Might Overcoming Right, Chapter 1
CHAP. I.
ANd here firſt of all the queſtion muſt be rightly ſtated, or elſe there can be no accurate reaſoning, but we ſhall ever and anon fall into the fallacy ex ignoratione E'lugchi. Now the caſe I conceive may be thus impartially ſtated: This Kingdom having bin long imbroyied in an unnaturall conſuming war, through a miſunderſtanding between the King & Parliament: The King at laſt fell into the Parliaments power, all his ſtrength being broken by them. While the King is in this condition (after many other overtures uſeleſſe, and experience of the diſcontent of the Nation, both for want of ſettlement; and the ſad condition of their King) There is ſet on foot a perſonall Treaty with the King: In which the Parliament demand of him conceſſion, and confirmation of ſuch priviledges, as from the beginning they thought conducible to render this people free, and happy, and were the ſumme of all that had been formerly demanded in any of their other treaties or propoſals, or had been held forth in their Declarations, as the ſcope of their undertakings. To this Treaty the far Major part of the Houſe of Commons agreed & that willingly, yea ſo far were they from being forct to it, (as it pretended) by petitions, that neither the impetuouſneſs of petitions from people, nor fear of ſouldiers piſtols, could make them relinquiſh it, for they were ſatisfied in their conſciences, that it was the faireſt, juſteſt, & moſt probable way to promote and ſettle the peace, & weal of a diſtreſſed Kingdom; ſo this Treaty is proſecuted till its very neer an happy concluſion. The Army (raiſed by, and deriving their millitary power from the Houſes) diſlike this Treaty, ſuppoſe it would indanger them, & a godly party in the land (ſo they ſtile their adherents.) This their judgment they remoſtrate to the houſe of Commons. The houſe not convinc'd by their reaſons, nor diſmayd at their power, laid aſide their Remonſtrance, hold on the Treaty, vote the Kings conceſſions to contain matter for a well grounded peace; hereupon the Army beſet the paſſages to the Houſe of Commons, take above forty of the Members of Parliament into ſafe cuſtody, and violently keep or fright a major part out of the Houſe, debarring them liberty of ſitting, and voting there. This action of the Army Mr. John Goodwin undertakes to defend under the title of garbling the Parliament. And I yet beleeve,pag. 2. that it was a moſt irregular and ſcandalous uſurpation, deſtructive to Parliaments, and ſo to the welbeing of this Kingdom, if not to the preſent ruine of it, unleſſe it be retracted by the actors. And this I here undertake to make good againſt Mr. John Goodwin, by making good thoſe arguments, which he would overthrow, and enlarging them as occaſion is offered.
Sect. 2.
The firſt argument which he incleavours to anſwer, is;pag. 3. From the Armies acting without ſufficient authority, and ſo tranſgreſſing that law which commands every man to keep order and within the compaſſe of his calling. And this he ſtiles the firſt born of our ſtrength. And you ſhall ſee that it is indeed like Moſes, a goodly child, if you view him in his right and full proportion, in mood and figure thus.
All exerciſe of juriſdiction, where neither by God or man we are clothed with authority, is uſurpation, breach of order, injurious, and ſo greatly ſinfull.
The Army in inhibiting the Members entrance into their Houſe of Councell, and more grosſly in impriſoning their perſons, did exerciſe juriſdiction, where they were clothed with noe authority from God or man. Therefore
The Army in that force upon the Houſes ſtand guilty of uſurpation, breach of order, and injurie to the Members ſo uſed, and ſo ſinned greatly.
The Major is undeniable; if men will grant there are ſuch things as uſurpation, diſorderly walking and injury, or that thoſe are ſinfull where ever they be. For what is uſurpation if this be not for men to exerciſe juriſdiction over them who are not under their authority, nay to whoſe authority they are ſubject? What is breach of ranke and order if this be not, for men that are under authority to uſurpe authority without a call? And what is injury if this be not, to be haled to priſon, by thoſe that are neither authoritative judges of my fact, nor have any ſuperiority over my perſon, and that only for acting according to the dictates of my conſcience? And are not ſuch abuſes groſly ſinfull, that doe as it were make void the fifth Commandment, and deſtroy Government?
And for the Minor, firſt its clear that the Army did exerciſe juriſdiction over the Members: for ſuſpenſion from office, and commitment are high acts of juriſdiction. And if the Army were clothed with any authority for this, let them produce their patents that we may beleeve them, or elſe the concluſion is in force againſt them, to convict them of uſurpation, breach of order and injury.
Sect. 3.
But now what ſaith Mr. Goodwin to this?pag. 3. As our Saviour ſaith. The Sabath was not made for man but man for the Sabath. So certain it is, that callings were made for man, and not man for callings. Therefore as the law of the Sabath, was to give way to the neceſſities of men: ſo the law of callings &c. therefore unles it can be proved, that there was no neceſſity lying on the Army to garble the Parliament; Their exceeding their callings, will not illegitemate their actions.
Anſw. 1. That ſaying of our Saviour, that the Sabath was not made for man &c. was not utter'd by him to ſhow that the action of the Deſciples in plucking, and eating the ears of corne, was warranted by neceſſity againſt the command of the Sabath, but that it was not within the prohibition of workes on the Sabath, which ordinarily is reſtrained to works of a civill or ſervile nature, not to naturall refreſhment, which is alwayes indulged on the Sabath and ſo that work of mercy is not under the prohibition, for the plucking of the eares of corn, when they were n the field was no more then drawing drink out of a veſſel and of this opinion is learned Chemnitius. Hoc Chriſtus it a defendit, ut ſimul oſtendat extra caſum contempus publici miniſterii, et turbationis cultus ſabati propter otium externum Sabati, hominem ne levi quidē incommodo aſſiciendum. By this Chriſt doth ſo defend his Deſciples, as withall he ſhews that out of the caſe of contempt of the publike miniſtery, and diſturbance of the worſhips of the Sabath, for the externall reſt of the Sabath, a man is not to undergo the leaſt dammage. So that in his judgement, though the other arguments ſhew, what is lawfull in caſe of neceſſity, ſo à Majori clears the diſciples, yet this argument ſhews this was not in the prohibition of works on the Sabath.
2. The reſt of the Sabath, and keeping within our callings, are duties we owe to God by vertue of commands of a far different condition: The one by a command poſitive, as that of the Sabath, the other by a law naturall, as the fifth commandment, that commands every one to obſerve their ranks, and duties in them. Now commandments that are poſitive, are to give way to duties naturall. Sacrifice, to mercy: The reſt of the Sabath, not to the life only, but to the cheerfulneſſe and welbeing of man; as the inſtance of the diſciples, who were not in danger of death if they had faſted a little longer, but of inconvenience. But I hope Mr. Goodwin will not judge, that danger of inconveniency, ſhould make every man, or party of power, turn controulers of magiſtracy. Not onelyonly Ʋzziah, that wantonly 2 Chron. 26. but Saul who out of fear of inconveniencie, 1 Sam. 13.11, 12, 13, 14: yea and Ʋzzah, who as he thought was a caſe of neceſſity, put his hand without the call to the work of a Prieſt, aſwell, as the former reproved, and ſmitten, 1 Chron. 13.9.20.
And if there be any caſe wherein neceſſity amounts to a calling, it muſt be where that neceſſity ingageth to a duty, that ought to take place before this Commandment for order amongſt men, as that for ſaving life &c. And then the danger muſt be apparent, not probable onelyonly to ſome and diſputable; for elſe he ſhall run againſt an undoubted rule, upon an uncertain exception. 2. It muſt be imminent, ſo that no other means is left, or poſſible in an ordinary way. 3. And illegall, as when any, whether Magiſtrate or other, is about to act miſchief to the perſons of others without or againſt law. But if a mans life be in danger in a legal way, though unjuſtly, A man may not himſelf, nor ought others to reſiſt authority armed with law, for that were to take away all honor and opportunity of Martyrdom. The ſervant who hath a froward unjuſt Maſter, is according to Chriſt's example to be patient, though he ſuffer unjuſtly committing his cauſe to him that judgeth righteouſly,(a)1 Pet. 2.18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 2. though many times the ſervant hath ſtrength enough to bind his exorbitant Maſter. And ſuch ſhould be the carriage of private Chriſtians to hard magiſtrates executing hard laws. But now that there was no danger, evident, imminent, and againſt the laws of the Nation to urge the Army ſo to force the Parliament, ſhalbe afterwards cleared.
Sect. 4.
But ſecondly Mr. Goodwin hath found out a new fancy, if the former fail him; but that is ſuch a feeble one, that I queſtion whether he be ſerious in it; for he takes the boldneſſe to affirm that the Army did not exceed the bounds of their calling, in their force upon the Parliament men, and he would ſeeme to prove it;pag. 3. for ſaith he, their calling and commiſſion was to act in the capacity of ſouldiers, for the peace, liberty, and ſafety of the Kingdom &c. But here firſt I muſt minde him that the Army themſelves have mand his market: for they who know better the purport of their own commiſſion then he, and whom he flatteringly tells in his Epiſtle dedicatory, that he doubts not but they were ſatisfied in the righteouſneſſe of their actions from heaven, before they were in being, roundly confeſſe, (in their anſwer to the demands of the remnant of the Houſe touching their Members Jan. 3. 1648.) That their reſtrayning the Members was a courſe in it ſelf Irregular, and UNIUSTIFIABLE, but by honeſt intentions, and extraordinany neceſſity, whereby they plainly diſclaim any call by the tenour of their Commiſſion. But leaſt any in ſuch times as theſe, when men many times are impriſoned firſt, and ſhew of juſt occaſion is gladly laid hold on afterwards, This falſe plea might be made uſe of, though it were not at firſt thought of, I will examine what he ſaith; he inlargeth himſelf: nor did their Commiſſion (I preſume) limit or conclude their judgments to any kind of enemies &c. But I preſume their Commiſſion was to bear armes, to remove evill Councellers from the King, and bring him back to his Parliament, and to endeavour the ſubduing of all them that were in armes againſt the Parliament, or the welfare of the Kingdom, and (as I am informed) they were ſtill to be regulated in their proceedings, by the Judgement of both Houſes of Parliament; which any man may eaſily beleeve; for that the Parliament ſhould give them a Commiſſion inabling them to judge of their Councells, and impriſon their perſons, if they anſwered not their new illuminated fancies (for they muſt be judges what grounds are competent to make men enemies) is ſo far from policy, reaſon, or common ſence, that I wonder any man of judgement ſhould aver it in print.
But ſaith he again,Page 4. If it ſhall be ſuppoſed, that by their Commiſſion they were limited, to judge only thoſe enemies who were in Arms with the King, and his partakers: Thoſe Parliament-men whom they have excluded have notoriouſly diſcovered themſelves to be men of this engagement, &. But was ever any accuſation more unjuſt or ſenſeleſs? Did not they in the Treaty hold the King ſo hard to it, as to juſtifie them and the Army in the war, to the vertual condemning of himſelf and his? And to grant all, for which they ingaged againſt him and his party? And can they for this be traduc'd, as apparently friends and abettors of that party. But he comes on with a third anſwer,Page 4, 5. That if the Parliaments call were warrantable to levy Forces againſt the King and his party; then was the Armies call to act in the buſineſſe under Debat…, warrantable likewiſe. But this conſequence is very weak, for the Parliament is the ſupreme Court, and Councel in the Kingdom (and in your apprehenſion, I beleeve, the ſupreme authority) who were indeed called to that Truſt by the people▪ but being by their call made members of Parliament, they became clothed with authority, to conſult, and provide m…ans for the ſafety of themſelves and the Nation, according to the Laws and Conſtitutions of it. And ſo iſſued out Commiſſions, &c. but this as private men they could not do. But now the Army was not by any Commiſſion clothed with any authority over the Parliament. And therefore they cannot juſtifie their actings againſt the Parliament, over whom they had no authority, by what the Parliament did, having ſo great authority; yea in the conceit of our new Lords, the greateſt authority in the Land. But he argues further,Page 5, 6. That if the Parliament-men by being made Parliament-men, had formally and really power to raiſe an Army, then that Army hath power to act whatſoever lies within the verge of their Commiſſion, &c. This is not doubted: But the thing which we doubt and deny is, That the tenor of their Commiſſion ſhould be by ſtrong hand to ſuppreſs all that by rationall grounds, they ſhould judg enemies of the peace of the Kingdom, without dependance on Parliamentary judgment: for they were as raiſed, ſo to be regulated by the Parliament in their proceedings. The power of judging being reſerved in the Parliament; The power of executing committed to the Army, eſpecially in caſe of doubt or difference. Never would, never did, any State raiſe an Army on other terms, unles they meant to make them Lords, not Servants. For who is likely to be more skilful in judging what is conducible to peace and publick weal? A Councel of War, or a Councel of State? Therefore its clear that the Army in aſſuming power to judg their raiſers authoritatively, and ſo uſing force againſt them; have exceeded the bounds of their Commiſſion, falſifyed truſt, and are injurious uſurpers on the Parliament men.
Sect. 5.
But he raiſeth an Objection, That it is not likely that the Parliament would give Commiſſion to act againſt themſelves. He anſwers:pag. 6. 1 That Law-givers when in their righe mindes, may give out Laws againſt mad men, which may be put in execution againſt themſelves when they become mad. And in caſe any of the Parliament men from whom the Commiſſion iſſued had turned Cavaliers, &c. But this is a wilde anſwer: for the excluded Parliament-men are in the ſame way, and in the ſame principles, in which they firſt gave out Commiſſions, that is, to have the King home, ſeparated from his evil Counſellors, that his Throne might be eſtabliſh'd in righteouſneſs. Therefore to argue, That becauſe their Commiſſion might have been uſed againſt them if they had left the Body that gave it, and united with the Kings party, that Now it may be ſo uſed when they continue in Parliament; and act on the ſame principles, on which they iſſued out the Commiſſions, is as poor a come off, as could be expected from the weakeſt Sophiſter.
Nor hath his 2 Anſwer any more ſtrength where he affirms, That what one *TraianeEmperor ſpake expreſly to an inferior Officer, is ſaid implicitly to al inferior Officers, by their ſuperiors; to uſe the power they have for them, if they rule well; againſt them, if they rule ill: pag. 6.7.for they are alſo for the puniſhment of evil-doers, and that without partiality. And S. Peter requires ſubmiſſion not only to the King as ſupreme, but unto governors, ſent by him for the puniſhment of evil doers. But firſt, if there were nothing peculiar in that ſaying of Trajane, why is it ſo often mentioned of him, as a note of eminency and honor? Again, though inferior officers ſhould uſe their power and be reſpected in the uſe of it, yet they muſt alſo remember their limits. A Juſtice of Peace hath power, but it is with limits in regard of place, which if he exceed, though his act be never ſo juſt, he uſurps, and is puniſhable. And ſo is he limited alſo in regard of perſons. Subordinate Magiſtrates are to govern, & to be obeyed by thoſe under them; but they are to be governed by the powers above them, and not exerciſe authority over them, for their Commiſſion extends not ſo far; Though we are to be ſubject to ſubordinate Magiſtrates, yet in caſe of opinion of wrong, we may appeal from them, as Paul to Caeſar; which ſhews the ſupreme Magiſtrate is to cenſure their Sentences, not they his.
You might have ſpared that Scripture which here you too lightly bring in, that in this Armies Commiſſion there cannot be pretence for that exception which is in that of Chriſt. 1 Cor. 15.27. But when he ſaith all things are put under him, it is manifeſt that he is exempted that did put all things under him, God the Father being incapable of ſin. For though the ſuperiour magiſtrate is not exempt from ſin, yet is he excepted out of the Commiſſion of the inferiour Magiſtrate, becauſe his ſuperiour in Magiſtracie; and Par in Parem, much leſſe inferior in ſuperiorem (in codem genere) non habet poteſtatem, equall hath no authority over his equall, much leſſe the inferiour over the ſuperiour in the ſame kind, eſpecially where the ſupreme Magiſtrate thinkes he doth well; for whoſe judgement ſhall controll? ſhall the inferiours controll the ſuperiour? Neither doth Mr. Prinne or any judicious Divine that I know, affirm that any other inferiour Magiſtrates but the repreſentatives of a Kingdom, ſhall take order with the reſtraining of Tyrants: or if any inferiour Magiſtrate may do it, yet they and the repreſentatives are to proceed, by taking order with their miniſters which are under the penalties of the law, and within the verge of authority. And there is no uſurpation in this, when penalties are inflicted on them that are under juriſdiction. But he adds If the Army had not ſo for mall a call, as the Parliament, yet had they a call as materiall, for the one had it from the perſons of the people, and the other from the peoples liberties, yea and lives, many of their lives being now laid upon the altar &c. what a loud untruth is here in matter of fact? whoſe lives were on the alter? Or what better ſecurity could the Parliament deviſe. Then firſt to be juſtified by Act of Parliament, and ſecondly to be ſecured from violence by the command of the militia? Again what palpable weakneſſe is here in matter of argument, to compare the calls of men to their votes, with reall calls of their miſeries, and theſe too moſt in their own fancies for the major part of people apprehend no ſuch thing, and ſo their gron…s call not: who knows not, that perſonall call by votes clothes with authority, gives juriſdiction, and enables to order others? But ſight of miſeries, gives a man no authority to command, onelyonly calls him to put forth that power he hath to help,
Laſtly he affirms incaſe of extream neceſſity, Aquinas, q. 32. Art. 7.all things are common, and ſo callings; for this he cites a Popiſh writer, a fit patron for a falſe poſition; for if this be true, here is no theft in extreme need when a man muſt dye, to feed on another mans ſtore, it is no theft. But this is againſt the Scriptures, making a difference indeed between him that ſteales preſumtuouſly, and him that ſteales for need, the one deſerving pitty, but is a theif ſtill, and muſt reſtore, though it be to all his ſubſtance Prov. 6, 30, 31.‖So Auguſtine in Pſalm. 73. Pauper mendicus furtum facit ex macie proceſſit iniquitas. And Cicero is of the ſame judgement, that a good man muſt famiſh rather then ſteale, lib. 3. Off.*Nonne igitur ſapiens ſi fame ipſe conficiatur abſtulerit cibum alteri ad nullam rem utili? Minimè vero; non enim mihi eſt vita mea utilior, quam animi mei talis affectus, neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia. wherein he ſpeaketh to the ſhame of Papiſts and all that ſymbolize with them. To the example of David I have anſwered already, for what he cites out of Polanus; That when ecleſiaſticks are negligent, Laickes may reforme, Its juſt nothing to his purpoſe; for who knows not that Polanus and other Proteſtant Divines, hold the reformation of the ecleſiaſticall eſtate to be within the verge of a magiſtrates call? But will Polanus or Mr. Goodwin ſay, that a magiſtrate in caſe of defect without any other call, may adminiſter the Sacraments? could neceſſity excuſe Ʋzzah? Therefore this pretended community in caſe of neceſſity, is a Popiſh device, and a figleafe too narrow.
He cloſeth his anſwer with a ſimilitude of his owne, which he amplifies out of Maſter Prin, Pag. 9.10.[Where he ſuppoſeth the Pilot of a Ship drunke, or mad, and the Ship running on quick-ſands, &c. In ſuch a caſe may not any man or inen Act as a Pilat, which others ſtand bound at the perill of their lives in this caſe to obey.] But firſt, ſimilitudes are better for illuſtrations, then proofes, Secondly, They prove nothing at all, unleſſe there be parity betweene the example, and the thing exemplified. Whereas here is the greateſt diſparitie. For if this ſimilitude cleare the Armie, it muſt ſuppoſe the Parliament-men drunke, or mad, whereas indeed they that accuſe them, labour of ſomewhat proportionable to theſe diſeaſes. But let the caſe be put thus: The Maſter of the Ship is, according to his place ableſt to guide the Ship, and he according to his beſt skill, directs ſuch a courſe, and accordingly gives out commands. The Maſter Gunner, preſumes he can ſteere a ſafer courſe, and thereupon, by the helpe of his under-officers, awes, and forcibly ſeizeth the Pilot, and ſo takes his owne way. Is not the Gunner here guiſtle of uſurpation and diſobedience? Juſt ſo ſtands the caſe between the Parliament and the Army. The Parliament are beſt able to judge, for they are the Councell of State, and have moſt right to guide the Ship of the common-wealth, for they have the Superior Authoritie. But the Souldiers command the Guns, and they propoſe another way, which though lookt upon, as moſt dangerous by the skilfull Pilots; yet by force, all are ſecluded, that will not run their way. Is not this uſurpation in the Souldier, and dangerous, not ſafe to publique weale? In caſe of difference in judgements, whoſe ſentence ſhall controll? Shall the ſons judgement controll the fathers? or the ſervants his Maſters? no more ought inferiours Magiſtrate controll the Superiours. The Armie therefore ſhould obey, not pr…ſcribe to the Parliament in things dubious, eſpecially ſuch as are of Civill, not Martiall cognizance. But becauſe the exception that Maſter Goodwin all along ſuppoſeth is, That the Parliament Members reſtrained, are drunke or mad civilly, or have turned back on truſt, and there is much depends on this. I will here, once for all, lay downe grounds to cleare it; That the Parliament-men reſtrained, are in reference to the Souldiery, ſober, in their right wits, and true to truſt, and that the contrary errours reſt among their oppreſſors. As firſt I argue thus:
Sect. 6.
Thoſe that keepe to their Principles, Profeſſions and Declarations made, when they are confeſt to be ſober, in their right wits, and true to trvſt, muſt needs be judged to be ſo ſtill. The Parliament men who indeavour the ſetling of the King and Kingdome, upon his large Conceſſions, keepe to their principle Declarations and Profeſſions. Ergo, They are to be judged ſober, in their wits, and faithfull to truſt. The Major is manifeſt, for conſtancy in Principles and wayes, is the greateſt evidence of ſobriety and faithfulneſſe. A double-minded man, a drunken man, a frantick man, is unſtable in all his wayes. The Minor is undeniable, which may be ſeene by every one in the Record of their Principles, Declarations and Profeſſions, in the Booke called, The exact collections, printed long ſince by the Parliaments appointment, and in other Summaries of them. And if the Members be ſoher, in their wits, and true to truſt; their oppoſites are under the evils, contrary to theſe vertues; For Contrarioram contraria ſunt praedicata.
Secondly, Thoſe that proceed in a way to which they ſtand ingaged, by divers ſolemne and religious bonds, they are ſober, in their wits, and true to truſt. The oppreſſed Members proceeded in a way to which they ſtood ingaged by many ſolemne and religious Bonds, therefore they are ſober, &c. The Major is not to be doubted of, unleſſe we be like Felix, and think much Religion or Learning makes mad.
The Minor is as evident, for the Oathes of Allegiance, Supremacy, Proteſtation, the Nationall Covenant, are all ſacred and ſolemne Bonds, and all ingage to preſerve the Kings Honour, Safety, and Greatneſſe, at leaſt upon ſuch Conceſſions as theſe granted by him. Therefore the concluſion is undeniable, and the blame muſt reſt on their Oppreſſors, but the oppreſſed Members are free.
Thirdly, They that walke in a way ſuitable to the Religion that they profeſſe, and after the patterne of the wiſeſt and beſt profeſſors of …, they are ſober, &c. The Parliament in according with the King upon his Conceſſions walke ſutable to the Religion they profeſſe and follow the patterne of the wiſeſt and beſt profeſſors of it, therefor they are ſober, &c. The Maior is evident, and the Minor is cleare, if there be any difference, it is from the Parliaments holding up the King too high, and not in ſtooping too low. For no Religion is more for not onelyonly accepting, but exalting Governours in legall waies, then the religion of Proteſtants in matter of Loyalty, even in caſe of difference of Religion, alwaies condemning the Jeſuiticall Doctrine of depoſing, or deſtroying Princes; And for the practiſe of the beſt Proteſtants you ſhall heare, Iunius Brutus in his Vindiciae contra Tyranos, a Book that is Scandalous even to many Proteſtants, for the great liberty he gives againſt Princes; yet in this caſe, thus he ſpeakes, p. 47. Cum his quoties cun que optaris praeſto eſt pax deſine caedere cedunt, Deſine deum, oppugnare, deſinent propugnare. Arma ſi velis iis è manibus encutere, ſatis eſt modo ne percutias. A Prince ſaith he may have pe ace with proteſtant Subjects when he will let him leave beating them, they yeeld to him; let him leave oppoſing God, they will leave their forcible defence; If you would diſarne them, its enough that you ſtrike them not: and a little after Principi portas urbis claudunt, ubi reſ…p…erit, & ad ſe redierit, impertata facere parati. They ſhut the gat…s of the City againſt the Prince; aſſoone as he ſhall repent, and come to himſelfe, they are ready to doe his Commands. A little after, no ſtrovero etiam tempore menivimus eos, qui pro vera religione, adverſus impietatem in Germania, Gallia que pugnarant, quotiescun que dei pure colendi poteſtas facta eſt, arma ultro depoſuiſſe. Alſo we remember that thoſe in our time have fought for true Religion againſt impiety, either in Germany or France, as often as they had liberty given to ſerve God purely, lay downe Armes. And his concluſion is very remarkeable, Ejusmodi ergo ſignis poſſient hi a defectoribus facile diſtingui. Therefore by ſuch like ſignes, thoſe (that maintaine legall liberties againſt Tyranny by the Sword) may be eaſily diſtinguiſht from Rebels or apoſtate Subjects. And thus it is cleared, that the Parliament, in indeavouring peace upon the Kings Conceſsions, doe walke after the rules and patterns of Proteſtants and their Religion; Therefore the concluſion ſtands good, that they are ſober, in their wits, and true to truſt, but then what to thinke of their oppreſſour… is obvious enough.
Fourthly and laſtly, (that I may not exceed in ma…ters ſo cleare; Th…ſe whoſe worke and truſt is, to provide for the honour, ſafety, peace, and pr…ſperity of a Nation, who proceede in the moſt probable way, to promote the honour, ſafety, peace and proſperity of that Nation; they are ſober, in their wits, and true to truſt. But ſuch was the worke, and truſt of reſtrained Members, and they tooke the moſt probable way to promote it; Therefore, they are ſober, in their right wits, and true to truſt. The Maior is manifeſt; The Minor may be cleare thus, Monarchicall Government, is the moſt honourable Government, when it is regulated, that it degenerate not into tyranny, and its an honour to people to be loyall to Governours in good wayes. Loyalty is praiſe-worthy, Treachery vile, and baſe; Therefore when by the Kings conceſſions. Tyranny is prevented the liberties of the people ſecured: to preſerve the Monarch, in ſafety and honour; and the people in loyalty is undoubtly, the glory of a Nation. And this would be as conducible to peace and ſafety, for this would have put a preſent period to our broyles, and ſet the Parliament in a capacity to preſerve peace, by their command of the forces by Sea and Land, and hereby we ſhould have recovered reverence from friends, and become terrible to enemies, and what could in reaſon be the reſult of all this, but great proſperitie? and this was the Judgement of the Army, but a little above a yeare agoe, and this diſcovered by ſundry Declarations and propoſals, inforc'd with ſolid reaſons, and this they purſued a good while, till ſelfe intereſt, ambition, or I know not what tentation turned their braines, and though they have layed out all their skill in their Remonſtrance, to ſhew that the King by peace on his Conceſſions, would have both oportunity and will, quickly to make himſelfe abſolute, and ſo fall upon revenge, yet there are fairer probabilities on the other ſide, that he would not, if he could or could not, if he would let out his ſpirit in ſuch a deſtructive way of revenge; And that he would not, if he could may appeare. Becauſe he hath given ſo ample teſtimony of deepe wiſedome, whereby he is able fully to foreſee the deſperate danger of attempting any ſuch change, or revenge. Secondly, Experience will make him wary; The burnt child dreads the fire, he hath ſufficiently felt the miſery, acrewing to Princes, by the alienation of Subjects. And thirdly, Which is moſt moving with me, his invincible patience, and tranquility of Spirit in his ſufferings. Noble natures that can beare adverſity without fainting; can injoy proſperity without revenging; revenging moſt haunts baſe, and cowardly natures; But if he would he could not breake out, becauſe by theſe conceſſions his hands are tyed; and by this recommodation, the Parlioment would be reinveſted in the peoples affections, and any attempt of breach on the Kings part, would cary ſo much ill in the face of it, that the whole Nation would be ready to riſe up, and plucke in pieces, whoſoever ſhould be ſuppoſed to be either Counſellors or Actors in ſuch a breach of faith; And the Militia being in the Parliaments hands, ſuch incendiaries might bs eaſily cruſht. I might adde the Kings carriage in his conceſsions, where his owne honour, or externall rights was concerned moſt facile; but where his conſcience was intereſted tenacious to the greateſt adventure, what found reaſon can be given, why the King ſhould be ſo reſolute in the matters of his conſcience, but that he meanes to keepe what he granted; And therefore would not grant now, what conſcience hereafter might inforce him to breake, as being againſt conſcience, and ſee the ingagement to it ſinfull, and null. But ſuppoſe the danger in peace on theſe conceſsions be more then I apprehend; yet if the danger of depoſing or deſtroying be greater, …nd more unavoydable: It is not madneſſe, but ſobriety to chuſe the ſuffer way, wherein if we fall, we ſhall fall with inward peace and honour, having diſcharged our conſciences in reference to our Oathes, and profeſſions: and to decline another way more dangerous, wherin if we fall, our fall will be more foule and uncomfortable. Now let the danger of depoſition or deſtroying the King be weighed in the ballance, either of experience or reaſon, and I doubt not but it will waigh downe the danger of commodation on ſuch conceſſions; for that the Prince of Wales ſhould come in, and ſubmit himſelfe to the depoſers or deſtroyers of his Father, is not imaginabl. What cauſe, and minde to revenge he will have; any man that hath a Father, to who… he is not onelyonly linkt in nature, but aſſociated in cauſe, may eaſily apprehend; And his opportunities are as Evident. What potent Prince will not ſeeke his affinity, having a juſt and cleare title to ſuch three Kingdomes? And what a partly is he like to have at home? The whole Peerage of England, diſtaſt rigour againſt the perſon of the King; and I thinke three parts of foure in the Houſe of Commons are in their minde. The Generality of the people of the Land deteſt it; The Miniſtry, that have not beene thought altogether inconſiderable, ſtand amazed at it, as moſt diſhonourable to Religion, nor are the affections of Scotland dubious in this point; nor is all faire weather in Ireland. The party, that had enough to doe, to grapple with the King, when United, is now divided; Peace in Germany will afford plenty of Mercenaries; What greater probability was there ever for any Prince, either to attempt or atcheive revenge? And by the ſame meanes be in condition to make his owne tearmes with his people? And if he ſhould faile in his attempts at firſt, yet how endleſſely they will be renewed, till the Kingdome be ſetled on his right baſis, is as cleare as the Sun in our experience. After the depoſition of Richard the ſecond, and ſetting up Henry the fourth, of the younger Houſe, There was no ſettlement betweene the Houſe of Yorke, and Lancaſter, for above fourſcore yeares, but ever and anon bloody Wars, to the ineſtimable damage of this poore Kingdome; neither was there any hope of ſetled Peace, till their titles were United by the marriage of Henry the ſeventh, of the Houſe of Lancaſter, with the Heyreſſe of the Houſe of Yorke. And thus I hope I have cleared it, that the Army was not oney deſtitute of any warrantable call, but alſo of all juſt occaſions, ſo to oppreſſe the Members of Parliament, for proceeding to ſettle the Kingdome by treaty: for its evident, they therein acted wiſely, ſoberly, faithfully, and ſuteable to their former profeſſions, and ſacred ingagements.