A Treatise of Monarchy, Treatise · Part 1

A Treatise of Monarchy · Treatise · Part 1

p. 1PART. I.

CAP. I. Of Politicall Government, and its Diſtinction into ſeverall Kinds.

GOvernment and Subjection are Relatives, Sect. 1 ſo that what is ſaid of the One, may in proportion be ſaid of the other: Which being ſo, it will be needleſſe to treat of both: becauſe it will be eaſie to apply what is ſpoken of one to the other. Government is Poteſtatis Exercitium, the exerciſe of a Morall Power. One of theſe is the Root and Meaſure of the other; which if it exceed, is exorbitant, is not Government, but a Tranſgresſion of it. This Power and Government is differenced with reſpect to the Governed, to wit, a Family, which is called Oeconomicall: or a publike ſociety, which is called Politicall, or Magiſtracie. Concerning this Magiſtracie we will treat 1. in generall. p. 22. Of the principall kind of it.

In generall concerning Magiſtracie, There are two things about which I find difficultie and difference, viz. the Originall, and the End.

Authority, how farre from God, how farre from Men.Firſt for the Originall: There ſeem to be two extremes in Opinion; while ſome amplifie the Divinitie therof: Others ſpeak ſo ſlightly of it, as if there were little els but Humane Inſtitution in it. I will briefly lay down my apprehenſions of the evident truth in this point: and it may be, things being clearly and diſctinctly ſet down, there will be no reall ground for contrariety in this matter. Three things herein muſt neceſſarily be diſtinguiſhed, viz. 1. The Conſtitution of Power of Magiſtracie in generall. 2. The Limitation of it to this or that kind. 3. The Determination of it to this or that Individuall Perſon or Line.

For the firſt of theſe, 1. It is Gods expreſſe Ordinance that in the ſocieties of Mankind, there ſhould be a Magiſtracie or Government. At firſt when there were but two, God ordeyned it, Gen. 3.16. S^t. Paul affirmes as much of the Powers that be, none excepted, Rom. 13 1. 2 This Power where ever placed ought to be reſpected as a participation of divine Soveraignty, Pſal, 82.1.6. and every ſoule ought to be ſubject to it for the Lords ſake 1 Pet. 2.13. that is, for conſcience ſake of Gods Ordinance, Rom. 13.5. and under penaltie of Damnation, v. 2. Theſe are Truths againſt which there is no colour of oppoſition. Indeed this Power may be claymed by them who have it not; and where there is a limitation of this Power, ſubjection may be claymed in caſes which are without thoſe limits: But to this Ordinance of Power where it is, and when it requires ſubjection, it muſt be given; as before.

For the ſecond. 1. In ſome particular communities the Limitation of it to this or that kind, is an immediate Ordinance of God: ſo Kingly Power was appointed to the Jewes on their deſire, 1 Sam. 8.9. whether they had not a kind of Monarchicall Government before, I will not ſtand on it: but it is evident that then, on their earneſt deſire God himſelfe condeſcended to an eſtabliſhment of Regalitie in that p. 3ſtate. 2. But for a generall binding Ordinance, God hath given no word, either to command or commend one kind above another: Men may according to their Relations to the forme they live under, to their affections and judgements in divers reſpects, preferre this or that form above the reſt; but we have no divine limitation: and it were an abſurditie to think ſo; for then we ſhould uncharitably condemne all the Communities which have not that form for violation of Gods Ordinance and pronounce thoſe other Powers unlawfull. 3. This then muſt have another and lower fountain to flow from, which can be no other then Humane. The higher Power is Gods Ordinance: That it reſideth in One, or more; in ſuch or ſuch a way is from humane deſignment: for when God leaves a matter indifferent, the reſtriction of this indifferencie is left to ſecondary cauſes. And I conceive this is S^t. Peters meaning, when he calls Magiſtracie foreign, Humane Creature; S. Paul calls it Gods Ordinance, becauſe the Power is Gods: S. Peter calls it humane Ordinance, becauſe the ſpecification of it to this or that form, is from the ſocieties of Mankind. I confeſſe it may be called a humane Creature, in regard of its ſubject, which is a Man, or Men: or its End which is to rule over Men for the good of Men, but the other ſeems more naturall and it induces no diſparagement to Authority, being ſo underſtood. But how ever you take that place, yet the thing affirmed ſtands good, that God by no word binds any people to this or that form, till they by their own Act bind themſelves.

For the third: the ſame is to be ſaid of it, as of the ſecond: ſome particular men we find whom God was pleaſed by his own immediate choiſe to inveſt with this his Ordinance of Authority: Moſes, Saul, David, yea God by his immediate Ordinance determined the Government of that people to Davids poſteritie and made it ſuccesſive; ſo that that People after his appointment and word was made known to them, and the room voyd by Sauls death, was as immediately bound by divine Law to have David, and his Sonnes after him to be Magiſtrates, as to Magiſtracie it ſelfe. But God hath not done ſo for every people: aſcriptum eſt cannot be alledged for p. 4the endowing this or that perſon or ſtock with Soveraignty over a community: They alone had the priviledge of an extraordinary Word. All others have the ordinary and mediate hand of God to enthrone them: They attaine this determination of Authority to their Perſons by the tacite and virtuall, or elſe expreſſe and formall conſent of that Society of men they governe, either in their owne perſons, or the root of their ſucceſsion, as I doubt not, in the ſequele it will be made appeare. But let no man thinke that it is any leſſening or weakning of Gods Ordinance in them, to teach that it is annexed to their Perſons by a humane Meane: for though it be not ſo full a title to come to it by them ſimple Providence of God, as by the expreſſe Precept of God: yet when by the diſpoſing hand of Gods Providence a Right is conveyed to a perſon or family, by the meanes of a publique Fundamentall Oath, Contract and Agreement of a State, it is equivalent then to a Divine Word; and within the bounds of that publique Agreement the conveyed Power is as Obligatory, as if an immediate word had deſigned it. Thus it appears that they which ſay there is divinum quiddam in Soveraignes, and that they have their power from God, ſpeake in ſome ſence truth; As alſo they which ſay that originally Power is in the People, may in a ſound ſence be underſtood. And in theſe things we have Dr. Ferns conſent in his late diſcourſe upon this ſubject. Sect. 3.

Sect. 2 For the end of Magiſtracie; to ſet out that is no hard matter,Whether the end of Government be the peoples good? if we conſider what was looked at when God ordeyned it. That was the Good of the ſociety of men over which it is ſet: So Saint Paul, Rom. 13.4. foreign. God aymed at it in the Inſtitution of Government: and ſo do all men in the choice of it, where they may be chooſers: ſuch a Government, and ſuch perſons to ſway it, as may moſt conduce to publique Weale. Alſo it is the meaſure of all the Acts of the Governour: and he is good or bad according as he uſes his Power to the good of the State wherewith he is intruſted. That is the end: but not the ſole end; The preſervation of the Power and Honour of the Governour p. 5is an end too: but I thinke not co-ordinate, but ſubordinate to the other: becauſe doubtles in the Conſtitution of Government, that is firſt thought on, and this in congruity to that; Alſo the reaſon why the Power and Honour of the Magiſtrate muſt be preſerved, is for the publique ſocieties ſake becauſe its welfare depends thereon: And if it fall out that one of them muſt ſuffer: every good Magiſtrate will deſcend ſomething from his greatnes be it for the good of the Community: On the other ſide, though every ſubject ought for the honour and good of the Magiſtrate to give up his private; yet none ought to advance the greatnes of his Soveraign with the publique detriment. Whence in my apprehenſion the end of Magiſtracie is the good of the whole Body, Head, and Members conjunctly: but if we ſpeak diviſim, then the good of the Society is the Ultime end: and next to that, as conducent to that, the Governours Greatnes and Prerogative. And herein alſo accordeth Dr. Fern with us. Sect. 3. Where he ſayes, That the people are the end of the governing Power. There is another queſtion of mainer concernment, here in our generall diſcourſe of Authority fitly to be handled. viz. How farre ſubjection is due to it? but becauſe it hath a great dependance on the kinds and States of Power, and cannot be ſo well conceived without the Precognition thereof: I will referre it to after opportunities.

For the diviſion of this Power of Magiſtracie. It cannot Sect. 3 be well divided into ſeveral ſpecies;Diviſion of Magiſtracie. for it is one ſimple thing an indiviſible bcame of Divine Perfection; yet for our more diſtinct conceaving thereof. Men have framed ſeverall diſtinctions of it. So with reſpect of its meaſure, it is abſolute or limited: In reſpect of its manner. It is as St. Peter divides it, Supreame, or Subordinate. In reſpect of its Meane of acquiring it is Elective, or ſucceſsive; for I conceive that of Conqueſt, and Preſcription of uſuage are reducible to one of theſe, as will appeare afterwards. In reſpect of its degrees it is Nomotheticall or Architectonicall and Gubernative or Executive. And in reſpect of the ſubject of its reſidence there is an ancient and uſuall diſtinction of it into Monarchicall, Ariſtocraticall p. 6and Democraticall. Theſe either ſimple or mixt of two, or all three together, of which the Predominant gives the denomination. Theſe are not accurate ſpecificative, Diviſions of Power, for it admits none ſuch, but partitions of it according to divers reſpects. The courſe of my intention directs me to ſpeak only of Monarchicall Power, which is the chiefe and moſt uſuall forme of Government in the world; The other two being apt to reſolve into this, but this not ſo apt to diſſolve into them.

CHAP. II. Of the Diviſion of Monarchy into abſolute and limited.

Sect. 1 NOW we muſt know that moſt of thoſe diſtinctions which were applyed to Power in generall are appliable to Monarchy: becauſe the reſpects on which they ariſe are to be found in it. But I will inſiſt on the three main diviſions: for the handling of them will bring us to a cleare underſtanding of what is needfull to be known about Monarchicall Power.

Firſt, of the diſtinction of Monarchy into Abſolute and Limited. Abſolute Monarchy is when the Soveraignty is ſo fully in one, that it hath no Limits or Bounds under God, but his owne Will. It is when a people are abſolutely reſigned up or reſigne up themſelves to be governed by the will of one man. Such were the ancient Eaſterne Monarchies, and that of the Perſian and Turke at this day, as farre as we know. This is a lawfull Government and therefore where men put themſelves into this utmoſt degree of ſubjection by Oath and Contract,Whether abſolute Monarchy be a lawfull government. or are borne and brought unto it by Gods Providence, it binds them and they muſt abide it▪ becauſe an Oath to a lawfull thing is Obligatory. This in Scripture is very evident as Ezek. 17 16.18.19. Where Iudgement is denounced againſt the King of Iudah for breaking the Oath made to p. 7the King of Babylon; and it is called Gods Oath, yet doubtles this was an Oath of abſolute ſubjection. And Rom. 13. the power which then was, was abſolute; yet the Apoſtle not excluding it; calls it Gods ordinance, and commands ſubjection to it: ſo Chriſt commands tribute to be paid, and payes it himſelfe; yet it was an arbitrary taxe, the production of an abſolute power. Alſo the ſoveraignty of maſters over ſervants was abſolute, and the ſame in Oeconomy as abſolute Monarchy is in policie, yet the Apoſtle enjoynes not maſters called to Chriſtianity to renounce that title as too great and rigid to be kept but exhorts them to moderation in the exerciſe of it; and ſervants to remaine contented in the condition of their ſervitude. More might be ſaid to legitimate this kinde of governement, but it needs not in ſo plaine a caſe.

This abſolute Monarchy hath three degrees, yet all within Sect. 2 the ſtate of abſoluteneſſe. The firſt, when the Monarch,Three degrees of abſoluteneſſe. whoſe will is the peoples Law, doth ſet himſelfe no ſtated Rule or Law to rule by, but by immediate Edicts and commands of his owne will governes them, as in his owne and Councels judgement he thinks fit. Secondly, when he ſets downe a Rule and Law by which he will ordinarily govern, reſerving to himſelfe liberty to vary from it, wherein, and as oft as in his diſcretion he judges fit: and in this the Soveraigne is as free as the former, onelyonly the people are at a more certainty what he expects from them in ordinary. Thirdly, when he not onelyonly ſets downe an expreſſe Rule and Law to governe by, but alſo promiſeth and engages himſelf in many caſes not to alter that rule: but this engagement is an after condeſcent and act of grace, not diſſolving the abſolute oath of ſubiection, which went before it, nor is intended to be the rule of his power, but of the exerciſe of it. This Ruler is not ſo abſolute as the former in the uſe of his power, for he hath put a bond on that, which he cannot breake without breach of promiſe; that is, without ſin: but he is as abſolute in his power, if he will ſinfully put it forth into act, it hath no politick bounds, for the people ſtill owe him abſolute p. 8ſubiection, that not being diſſolved or leſſened by an act of grace comming afterwards.

Sect. 3 Now in governments of this nature, How far obedience is due,Whether reſiſtance be lawfull in abſolute Monarchy. and, Whether any reſiſtance be lawfull, is a queſtion which here muſt be decided. For the due effecting whereof, we muſt premiſe ſome needfull diſtinctions to avoid confuſion. Obedience is twofold; firſt, Poſitive and active, when in conſcience of an authority we doe the thing commanded: ſecondly, Negative and paſſive, when though we anſwer not Authority by doing, yet we doe it by contented undergoing the penalty impoſed. Proportionably reſiſtance is twofold: firſt, Poſitive, by an oppoſing of force: ſecondly, Negative, when onelyonly ſo much is done as may defend our ſelves from force, without returne of force againſt the Aſſailant. Now this negative reſiſtance is alſo twofold: firſt, In inferiour and ſufferable caſes: ſecondly, or in the ſupreme caſe and laſt neceſſity of life and death: and then too it is firſt, either of particular perſon or perſons; ſecondly, or of the whole community. And if of particular perſons, then either under plea and pretence of equity aſſaulted; or elſe without any plea at all, meerly for will and pleaſure ſake: for to that degree of rage and cruelty ſometimes the heart of man is given over. All theſe are very diſtinguiſhable caſes, and will be of uſe either in this or the enſuing diſputes.

Aſſert. 1 To the queſtion I ſay, Firſt, Poſitive obedience is abſolutely due to the will and pleaſure of an abſolute Monarch, in all lawfull and indifferent things: becauſe in ſuch a State the will of the Prince is the ſupreme Law, ſo that it binds to obedience in every thing not prohibited by a ſuperiour, that is, Divine Law: for it is in ſuch caſe the higher power, and is Gods ordinance.

Aſſert. 2 Secondly, When the will of an abſolute Monarch commands a thing forbidden to be done by Gods Law then it bindes not to active obedience; then is the Apoſtles rule undoubtedly true, It is better to obey God then men: For the Law of the inferiour gives place to the ſuperiour. In things defined by God, it ſhould be all one with us for the Magiſtrate p. 9to command us to tranſgreſſe that, as to command us an impoſſibility; and impoſsibilities fall under no Law. But on this ground no man muſt quarrell with Authoritie, or reject its commands as unlawfull, unleſſe there be an open unlawfulneſſe in the face of the act commanded. For if the unlawfulneſſe be hidden in the ground or reaſon of the action, inferiours muſt not be curious to enquire into the grounds or reaſons of the commands of ſuperiours; for ſuch licence of enquiry would often fruſtrate great undertakings, which much depend on ſpeed and ſecrecy of execution. I ſpeak all this of abſolute government, where the will and reaſon of the Monarch is made the higher power, and its expreſſion the ſupreme Law of a State.

Thirdly, ſuppoſe an abſolute Monarch ſhould ſo degenerate Aſſert. 3 into Monſtrous unnaturall Tyranny, as apparently to ſeeke the deſtruction of the whole community, ſubject to him in the loweſt degree of vaſſallage, then ſuch a community may negatively reſiſt ſuch ſubverſion: yea, and if conſtrained to it by the laſt neceſſity, poſitively reſiſt and defend themſelves by force againſt any inſtruments whatſoever, imployed for the effecting thereof. 1. David did ſo in his particular caſe, when purſued by Saul: he made negative reſiſtence by flight, and doubtleſſe he intended poſitive reſiſtence againſt any inſtrument, if the negative would not have ſerved the turne: elſe why did he ſo ſtrengthen himſelfe by Forces? ſure not to make poſitive reſiſtance, and lay violent hands upon the Perſon of the Lords Anointed, as it appeared; yet for ſome reaſon he did it doubtleſſe, which could be none other, but by that force of Armes to defend himſelfe againſt the violence of any miſ-imployed inferiour hands. If then he might doe it for his particular ſafety, much rather may it be done for the publike. 2. Such an act is without the compaſſe of any the moſt abſolute Potentate; and therefore to reſiſt in it, can be to reſiſt no power, nor the violation of any due of ſubjection. For, firſt, the moſt ſubmiſſe ſubjection ever intended by any community, when they put themſelves under anothers power, was the command of a reaſonable will and power; but to will and command the deſtruction of p. 10the whole body over which a power is placed, were an act of will moſt unreaſonable and ſelf-deſtructive, and ſo not the act of ſuch a will, to which ſubjection was intended by any reaſonable creatures. Secondly the publike good and being is armed at in the utmoſt bond of ſubjection; for in the conſtitution of ſuch unlimited ſoveraignty, though every particular mans good and being is ſubjected to the will of One ſupreme yet certainly the conſervation of the whole Publike was intended by it; which being invaded; the intent of the conſtitution is overthrowne and an act is done which can be ſuppoſed to be within the compaſſe of no politicall power: So that did Nero as it was reported of him in his immanity thirſt for the deſtruction of whole Rome; and if he were truly what the Senate pronounced him to be, Humani generis hoſtis, then it might juſtifie a negative reſiſtance of his perſon; and a poſitive, of any Agent ſhould be ſet on ſo inhumane a ſervice. And the united Provinces are allowed in reſiſting Philip 2^d. though he had bin their abſolute Monarch, if he reſolved the extirpation of the whole people, and the planting the countrey with Spaniards, as it is reported he did. And that aſſertion of ſome, that All reſiſtance is againſt the Apoſtles prohibition. Reſiſtance by power of Armes is utterly unlawfull, cannot be juſtified in ſuch a latitude. But of this more will be ſpoken in the current of this diſcourſe.

Aſſert. 4 Fourthly, ſuppoſe by ſuch a power any particular perſon or perſons life be invaded, without any plea of reaſon or cauſe for it, I ſuppoſe it hard to deny him liberty of negative reſiſtance of power; yea, and poſitive, of any Agents, in ſuch aſſault of murther: for though the caſe be not ſo cleare as the former yet it ſeemes to me juſtified by the fact of David, and the reſcuing of Jonathan from the cauſleſſe cruell intent of his Fathers putting him to death. As alſo ſuch an act of will carrying no colour of reaſon with it, cannot be eſteemed the act of a rationall will, and ſo no will intended to be the Law of Soveraignty. Not that I thinke a Monarch of ſuch abſoluteneſſe is bound to yeeld a reaſon why he commands any man to be put to death, before his command be obeyed; but I conceive the perſon ſo commanded to p. 11death may bee juſtified before God and men for protecting himſelfe by eſcape, or otherwiſe, unleſſe ſome reaſon or cauſe bee made knowne to him of ſuch command.

Fifthly, Perſons ſubject to an unlimited dominion muſt Aſſert. 5 without reſiſtance ſubject their Eſtates, Liberties, Perſons, to the will and pleaſure of their Lord, ſo it carry any plea or ſhew of reaſon and equity. Firſt, it ſeemes to me evident, 1 Pet. 2.18, 19 20. if well doing be miſtaken by the reaſon and judgement of the power for ill doing, and we be puniſhed for it, yet the Magiſtrate going according to his miſguided reaſon it is the command of a reaſonable will, and ſo to be ſubmitted to; becauſe ſuch a one ſuffers by Law, in a State where the Lords will is the Law. Secondly, In commands of the power where is the plea of reaſon and equity on the part of the commander, whether it be ſuch indeed, ſome power muſt judge, but the conſtitution of abſolute Monarchy reſolves all judgement into the will of the Monarch, as the ſupreme Law: ſo that if his will judicially cenſure it juſt it muſt be yeelded to as if it were juſt without repeale or redreſſement by any created power. And let none complaine of this as a hard condition, when they or their Anceſtors have ſubjected themſelves to ſuch a power by oath, or politicall contract: If it be Gods ordinance to ſuch, it muſt be ſubjected to and its exorbitances born, as he ſayes in Tac…tu…, as men beare famine, peſtilence, and other effects of Gods diſpleaſure.

Sixthly in abſolute Monarchy the perſon of the Monarch Aſſert. 6 is above the reach of juſt force and poſitive reſiſtance: for ſuch a full reſignation of mens ſelves to his will and power, by the irrevocable oath and bond of politicall contract, doth make the perſon as ſacred as the Unction of Saul or David. In ſuch a State all lawful power is below him, ſo that he is uncapable of any penall hand which muſt be from a ſuperiour, or it is uniuſt. I have bin the longer on this abſolute Monarchy, becauſe though it doth not concerne us, yet it will give light to the ſtating of doubts in governments of a more reſtrained nature: for what is true here in the full extent p. 12of power, is there alſo as true within the compaſſe of their power.

Sect. 4 In moderate or limited Monarchy it is an enquiry of ſome weight to know,What makes a Monarchy limited? What it is which conſtitutes it in the ſtate of a limited Monarchy.

Firſt, A Monarchy may be ſtinted in the exerciſe of its Aſſert. 1 power, and yet be an abſolute Monarchy, as appeared before in our diſtinction of abſolute Monarchy: If that bounds be a ſubſequent act, and proceeding from free will and grace in the Monarch; for it is not the exerciſe, but the nature and meaſure of power, wherewith he is radically inveſted, which denominates him a free, or conditionate Monarch.

Aſſert. 2 Secondly, I take it, that a limited Monarch muſt have his bounds of power ab externo, not from the free determination of his owne will. And now Kings have not divine words and binding Lawes to conſtitute them in their Soveraignty, but derive it from ordinary providence, the ſole meane hereof is the conſent and fundamentall contract of a Nation of men, which conſent puts them in their power, which can be no more nor other then is conveyed to them by ſuch contract of ſubiection, This is the root of all ſoveraignty individuated and exiſtent in this or that perſon or family; till this come and lift him up he is a private man, not differing in ſtate from the reſt of his brethren; but then he becomes another man, his perſon is ſacred by that ſoveraignty conveyed to it, which is Gods ordinance and image. The truth hereof will be more fully diſcovered, when we come to ſpeake of Elective and Succeſſive Monarchy.

Aſſert. 3 Thirdly He is then a limited Monarch, who hath a Law beſide his owne will for the meaſure of his power. Firſt, the ſupreme power of the State muſt be in him, ſo that his power muſt not be limited by any power above his; for then hee were not a Monarch, but a ſubordinate magiſtrate. Secondly, this ſupreme power muſt be reſtrained by ſome Law, according to which this power was given, and by direction of which this power muſt act; elſe he were not a limited Monarch, that is, a liege Soveraigne, or legall King. Now a Soveraignty p. 13comes thus to be legall, or defined to a rule of Law, either by originall conſtitution, or by after-condeſcent. By originall conſtitution, when the ſociety publike conferres on one man a power by limited contract, reſigning themſelves to his government by ſuch a Law, reſerving to themſelves ſuch immunities: In this caſe, they which at firſt had power over themſelves, had power to ſet their owne termes of ſubiection; and hee which hath no title of power over them but by their act, can de jure have no greater then what is put over to him by that act By after-condeſcent, viz. when a Lord, who by conqueſt, or other right, hath an abſolute arbitrary power; but not liking to hold by ſuch a right, doth either formally or virtually deſert it, and take a new legall right as judging it more ſafe for him to hold by, and deſirable of the people to be governed by. This is equivalent to that by originall conſtitution; yea, is all one with it: for this is in that reſpect a ſecondary originall conſtitution. But if it be objected, that this being a voluntary condeſcent is an act of grace, and ſo doth not derogate from his former abſoluteneſſe as was ſaid before of an abſolute Monarch, who confines himſelfe to governe by one rule; I anſwer. This differs eſſentially from that: for there, a free Lord, of grace yeelds to rule by ſuch a Law, reſerving the fulneſſe of power, and ſtill requiring of the people a bond and oath of utmoſt indefinite ſubjection; ſo that it amounts not to a limitation of radicall power: whereas here is a change of title, and a reſolution to be ſubiected to, in no other way, then according to ſuch a frame of government; and accordingly no other bond or oath of allegeance is required, or taken, then according to ſuch a Law: this amounts to a limitation of radicall power. And therefore they ſpeak too generally, who affirme of all acts of grace proceeding from Princes to people, as if they did not limit abſoluteneſſe: 'Tis true of acts of grace of that firſt kinde; but yet you ſee, an act of grace may be ſuch a one, as may amount to a reſignation of that abſoluteneſſe into a more milde and moderate power unleſſe we ſhould hold it out of the power of an abſolute Lord to be other; or that by free condeſcent, and act of grace, a man cannot p. 14as well part with, or exchange his right and title to a thing, as define himſelfe in the uſe and exerciſe; which I thinke none will affirme.

Sect. 5 In all Governments of this allay and legall Conſtitution there are three Queſtions of ſpeciall moment to be conſidered.

How farre ſubiect o… is due in a limited Monarchy?Firſt, How farre ſubjection is due? As farre as they are Gods Ordinance, as farre as they are a power and they are a power as farre as the Contract fundamentall from which under God their authority is derived doth extend. As abſolute Lords muſt be obeyed as farre as their Will enjoynes, becauſe their Will is the meaſure of their Power, and their ſubjects Law: ſo theſe in the utmoſt extent of the Law of the Land, which is the meaſure of their power, and their ſubjects duty of obedience. I ſay ſo farre, but I doe not ſay no further: for I believe, though on our former grounds it clearely followes that ſuch Authority tranſcends its bounds if it command beyond the Law: and the Subject legally is not bound to ſubjection in ſuch caſe, yet in Conſcience a Subject is bound to yeeld to the Magiſtrate, even when he cannot de jure, challenge obedience, to prevent ſcandall or any occaſion of ſlighting the power which may ſometimes grow, even upon a juſt refuſall: I ſay, for theſe cauſes a ſubject ought not to uſe his liberty, but morem gerere, if it be in a thing in which he can poſsibly without ſubverſion, and in which his act may not be made a leading caſe, and ſo bring on a preſcription againſt publique Liberty.

Sect. 6 How farre it is Lawfull to reſiſtSecondly, how farre it is lawfull to reſiſt the exorbitant Illegal Commands of ſuch a Monarch? 1. As before in lighter caſes, in which it may be done, for the reaſons alledged, Poſ. 1 and for the ſake of publique peace, we ought to ſubmit, and make no reſiſtance at all, but de jure recedere.

Poſ. 2 2. In caſes of higher nature. Paſsive reſiſtance, viz. By appeale to Law, by Concealment, by Flight, is lawfull to be made, becauſe ſuch a Command is politically powerles, it proceeds not from Gods Ordinance in him: and ſo we ſin p. 15not againſt Gods Ordinance in ſuch Non-ſubmiſsion, or Negative reſiſtance.

3. For Inſtruments or Agents in ſuch commands, if the Poſ. 3 ſtreight be ſuch, and a man be ſurprized, that no place is left for an appeale nor evaſion by Negative reſiſtance; I conceive, againſt ſuch. Poſitive reſiſtence may be made: becauſe authority failing or this Act in the Supreame Power, the Agent or Inſtrument can have none derived to him; and ſo is but in the nature of a private perſon, and his Act, as an offer of private violence, and ſo comes under the ſame rules for oppoſition.

4. For the perſon of the Soveraigne, I conceive it, aſwell Poſ. 4 above any Poſitive Reſiſtence, as the Perſon of an abſolute Monarch; Yea, though by the whole Community, (except there be an expreſſe reſervation of Power in the body of the State, or any deputed Perſons or Court, to uſe in caſe of intolerable exorbitance. Poſitive Reſiſtence, which, if there be, then ſuch a Governour is no Monarch, for that Fundamentall Reſervation deſtroyes it's being a Monarchy in aſmuch as the Supreame Power is not in one.) For where ever there is a Soveraigne Politique Power conſtituted, the perſon or perſons who are inveſted with it are Sacred, and out of the reach of Poſitive Reſiſtance or Violence: which, as I ſaid, if juſt, muſt be from no inferior or ſubordinate hand. But it will be objected, that ſith every Monarch hath his power from the conſent of the whole body, that conſent of the whole Body hath a Power above the Power of the Monarch, and ſo the reſiſtance which is done by it, is not by an inferior power and to this purpoſe is brought that Axiome. Quicquia efficit tale eſt magis tale. I anſwer, That rule even in naturall cauſes is lyable to abundance of reſtrictions: And in the particular in hand it holds not. Where the cauſe doth bereave himſelfe of that perfection by which it works, in the very act of cauſing, and convey it to that effect, It doth not remain more ſuch then the effect, but much leſſe, and below it, as if I convey an eſtate of Land to another, it doth not hold that after ſuch conveyance I have a better Eſtate remayning in me then that other, but rather the contrary; p. 16becauſe what was in one is paſſed to the other: The Servant who at the year of Iubile would not go out free, but have his eare boared, and given his Maſter a full Lordſhip over him: can we argue, that he had afterward more power over himſelfe then his Maſter, becauſe he gave his Maſter that power over him, by that act of Oeconomicall Contract. Thus the Community whoſe conſent eſtabliſhes a Power over them cannot be ſaid univerſally to have an eminencie of Power above that which they conſtitute; ſometimes they have, ſometimes they have not: and to judge when they have, when not reſpect muſt be had to the Origiginall Contract and Fundamentall Conſtitution of that State, if they have conſtituted a Monarchy, that is, inveſted one man with the Soveraignty of Power, and ſubjected all the reſt to him; Then it were unreaſonable to ſay, they yet have it in themſelves; Or have a power of recalling that Supremacie which by Oath and Contract they themſelves transferred on another: Unles we make this Oath and Contract leſſe binding then private ones, diſſoluble at pleaſure, and ſo all Monarchs Tenants at will from their people. But if they in ſuch Conſtitution reſerve a power in the body to oppoſe and diſplace the Magiſtrate for exorbitancies, and reſerve to themſelves a Tribunall to trie him in, that man is not a Monarch but the Officer and Subſtitute of him or them to whom ſuch Power over him is reſerved or conferred. The Iſſue is this, If he be a Monarch he hath the Apex or Culmen Poteſtatis, and all his Subjects diviſim and conjunction, are below him: They have deveſted themſelves of all ſuperiority and no Power left for a Poſitive Oppoſition of the Perſon of him whom they have inveſted.

Sect. 7 Thirdly, Who ſhall be the Iudge of the Exceſſes of the Soveraigne Lord in Monarchies of this compoſure?Who ſhall be the Iudge of the exceſſes of the Monarch? I anſwer, A frame of Government cannot be imagined of that perfection but that ſome inconveniencies there will be poſſible for which there can be provided no remedie: Many miſeries to which a people under an abſolute Monarchie are lyable are prevented by this Legall Allay and definement of p. 17Power. But this is expoſed to one defect from which that is free, that is an impoſsibility of conſtituting a Judge to determine this laſt controverſie, viz. the Soveraignes tranſgreſſing his fundamentall limits. This Judge muſt be either ſome Forraigner, and then …e loſe the freedome of the State, by ſubjecting it to an externall power in the greateſt caſe: or elſe within the body: If ſo then 1. either the Monarch himſelfe, and then you deſtroy the frame of the State, and make it abſolute; for to define a Power to a Law, and then to make him Judge of his Deviations from that Law, is to abſolve him from all Law. Or elſe 2. the Community and their Deputies muſt have this power: and then, as before, you put the apex Poteſtatis, the prime foreign in the whole body, or a part of it, and deſtroy the being of Monarchy: The Ruler not being Gods immediate Miniſter but of that Power, be it where it will to which he is accomptable for his actions. So that I conceive in a limited legall Monarchy, there can be no ſtated internall Judge of the Monarchs actions, if there grow a fundamentall Variance betwixt him and the Community. But you will ſay, It is all one way to abſoluteneſſe to aſsigne him no Judge as to make him his own Judge. Anſw. I ſay not ſimplie in this caſe there is no Judge: But that there can be no Judg legall and conſtituted within that frame of Government: but it is a tranſcendent caſe beyond the proviſion of that Government, and muſt have an extraordinary Judge, and way of deviſion.

In this great and difficult caſe, I will deliver my apprehenſions freely and clearly, ſubmitting them to the cenſure of better Iudgements. Suppoſe the controverſie to happen in a Government fundamentally legall, and the people no further ſubjected then to Government by ſuch a Law.

1. If the act in which the exorbitance and tranſgreſsion Poſ. 1 is ſuppoſed to be, be of leſſer moment, and not ſtriking at the very being of that Government, it ought to be borne by publique patience, rather then to endanger the being of the State by a contention betwixt the head and body Politique.

2. If it be mortall and ſuch as ſuffered, diſſolves the frame Poſ. 2 and life of the Government and publique liberty. Then the p. 18illegality and deſtructive nature is to be ſet open and redreſment ſought by Petition; which if failing, Prevention by reſiſtance ought to be. But firſt that it is ſuch muſt be made apparent; and if it be apparent, and an Appeale made ad conſcientiam generis humani, eſpecially of thoſe of that Community, then the fundamentall Lawes of that Monarchy muſt iudge and pronounce the ſentence in every mans conſcience; and every man (as farre as concernes him) muſt follow the evidence of Truth in his owne ſoule, to oppoſe, or not oppoſe, according as he can in conſcience acquit or condemne the act of carriage of the Governour. For I conceive in a Caſe which tranſcends the frame and proviſion of the Government they are bound to. People are unbound, and in ſtate as if they had no Government; and the ſuperiour Law of Reaſon and Conſcience muſt be Judge: wherein every one muſt proceed with the utmoſt advice and impartiality: For if hee erre in iudgement hee either reſiſts Gods Ordinance, or puts his hand to the ſubverſion of the State and Policy he lives in.

And this power of judging argues not a ſuperiority in thoſe who Judge, over him who is Judged for it is not Authoritative and Civill, but morall, reſiding in reaſonable Creatures and lawfull for them to execute, becauſe never deveſted and put off by any act in the conſtitution of a legall Government, but rather the reſervation of it intended: For when they define the Superiour to a Law, and conſtitute no Power to Judge of his Exceſſes from that Law, it is evident they reſerve to themſelves, not a Formall Authoritative Power, but a morall Power, ſuch as they had originally before the Conſtitution of the Government; which muſt needs remaine, being not conveyed away in the Conſtitution.

p. 19CHAP. III. Of the diviſion of Monarchy into Elective and Succeſſive.

THe ſecond diviſion of Monarchy, which I intend to Sect. 1 treat of, is that of Elective or Succeſſive.Elective and ſucceſsive Monarchy what they are? Elective Monarchy is that, where by the fundamentall conſtitution of the State, the ſupreme power is conveyed but to the perſon of him whom they take for their Prince; the people reſerving to themſelves power, by men deputed by the ſame conſtitution to elect a new perſon on the deceaſe of the former. Succeſſive is, where by the fundamentall conſtitution of the State, the Soveraignty is conferred on one Prince; and in that one, as a root and beginning to his heires, after a forme and line of ſucceſſion, conſtituted alſo by the fundamentals of that Government. In the firſt, the Peoples oath and contract of ſubiection extends but to one perſon: In the other, to the whole Race and Line of Succeſſors; which continuing, the bond of ſubjection continues; or which failing, the people returne to their firſt liberty, of chooſing a new perſon, or ſucceſſion to be inveſted with Soveraignty.

I doe conceive that in the firſt originall all Monarchy, yea Sect. 2 any individuall frame of Government whatſoever,All Monarchy whether originally from conſent? is elective: that is, is conſtituted, and drawes its force and right from the conſent and choice of that Community over which it ſwayeth. And that triple diſtinction of Monarchy in o that which is gotten by Conqueſt, Preſcription, or Choice is, not of diſtinct parts unleſſe by Choice be meant full and formall Choice: my reaſon is, becauſe man being a voluntary agent and ſubiection being a morall act, it doth eſſentially depend on conſent: ſo that a man may by force and extremity be brought under the power of another, as unreaſonable creatures are, to be diſpoſed of, and trampled p. 20on, whether they will or no: But a bond of ſubjection cannot be put on him, nor a right to claime Obedience and Service acquired, unleſſe a man become bound by ſome act of his owne Will. For, ſuppoſe another, from whom I am originally free, be ſtronger then I, and ſo bring mee under his mercy doe I therefore ſin if I doe not what he commands me? or can that act of violence paſſe into a morall title, without a morall principle?

Sect. 3 But this will be more manifeſt, if by induction I ſhew how other titles reſolve into this.Monarchy by divine inſtitution. I will begin with that of divine inſtitution. Saul and David were by the Sacrament of anointing deſigned to the Kingdome, as it were by Gods owne hand, which notwithſtanding, they were not actually Kings till the Peoples conſent eſtabliſhed them therein: That unction was a manifeſtation of the appointment of God, and when it was made knowne to the People, I thinke it had the power of Precept, to reſtraine the Peoples choice to that perſon; which if they had not done, they had reſiſted Gods ordinance. Yet they were not thereby actually endowed with Kingly power, but remained as private men, till the Peoples choice put them in actuall poſſeſſion of that Power, which in David was not till after many yeares.

Sect. 4 Then for that of Uſuage or Preſcription; if any ſuch did ever conſtitute a Monarchie,Monarchy by preſcription. it was by vertue of an Univerſall conſent by that Uſuage and Preſcription proved and implyed: For in a Popular ſtate, where one Man in the Communitie, by reaſon of great eſtate, Wiſdome, or other Perfection is in the eye of all the reſt, all reverence him, and his advice they follow: and the reſpect continues from the People to the houſe and family, for divers generations. In this caſe, ſubjection at firſt is arbitrary in the people; and if in time it become neceſſary, it is becauſe their Cuſtome is their Law; and its long continuance is equivalent to a formall Election: ſo that this Tenure and Right if it be good and more then at pleaſure, as it was at firſt, the p. 21conſiderate muſt needs aſcribe it to a conſent, and implicite choyce of the People.

But the mayn Queſtion is concerning Monarchy archieved Sect. 5 by Conqueſt;Monarchy by conqueſt. where at firſt ſight the Right ſeems gotten by the Sword, without the conſent and Choyce of the People, yea againſt it. Conqueſt is either 1. Totall where a full Conqueſt is made, by a totall ſubduing a people to the Will of the Victor: or 2. Partiall, where an entrance is made by the Sword: But the People either becauſe of the Right claymed by the Invader; or their unwillingneſſe to ſuffer the Miſeries of Warre, or their apparent inability to ſtand out in a way of Reſiſtance, or ſome other conſideration, ſubmit to a compoſition and contract of ſubjection to the Invader. In this latter it is evident, the Soveraignes Power is from the Peoples conſent; and the Government is ſuch as the Contract and fundamentall agreement makes it to be if it be the firſt Agreement, and the pretender hath no former Title which remaines in force, for then this latter is invalid, if it include not and amount to a relinquiſhing and diſanulling of the Old. But the difficulty is concerning a full and meere Conqueſt; and of this I will ſpeak my mind clearly. Such a Warre and Invaſion of a People, which ends in a Conqueſt, 1. it is either upon the pretence or claim of a Title of Soveraignty over the People invaded: and then, if the pretender prevaile, it is properly no Conqueſt, but the vindication of a Title by force of Armes. And the Government is not Originall, but ſuch as the Title is by which he claymes it. 2. Or it is by One who hath no challenge of Right deſcending to him to juſtifie his claim and Invaſion of a People: Then if he ſubdue, he may properly be ſaid to come to his Government by Conqueſt.

And there be who wholly condemne this title of Conqueſt as unlawfull,Whether conqueſt give a iuſt title? and take it for nothing elſe but a Nationall and publike robbery: ſo one of the Anſwerers to Doctor Ferne, ſaies in his p. 10. Conqueſt may give ſuch a right as Plunderers uſe to take in houſes they can maſter.— It is inhumane p. 22to talke of right of Conqueſt in a Civill, in a Chriſtian State. But I cannot allow of ſo indefinite a Cenſure: rather I think the right of Conqueſt is ſuch as the precedent Warre was: if that were lawfull, ſo is the Conqueſt: For a Prince may be invaded, or ſo farre injured by a neighbour People, or they may be ſet on ſuch a pernicious enmitie againſt him and his people, that the ſafety of himſelfe and people may compell to ſuch a Warre, which warre if it end in Conqueſt, who can judge ſuch Title unlawfull? Suppoſe then Conqueſt may be a lawfull way of acquiſition: yet an immediate cauſe of right of Soveraignty; that is, of a Civill power of Government to which obedience is due, it cannot be: I ſay, an immediate cauſe, for a remote impulſive cauſe it oft is, but not an immediate formall cauſe; for that muſt ever be the conſent of the people, whereby they accept of, and reſigne up themſelves to a Government, and then their Perſons are morally bound, and not before. Thus far the force of conqueſt may goe; it may give a man title over, and power to poſſeſſe and diſpoſe of the Countrey and Goods of the Conquered; yea, the Bodies and lives of the Conquered are at the Will and Pleaſure of the Conquerour: But it ſtill is at the Peoples choice to come into a morall condition of ſubiection or not. When they are thus at the mercy of the Victor, if to ſave life they conſent to a condition of ſervitude or ſubiection, then that conſent, oath, or covenant, which they in that extremity make, being in relicita, bindes them, and they owe morall Duty. But if they would rather ſuffer the utmoſt violence of the Conquerour, and will conſent to no termes of ſubjection as Numantia in Spaine, and many other People have reſolved; they die or remaine a free People. Be they captived or poſſeſſed at pleaſure, they owe no duty, neither doe they ſin in not obeying; nor doe they reſiſt Gods ordinance, if at any time of advantage they uſe force to free themſelves from ſuch a violent poſſeſſion: yea perhaps, if before by contract they were bound to another, they ſhould ſin if to avoid death or bondage they ſhould ſweare or covenant fealty to a Conquerour, and it were more noble and laudable to die in the ſervice, and for the faith to their naturall p. 23Soveraigne. Thus I am perſwaded it will appeare an uncontrolable truth in Policie, that the conſent of the People, either by themſelves or their Anceſtors is the only mean in ordinary providence by which ſoveraignty is conferred on any Perſon or Family: neither can Gods ordinance be conveyed and People engaged in conſcience by any other means.

It hath been affirmed by ſome, that mixture and limitation Sect. 6 is inconſiſtent to ſucceſſive Monarchy;Whether a Monarch by ſucceſsion may not be limited? as if where ever Soveraignty is entailed to a ſucceſſion, it muſt needs be abſolute: But I muſt profeſſe I cannot ſee how it can ſtand with truth: Rather I thinke, that both Elective and Hereditary Monarchy are indifferently capable of abſoluteneſſe or limitation. If a free, and not pre-ingaged People to any Government, by publike compact yeeld up themſelves to a Perſon, to be commanded by his Will as their ſupreme Law, during his naturall life, and no longer, can it be denied but that he is an abſolute, and yet Elective Monarch? unleſſe you will ſay, he is not abſolute, becauſe he cannot by his Will, as by a Law, bind them to elect his ſonne to ſucceed him, and change their Government into hereditary. But his being limited in this Clauſe doth not diſparage his Soveraignty, or make his power of Government limited, becauſe this belongs not to preſent Government, but is a meere proviſion for the future. Againe, if the power of Ruling according to a Law, be by conſent conveyed to one Perſon, and his heires to ſucceed after him, how this ſhould come to be abſolute and the entailement ſhould overthrow the conſtitution, I cannot imagine: If the whole latitude of power may be by a People made hereditary ſure a proportion may as well; unleſſe the limitation be ſuch as includes a repugnancy to be perpetuall. Indeed this enſtating of a ſucceſſion makes that power irrevocable, during the continuance of that ſucceſſion but it makes it neither greater nor leſſe in the Succeſſor then was in his Progenitors, from whom hee derives it.

In a ſucceſſive Monarchy the Succeſſor holds by the originall Sect. 7 p. 24Right of him who is the root of ſucceſſion; and is de jure King the immediate inſtant after his Predeceſſors deceaſe: Alſo the people are bound … him, though they never take any Oath to his perſon. For as he commands in vertue of the originall Right, ſo they are bound to obey by vertue of the originall Covenant, and nationall Contract of Subiection: the new oath taken either by King or People, is but a reviving of the old; that the Conſcience of it by renewing might be the more freſh and vigorous: it neither gives any new power, nor addes or detracts from the old, unleſſe by common agreement an alteration be made; and ſo the foundation in that clauſe is new, which cannot be without the conſent of both parties.

CHAP. IIII. Of the Diviſion of Monarchy into Simple and Mixed.

Sect. 1 THe third diviſion is into Simple and Mixed. Simple is when the Government abſolute or limited is ſo intruſted in the hands of one,Simple and mixed Monarchy, what? that all the reſt is by deputation from him: ſo that there is no authority in the whole Body but his, or derived from him: And that One is either individually one Perſon, and then it is a ſimple Monarchy: Or one aſſociate Body, choſen either out of the Nobility, whence the Government is called a ſimple Ariſtocraty: or out of the Community, without reſpect of birth or ſtate, which is termed a ſimple Democracy. The ſupreme authority reſiding excluſively in one of theſe three, denominates the Government ſimple, which ever it be.

Now experience teaching People, that ſeverall inconveniences are in each of theſe, which is avoided by the other: as aptneſſe to Tyranny in ſimple Monarchy: aptneſſe to deſtructive Factions in an Ariſtocracy: and aptneſſe to Confuſion and Tumult in a Democracy. As on the contrary, each p. 25of them hath ſome good which the others want, viz. Unity and ſtrength in a Monarchy; Counſell and Wiſedome in an Ariſtocracy; Liberty and reſpect of Common good in a Democracy. Hence the wiſedome of men deeply ſeene in State matters guided them to frame a mixture of all three, uniting them into one Forme, that ſo the good of all might be enjoyed, and the evill of them avoyded. And this mixture is either equall, when the higheſt command in a State by the firſt Conſtitution of it is equally ſeated in all three; and then (if firme Union can be in a mixture of Equality) it can be called by the name of neither of them but by the generall ſtile of a Mixed State: or if there be priority of Order in one of the three, (as I thinke there muſt be or elſe there can be no Unity) it may take the name of that which hath the precedency. But the firmer Union is, where one of the three is predominant and in that regard gives the denomination to the whole: So we call it a Mixed Monarchy, where the primity of ſhare in the ſupreme power is in one.

Now I conceive to the conſtituting of Mixed Monarchy Sect. 2 (and ſo proportionately it may be ſaid of the other.What it is which conſtitutes a mixed Monarchy?)

1. The Soveraigne power muſt be originally in all three, viz. If the compoſition be of all three ſo that one muſt not hold his power from the other, but all equally from the fundamentall Poſ. 1 Conſtitution: for if the power of one be originall, and the other Derivative, it is no mixture, for ſuch a Derivation of power to others is in the moſt ſimple Monarchy: Againe, the end of mixture could not be obteyned; for why is this mixture framed, but that they might confine each other from exorbitance, which cannot be done by a derivate power, it being unnaturall that a derived power ſhould turne back, and ſet bounds to its owne beginning.

2. A full equality muſt not be in the three eſtates, though Poſ. 2 they are all ſharers in the Supreame power; for if it were ſo, it could not have any ground in it to denominate it a Monarchie, more then an Ariſtocracie or Democracie.

3. A power then muſt be ſought wherewith the Monarch Poſ. 3 muſt be inveſted, which is not ſo great as to deſtroy the p. 26mixture; nor ſo titular as to deſtroy the Monarchy; which I conceive maybe in theſe particulars.

1. If he be the head and Fountaine of the power which governs and executes the eſtabliſhed Lawes, ſo that both the other States as well conjunctim as diviſim, be his ſworne ſubjects, and owe obedience to his commands, which are according to eſtabliſhed Lawes.

2. If he hath a ſole or chiefe power in capacitating and putting thoſe perſons or ſocieties in ſuch States and conditions, as whereunto ſuch Supreme power by the foundations of the Government doth belong, and is annexed: ſo that though the Ariſtocratical and Democraticall power which is conjoyned to his, be not from him: yet the definement and determination of it to ſuch perſons is from him, by a neceſſary conſecution.

3. If the power of convocating or cauſing to be put in exiſtence, and diſſolving ſuch a Court or Meeting of the two other eſtates as is authoritative, be in him.

4. If his authority be the laſt and greateſt, though not the ſole, which muſt eſtabliſh and adde a conſummatum to every Act. I ſay theſe, or any of theſe put into one perſon makes that State Monarchicall, becauſe the other, though they depend not on him quoad eſſentiam et actus formales, but on the prime conſtitution of the Government, yet quoad exiſtentiam et determinationem ad ſubjecta, they doe.

The Supreme power being either the Legiſlative or the Gubernative. In a mixed Monarchy ſometimes the mixture is the ſeate of the Legiſlative power, which is the chiefe of the two: The power of conſtituting officers for governing by thoſe Lawes being left to the Monarch: Or elſe the Primacie of both theſe powers is jointly in all three: For if the Legiſlative be in one, then the Monarchy is not mixed but ſimple, for that is the Superiour, if that be in one, all elſe muſt needs be ſo too: By Legiſlative, I meane the power of making new Lawes, if any new be needfull to be added to the foundation: and the Authentick power of interpreting the old; For I take it, this is a branch of the Legiſlative and is as great, and in effect the ſame power.

p. 27Every mixed Monarchy is limited: but it is not neceſſary Sect. 3 that every limited ſhould be mixed: For the Prince in a mixed Monarchy, were there no definement of him to a Law but onelyonly this: that his Legiſlative acts have no validity without the allowance and joint authority of the other: this is enough to denominate it exactly a limited Monarchy: and ſo much it muſt have, if it be mixed. On the other ſide, if in the foundations of his Government he be reſtrained to to any Law beſides his own Will, he is a limited Monarch, though that both the Legiſlative and Gubernative power (provided he exceed not thoſe Lawes) be left in his owne hands: But then the Government is not mixed.

Now concerning the extent of the Princes power, and the Sect. 4 ſubjects duty in a mixed Monarchy,How far the Princes power extends in a mixed Monarchy? almoſt the ſame is to be ſaid, which was before in a limited: for it is a generall rule in this matter: ſuch as the Conſtitution of Government is, ſuch is the Ordinance of God: ſuch as the Ordinance is, ſuch muſt our duty of ſubjection be. No Power can challenge an obedience beyond its owne meaſure; for if it might, we ſhould deſtroy all Rules and differences of Government, and make all abſolute and at pleaſure. In every mixed Principality.

Firſt, Looke what Power is ſolely entruſted and committed Aſſert. 1 to the Prince by the fundamentall Conſtitution of the State, in the due execution thereof all owe full ſubjection to him, even the other Eſtates, being but ſocieties of his ſubjects bound to him by Oath of Allegeance as to their liege Lord.

Secondly, thoſe acts belonging to the power which is ſtated Aſſert. 2 in a mixed Principle if either part of that Principle, or two of the three undertake to doe them it is invalid it is no binding Act; for in this caſe all three have a free Negative voice: and take away the priviledge of a Negative Voice, ſo that in caſe of refuſall the reſt have power to doe it without the third, then you deſtroy that. Third, and make him but a Looker on: So that in every mixed Government, I take it, there muſt be a neceſſity of concurrence of all three Eſtates p. 28in the production of Acts belonging to that power, which is committed in common to them: Elſe ſuppoſe thoſe Acts valid which are done by any major part, that is, any two of the three, then you put it in the power of any two, by a confederacy at pleaſure to diſanull the third, or ſuſpend all its Acts, and make it a bare Cypher in Government.

Aſſert. 3 Thirdly in ſuch a compoſed State, it the Monarch invade the power of the other two, or run in any courſe tending to the diſſolving of the conſtituted frame, they ought to employ their power in this caſe to preſerve the State from ruine; yea that is the very end and fundamentall aime in conſtituting all mixed Policies: not that they by croſſing and jarring ſhould hinder the publike good; but that, if one exorbitate, the power of reſtraint and providing for the publike ſafety ſhould be in the reſt: and the power is put into divers hands, that one ſhould counterpoize and keep even the other: ſo that for ſuch other Eſtates, it is not onelyonly lawfull to deny obedience and ſubmiſſion to illegall proceedings, as private men may, but it is their duty, and by the foundations of the Government they are bound to prevent diſſolution of the eſtabliſhed Frame.

Aſſert. 4 Fourthly, the Perſon of the Monarch, even in theſe mixed Formes, (as I ſaid before in the limited) ought to be above the reach of violence in his utmoſt exorbitances: For when a People have ſworne allegeance, and inveſted a Perſon or Line with Supremacy, they have made it ſacred, and no abuſe can deveſt him of that power, irrevocably communicated. And while he hath power in a mixed Monarchy, he is the Univerſall Soveraigne, even of the other limiting States: ſo that being above them, he is de jure exempt from any penall hand.

Aſſert. 5 Fifthly, that one inconvenience muſt neceſſarily be in all mixed Governments, which I ſhewed to be in limited Governments, there can be no Conſtituted, Legall, Authoritative Judge of the fundamentall Controverſies ariſing betwixt the three Eſtates. If ſuch doe ariſe, it is the fatall diſeaſe of theſe Governments, for which no ſalve can be preſcribed; For the eſtabliſhed being of ſuch authority, would p. 29ipſo facto overthrow the Frame, and turne it into abſoluteneſſe: So that if one of theſe, or two, ſay their power is invaded, and the Government aſſaulted by the other, the Accuſed denying it, it doth become a controverſie: of this queſtion there is no legall Judge, it is a caſe beyond the poſſible proviſion of ſuch a Government. The Accuſing ſide muſt make it evident to every mans Conſcience. In this caſe, which is beyond the Government, the Appeale muſt be to the Community, as if there were no Government; and as by Evidence mens Conſciences are convinced, they are bound to give their utmoſt aſſiſtance. For the intention of the Frame in ſuch States, juſtifies the exerciſe of any power, conducing to the ſafety of the Univerſality and Government eſtabliſhed.