A Vindication of Free Grace, Correspondence · Letter 2 – Postscript

A Vindication of Free Grace · Correspondence · Letter 2 – Postscript

p. 37The Second Letter to Mr. J. G. In Reply to the SERMON.

Much respected Sir,

UPon failing in my expectation, of your peruſing that Copy of your Sermon, preached April 28. 1644. being the Sabbath next after my giving you in two Sheets of writing (which Copy I left at your houſe the night before your journeying, about May 15.) I ſince have commended Copies thereof to the ſtrict view of ſome of your knowne hearers and writers; who upon comparing it with their Noats, finde it exactly to agree with what you delivered: which the rather I took care to do, becauſe (as I ſignified in my Noat left for you, with that Copy the night forementioned) I found by the meer reading, and writing that Copy (which alone I had then done) that 'twas mainly intended by way of anſwer to the Objections in thoſe two ſheets preſented; and upon further peruſall, I finde you intend it for a full and perfect anſwer: wherein you give two Arguments, which you affirme, are for the clearing of the whole buſineſſe, being for vindication of your fifth aſſertion oppoſed, and afterwards you endeavour to clear it from the opinion of Free-will, and that becauſe 'tis charged there to be the ſame with a maine maxime of the Arminians there expreſt, yea, I can conclude no leſſe from your very next Sermon following, preached May 5. wherein, without the leaſt intimation of any Objections behind not cleared. You intimated your clearing the matter from all Objections, and ther…upon proceeded to new matter; and that notwithſtanding the Friday b…fore; being May 3. upon my ſpeech with you about thoſe Obje…ions, you informed me, that in peruſall you were much ſtraitned in time, and thereupon, at my deſire, you ſeemed to promiſe further conſideration.

And for as much as I finde, that mine end in that diſcourſe given you in being wholly for the truths advantage, inſtead of being p. 38accompliſhed is perverted, in that you have thence taken occaſion after a grievous manner to defame that truth, which is there grounded on ſundry Scriptures againſt your errour: I count … meet to wards the attaining that firſt end, to endeavour the … cation thereof againſt all aſperſions caſt upon it; elſe will my former endeavour continue very injurious to that truth, which it was intended to advantage.

Wherein, before my vindicating the main matter, I cannot but take notice of one paſſage; that whereas upon your inlargements about your fifth Aſſertion, you gave ſuch an expoſition upon Epheſ. 2.5. Dead in ſinnes, &c. as is at large proved contradictory to evident reaſon: yet about the beginning of that clearing Sermon, you rehint the ſame, in theſe words [Dead in ſinnes, &c. in ſuch a ſenſe, as was formerly explained,] and that without the leaſt title for its vindication.

Another thing to be obſerved, is your expreſſion touching your fifth Aſſertion, which you ſay in the beginning of that Sermon, is [one paſſage which it ſeems ſome did not ſo clearly underſtand] and afterwards [which ſome could not ſo well underſtand or comprehend;] by which you make the ground of all the Controverſie, to be a miſ-underſtanding; whereas you repeat the ſame in theſe very expreſſions wherein 'twas oppoſed, as namely, thus.

That if men will be willing to do unfeinedly what God hath appointed them in a way of nature, God hath promiſed ſucceſſe and acceptation in this way: yea, ſoon after recited thus, Men putting forth themſelves to do according to what God hath inabled them to do in a way of nature, God will meet them with grace and acceptation. Yea, moſt plainly reitrerated in your after ſhewing the difference between this, and the opinion of Free-will, in theſe words. Their opinion aſſerts not a ſufficiency of executive power to do ſuch things as whereto grace is annexed by promiſe. By which you diverſifie your opinion from theirs, clearly ſhewing, that Your opinion aſſerts a power to do ſuch things, as whereto grace is annexed by promiſe, which are the very tearms oppoſed; now it is hard to conceive, how I ſhould miſ-underſtand, in oppoſing your expreſſions ſo often given: whereof you give one various expreſſion; namely, That if men do their utmoſt, &c. they ſhall have anſwerable ſucceſſe: which expreſſion directly overthrowes your Tenent, That man may ſo do, as to ingage God to give grace; for if upon p. 39improvement God gives anſwerable ſucceſſe, then certainly he gives not ſaving-grace; for there is an infinite diſproportion and unanſwerableneſſe betweene mans naturall improvement, and Gods ſuperadding ſupernatur all grace: ſuch ſhall have anſwerable ſucceſſe; namely, in reſpect of naturall indowments, they ſhall have the uſe of their naturals continued, augmented, and ſhall not be given up to vile affections, which Rom. 1.26. is the puniſhment of abuſers of naturals, but this is far ſhort of ſaving-grace, which you make to be but ſucceſſe anſwerable. Having therefore received abundant confirmation that I no way miſ-underſtood the errour, I ſhall now take boldneſſe to proceed; wherein, as God ſhall aſſiſt me, I ſhall endeavour to ſound the depths of thoſe two grand clearing Arguments, ſuppoſing, that if God ſhall inable me to levell thoſe Mountaines lying in the way of mine aſſertion alleadged againſt your errour, there will need no further attonement for that which you make utterly incurable by any mediation of reaſon, conſideration, diſtinction, project, &c. one or other: Towards vindication of which mine aſſertion, (namely, That men naturally have not power to do ſuch things, as whereto God hath promiſed grace;) I conceive it very meet here to premiſe a very pertinent Obſervation, which I received from your ſelfe, in a Sermon preached June 12.1639. at Caple; on John 20.31. wherein, when you came to anſwer Objections, you premiſed this conſideration, When men have a truth well grounded on Scripture, though they ſhould meet with a thouſand objections, which they could not anſwer, yet they muſt not therefore caſt away the truth, if they can ſee it through them all, becauſe it is eaſier to obſcure and ſhadow many truths by objections, then to clear one truth from all objections. Seeing therefore the tenent to be vindicated, hath been bottomed on many Arguments from Scripture, I may not in the leaſt queſtion that truth, till thoſe Scripture-grounds be deſtroyed, and whether you do not rather ſhadow a truth then oppoſe an errour, in that you deſtroy not one Argument of many, though from Scripture, but only produce two remote Arguments to prove the neceſſity of your errour, this I commend to any impartiall tryall: as alſo whether two Arguments alleadged, to arraign and condemne the equity and righteouſneſſe of Gods proceedings according to his Word (though not to all croſſe reaſonings) be ſufficient to deſtroy the truth of his Word.

p. 40Which being premiſed, I ſhall in Gods Name make … againſt thoſe two Arguments, at leaſt, as they oppoſe the … pleaded for.

Firſt then, for the firſt reaſon; If men muſt labour, &c. Then God must deſtroy man for not doing that which is altogether … of his power to doe: which conſequence you count moſt abſurd, ſenſeleſſe, &c.

Touching which conſequence ſo exploded, That God deſtroyes, &c. that this is fully agreeable with Gods juſtice, grace; &c. which you ſay, it ſo oppoſeth, I ſhall prove clearly from your … words in your ſecond reaſon following, viz.

That the Scripture placeth the cauſe of the equity of Gods proceedings in condemnation ſtill upon mans will, or on ſome corrupt…, frowardneſſe, or perverſeneſſe found therein.

Whence it thus followes; if it be equity in God no condg… man for the ſinfulneſſe of his will, then God may in equity condemne man for not doing that which is altogether out of his power to do; but the former you hold and prove true from Scriptures the latter therefore, that God may in equity condemne man, for not doing that which is altogether out of his power to do, inevitably followes, becauſe to purifie or rectifie mans will, is altogether out of mans power to do; w^ch thing you peremptorily aff… againſt the tenent of Free-will: ſo then, that God deſtroyes men for not doing that, which is altogether beyond their power to do (which here you make ſo abſure, unjuſt, &c.) this is a direct conſequent upon your own enſuing reaſon; yea, this very reaſon proves, that Gods deſtroying man to, is an act of justice and equity.

Object But yet you further objected in diſcourſe, That God deſtroyes man, not ſo much for not willing ſavingly, as for the obſtinacy of his naturall will.

Anſw For anſwer whereto; firſt, this diſtinction between … wi…i…g ſavingly, and obſtinacy of will, on which you ground the Objection, is of no force at all: for he that wils not ſavingly, is obſtinate in his will: ſo Rom. 8.7. The carnall minds, or the minding of the fleſh, is enmity againſt God: which tearm fleſbly winde, being there oppoſed to the spirituall minds, takes in every mind that is not ſpirituall; yea, it includes the will, being a chieſe part of the minde: and ſo every naturall will without exception, is en…y, p. 41or obſtinacy & perverſeneſſe, all which, the tearm enmity imports; ſo then God deſtroying man for not willing ſavingly, doth deſtroy for obſtinacy of will.

Or ſecondly, wh…ther God deſtroy for enmity of minde, and ſo of will, or whether for not willing ſavingly, or according to the expreſſion in that Text, for not ſubjecting it ſelf to the Law of God; ſtill he deſtroyes man for not doing that, which is altogether out of his power to do, which is clear from the end of that ſeventh Verſe; where the reaſon of the mindes, and therein of the wils obſtinacy, and of its not becomming ſubject to Gods law is added, in theſe words, becauſe it cannot, or becauſe it hath not power, namely to become ſubject, or to ſubject it ſelfe to Gods Law: It muſt therefore be concluded, that God deſtroying man upon any of your tearmes, whether for not willing ſavingly, or for obſtinacy, perverſeneſſe, &c. doth deſtroy man for not doing that which is altogether out of his power to do; and conſequently, that according to your own grounds, you inevitably plunge your ſelfe into that very pit of abſurdity, which you digg'd; yea, into ſuch an Abyſſe, as whereout you conclude, No mediation of reaſon, project, &c. can redeeme: yea, by your very tearms, the juſtice and equity of God, in ſuch a deſtroying of man, is undeniably confirmed: By which reaſons, ſtriking ſo directly the root of your firſt Argument, I conceive tis clearly removed: nevertheleſſe becauſe there are ſuch ſtrong holds raiſed to ſtand by it, I ſhall according to what power God ſhall vouchſafe me, aſſault thoſe alſo.

Wherein, for thoſe high aſperſions caſt upon the conſequent of that opinion, which oppoſeth yours, which you make ſo contrary to the tenour, truth of the Goſpel, &c. comparing theſe with what you ſay after in the concluſion, that [perhapſe for the ſubſtance of it, tis no more then the truth] which you give as your finall ſentence paſt upon the ſame opinion, I cannot but judge that here you little thought what you ſhould ſpeak after, and at the concluſion, you quite forgot what you had ſaid before. But that ſuch a ſaying riſes up with ſuch contradiction againſt Gods juſtice, grace, &c. as no principles of reaſon, common ſenſe, &c. can reconcile, &c. this ſhall, yea muſt be granted you, yet all ſo far from the leaſt diſparaging its truth, as that it ſhal… have meat out of this eater: for could the heights and depths of Gods juſtice in wayes of condemnation be compaſt about by the reaſon and comprehenſions of p. 42men, yea or Angels, they could not be themſelves incomprehenſible, whoſe judgments are paſt finding out; therefore to ſay they are without the line or ſphear of the largeſt created underſtanding, is to give them their due valuation: whereas, to ſay that cannot be juſtice in God, which no reaſon can reach, this is to make his juſtice comprehenſible, and that we muſt believe nothing of Gods wayes above our reaſon.

And whereas you affirme, …t were as good reaſon to ſay, God deſtroyes man for not being God, &c. as for not believing, becauſe man can no more do the one, then the other, &c.

Firſt if it be granted, that man hath no more power to believe, then to become God, &c. it followes not therefore, that us as good reaſon to deſtroy man for not being God, or for not creating, as for not believing; for in Adam (in whom you after-ſay, all his poſterity ſtood) man, in order to his perfect happineſſe, had a power to performe what ever might have been by God commanded (for without ſuch a power man-kind, in Adam, could not have had power to ſtand happy, but had at beſt bin ſiable to miſery, by diſobedience, and that through impotency ſeeing therefore, that while he could hauehave ſtood in a ſtate of life, he prophanly changed it for a ſtate of death, with moſt reaſon might God require him, to doe as much for recovering his happines, after loſt by his own tranſgreſſion, as before for continuing it, and ſo may require any act from him (whether faith or any other) who was at firſt created with a power correſpondent; but contrarily, man never had power to be God, nor to create, &c. Therefore 'tis not a like reaſonable, to require him to become God, for his recovery, as to believe. Again, 'tis denied, that man hath no more power at all to believe, then to make himſelf God, &c. For there is ſuch a power in man as may be made a meet ſubject to receive, and cloſe with Gods work of faith; but man is not made a ſubject capable of the Godhead, nor of the ſupremacy of creation.

Next then, to proceed to the chiefe queſtion, whether Adam in innocency had a power of believing, or not. Touching which controverſie it ſeems moſt neceſſary to conſider ſtrictly, what 'twas for him to have ſuch a power, or wherein it truly conſiſts, that we confound not our ſelves by compounding it with ſome other thing; becauſe if we conſider not what 'tis ſimply in it felt, we may conceive it not to be, where 'tis; becauſe ſome other p. 43power or thing, taken, or indeed miſtaken for it, may not be there alſo: Concerning which, a power of believing (according to your own definition) may be ſaid to be that, whereby the ſoule is inabled cordially to aſſent to, or intirely to cloſe, with what God ſhall reveale to be believed. Which cordiall aſſenting you expound to be an act which the whole heart cloſeth with, even the understanding, will, and affections, as in your Sermon forementioned, preached at Caple, o… John 20.31. Which act of cloſing, whether it may be taken in, without an act of recumbency, which you then underſtood to be immediately, and as it were inſeparably following, or elſe, as eſſentially comprehending an act of recumbency; this needs not be queſtioned here, both agreeing in this, that a power of believing is a power of entire cloſing with things revealed, and whether only to be cloſed with, as true, or vvith relying alſo, this rather concernes the manner of propounding or revealing, though to follow your definition would be greater advantage to me; which laid dovvn, may be very uſefull tovvards the matter in doubt.

As firſt, for your firſt reaſon againſt Adam having ſuch a povver, becauſe no neceſſity thereof, &c. ſuppoſe it granted, that he had no need to believe; yet this proves not his not having a povver, for the uſe or need of a povver given not eſſence to it, nor is it the eſſence thereof; there may be a povver to do vvhere no need is, elſe a man hath not povver to do any thing vvhereof he hath not, need; as not a povver to vvalk, ſpeak, &c. becauſe no need: vvhereas a man hath povver to do thouſands of acts needleſſe, and God hath a povver to raiſe of ſtones children unto Abraham, though it be a needleſſe vvork. So that povver is here miſ-underſtood in making povver and need to believe, vvhichwhich are tvvo evidently diſtinct things to be in one individuall.

But ſecondly, by vvay of exception againſt your Argument, that becauſe he needed not to believe to juſtification, therefore he needed not a power to believe. This conſequence may be denied thus.

If there may be need and uſe of believing this myſterie, in or among ſuch as have no need, nor uſe thereof unto juſtification; then Adams not having need or uſe of believing to juſtification, cannot prove his not needing to have believed at all. But the former is true, vvitneſſe the Angel Gabriel, Luke. 1.26. Who having no need, nor uſe of believing to juſtification, had yet need and uſe p. 44thereof for the teſtifying the truth of this myſterie, vvhichwhich he could not have done without a true believing it himſelf. The like might be proved from that company of Angels ſolemnizing CHRISTS birth, with a ſong ſo befitting it, Luke 2.15. The litter therefore plainly followes, that Adams not having need to believe this myſtery unto juſtification, cannot prove that he could not have need to have believed for ſome other end.

Yea thirdly, and that partly by way of conceſſion, and partly by way of exception, if it be granted, that Adam needed not to have believed this myſterie to juſtification, nor for any other end; yet this proves not that he needed not a power to have believed this myſterie: becauſe ſuch a power ſo excellent might be needfull and uſefull to the producing of other acts needfull, though altogether uſeleſſe for this; and that it vvas needfull ſo, appears from the next particular.

Therefore in the fourth place, the thing to be proved is, that he had both need and uſe of ſuch a power for other ends; that, what you ſay againſt Gods Wiſdome, in giving man ſuch a power, may thereby be overthrown; and that he needed ſuch a power, I prove from this your own Argument alleadged to evince the contrary, and that thus: Adam ſtanding righteous by the Law of works (which is your Argument) that he might ſo do, could not but need a power of true cloſing with the righteouſneſſe, holineſſe, &c. of God, in every work or command required; for without a right apprehending and acknowledging the excellencies of God, in his commands, he could not have rightly obeyed God in any one command: whence it follows, that in having need of a power of cloſing with the holineſſe, &c. of God in any command, he therein had need of a power of cloſing with the truth, and faithfulneſſe of God in any promiſe, whether of Chriſt, or any other; becauſe the ſelf-ſame power would neceſſarily have inabled him to each of thoſe acts a-like; for it had been impoſſible for Adam to have had a power to have acknowledged God in his holineſſe, and not by the ſame to cloſe with his truth and faithfulneſſe; both which go together ſo inſeparably, as that we finde God himſelfe moſt frequently ratifying the promulgation o… great promiſes by the Prophets, by declaring himſelf the holy One, Thus ſaith the Lord the holy one of Iſrael, clearly intimating, that the true apprehending of Gods holineſſe is ſuch a prevailing argument, as will inforce p. 45men to cloſe with his truth and faithfulneſs touching the performance of all his promiſes.

Yea, for further clearing, Adam had not only need, but uſe of a power of believing, as appears from Gods method, in ſtating man in that high office of dominion over the whole creation; wherein, after God had given him command to bear dominion over all creatures, Gen. 1.28. he proceeds in the two following verſes to confirme to him that office, by promiſes as large as that command, Behold I have given to you every Hearb, &c. Which ſhall be to you for meat: which words are a direct promiſe, in anſwer whereto Adam needed a power to believe; becauſe, as God added to the command a promiſe anſwerable, and all as needfull for the ſetling of the dominion upon him, ſo vvas it as needfull for Adam actually to believe that promiſe, that thereby he might undertake that office, not vvith doubting, but vvith aſſurance of ſucceſſe, which could only be confirmed to him, by a promiſe from the ſole Creator, and Lord over all. Yea, contrarily, if he had not regarded that promiſe he had thereby prophaned Gods wiſdome in exhibiting it, and not believing he had oppugned Gods truth and faithfulneſſe touching performance. Seeing then that Adam had both need and uſe of a power, whereby to believe the truth, yea, the rich grace of God alſo, in that great promiſe, which confirmed his univerſall Soveraignty over the whole creation, hence it followes that Adam had both need & uſe of ſuch a power, as whereby he could have believed the myſtery of Chriſt (though he needed not, by that power to believe that myſtery) which may be fully proved from this reaſon, becauſe Adam being then upright or perfect, could not but believe that firſt promiſe of dominion, from a right principle; namely, from a true apprehenſion and knowledge of the faithfulneſſe and grace of God, which knowledge (being that ſpring or fountaine, whence a true believing in Chriſt doth alwayes, and can alone flow) Adam being furniſhed with, could not but have believed the myſterie of Chriſt; becauſe hereby all the Saints have believed: and indeed God acts ſo fully like himſelf, that ſo far as a man knowes, and believes Gods excellencies, he cannot but know and believe his revealed acts and contrivances what ever they be: but above all others, the myſterie of compaſſing ſalvation by Chriſt, holds forth ſo lively a repreſentation of God, in all his excellencies of Wiſdome, p. 46grace, righteouſneſſe, &c. as would have enforced Adam to have beleeved it, who before had a knowledge of Gods excellen…, in being created in Gods own image, which conſiſted in knowledge, as alſo in righteouſneſſe and holineſſe. By which Arguments, I conceive, that both Adams having need, and uſe of … power, as could have produced a beleeving in Chriſt, is evinced; and the Wiſedome of God therein vindicated, the vindication whereof is a work of ſuch concernment as will I hope, excuſ…y largeneſſe herein.

But to proceed both to the ſecond and third reaſon, which are one and the ſame; The firſt, becauſe he had not power to foreknow his fall, nor ſecondly Chriſts death, &c. which Argument may be thus deſtroyed.

If the eſſence of a power of beleeving conſiſts not at all in the knowledge of Gods Will, before revealed by God, then Adam not having power to know the myſtery of Chriſt, before revealed by God, doth no way prove his not having a power of beleeving that myſtery; but the former is true, That the eſſence of a power of beleeving conſiſts not, &c. Becauſe according to your definition …is a power of cordiall aſſenting to the truth of a promiſe of God, that is to ſay, a promiſe revealed, or propounded, which muſt be preſuppoſed; now a power of cloſing with the truth of what God reveales is far different from a power of fore-knowing Gods Will before revealed: for the one, namely the knowledge of the ſecrets of God belongs onelyonly to God, while his revealed will belongs to men: And ſo God gives a power of beleeving to many thouſands, and yet reſerves his ſecret Councell from them all; the latter alſo, That Adams not having power to foreknow, &c. follows inevitably, becauſe when two faculities differ in kind, then the abſence of one proves not at all the abſence of another.

Next after, you propound an Objection againſt your ſelfe, for Anſwer whereto, you firſt refer to your fore-going argument againſt Gods Wiſdome, which is already anſwered at large, afterwards you cloſe up your anſwer after this manner of reaſoning.

Firſt, you ſay, Christ could not be revealed, becauſe not convenient, &c. And thence you infer, that Therfore doubtles Adam had not a power to have beleeved in Chriſt; no, not on this ſuppoſition, That Chriſt had been then revealed to him. Which Argument is indeed p. 47moſt contradictory, yea utterly deſtructive to it ſelfe: For firſt, you ground Adams not having ſuch a power upon this reaſon, becauſe Christ could not be revealed, and afterwards, you quite deſtroy that very reaſon, by ſuppoſing, or granting Chriſt to have been revealed: ſo that in Anſwer to a main and moſt conſiderable objection, you onelyonly repeat a former reaſon, already anſwered, and adde one new, which you immediately deſtroy by your own contra-ſuppoſition, and ſo the Objection remaines altogether unanſwered.

Next follows your fourth reaſon, againſt Adams having ſuch a power, becauſe Chriſt was not revealed, which may be deſtroyed thus.

If the want of an outward meanes, though neceſſary to concur in producing an act, cannot prove the want of the intrinſe call power neceſſary to that act, then it follows, That Adams wanting the Revelation of the object to be beleeved, cannot prove his wanting an inward power to beleeve: But the former is true, that the want of an outward meanes, &c. cannot prove the inward power wanting, becauſe the outward means, and the inward power are two diſtinct things: for inſtance; food, the outward means of feeding is one thing, and the appetite, the inward faculty of receiving food, is another; and therefore the having of either may well conſiſt with the want of either; one man may have an inward faculty of appetite, and want outward food; and another may have outward food, and want an inward receptive faculty: The latter therefore inevitably follows, that Adams wating the Revelation, &c. proves not his wanting an inward power, &c. becauſe the Revelation of the object by promiſe, the outward means of beleeving, being one thing; and faith the inward power of receiving it another thing, diſtinct from the former: hence it comes to paſſe, that either of them may be, where either of them is wanting; Adam then might have a power of beleeving, and want the word of faith, though now faith comes by hearing even as he was created in Gods image, perfectly at once, though Saints now are transformed into the ſame image gradually and that by means of the Word, 2 Cor. 3.18. and contrarily many now have the Word, and not that power, the Word being not of the eſſence of that power.

Secondly, another Argument may be this, if Adam had not p. 48power to beleeve a thing, or object, becauſe the object was not revealed, then 'twill follow that Adam had not a power of ſta… righteous by the Law of works, for if he had not power to bel…ve a thing, becauſe 'twas not revealed, then by the ſame reaſon, he had not power at firſt to obey any command, becauſe 'twas not revealed, for the Revelation of a command is as much neceſſary to obeying …s the Revelation of a promiſe is neceſſary to the beleeving therof; and the meer Revelation of a promiſe would have infuſed into Adam no more power of beleeving, then the meer Revelation of a com…nd would have infuſed power of obeying: whence it follows, that Adam in his firſt perfection was ſo far from having power to ſtand righteous, by a Law of works, by performing any thing to be commanded, as that indeed, when he was at firſt created, according to this your reaſon, he had not then power to obey any command whatſoever, becauſe his creation was fully finiſhed, before any command was revealed: yea, from that time forward when ever any command had been revealed, he had ſtood in …eed of ſupply of new power to obey, becauſe before 'twas revealed he had not power to obey. Which conſequences utterly overthrow that perfect power by ſtanding righteous by works, which you expreſly affirm, Adam had, making him unable to perform any work, by his firſt created power.

Thus much in Anſwer to your reaſons alleadged againſt Adams having power of beleeving, &c. which are all grounded upon a miſ-underſtanding of, and ſwerving from, the true definition of ſuch a power, and ſo are made up of an indi…tinct, and conſuled conjumbling of other things with it; for neither the need, uſe thereof, nor the fore-knowledge, or Revelation of an object, are at all eſſentially neceſſary to make up ſuch a power, as hath been proved. Touching which matter I muſt adde one word, viz. that it muſt needs be dangerous preſumption to charge ſuch a perſon with weakneſſe before triall, who for excellency and perfection of nature, is avouched again and again by God himſelfe to be created after Gods own Image and likeneſſe, Gen. 1. and to be made upright, or righteous, Eccleſ. 7.29. Yea, eſpecially to ground that charge againſt him upon ſuch reaſons, as wholly tend to prove, that he was not in a capacity of being tryed; whether he had ſuch a power of beleeving or not, by which act the grand Maſter-peece of Gods whol Creation is without all ground vilified.

p. 49Againſt all which, that I may yet adde one paſſage; I ſhall indeavour to ſtate the queſtion in moſt cle… and full tearmes, which queſtion being, Whether. Adam had a power of beleeving in Chriſt; (the eſſence of which power conſiſts in a power to beleeve an object revealed) cannot be truely framed, except with this ſuppoſition, That Chriſt had been revealed, ſo that to go about to examine, much more to determine, what his power was to beleeve an object, without ſuppoſing that object to be revealed; this is a courſe inconſiſtent with the nature of this power, which neceſſarily preſuppoſeth the revelation of an object, for the tryall thereof: for though ſuch a power may be without an outward Object yet there can be no tryall of its being without it, as a man may have an inward appetite, but we cannot rightly examine his having it, but by giving him outward food, which queſtion therefore may be fairly propounded thus, Whether Adam had a power of believing Chriſt, ſuppoſing, Christ had been revealed? Anſwer whereto muſt be this, That he could not but have ſuch a power, it being eſſentially neceſſary to his ſtate of perfection, as appeares by theſe three conſequences.

Firſt, becauſe without it, upon the revealing of Chriſt (which is here ſuppoſed) Adam muſt have been miſerable by oppoſing the truth of God in that promiſe, and that through want of power.

Or ſecondly, if upon the revelation of this myſtery, he had not had power to have beleeved it, then neceſſarily he muſt have, needed ſupply of new power, whereby to have beleeved, and ſo upon this revelation (ſuppoſed) his condition, would have been the very condition of unbeleevers now, who upon the revealing of this myſtery need new power to beleeve it; both which conſequences are utterly inconſiſtent with the nature of his firſt compleat power of ſtanding happy.

Yea thirdly, ſuppoſing that Myſtery to have been revealed to Adam, to be beleeved, the very revelation hereof would have required, and commanded him to have beleeved it, and his beleeving would have been a proper act of Obedience to the Law of that promiſe requiring faith; If therefore he had not a power to have obeyed the law of that promiſe by beleeving, then it follows, That his firſt power could not have inabled him to ſtand by a Law of Works, by perfect obedience, which (as you expreſly grant) he was fully able to do.

p. 50And yet, before paſſing from this queſtion, I mi…t … word to prevent the miſtaking mine and in anſwering it, … is, That I have not endeavoured to prove Adams …aving … power, from this reaſon, becauſe without it God could not … ſtice deſtroy mankinde; for whether he had a power of beleeving or no, is a Queſtion needleſſe and impertiment, touching the … ring of Gods juſtice in mans deſtruction, as may be made … feſt thus.

If Adam, in whom (as you acknowledge) all his poſterity ſtood, had ſuch a power, under the firſt Covenant, as was ſu… ent to juſtifie God in the death or deſtruction of man diſobeying then to examine, whether Adam had power to beleeve a ſecond Covenant is altogether …iceeſſ…ry to clear Gods Juſtice, in … ſtroying man, diſobeying; But the former is true, this Adam had &c. becauſe God after ſtating him in his firſt power, … thereupon as a righteous Judge, fore, paſſe or denounce the … ning or ſentence of death or deſtruction upon him, if he ſho… diſobey, Gen. chap. 2. verſ. 17. Thou ſhall ſurely …ye. W… threatning could not have been juſtly denounced againſt … except his firſt power and perfection, had ſuch an anſwerable proportion thereto, as might juſtifie that threatning. The latter alſo, That to examine, &c. is a needleſſe queſtion for clearing Gods juſtice, &c. follows inevitably, becauſe ſeeing the eſt…ce of Adams firſt power was ſufficient to juſtifie God in deſtroying man, diſobeying; 'tis therefore needleſſe to inquire, what … power could produce. Yea, ſeeing you underſtand a power of beleeving, as having relation to the ſecond Covenant onelyonly, t… therefore could not be at all neceſſary to the clearing of Gods juſtice in mans death or deſtruction, becauſe the threatning of death was denounced againſt him; onelyonly with relation to the t…a… of the firſt Covenant, which alone he know; which threa…ing was as juſt before Gods promiſing Chriſt in a ſecond Covenant, upon mans fall, as afterwards, becauſe God made not that promiſe to clear his juſtice.

To proceed now to the ſecond ſort of reaſonings, being on ſuppoſition, That Adam had ſuch a power, yet that this would not avail, becauſe God having made a new Govenant, &c. to which I reſet. Touching which it muſt be affirmed. 1. That for God to daprive man of the bleſſing, &c. As you there expreſſe, this is p. 51wholy … with and deſtructive …o the …ſſ… of a Cove… of Univ…ſ…ll goo…, … enyes that all …e power to obtain Gr…ce or intere…e thou…lves therein, but if we ſpeak of the Covenant of Free-Grace, them the truth is for God that he might not deprive any man of the ob…ſſing of it, therefore to hold it forth on ſuch tearmes, as are attainable by mans improvement, as upon which Go…gagi… …ly by … of th…s Covenant, to grant acceptation and grace, (which you aſſir… to uphold the freedome of his grace) this is … and deſtructive to the very … and …outh of that Covenant of grace, which con…ws ſaving grace peculiardy … ſo… for 'twould be impoſſible for God … not to fa…fi…e ſ… a Covenant, as ſhould both promiſe grace to ſome …ely, and not to there, (which the Covenant of grace doth) and yet alſo ſhould promiſe the ſame grace, after the ſ…e manner, … all …. It muſt therefore be …, that the … of the ſecond Covenant are utterly … by … utmoſt power, but yet this no way deſtroyes the freedome of Gods … in that Covenant, for though God therein …ds …tai…ble conditions from all, yet his promiſe wherein … work thoſe conditions in ſome, is of Free grace. Gods … do …t make hi… promiſes of none effect. And touching your inſtance of a Noble f… …ly, 'tis wholy impertinent, for all it ſhews is …t this: That the conditions required in the Covenant Gr…ce, are ſuch as cannot tender all, no, n…r any one capable of grace, by his …ſt indeavour, which is …d enviably …, …g th… … of God, to work ſuch conditions in …, i… … of Free Grace, this is ſtill to be proved. By which inſtance you deny the Goſpell to pro…ſſe any peculiar thing to ſome, making it onelyonly to … the ſame conditions from all, whereas i…ed its promiſes and as large to ſome, as the command ….

'Tis then moſt ground le…t …, becauſe the Covenant of Grace is not common to all … g…lly upon improvement, that therefore 'tis not of grace to ſome, for grace in i… own nature is more free and tranſcend …, becauſe to ſome onelyonly and not to others, Which … may be p…ll…ed to the …ſo thus, viz. ſuppoſe a Prince … a No… … guilty of high … ſo as that without … of juſtice, he cannot but condemn them, if now lie will give … onelyonly ſon, … be …c…ficed, … p. 52randome for part of them, from the condemnation, becauſe …e findes nothing in them to ſatisfie his juſtice without their deſtruction: this betokens abundance of grace; y… further, to work alſo in them that neceſſary condition, which he requires; becauſe they cannot attain thereto of themſelves: this is alſo a high ſtrain of Free-grace.

Next follows your applying that inſtance, They that make the ſ… ving tearms of the Goſpel, &c. Concerning w^ch it muſt be affirmed, that in reſpect of obtaining grace to ſalvation, man by his utmoſt improvement, cannot tread as much as one ſure or ſteady ſtep in that way; ſo that his utmoſt improvement ſhall of it ſelf at beſt be ſucceſſeleſſe therein. And this is ſo far from rendring the Goſpel reproach, as that Paul eſtabliſheth the freedome of Gods diſpenſation upon this very ground, Rom. 9.16. Where after examples given to ſet our the freedome of Gods grace, Verſe▪ 11. in chooſing and refuſing, according to his good pleaſure, without any regard had to any improvement or work done, be layes down this as a ſure concluſion, Verſe▪ 16. So then, tis not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that ſ…emeth mercy▪ where Paul, that he might lay down and declare the ſure ground of ſalvation, like a wiſe builder, he firſt deſtroyes the rotten ground of the Arminians, and that by …utting off all manner of intailement or ingagement of grace, on mans willing, yea, and running; which tearms cannot but import greateſt intention and ext…ntion of abilities: he ſaith not, upon willing or running, God hath promiſed mercy or grace, but tis not of him, &c. but of God, &c. The Apoſtle moſt emphatically expreſſeth it by the rearme (but) a knowne particle of oppoſition; thereby cutting off any binding of the latter, Gods mercy to the former, mans improvement. The reaſon of which method is clear: becauſe if it were of him that willeth or runneth, ſo as that to, and upon it, grace is …nexed, then it could not be free, and without reſpect to mans improvement; which thing Paul is proving, Verſe▪ 11. but muſt then have been of Grace, ingaged upon running.

Touching your next expreſſion, Were I of the judgement of Arminius, I could, &c. I muſt with griefe of heart ſay thus much; I fear your left hand hath learned too much of this cunning; and indeed there in that enmity in the underſtanding of reaſonable man againſt the truth, that is may be more eaſie to repreſent many p. 53e…ours planſible to them, then one truth.

Next followes your ſecond reaſon, upon ſuppoſing Adams having a power of believing &c. which will not juſtifie God, &c. becauſe juſtice ſtands in a Geometricall proportion, &c.

Which Argument reaches far higher then the tenent it ſhould prove; yea, makes it void: For this proves not that God is ingaged by promiſe, &c. but which is far more intolerable, this makes it but an act of juſtice in God, to give men life, or ſave them from condemnation upon improvement. For if after mans falling from his perfect power God cannot in equity condemn… man, doing his utmoſt, and that becauſe juſtice stands in a Geometricall proportion, or in taking an exact accompt or conſideration of the perſons preſent power and improvement, in anſwer to their power loſt; which (according to your inſtances produced, and your direct application of all to Adams caſe) you underſtand by thoſe expreſſions of Geometricall proportion: hence then it followes, that Gods ingaging himſelf by promiſe to improvement, is no neceſſary ground of mans ſalvation; but Gods juſtice beholding them and their improvements, is made a neceſſary ingagement on God to ſave ſuch improvens: ſo that without ſalvation of ſuch his juſtice cannot be ſalved, and conſequently his grace needs not act in their ſalvations but for the right improvement of your Argument, I adde this. Mans loſing his firſt perfect power of obedience, &c. cannot but in equity juſtifie God in his condemning man, doing his utmoſt according to his power now remaining; and that from your very reaſon, Becauſe justice ſtands in a Geometricall proportion; or in a ſtrict conſideration of perſons, their conditions, abilities, &c. For if Gods juſtice ſtands in judging acts according to the abilities, where with the perſon is intruſted, then it muſt in reference hereto, count what abilities have been given him: whereupon finding man in Adam, to have been intruſted with a fulneſſe of power; to believe (which power throughout your ſecond reaſon you ſuppoſe and grant) it cannot but require an act correſpondent: for as much therefore as man after utmoſt improvement cannot but fall infinitely ſhort of ſuch an act (which you alſo grant) Gods juſtice, upon computing both together, muſt needs be ſo far from rewarding it with grace; as that it cannot but condemne man, for acting no way anſwerable to the power given; and that in greateſt equity, becauſe of the infinite p. 52duplicate page p. 53duplicate page p. 54diſproportion between each, which …ight …. If Gods juſtice in judging the …, be ſo …ri…t … comp…ng the …, given … perſon in relation to the act, as that a great ſa… from a m…ied … then two …iter from a widow, and that becauſe it judgeth according to their reſpective abilities; then certainly juſtice weighing ſpirituall actions, with the power given … Ad… (which you ſuppoſe) cannot but condemn …, becauſe his actions …ct utmoſt improvement, hold a vaſt disprop…tion with that power.

Againe, according to the parable of the talent, …f juſtice ſo exactly requires by way of …ta…iation, … for …alout, two for two, five for five, then open r…qui…ing acts, anſwerable to the power, here ſuppoſed to be given man in Adam, it m…ſt needs … man falling … ſhort …t beſt.

So that indeed there is no congruity between the reaſon and the inſtances. For firſt, your reaſon is mainly grounded on this ſuppoſtion, That man had power in Adam, … ſo … it. But the inſtances import not the leaſt …ittle of my power, which … the Widd…w or Lords ſervants had and loſt.

Againe, the inſtances prove it a matter of equity to accept of the endeavours of ſuch as act propo…ti…nably to their …, but fall infinitely ſhort of proving the acceptance of ſuch as act no way anſwerable to their talents.

Which inſtances can only be parallel'd to your ſecond reaſon, th…, That … the Widow been in…ſted with a great … and …ewdly ſpet… all but two …, yet thoſe m…ſt in juſtice have been co…ted us much as the large contributions of others; becauſe ſhe hath now no more left. And the Lords ſ…rva… after …oſing ten talents, being intruſted with one more, upon his improving that to his power, (though not well) his Lord in juſtice muſt … ſuch improvement, and not require ſatisfaction for the …; whereas in juſt ſevei…ty, h…uſt his other ſervant … darkneſſe, o…ly for not making profit of …m ſingle …alent, though … miſ-ſpent it not, but … it up.

Yet I would not here be miſta…e…, as if I conceived it matter of mo…nt to ſhew your miſ-application of there inſta…; for could they be proved to be anſwerable to … would no way advantage it; for though you … by way p. 55of proofe, yet in ſo doing you pervert the uſe of inſtances, which may indeed illuſtrate a matter, but cannot prove it, according to that approved ſentence — Theologia parabolica non eſt argumentativa; or thus, parabolae illuſtrant non probant.

And touching your applying all to Adams poſterity, that, though it be ſuppoſed they had a power of believing, &c.

'Twould indeed be tedious work it to reckon up the leaſt part of all the dangerous confequences thereof; for if Adams fallen poſterity may do that, which may be of more conſideration in point of equity, &c. as you expreſſe. Then it followes, that mans fall is no prejudice at all, but matter of advantage rather.

Againe, hence 'twill follow, that God hath no reſpect to the ſtate of the perſon acting, whether he be in a ſtate of acceptation with God, or of rejection; but only to the action done, in that man full of enmity, may do that, which may be of greater conſideration in the eye of Gods juſtice, then what ſpotleſſe Adam could doe. Whereas touching the acceptance of the perſon, in relation to the acceptance of acts, 'tis evident from the generall current of Scripture, that the acceptance or non-acceptance of acts, principally depends on the acceptation or non-acceptation of the perſon; hence, the prayer of the wicked is an abomination to the Lord, while the prayer of the upright is his delight, Prov. 15.8. ſo God accepted Abel and his offering; Whence was his offering accepted? even from Gods free accepting the perſon, and not the perſon for the offerings ſake. But here you make God bound by equity, as much, yea more, to accept an accurſted man for his improvements ſake, then Adam a righteous man, and his righteous works: which argument directly maintaines juſtification by works and merit, in that you ſay, Man may now do what is as good or better in val… then Adam, who then ſtood by works.

To adde yet one word againſt the force of all your Arguing, upon ſuppoſition of Adams having a power to beleeve, &c. viz. Man beinging death on himſelf by breach of the firſt Covenant, the work of juſtice hereupon is to inflict death, what ever tearmes therefore are tendered to prevent death, theſe are all fruies of free-grace: though then thoſe tearmes are unatta…able by man fallen; God may, notwithſtanding without any injuſtice, ſuſpend the gift of a power anſwerable to them, though man periſh thereby. God was not bound in juſtice to offer any tearmes beſide thoſe to p. 56Adam, Doe thus, elſe thou ſhalt ſurely dye, much leſſe is he bound, to give a power correſpondent to new tearms.

Next followes your ſecond reaſon, If men putting forth themſelves, &c. and not finde grace, &c.

Touching which, I muſt affirme, that though in my former diſcourſe I gave you no ground to think I feared your opinion to comply with the opinion of Free-will in the Goſpel ſenſe, yet am I conſtrained to affirme, that the force of this ſecond reaſon, is that very opinion which may thus be proved.

If mercy putting forth their utmoſt power, and not finding grace with God, &c. may be deſtroyed for want of an executive power, without any miſcarriage or ſinfulneſſe at all in the will, then men may ſo far put forth themſelves by their own power without grace, as whereby, they may be without any ſinfulneſſe at all in the will, which is indeed to have full power of Free-will. The former whereof is the expreſſe force of your reaſon; the latter alſo plainly followes; for he that can by his own power attain to a freedome from all ſinfulneſſe in his will, cannot but have Free-will to cloſe with God; becauſe without ſuch a free cloſing with God, the will cannot be free from all ſinfulneſſe: ſo than man by his own power rendring himſelf free from, or without any ſinfulneſſe at all in his will, thereby removeth all that kept him from a power of Free-will; which you afterwards grant in owning that of Augustine, Take away mans will, and take away Hell and all.

Againe, from the concluſion of that your ſecond reaſon, compared with the former part of it, this dangerous conſequence unavoidably proceeds, viz. that man is able of himſelf to remove all the ground of his condemnation, which appears thus.

If the Scripture placeth Gods juſtice in condemnation alwayes, upon ſome ſinfulneſſe in the will, and man himſelf by improvement be able to free himſelf from all ſuch ſinfulneſſe; then man is able of himſelf to remove all the ground of his condemnation, or to ſave himſelf from deſtruction by his own improvement, not needing grace to ſalvation. The former, that Gods juſtice is cleared from the ſinfulneſſe of the will, you prove from Scripture. Againe, that man can render himſelf free from all ſuch ſinfulneſſe; this is the main ſtrength of your reaſon. The concluſion therefore neceſſarily followes, that man hath power to take away or remove p. 57the ground of his condemnation. For if God in juſtice can only deſtroy man for ſuch ſinfulneſſe; then man freeing himſelfe from all ſuch ſinfulneſſe, takes away thereby all juſt ground of condemnation; and ſo layes a ſure ground for ſalvation, which is only oppoſed by ſin.

And touching thoſe many Texts inſuing, what they prove is granted, which is, that mans condemnation is laid upon ſome ſinfulneſſe in the will; but theſe are all far from proving, that man hath power to free himſelf from all the ſinfulneſſe of the will, the ſcope of all which is to ſet out the obſtinacy of the will, in the wicked actings thereof, which is a point diſtinct from that of ſhewing the main ground of its continuing ſo perverſe: For, there is no neceſſity of ſhewing, that man wants power to ſubdue the perverſeneſſe of his will in every place, where that perverſeneſſe is ſpoken of: the grounds therefore of ſuch perverſeneſſe muſt be ſought for there, where the Holy Ghoſt diſtinctly expreſſeth it: one ſpeciall place for which, John 6.36. compared with Verſe 44. & 65. was proved to be in the diſcourſe given you. But yet among thoſe many Scriptures, I ſhall take notice of one, which you mainly ground upon; which is Acts 7.51. which you thus alleage and open.

Ye have alwayes reſiſted; now how did they reſiſt, &c. not by any defectiveneſſe of power, &c.

Whereas 'tis cleare that the former part of the Verſe layes down the ground of their perverſeneſſe firſt, as the precedent article of their condemnation, in this clauſe, ye uncircumciſed in heart; whence indeed their reſiſting aroſe; ſo that the queſtion is, whether they had power to take away this main obſtacle, the uncircumciſion of their hearts; but 'tis certaine they cannot; for this is peculiarly within Gods power, as Deut. 30.6. The Lord thy God will circumciſe thy heart. Seeing then they reſiſt from the uncircumciſion thereof, it followes, that they reſiſt through want of power, for that they need power from above to circumciſe their hearts.

And ſo all thoſe other Texts prove not at all mans not wanting a power, &c. From all which you would force in this tenent, That man wants no power to reduce his will to Gods, which is to ſay he hath a power of Free-will, as appears from that, Acts 7.51. whence you ſay, Man reſiſts not from any want of power; the p. 58ſelfe-ſame from John 5.40. Ye will not come, they wan… not power to come: though it be proved in the diſcourſe given you, that the reaſon thereof is declared to be a want of power, in Chap. 6.44.

Next you raiſe a Quere, how your opinion differs from the opinion of Free-will? Which Quere I finde you make from this ground, becauſe your opinion is feared to comply with the Arminian tenent of Free-will, as you expreſſe ſoon after the beginning of this clearing Sermon. Touching which, what I did, & do fear and finde is this; that your fifth and main aſſertion impleaded, is the ſame with that Arminian Maxime, there expreſt, facienti quod in ſe est, &c. Which opinion you take to be that of Free-will; and ſo indeed you may, for both are the ſame in effect: For if man may ſo do as to ingage God to give grace (which you affirme) he doth thereby that which is as ſurely effectuall to ſalvation; as Free-will to act ſavingly: for God cannot but performe what he hath p… miſed to man upon doing. And that this your opinion is the grand tenent of the Arminians, may be proved by the teſtimony of Doctor Robert Sanderſon, in his firſt Sermon, ad populum, on 3 Kings 21.29. § 26. where he hath this paſſage.

It appears from the premiſes, that Gods thus dealing with wick…d &c. gives no warrant or strength at all, either to that popiſh or currupt doctrine of Meritum congrui, in deſerving the firſt grace, by the right uſe of naturals, or to that rotten principle and foundation of the whole frame of Arminianiſme, facienti quod in ſe eſt, Deus non poteſt, non debet denegare gratiam.

Which latter is your very opinion; for, if man may do ſuch things as whereupon God hath promiſed to give grace (which you affirm) then man may ſo do, as wherupon God neither ought nor can deny grace; becauſe God for his truth and faithfulneſſe ſake, neither can, not ought to violate his owne ingagements; ſo that by maintaining your fifth aſſertion, as a tenent ſo neceſſary, you uphold the rotten foundation of the whole frame of Arminianiſme.

The ſame alſo may be further proved out of Dr. Twiſſe his diſpute about Mr. Perkins and Arminius, where Sect. 2. lib. 3. upon the ſixth errour, Mr. Perkins charges the Arminian School…men, with this very tenent thus, Si faseret, De… adjuvants, quod in ſe eſt, Deus illum illuminaret ſupernaturali gratia.

Yea further, leſt it be thought, the Arminians may be wronged, Arminius himſelf repeats this very tenent, more plainly, in his p. 59reply immediately following; yea, which is very conſiderable, he labours to prove it after that very manner, as you doe, by making God ingaged by promiſe, as in theſe words.

Annon iſto dicto Chriſti, babenti dabitur, promiſſio iſta contin…atur, qua Deus ſpondet ſe gratia ſupernaturali illuminaturum, qui lumine naturali recte utetur, a…t ſalt… utetur minus male.

Which text, to him that hath ſhall be given, Arminius produceth, inſtead of thoſe Texts of yours, ask and you ſhall have, &c. whence he affirmes the ſame with you, ſaying, that by that promiſe, to him that hath ſhall be given; God ingages himſelfe to enlighten with ſupernaturall grace, ſuch as rightly uſe naturall light, or at leaſt; who will uſe it, as much as he can, leſſe evilly.

So that touching the great difference you make between your opinion, and that of Free-will, as if yours were not Arminian, 'tis plain, Arminius holds the one as ſtrongly as the other: yours oppoſed, he plainly holds, and labours ſo to prove it, as you do; for inſtead of perfect free-will, he acknowledgeth ſome defect in the will, as by that his expreſſion, leſſe evilly, whereby granting ſome ſinfulneſſe therein.

Yea, that Arminius holds both opinions; how contradictory ſoever to each other, I finde expreſly in Doctor Twiſſe, in his third book and first digreſſion, touching the ſenſe of that Text, to him that hath ſhall be given, as appears by this ſentence. Quamvis requirant gratiam ad r…te …dum naturalibus, …amque ſupernaturalem, tam…u i…rerd… diſer…e d…ce…, bo…inem iſta natura vipra…are poſſe, which he there proves from C…rvinu…: It appeats therefore from theſe teſtimonies, that your opinion of ingaging God to give grace, &c. which you go about to quit them from, is moſt uſuall amongſt them, being more plauſible; and that which denies a neceſſity of ſupernaturall grace, is but rarely found among them.

And touching your complyance with both theſe opinions, as their former is your fifth aſſertion, ſo the latter of Free-will in the gro…ſt ſenſe, is directly maintained, by the force of your ſecond reaſon, as is before proved.

Furthermore, ſeeing you profeſſe your …nd in all, to be the prev…ning of ſuch … p…eſſions, … are given by the most againſt the Arminians (… diſcourſe, … in the …d of this Sermon … intimated) it ſeems meet to …quaint you, …ow greatly you p. 60have croſt your own deſigne, and that by the ſecond and maine point of difference, which you make between your opinion and theirs. For whereas you there charge them with this, as their main and only tenent, viz. That man hath power to produce a ſaving act, without any ſupernaturall aſſiſtance, it appears from thoſe words preſcript; Quamvis requirant gratiam, &c. ſupernaturalem; that when they are their Crafts-maſters, they do, and that generally, require ſupply of ſupernaturall grace; ſo that you ſeem uncharitably to take them alwayes at the worſt.

In which alleaging of theſe teſtimonies, though I cannot but acknowledge my prolixity, yet muſt I partly juſtifie it, from the neceſſity thereof, even to eſtabliſh that truth by the mouth of two or three witneſſes, which being only affirmed before, you did ſo lightly put by.

And yet muſt I adde one word, to minde you of your politick method, uſed about denying your tenent to be Arminian; that whereas their opinion of Gods being ingaged, &c. (given in thoſe words, facienti quod in ſe eſt, &c.) is directly yourfifth aſſertion; and their main maxime you wholly neglect to prove, wherein your opinion differs from that maxime, contenting your ſelf only to ſhew how it differs from another Arminian opinion, which you were not at all charged with: ſo that ſtill your opinion lyes under this heavie charge, of being the main… foundation of the whole frame of Arminianiſme, which is now made good by clear evidence.

Next you raiſe a queſtion touching the difference between an executive and willing power, or a principle drawing out that power into act, &c.

The occaſion of your opening which diſtinction, I finde to be from a paſſage in my diſcourſe given you; where 'tis denied, that man hath an executive power to believe, which now you would farther prove.

In opening of which power you ſeem to contradict yourſelf, for you take it to be a power, whereby to act, and yet by thoſe inſtances, you underſtand that to be an executive power, which cannot inable to act: you ſay A rich man hath an executive power to be liberall, whilſt of a penurious diſpoſition, though by that power he is never the nearer being liberall: but how contradictory is it to ſay, A man by means of ſuch a thing, hath power to ex… ſuch a worke, though by that thing be is never the nearer execution p. 61thereof; by this you ſeem to nullifie that power in reſpect of inabling to an act, which you call a power to act.

Again, you ſay he hath an executive power to do, though that power be defective touching doing, but that which is defective in order to an act, cannot be a power to act, for a power to act is inconſiſtent with defectiveneſſe, or want of power; power and want of power are contraries.

But for brevity ſake, I ſhall endeavour to grant the utmoſt extent of your inſtances, viz. A penurious rich man hath ſuch a power in him, in order to acts of liberality, as an Infant hath principles of reaſon and underſtanding, which may of themſelves in an ordinary way of nature, become executive to anſwerable acts, without any ſuper-naturall infuſion; ſo a rich penurious man hath ſuch principles as by conſideration, councell, &c. may be inclined to liberality, without a ſuper-naturall change of thoſe principles, but yet whilſt penuriouſly diſpoſed, he is as far, or farther, from an executive power, as a willing; as a child is in the caſe given.

And thus may the reſt be underſtood, As that Gen. 31.…9. 'tis in the power, &c. that is, he had a ſufficiency of outward ſtrength and ſuch a naturall principle of revenge, as might act revenge, if not hindered by an extraordinary hand, and ſo, have not I power to eate, &c. man hath a naturall receptive faculty for that end.

The tenour of which inſtances being thus conſidered, the maine is to examine; what is in them to ſerve your purpoſe, which is to prove, that a man hath an executive power to beleeve: Between which inſtances, and the things you would prove, there is as vaſt a diſ-proportion, as between naturall and ſupernaturall acts, for all that theſe prove, is but that men have an executive power to performe ſuch acts, as may be done without ſupernaturall influence, as to be liberall, to frequent the Ordinances, or (to ſpeak in your own language) to ſin, revenge, eate, drink, &c. Now 'twere moſt unadviſed to conclude, becauſe men have an executive power to the externall acts of Religion, frequenting the Ordinances; to acts naturall, eating, drinking; morall, as to be liberall, &c. that therefore they have a like power to ſupernaturall acts. Of all which inſtances, the moſt genuine ſcope, is to prove mans free-will to beleeve, for the main Argument of both your Sermons, is touching mans power towards attaining faith, which power p. 62you call executive, which ſo called, you demonſtrate by making it like that power which thoſe inſtances hold forth… but to all thoſe ſeverall acts, the perſons reſpectively have a power of free will; thoſe concerning men have, becauſe all thoſe acts may be done by man in his pure naturalls, thoſe which concern God are much more within his power to will, as they are acts requiring power, for God is not capable of receptive power (though God wills not …ſe…ring acts) therefore in making mans executive power to come to Chriſt, or beleeve, to be ſuch as thoſe inſtances have, you neceſſarily make man to have Free-will …o beleeve, elſe all thoſe inſtances are to no purpoſe.

In briefe thou a man cannot be ſaid to have an executive power to any act, but what he can voluntarily do, and is within the li…e of that power, ſo as to ſtand in need of no ext…ordinary divine aſſiſtance; 'tis contradictory to ſay an executive power cannot execute of it ſelfe, for if a ſupernaturall power muſt co-operate to execution, then the other power cannot be executive, but the work of faith cannot be executed, without a divine power infuſed (which you elſe-where grant) therefore man cannot have an executive power to beleeve, till he be ſo inſpired; inſteed therefore of a willingneſſe to draw out an executive power to act faith which you ſpeak of there muſt be a putting in a new power, before any drawing out to act can be.

To and this therefore, I deſire to know directly what this power is by name, which you call executive, for it forms not imaginable, that the name executive ſhould be any other then a nick name of ſuch a power as cannot execute. Who ever then can diſtinguiſh between an executive power, or a principle whereby to act, (…syo…pl…mit) and ſuch a principle as … produce a…act, ſuch a one will doubtleſſe out the hair indeed.

But yet between your unfolding the diſtinction of powers, you inſert two particulars, one is a quaere about Ar… T…s, which is for ſubſtance the ſame with your opening the diſ…ce, between your opinion, and that of free will, which being already …ale with, I paſſe over.

The other particular is an Objection from Joh…: 44. Which in the …i…o… given you, is …llendged, … through was of power; which for anſwer, you …; Now … come▪ … p. 63put forth himſelf in any ſuch way, wherein God hath promiſed to meet him with grace.

By which expreſſion, No man can come, you underſtand can proceed ſo far in a way of nature, in order to grace, as wherein God hath promiſed to meet him with grace; but this deſtroyes the ſenſe, for 'tis moſt evident, that the expreſſion cometh imports a coming to life with ſaving grace, which might be proved from many other Texts, ſome whereof are given in that diſcourſe, as John 5.40. ſo John 6.37. He that cometh to me, which imports coming with ſaving faith; which place you have underſtood ſo. Now there is a great contrariety between theſe, for mans doing that wherein God hath promiſed to meet him with grace, is a doing by himſelf without grace; upon which doing, you ſay, God meets with grace; but the comming here is a ſaving comming, or unto life by ſaving grace; therefore not a comming in the courſe of naturall abilities, to meet with grace thereupon.

Againe, there appears not the leaſt ground for ſuch an interpretation, becauſe here is never a word ſpoken of pawing forth in a courſe of nature, but of comming to Chriſt, or believing (which in the diſcourſe given, are proved to be tearms equivalent) nor yet is there the leaſt tittle of a promiſe of meeting man with grace upon comming.

And for that clauſe, except my Father draweth, which you expound, except be interpoſe with ſome greater power then ordinary's that you underſtand thereby, Gods inabling to improve naturals to the utmoſt, in order to grace, is plaine, in that you make Gods interpoſing to be a carrying of man ſo far in a courſe of nature, as wherein God hath promiſed to meet him with grace, and ſo you make Gods drawing to be, but by way of preparation unto grace, promiſed thereupon; againſt which 'tis evident, 'tis ſuch a drawing as whereby man commeth unto Chriſt, or believeth both being one; therefore drawing is an act of divine power, working ſaving-grace, and not a carrying of man ſo to do, as upon which doing, God will afterwards meet him with the gift of grace. Afterwards you adde another Expoſition, no man hath any foreſight of any compleat power of comming; which implyes, man hath in himſelf a power to come to Chriſt, before Gods drawing; ſo that by drawing; God only gives him ſight of that power: But this directly oppoſeth the words which are, no man can or hath a p. 64power to come; he ſaith not, no man hath a ſight that he can come.

For eſtabliſhment of which expoſition, you re-aſſume your diſtinction of powers already dealt with; by opening of which executive power to come to Chriſt, you make mans power of comming to Chriſt, or believing, to be a power of Free-will, as is before proved from the inſtances.

After that, you expreſly conclude from what is delivered in that Sermon, The neceſſity of your fifth aſſertion, touching Gods promiſing grace, &c.

Concerning all which, to ſpeak truly ſuppoſing theſe two Arguments (which you ſay are for the clearing of the whole buſineſſe) were unanſwerable, yet would they be far from ſuch a clearing; for all the arguing of Men or Angels ſhall never prove this, without bringing a promiſe of God for it; which throughout this Sermon you no where attempt, though all your former texts pretended to containe ſuch promiſes alleaged in your former Sermon, are prowed wholly impertinent, in that diſcourſe given in. The thing you would prove by theſe Arguments is, That God is ingaged by promiſe to naturall improvers; but if this promiſe be ſuch as God hath been graciouſly pleaſed to make (which you affirme) then you cannot prove ſuch a promiſe by Argument, but only from expreſſe exhibition; becauſe what God doth of Free-grace, can proceed from no ground or reaſon, but his own freeneſſe, for which, being Gods eſſence, no reaſon can be given.

Yes, of all grounds, that whereon you build the ſtrength of all your Arguments; namely, the vindication of Gods juſtice, muſt needs be moſt weak: it ſeems of all reaſonings moſt abſurd, to ſay God cannot but freely promiſe grace, becauſe his juſtice binds him to it. And ſeeing you expreſſe your maintaining that aſſertion to be of ſo great neceſſity for upholding the truth, &c. of the Goſpel. I wonder you omit, both the juſtifying it, by any one Scripture, after all the Scriptures alleaged are proved contrary; and likewiſe the vindicating it from thoſe pernicious conſequences, which in the diſcourſe given you, are ſhewed to be moſt inevitably deduceable thence; becauſe in what degree that ſuffers, whereon you make the truth, grace, &c. to depend; ſo much muſt the truth, grace, and uprightneſſe of the Goſpel, &c. ſuffer.

And touching that of Auguſtine, take away, &c. if it be compared with a paſſage immediately foregoing, which is, that men p. 65may be deſtroyed without any malignancy in their wils, both put together, plainly make man to have power of Free-will; for you make taking away all malignancy of will to be within mans power, which being taken away, nothing hinders from Free-will.

Next you further refer this controverſie to your disputes againſt the Arminians; diverſe things, wherein eſpecially in the two laſt Exerciſes, ſeem juſtly liable to exception, but I ſhall decline further dealing there with on this ground, becauſe the ſubſtance thereof is repeated in this Sermon: and though I intended to have added a word about that Text, To him that hath ſhall be given, I ſhall wholly omit it, referring to that learned diſcourſe of Doctor Twiſſe upon the ſenſe thereof, in his Third Book fore-cited.

Touching the uſe you make of all, in which is implyed your great care in all this, to ſtudy out mollifying, and to prevent harſh expreſſions, which (as you intimated in diſcourſe) are given out by most againſt the Arminians; I may not unfitly inſert a paſſage which you uſed againſt the Arminians, being here fitly applicable, viz. While you go out of the Kings high-way in relation to Free-grace, and ſeek out by-wayes of mans ingaging God by improvement, cenſuring Gods juſtice, the freeneſſe of his grace, &c. you hereby fall into worſe wayes, though you endeavour ſo to pave them, that they may ſeem moſt ſmooth.

And whileſt you profeſſe great care againſt harſh unſavoury expreſſions, &c. I know not what expreſſions can be more harſh then ſuch, as belch out ſuch calumny againſt the justice of God, the freeneſſe of his grace, &c. of which it may fitly be ſaid, who art thou that replieſt againſt God? nor know I with whom ſuch expreſſions can be ſavoury after triall, except with the Arminians themſelves.

And touching your Apology, I commend this Quare to ſerious conſideration, whether it would not be a more ingenuous way of Apologizing to diſclaime your own errour, and with that mouth to juſtifie that truth wherby you have condenmed it, rather then to pleaſe your ſelf with this ſaying. If ſo be we cannot come to expreſſe our ſelves, &c. We ſhall content our ſelves with ſome ſuch manner of excuſe as this is, That God hath not given us that ability and faculty of utterance and expreſſions, and that we conceive the buſineſſe better in our mindes, then we are able to give account of to others? Which I the rather refer to conſideration, becauſe of that fluency p. 66of utterance and expreſſion, which God hath vouchſafed you above many.

And ſeeing you conclude, The Scripture affords ſuitable expreſſions for this matter, and that ſuch are here moſt neceſſary, I wonder you omit ſearching out ſuch from Scripture; and inſtead thereof take upon you ſo hard a task, as to create or frame Goſpel, or promiſe of grace, out of reaſon and argument, without any Scripture-proof.

And touching your advice, cloſing up all; ſeeing in my former diſcourſe I endeavoured to pleade for the truth of God. I have in this endeavoured (according to Gods aſſiſtance vouthſafed) to quallifie that hardneſſe, which your Arguments have attempted to caſt upon it.

Yet one word more, touching your ſcope in propounding and maintaing your fifth aſſertion, ſeeing you hold it ſo neceſſary for the encouraging of naturall men, I wonder you wholly omit to teach them what particular duties are to be done by them in this way of improvement: For whileſt you tell them, If they put forth themſelves to do what God hath inabled them in a way of nature, they may do ſuch things as whereunto God hath promiſed grace, you neglect to tell them what thoſe things are. Now you know, Dolus latet in generalibus, deceit lyes in generals; and therefore in the iſſue ſuch generall tearms muſt needs become ſnares of deceit to naturall men, who after doing ever ſo much, are ſtill left to ſeek out what actions they be, upon which God hath promiſed grace, which tearms (to retort upon you with your own language) are indeed like to the demanding to catch all the fiſhes in the ſea, or foules of the aire; or like the leading men into a Laby…inth, o… into the middle of the boundleſſe Ocean, and there leaving them: For you give naturall men a boundleſſe task of doing ſuch things as whereto God hath annexed grace by promiſe; but what or how many thoſe things are, is not at all ſhewed, but is left to their own judgement; which being wholly erroneous, muſt neceſſarily lead them to preſumption or diſpaire. Much like in ſome reſpect to the doctrin of many heretofore, urging in generall a neceſſity of legall terrou…s, before any true comfort could be had, by which means multitudes have laid lo…ds of per… upon themſelves one after another; and after all, find… no more ground comfort then at the beginning, becauſe they can ſin…e not Scripture p. 67Standard to meaſure ſuch qualifications by. Seeing then you count this doctrine (of naturall mens doing ſuch things as whereupon God hath promiſed grace) ſo neceſſary; you may do well in a matter ſo weighty, not to lead and leave them to be beguiled by generals; but let them know in particular, what, and how many actions they are to do, upon doing whereof God hath promiſed grace; that ſo after they have finiſhed ſuch a tale, they may ſing a Quietus eſt to their ſoules through confidence of their happy ſtate, as the Papiſts do, upon their Opus aperatum, after they have mumbled over the full tale of their prayers, according to the number of their Beads.

And now in anſwer to your method, I ſhould ſhut up all with a word of uſe, which may be firſt for caution to ſuch as take upon them to promote the truth of God, viz. foraſmuch as errour is of ſo bewitching a nature, as that men are apt to maintain one errour by the broaching of others worſe, rather then to relinquiſh and diſclaim the firſt, this ſhould provoke ſuch perſons in ſpeciall, to great jelouſie againſt every errour, leaſt one errour received prove an in-let to more and worſe.

Or ſecondly, by way of direction to men, both in improving the meanes of grace, and in tryall of their ſtate.

Firſt, then for direction in improving; firſt negatively, let no man becauſe he labours, in the ſtrength of his naturalls, to improve the outward meanes of grace, therefore addreſſe himſelf to God, with this confidence; Lord I have endeavoured with utmoſt intention, &c. Therefore do thou, according to thy promiſe made to theſe improvements, give me ſaving grace, for this is to miſt in lying vanities, and to go to God with a lye in ſteed of a promiſe, becauſe God hath made no ſuch promiſe; but contrarily, in all thine improvements, acknowledge with thankfulneſſe Gods long ſuffering, and freedome of diſpenſation, who might in juſtice have hurld thee from out of the womb, the place of thy ſinfull conception, into hell the place of endleſſe woe, as he hath done multitudes; and may now juſtly leave thee in all thy improvements, to go with the five fooliſh Virgins to the gate, through which the wiſe Virgins entred in, …nd yet ſhut thee for ever out of the bride chamber; nevertheleſſe waite thou in Gods preſcribed way, abhorring thy ſelf in all thine endeavours, as being ſo far from ingaging God to give grace, as that the loathſomeneſſe of them all may juſtly provoke God for ever to ſuſpend his grace from thee.

p. 68Again, in point of tryall, ſing not this requiem to thy ſoul, I have earneſtly laboured to reach the terms of the Covenant of Grace, therefore certainly God hath added thereto the work … faith, becauſe otherwiſe the Goſpell could not be a Covenant of Free-Grace; but contratily, examine whether the powers of nature in thee, be ſo carried up above themſelves, by divine operation as that they renounce, and abhor thy moſt choyce improvements, as having no worth, no comfort in them, and in ſteed thereof do cleave vigorouſly, and intirely unto Chriſt, as the onelyonly fountain of all true comfort; yea, all this done ſo, as in ſteed of finding matter of ſelf-boaſting in thine own improvements, thou findeſt great ground of admiring the free diſpenſation of Gods over-powring grace, working ſuch a change in thee, contrary to, & above thy ſelf; this being found may afford much comfort. But I muſt totally, though moſt abruptly, decline further progreſſe.

Sir,

Poſt Script.

HAving laid by this Work of Vindication for diverſe moneths, and that in hope of commending it, in ſome most convenient time, to your peruſall, and finding after ſo long expectation, multiplicity of occaſions, more and more flowing in unto you to the greater diſappointment of ſuch your convenient leiſure, as I hoped for, poudring withall the ſo great importance of this matter, ſo greatly concerning the doctrine of the Gospel, to which as ſupream, ſubordinate matters of order and diſcipline, ought to give the right hand of pre-eminence: I count it my duty without further delay, to crave both your peruſall therof, as alſo your impartiall care and zeal to vindicate a truth ſo choyce and fundamentall, ſo far forth as it hath been defamed, that ſo after my being made by accident, an occaſioner of your defaming truth, viz. by my former diſcourſe, I may by this be made the occaſioner of your vindicating the ſame; and that you alſo (who after your most ſolemn under-taking to deſtroy the Arminian doctrines, have laid again the main foundations thereof, and ſo according to Pauls expreſſion, have made your ſelf a tranſgreſſor) may no longer continue ſo to be, by upholding thoſe rotten principles. Which ſervice for truth, in all bumility, and reſpect committing to your timely performance, as you are a pr…mover of truth, I devote my ſelf ſteafastly to continue.

Tuus uſque ad Aras veritatis SAMUEL LANE.