Reply to Rutherford, Treatise · Chapter 8
CHAP. VIII.
Whether Antioch, Act. 15. Had right to have ended the controverſie amongſt themſelves, if they had been able; and whether their ſending to Jeruſalem for helpe, or their knowledge that other Churches were troubled with the like evill, or the party among themſelves who were againſt the truth, doe prove the contrary. And of ſupremacy of power in Congregations.
BVt though our Author doe not cleere it to us where the ſupremacie doth lye yet in this pag 423, and 424. He uſeth an argument from the practiſe of the Church of Antioch, Act. 15. And our own Doctrine concerning the ſame to prove that it doth not lye in the Congregation, which argument we are willing to conſider. His words are thoſe. That ſupremacie of power ſhould bee in a Congregation without any power of appealing, I thinke our Brethren cannot teach. For when the Church of Antioch cannot judge a matter concerning the neceſſity of keeping Moſes Law, they by Natures direction, Act. 15. 2. Decree to ſend Paul and Barnabas and others to Jeruſalem, to the Apoſtles and Elders, as to an higher Judicature, that there truth may be determined: and then he addeth that Mr. Tompſon and my ſelfe do teach that the Church of Antioch had jus, power to judge and determine the controverſie, but becauſe of the difficulty, had not light to judge thereof (alledging for this in the Margent the anſwer, Chap. 4. Page 42.) Ergo ſaith he, they muſt acknowledge Appeales by Natures light warrantable, as well as wee.
Anſw. That appeales are warrantable, and warrantable by Natures light till we come to the ſupreame judicatorie, this we deny not, but have formerly yeelded no leſſe. But for that our Brother here aymes at, viz. Appeales from a Congregationall Church (as not being ſupreame) to another Iudicatory, this we conceive is not proved by the example of the Church of Antioch, nor by any thing that we have written concerning the ſame And the reaſon it becauſe Antioch had right and Authority to have ended the matter amongſt themſelves if ability had ſerved thereto: and their ſending to Ieruſalem for helpe may argue want of agreement, or imperfection of light, but argues no want of Authority or right within themſelves. For it is plain verſe 2, that Antioch did endeavour to have ended the matter amongſt themſelves, and had much diſputation about it for that end, afore there was any ſpeech of ſending to Ieruſalem. Now this endeavour doth argue their right; for otherwiſe it had been ſinfull, as being a preſuming to do that which did not belong to them. This reaſon we have rendered afore in the place which our Author alledgeth, and he doth not at all remove it; and therefore we are ſtill of the ſame mind as before, that Antioch was not dependant upon the Iuriſdiction of other Churches, but had independant power within themſelves, as many may have who yet need the help of light from others, for their direction in uſing their power. Great Kings and Monarchs have received light from their Councellours without any impeac…ment of their independant power, which they have in themſelves, and without any aſcribing of that power to thoſe their Counſellours. As we ſaid in the place alledged, Antioch may ſend to Ieruſalem for help, and yet this ſending neither prove right of Iuriſdiction in them who are ſent unto, nor want of Iuriſdiction in them who do ſend.
And therefore whereas our Brother ſaith, Antioch becauſe of the difficulty of the controverſie, had not light to judge thereof, Ergo we muſt acknowledge Appeales to be warrantable, We would rather argue thus, Antioch wanted light, Ergo Counſell and light is to be ſought elſewhere; and thus we conceive the inference will hold: but to ſay, Ergo there muſt be Appeales from the Congregation to others in matter of Iuriſdiction, this we conceive will not follow at all. No more then it will follow, Kings or other ſupreame civill Rulers muſt ſeek light and direction from their Counſellours, Ergo there lyes an appeale from them to thoſe Counſellours, which Conſequence none will maintain nor affirme.
If the Scriptures had ſaid that Antioch did never attempt to …nd that controverſie, as knowing that the ending thereof belonged not to them but to others: or if it had ſaid, that the cenſuring of theſe obtruders of Circumciſion had been performed by them of Jeruſalem, and not by them of Antioch as not belonging to Antioch but to them of Jeruſalem, then our Brother might have had ſome ground from Antioch to prove the neceſſity or warrantableneſſe of appeales from Congregationall Churches to other Iudicatories: but ſuch no ſuch thing is ſaid, we ſee not how this example can be any ground for the eſtabliſhing of ſuch appeales, or the taking away from Congregationall Churches their power of Iuriſdiction within themſelves.
Eſpecially, wee ſee not how this our Brother can alledge the ſame for ſuch a purpoſe, conſidering what himſelfe hath written elſewhere in this learned Treatiſe of his wherein he examines that anſwer of ours. Two paſſages in his treatiſe I propound to conſideration, which ſeeme to me to make for that independant or ſupreame power in Congregations, which here he is diſputing againſt, the one is that which we touched before in his Page 413. Where he ſaith that Synods in caſe of neglect of Presbyteriall Churches are to command the particular Churches whom it concerneth, to do their dutie, as in other particulars there named, ſo in excommunication of offenders; and further that the Synod, Act. 15. Is to remit the cenſure of Excommunication to the Presbytery of Antioch and Ieruſalem, in caſe of the obſtina…ie of theſe obtruders of Circumciſion. Which I conceive is very truly ſpoken, and thereupon it followes that there was a ſupremacie of Iuriſdiction in that Church of Antioch, and no neceſſity of appealing from them to the Iuriſdiction of others. For …ith the Synods are only to command the Churches to do their duty, and to remit the cenſure of offenders to the Churches themſelves to whom the offenders belong, it plainly appeareth thereby where the ſupremacie of Iuriſdiction doth lye.
The other place is in his Page 307. Where we have theſe words, viz. The power of Juriſdiction ordinary intenſive and quo ad eſſentiam Eccleſiae Miniſterialis, according to the intire eſſence of a Miniſteriall Church, is as perfect and compleat in one ſingle Congregation as in a Provinciall, as in a Nationall. Yea as in the Catholike viſible body whereof Christ is the head. Now if there be ſuch perfect & compleat power of Iuriſdiction in a ſingle Congregation, I know not how there can be ſuch neceſſity of Appeales from them to the Iuriſdiction of others as he is pleading for, nor how that ſupreame and independant power in Congregations can be denyed, which here he diſputeth againſt. For let this compleat and perfect Power of Iuriſdiction be acknowledged as due to ſuch Churches, and appeales from them to other Iuriſdictions will be of ſmall neceſſity or uſe.
I know indeed this Reverend Author ſayeth in the Page laſt mentioned, and within a few lines of the words which I have here alledged, That a Congregation is ſo a part of the Presbytery that it hath not a whole intire compleat intenſive power over its own members to Excommunicate them—. And therefore the conſociated Churches muſt have a power over the members of a Congregation. Which words I confeſſe ſeeme not well to agree with the former, becauſe in the one intire compleat intenſive Power is denyed to a Congregation, and in the other the Power of Iuriſdiction, ordinary intenſive, is ſaid to be as compleat and perfect in the Congregation as in the great Churches. But it is not the latter words but the former which I do ſtand upon; and by them (as I conceive) the ſupremacie of Congregations is eſtabliſhed, and the neceſſity of appeales from them to other Iuriſdictions is cleerely takes away. For if the Power of Iuriſdiction be as intire perfect and compleat in the Congregation as in the greater Churches, as our Brother expreſly affirmes it to be, I know not the reaſon why there muſt be appeales from the Iuriſdiction of the Congregation unto the Iuriſdiction of thoſe other Churches. If the Power ſpoken of were more imperfect and incompleat in the Congregation, then it is in the other Churches, then there might be more reaſon or …ayrer pretence for thoſe appeales: but ſith our Author confeſſeth it is no more intire compleat and perfect in theſe then in the Congregation, but as compleat and perfect in the Congregation as it is in the other, I am yet to ſeeke of a ſufficient ground for the neceſſity of appeales from the Iuriſdiction in a Congregation. For is it reaſonable to appeale from one Iudicatory to another, and yet the power of Iuriſdiction be as intire compleat and perfect in the former from which the appeale is made, as in the latter to which the cauſe is brought by ſuch appeale? It ſeemes by ſuch appeales we are not like to be much helper, nor much to mend the matter above what it was before, and therefore the uſefulneſſe and neceſſity thereof is ſtill uncl….
I thinke the Brethren erre in this to teach that Antioch had power to determine the controverſie, Act. 15. When the Churches of Syria and Cicilia, to their knowledge were troubled with the like queſtion as verſe 24. may cleere,—I doubt much if they had power to determine a queſtion that ſo much concerned all the Churches.
Anſw. It is not cleere from verſe 24. nor from any part of the Chapter as farre as I can find, that Antioch did know that other Churches were troubled with this queſtion; and if they had known it, I ſee nothing therein but they might notwithſtanding lawfully end the matter ſo farre as concerned themſelves. For when this queſtion was ſtarted amongſt them by ſuch as came from Judea and taught this corrupt Doctrine at Antioch, the text is very cleere verſe 2, that they had much diſputation amongſt themſelves to have ended the matter, afore there was any ſpeech of ſending to Ieruſalem: which diſputation is an argument that they had right to have ended it, if ability had no… been wanting.
And as for our Brothers reaſon for the contrary taken from their knowledge that the other Churches of Syria and Cicilia were troubled with the like queſtion, there is not one word in the verſe alledged to ſhew that Antioch had knowledge of any ſuch matter, nor is Syria and Cicilia once mentioned therein: And though they be mentioned verſe 23. Yet neither doth this verſe declare that Antioch had any knowledge that this queſtion had ever troubled thoſe other Churches. Say it be true that indeed they had been troubled therewith, and that the Epiſtle from the Synod doth intimate no leſſe, this may prove that when the Epiſtle came to be read at Antioch, then Antioch by this meanes might come to the knowledge thereof; but all this doth not prove that Antioch knew ſo much afore. And therefore they might endeavour to end the matter amongſt themſelves, as not knowing for any thing our Author hath yet brought to the contrary, that any other Churches beſides themſelves were troubled therewith. But ſuppoſe they had known ſo much, I ſee nothing in this to hinder but Antioch might lawfully cleere up the truth in the queſtion, and cenſure ſuch of their Church as ſhould obſtinately hold and teach that falſe Doctrine, notwithſtanding their knowledge that others had been troubled with the like Doctrine and teachers. Suppoſe a Chriſtian family be troubled with lying Children, or ſervants, or ſuch as are diſobedient and undutifull in one kind or in another; ſuppoſe they alſo knew that their neighbour families are troubled with the like, ſhall this knowledge of theirs hinder the Parents or Maſters in ſuch a family from cenſuring or correcting theſe that are under their government, according to their demerits? If not, why ſhall Antioch be hindered from cenſuring offending members of their Church, only upon this ground becauſe to their knowledge other Churches are troubled with the like offenders? A City or Corporation is troubled with Drunkards, with theeves, or other vicious and lewd perſons, and knoweth that other Cities or Corporations are troubled with the like: A Nationall Church, as Scotland for example, is troubled with obtruders of Ceremonies, Service booke, Epiſcopacie or other corruptions, and knoweth that England or other Churches are troubled with the like, ſhall Scotland now be hindered from removing theſe corruptions, and the obtruders of them from amongſt themſelves, only upon this ground, becauſe England to their knowledge is troubled with the like? Or ſhall the Corporation …ee hindered from puniſhing theeves and ſuch other malefactors, only for this reaſon, becauſe to their knowledge other Corporations are troubled with the like lewd perſons? I ſuppoſe it is eaſie to ſee the inſufficiency and invalidity of ſuch Conſequences? And therefore if Antioch did know that other Churches were troubled with the like offenders, as themſelves were troubled withall, this needs not to hinder but they may determine queſtions that ariſe amongſt themſelves, and may cenſure ſuch of their members as ſhall trouble the Church or Brethren therewith, and obſtinately perſiſt in ſo doing.
This being conſidered withall, that in thus doing they do not go beyond their line, nor meddle with matters any farther but as they are within their Compaſſe. For when divers Churches are troubled with the like corruptions in Doctrine or practiſe, and ſome one of thoſe Churches by uſing the Key of Doctrine or diſcipline or both, doth endeavour the removall of theſe corruptions, they do not hereby attempt and endeavour to remove them out of other Churches (which might be an appearance of ſtretching their line beyond their compaſſe) but out of their own Church, and only ſo farre as concernes themſelves, and in ſo doing no man can juſtly ſay they meddle further then their Power doth reach.
But he gives another reaſon why Antioch had not right to determine the queſtion, And this is taken from the ſtrong party that was in Antioch againſt the truth, which was ſuch as that they oppoſed Paul and Barnabas: concerning which he ſaith, that when the greateſt part of a Church as Antioch is againſt the truth, as is cleere, Act. 15. 2. He beleeveth in that they looſe their jus, their right to determine eatenus in ſo farre; for Christ hath given no Eccleſiaſticall right and power to determine againſt the truth, but onelyonly for truth; and therefore in this, Appeales muſt be neceſſary.
Anſw. How is it cleere that the greatſt part of the Church at Antioch was againſt the truth? The text doth not ſay ſo much, but only this, that certain men which came from Iudea, taught the Brethren and ſaid except ye be Circumciſed ye cannot be ſaved, and that Paul and Barnabas had no ſmall diſſenſion and diſputation with them about the matter, and that in the iſſue they determined that Paul and Barnabas and certaine others ſhould go up to Ieruſalem about the queſtion: Thus much the Scripture witneſſeth, Act. 15. 1, 2. But whether they that held that corrupt Doctrine at Antioch were the major or the minor part of the Church, the text doth not expreſſe, except we ſhall ſay that where a falſe Doctrine is taught by ſome, and greatly oppoſed and diſputed againſt by others, there it muſt needs bee that the greateſt part are tainted with that falſe Doctrine, which wee thinke is no good Conſequence. And therefore whereas our Author ſaith, the greateſt part of this Church was againſt the Truth, and that ſo much is cleere from verſe 2. I anſwer, firſt that I do not perceive this cleereneſſe, neither from verſe 2, nor from any other place of the Chapter.
Nextly, ſuppoſe this were cleere, this may argue that they wanted ability and light to end the matter, but muſt it needs argue that they wanted right though they had been able? Or ſhall we ſay that they who want ability to doe things as they ſhould be done, do therefore want right to …al… in them at all? I conceive it will not follow, and the reaſon is becauſe this right in Churches is Naturall, or Connaturall to every Church, and this want of ability is only accidentall, and therefore this latter cannot totally hinder the former.
That light of government is Naturall or connaturall to every Church, our Brother own words do teſtifie Page 341. Where he ſaith this, viz. Suppoſing that Christ have a viſible Church it is morall that ſhe have power of government alſo, in ſo farre as ſhe is a Church; yea, power of government upon this ſuppoſition is Naturall or rather connaturall. And in Page 307, he ſaith as was alledged before, That the power of Iuriſdiction ordinary intenſive—. Is as perfect and compleat in one ſingle Congregation as in a Provinciall, or in a Nationall; yea, as in the Catholike viſible body whereof Christ is the head. And in Page 383. He ſaith, That to a Congregation Christ hath given by an immediate flux from himſelfe a politicall Church power intrinſci…ally in it, derived from none but immediately from Ieſus Chriſt: And the like he ſaith of a Presbyteriall Church. Now whether Antioch was a Congregationall Church as we hold, or a Presbyteriall as is holden by this our Brother, yet it is cleere by thoſe words of his here alledged, that being eſſentially a Church; it had a politicall Church power intrinſcically within it ſelfe, yet a perfect and compleat power of Iuriſdiction, yea and ſuch a power as was naturall or connaturall unto her, as ſhe was a Church. But now the light of knowledge whereby they ſhould be enabled well to uſe this power, did not adde any power unto them which they had not before, not did the want of it, being but accidentall, deprive them of that Power, which was intrinſcicall, eſſentiall and connaturall unto them as they were a Church of Chriſt. OnelyOnly this want did hinder their ability to expreſſe their power well, but their right as being a thing Connaturall did ſtill remaine.
Our Brother hath a ſaying or two about the civill Power, which by proportion may well illuſtrate this that I am ſpeaking o…bo it ye Church-power. In one place he ſaith thus, There is a two-fold power in a King, one in a King as a King, and this is a like in all, and ordinary regall, coactive: whether the King be an Heathen, a Turke, or a ſound believing Chriſtian: there is another power in a King as ſuch a King, either as a Propheticall King as David and Solomon or as a Christian believing King. And of this latter he ſaith, that it is not a new regall power, but poteſtas execuliba, a power or gracious ability to execute the Kingly Power, which he had before as a King; Page 387. &c. 388. …ow why may it not be ſaid in like ſort, there is in a Church two-fold Power, one in a Church as it is a Church, and this is a like in all true Churches of Chriſt, whether the Church in this or that particular queſtion have light to diſcerne, and hold the truth, or otherwiſe: another in a Church, as it is ſound believing Church, holding the truth in ſuch or ſuch queſtion; and this is but only a gracious ability to exerciſe the power which they had before, not adding to them any new Power at all? Againe, in his Page 393. he hath theſe words. Though the King were not a Chriſtian Magiſtrate, yet hath he a Kingly power to command men as Chriſtians, and it is by accident that he cannot in that ſtate command Chriſtian duties, and ſervice to Christ; becauſe he will not, and cannot command thoſe dutyes remaining ignorant of Chriſt; even as a King ignorant of neceſſary civill dutyes cannot command them, not becauſe he wanteth Kingly power to command theſe civill things, for undeniably he is a Iudge in civill things, but becauſe he hath not knowledge of them. And may we not ſay in like ſort, though a Church want the knowledge of the truth, in ſome particular queſtion, yet they have a Church power to determine ſuch queſtions, & to command obedience therein, and it is by accident they cannot in that ſtate determine rightly, becauſe they will not, being ignorant of the truth therein, not becauſe they want Church-power to determine ſuch matters, but becauſe they have not the knowledge of them. Againe a little after in the ſame P. he tels us, That Chriſtianity addeth no new fatherly power to a Father over his Children, nor giveth a new husband right to the husband, once an Heathen over his wife; for an heathen Father is as eſſentially a Father over his Children as a Chriſtian Father, and an heathen husband an heathen maſter &c. are all as eſſentially Husband, Maſters, &c. as are the Chriſtian husbands, maſters, &c. And may we not as well ſay, ſoundneſſe of knowledge in ſuch or ſuch a particular queſtion addeth no new Church power to a Chriſtian Church over their own members, nor giveth a new Church right over them which they had not before; for a Church that wanteth ſuch knowledge is as eſſentially a Church, inveſted with Church power over her members as is another Church? For ought I perceive the caſes are alike; and if ſoundneſſe of knowledge do not give to a Church their Church-right in this or that queſtion, how can want of that knowledge deprive them of that right? Sure one would thinke the whole ſubſtance of Chriſtianity might do as much for the adding of Kingly right, Fatherly right, Husband right, &c. As ſoundneſſe of knowledge in ſome one particular queſtion, for the adding of Church right; & that the want of all Chriſtianity ſhould be as available for taking away the Kingly right, the Fatherly right, &c. As the want of knowledge in one particular point for ye taking away of Church-right; and ſith we have our Brothers own teſtimony cleer and full for the one, it ſeems to me the caſes are ſo parallel and proportionable, that the other is unavoidable: I meane thus, ſith in the one caſe the whole ſubſtance of Chriſtianity doth not give power, nor the want thereof take away the ſame by our Brothers own teaching, I know not how in the other caſe ſoundneſſe of knowledge in one particular queſtion ſhould give power or right, & want of ſuch knowledge take away the ſame. And ſo for Antioch in particular, if it were as our Brother ſuppoſeth that the greater part of them did hold againſt the truth in that queſtion about Circumciſion, I ſee not how this could deprive them of their Church right which they had before.
As for our Brothers reaſon that Chriſt hath given no Eccleſiaſticall right and power to determine againſt the truth, but onelyonly for the truth, This ſaying I confeſſe is very true, but doth not ſuffice for the purpoſe for which hee brings it, viz. To prove that Antioch being ignorant of the truth in that queſtion about Circumciſion, or holding againſt the truth therein did thereby loſe their Church right to determine. For if this reaſon be good, then a man may conclude againſt that power in heathen Kings, Parents, and Husbands, to governe their Subjects, children and Wives; which our Brother, as we heard afore, hath granted and taught: For ſuppoſe that Antioch were ignorant of the truth in that particular is it not cleere that the Kings, Parents, and Husbands mentioned are ignorant of the truth in many more matters? And it Antioch do hereupon looſe their right, becauſe Chriſt hath given no power to determine againſt the truth but for the truth, how will it be avoided but by the ſame reaſon, …he Kings and the others mentioned muſt likewiſe loſe their right to governe their own ſubjects and families? For the Lord gives no right, I hope, to Pagans againſt the truth, no more then he doth unto Churches. And therfore if the reaſon be valid and ſtrong in the one caſe, and for the purpoſe, for which our Brother brings it, it ſeemes to be as ſtrong in the other caſe alſo, which ſhall be contrary to what our Brother himſelfe doth teach.
In a word▪ Churches and Antioch in particular have right to determine queſtions, and they ought to determine only according to the truth: They have formally a right to determine, and when their determinations are according to truth, then they will …ind Ʋi mat…i… which elſe they will not. They have right to determine in fore Humano, and if their determinations be for matter agreeable to truth, they will be ratifyed in foro Div…o, but not elſe. Now our Brothers arguing doth ſeeme to confound theſe two; and becauſe of the latter which is freely granted, he would conclude againſt the former, which we thinke is not good reaſoning; but on the contrary do ſtill thinke, that though Churches ought to give out no determinations but ſuch as are agreeable to truth, and that otherwiſe their determinations, in reſpect of the matter of them will not bind before God, yet for all this they may have right formally and in Foro humano to judge, and to determine of ſuch things.
Moreover, if this were granted for true, that Antioch when they are againſt the truth do loſe their right to determine Controverſies, yet we are not hereby much neerer to an iſſue, unleſſe it be determined withall who muſt be judge whether they be againſt the truth or no, and the reaſon is becauſe if they be not againſt the truth but for it, then I hope, it will be granted that they doo not loſe their right at all. The queſtion therefore ſtill remaines, who hath this Miniſteriall Power to Iudge whether this or that Church, Antioch or any other be againſt the truth or for it; and unleſſe this be cleered we are but where we were before.
But to draw towards an end of this paſſage about the Church of Antioch: whether they had right to determine Controverſies when ability failed, or whether they did when loſe that right, I will here tranſcribe a few words of our Brother as I find them in his ſecond, 331. Page. Wherein he either cleerely yeeldeth the cauſe, and ſaith the ſame that we do or I am much miſtaken. The words are theſe, There is a difference between ability to judge, and right or power to judge. A presbyteriall Church, (and he diſputeth in ſix Pages together to prove Antioch ſuch a one, Page 470. 471. &c. ſequ.) may have right, jus, and Eccleſiaſtic…ll law to judge of a point, to the judging whereof they want ability: therefore de facto, it belongeth to an higher Synod where more learned men are, though de jure the Presbytery may judge it. Theſe words I wiſh to be well conſidered. For whereas in the place we have been ſpeaking of, he ſaith Antioch, the greater part of them being againſt the truth, did loſe their jus, their right to determine, for which as wee have heard, he gives this reaſon, becauſe Chriſt hath given no right and power to determine againſt the truth but for it, yet now wee ſee he grants diſtinction between ability and right, and ſaith, a Presbyteriall Church may ſtill retaine this latter of their right, even then, when they want the other of ability. Which two ſayings whether they do perfectly agree, and whether in the latter of them he do not plainly come up to us, againſt whom he hath been diſputing in the former, I leaue it to the wiſe in heart, and eſpecially to himſelfe to conſider. For, for my part I muſt confeſſe that theſe two ſayings, A Presbyteriall Church as Antioch may have right, jus to judge a point, to the judging whereof they may want ability; and, Antioch a Presbyteriall Church wanting ability did thereby loſe their right, or jus to determine the point, theſe two I ſay, are ſuch ſayings as are not eaſie for me to reconcile.
Laſtly, if it be ſaid our Brother doth not deny unto Antioch, or a Church in error all power ſimply to determine, but only to determine tali mode, that is, to determine againſt the truth; for his words are, they loſe their jus their right eatenus, in ſo far. I anſwer, he hath ſuch a word indeed, as eatenus, in ſo farre: but if any ſhall ſay he meant no more in this diſpute, but only that ſuch a Church hath no right to determine againſt the truth, I conceive that he that ſhall ſo ſay, ſhall therein impute ſome fault unto our Brother, even the fault of wreſting Mr. Tompſons Tenent and mine, and ſuggeſting againſt us unto his Reader, as if we had held ſuch a thing as we never wrote nor thought. For it is plain, that our Brother in his Pag. 424. is diſputing againſt us; For he ſaith, that we teach the Church of Antioch had jus, power to judge and determine the controverſie, but becauſe of the difficulty had not light to judge thereof, And ſets down Maſter Tompſons name and mine as the men that ſo teach, in Anſwer, Page 42. And a few lines after he ſaith, I thinke the Brethren erre in this, to teach, that Antioch had power to determine the Controverſie, Act. 15. And then hee gives two reaſons for the contrary. So that it is manifeſt that he intends this diſpute againſt us. Now what have we ſaid in this matter? Have we delivered any ſuch thing, that Antioch had right to determine againſt the truth? Let the Anſwer be viewed in the place which he alledgeth, viz. Page 42. And I am ſure no ſuch groſſe Tenent will be there found, no nor any where elſe in our writing. That which we have ſaid, is this, that Antioch had right to have determined the matter if ability had ſerved thereto: but for right to determine againſt the truth, we never ſpake one word that ſoundeth that way. Our Brother therefore intending this diſpute againſt us, and plainly expreſſing ſo much, and our Tenent being no other then as I have ſaid, it muſt therefore needs follow that his intendment is, that Antioch had no right to determine that matter. But for right to determine againſt the truth, he cannot confute ſuch a Tenent as ours, we never having delivered any ſuch thing, but he muſt withall be culpable of manifeſt miſtaking and miſ-reporting of us to the World; and we are, and muſt be ſlow to believe that a man of ſuch worth would willingly do us ſuch wrong. It remains therefore, that right to determine and not right to determine againſt the truth, is the thing which he oppoſ…t… as ours, and therefore it is that in this ſence and meaning I have here applyed my anſwer.
The … thus much; That Antioch had right to determine againſt the … that may ſoone be con…uted, but the Tenent is none of ours: That … to determine, is indeed our Tenent, and whether this be con…uted …, let the wiſe and Iudicious conſider.