Uniformity in Human Doctrinal Ceremonies, jeanes 32 – hammond 33
Jeanes.
This is a modall Syllogiſme, framed exactly according to the rules of Logick touching modall Syllogiſmes; as for that Syllogiſme which you parallel unto it, it hath no alliance with it; for both the premiſes of mine are true, and the Minor of yours is groſly and palpably falſe; for unjuſt lawes are not, in propriety of ſpeech, lawes, but are ſo termed only equivocally, as a painted, a dead man, is ſaid to be a man: turpe praeceptum non eſt lex, ſed in…quitas, for obligation is eſſentiall unto a law; now every law obligeth in the name of God, by authority derived from him, and the glorious name of God cannot oblige unto any thing that is unjuſt: the Fathers, Schoolmen and ancient Philoſophers are all ſo unanimous in aſſerting of this, and have for this their aſſertion ſuch pregnant and convincing reaſons, as that I cannot but wonder, that a man of your learning ſhould be of an other opinion; but in your next we ſhall hear what arguments you have for your diſſent: In the mean while, I ſhall deſire the Reader to take notice of the witneſſes, and reaſons produced, amongſt many others, by Suarez, and Gregory de Valentia, for what I affirme,
1. Suarez de legib. lib. 1. cap. 9. De ratione, & eſſentia legis, eſt, inquit, ut praecipiat justa: Aſſertio eſt non ſolum certa ſecundum fidem, ſed etiam clara ſecundum naturalem rationem. Et ita eam tradunt non ſolum Theologi, & Patres inferius allegandi, ſed etiam paſſim Philoſophi &c. Verum tamen haec ipſa conditio dupliciter explicari poteſt, ſcilicet vel negative, ut ſcilicet quod praecipitur, nec injuſtum, nec turpe ſit; vel poſitive, ut ſit juſtum & honestum.
Conditio ergo hae… praecipue intelligitur priori modo, & ſic eſt evidens, alia vero ratione invenitur in legibus divinis, & aliter in humanis. In divinis enim ratio eſt recti…udo per eſſentiam divinae voluntatis. Eſt enim Deus ſumme bonus, & ideo non poteſt aliquid pravum praecipere. &c.
De legibus autem humanis, hoc fundatur in alio principio. Nam legiſlator humanus men habet voluntatem perfect…m, ſicut Deus, & ideo quantum est ex ſe, & quoad factum, poteſt interdum iniqua praecipere, ut conſtat: non tamen habet poteſtatem ad obligandum per iniquas leges, & ideo licet iniqua praecipiat, tale praeceptum non est lex, quia vim, aut valorem ad obligandum non habet. &c.
Et ita eſt clara ratio aſſertion is, tum quia illa potestas, ſcilicet obligandi, est a Deo, quae tem a Deo ſunt, ordinata ſunt: Ergo eſt data in honum, & in aedificationem, non in malum, ſe… in deſtructionem: Tum etiam quia nullus inferior potest obligare contra legem, & veluntatem ſuperioris; ſed lex praecipiens pravum actum eſt contra legem Dei prohibentis illum: Ergo non poteſt obligare, quia impoſſibile eſt, homines ſimul obligari ad agendum, & non agendum aliquid: ſ… autem opus pravam eſt prohibitum lege d…vina, non poteſt lex inferioris tollere illam ſuperioris obligationem: Ergo nee potest inducere ſaam: Ergo ejus lex tali opere non poteſt eſſe valida. Et de hac juſtitia legis loquebatur Auguſt, lib. 1. de libero arbit. cap. 5. cum dixit, mihi lex eſſe non videtur, quae juſta non fuerit. Et de eadem intelligi poteſt, quod dicit lib. de vera relig. cap. 31. Conditor legum temporalium, ſi vir bonus eſt & ſapiens, legem conſulit aeternam, ut ſecundum ejus incommutabiles regulas, quid ſit pro tempore vitandum, jubendumque diſcernat. Vnde ſicut lex aeterna ſolum justa praecipit, quia eſt i…ſa juſtitia per eſſentiam, ita vero lex humanae eſſe debet participatio ejus, & ideo non poteſt valide praecipere, niſ… juſta, & homeſta, juxta illud Prov. 8. Per me Reges regnant, & legum conditores juſta decernunt.
Atque hinc ulterius concluditur, hanc conditionem, etiam poſitive intellectam eſſe de …tione legis.; quamvis non uno & eodem modo ſingulis applicanda ſit, &c.
Ex h…c aſſertione ſic declarata duo inferre poſſumus. Vnum eſt ad illam maxime pertinere primam conditionem poſitam ab Iſidoro, …cilicet, ut lex ſit honeſta, quod ex ipſa vocis proprietate▪ ſatis pate…. &c.
Secundo infertur ex dictis, legem non habentem hanc juſtitiam, ſeu honeſtatem, non eſſe legem, neque obligare, ve…um etiam nec ſervari poſſe &c.
Unto this of Suarez I ſhall adde what Gregory de Valentia hath to the ſame purpoſe, tom. 2. diſp. 7. quaeſt. 1 punct. 3. Nomen legis mag… prop…re ſignificat rectam aliquam regulam praeſcribentem communitati alicui perfectae modum neceſſarium ad bonum ejuſdem communitatis &c.
Atque hoe mod… accipit D. Thomas legem, cum infra quaeſt. 96. art. 4, inquit leges iniquas magis eſſe violentias, quam leges. Item quaeſt. 90. art. 2 & 3. Vbi defin…t, legem ad bonum commune ordinari, & ab eo, qui curam gerit communitatis ferri.
Sic etiam D. Auguſtinus lib. 1. de libero arbitrio cap. 5. leg…m accepit, cum dixit, legem non videri, quae justa non ſit. In quam ſententiam lib, 19. de civitate Dei, cap. 21. inquit etiam, non eſſe jura dicenda, vel putanda, iniqua hominum conſtituta, Atque etiam legem eſſe regulam aliquam rectam cenſuit Clemens Alexandrinus, lib. 1. Stromatum, cum dixit: legem eſse opinionens bonam, & regulam juſtorum, & injustorum. Item Plato in Dialogo primo de legibus, & in Epinome, ubi aſſeruit, finem legis eſſe Deum & cultum ejus. Item Philoſophus lib. 5. Ethi…or. cap. 1. inquiens, legalia juſta eſse factiva & conſervativa falicitatis, omnium que elariſſime Cicero lib. 2. de legitus: Conſtat, inquit, profecto adſalutem civium …ivitatum que incolumitatem, vitamque quietam, & beatam, conditas eſſe leges. Et poſt, cum dixiſſet eos, qui pernicio…a, & injuſta populis jara deſcripſiſſent, quidvis aliud potius tuliſſe, quam leges, concludit, perſpicuum eſſe in ipſo no mine leges interpretando, ineſſe vim, atque ſententiam juſti, & juris colendi.
By this you may ſee, that in your Syllogiſme there are four termes, for lawes in the Minor are taken improperly and equ…vocally, in the concluſion properly and univocally; But custome in my Syllogiſme, both in Minor and Concluſion, is taken properly and univocally, for cuſtome is predicated univocally of the moſt undecent cuſtomes.
For farther juſtification of my Syllogiſme I ſhall reduce it in like manner that Logicians reduce Syllogiſmes made in Baroco and Bocardo, to wit, with that reduction which is ad impoſſibile or per deductionem ad abſurdum: I ſuppoſe, that you will grant my premiſes, for the minor you confeſſe in terminis in the next Section; And the Major cannot be denyed with any colour of reaſon; for the rule of decency is, in ſome ſo…t, an exemplary cauſe of decency, and it is impoſſible for the exemplary cauſe of decency to be undecent. Well then, I ſuppoſe, that you grant the premiſes, and only deny, that the inference of the concluſion from theſe premiſes is legitimate; if you grant the premiſes to be true, then you grant the Propoſitions, that are contradictory unto them, to be falſe, and hereupon it will follow, that if I take the contradictory of my Concluſion, and can thence, joyned with one of my premiſes conclude, that one of the premiſes which I ſuppoſe, you grant, is falſe, hereby I ſhall convince you, that the principall concluſion, which is contradictory unto this, was true: The contradictory of my concluſion is, cuſtome is the only rule of decency (I take contradictory largely, as ſome oppoſite propoſitions are ſaid by Logicians, to be contradictory de lege) Now this I take and ſubjoyn unto my Major, and here hence I inferre the contradictory of my Minor, all which will make up this following Syllogiſme.
It is impoſſible for the only rule of Decency to be undecent.
But Cuſtome is the only rule of Decency.
Therefore it is impoſſible that any cuſtome ſhould be undecent.
But the concluſion is falſe, and, I ſuppoſe, that you grant the contradictory thereof. Now if …he concluſion be falſe, one of the premiſes muſt needs be falſe; for, ex vero …il niſi verum ſequitur. Now 'tis not the Major, for I ſuppoſe, and that with very good reaſon, that it is granted by you, therefore '…s the Minor: now the Minor is contradictory unto the concluſion which you deny, and therefore the concluſion, which you denyed, is true, viz. that Cuſtome is not the only rule of decency: for of contradictory propoſitions both cannot be true, Contradictio ſemper dividit verum à falſo.
Thus you ſee my Syllogiſme is demonſtrated to be true, demonstratione ducente ad impoſſi…ile vel abſurdum.
But for the fuller clearing of it, I ſhall propound and anſwer two objections, that I foreſee may be made againſt it, by ſuch as are not well skilled in Modal Syllogiſmes.
The firſt is, that the duo modi impoſſibile and poſſibile are repeated but once a peece in my Syllogiſme, and in a good Syllogiſme every term is to be put twice.
The anſwer unto this in breif is, that in a Modal Syllogiſme, the modus is none of the terms, but onelyonly a Syncategorematical word, ſo Vallius Introduct. Log. par. 3. cap. 12. In terminis, inquit, non numera tur modus ſicut; enim in converſione propoſitionum modus non numeratur inter praedicata vel ſubjecta, ſed eſt quid additum ill is, ſie in Syllogiſmis modalibus, modus non numeratur inter terminos, unde etiam ſaepe in Syllogiſmo modali non potest inferri concluſio '…um modo, ſed ſine illo. The very ſame thing is taken notice of by Scheibl. concerning ſuch Modal Syllogiſms as conſiſt of Modal compounded propofitions, Ihi enim inquit, quod modalis particula non habeat vel rationem ſubjecti, vel rationem praedicati; ſed ſimpliciter habeat ſe ex parte copulae: inde clarum eſt, quod in iſtis modalibus Syllogiſmis, particula modalis ter poni poteſt, nempe in ſingulis taelium Syllogiſmorum partibus, veluti: Neceſse eſt hominem eſſe animal. Neceſſe eſt Petrum eſse hominem. Ergo neceſſe eſt Petrum eſſe animal. Hîc aio, particulam neceſſe, nec habere rationem praedicati, nec ſubjecti, ſed eſſe ex parte copulae, quia in propoſitione, aſſumptione, & concluſione reperitur. At nullus terminus in Syllogiſmo ter poni…poteſt.
A ſecond objection is, that in the Modal Syllogiſmes mentioned by Ariſtotle, this mixture or combination of impoſſibile and poſſibile is not at all mentioned.
For anſwer, Ariſtotle inſtanceth in Modal Syllogiſmes, wherein there is a mixture of neceſse and contingens, and Logicians generally hold that impoſſibile is reduced unto neceſſarium and poſſibile unto contingens. Let two ſpeak for all.
1. The but now quoted Vallius in lib. 1. prior pag. 38. Impoſſibile. (inquit Philopenus) comprehenditur ſub neceſſario, quia quod eſt neceſſarium, eſt impoſſibile ut non ſit, ſicut quia homo eſt neceſſario animal, impoſſibile eſt ut non ſit animal: & eâdem ratione quod eſt impoſſibile, eſt neceſſarium ut non ſit. Similiter poſſibile comprehenditur ſub contingenti, quod enim contingit eſſe, hoe fieri poteſt, …eu eſt poſſibile, & quod poteſt non eſſe, contingit non eſſe: adeoque id, quod proprie vocatur poſſibile, concurrit cum contingenti. He quotes alſo for it, if my memory fail not, Burana affirming as much ex Alexandro.
The ſecond Author is a late one read by every Freſh-man, Burgerſdicius inſtitut. Log. lib. 2. c. 14. Propoſitiones modi impoſſibile annumerantur propoſitionibus modi neceſſe; & propoſitiones modi poſſibile, iis quae ſunt modi contingit.
Dr. Hammond. ſect. 41.
To diſcover this deceit then, the Syllogiſme, which is now no Syllogiſme, must he… ſomewhat better formed, according to the rules of Logick, and reduced, as near as it can, into a true Syllogiſme. Thus,
Whatſoever is it ſelf undecent, cannot be the onelyonly rule of Decency.
But cuſtome is it ſelf undecent.
Therefore Cuſtome cannot be the onelyonly rule of Decency.
Here before it can be defined, whether this be a regular Syllogiſme, or no? It muſt bee demanded, quanta eſt minor, is the aſſumption univerſal or particular? If it be particular, then either the concluſion muſt be particular alſo, or elſe 'tîs a falſe Syllogiſme. And if the concluſion be particular, then it inferres no more, than that ſome undecent cuſtome cannot be the onelyonly rule of decency, which is willingly granted by me, who doe not at all affirm it of undecent cuſtomes. But if the Minor be univerſal, then 'tis a falſe propoſition; for certainly all cuſtomes are not indecent. The ſhort is, Nature may bee the rule of one ſort of decency, and Cuſtome the onelyonly rule of another; yet if the cuſtome be in it ſelf indecent, then of ſuch indecent cuſtome it is not pretended, that it is either onelyonly, or at all the rule of decency. And ſo ſtill my propoſition may ſtand good, which as it belonged not to natural decency, ſo much leſse to what is by nature, or in it ſelfe undecent, never imagining it reaſonable, that what geſtures were againſt thoſe Laws of Nature, or Scripture, or any other Law of decency, or rather of naturall comelineſſe and honeſty, ſhould by pretenſe of any cuſtome whatever, be introduced into Gods worſhip: 'Tis ſufficient that ſome cuſtomes may bee decent, or in themſelves not indecent, and that all decency in the ſervice of God, is to be regulated and judged of by conformity with them: For I ſaid not, that all cuſtomes were the rule of decency, but that ſome were, and that there was no other rule, but cuſtome: This, I hope, hath diſcovered the invalidity of his ſecond Argument.