The Pagan Preacher Silenced, Text (3 of 4)

The Pagan Preacher Silenced · Text (3 of 4)

p. 58Arg. 1 If God to many in the world be but (paratus faccre gratiam) ready to give divine grace, then he doth not actually give aſſiſting grace to every man in the world without exception: but it is as frequent as their pages to uſe this expreſſion (Deus aut gratiam facit, aut facere paratus eſt) God doth either give grace, or is ready to do it; which Salvo they need not ſo cautelouſly to provide, if they can prove that God giveth to every man divine aſſiſting grace, to that end that they might uſe the light of nature well.

Arg. 2 All grace given to man ſince the fall, in tendency to his recovery, comes to us through Chriſt, and is called the grace of Chriſt.

But the grace of Chriſt is not exhibited to all men without exception.

Therefore no Supernatural grace.

All grace comes to us by Chriſt, therefore it is called the grace of Chriſt,Eph. 1.3. John 1.16.Eph 13 John 1:16 and we are bleſſed with all ſpiritual bleſſings in him, Eph. 1.3 and we are ſaid to receive grace for grace from him, John 1.16. But that the grace of Chriſt is not exhibited to every man without exception, I need not produce Scriptures to prove; for the Remonſtrants will ſurrender it up to us without any hoſtile progreſſe: for ſpeaking of the natural law inſcribed in the heart of all men, they ſay thus, as I have formerly quo…ed from them, Not to that end that by that onelyonly they ſhould be immediately ſaved, but that by that they ſhould be rendred fit hearers of the Goſpel, wherein there is the Sermon of the grace of Chriſt. Whence I conclude, that the grace of Chriſt hath no place, till that natural light be actually improved, and that ſo high, as that thereby they make themſelves fit hearers of the Goſpel, and ſo to receive the grace of Chriſt: now if any may receive the grace of Chriſt, to that end that they may uſe nature well, and ſo by conſequence before they do uſe it well, then the words of theſe great diſputers want weight to ballaſt them.Cornel. à lapid. in loc. Beſides, let them conſult with the interpreters of their own ſide, who thus expound this text, Eph. 2.12. wherein it is ſaid, the Gentiles were without Chriſt; one ſaith thus, without Chriſt, that is, without the knowledge of Chriſt, the law, the grace, the life of Chriſt: Theſe two are arguments ad hominem.

Arg. 3 p. 61If God ſuffered the Nations to walk in their own waies, then he did not give the principle of his aſſiſting Grace to that end, that they might uſe the light of nature well.

But God ſuffered the Nations to walk in their own waies, Acts 14.16. Therefore he doth not the latter. This Argument I humbly conceive hath ſo much weight in it, that it will deſervedly challenge their moſt intimate conſideration, and it is grounded upon this foundation: For God to ſuffer them to walk in their own waies, which the word of God affirmeth, and yet to do what in him lieth to hinder them from ſo doing, which this method of the Remonſtrants muſt needs import, are in themſelves very contradictious and inconſiſtent, and that upon the principle of Arminius himſelf, which is, that (a)(a)Permiſſio eſt ceſſat…o ab omni impediendi actu. Anteperk 2. p. 21impedition and permiſſion cannot ſtand together, permiſſion is the ceſſation from all acts of impedition; for clear it is, that he that doth any thing to hinder an act, cannot be properly ſaid to permit it, although the thing it ſelf be done.

Now let us proceed to the buſineſſe upon Arminius's grounds, that Permiſſion is the ſuſpenſion of all efficiency, whereby the action of men may be rationally hindred; and that God hinders an act two waies, either giving a law whereby men are not left to their own liberty, but they are ſo confined, that they cannot do it but ſin: as alſo by putting to any impediment, whereby the action may be hindred; both theſe then muſt be wanting if there be a permiſſion; and ſo by conſequence, where there is permiſſion, there is neither of theſe, ſo that by the help of this, we may come to conclude what conſonance the Doctrine of univerſal grace hath with the Scriptures or Reaſon. Will they think it rational for us to ſay, that that father which gives to his ſon a great eſtate, or it may be a leſſer portion, to negotiate and trade with, and alſo by his counſel and direction, yea and his labour and pains, is ready to aſſiſt him; that he ſhould be ſaid to leave him to himſelf, and to ſuffer him to walk in his own waies? So in this caſe, they ſay that God gives all the heathen a law to circumſcribe them, and by that their conſciences will accuſe them, and condemn them if they walk not according to that law, and this God gives them as a full ſtock and meaſure of Talents, to negotiate and drive on an heavenly trade, and with that intent, that they may thrive in a ſpiritual eſtate towards heaven; and not onelyonly ſo, but by the motion of his holy Spirit, aſſiſt, direct, and move, and perſwade to reſtrain them from abuſing thoſe Talents, and to the end they may uſe them well. If ſo, then what truth can there be in that Scripture, that ſaith, God ſuffered them to walk in their evill waies? or if there be truth in thoſe Scriptures, what truth then in thoſe frequent aſſertions of theirs, that contein ſuch adminiſtrations of grace to them, to hinder them from walking in their own waies? ſeeing permiſsion and impedition cannot ſtand together; no nor your permiſſion and the putting forth ſuch means, as either they ſuppoſe may, or intend ſhould hinder ſuch actions, can conſiſt and ſtand together.

And as a further illuſtration of this argument, I demand Cui fini? to what end is this principle of aſſiſting grace given to all men. I… is true, I know, they tell us in general that it is to aſſiſt them that they may p. 62uſe the light of nature well:Specialem modū operationis, non neceſſe eſt nobis exponere. Corvin in Mol. c. 43. S. 5. Etſi dici à nobis actum per meras ſcaſtones…n nobis effici probare non puſſi…; lubenter canon concedimus cam non effici fine ſuaſionibus, Ib. ſee 7 Ponitur Impedi mentum volan tati duplici mo do; vel per modum naturae, vel per madū liber…a…s Prima eſt phyſicci …pellendo. Secunda eſt moral…e… ſuadendo; in prima voluntas neceſſariò, in ſecan a certò impeditur. Armin. Antiperk p 150. but this doth not ſatisfie. I demand further, what is the work, or the manner of working in this caſe? how doth this ſpirit aſsiſt the heathen to uſe nature wel? They deny any infuſed habites, but it muſt be in a way that ſutes well with the liberty of mans free will, which is by moral ſuaſion, as they ſay in all their writings: yet if we charge them with this, they deny it, and that upon good ground: for if they ſay it is by a Phyſical efficiency onelyonly, it deſtroies their very foundation; and if by a moral ſuaſion onelyonly, they cannot prove it; we may well therefore demand how? but we cannot receive ſatisfaction from them in this, for they anſwer us thus, The ſpecial and particular manner by which the ſpirit works, it is not neceſſary for us to explain. How do theſe aſſertors of univerſal grace delight to lurk in obſcurities, and upon every occaſion decline the open profeſſion of the truth? and it will be too much digreſſive from the point, for me to ingage in this diſpute (de modo operationis gratiae) but to take it as we find it granted by them, thus: Although thou canſt not prove that we ſay the grace of God acts by mere ſuaſion, yet we grant willingly it acts not without ſuaſion; or to …ake the words of Arminius, who treating of permiſsion which he maketh to be a ſuſpenſion of all impediment, ſaith thus, Impediments are put before the will of man two waies, either by acting according to the manner of nature, or acting according to the manner of free choice; the former is by Phyſical impulſe, the ſecond by moral ſuaſion; in the firſt the will is neceſſarily, in the ſecond certainly hindred. By all which we may conclude, that where the grace of God is given by way of an aſſiſting principle, it muſt be either by a Phyſical efficiency, neceſſarily acting the will, or by a moral perſwaſion, certainly perſwading the will, or both join…ly; and ſo on the contrary we may ſay, that to them whom he neither Phyſically moves, nor morally perſwades, to ſuch the aſsiſting grace of God is not given to hinder them from walking in ſinfull waies, or to enable them to uſe the light of nature well; by this we may conclude, that this aſsiſting grace is not given to the Heathen nations, becauſe he ſuffred them to walk in their waies; which permiſsion excludes both Phyſical efficiency and moral ſuaſion, and that this is firm reaſon, I ſhall preſent to the world their own grants. Fi…ſt Arminius gives it as the ground work, thus (a)(a)Perm…ſſio igitur quà Deus perm…tat creaturam ra…ionalem perpetrate actum, eſt ſuſpenſio impedimentorum om…um quibus volantas perſua denda erat. Arm, in Perk. p. 153.Permiſſion by which God permitteth a rational creature to commit any act, is the ſuſpenſion of all impediments, by which the will is to be moved and perſwaded. Now I thus urge, that if permiſsion be the ſuſpenſion of all impediments by which the wi…l is to be perſwaded; then I ſay, the will is neither to be Phyſically acted, nor morally perſwaded; where either of theſe is, there is no permiſſion, and this Arminius himſelf granteth, thus:(b)(b)Impedimentum quo peccatum quà tale impeditur, eſt vel voluntatis divinae … velatio, vel ſuaſio voluntatis ad obre…nperandum voluntati divinae; unde conſtat, permiſſionem peccati eſſe ſuſpenſionem iſtius revelationis, vel ſuaſionis, vel utriuſque. pag. 157. The impediments by which ſin as ſin is hindred, are the revelation of the divine will, and ſuaſions to move the will to obey that divine will. Whence it is clear, that Gods permiſſion to commit ſin, is the ſuſpenſion of that Revelation, or of that ſuaſion, or of both joint…y. And as a further teſtimony in this caſe, he ſaith in another place thus; (c)(c)Nam utunum argumentum impedire poteſt voluntatem ne velit quod Deus vult impeditum; ita neceſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum iſtorum perſuadeatur voluntas ad nolendum, ſecus non eſt permiſſio. p. 153.For as one argument may hinder the p. 63will from willing that which God would have hindred, ſo it is neceſſary that he uſe no argument to perſwade the will to be unwilling, otherwiſe there is no permiſſion.

What can be made more clear then this, that where God permits, he uſeth no means either Phyſically to act, or morally to perſwade the will? Now to draw to a concluſion in this Argument, thus I ſumme up the ſtrength of it, God permitteth the Nations to walk in their own waies, according to the Scriptures, Acts 14.16, 17. and becauſe he permitteth, therefore we muſt not ſay, that either he Phyſically acts, or morally perſwades the will to uſe the light of nature well, according to the Remonſtrants own conceſsions; and then I conclude, that either the aſsiſting ſpirit and grace of God is not given at all, or elſe to be idle, or to no uſe, not to aſſiſt them to uſe the light of nature well; Let them take which of theſe they pleaſe, and till any for them can prove, that Gods aſſiſting grace and ſpirit, and permiſsion or ſuffering them to walk in their evil waies can ſtand together, without being at a very high rate contradictious, I ſhall conclude that they do but uſurp the title of Univerſal Grace.

Arg. 4 If there be no need of the aſsiſting principle of Divine grace to enable men to do thoſe things that are contained in the Law, then God giveth not to every man his aſsiſting grace to do thoſe things conteined in the Law.

But there is no need of Gods aſsiſting grace to that end: Therefore there is no ſuch principle given.Corvin. in Mol. cap. 11. ſect. 4.

We challenge (and that but in equity) that liberty of arguing which they take unto themſelves: When we urge that Adam in integrity had that grace, which if we had now unmaimed and not impaired, we might be as able to beleeve in Chriſt, as Adam was to do that which was commanded him; and ſo by conſequence that grace which Adam had was (principium poteſtativum credendi in Chriſtum) the poteſtative principle of beleeving in Chriſt, if his condition had required it. To this they ſay, God did not give ſuch power to beleeve to Adam in his integrity, becauſe then there was no need of it: and that upon this ground, it is againſt the wiſdom of the Almighty to give grace to do that, of which there is no need, or to give grace where there is no need And may not we likewiſe ſay, that it is not ſuitable to the wiſedome of God, to give his ſpecial aſſiſting grace to enable them to uſe the light of nature well, when they are enabled without that grace to do the things conteined in the Law? Now in this Argument I ſhall proceed onelyonly upon their principles, and I clear it thus. When we urge that all men are dead in ſin, and ſo improve this as an argument for the power of Gods grace, becauſe men are dead, and ſo cannot further their own converſion, or prepare themſelves to receive regenerating grace, as Molin preſſeth Arminius; Corvinus, who is the defender of the Arminian faith, replieth thus (a)(a)Addo quidem cum habere reliquias vitae ſpiritualis (& explico me) in intellectu … aliquam Dei cognitionem; & in affectu defiderium ad bonū cognitum: ideo que licet id quod vere bonum eſt age e non poſſit, poteſt tamen per illud bonum aliquid agere, intelligare Deum, eſſe bonum & juſtum, facere caquae ſunt legis, pagnare cum defideriis licet non vincere, locomotivum regere, quae talia ſunt quae Deu requirit ab eo quem intendit regenerare. Cor. in Ma…. 32. ſe. 2.Man hath the reliques of ſpiritual life; that is, in his underſtanding ſome knowledge of God, in his affections ſome deſire of good being known: ſo that although he cannot do that which is truly good, yet he can by it do ſome good, underſtand God to be good and juſt, do the p. 64things conteined in the Law, fight with his own deſires, although not overcome them; and to govern his locomotion, which things God requireth in thoſe whom he will regenerate. Now if man by nature have ſuch reliques of ſpiritual life in him as to know God, deſire good, do the things conteined in the Law, fight with their deſires; govern their locomotion, and all this by vertue of the reliques of ſpiritual life; then what need of a principle of aſſiſting grace, de novo, to enable them to do the things conteined in the Law? for that which is performed by the reliques of ſpiritual life, need not any aſſiſting principle of grace anew. Again, the Collocutors at the conference at Hague, upon this very argument, ſay thus, (a)(a)In ſpirituali morte non ſeparantur propriè dona ſpiritualia ab hominis voluntate, quia nunquam illa fuerunt et inſita. Sed libertas duntaxat agendi bene aut malè, quae libertas quamvis vites ſuas non exerere poſſit in homine peccato…e propter tenebras intellectus, & depravationem affectuum, manſit tamen pars creatae naturae. Col. Hag. 279.In ſpiritual death, ſpiritual gifts are not properly ſeparated from the will, becauſe they were never in it; for in the will there is onelyonly that liberty of doing good or evil, which liberty although it cannot put forth its ſtrength in fallen man becauſe of the blindneſſe of his underſtanding, and depravation of his affections, yet it remaineth as part of a created nature. And many of ſuch like expreſsions paſſe in that argument, by all which they affirm death to be onelyonly in the underſtanding and affections, not in the will; but that in the depth of ſpiritual death, the will according to its natural freedome, can act as the underſtanding dictateth, and the affections move; all which are very contradictious to themſelves in other places, and the holy Scriptures every where: yet upon this ground I proceed againſt them with their own ſword, The will needs no life to be infuſed anew, it is enough if the underſtanding and the affections be rectified; but as for the underſtanding that hath the knowledge of God, and the truth naturally, which Arminius calleth (Lumen naturale) natural light, and Corvinus Scinitilla luminis, ſparks of light, which light is called the law of Nature, and ſo often by the Arminians and Mr. Goodwin called natural light: and in the affections there is a deſire of good, fighting with inordinate deſires, and by both they come to do the things conteined in the Law, and that by nature; what need then of a principle of aſsiſting grace conferred anew, to enable them to do any of theſe? True indeed, the Remonſtrants often uſe the word grace as Pelagius did,Gratiae vocabulo invidiam frangens, & offenſionem declinans. of whom it was ſaid (by the word grace he indeavoured to break the cloud of envy, and avoid offences) ſo theſe, meerly to ſerve them at this turn, and to carry on their own intereſt, are ſtrong ſticklers for the grace of God, to aſsiſt man in doing the leaſt thing towards grace and ſalvation.

When they would prove man not to be wholly dead, they urge ſome Reliques of life, whereby he is able to know God, deſire good, fight againſt his luſts, govern his locomotion, do the things conteined in the Law,Textus non dicit eos diſpoſitos eſſe à Deo. Coll. Hag. 109. and ſo to diſpoſe themſelves to grace and eternal life: for thus they ſay when they ſpeak of, or rather pervert that text, Acts 13.48. (As many as were ordained to eternal life beleeved) they ſay that (ordained) in the text, is no more then diſpoſed to eternal life; and that the text ſaith not they are diſpoſed by God to eternal life. Now not to be diſpoſed by God, is not to be diſpoſed by the grace of God; for by that we ſay men are diſpoſed to eternal life: but it ſeemeth they ſay men are diſpoſed to eternal life, and yet not by God or his grace, and what p. 65can this be but by nature, and the natural powers of man, and ſo of themſelves without any new principle of aſſiſting grace? And yet when they come to make out a general and univerſal grace, then no man muſt be diſpoſed to do any thing, or know any thing, but by a principle of aſsiſting grace, without which, nature is wholly blind; and are now become as abſolute patrons of the grace of God as may bee. Oh the fraud and jugling of theſe ſupporters of the doctrine of univerſal grace! I urge theſe two things to them; Firſt, when they urge that man by the relicks of life hath abilities to all thoſe things before mentioned, and this to prove man not to be wholly dead. I demand whether they underſtand man to have thoſe abilities by the reliques of life, with the aſsiſting grace of God or without it: if they meane with it; then it is very impertinent to prove man not to be wholly dead; for no man is ſo ſimple to plead man to be ſo dead by ſinne, that hee cannot do anything, being excited and aſsiſted by the grace of God; and if they meane the reliques of life without that grace, then I have what I deſire, that all men have not grace; ſo univerſal grace falleth. Secondly, I urge, if thoſe words in Act. 13.48. foreign, which text according to their own gloſſe is to be read thus [as many as were diſpoſed to eternal life;] if thoſe words (I ſay) diſpoſed to eternal life, doe not neceſſarily import thus much, that men are diſpoſed by God to eternal life; Then what ground have they to ſay that no man is able to do the things contained in the law, or any thing whereby hee is diſpoſed to faith and regeneration, but as he is aſsiſted by the grace of God de novo? How neceſſarily is this doctrine inevitably involved? When they would prove man not to be wholly dead, then we have it only thus, [they do by nature the things contained in the law;] but when they come to prove univerſal grace, we have it with a comment thus; [they do the things contained in the law by nature, as it is helped and aſsiſted by grace] let them adhere either to the one or other: either, that man hath no ſuch reliques of life by which he is able to diſpoſe himſelfe to faith; or elſe that a new principle of aſsiſting grace is not needful, nor given to every man. The one wil help in the point of the manner of working of Gods grace in mans converſion; the other in the point of univerſal grace. And until they can reconcile thoſe reliques of life in every man, wherby they are enabled to do thoſe things contained in the law, & to prepare themſelvs for faith; and the neceſsity of the aſsiſting principle of Gods grace to be imparted to man anew, for thoſe ends & purpoſes; I ſhal conclude, that they do but uſurp the name & title of univerſal grace.

Thus I have endeavoured to prove that that which they pretend is given to everie man, cannot be called Grace. In the next place I ſhal examine whether that which is given to every man (although it be granted to be grace) be truly ſaid to be ſufficient. Now this muſt be proved as wel as the former, if they wil carry up to the height an univerſal ſufficient grace.

Now that this buſineſs may be perſpicuouſly decided, it is requiſite that we firſt conſider the nature and definition of ſufficiencie, in general, and then apply it to particular caſes.

p. 66The Remonſtrants give us a general definition of ſuffiencie, tending to this reſult, Sufficiencie is a poſition of things neceſſary and requiſite to that thing, in reſpect of which it is ſaid to be ſufficient; and this I willingly receive as rationall.

Upon that text, Iſa. 5.1, 2.3. They ſay thus.

(a)(a)Sufficiens gratia nihil aliud eſt quam ea gratia quae omnia neceſſaria ad regenerationem adhibet, ut quod ad actum praeſtationem neceſſarium nihil ult a requiratur. Definitio gratiae ſ…ffie ent…s hoc habet, ut omnia neceſſaria adh…bet; Tolle aliquid neceſſarium, no… erit gratia ſufficiens; pone omnia neceſſaria, & erit gratia ſufficiens. Act. Synod. acr. 4. pag 9.Sufficient grace is nothing elſe but that grace which affordeth all requiſites and neceſſaries to the effecting of regeneration, ſo that to the performance of the act, nothing can be beyond it required as neceſſary; the very definition of ſufficient grace containeth this in it, that it afford all neceſſaries: take away any one neceſſary requiſite, and we take away ſufficient grace, grant all, and wee grant ſufficient grace. And true it is, that ſufficiency in general, is wel expreſt in other words, thus [Poſitis omnibus requiſitis.] But wee muſt not ſtay in generals, if wee undertake to clear the truth of this point to ſatisfaction. But conſider the various ends and purpoſes, in tendency to which, this or that meaſure of grace is ſaid to be ſufficient. The Remonſtrants do not affirme that aſsiſting grace given to every man to be ſufficient to all ends and purpoſes, …amely to worke faith in Jeſus, to effect reg…neration, or ſufficient to bring men to eternal life; as Mr. Goodwin fondly dreameth. Corvinus ſaith thus, (b)(b)Omnibus aliqua m…dia ad…ibentur ad ſalutem; quae licet non ſemper ſufficiunt ad fidem ingenerandam immediatè, tamē ad actiones aliquas ſuffic…unt, quibus Deus vult homines ad fidem praeparari. Corv. in Molin. cap. 39. Sec. 1.Some means in tendency to ſalvation are given to all, which although they be not ſufficient to worke faith immediately, yet they are ſufficient to thoſe works by which God will have men prepared to faith and regeneration. And againe the ſame Author thus, (c)(c)Quantum ad athnicos pertinet ad quo… Chriſti nomen non pervent, eos taligrat…â abſol tè ad ſal…tem et fidem ſufficiente praeditos non eſſe, ſaepe ſuprà diximus; quare po ſuimas…, radum ſuffic…en…iae ac men uram diverſam …alem quae fit pro menſura vocationis, c 37 ſ. 11 Act. Synod. art. 2. p. 237.So much as appertaineth to the heathen to whom the name of Chriſt never came, wee have oftentimes ſaid that they are not endued with a grace ſufficient, abſolutely, either to faith or regeneration; therfore wee have put divers degrees and meaſures of ſufficiency, according to the meaſure of their call. So that we have clearly diſcovered negatively, what the general and common grace is not ſufficient to effect, namely not ſufficient to ſalvation, not yet to faith in Chriſt: but affirmatively, to what it is ſufficient, ſomething more dubiouſly. Sometimes we have it thus, It is ſufficient to thoſe actions by which men are diſpoſed to faith and regeneration. Other ſometimes we have it thus, that by it men may be diſpoſed to become apt and fit hearers of the Goſpel, as the Remonſtrants in a forementioned place: which muſt be things very different. Now here we muſt look for the height of the doctrine of Univerſal Grace, thus, God gives common grace to all, by which they are ſufficiently enabled to do ſuch acts or workes by which they are diſpoſed and prepared for the hearing of the Goſpel, and for faith and regenerating grace. The next thing enquirable is, what thoſe works or actions are by which they are diſpoſed to faith and regenerating grace, and to which they have ſufficient grace? and theſe cannot b…e otherwiſe then confuſedly taken up from the pens of the Remonſtrants. In that chapter which by Corvinus is ſet apart to treat of this verie ſubject, viz. of that grace that prepares men for faith, we may find various actions mentioned: as firſt. (a)(a)Quae legis ſunt faciunt; iſta opera, licet talia non ſint qualia iam regeniti praeſtant, ſed valdè exigua, tamen ea Deus requirit in eo quem intendit regenerate, & iis utitur ad hominē regenerandum. Corv. in Molin. cap. 34. ſect 2.The doing the things contained in the law, Rom. 2.14. of theſe he ſaith, that they are ſuch as God requireth of thoſe whom hee intendeth to regenerate, and uſeth them in tendency p. 67to it. Againe in the next Sermon we find another, viz. thirſting after Chriſt, and a deſire of grace, and this he urgeth from Iſa. 55.1. and expreſly ſaith thus, (b)(b)Cupiditas ſalutaris gratiae, & gemitus conſcientiae anhelantis ſub pondere peccatorum ſunt effecta Spiritus; ſed non regenerantis, ſed ad regenerationem praeparantis, ſ. 3.The deſire of ſaving grace, and the groans of a conſcience breathing under the weight of ſinne are effects, not of the regenerating ſpirit, but of the ſpirit preparing to regeneration. In another place we find thus, (c)(c)Homo in peccatis mortuus, habet in intellectu Dei cognitionem, & in affectu ad bonum cognitum aliquod deſideriū, quibus ſacere poteſt ea quae ſunt legis, pugnare cum deſideriis, & locomotivum regere, quae talia ſunt ut ea exigat Deus ab eo quem intendit regenerare Cir. in Mol. c. 32. ſe. 24.A man that is dead in ſinnes, hath the knowledge of God in his underſtanding, the deſire of that knowne good in his affections, by which he can doe the things contained in the Law, fight and ſtrive with his deſires, governe his locomotion; all which are required of thoſe whom God willeth to regenerate. So that by theſe wee may gather up a catalogue of thoſe actions to which man hath ſufficient meanes, and by which he is diſpoſed to faith and regeneration; namely, knowledge of God, deſires after God and ſaving grace, groaning under the burthen of ſinne, fighting with inordinate deſires, government of the locomotion. Theſe and ſuch like are thoſe actions they mean of. Now I muſt examine theſe two things. Firſt, whether theſe actions bee diſpoſitive to regeneration, or that men be therby properly ſaid to be prepared to converſion. Secondly, whether (though this be granted) all men may be truly ſaid to be ſufficiently enabled for ſuch actions.

For the firſt of theſe, I urge two wayes. Firſt to examine whether theſe actions be truly ſaid to be the effects of regeneration, or the preparations to it. It is the grand queſtion betwixt Molincus and Corvinus. Molineus affirmes them to be effects; Corvinus contends for this, that they are but preparations to it, and may be where converſion is not. I ſhall not uſe any elaborate diſcourſe in this buſineſſe, only to put them, or any for them to conſider, whether to grieve for ſin, and groan under the burthen of ſinne, and to fight with inordinate luſts and deſires, and from thoſe to deſire and thirſt after the ſaving grace of God, bee not parts of converſion: Is there not a change in the affections when we deſire good, and the ſaving grace of God, and are ſo farre eſtranged from ſin, as to groan under the burthen of them; and from that change in affections wee come to fight againſt inordinate deſires? which phraſe intimateth a reluctance, or averſation in the mind from ſin, contrary to that condition wherin our minds are ſet upon evil works; Col. 1. In converſion there is a double terme, A quo, and Ad quem, from which, to which we are converted; in theſe actions there is both from ſin, to God and his grace, and that both in deſires, affections, and execution: and is it not yet converſion with the Remonſtrants? We may wonder by what colour of reaſon they can imagine,In Actis dicitur …e plaritus, qui ante ipſam converſionem Deum timuerunt, & religioſi fuere, ut de Judaes, co…nelio, Lydia Corvin. in Mol. cap. 34. ſect. 5. that when men are ſo farre turned from ſin as to grieve for it, groane under the burden of it, and ſo to ſtrive and fight againſt it; and ſo farre turned to God as to deſire and hunger and thirſt after his grace, they ſhould not yet be partakers of converſion; ſhal we ſee a piece of their reaſon? wee have it in Corvinus, who ſaith thus, It is ſaid in the Acts of the Apoſtles, that many before they were converted, were religious, and feared God, as Act. 2 5. & 10.2. & 16.14. of the Jews, Cornelius and Lydia. And it wil be an excellent proofe, when they prove that theſe mentioned in theſe Scriptures were not converted before p. 68the preaching of the Apoſtles, which I believe wil be ad Gracas Calendas, Let any Arminian tell me what one ſyllable in thoſe texts, import that thoſe there ſpoken of, were then unconverted: or where do we find any footſteps of their converſion afterwards, or that the Apoſtle was ſent for to convert Cornelius; and where hee did it? til this be done, I ſhall conclude their proofe very infirm and weake. For the Apoſtle did not goe to Cornelius to convert him to God, but to inſtruct him in a more particular and diſtinct knowledge of Chriſt; which I hope they will grant many had not in thoſe daies, and before that yet were converted to God.

A ſecond piece of their reaſon, wee have from the ſame Author, and in the ſame place, from this, that the feare of God is ſaid to be before the revelation of the divine wills and his Argument is this; (a)(a)Ille timor convenit nondum credentibus, qui praecedit revelationem divinae voluntatis; talis eſt timor de quo ſermo eſt, Pſal. 15.12, 14. Ibid.Ps 15:12Ps 15:14That fear agreeth well to thoſe that yet believe not in Chriſt, which goeth before the revelation of the divine will: But ſuch a feare is that ſpoken of, Pſal. 25.12, 14. Ergo. But when this argument is reduced to a right and legitimate formation, it wil appear to be of the ſame ſize with the former.

Firſt, for that phraſe, believeth not in Chriſt, he ſhould have inſerted, are not converted; now it is ill confounding theſe two, becauſe according to them, many before Chriſt (of whom this text is ſpoken) were converted to God, and yet did not believe in Chriſt: ſo that the propoſition ſhould have run thus, [That fear agreeth wel to men unconverted, which goeth before the revelation of Gods wil.]

Secondly, That phraſe, Revelation of the divine will, muſt be diſtinguiſhed, and we muſt know whether he meaneth, all the diſcoveries of Gods will, or only a further confirmation or increaſe of knowledge of his wil. If they underſtand it in this laſt ſenſe, I deny the Propoſition; if in the former, the Aſſumption: for the fear there ſpoken of doth not precede all knowledg of the divine will. God may well be ſaid to ſhew his covenant, and to teach in the way that he ſhall chuſe, and to tell his ſecrets to them that are already converted, and have had ſome diſcoveries of his will; otherwiſe David ſo often as hee prayes to God in Pſal. 119. to teach him his word, his wil, his waies, his ſtatutes, ſo often he ſhould beſpeake himſelf without the knowledge of Gods will, and yet unconverted. And by ſuch arguments as thoſe they attempt to prove that thoſe actions are but preparative to converſion and regeneration. I ſhall only come againſt them with their own ſword in one Argument, thus: they grant us in expreſſe terms, that (b)(b)Homo in ſtatu peccati nihil boni ex ſe & à ſe poteſt aut facere aut velle, aut cogitare; ſed ne ceſſe eſt ut in intellectu, voluntate, affectibus, & omnibus viribus renovetur. Script. Synod. Art. 3. p. 1.Man in the ſtate of ſinne, can do no good, nor think good, nor deſire good of himſelf; but to theſe it is neceſſary that he be renewed in his underſtanding, will, affections, and all his powers. Now upon this ground they will be reduced to this dilemma, either theſe actions are not good, or elſe they are not done as preparative to, but as effects, or as parts (as ſome would expreſſe it) of regeneration. Now to examine which of theſe two they take: Wee find Corvinus thus ſalving the buſineſſe: ſpeaking of thoſe re…icks of life in man, he ſaith thus,(c)(c)Ideoque licèt illud quod verè honum eſt agere non poſſit, poteſt tamen per illud bonum aliquid agere. In Molin. cap. 32. Sect. 24. Although by this he cannot do that which is truly good, yet by this good he is able to do ſomthing. A very learned deciſion, and well becoming ſuch a man. p. 69Who ever yet feigned to himſelf man ſo deſtitute of power that he could do nothing? But with him it ſeems man hath ſuch a ſufficiency of grace, that he can do ſomething. But I hope this is not the height of the doctrine of univerſal ſufficient grace; he ſhould have ſhown what it is that they can do, whether bonum, or malum, or nec bonum, nec mulum; that is, whether good, or evil, or indifferent; Good he denies, Indifferent he doth not ſay, and Evil he cannot prove. Neither is that any clearer ſatisfaction which we find in another place, though upon the ſame ſubject; who being preſſed with this, Whether thoſe works that men did as diſpoſitive to regeneration, were good, or no? he anſwers thus,(a)(a)Si verè bona ea intelligantur quae habent quicquid ſecundùm evangelium ad eſſentiam boni operis pertiner, non ſunt verè bona: ſed ſi verum opponitur ficto ac apparenti, c…tra ſubſtantiam, ſuo modo etiam verè bona dici poſſunt quâ in illis eſt ſinceritas & integritas. c. 34. ſ. 7 If truly good be underſtood of that which hath thoſe things which according to the Goſpel appertain to the eſſence of a good work, ſo they are not truly good: but as truly good is oppoſed to feigned and appearing, without ſubſtance, ſo they are truly good, becauſe there is in them integrity and ſincerity. But hee that can reduce this elaborate diſtinction to right reaſon, hee ſhall be with mee great Apollo. How willing, and yet unwilling is Corvinus to affirme theſe actions truly good, and that becauſe preſſing inconveniences attend him on either hand? And therefore he will ſpeake at a high rate of inconſiſtency, but hee will reconcile the buſineſſe, and affirme them good, and truly good, as they have the ſubſtance of good; but not truly good, as they have not the eſſence of good; as if the ſubſtance of good can be preſent, and yet the eſſence of good be abſent: as if when the queſtion was put concerning this or that thing, whether it be a true man or no, wee ſhould ſay, as (true man) is taken for that which hath the eſſence of a man, ſo it is not a true man: but as the phraſe true man is taken for that which is a man, not in appearance, but in ſubſtance, ſo it is a true man; would not this be exploded as very ridiculous? the termes are ſo coincident, that one cannot be without the other; for it cannot be truly ſaid to be a man quoad ſubſtantiam, unleſſe it hath the eſſence of a man. Quicquid eſt homo habet eſſentiam hominis. Yet this is the beſt ſatisfaction that wee receive from theſe great aſſertours of univerſal grace, and in this diſtinction they have a double diſadvantage. The members thereof are coincident, and ſo no legitimate members of a diſtinction; and alſo the laſt member, which he granteth, ſerveth our turne; for then thoſe actions which they produce, which all men have ſufficient grace to performe, (as they ſay) are by Corvinus his owne confeſſion ſuch as have the ſubſtance of good, and are not feignedly but truly good: then how can ſuch things be done before regeneration as pre-diſpoſitions therunto, ſeeing they are truly good? and becauſe they are ſo, according to their own conceſſions, they cannot be done by any man untill he be regenerated in all his p…wers: how are they in their laſt refuge implicated and involved?

Secondly I urge. Suppoſe they he proved to be antecedents to regeneration, yet how will they prove they are true and proper diſpoſitives thereunto? I demand ſome ground, either from Scripture or reaſon to prove that by theſe, man is diſpoſed to converſion. What place in Scripture intimateth either theſe or any other things as diſpoſitions p. 70to converſion, or how in all their writings do they cleer theſe expreſſions to ſatisfaction? Thoſe words by which they moſt declare their minds in this point, I find in Corvinus, who ſaith thus, (a)(a)Mens noſtra eſt, Hominem communiori iſtâ gratiâ rectè utentem, ideo eſſe aptum & idoneum ad credendum Evangelio; quia tal bus evangelium …um fi…ctu revelat, & ut evangelio credant in talibus efficit, Corvin. in Mol. c. 33. §. 11.Our mind is, that man uſing common grace well, is therefore apt and fit to believe the Goſpel, becauſe God doth reveale the Goſpel to ſuch with fruit, and doth worke faith in ſuch. And in another place ſpeaking of theſe verie actions, ſaith thus, God requireth them of him whom he wil regenerate. And many more to this purpoſe; whereby they in ſtead of proofe from Scriptures, being deductions of their owne, which are very obnoxious to ſcruple; and their reaſoning is this, they deduct mens aptneſſe and fitneſſe to be converted by ſuch acts, from Gods diſpenſations, and his actual converting of thoſe in whom are ſeen thoſe acts. And may not I retort this Argument with as great ſtrength thus? Man uſing common grace well, is not diſpoſed to converting grace,(b)(b)Ea praeexi, it Leus ab eo quem intendit regenerare. c. 32. Sec. 14. becauſe God doth not alwaies give converting grace to ſuch, and doth often give it to others that do not uſe the light of nature wel; or at leaſt as Armanius ſaith, minus malè: And the Argument is of ſome ſtrength; if there be no unbended method for Gods diſpenſing converting grace, then what wil become of their diſpoſitions to converſion? Many of the Corinthians are recorded to be Idolaters, Adulterers, buggerers, theeves, and what not? they did not uſe the light of nature well, and yet they were bleſſed with the Goſpel, and did partake of the regenerating grace of God; but let any man ſhew me the diſpoſitions to this grace, by which they were fitted to receive it. Paul was a perſecuter, blaſphemer, injurious, abuſing not only the Goſpel, but the light of nature alſo; which (if Mr. Goodwin divine right) teacheth men to ſearch out and yeild to the beſt diſcoveries of Gods will and pleaſure; and ſo was without all diſpoſitions to receive converting grace, and yet he found mercy in the height of his obſtinacie, which is recorded as a demonſtration of the power of Gods grace to reduce him, when there were no probable apparent diſpoſitions to receive converting grace; but Tyre and Sydon, who were ſo well diſpoſed and fitted to receive further grace, and had uſed the light of nature well, as that Chriſt ſaith of them, they would have repented in ſackcloth and aſhes, if they had enjoyed that word, and theſe miracles; and yet to them God gave neither the outward meanes of the Goſpel, nor yet converting grace: but what need I caſt about to produce proofe? The Remonſtrants owne conceſſions are enough to confirme us againſt themſelves, who upon the ſame point thus ſay.

(a)(a)Novimus enim Deum ſaepe evangelicae praeditationis gratiam iis facere qui nihil minus curae habuerunt quam ut communion vo…ation reſpond…ant, & qaum tal…bus eam facit, eandem non facit ii… qui nihilo ſunt pejores; & ſi ulterius conſideretur mediorum ad ſalutem diſpenſatio, agnoſcimus Deum omnis boni largitorem tali ut… libertate, ut paribus impa…em, imparibus parem gratiam conferendo, minus malos non vocando, pejores vocando, ut ex uſu vel abuſu donorum generaliorū exactam ejus rationem red…i non poſſe, libenter a…noſcimus. Act. Synod. Art. 2. p. 528.For wee know very wel, that God hath given evangelical grace to them that take care for nothing leſſe then to uſe common grace well; and alſo doth not give it to others that are nothing worſe then they: and if his diſpenſations of the means of ſalvation be truly conſidered; wee acknowledge, that God who is the giver of all good, uſeth ſuch a liberty in giving unequal grace to equal men, and equal grace to unequal men; in rejecting thoſe that are leſſe evil, and calling worſe; and that he makes ſuch a various adminiſtration of his grace, that wee willingly acknowledge p. 71there can be no exact account given thereof by the uſe or abuſe of general grace. And what more clear then this, to cauſe all that doctrine of diſpoſitions to converſion, which God requires in all them to whom he intendeth to give converting grace, to vaniſh into ſmoak? There are no ſuch congruities in men, or diſpoſitions to determine the will of God to give them converting grace, but according to their owne judgment he uſeth ſuch a liberty, that as Jacob, he layeth his right hand upon the youngeſt ſon, and reſerves his left for his eldeſt, which makes us oftentimes to admire the depth of the power and the wiſdom of God. Now if any ſhal demand of me, what I have gained in all theſe allegations? I anſwer, thus much, that thoſe actions which they pretend all may do, are no way diſpoſitions to converting grace or regeneration, and therefore they have no colour of reaſon to pretend men are ſufficiently enabled to do them, and that in reference to ſalvation; making all to ha…g in this method, All men have grace to enable them to uſe nature well, and do things contained in the law, &c. which are diſpoſitions to converſion and faith, and thoſe to eternal life. Hence they inferre, that that common grace is mediately ſaving; but I herein break the chaine, and have proved, that they are not diſpoſitions to regeneration, but many of them effects of regeneration, to which they themſelves grant all men have not ſufficient grace; and therefore not to thoſe invented actions, and ſo by conſequence to nothing.

Secondly, I ſhall further examine, whether (if we granted that ſuch works were diſpoſitions to converting g…) they can prove, that all men have a ſufficiency of means to do a…l thoſe particulars mentioned, viz. to know God, d…ſire good, thirſt after ſaving grace, grieve for ſinne, ſtrive againſt in …r…inate deſires, &c. Whether have all men ſufficient mea…s to do …heſ…? And this is moſt directly pertinent to our purpoſe: They muſt affirm it, I may deny it; and to clear it I thus proceede. Corvinus treating about ſufficient grace, thus ſaith, (b)(b)Monemus iterum qu…cquid de ſuffic…entia dicimus, aſſiſtentiae Sp…ritus tribui à n…bis. C. 8. ſect. 2.This I give as a Caution, that alwayes when we ſpeak of ſufficiency, we intend it to be attributed to the aſſiſtance of the Spirit of God. Out of which words I can draw out no other meaning but this that they doe n…t hold any ſufficiency, where there is not the actual aſſiſtance of the Spirit of God. Then I p…ſſe to another expreſſion of his in the ſame Ch…ter, …hus, (a)(a)Non ſtatuimus, Gratiam habitualem omnibus communem; ſed ac…udem …piritus aſſiſtentiam ad ſingulos actus; quae licè omnibus praeſtò ſic, quaterus ag…t ſecundum rationem pri…pii praevenientis; pe…ialis tamen eſt cum in actu adjuvat & cooperat. Ibid. ſect, 8.Wee hold no habitual grace common to all, but only the aſſiſting grace of God to every act, which although it be common to all, as it is prevenient; yet it is but ſpecial as it is adjutant and cooperant with them in doing. In al which I will not inculcate the palpable implications of that accurate Remonſtrant; whereby hee muſt grant the ſame grace both common to all, and yet ſpecial to ſome; common to all becauſe ſufficient, and yet ſpecial, becauſe aſſiſting: Wee muſt note alſo, that aſſiſting grace is (in agendo) in doing. Sufficient is (ad agendum) to the doing any act; and (adjuvant) and (Cooperant) and (aſſiſtant) I take to be termes equipollent. Therfore to let the mplication die, by the helpe of theſe two places of Corvinus, I thus arue, which wil bring mee to a fair iſſue in this point. My Argument this.

p. 72If all men have not the aſsiſting grace of God to do all thoſe actions, then they have not a ſufficient grace.

But all men have not the aſſiſtant grace of God, to and in thoſe actions. Ergo, Not ſufficient grace.

The Propoſition of this ſyllogiſm is grounded upon Corvinus his firſt expreſſion. What-ever wee ſpeak of ſufficiency, we aſcribe it to the aſſiſtance of Gods Spirit.

The minor propoſition is grounded upon his ſecond, Which grace is common to all, as it is prevenient; but ſpecial as it is adjuvant and cooperant, which are all one with aſſiſtant. But I further prove the minor thus:

If all men do not actually do thoſe actions, then all men have not the aſsiſting grace of God.

But all men do not, &c, Therefore they have not, &c.

The Propoſition of this argument is grounded upon this truth, The aſſiſting ſpirit of God is only had in doing; God then aſſiſts, and helpes, and cooperateth, when wee actually doe: aſſiſting is properly only in doing. Improperly (ad agendum) to the doing.

The minor is clear by experience, and many Scriptures. Now I have waded ſo farre in this Argument, becauſe it ſo fairly leads mee to a buſineſſe of very great concernment, touching the nature of ſufficiency; and that is, whether any thing can be truly ſaid to be ſufficient to the working of any good in man, but what is efficient. And ſeeing wee are ſo fairly led by the hand of their owne conceſſion, I ſhall aſſume that liberty at this time to deny it, and to ſay, that no grace is ſufficient to converſion, or to work any good but what is efficient, and doth actually work it. And to prove it, I ſhall in the firſt place make uſe of their definition of ſufficiency in general; which was, that it is a poſition of all things that are requiſite and neceſſary to that action to which a ſufficiencie is granted.

Secondly, I muſt alſo adapt the Queſtion to the particular ſtate and condition of man, as he is now corrupt and fallen; and by reaſon of that corruption many impediments and hinderances lie in the way to his converſion, or doing any thing that may be called good; which I hope (all will grant) muſt bee removed before hee can bee ſaid to be ſufficiently enabled to be converted, or to do any good; as the woman in the Goſpel could not be ſaid to be ſufficiently enabled to enter the ſepulchre, till the ſtone was rolled away from the doore.

Thirdly, I muſt premiſe alſo, that amongſt other impediments, the depravation and averſation in the wil of man,John 5.40. 2 Pet. 3.5. Weems in Portraiture of Image of God in man. p. 98. Act. Synod. Art. 30. p. 1.John 5:402 Pet 3:5 to convert or doe any good, is one of the main, as Chriſt ſaid to the Jewes, I would have gathered you, but yee would not: and againe, Yee will not come to mee that yee might have life. And the Apoſtle, Your minds are ſet upon evil works; which wil of man hath ſuch a reflexive influence upon the underſtanding, that it is kept off thereby from giving in a true dictamen; and as the Apoſtle ſaith, for the moſt part men are willingly ignorant: and this the Remonſtrants grant, when they ſay, That no man can do any good until the wil be regenerate as well as other faculties.

p. 73Fourthly, I muſt alſo premiſe this, that when the will is regenerate, and men of unwilling are made willing, (whether it be a phyſicall efficiency of Gods ſpirit, or by moral ſuaſion only) it mattereth nor, then is the grace of God truly ſaid to be efficient; for velle convertere eſt converti, velle credere eſt credere; this is my method by which I uſe to prove that there is no ſufficient grace, but that which is efficient; and it is ſo plauſible, that it hath ſome aſſertours beſides my ſelf.Singularis illa gratia quâ reipſa ſalvos & juſtos efficit, promiſcuè dari omnibus negatur. quae quia ſola eatenus efficax eſt, quatenus hominem in peccato immerſum non modo evocat, ſed excitat; ſolâ etiam reſpectu eventus, & hominis jam corru ti dici poſſit. Conrad. Vorſt. Antibellarm. pag. 555. Conradus Vorſtius gives his judgment thus, That ſingular and ſpecial grace by which he indeed makes men juſt, and ſaveth them, is ſo farre efficacious as it not only calls, but alſo excites man drowned in ſinne; ſo alſo in reſpect of the event, and of man now vitiated and corrupted, it only can be called ſufficient. True indeed, I acknowledge there are very elaborate diſputes about this very diſtinction of ſufficient and effectuall grace. And the Remonſtrants thus bound either, Sufficient grace they ſay is ſuch as is able to produce the effect; and efficient is that which doth actually produce the effect; and this diſtinction is good, if taken in the general: but as it is applyed to man in his corrupt eſtate, it will not paſſe; and that upon the forementioned ground.

Learned Mr. Perkins urgeth this alſo, That no grace is ſufficient, but what is efficient, and then proves it; hee firſt aſſerteth it, but Arminius he denies it, and maintaineth the diſtinction of ſufficient and efficient grace, and holds that grace may be ſaid to be ſufficient that is not efficient: and he attempts to illuſtrate the buſineſſe thus, (a)(a)Deus ſufficit multis mundis creandis; ſed tamen efficaciter non fecit: Chriſtus ſufficit ad omnes homines ſalvandos, ſed efficaciter non fecit. Antiper. p. 245.God was ſufficient to have made many worlds, but hee did not make them effectually; Chriſt was ſufficient to ſave all men, but he doth not effect it. Which Inſtances ſatisfie not for ſeveral reaſons.

1.) Becauſe there is no due Analogie betwixt creation and converſion in this particular. In creation there are no impediments to hinder this worke; the Chaos riſeth not up againſt the plaſticall power of the Creator; but in man, and that according to their owne principles, there is a ſtrong reſiſting power, and ſo as to make the the work of God altogether null and void, as to the act of converſion; no impediments in the one, but ſuch in the other that can not be removed without being efficient.

2) His arguing is fallacious, for when wee treat of ſufficient means, wee preſuppoſe them to be actually put forth and adminiſtred; and hence the definition of ſufficiency is the Poſition or adhibition of all requiſites; nothing can be ſaid to be ſufficient to produce any act except it be applyed, and put forth. And I may ſay (I ſuppoſe) with a holy reverence, no not the divine power, except it by his holy will be put forth to create; ſo that the divine power may be conſidered either as put forth and ſet on worke by the counſel of his will, or not; if not, then I ſee not (I ſpeak with ſubmiſſion) how it can bee called ſufficient. His omnipotency we are taught thus to conceive of, it is that by which hee doth whatſoever he will; and if that power bee by his wil put forth, it is efficient, and ſo the cauſe returneth to us again.

p. 74But Mr. Perkins doth not only aſſert, but prove alſo, that now in mans corruption nothing is ſufficient to converſion, but what is efficient, and that by an argument which I ſhal follow a little, and it is this,

Argum. If to converſion be neceſſary prevenient, preparant, operant, cooperant grace of God, then no grace is ſufficient, but what is efficient.

But the former is true, therefore the latter.

This argument is grounded upon this method. Sufficiency implyeth a poſition of all neceſſaries. Now if all thoſe be neceſſarie, then all muſt concurre to make a ſufficient grace to converſion; and if all concurre, that grace is efficient; then what is more connatural then this, that no grace is ſufficient but what is efficient? And Mr. Perkins proceeds only upon Arminius his owne conceſſions; yet Arminius anſwers thus,

Conſequentia iſta nulla eſt, dicere, nulla datur ſufficiens gratia, quia null illorū ſola ſ…fficiat. Antiper. p. 246The conſequence is not good, to ſay, there is no ſufficient grace becauſe none of theſe five alone is ſufficient; but this is a meere trifling and miſallegation of his adverſary. Perkins did not ſay that there was no ſufficient grace; but no ſufficient but what was efficient, becauſe none alone except a…l concurred could be called ſufficient; and if al did, then it was efficient: and is not the conſequence good? I conceive undeniable. If all be granted to converſion, before a man can be ſaid to have ſufficient grace to the working of regeneration; then ſufficiency and efficiency muſt needs meet in one; for where all are, there they are certainly efficient; the cooperant grace of God alwaies implying efficiency. But Arminius anſwers further, (a)(a)Omnes illae gratiae, praeveniens nempe et praeparans, aut ſuffientes ſunt, aut efficaces; Deus praevenit ſufficienter & efficaciter, praeparat ſufficienter & efficaciter, & quaeri poſſit an non ſic de reliquis. Armin. Antiperk. ibid.All thoſe graces, namely, the prevenient, and preparant, are either ſufficient or efficient; God preveneth ſufficiently and effectually, he prepareth ſufficiently and effectually; and it may be enquired into whether it holdeth not in the two laſt graces But what rational anſwer theſe expreſſes are to the Argument in hand, I am not able to divine, nor the congruity of them with themſelves; The making thoſe graces in one clauſe to be either ſufficient or effectuall; in the ſecond clauſe to be both: couplatives and disjunctives, do not wel in the ſame ſentence, referred to the ſame thing, in the ſame reſpect. Beſides, here is a groſſe miſ-underſtanding of his adverſary: he did not ſay, there was not a ſufficiencie in any of thoſe graces alone to their proper ends and actions; as that there was not a ſufficiencie in the prevening grace alone to prevent, ſo not in preparing grace alone to prepare: But he ſaid, not in any alone to convert. If hee underſtand him otherwiſe, he thinks amiſſe: and if he judge of his adverſary aright, his anſwer is very impertinent.

But further then this, Arminius is his owne greateſt enemie. Arminius contendeth for a ſufficient and efficient grace diſtinct; ſo that he ſhould have produced a ſufficient grace that had not beene effectual, then it had beene to his purpoſe; but this is no probable way to make both ſufficiencie and efficiency to concurre in every grace. And I conceive it is an undeniable argument againſt himſelfe, that if no grace be ſufficient and not efficient, that (viz.) God prepareth both ſufficiently and efficiently; and ſo in preventing, operating, cooperating p. 75grace; It will appear that no grace is, or can be ſaid to be ſufficient to any end or purpoſe, but what is alſo efficient in the ſame deſigne. And of this I ſhall make a good improvement, to bring to a faire iſſue out of this engagement with them, thus, If no grace, no not ſo much as prevenient and preparant, but they act both ſufficiently and efficiently, and not ſufficiently prepared and diſpoſed until they be efficiently ſo; then is my Argument ſtrengthened; which is this, All are not ſufficiently enabled either to convert, or to do thoſe things by which they are diſpoſed to convert, until they do actually do thoſe things which all do not, and therefore are not ſufficiently enabled; and then what becomes of the doctrine of univerſal ſufficient grace? let all the world judg. Thus I have (according to my ſmall talent) endeavoured to refel the groundleſſe doctrine of univerſal ſufficient grace, and have diſcovered the riſe, and progreſſe, and growth of it, how high it amounteth, where it ſticks, and where the proofe remaineth on their part very ſhort and imperfect, and that it appeareth not that either all men have that which is truly called grace: or if it might be ſo called, yet they prove not that it may truly be ſaid to be ſufficient to any end, no not to the enabling of men to worke thoſe things by which they ſay men are enabled to converſion; and if neither, then univerſal ſufficient grace muſt needs fall. And by this engagement with the Remonſtrants, whom I now leave, I am the better enabled to engage Mr. Goodwins notions, which are of a farre lower flight: and to him I now returne after this long digreſſion.

Hee being ſomething doubtful of carrying on his aſſertion the firſt height with ſtrength of reaſon, viz. a ſufficiencie of means afforded to all men of believing in Chriſt, immediately by the creatures, and the ſound of the heavens; he is now traverſing his ground in the lower road, and would make out a ſufficiencie to believe in Chriſt upon improvement of natural abilities according to the ſtanding courſe of providence, (Habenti dabitur) to him that hath ſhall be given: in which I ſhall engage with him, and now only mind him of his changeing the expreſſion; his task is to prove a ſufficiencie in all men to believe; but here wee have it only thus, that all men are in a capacity of believing; for thus runs his expreſſion,Pag. 15. Suppoſe that the heathen &c. were not in an immediaie capacity of believing the Goſpel; yet this proves not but that they are in a capacity of believing it. But by the term capacity, I hope he meaneth ſufficiency, not only becauſe this expreſſion is ſuitable to his purpoſe, but alſo becauſe in his diſpute with Mr. Sympſon, treating about the ſame buſineſſe, in ſtead of a remote capacity (as he gives it here) wee have a mediate ſufficiency, and a remote ſufficiency. Now ſeeing he attempts to make out a ſufficiency of believing in Chriſt in this his ſecond, and (as he thinketh) a more ſafe and plauſible method, I muſt have a word or two with him about the terme ſufficiencie; for in that diſcourſe wherein men litigate about ſufficient meanes, it is requiſite to determine firſt what ſufficiencie is.

Mr. Goodwin in his writings, I find excuding a double diſtinction of ſufficiencie. Firſt, In this place covertly, into Mediate and Immediate p. 76near and remote; Pag. 78, 79.but in other Treatiſes more expreſſe. In his Diſpute with Mr. Simpſon, treating about the ſame buſineſſe, hee ſaith thus, There is a double ſufficiency, mediate and immediate: Immediate, by which a man is enabled for the doing of ſuch a thing, without the having or doing of any thing elſe but what hee then actually hath or doth. Mediate is ſuch by which he is not enabled to do the thing for the preſent, but he is enabled to do ſuch things by which he may compaſſe farther means, and ſo poſſeſſe himſelf of an immediate capacity. And this diſtinction hath ſome apparent footſteps in the Remonſtrants. But I conceive, it is no fair and plauſible diſtinction, becauſe the laſt member thereof ſeems to carry a contradiction in the face of it; for, ſaith he, A mediate ſufficiency is that whereby a man is not for the preſent enabled to do a thing. A rare diſcovery! an inſufficient ſufficiencie. How that man can be ſaid to have a ſufficient means for that to which he is not at the preſent enabled, let other men divine, for I cannot. Sufficiency if expreſſed in other terms, is thus, Poſitis omnibus requiſitis; and thus all of his own ſide define it, to be a poſition of all things neceſſary and requiſite; Now if hee be not enabled without the doing and having a further ſupplement, there is no kind of ſufficiencie. Hee ſeeketh to illuſtrate it, and his very illuſtration diſcovers the vanity of this his pretended mediate ſufficiencie; it is thus: Though wee have not a ſufficiency at preſent, to ſpeak in an unknown tongue, as Spaniſh, or the like, yet we have a remote ſufficiency, becauſe we have the principles of Reaſon and Underſtanding, by which we may come, &c. Wherein

1. His own expreſſes overthrow him; he ſaith, Though we have not a ſufficiency at preſent, yet we have a remote: By which I perceive, that by his remote ſufficiencie, he means a poſſibility of a ſufficiencie. But this in its very notion implyeth that a ſufficiencie is not in act; and then the heathen have not a ſufficiencie: but onelyonly are in a capacitie of having it: if he intend it thus, it ſerves him nor, neither will I contend with him.

2. This maketh me think that there is ſome fraud in Mr. Goodwins changing his expreſſes, uſing ſometimes ſufficiency, ſometimes capacitie; but this is not ingenuouſly done: for theſe are very far diſtant, and ſo far that the one doth no whit imply the other. Nay, ſo far are they diſtant one from the other, that the one doth exclude the other; for Capacity implyies onelyonly a power or poſſibility to receive; but ſufficiency intimates the preſent poſition or enjoyment of ſuch means: Thoſe things which we have already, we are not properly ſaid to be in a capacity of them; and ſo è contra.

3. Sufficiency is ſuch a thing as is determined to an individuall poſition of all neceſſaries, otherwiſe no ſufficiencie; and where that is, there is a ſufficiencie. But a capacity is ſuch a wild and undetermined notion, that we know not where it ſhould fix its foot. True, a man is in a capacity of learning the Spaniſh tongue, when hee hath the uſe of reaſon and his underſtanding; but may we not ſay he is in a capacity of learning it when he is born, becauſe he may come to have the uſe of his underſtanding, and ſo further? and why muſt we ſtay here? May p. 77he not be ſaid to be in a capacity, though ſomewhat more remote, when he is begotten? for then is he in a capacity of being born, and ſo of coming to the uſe of his underſtanding; and may not this capacity thus run in infinitum? Thus wee may affirm, that Adam had a ſufficiencie to beleeve in innocencie, becauſe he was in a remote capacity, he had underſtanding and the uſe of his reaſon; nay thus may he indeed aſſert all men to have a ſufficiencie of believing in Chriſt without any means tending thereunto, becauſe they have the uſe of theſe faculties: But this is but meer trifling; ſo that in his next he may leave out this diſtinction. I grant his Capacity, but deny his Sufficiency: and his mediate ſufficiency is none truly ſo called.

A ſecond diſtinction I finde in the ſame Diſpute with Mr. Simpſon where he diſtinguiſheth thus;Pag. 64. There is a ſufficiency by which a man is enabled the more eaſily to do a thing; and a ſufficiency, that is, ſuch a thing without which he cannot do the thing, viz. the act of beleeving. And this is more confuſed and impolite then the former. In the firſt member there is an intire diſtiction couched; and if he had ſpoken ſcholaſtically, he ſhould have ſaid thus, There is a ſufficiency ad rem, and another ad modum rei; one ſufficiency to the thing, and another to the manner of doing; for that which is ſufficient to the thing barely, is not ſufficient to this or that manner of doing. An ordinary power had been ſufficient to have barely cured Peters mother of a feaver, but none but an extraordinary miraculous power ſerved to cure her in an inſtant. But he immethodically giveth it us thus: That is a ſufficiency by which we are enabled more eaſily to beleeve. As if that grace by which men are onelyonly enabled to beleeve, were not as truly ſufficient to the act of believing, as that which hee ſpeaketh of to the more eaſie way and manner of believing. That which excludeth an entire diſtinction, is not providently produced as one member of an imperfect diſtinction.

The ſecond member of his diſtinction is ſuch as was never heard to come out of any mans ſtudy; it is an uncouth and illiterate deſcription of ſufficiency, which agrees to many things that cannot be called ſufficient. Hee ſaith, That is ſufficient, without which it is impoſſible for the action to be done. It is ſtrange that he did not conſider, that without his legs he cannot be an integrall man; but I hope hee will not ſay, that his legs are ſufficent to make him an integrall man, there will be ſomething elſe required. A man cannot ſee without his eyes; but his eyes are not ſufficient to make him ſee a thing; there muſt be a viſible object, a well diſpoſed medium, a fit and proportionable diſtance. A man cannot aſcend to the top of the ladder, except hee aſcend the firſt ſteps; but I hope the aſcending up the firſt ſteps is not ſufficient to make him attain the top of it. In a word, of every or any one requiſite it may be ſaid, that without it a thing cannot be done; but a ſufficiency is not till all requiſites be preſent. And yet theſe are the moſt perſpicuous notions that Mr. Goodwin ſets before us. If he can diſtinguiſh about Sufficiency no better, we have ſmal ground to hope he will determine about it any better.

p. 78But to proceed to what he ſaith in the ſeverall following pages in his Treatiſe.

All that I finde of moment in the 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 pages of his Treatiſe is reducible to theſe four Heads.

1. That every man can uſe the light of Nature conſcientiouſly and regularly.

2. That every heathen man may, and that in ſo doing be doth quit himſelf to ſome degree of well-pleaſing to God.

3. That there is a ſtanding courſe of providence whereby God hath tyed himſelf not to faile to reveale Chriſt, and give further grace to ſuch as improve naturall gifts, from that Text, Habenti dabitur, To him that hath ſhall be given.

4. That upon this ground all men have a remote ſufficiency of having Chriſt revealed, and believing in Chriſt.

A very fair and plauſible way (as Maſter Goodwin thinks) to make out his pretended Sufficiency. And upon theſe four Pillars ſtandeth the whole Fabrick of this his ſecond pretended Method, whereby by hee proveth his univerſall ſufficiency. Now a full and cleare Anſwer will be made to him in counter-arguing in every one of theſe; and therefore I deny all theſe particulars, and in theſe following pages prove,

1. That no heathen man can improve the naturall gifts given him well (as Maſter Goodwin expreſſeth it) regularly and conſcientiouſly.

2. That if he could, yet he could not at all pleaſe God.

3. That there is no ſuch ſtanding courſe of Providence of giving the increaſe of his grace, as Mr. Goodwin pretendeth.

4. Though all were granted, yet will it not follow, that a man hath a ſufficiency of believing in Chriſt. And when I ſhall have performed my task in all theſe, I hope Mr. Goodwin will bee ſeeking about for another Method to prove his Aſſertion.

For the firſt, viz. That no heathen man meerly by the light of nature can improve naturall abilities regularly and conſcientiouſly, I need not ſpend much time to prove it; thoſe of his own ſide will prove it for me. The Remonſtrants never yet contended for an improvement of naturall gifts without the aſſiſting grace of God; and but onelyonly ſo much as to do the things contained in the Law: But this is far ſhort of improving naturall abilities regularly and conſcientiouſly. And if the Remonſtrants did purpoſely uſe the term of aſſiſting grace, to avoid the charge of Pelagianiſme, how can Mr. Goodwin avoid it, when hee urgeth this, that men can improve natural abilities; yea, more then that, believe in Chriſt, only by the light of nature?

But to drive on this buſineſſe to ſome faire iſſue: Mr. Goodwin muſt know, That for a man to improve abilities regularly, is beyond the materiality, and includeth the very formality of a good action; and that a good thing be done in a good manner, according to rule, and p. 79conſcientiouſly;Corv. in Molin. cap. 34. §. 7. which the Remonſtrants affirm to conſtitute the reality, and truth, and ſubſtance of a good action: And can the heathen man do this without the renewing and regenerating grace of God? The Remonſtrants yeeld ingenuouſly thus; That man can do nothing that is good, without he be renewed in all his faculties. Script. Synod. Art. 3. pag 1.Then certainly not improve naturall abilities in a regular way; for that, according to them, is a ſaving good, becauſe it is tending to, and directed to ſalvation.

But when Mr. Goodwin ſaith, A heathen man can regularly improve natural abilities; hee implyes, that that improvement muſt be according to rule; which rule muſt either be the rule of Nature, or the law of God, or the law of the Goſpel, or the rule of Conſcience. To examine all theſe.

1. A heathen man by the light of nature cannot improve abilities according to the rule of Nature, or law of Nature; for to do thus,(a)(a)Non dicit Apoſtolus, Gentes legem implere; ſed ea quae ſunt legis facere; ſc. faciliora aliqua. Qui legem implēt, totam et integram facient, quod fieri non poſſit ſine gratia Chriſti, & fide in Chriſtum, Cornet. à Lap. in locum. is to fulfil and perform the law of Nature, legem Naturae implere; which none of the Patriots of that Cauſe durſt ever claime. Cornelius à Lap. ſaith thus upon Rom. 2. They do by nature not fulfill the Law, but do the things contained in the Law; that is, ſome of the moſt eaſie precepts: for to fulfill the Law, is to perform it wholly and integrally; which cannot be done without the faith and grace of Chriſt. And the Remonſtrants themſelves (as Corvinus ſaith expreſly) (b)(b)Non enim contendimus, Ethnicos legem Dei perfectè implere; ſed in eo acquieſcimus, quod probamus eos ſaltem aliquid legis f…ciſſe. Corv. in Molin. cap 34. § 2,We do not contend, that the heathen do perfectly fulfill the Law of God; but we reſt in this, that wee prove that they do ſomething that the Law commands. And this the Text it ſelf evinceth, becauſe they have their conſciences both excuſing and accuſing. But there is no place for accuſing conſciences, where they improve all abilities according to the rule of the law. The worſhiping of God (c)(c)Si per rectitudinem intell…gas, foreign, verum eſt, neminem poſſe rectè Deum colere citra fidem; ſed quaeritur, an non poſſit citra fidem, quanquam non foreign, aliquâ tamen ratione, & imperfectè Deum colere. …39 ſect. 2.foreign, according to the rule. Saith Corvinus, It is moſt true, that in this ſenſe, it is not poſſible, that any man can ſerve God without faith: But it is queſtionable, whether without faith a man cannot worſhip, although not according to the rule, yet in ſome way and manner, although but imperfectly. Then certainly Mr. Goodwin walketh in a very unſafe and difficult way in contending for an ability in the heathen to improve their natural abilities according to the rule or law of nature.

Beſide, to walk according to the light and law of Nature, is to walk according to the rule of Conſcience; for the law of Nature is nothing but the law of God engraven in the hearts and conſciences of men; and here Maſter Goodwin joynes them together, [regular and conſcientious improvement:] But then I hope, hee muſt meane a rightly guided and informed conſcience: elſe how ſhould it be a rule? A crooked rule will never bring men to the ſtraight way of holineſſe. I hope, that neither Maſter Goodwin, nor any Arminian will ſay, that the uſe of Naturals according to the dictate of a miſguided and erring Conſcience, leads either to a further degree of grace or glory. But then conſider alſo, That men not having their conſciences rightly informed and diſpoſed, cannot be ſaid to walke ſo regularly, as to fetch from God increaſe of grace; p. 80but ſuch is the caſe of all men by nature without the grace of Chriſt.

To conſider this a little more diſtinctly. Mr. Goodwin (I hope) well knoweth, that to the regular improvement of every heathen man, there is required both a Rule and Practice; and they are to afford both, not only to do thoſe things contained in the law; but they are to be a law to themſelves, Rom. 2. Now ſeeing that they are to afford the law and rule within them, I hope, they will ſay, it muſt be a right and ſtraight rule; a rightly diſpoſed and a good conſcience; otherwiſe, to walk after the rule of an evill conſcience, will not be found an improvement or uſe, but rather an abuſe of naturall gifts. An evill conſcience is ſuch from which we are to be cleanſed, Hebr. 10.22. But from an improvement of naturall gifts, or from the right rule leading thereunto there is no need of being waſhed. Now where is this rightly guided and good conſcience amongſt the heathen? All men are divided into two ranks by the Apoſtle; into the Pure and Impure: the pure have all things pure, the impure and unbelieving all things impure,Tit. 1.15.Titus 1:15 having their minds and very conſciences impure, Tit. 1.15. Hence the Caſuiſts tell us, that aaAmeſius Caſ. Conſ. p. 102.Conſcience is but a ſubordinate rule, as it is directed by the Word of God. Men have not improved their abilities by walking according to their conſciences: Paul was a perſecuter: and many come to kill and put to death the tru… diſciples of Chriſt, John 16.2.John 16.2.John 16:2 and both by the dictate of their conſcience; they thought they did God good ſervice. And as for the light of the heathen, whereby they may be directed to the obſervance of God in a way of obedience, Alas, what is it? Well may the Remonſtrants ſay, it is relicks of life, and ſparks of knowledg, and that they have aliquam cognitionem Dei, ſome kind and meaſure of the knowledg of God: but alas, what is it? not ſo high as to be a rule of an acceptable improvement of their Abilities.

I would that Mr. Goodwin had put forth ſome Diſcourſe of naturall light, that wee might examine the ſubject of it, and the penetrative vigour thereof. True indeed, the Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Inviſible things of God are to be ſeen in the viſible creatures. But here the glory of God is in the creatures, but as light is in the Sun; which yet is not actually ſeen by blind men. To the act of ſight there is not only required a viſible object, but there muſt be a well diſpoſed organ; and the eye muſt be open. Now true it is, that the heavens declare the glory of God, as the Sun diſplayes his light; but the heavens do not open the eys, or give light to the ſimple, Pſal. 19.4, 5, 6, 7. What improvement can Mr. Goodwin produce that ever was made by the rule of natural knowledg? The Apoſtle telleth us, that the Gentiles are alienated from the life of God, Epheſ. 4.18. 2 Pet. 1.9Eph 4:182 Pet 1:9and that through the ignorance that is in them; having their mindes darkened. Man now in the ſtate of corruption, whatever the light be that ſhines in the creatures, hee is but foreign, a purre-blinde man, and their height is but to groape after him, palpare Deum, Acts 17.27Acts 17:27as blinde men; by which they are capable of ſo much as to render themſelves inexcuſable, if they fall to idolatry, and forſake p. 81the true God, but that thereby they may know how to worſhip the true God, and ſerve him, or that their light is or can be a rule of a right and true Improvement of natural ability, I leave as Maſter Goodwin's task to prove either by Scripture or good reaſon; eſpecially ſuch an Improvement, upon which all the adminiſtrations of God to men tending to ſalvation ſhall proceed. Now until that Maſter Goodwin cleareth theſe two things; Firſt, that the Heathen can afford within themſelves the rule of a right Improvement of their abilities: or, Secondly, that ſuppoſe they have the rule within them; yet that they can exerciſe ſuch a regular Improvement according to the rule in a perfect Obedience: (for he that faileth in any one thing, walketh not according to rule, and maketh not a regular Improvement) I ſhall conclude that no Heathen man can make a regular Improvement of his abilities, that is, neither according to the rule of Conſcience or Law of Nature, and as for any Law of the Goſpel or Poſitive Law of God: there is no need that any diſpute proceed upon theſe, becauſe in the very foundation of this diſcourſe, it is ſuppoſed that thoſe are not revealed to the Heathen. But ere I paſs, I ſhall urge one only argument to prove that a Heathen man cannot make any regular Improvement of his natural abilities, and it is thus.

If the natural man be enmity againſt God, and neither is nor can be ſubject to the Law of God, then he cannot make a regular Improvement of his natural abilities.

But the former is true, Rom. 8.6, 7, 8. Therefore the latter in true alſo.

Now to this Argument, I for the preſent conceive, that two things chiefly may be replied.

Firſt, he may ſay, that text, Rom. 8.7. ſpeaks of the Poſitive and Moral Law of God; but we are treating of the Law of Nature. Now to the Laws of Nature we yield Obedience by Nature, but to the Poſitive Law of God by Grace. If Maſter Goodwin pleaſe to urge this or any thing like it, then I refer it to him to prove that the Law of Nature and Poſitive Law of God be different in ſubſtance, and not in that reſpect one and the ſame, ſave only in the manner of diſcovery: the one internally inſcribed, the other externally manifeſted. Again, he muſt conſider, that the dint of the Argument is in this, that the natural minde is enmity againſt God: the enmity of natural men is originally againſt God: and ſo by conſequence againſt any Law of God, whether internally inſcribed, or outwardly given: the Law of Nature is as well the Law of God as any of his Poſitive Lawes, and ſo equally occaſions the enmity of a natural man; For (Quae conveniunt in aliquo tertio conveniunt inter ſe:) both theſe Lawes being the Lawes of God, and the natural mans Enmity being originally againſt both theſe Laws, agree in this, that the natural man cannot be ſubject to them.

p. 82Rectè quidem concluditur, hominem qui merè naturalis eſt & omnis divinae cognitionis expers, qui inſtar brutorum naturaliter & ſecundùm ſenſum vivit. Corvin. in Molin. c. 33. §. 1.Secondly, I finde Corvinus thus replying to us, [Rightly it is concluded that a natural man cannot be ſubject to the divine Law: but that is ſuch a man as is meerly natural, void of all the knowledge of God, and that liveth according to ſenſe, like to brute beaſts.]

Be it ſo, then we muſt enquire whether the Heathen men be not ſo, Epheſ. 4.18.

Secondly, their gloſs overthroweth their doctrine, their gloſs ſuppoſeth many Heathen to be without all knowledge of God. When yet their whole Doctrine in this point urgeth ſo much of Divine Knowledge in every man, that they may improve their natural abilities, and are ſufficiently enabled thereunto.

Thirdly, they would have man conſidered in his meer corrupt eſtate, that is, without all knowledge of God and aſſiſtance of the Spirit; ſo that in their doctrine to have the knowledge and aſſiſting Spirit of God, is to reduce them from the corrupt and natural eſtate, which knowledge and grace they pretend that every man in the world hath without exception; and hence we come to ſee that this is the ſumme of their Doctrine, that now no man is in his corrupt eſtate, or can be called a natural man, which will render the Apoſtles words very vain and empty.

Fourthly, this anſwer is grounded upon that exotick tripartition of the World, which we finde in all their works: They ſay (man is either meerly natural; or natural, yet diſpoſed to regeneration; or thirdly, regenerate:) it matters not what our corrupt mindes may ſuggeſt to us to the maintenance of our opinions, when Molin ſaith, that (The fear of God doth not agree to thoſe that are unregenerate;) Corvinus thus replyeth,Si per irregenitos intelligis eos qui animum planè à Deo averſum habent, verum dicis, ſed ſi per irregenitos eos intelligis qui nondum ſunt regeniti, erras. cap. 34 §. 4. [If by unregenerate thou meaneſt thoſe that have their mindes altogether averſe from God, thou ſayeſt true; but if by unregenerate thou meaneſt thoſe that are not yet regenerate, thou erreſt in ſo ſpeaking.] But can the acuteneſs of Corvinus diſcover a way whereby a man unregenerate may not be taken for a man not yet regenerate? as if a man unregenerate, and a man not yet regenerate, be not terms equipollent, and of the ſame ſignification; or where can he in Scripture give us the leaſt teſtimony of Scripture, that preſents us with a man not yet regenerate, that hath not his minde wholly averſe from God? we ſhould be glad to ſee any of thoſe proofs; or will they enable us to finde ſuch Diſtinctions in the Scripture, as of natural men, ſuch as are meerly natural, and ſuch as are diſpoſed to regeneration? and ſo likewiſe of men having the Spirit; Some are ſuch as are by the aſſiſting Spirit only prepared to be regenerate: Others are by the Spirit regenerate and born again. Let them make it appear, that theſe notions are not the iſſue meerly of wanton and luxuriant brains; the Scripture thus only divideth, All man are either born of the fleſh, or born of the Spirit, Joh. 3.6. either live after the fleſh, or after the Spirit, Rom. 8.4, 5, 6. Either carnally minded, or ſpiritually minded, Verſe 6. and it ſaith in general, [As p. 83many as are led by the Spirit of God, are the ſons of God,] Rom. 8.14. that is, ſo many as are led by the ſweet ducture of the Spirit of God, to do any thing in tendency to ſalvation, are the ſons of God, and ſo born again: and of ſuch it cannot be ſaid, they are unregenerate. But more ſhall be ſaid to this purpoſe, when I ſee Maſter Goodwins, replyes to this argument, and till I ſee them, I ſhall conclude a Heathen man cannot improve his abilities regularly, becauſe the natural man is enmity againſt God, and cannot be ſubject to his Law.

In the next place, I am to conſider the ſecond main Pillar upon which this pretended method ſtands, and that is, whether a Heathen man by the light of nature, can by his Improvements, or any other thing, quit himſelf to a degree of well-pleaſing to God. Maſter Goodwin affirms it, I in this ſecond particular counter-argue him thus:

That no Heathen man can pleaſe God by any ſuch Improvement as he is able to make of his natural abilities, If it appear that man cannot by nature improve his natural gifts, upon that defect I know Maſter Goodwin himſelf will grant that man cannot pleaſe God; ſo that till he can make good the firſt particular, we are ſafe enough here; but I ſhall go a little further: Suppoſe man could improve his natural abilities, yet could he not be ſaid to pleaſe God; what complacency can any man diſcover from Scripture, if God takes in the performances and perſons of men without faith before they be born again, & become his ſons in Chriſt? the Apoſtle ſaith,Epheſ. 1.6.Eph 1:6 He hath made us accepted in the beloved, Epheſ. 1.6. Now I ſhall give the Remonſtrants leave ſo far as to be the interpreters of this and the reſt the of like expreſſions in this Chap. In the fourth Verſe he ſaith, He hath elected us, (in Chriſt;) now ſay the Remonſtrants (us in Chriſt) that is, foreign, elected us being (in Chriſt) that is, believing in act; & hence they contend that none are Elected but ſuch as are believers either in act or in the divine preſcience, then I hope they wil not repine if I ſay here, from this text (He hath made us accepted in the beloved) that is, we being in Chriſt actually believers, with whom and by which faith he is well pleaſed with us, and that none are accepted of God, or he well pleaſed with any, but thoſe that are in Chriſt; me thinks they might have ſo much fore-ſight as not to give ſuch gloſſes upon any expreſſion in one place that will ſtrangle their own ſenſe in another text. But again, the Remonſtrants willingly confeſſe, that no man can fulfil the Law of nature perfectly or worſhip God according to the rule, and then will they ſay that God is pleaſed with lame and imperfect performances? He that faileth in one point, becomes guilty of all. Nay, but ſuppoſe they could improve the light of nature to the height of the rule of nature; yet how would they pleaſe God by ſo doing? All the obedience to the Law of God Poſitive and Moral, cannot pleaſe God without Chriſt. p. 84The people of God have confeſſed,Iſaiah 64.6.Isa 64:6 that their righteouſneſs is as menſtruous rags in his ſight: then certainly, the natural performances of the Heathen, though never ſo regular, cannot pleaſe God. Paul with all his moral righteouſneſs, though in relation to the righteouſneſs of the Law he was blameleſs, yet accounted that but dung (which is not acceptable to man) in compariſon of the righteouſneſs of Chriſt, that he might be found in it, but certainly he would not account any thing dung that was acceptable to God, or with which he was pleaſed. Now the Apoſtle ſpeaks here not comparatively, that is, his righteouſneſs of the law was dung and loſs in compariſon of Chriſt, but abſolutely he accompted his own righteouſneſs dung, that he might win Chriſt: or ſuch conceits that our own righteouſneſs pleaſeth God, hinder us either from the ſeeking or obteining the righteouſneſs of Chriſt. Now if the moral righteouſneſs of Paul, though to the law he was blameleſs, could not pleaſe God; How can the natural Improvements of the Heathen pleaſe God?

Again, the Heathen (let their Improvement be never ſo high and eminent) are but unregenerate, and not born again, and therefore but yet in the fleſh,Rom. 8.6, 7, 8.Rom 8:6Rom 8:7Rom 8:8 But thoſe that are in the fleſh cannot pleaſe God. But I ſhall reduce all to one perſpicuous Argument, and that is this.

Arg. 4 (Without faith it is not poſſible to pleaſe God, Heb. 11.6.

But the Heathen with their Improvements are without faith, ſo long as they have the light of Nature only.

Ergo So long as they have only the light of Nature, they cannot pleaſe God.)

Molinaeus in his Anatomy of Arminianiſme, I finde forming the Argument thus.

(If a man cannot perform thoſe actions by which he may pleaſe God, without faith which is the gift of God, then he cannot of himſelf pleaſe God.

But the former is true: Therefore the latter is true).

The formation of which Argument made the anſwer of Corvinus to be ſo ready at hand, which was, That the concluſion of the argument is nothing againſt them, they pretending the aſſiſting Spirit of God, they hold not any man can of himſelf without the grace of God do any thing to pleaſe God.

Yet notwithſtanding this argument is valid enough againſt Maſter Goodwin: becauſe he is not ſo expreſs in the point of aſſiſting grace, as the Remonſtrants are, but is all for the light of nature onelyonly; but becauſe I will make it firm againſt all parties, I deſire to form it thus:

(If no man without faith can pleaſe God, then no man can by all his Improvemements pleaſe God before faith.

But the former is true: Therefore the latter.)

And to this Corvinus hath an anſwer at hand, ſuch an one as we p. 85finde it, thus: [Heb. 11.6. doth not well prove, Heb. 11.6. Male probat nullam actionem quae Deo placcat praefari poſſe, quia ibi agitur de tali beneplacito quo quis placet Deo ad gloriam. Corvin. in Molin. c. 33. §. 4. Agitur de tali beneplacito quo Enoch Deo placuit, quando cum è mundo ſuſtulit. Ibid Acta Synod. Art. 1. pag. 211.Heb 11:6that no action can be done to pleaſe God without faith. Becauſe that text means ſuch a pleaſing whereby a man pleaſeth God to glory] how they ſweat at it to ſtrangle a clear text?

Firſt, I demand how that appeareth from the text? that it meaneth ſuch a pleaſing, whereby a man pleaſeth God to glory, he gives the reaſon why thus, in the ſame place, [becauſe it ſpeaks of that pleaſing, whereby he pleaſed God when God tranſlated him;] but this is a manifeſt forgery: for, ſaith the text (before he was tranſlated he had this teſtimony, that he pleaſed God: but without faith a man cannot pleaſe God.) If then the Text ſpeak of ſuch a pleaſing, whereby Enoch pleaſed God before the tranſlation of him, then it is but a meer ſhift of diverſion to confine it to ſuch whereby Enoch pleaſed God when he tranſlated him.

Secondly, it is not becauſe of the long interval, that Corvinus cannot at his turn remember, that he was one of that full Jury of Remonſtrants who urge this Argument to the clearing of their doctrine, in the firſt article from this very place thus:

That without which we cannot pleaſe God, without it we cannot be elected to life.

But without faith we cannot pleaſe God, Heb. 11.6.

Therefore without faith it is impoſſible for any one to be elected to ſalvation.

Now, I ſhall make uſe both of this argument it ſelf, as alſo their reply to our anſwer; to refel their futilous gloſs, firſt, the argument it ſelf overthrows them, if this text be to be taken in ſuch ſenſe as whereby a man pleaſeth God to glory (that is, actually to give glory) then their Propoſition or Major, muſt be corrected and run thus: That without which we cannot pleaſe God to glory, without it a man be elected to glory.

And let any Arminian look upon the face of this Propoſition, and tell me if it pleaſe them, and whether this be like their doctrine, that no man can pleaſe God ſo far as to Elect him, without that by which he will ſo far pleaſe him as to give him glory; and ſo by conſequence he ſhall give glory to ſo many as he elects. What will then become of their doctrine of falling away, and that thoſe that are now elected may afterwards come to be reprobated, and never ſo pleaſe God, as to give them glory? and if the caſe be ſuch then, what egregious foul dealing are they guilty of, to forge ſuch a gloſs againſt the cleer text at this turn; when yet they are forced to relinquiſh it in another?

Secondly, to conſider the Anſwer of the Contra-Remonſtrants to this argument thus: [Faith is taken two wayes, either for faith preſent, or for faith fore-ſeen; the text runs upon faith preſent, but the p. 86question upon faith foreſeen, therefore the text cannot agree with the question.] To this Anſwer, although very pertinent and plauſible, yet the Remonſtrants with an open mouth reply thus.

[(a)(a)Quis non videt quàm Contra-Remonſtrant haerēt, quia Apoſtoli pronunciatum eſt abſolututum & univerſale. Sine fide nemo poteſt Deo placere? Act. Synod. ibi. Who ſeeth not the Contra-Remonstrants to be at a ſtand here, ſeeing the ſaying of the Apoſtle is univerſal and abſolute without faith a man cannot pleaſe God] but (mutato nomine de Remonſtrantibus narratur fabula;) or the Remonſtrants may well bear with us, it is better ſometimes to be at a ſtand, then alwayes in a precipice, falling down-right upon the truth in wilful contradictions: for if the Apoſtles words be univerſal and abſolute, Without faith no man can pleaſe God, why then I pray muſt it now be confined and determined to ſuch a pleaſing (viz.) to glory? Is it ſuch an offence for us to diſtinguiſh of the word (faith) becauſe the words of the Apoſtle are univerſal and abſolute? and may they take the licence to diſtinguiſh of the word (pleaſe?) by what law, I pray? or what reaſon? for according to their own ſenſe (placere Deo) to pleaſe God is immanent in God; but (to give glory) is external to God; the queſtion is not, what followes our pleaſing of God, but what goeth before it; not what he doth by our pleaſing of him, but what we do whereby he comes to be pleaſed with us: and their gloſs to this purpoſe is altogether heterogeneous and impertinent. (Pleaſing to glory?) then it ſeemeth there is one degree of pleaſing, to give the Goſpel; another, to give faith; a third, to give glory; and ſo that which is in their doctrine immanent in God, ſhall be capable of intenſion, and remiſſion: where ſhall they finde proof for theſe notions? I ſhall expect it.

I have ſaid thus much in this buſineſs, becauſe if Mr. Goodwin having conſulted with them, ſhall reply theſe things, I prevent him, and eaſe my ſelf, in putting things as far as I may: or if Mr. Goodwin pleaſe to interpoſe other replies, I am readie to receive them.

Or if this place or phraſe do not pleaſe Mr. Goodwin, I ſhall give him another, and ſo let him take both together thus:

If no man that is in the fleſh can pleaſe God, then not the Heathen by all their improvements, onelyonly by the light of nature:

But no man that is in the fleſh can pleaſe God, Rom. 8.6, 7.

Therefore the heathen cannot pleaſe God, &c.

This argument is grounded on this: All men till regenerated are in the fleſh; and ſo long as they remain onelyonly with the light of nature, they are unregenerated: till theſe arguments be anſwered, I ſhall conclude, that no Heathen can by his improvements pleaſe God.

Thirdly, in the next place I am to make good, that ſuppoſe man could both improve his naturals well, and thereby pleaſe God, yet there is no ſuch ſtanding courſe of providence, whereby God doth proceed to the revealing Chriſt and working faith and ſo give ſalvation, which courſe Mr. Goodwin affirms: I on the contrary p. 87ſay, there is no ſuch, neither doth that text (Habemi dabitur) To him that hath ſhall be given, import any ſuch thing: If M. Goodwin take a ſurvey of the Scriptures, he ſhall find that there is no ſtanding courſe of providence in any of his diſpenſations whether natural or ſpiritual.

We ſhall find in Scripture moſt frequently, that much is given to them that had the leaſt in poſſeſſion or in improvement or in diſpoſition; ſomtimes God is found of them that ſeek him; hence that command is given, and a promiſe is annexed, (Seek, and ye ſhall find;) but there is no ſtanding courſe for this; For ſometimes, yea, very often he is (found of them that ſeek him not; Rom. 10.20.Rom 10:20) the Apoſtle ſeemeth to apply that ſaying to the Gentiles, but his diſpenſations of mercy to the full crop and harveſt of Gentiles, are more Catholike and generall then to the handfull of the Jewes; any ſtanding courſe of providence, or this grounded upon this method, would proſtitute the unſearchable wiſdome of God to every common capacity, and fill up that (foreign, or depth) that the Apoſtle affirms, yet admires, Rom. Rom. 11.33.Rom 11:3311.33. And what is that depth he telleth us in the 30. verſe, that they who have not yet believed (the Gentiles) no nor yet were diſpoſed to believe, ſhould yet receive the Goſpel. It is remarkable, how the Gentiles all along are branded with the black mark of all unrighteouſneſs, and a reprobate ſenſe, the Gentiles are made the ſtandard and meaſure of all laciviouſneſſe, exceſſe, revellings, and all kindes of Idolatry, to commit theſe is to worke the will of the Gentiles.1 Pet. 4.4, 5.1 Pet 4:41 Pet 4:5 1. Pet. 4.4, 5. what diſpoſitions or improvements are there found in theſe, now when we ſhall conſider, that God taketh away the Goſpel, from the Jew and gives it to theſe Gentiles? true it is, there is ſome cauſe why he might take it away from the Jew, but what was there that he ſhould give it to the Gentiles? was it (To him that hath ſhall be given?) what had the Gentiles, or did they, to fetch this diſcoverie of the Goſpel from the Almighty? Where as this ſtanding courſe of providence? ſeeing here is nothing but that foreign, that admirable depth of goodneſſe and wiſdome. Nay, let me go a litle further, when God choſe Iſrael to be his people, and to diſcover his Word and will to them, what ſtanding courſe of providence was there ſeen in that? what improvement was there? if any, let Mr. Goodwin, reconcile them to Deut. 7.7, 8. There was,Deut. 7.7, 8.Deut 7:7Deut 7:8 ſaith the Apoſtle, 1 Cor. 5.1. Such Fornication amongſt the Corinthians as was not named among the Gentiles; the Corinthians who had the Goſpel abuſed the light of nature ſo far, as to commit and allow of that ſin; the Gentiles that had not the Goſpel uſed the light of nature ſo well, or at leaſt leſſe evilly (as Arminius) that that ſin was not ſo much as named amongſt them; But God gave the Goſpel to the Corinthians, denied it to the other, where is this ſtanding courſe of providence in all this?

p. 88Again, Ahab humbled himſelf, Herod heard John gladly, Agrippa was half perſwaded to become a Chriſtian, Judas repented, and Tyre and Sidon had ſo quitted themſelves that God teſtified this of them, that if they had enjoyed the means that Corazin had, they would have repented, and that long ago, without any ſuch delay. All theſe are accompted by the Remonſtrants to be as preparations to regenerations, and improvements and abilities: but I expect that Mr. Goodwin give me as fair an accompt of the increaſe of ſaving grace given to any of them according to this ſtāding courſe of providence ſo much pretended: whereupon Mr Goodwin either doth or may know that the beſt of his owne ſide have (verbis diſertis) declined this ſtanding courſe of providence in a text before cited, the concluſion whereof is this [We freely acknowledge that God the giver of all good uſeth ſuch a liberty in giving, Script. Synod. Art. 2. Pag. 528.inequall grace to equall men, and equall grace to inequall men, calling thoſe that are more evill, and paſſing by thoſe that are leſſe evill, that we freely confeſſe that there can be no exact account given of his diſpenſations of grace either by the uſe or abuſe of more generall gifts] and yet Mr. Goodwin will needs have a ſtanding courſe of providence; whereby God faileth not to give grace to him that improves naturalls well. And yet although by theſe clouds of witneſſes they are forced to confeſſe that there can be no exact reaſon given of Gods diſpenſations of grace either by the uſe or abuſe of natural gifts, yet they can (to make out that intention in God to ſave all) affirm that [(a)(a)Nullus corum quos communi vocatione vocat quem non ex primâ intentione ideò vocet ut eos ſpecialioris gratiâ vocationis afficiat. Script. Synod. Art. 2. Pag. 327. No man that enjoyes that generall and common Call (which is the ſame with the generall gifts they before ſpoke of) but God calleth them out of his primary intention, to endew them with the grace of his more ſpecial call;] how miſerable is the diviſion of that houſe, that the ſtrengthening of one part is the confuſion of another? true indeed if they did grant any ſuch ſtanding, or exact rule for Gods diſpenſations of grace, then they might thus evade us, all things propounded and intended by his primary and antecedent will, fall not out ſo in execution by his conſequent, becauſe man is wanting to himſelf; there is the intervening peccancie of mans free wil; but they take this evaſion out of their own mouths, for if no ſuch exact or ſtanding rule be, ſo that we cannot tell how grace ſhall be diſpenſed either by the uſe or abuſe of general gifts, then how God may be truely ſaid to give general gifts intentionally that by improvement of them he might in dew men with more ſpecial grace; let them that can, divine: for I profeſſe my ſelf unable to do it.

Again, one thing more if there be ſuch a method (which out of the fluttering expreſſes of our Adverſaries may be made out) that general gifts are given to every man with an intention that they might improve them, and upon the inprovement of them be compenſated with the revelation of Chriſt, and the improvement of that p. 89with more grace, till they come to be ſaved, and that all this method from nature to glory (by the reaſon of the irrefragable contignation betwixt all the parts thereof) be but one entire way to Heaven and eternal glory, then I demand of Maſter Goodwin, whether thoſe that believe in Chriſt are more truly ſaid to have life then thoſe that have only the gifts of nature, and how Chriſt is ſaid to be the way? When yet the Heathen are in the way, and yet are without Chriſt; and how the Heathen are ſaid to have gone out of the way, and not to have known the way of peace, when Mr. Goodwin can tell us they have the light of nature, which is a part of that way that leads to life, what doth he think is the difference betwixt the believers in Chriſt, and the Heathen Gentiles? Doth he think them alike in this, that they are both in the way to life, and only this difference that the one hath gone further in this way then the other. Thoſe that are believers may (in Mr. Goodwins judgement) finally fall away and periſh, and the Lord Chriſt hath not promiſed to preſerve them from their voluntary defections; and their faith in Chriſt may yet ſo fail them, as that they ſhall not come to life: and yet on the other ſide, a Heathen man hath general gifts given to him with this intention, that he might improve them, and improving them have an increaſe of grace till they come to be ſaved, how ſhall we herein diſcry any difference betwixt them: and that the one ſhall appear to be more truly in the way to life then the other? his deciſions herein wil be acceptable, and provoke me to further explanations in this particular; only I muſt adviſe him to be caſting about for ſufficient proofs for this, that thoſe Heathen men that have only the light of nature, can be ſaid to know the way of peace, and to be in the way of eternal life; otherwiſe I ſhall not yield to this ſtanding courſe of providence, ſo much, and ſo confidently urged by him.

But then in the next place, he will urge us with that text, Matth. 25. the Parable of the talents, in which it is ſaid (To him that hath it ſhall be given:) from this text they deduce this generall or ſtanding courſe of providence: and hence, ſay they, it appears, that God bindes himſelf to give increaſe to him that uſeth thoſe gifts well, that he hath received, nay, Mr. Goodwin ſaith expreſly, that here by talents are meant natural gifts, and in that ſaying (To him that hath ſhall be given) God promiſes to give an increaſe of grace to him that ſhall uſe the light of nature well.

Now becauſe this text is the whole proof, by the ſtrength of which the whole fabrick of Ʋniverſal Grace ſeemeth to ſtand, I ſhall a little expatiate upon it, and truly were it ſo that either Mr. Goodwin or the Remonſtrants were but at unity with themſelves, it would be poſſible for us in ſometime to ſhape them out ſome anſwer looking towards ſatisfaction; but the intricacies and uncertainties of our adverſaries render our work herein very difficult. If this text prove their pretended method, they muſt prove that theſe talents are natural p. 90gifts and abilities, or at leaſt neceſſary to take them in. But to take a ſurvey of their conſtancy in this particular, Arminius would have the talents be the (light of nature) he ſaith thus. [(a)(a)Vide mihi annon iſto dicto (Habenti dabitur) promiſſio iſta contineatur, quâ Deus ſpondet ſe gratiâ ſupernaturali illuminaturum eos qui lumine naturali rectè utuntur. Antiperkinſ. pag. 218. Doth not that ſaying of Chriſt (To him that hath, ſhall be given) contein the promiſe by which God bindeth himſelf to give ſupernatural grace to him that uſeth the light of nature well?] But Corvinus tempers the text to a greater latitude thus: [(b)(b)Quod attinet ad proverbialem illam ſententiam, Habenti dabitur, confirmemus ſententiam noſtram de remunerando recto uſu prioris gratiae per majorem ſubſequentem. in Molin. Cap. 41. §. 5. For as much as appertaineth to that proverbial ſentence, (To him that hath, ſhall be given) by it we confine our ſentence of rewarding the right uſe of former grace, by the increaſe of a greater following grace.] So that now thoſe talents muſt be grace; and yet this doth not pleaſe, but in the words immediatly following another ſpirit poſſeſſeth his pen thus: [(c)(c)Sententia eſt generalis, & nihil aliud Dominus dictum vult quàm hoc, quòd Deus compenſat rectum uſum donorum majori liberalitate. Ibidem. Pag. 20. The ſentence is general, wherein the Lord ſpeaks nothing but this, that he will compenſate the right uſe of gifts received with greater liberality.] Here the talents are ſo laxly interpreted, as that we may make them either nature or grace or both, or, if ſuch could poſſibly be, neither. Sometimes the talents are natural light, ſometimes grace, ſometimes either or both, and may we finde Maſter Goodwin any thing more certain to his principles? In the 20th. page of his Book he urgeth (that the talents are natural gifts, and can be underſtood of nothing elſe by any colour of reaſon,) and yet in the 18th. page, he gives himſelf a little more room, and ſaith, that that text avoucheth that, [That whatſoever a mans ſtock or endowments is in one kinde or other from Gods hand, yet by a careful improvement it may ariſe to a ſpiritual eſtate.] and in the 21th. page further ſaith quite contrary, that [Thoſe abilities that are given to man, are more commonly then properly called natural,] and is it not likely that we ſhould give ſatisfactory anſwers to them, who cannot yet make any ſetled and ſatisfactory demands? but it ſeems I muſt do it as well as I may. And becauſe Mr. Goodwin toucheth upon theſe things I ſhall examine: Firſt, what we are to underſtand by the Talents; Secondly, who by ſervants; Thirdly, what by increaſe. Fourthly, what by the reward; and when this is done, this text will be ſufficiently cleared.