall be with well them that fear God, which fear before p. 123him: But it ſhall not be well with the wicked, neither ſhall he prolong his days, which are as a ſhadow, becauſe he feareth not before God, Eccleſ. 8.12, 13.

Obj. Some things in Scripture are aſcribed unto Chance, Eccleſ. 9.11. Luke 10.31. therefore all things are not ordered by God.

Anſ. Chance is taken for an Event,Túxn non legitur in N. T. Fortuna gentilium eſt blaſphemia, quam Diabolus expuit in divinā providentiā, unde bea: ū Auguſtinū paenituit ſe toties impiâ hac voce uſum fuiſſe. ſuppoſed to fall out by a meer contingent efficiency, or caſual working of the ſecond cauſe; beſides the intent, and therefore without the Efficiency of the firſt Cauſe. Such Events the Heathens aſcribed unto Fortune; in this ſence there is no Chance. It is not unworthy our obſervation, that the word properly ſignifying Fortune, is not uſed in the New Teſtament.

Or elſe Chance is taken for ſuch an Event, good or bad, as falleth, or meeteth a man in his way, unlooked for, viz. unexpectedly in reſpect of men, but not unintendedly in reſpect of God. The word uſed Eccleſiaſt. 9. verſe 11. is tranſlated an occurrent, 1 Kings 5.4. a Metaphor taken from ſomething meeting of a man, or one meeting another upon the way, unexpectedly. So that Solomons ſcope in the place objected, is to ſhew that the event of humane affairs is not in the power of man, however furniſhed thereunto with ſecond helps; but depends upon the Decree and efficient Providence of God. This the Wiſe-man holdeth forth by an enumeration of ſome particulars, whence as by ſeveral inſtances God would teach this truth, by denying ſucceſs to ſuch perſons who according to ſecond cauſes might expect it, and giving it to them who according to ſecond cauſes could not expect it. I returned and ſaw under the Sun, that the race is not to the ſwift, nor the battel to the ſtrong, neither yet bread to the wiſe, nor yet riches to men of underſtanding, nor yet favor to men of skill, but time and chance happeneth to them all, Eccleſ. 9.11.

The word uſed Luke 10.31. and tranſlated [it chanced] is of the ſame ſignification with the Hebrew word uſed Eccl. 9.11. turned, Chance; and with that verſ. 2. turned, Event, foreign aeb Heb. foreign unde foreign Piſc. in loc.(from the root whereof the Greek word is by ſome thought to come:) it is taken for a good event, Ruth 2.3. for a bad event, 1 Sam. 6.9.

p. 124Thoſe things that fall out caſually, or neceſſarily, in regard of the ſecond cauſe, fall out alike infallibly, and therefore alike intendedly, in regard of Gods Decree.

Thoſe effects which proceed from ſecond neceſſary cauſes, as heat from fire, are ſaid to fall out neceſſarily: Thoſe effects which proceed from ſecond contingent cauſes, that is, ſuch whoſe effects in reſpect of their ſecond cauſe was likely not to be, as to be, as namely the elicit acts, i. e. the free choyce of the will, or the tyle falling from the houſe to alight upon the head of the paſſengers, are ſaid to fall out caſually.

Theſe modifications or qualifications of things, namely Neceſſity and Contingency, as they ſtand oppoſed one unto another, are only found in things in reſpect of the ſecond cauſes, not in reſpect of the firſt Cauſe.

Thoſe things which fall out moſt neceſſarily in regard of the ſecond cauſe, in reſpect of the firſt cauſe, they may be ſaid to fall out freely, rather then neceſſarily. In like manner, thoſe things which fall out contingently in regard of ſecond cauſes, upon ſuppoſition of the Decree ſo predetermining them, may be ſaid to fall out neceſſarily. No neceſſary act of the creature is neceſſary ſimply; an experiment whereof is the Babyloniſh furnace. Every contingent act of the creature is neceſſary upon the ſuppoſition of the Decree. The ſame effect is contingent and caſual in reſpect of the ſecond cauſe, and neceſſary in reſpect of the Decree. Contingent or caſual, becauſe in reſpect of the natural agency, or cauſality of the ſecond cauſe, it might not have been; but neceſſary in reſpect of the Decree, all whoſe volitions infer a neceſſity of infallibility.

The Doctrine of the Efficiency of God affords an Antidote or Preſervative againſt many peſtilent Errors concerning the Providence of GOD: The Ʋſe of this Doctrine.The chief whereof are;

1. Atheiſm, concluding from the ſeeming diſorder of ſecond cauſes, that there is no God.

2. Epicuriſm, concluding from the appearing confuſion of humane affairs, that God neither governs nor regards them; and thereupon looks at it as the only good to take its fill of pleaſure during life.

p. 1253. Stoiciſm, Non Deus eſt numen, parcarum carceclauſum. Q…ale putabat…r ſt…icus eſſe Deus.which maketh the firſt Cauſe to be depending upon, and determined by the ſecond cauſes, in reſpect of their operations.

4. Such who aſcribe the adminiſtration of things unto Fortune; that is, neither unto the irreſiſtable order of the ſecond cauſe, with the Stoicks; nor unto God, with the Truth: but unto that blind Idol, deviſed by the Heathen, and juſtly cenſured to be the ſpittle of the Devil upon the face of divine Providence.

5. Libertiniſm, denying the Efficiency of the ſecond cauſe, and thereby introducing that Chaos of confuſion, and tranſgreſſion,Bellar. de amiſſ. grat. & ſtat pec. lib. 2. cap. 18. Vaſquez. in 3. diſp. 14. cap. 8. ex Twiſſ. c…im. 3 Suarez. M… taph. diſp. 22. Sect. 2. of which before.

6. The Doctrine of the Jeſuites, who albeit they teach the concurrence of the firſt cauſe, to be neceſſary unto each operation of the ſecond cauſe: yet ſo, as it doth not determine, but is determined by the ſecond cauſe: thus Bellarmine. So as not fore-going, only accompanying of the ſecond cauſe: thus Vaſquez.

So as it co-operates with the ſecond cauſe, not after the manner of a principle, but after the manner of an action: thus Suarez.

It determineth the ſecond cauſe (ſay they) negatively,Hurtado. Phyſ. diſp. 10. Sect. 4. N. 53. not by way of influence: which myſtical ſence of the Jeſuſuits. Hurtado (himſelf alſo a Jeſuite) opens by a familiar compariſon, thus: As (ſaith he) in caſe you can write with two pens, and I holding one of them, hinder you writing with it, permitting you to write with the other: this permiſſion compelleth not you to write, you are free to both: but if you write, it muſt be with that pen which I leave, not with that which I hold in my hand.

7. The Doctrine of the Arminians, Profunda ſubtilitas Twiſſ. de praed. digr. 10. Sect. 6.who with the Jeſuites yeild a concurrence of the Spirit to be neceſſary unto each act of obedience: yet ſo, as they make it ſubſequent, not antecedent; following, not fore-going: lackquying, not leading of the operations of the Will. Whence according to them the beginning of every good work, or act of new-obedience, is from the creature.

As this Doctrine miniſtreth an Antidote againſt many p. 126pernicious errours; ſo is it alſo a principle, whence we may deduce many precious truths. Amongſt many take theſe.

God's Decree is the Rule of his Efficiency: Who worketh all things according to the Counſel of his own will, Epheſ. 2.11.

God's Efficiency is anſwerable unto his Decree.

The univerſal Efficiency of the firſt cauſe, and the ſubordinate Efficiency of the ſecond cauſe, conſiſt together: Workout your own ſalvation with fear and trembling: For it is God which worketh in you, to will, and to do, of his good pleaſure, Philip. 2.12, 13.

The ſecond cauſe acts, and doth its actions as properly, really, and formally: as if (upon a ſuppoſition, which yet is impoſſible) there were no firſt cauſe. The firſt cauſe acts, and doth all things as properly, and really, as if there were no ſecond cauſe.

Notwithſtanding the creature in regard of its formal free-efficiency, is ſomewhat diſtinguiſhed from a meer inſtrument: yet, even thoſe effects wherein God uſeth the ſecond cauſe, as a ſubordinate free-agent, depend upon, and are determined by the firſt cauſe; as much as where the ſecond cauſe is a meer paſſive inſtrument; becauſe the free-efficiency of the ſecond cauſe, is the effect of the firſt cauſe. And as much as thoſe effects, for the producing of which, a man makes uſe of a meer inſtrument; depend upon, and are determined by the man, who uſed that inſtrument. Becauſe an inſtrument being a creature, cannot depend upon its fellow-creature, ſo much as every creature depends upon its Creatour. And hence it is, that ſecond free-agents are ſometimes compared unto meer inſtruments.

Notwithſtanding ſin is wholly of man, and ſubordinate efficiency in ſinful actions, belongs formally unto the ſecond cauſe: yet the infallible futurition, and execution of all effects: the infallible futurition, and ordering the execution of all events; is as fully aſcribed unto God, as if man had no hand therein. So then it was not you that ſent me hither, but God, Gen. 45.8.

p. 127As it is a truth, that God is not the Authour of any evil, ſo it is a truth, that God is the Authour of all good. God is the Eternal, and only Independent, the creature is a time-dependent. He is the only all, we are of our ſelves nothing. The ſecond cauſe is in reſpect of its being,Nam ſi tu lumen facici averteris a me. Mox abeo in nihilum qui nihil antefui. Non ſecus ac vultu ſubſtracto aufertur imago. In ſpeculo, & corpus cum later, umbra perit. and continuance in its being, ſo alſo in reſpect of its operation, eſſentially dependeth upon the firſt cauſe. This is true in ſpiritual actions, John 15.5. For without me you can do nothing. In all actions, both Natural, Civil, Moral, and Holy: For in him we live, and move, and have our being, Acts 17.28. All diſorder in the ſecond cauſe, falleth under the order of the firſt cauſe: yea, the moſt ungoverned actions of the reaſonable creature, are governed by the Creatour; and that not only according to his Decree, but alſo according to his Law preſcribed to them; where the Goſpel hath not been heard. According to both Law and Goſpel, where the Goſpel hath been promulgated.

It is the duty of man to ſanctifie God, by acknowledging of, and acquieſcing in his Decree, and his All-glorious eſſicient execution thereof. By Creation and Providence, applying our ſelves to the care of our duty; and leaving unto him the care of the event, to be effected according to the All-predetermining Counſel of God. This is the ſubſtance of Heſters anſwer to Mordecai, Go, gather together all the Jews, that are preſent in Shuſhan, and faſt ye for me, and neither eat, nor drink three days, night nor day; I alſo and my Maydens will faſt likewiſe, and ſo will I go in unto the King, which is not according unto the Law: and if I periſh, I periſh, Heſt. 4.15, 16. See Gen. 43, 14. 2 Sam. 10.12. Acts 21.14. Prov. 29.26.

There is grace enough in the Promiſe,In hac fiducia recumbere, unicum eſt reelè agendì compendium. Calv. Epiſt. ante Pralect. in Daniel. to enable believers to run the race of Providence. Let us run with patience the race that is ſet before us, looking unto Jeſus the Authour and Finiſher of our faith, Heb. 12.2. There is alſo comfort enough in the Promiſe to ſupport believers ſo running concerning all events of Providence. And we know that all things work together for good unto them that love God, to them that are the called according to his purpoſe, Rom. 8.28. So much p. 128hath God revealed, as that he who believeth, and walketh according to the rule, needs not be afraid of his ſecret Will. Both the Decree, and the Execution thereof, (though yet unknown as touching infinite particulars) are for them not againſt them.

Unmortified diſcontent at the Providence of God, is an Argument of an ungodly man; the character and diſpoſition of a ſinner, Eccleſ. 2.26. Contentment therewith is the ſpecial gift of God unto his Saints: The character, and life of the life, of a godly man. As concerning all the infallible changes, that paſs upon us in their appointed time, according to Gods Eternal Decree: I know there is no good in them, but for a man to rejoyce and do good in his life, and alſo that every one ſhould eat and drink, and enjoy the good of his labour: this is the gift of God, Eccleſ. 3.11, 12. To ſpeak properly, no man is content with his eſtate, but a godly man: no godly man, but is content with his eſtate.