Exposition of Jude, Exegesis of Jude · Verse 6 · Part 5
EXPLICATION.
The nature of the ſubject, and indeed, the very expreſſions of the Apoſtle, of not keeping, and leaving, puts us upon explaining three particulars.
1. What was the original cauſe that theſe angels made a defection; or that they kept not their firſt eſtate.
2, What was that firſt ſin whereby this defection was made, or, their firſt eſtate not kept.
3. In what degree and meaſure it was made, it being here ſaid, they kept not their, &c. but left their own, &c.
1. For the firſt.
1. God, who is infinitely and perfectly good and holy, the fountain of all goodneſſe, and goodneſſe it ſelf, was not the cauſe of the ſinfull defection of theſe angels; nor had it been juſtice in God to have condemned them, for that which himſelfe had cauſed; or to make them fall, and then to puniſh them for falling: And whereas it is objected, that God might have hindred them from falling, therefore he was the cauſe thereof. I anſwer, 1. Not every one who can hinder an evill is acceſſary to it, unleſſe he be bound to hinder it; but God was not here ſo bound. Angeli & homines ex officio debeut Deo. Deus nihil debet niſi foreign, quum ſe ipſe obſtring it ultro, ex promiſſionibus gratiae. Illi ex natur â debent; Deo natura debetur ipſa. Junius in loc. Aſſerunt malam eſſe naturā, quae immutari nullo modo poteſt. Aug. con. 2. ep. Pet.Nor oweth he any thing to any of his creatures, further then he bindeth himſelfe. Angels and men are bound to God Ex officio, by duty: nothing from God is due to them, but of his own good will and pleaſure, when freely and of his own accord he binds himſelf to them by his promiſe of grace. Angels and men owe to God all they are, all they have, all they have loſt; they are debtors to God by nature, and even nature it ſelfe is owing to God.
2. Nor ſecondly, Were the angels made to ſin (as the Manichees fondly and falſly imagined) by ſome firſt evill cauſe, which (as they held) was the original and fountain of all ſin; and whereby a neceſſity of ſinning lay upon creatures from the very being of nature, which therefore could not be changed from being evill, but was ſo, unavoidably, unalterably.
3. Nor thirdly, Do I conceive that this ſin of the angels proceeded from any error or ignorance in their underſtanding before their ſin, as if their underſtanding firſt judged that to be good, which was not, and therefore they afterwards ſinn'd in willing and embracing that good; for this were to make them erroneous before they were unholy; miſerable, before they were ſinfull; whereas the ignorance of that which ought to be known is a part of ſin, and all miſery is a fruit of ſin. *Illa ignorantia five error ſecundùm quem omnis peccans ignorat et errat, propriè non eſt cauſa peccati, ſed potius aliquid peccati. Peccat enim homo eo ipſo, quòd ratio pravè judicat. Peccat inchoativè, ſicut conſummativè peccat, in eo quod voluntas malè eligit. Nam omne peccatum quaſi duabusillis partibus conſtat, &c. Error judicii non eſt ſeparandus à peccato, ſed in plena ejus ratione includitur. Eſtius in l. 2. ſent. diſt. 22.That ignorance or error (ſaith Eſtius) whereby he who ſins is ignorant and erroneous, properly is not a cauſe of ſin, but ſomething of ſin; for a man who judgeth amiſſe, ſins inchoatively; as he whoſe will chuſeth wickedly, ſins conſummatively and compleatly; for all ſin (he ſaith) doth as it were conſiſt, and is made up of two parts, falſe judgement, and evill election; and the error of judgement is not to be ſeparated from ſin, but to be included in, and *Involvitur ignorantia malae electionis ſub ipſo malae electionis peccato, tanquam aliquid ei intrinſecum: propriè dicimus omnem qui peccat, eo ipſo quo peccat, errare: impropriè autem omnem peccantem ex errore peccare. Id. ib.involved under the ſin it ſelfe of evil election, as ſomething intrinſecall to it; and that every one who ſins, properly is ſaid to err in that he ſins, and improperly ſaid to ſin, by, or from error. And thus the ſoundeſt among the Schoolmen, anſwer the Objection againſt the poſſibility of the fal of the angels, taken from this ground, that every ſin proceeds from ignorance; which cannot (ſay they) be true of the ſin of the angels.
4. Fourthly, I conceive that ſin, being a defect, a privation of good, and a want of due rectitude, hath not properly any cauſe whereby it may be ſaid to be effected or made. Sin is not a nature or a being, for then it ſhould be a creature, and appetible (every creature deſiring it's being) and by conſequence good. Nor yet is it a meer negation of good, for then the bare abſence of any good belonging to another creature, would be a mans ſin. But ſin is a privation of that good, which hath been, and ſhould be in one. Now in regard ſin is a privation and defect, Let none (they are the words of Auguſtine) enquire after the efficient cauſe of an evill and ſinfull will, of this their being not an efficient, Nemo quaerat efficientem cauſam malae voluntatis; non enim eſt efficiens, ſed deficiens. Cauſas defectionum iſtarum, cum efficientes non ſint, ſed defiicientes, velle invenire, tale eſt, ac ſi quiſquam velit videre tenebras, vel audire ſilentium, quod tamen utrumque nobis notum eſt, ne que illud niſi per oculos, neque hoc niſi per aures, &c. Aug. l. 12. d. c. D. c. 7. Vitio depravari, nifiex nihilo facta, natura non poſſet: per hoc ut natura ſit ex eo habet, quod à Deo facta eſt; ut autem ab eo à quo facta eſt, deficiat, ex hoc, quod de nihilo facta eſt. Aug. de civ. Dei. l. 14. c. 13. Non ex conditione naturae, ſed ex dono gratiae. Aquin. par. 1. q. 63. Eſti. diſt. 7. § 9. Solum illum actum à rectitudine declinare non contingit, cujus regula eſt ipſa virtus agentis: ſi enim manus artificis eſſet ipſa regula inciſionis, nunquam poſſit artifex niſi rectè lignum incidere: ſed ſi rectitudo inciſionis ſit ab alia re gula, contingit inciſionem eſſe rectam, vel non rectam; Divina autem voluntas ſola eſt regula ſui actus, quia non ad ſuperiorem finem ordinatur; omnis autem voluntas cujuſtibet creaturae rectitudinem in ſuo actu non habet, niſi ſecundùm quod regulatur. Id. Ib.but onelyonly a deficient cauſe; for to depart from that which is chiefe and higheſt, to that which is leſſe and lower, is to begin to have an evill, and a ſinfull will: To enquire therefore after the cauſes of that defection, when as they are not efficient, but deficient, is as if a man would go about to ſee darkneſſe, or to hear ſilence: both which notwithſtanding, are known to us; the former by the eye, the later by the ear; and yet not by any ſpecies, or repreſentation, but by the privation thereof: darkneſſe cannot be ſeen, unleſſe it be by not ſeeing: nor ſilence perceived, unleſſe by not hearing.
5 The originall or beginning of the ſin of theſe Angels, was the defectibility and mutability of their own will; whereby, though for the preſent, they willed that which was good, and might have willed to have perſevered therein; yet being mutable, they might alſo will evill, and ſo fall from God. Every creature as its made of nothing, may again, unleſſe ſuſtained by God, return to nothing; and in that reſpect it was that the intellectuall creature might make a defection from him who created it, and deviate from the rule of divine righteouſneſſe: for (as St Auguſtine obſerves) the being of nature comes from hence, that its made by God: the defection of nature from hence, that its made of nothing. If there be any creatures therefore, which cannot ſin, they have not this from the condition of nature, but from the gift of the grace of God: And Aquinas ſeems to argue rightly, that according to the condition of nature, none is exempted from a poſſibility of ſinning, but only God: in regard that ſin being the declining of an act from the rectitude of the rule, it is onelyonly impoſſible for that act not to decline from rectitude, the rule of which, is the very power and will of the agent; for (as he well illuſtrates it) if the hand of the artificer, were the very rule of cutting a piece of timber, the artificer could not but cut the wood evenly and rightly; but if the rectitude of the cutting, be by another, an externall rule, the cutting may either be right, or not right. The divine will is onelyonly the rule of his act, as not being ordained to any higher end: but the will of every creature hath in its act no rectitude, but as it is regulated by the will of God, which is its ultimate end. And hence it is, that notwithſtanding the nature of the intellectuall creature was good, yet evill is ſaid to ariſe and proceed from it; and that Auguſtine ſo frequently, and others after him, aſſert, that evill hath its originall and beginning from that which was good: For though evill doth not proceed from good, (ſaith Saint Auguſtine) as that good was made by God, yet it did proceed from good, Vid. l. 1. cont. Jul. Pelag. c. 3.as that good was made of nothing, and not of God. And whereas it is objected againſt this, that a good tree cannot bring forth evill fruit; Catholica fides dicit, non prolatum eſſe malum, niſi de bono; & iniquum, niſi de juſto; ex bouis mala orta ſunt. Et de nup. & concup. c. 28. Ecce ergo ex bono oritur malum, nec fuit omnino unde oriri poſſet niſi ex bono: nec ideo tamen potuit ex bono criri malū, quia bonum factum eſt à Deo, ſed quia de nihilo factum eſt, non de Deo. Vide Auguſt. in. Enchirid. cap. 15. Nec fuit prorſus unde primitus oriretur voluntas mala, niſi ex angeli & hominis natura bona. Eſti. in l. 2. diſt. 34. §. 1.therefore evil could not ariſe from the nature of angels; and the angels could not ſin of themſelves: it's anſwered by the fore-mentioned Father, That though a good tree cannot bring forth evill fruit, yet good ground may bring forth evill plants; out of the ſame ſoil may grow both thorns and vines: and though from the good act of the will, ſin cannot ariſe, yet out of the ſame nature, may ſprout and ariſe a will either good or evill. Nor was there any beginning, from whence at firſt a ſinful will ſhould ariſe, but from the intellectuall nature which was created good. Nor doth this defectibility of the intellectuall creature at all countenance the profane cavils of thoſe, who hence would needs inferre, That God might have made the world better then he did; and that he had done ſo, if he had made the intellectual creature free from all poſſibility of ſinning. For 1. It is a Queſtion (though perhaps too curious) and by ſome learned among the Schoolmen diverſely maintained, whether it was poſſible for any creature to have been made impeccable by nature, Johan. Major. in 2 diſt. 23. q. Ambr. l. 3. de fid. ad Grat. l. c. 2. Ʋna ſola ſubſtantia divinitatis quae mori neſcit. Anima moritur, nec angelus immortalis, &c. in angelis naturae capacitas vitio obnoxia. Nec ex immortali natura habet, ſed ex gratia, ſi ſe ad vitia non mutat. Hierom in 6. Gal. Exceptâ Trinitate, omnis creatura etiamſi non peccat, tamen poteſt peccare. Aug. cont. Max. cap. 12. Jun. in Jud. Creaturarū natura coeleſtium moripotuit, quia peccare potuit. Angeli qui non peccaverunt, peccare potuerunt. Per hoc ſolus Deus habet immortalitatem, quia non cujuſquam gratiâ, ſed naturâ ſuâ, &c. Greg. de Val. q. 14. punct. 1. Aquin. 1. p. q. 63. Eſti. l. 2. d. 7. Etiamſi ab initio tales conditi fuiſſent quales nune per gratiam confirmationis facti ſunt, nec ſic tamen ex conditione naturâ impeccabiles eſſent, ſed ex dono gratiae; quod etſi hactenus naturale dici poſſet, quia cum ipſa natura datum eſſet, & in natura inſitum, eâ dem tamen naturâ, atque eſſentiâ ſalvâ, poſſet auferri. Solus Deus eſt qui non gratiâ cujuſpiam, ſed naturâ ſuâ, non poteſt, nec potuit, nec poterit peccare. Aug. l. 3. cont. Max. c. 12.or free from all poſſibility of ſinning. Some of them indeed determine it affirmatively: but herein they oppoſe the Fathers, Ambroſe, Auguſtine, and Hierome. The two former of whom teach, that, becauſe its ſaid that God only hath immortality, it follows, that he only hath immutability, and ſo by conſequence, only by nature impeccability. The ſame argument is alſo uſed by the learned Junius, who denyes that ſimply God could have made the Angels better then they are by nature, becauſe then they ſhould have been moſt conſtant in their own perfect goodneſſe by themſelves, which can only be attributed to God. Alſo to the forecited Fathers, agree the Schoolmen of the greateſt note, among whom Eſtius aſſerts, That ſuppoſing that the Angels had been from their beginning created ſuch as they are now made to be by the grace of confirmation, yet even ſo they had not been impeccable, or free from a poſſibility of ſinning, by the condition of nature, but by the gift of grace: which although it may be termed naturall, as given with, and implanted in their nature: yet it might have been taken away and removed, without the deſtruction of their nature. And he ſaith, Its no derogation from the power of God, that a Creature cannot be made by nature impeccable: for the thing ſpoken of is not in the number of poſsibles; Res de qua agitur non eſt de numero poſſibilium. Includit enim contradictionem, ut quod creatum eſt, i.e. ex nihilo productum, deficere non poſſit. Ideo non poteſt Deus facere creaturā ex natura impeccabilem, quia facere non poteſt ut creatura non fit creatura. Siquidem eo ipſo quo creata eſt, defectibilis eſt, Deo potente ſubtrabere vel eſſe, vel operari, vel ipſius operationis rectitudinem, ex quo manifeſtum eſt, non negatione, ſed poſitione creaturae per naturam impeccabilis derogari potentiae Dei. Eſt. in 2. ſent. Diſt. 7. § 9.and it is a contradiction to ſay, that a Creature, that is, a thing made of nothing, ſhould not be able to change, and that therefore God cannot make a creature by nature immutable, becauſe he cannot make that a creature ſhould not be a creature; which as ſuch, is defectible, God being alwayes able to withdraw its being, or the operation of its being, or the rectitude of its operation. Whereby (ſaith he) its manifeſt, that not by the denying, but by the granting that a creature may be impeccable by nature, we derogate from the power of God.
But 2. I anſwer with Aquinas p. 1. q. 36. a. 2. that God appointing an inequality in the things which hee created, hereby made the world after the beſt manner. The perfection of the whole, requires, that there ſhould be an inequality in the ſeverall Creatures, that ſo there might be all degrees of goodneſſe made up: and this is one degree of goodneſſe, that ſomthing be ſo good, that there ſhould bee an impoſſibility for it ever to ſwerve from its goodneſſe; and another degree of goodneſſe is, that ſome things ſhould bee made defectible, and in a poſſibility of leaving their goodneſſe. And as the perfection of the world requires, that there be not only incoruptible, but alſo corruptible creatures; ſo likewiſe, that there ſhould be ſome things defectible from goodneſſe. If angels might have been made more excellent in themſelves, yet not in relation to that goodly order, and admirable beuty which God hath cauſed in the world, by making them in that capacity wherein they were created. A Captain, a Colonel, are better then a common ſouldier in an army; but yet its better for the order and beuty of the army, that ſome ſhould be common ſouldiers, and commanded, than that all ſhould be Officers and Commanders. And God (as *Aug. Ench. c. 11.27. Melius judicavit de malis bene facere, quam mala nulla eſſe permittere.Auguſtine ſaith) thought it better to bring good out of that which was evil, then not at all to ſuffer evil to be. For he that is perfectly good, would not ſuffer evil in his works, unleſſe he were ſo omnipotent, as to bring good out of that evil.
2. By way of explication of this ſecond branch, 2d Branch.it may be enquired, what was that first ſin, whereby this defection was made, or this firſt eſtate of the angels not kept. And here ſundry opinions offer themſelves.
Some falſly expounding that place of Gen. 6.2. Philo. Orig. Joſephus, Irenaeus, Juſtin Mart. in Apol. pro Chr. Clem. Alex. ſtrom. l. 3 Tertul. l. de hab. mul. Lactant.The ſons of God ſaw the daughters of men, that they were fair, and they took them wives, &c. imagined, that the angels being taken with the love of women, ſinn'd by luſt. Strange it is, that ſo many learned men among the ancients, ſhould embrace an opinion ſo flatly oppoſite to Scripture and reaſon. For not to ſpeak of the ſpirituall nature of angels, whereby they are incapable of Carnall and ſenſible pleaſures, or of the different nature of their (by ſome ſuppoſed) bodies from ours, theirs being (if they be at all) not compounded of the elements, but ſo pure, and thin, that its impoſſible they ſhould be fit for generation; the Scripture plainly teacheth that the angels fel from their integrity before there were any daughters of men in being; beſides, Chriſt tels us, that the angels in heaven neither marry, nor are given in marriage, Mat. 22.3. Others conceive that the firſt ſin of the angels was hatred of God; Odium omne ex amore eſt. Naſcitur odium Dei tanquam prohibentis amantem ab eo quod inordinatè amat. Eſt. in 2. l. ſent. diſt. 6. §. 2.the adhering of the angels unto God being by love, their departure from God (they ſay) muſt needs be by hatred; but this opinion ſeems falſe, becauſe hatred of God muſt needs proceed from inordinate love of ſomething elſe, God being hated becauſe he hinders the creature from ſomething which it loves inordinately. Hatred therefore could not be the firſt ſin, but the irregular affecting of ſomething elſe, or ſome other ſin.
A third opinion is of thoſe who hold, that the firſt ſin of theſe angels, was envying the dignity of man, in being created after the image of God; but this is confuted by Auguſtine, who ſaith, That pride muſt needs go before envy; and that envy was not the cauſe of pride, but pride the cauſe of envy; for none can by envy hate anothers excellency, unleſſe by pride he firſt inordinately love his own, Superbi endo invidus, non invidendo quiſquam ſuperbus eſt. Aug. Invidus ex hoc, de bono alterius dolet, in quantum bonum alterius aeſtimat ſui boni impedimentum. Aquin. 1. p. q. 63. a. 2. Bern. in Cant. ſer. 22. Greg. l. 34. moral. c. 14. Ambroſ. in Pſal. 37. Hierom. in Eſ. 14. Auguſt. l 12. de Civ. Dei c. 6. Ab illo qui ſummus eſt averſi ad ſe converſi ſunt, & hoe vitium nihil aliud eſt quam ſuperbia. Proprium objectum ſuperbiae eſt excellens menſuram à Deo praefixam. Bona vero ſpiritualia cum ſecundum ſe exceſſiva eſſe non poſſunt, conſequens eſt, ut ex hoc primum habeant rationem vitioſi appetibilis, ex quo primum habent rationem excedentis & in commenſurati alicui; hoc autem conſtat eſſe divinam diſpenſationem & regulam: Cajetan. in 1. p. ſum. q. 63. a. 2. Quid eſt ſupcrbia niſi perverſae celſitudinis appetitus? Aug. de civit. D. l. 14. cap. 13.which he apprehends to be impaired by anothers.
A fourth (to adde no more) and the moſt probable opinion, is, of thoſe who hold that the firſt ſin of theſe angels was pride. And this is the opinion moſt received and commonly embraced by the Fathers: and after them received generally by the Schoolmen and others. Aquinas ſeems ſtrongly to prove, that it could be no other ſin but pride. A ſpirituall nature (and ſuch is the angelicall) can only (ſaith he) affect ſome ſpiritual object, as being that which is only agreeable to it; now there can be no ſin in affecting ſpirituall objects, which in themſelves are good, unleſs it be becauſe in affecting of them, the rule of the ſuperiour is therein not obeyed; and this is the ſin of pride. For the proper object of pride (ſaith Cajetan) is ſomething exceeding that meaſure prefixed and limited by God. Now in regard ſpirituall things cannot be exceſſive, nor can we have too much of them in reſpect of themſelves, becauſe the more of them the better; it followes, that then they come to be ſinfully deſired, when they begin to exceed, and to become incommenſurate to the divine rule and diſpenſation: the affecting them in which inordinate meaſure, namely, beyond the limits preſcribed by God, was the ſin of pride in the angels. That this pride then, or an affecting (as Auguſtine calls it) of ſome ſpirituall highneſs, beyond the bounds of Gods will, was the firſt ſin, ſeems very probable by reaſon; but more then probable by that of Paul, 1 Tim. 3.6. where the Apoſtle gives this reaſon, why a Biſhop muſt be no novice, Ne ob ſuperbi am incidat in eandem damnationis poenam cum diabolo. Eſt. in Loc.leſt (ſaith he) heing lifted up with pride, he fall into the condemnation of the divell; in which place I underſtand not why the Apoſtle expreſſeth the condemnation or puniſhment of the divel to deterre from pride, unleſſe the divel had faln into condemnation for that ſin, and unleſſe the Apoſtle had intended to ſhew the danger of being proud, by ſetting down the puniſhment of the divel for that ſin.
But more particularly, if it be enquired, wherein this pride of the angels did conſiſt, and what that highneſſe was, which they did affect beyond their meaſure; I think, the anſwer hereunto can be but conjecturall and uncertain.
Some conceive that it was revealed to the Angels, ſoon after their creation, that the humane nature ſhould in time be hypoſtatically united to the divine, that the Son of God, in humane nature, ſhould be the head of men, yea of angels; that hereby mans nature was to be exalted above the very angels, Heb. 1.6.and that they were commanded to worſhip and ſubmit to him. Hereupon (ſay ſome) they deſired that the dignity of this union with the divine might be afforded to their own angelical nature. But (ſay others) they refuſed to conſent and ſubmit to Gods pleaſure in the former diſcovery; Vid Zanch. de op. Dei.in this (ſay they) ſtood the pride of angels. And of this opinion is Zanchy, whoſe chiefeſt argument is taken from that deadly hatred which Satan hath ever put forth againſt the doctrines of the Perſon and Offices of Chriſt, and his inceſſant oppoſing of beleeving and affiance in him.
Others conjecture (for indeed none in this point can do much more) that the angels deſired to be equal with God, and that they aſpired to the divinity it ſelf. And here they diſtinguiſh of a twofold will in the angels; 1. A will of efficacy, which others term a will of intention. 2. A will of delight and complacency. According to the former, they ſay, that the angels did not deſire to be equall with God, as if they had intended or uſed means to attain to divinity; For this the angels knew was abſolutely impoſſible; but according to the later will of complacency, they ſay, the angels might deſire to be equall to God; namely, wiſh it as a pleaſing and delightfull thing to them: as a ſick, a dying man, who deſpaires of recovery, deſires health, though not as uſing means to procure it, becauſe he judgeth it impoſſible to be obtained, yet as a good and moſt pleaſing benefit; and thus (they ſay) theſe angels had this will of delight, or a velle conditionatum, ſuch a will, whereby, if it had been poſſible to have attained to the divinity, Scotus in l. 2. ſent. diſt. 6. Eſtius in diſt. 6. §. 6.they would have uſed means to have done it; and this was the opinion of Scotus, and after him of ſundry others, who conſider the tentation that Satan laid before our firſt parents, Ye ſhall be gods: And afterward being blinded with pride, his endeavouring to have Chriſt worſhip him, and his propagating the adoration of himſelfe among heathens, under the names of ſundry gods.
The moſt probable opinion is that of Auguſtine, Suâ poteſtate delectati, velut bonum ſuum ſibi ipſi eſſent, à ſuperiore communi omnium beatifico bono, ad propria defluxerunt. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 12. c. 1. It ſeemeth that there was no other way for angels to ſin, but by reflex of their underſtanding upon themſelves, who being held with admiration of their own ſublimity and honour, their memory of their ſubordination to God, and their dependency on him was drowned in this conceit; whereupon their adoration, love, and imitation of God, could not chuſe but be alſo interrupted. Hooker. L. 1. §. 14.and after him, Aquinas, Cajetan, and others, who think that the pride of the angels, was in deſiring and reſting in their own naturall perfection, as their ultimate end. That as God is bleſſed by his own nature, having no ſuperiour from whom to draw his bleſſedneſſe, ſo did theſe angels deſire to be, and would needs reſt in the perfection of their own nature, neglecting that rule of their ſuperiour, whereby they were called to deſire the attaining ſupernaturall bleſſedneſſe by the grace of God. Or as ſome expreſſe it, this pride ſtood in a ſtaying within themſelves, a reflecting upon their own excellency, and by conſequence, an affecting an independency upon any ſuperiour vertue in being and working, making themſelves the firſt cauſe, and the laſt end of their own motions; for, ſince next unto God, every reaſonable created being is neareſt unto it ſelfe; we cannot conceive how it ſhould turn from God, and not in the next ſtep turn unto it ſelfe.
The third particular to be explained in this firſt part of the Text, Nemo ſanae fidei credit apoſtatas angelos ad priſtinam pietatem correctâ aliquando voluntate converti. Aug. ep. 107. Proſp. l. 1. de vit. contempt. c. 3. De angelis hoc Deus diſpoſuit, & implevit, ut ſi quis eorum bonitatem voluntatis perderet, nunquam eam divino munere repararet. Fulgent. l. de ſid. c. 3. Daemones nec malâ unquam poſſunt carere voluntate, nec poena. Vid. Aquin. at 1. p. q. 64. a. 2. Angeli boni non habent ex ſuâ naturâ, immutabilitatem ex bono in malum, ſed ex ſotâ gratiâ, qui tamen cum plenâ deliberatione, bonum eligerunt, atque ita nec mali habent naturâ ſuâ, immutabilitatem ex malo in bonum, ſed ex ſola privatione gratiae. Greg. de Valent. Diſp. 4. q. 15. punct. 2.is the degree and meaſure of the defection of theſe angels; they fell finally, they kept not, &c. they left their, &c. they quite forſook God, his image, heaven it ſelfe, and that office therein aſſigned unto them. And as the holy are confirmed in goodneſſe, ſo the fallen angels are hardned in the love of that which formerly they made choice of. This is intended by Chriſt, in thoſe words, John 8.44. There is no truth in him, they cannot ſo much as will to do well, but they do immovably cleave to wickedneſſe. Theſe trees, as they have faln, ſo they lie. Angels went ſo far, that they never turn; they fell ſo low, they never ariſe. This is proved from their eternall miſery, which the Scripture mentions in this verſe, and elſe where frequently; this everlaſtingneſſe of their puniſhment, including the perpetuity of their ſinning; and ſuch an eternall forſaking of them by God, that they ſhall never have righteouſneſſe repaired in them again. The ſchool-men are too curious, in inquiring into the ground of this total & final fal of the angels into ſin. Aquinas, and his followers hold, that their obſtinacy proceeds from the very nature of the wils of angels, according to which (ſay they) angels are ſo inflexible and immovable, that they can never hate that which once they have choſen, nor chuſe that which once they have hated; but, as I conceive, Valentia overthrowes this opinion, by arguing, that if the immutability of the good angels from good to evill, be not from nature, but from grace only, who yet did with ful deliberation chuſe that which was good; then the immutability of the evil angels from evil to good comes not from nature, but from the juſt and totall deprivation of grace. Others of them aſſert, That God preſerves in the wils of the divels an hatred of himſelfe, and that this preſervation is an act of punitive juſtice, and that God cauſeth that wicked habit in the wils of the divels, whereby they are neceſſarily inclined to ſin; and this impious opinion is aſſerted by Occham, Biel, and Aureolus; which I note by the way, as wiſhing that while the Papiſts behold a ſuppoſed mote in the eye of holy Calvin, they would obſerve thoſe reall beams which are in the eyes of their own moſt famous Schoolmen, as to this point of making God the Authour of ſin. But thoſe who ſpeak more modeſtly and piouſly, then either of the former, give this reaſon of the obſtinacy of the fallen angels: namely, the totall and perfect privation of all holineſſe: which is conſiderable, 1. On their part; and ſo its that defective and depraved quality (as Junius cals it) that utter impotency to all good, Qualitas defectiva.intended by thoſe words of our Saviour, [There is no truth in him,] and flowing from that defection (as its fountain) called by our Saviour, a not abiding in the truth; and here by Jude, a not keeping their firſt eſtate: which defection is ſo ſet down by Jude, Si non ſervaverunt, ſed dereliquerunt, profectò habcre deſtiterunt, & privati ſunt eo quod habebant; quod autem privati ſunt, ſemel, id eſt, foreign privati ſunt, ut qui naturam ſuam eo privaverint, quae cum non poſſit eſſe otioſa, &c. Jun. in loc.(ſaith Junius) as that this totall impotency to, and privation of all good in the angels, is alſo comprehended; For (ſaith he) what they kept not, they ceaſed to have, and were deprived of; and what they were deprived of, they loſt totally, (foreign, as he expreſſeth it) once for all, as thoſe who deprived their very nature therof. And ſince the nature of theſe angels, (though it cannot be holy, yet alſo) cannot be idle, it enclines inceſſantly to the contrary to that of which it was deprived, there following effects of the ſame kind with this conſtant privation. 2. On Gods part, who hath determined never to beſtow upon the fallen angels reliefe and aſſiſtance for their recovery, (which being denied to them, it is impoſſible that ever they ſhould turne from their ſin to God) but to deliver them totally up to the bent of their own depraved nature. God having ſo layed out their ſtate, and ordered the nature thereof, that their fall ſhould be the term of their being holy (and it's natural for every thing not to move when once arrived at it's term, Hoc eſt angelis caſus, quod hominibus mors.but there to ſtop) and that as the end of life is the term beyond which God will not offer to ſinners his grace, ſo that the fall ſhould even be the ſame to the angels, which death is to man.