The Divine Right and Original of the Civil Magistrate, Chapter 9 – Chapter 10
CHAP. IX. CHAP. IX. SECT. I.Some other Arguments for the concluſion inſiſted on in the former Chapter, taken from other Scriptures, and Mediums.
I Have thus gone over the Context, and taken notice therein of the generall clauſes, or ſtructures in it which adde their light, or ſtrength to clear, or confirme the ſenſe of our Text above concluded on. There is yet another thing promiſed to be diſpatched, to wit, a ſuper-addition of ſome other grounds, or Mediums that may further prove the determination aforeſaid.
SECT. I. Argueth from the ſenſe of Scriptures, forbidding the Retaliating of wrong.
1 THe firſt of theſe may be that which lyes not far from this Text. Let us take notice of the meaning of thoſe prohibitions, Rom. 12.17, 19. Recompenſe to no man evil for evill. Dearly beloved, avenge not your ſelves. The interpretation of theſe inhibitions (together with thoſe given by Chriſt, Matth. 5.39, 40, 41.) by the genera…l conſent of all Orthodox Expoſitors that I meet with, is, that they doe not ſimply, or abſolutely diſallow, or forbid all humane puniſhment, or vindicative juſtice to be done by any man; for this is authorized, and commanded by God to be done by certain perſons, (as Rom. 13.4.) no, nor every punitive act that may be done by e…e in his own caſe, or behalf, (for that the Magiſtrate may do:) But that thoſe Scriptures take vindicative juſtice out of the hands of private perſons; who, though they receive, or ſuffer evill, yet they may not aſſume the penall ſword, or the inflictive vindication of themſelves, into their own hands. And to theſe prohibitions, leſt it ſhould ſeem an over-ſtrait, and harſh confinement of the Chriſtian (as importing a moſt free expoſal of him to all bodily injuries, from all unreaſonable men, without any remedy, yea an open invitation of them) the Apoſtle ſubjoyneth.
1. An advertiſement, what help a Chriſtian hath, what his proper, and allowed remedy is in caſe of ſuch ſufferings. It is to give place unto wrath, viz. to refer the taking puniſhment unto God, to his judiciall proceſſe, either by his ſpeciall Miniſter ordained, and ſet up by him for that work (Cap. 13 4, 6.) or by other meanes he ſhall pleaſe to take (according to that ſuperſedeas of David unto Abiſhai, 1 Sam. 26.10.)
2. A reaſon of both the foregoing prohibition of ſelf-revenge, and of the preſcrip…ion of the awayting the ſaid remedy. For it is written, Vengeance is mine, I will repay it, ſaith the Lord. This Reaſon,
1. Aſſerts the right, and propriety of punitive juſtice unto God: ſo that none may meddle with it but himſelfe, either by himſelf, or by them that are expreſly war…anted, and deputed by him. Vengeance is mine.
2. Engageth his word, or undertaking to perform it. I will repay, ſaith the Lord.
If we compare the words of this T…xt in this plain ſenſe with what follows after (to wit, Cap 13.4.) For he is the Miniſter of God, a revenger to execute wrath, &c.) We ſhall finde cau…e to diſtinguiſh of humane revenge, or that which is done by man, as being one way prohibited, and another way authorized: and to ſay there is,
1. A ſinfull, and inhibited. 2. A lawfull, and commanded avengement. The ſinfull avenging is private, or that which is a mans revenging of himſelf; that is, when a man taketh vengeance, both in his own caſe, or behalf, and of his own accord, motion, or minde. The lawful, and commanded is that which is taken by him that is the Miniſter of God to execute it, by vertue of authority derived from God: and the diſtinction (Let this be obſerved as that wherein lyes the ſinew of the Argument) betwixt theſe two, is not in the act, or matter done, both may inflict the ſame kinde, and meaſure of evill; nor in the having of power, that is, ability, or predominant ſtrength in the hand to do it, for that may be ſuppoſed of them both, of the ſelf-avenger, as well as of the other; but in the having of a call, commiſſion, or warrant from God; In regard whereof, in the act of the one, God may be peculiarly ſaid to be the avenger, and repayer, in the other the perſon may be laid to revenge himſelf.
If we ſhould underſtand Gods repaying meerly of his doing it by any providential inſtrument, this diſtinction betwixt theſe two were deſtroyed; for when a private perſon recompen…eth his wrong, it may be ſaid of that way, that God ſo, that is, providentially repayeth. But if we conſtrue it of, or apply it unto Gods repayment by ſuch an inſtrument as is by him authorized, commiſſioned, or warranted to that worke, a revenge, or puniſhment, by ſuch an one we can clearly call Gods incontradiſtinction to that which is mans of himſelfe. Gods this is, not onelyonly by way of infliction,CHAP. IX. SECT. V. but by his warranty and approbation; not mans, or a ſelf-rev…nge: for in it, man onelyonly hath the execution, God the appointing; man the acting, God the enacting.
In ſome caſes, indeed, of the publique Magiſtrates avenging, theſe two (viz. Gods, and ſelfs-revenge) may ſeem to be coincident, to wit, when the Magiſtrate puniſheth, or judgeth in vindication of his own right; yet even here, in as much as he hath authority deputed to him by God, and he is to adminiſter the juſtice of God to all, and beſides him there is none to do it, and the aſſerting of his right and ſafety ordinarily no leſſe concerneth the publique, and common then his own perſonal intereſt, and is of much more importance then that of any other mans, what he doth therein falls not under that ſelf-avengement which there is forbidden, but reduceth it ſelfe to that which is a giving place to the wrath of God, and to his repayment, as contradiſtinct to his own. For, though he here avenge in his own cauſe, yet, neither doth he it of his own accord, or motion, neither doth he meerly, or formally vindicate himſelf, neither, if he rightly go about it, doth he therein ſo much conſider, or conſult himſelf as others.
Now let the clear ſenſe of this prohibition of ſelf-revenge, and the commandement, of giving place to wrath, with the inſtitution of the Magiſtrate to be a revenger to execute wrath, and the diſtinction betwixt theſe two revengings be conſidered, and the concluſion againſt the intruſive, unwarranted, meer poſſeſſory power will be thence very evident.
SECT. II. CHAP. IX. SECT. II.Argueth from the Prophets compariſon of the Jewiſh State under the predatory power of the Chaldean unto that of ſuch Animals as have no Ruler over them.
2 IN the Prophet Habakkuk (Cap. 1.14.) the ſtate of the people of Judah, and of other Na…ions under the Chaldean Monarchy is reſembled to that of fiſhes, and creeping things that have no Ruler over them. How were they ſaid to be ſo, to be without Ruler over them, when the Chaldean actually commanded, abſolutely ruled, and ſo grievouſly enſlaved, and oppreſſed them? yea, the fiſhes, and reptiles, cannot be ſaid ſimply to have none ruling over them; for the weaker are overpowered and maſtered by the ſt…onger, and fiercer, and by them made, either to give way, or to become their prey, or food: And in regard of this prevailing of the greater over the ſmaller by meer force, and impetuoſity the condition of the Jewes is compared to that of thoſe Brutes. The meaning then is, theſe creatures have no Ruler over, them by order of nature; and the Jewes had no Ruler*foreign the root of that Noune tranſlated, Ruler, ſignifies, jus, authoritatem habuit. Pagninus. Piſcator eſt Nebuchadonozorus, mare orbis univerſus, piſces ſunt homines, rete, ſagena, hamus vocàntur copia, vires, artes Chaldaeorum. Nam ut minuti piſces majoribus pro cibo ſunt, ita homines infirmi a potentioribus opprimuntu…. Druſius in loc. over them, by any right, or any that was properly their Magiſtrate, or Soveraign, that is, by Divine authority, or ordination ſet over them;CHAP. IX. SECT. III. but, as it is among the fiſhes, and creeping things, if any command over other, it is owned by no direction, inſtinct, or intimation of nature, but wholly impetuous, ſavage, and by a preternatural encroachment: (underſtand we this either of thoſe kinds of Animals whom the Text ſpecifies, or indefinitely of any in reſpect of Individuals of one ſpecies over-powering thoſe of another; for of ſome certaine kinds, as of Bees, Cranes, and others, it is obſerved there is ſome image of order, and government among them, to wi… …ithin, or in relation to thoſe of their own ſpecial kinde, and particularly ſociety, or herd:) and ſo it was with this people, there was none whom they could take as deſigned, or pointed out by warrant from God to be their Ruler, but meere confuſed violence tooke place; whoſoever could, and liſted, took the ſuperiority, and bare ſway over them. We ſee then it is one thing for a people to have an arbitrary maſterdome, an enthralling tyranny, another to have a true M…giſtracy, or Principality over them: and that without ſome ruler of order, and juſtice, in poynt of conſtitution of government obſerved; Cities or Countreys are but as mountains of prey, chaſes of wilde beaſt, or pools of ſilly fiſh.
SECT. III. Argueth from the nullity of a ſelf-created power, declared negatively in Christs, poſitively in Babylons caſe.
3 OUr Savi…ur Chriſt delivers this as a commonly received, and a true Max…me [John 8.51.] If I honour my ſelfe, my honour is nothing. By which the nullity of a ſelf-created Dignity is againſt all contradiction aſſerted. The Jewes (unto whom he ſpake theſe words) had objected to him, that the things which he had before declared of himſelf were but his own preſumptions, or arrogations, Whom makeſt thou thy ſelfe? unto which he anſwers; Firſt, by way of conceſſion, if ſo it were indeed his claims were voyd, and of no force*Monemur his verbis, quicquid gloriae ſibi homines a ſeipſis conciliant frivolum eſſe, ac nihili. Calv. in loc.. If I honour my ſelfe, my honour is nothing.
Secondly, by way of vindication to himſelfe of another, a contradiſtinct, and an indubitable valid title to his dignity, It is my Father that honoureth me. Here then is a two-fold riſe of honour diſtinguiſhed of; the one real, & current, the other ſuppoſititious, and null; the one renounced, the other owned by Chriſt, viz. ſelfe-honour, and honour which is from God. As the honour which is from ones ſelfe, is thus in whomſoever diſallowed by Chriſt as fruſtrate, and nothing, ſo it is the brand of Babylon, and charged upon her as one of her maſter-vices, that ſhe glorified her ſelfe, [Rev. 18 7.] If by Babylon we underſtand the City of Rome (as not onelyonly our Proteſtant Expoſitors generally, but Ribera, and other Popiſh Commentators, yea, and ſome of the Fathers, as Tertullian, and Auguſtine apply it) that brand doth fitly and notably expreſſe the uſurped power, both Eccleſiaſticall, and Civill, which that City, as the ſea…e, and metropolis of the Pope, and the Pope in it doth claim, and in great meaſure exerciſe over all the Dominions of Chriſtendome, as it is contradiſtinguiſht from, and privative of the power of the reſpective civill Lords of thoſe Dominions whoſe right they are: who are therefore ſaid, in diſcrimination from her, to receive their kingdome, and power, Rev. 17.12.
CHAP. IX. SECT. IV.SECT. IV. Argueth from ſundry abſurdities following upon the attributing of a meere poſſeſſory power unto God as his ordinance.
4 IT is a generally received, and moſt certain principle, All dominion, rule, and power of command over any creature, or any of mankind is abſolutely, and originally in God alone; in the creature onelyonly derivatively, and by communication from him. Whoſoever then may claim to himſelfe, or be ſaid, and taken by others to be in place of rule, or government over other men (in what ſociety ſoever) muſt have and be able to ſhew a delegation, or ſubſtitution from God for it.
Now for this it being clearly repugnant, both to the nature of authority, and to divine proceeding about it, to ſay that God hath ordained it (whether it be that of a Father, or of a Husband, or of a Magiſtrate, or civill Lord) to be in every man; but contrariwiſe all muſt confeſſe he hath to ſome appropriated, to others prohibited it, having commanded theſe the contradiſtinct duty of ſubjection; ſuch a delegation muſt needs be required as doth fixe ſuch a ſort of authority in ſuch a particular man, in relation to ſuch a ſociety, or ſuch perſons, who are thereupon to yeeld their obedience, by vertue of a divine obligation to him.
But to ſay God hath appointed any kind of authority, and particularly that of civill Magiſtracy, to be the certaine, and inſeparable reſult of poſſeſſion, or to be his that can prevaile, and doth poſſeſſe himſelfe (by w…at meanes ſoever) of a ſupe…iour commaad over people is,
1. To bring a people to a loſſe, and to put an indeterminateneſs and diſobligation upon them unto any M…g…ſtracy whomſoever, when the Throne comes to be de facto unpoſſeſſed, whether it be by the death, or abſence of the Prince or otherwiſe, and to impoſe on them in thoſe caſes a continuall uncertainty, and diſſettlement of Government, and that as by divine ordination.
2. To give an equall warrant (in caſe of ſuch vacancy) to all men to ſtep up to, or ſtickle for the Throne, and to leave it to be attempted, aſpired to, and ſcuffled for by whoſoever pleaſeth.
3. To caſſate, diſannul, and make vaine all thoſe preobligatious, cautions, reſtrictions, and rules which God himſelf hath at any time delivered before-hand for the determining, or directing of peoples proceedings about the erecting of Magiſtracy, as he hath given ſundry to Iſrael, ſometimes preſcribing them the particular ſtock they ſhall fixe upon*Deut. 17.15.; and ſometimes ſending them to the uſe of Lots†1 Sam. 10.18., and ſometimes to a certain race, or lineage*1 Chron. 28.4, 5. 2 Chron. 23.3., to finde ou…, and receive thence the determination of their Magiſtracy.
4. To cancell, make impertinent, and truſt aneous all other titles, or meanes of any mens coming into authority, and all conſultations, proviſions, conſtitutions or oaths of Senators, or people that look any other way, or digreſſe from this path of actual poſſeſſion, or prevalidity.
Why ſhould Moſes have been ſo ſolicitous about his ſucceſſor in the Government of Iſrael,Numb. 27.15, &c. and ſo earneſt with God for the nomination of him before his death, if G…d h…d ordained (and then no doubt Moſes would have known and ſhould have acquieſced in it) that occupation, or poſſeſſion muſt determine it. His own experience of the aſpirings of Korah, and the reſt during his life, would tell him there was likely to be no want of a ſucceſſor after his death, if it might be carryed by uſu…pation. In like manner, to what purpoſe did Iſrael after the death of Joſhua aske of God who ſhould be their Leader? Or, did David enquire of God what he ſhould do in relation to his obtaining the K ngdome of Iſrael before promiſed him when Saul was dead?Judg. 1.1. 2 Sam. 2.1. he might have known if this had been a received principle, that he had no more to do but gird on his armour, lead on his men, and take poſſeſſion.
If God hath ordained that poſſeſſion ſhall be the baſis or bottom of civill power, to what purpoſe is any State-conſtitution, law, or decree for the continuation or ſucceſſion of government? according to this poſition upon any vacancy, or voidance of the Throne, no perſon can by ſuch conſtitution have any right to ſucceed, neither can any violent intruder be by it illegitimated.
Though a perſon upon ſuch vacancy come in, and the people receive him as their Magiſtrate by vertue of an antecedaneous civill conſtitution, or an oath of allegiance, yet upon that ſuppoſal the entry upon this ground, or title is but a Chimaera, a meere conceit, or airy phantaſme, for it is not in t…u…h that title, but his poſſeſſion which derives, and confers Magiſtracy upon him. And on the other hand, though a perſon be deſtitute of, or come in directly in oppoſition to, and violation, and everſion of ſuch preobligations, yet if he any way get poſſeſſion, he is a Magiſtrate true, and good enough; and if a perſon have all the lawes, conventions, and pactions by man deviſable for him, yet if he lack, or looſe poſſeſſi…n, he is no body, all is null. Yea,
5. This is to conclude all ſuch conſtitutions, and obligations unlawful, and ſinful in the making; for to what intent are they made? the very end of their enacting is to circumſcribe and ſence in the Throne, and to limit the way to it, to pre-diſpoſe the property of it; and to exclude, and prevent, to illegitim…te, and condemn the entry of any whomſoever to it in any o her way, or upon other account then that which is preſcribed, and limited in the conſtitution; and therefore to diſallow, and bar out one if not the onelyonly way, and title to it which God (if this poſition ſay true) hath authorized, to wit, meere prevalency, or intruſive acquiſition, and poſſeſſion.
6 To expoſe the Common-wealth as a common booty, and prize to all aſpiring ſpirits, and to give an invitation (making God the author of it) to every ambitious, diſcontented, or diſloyal party continually to be hatching, and attempting by power, or policy to undermine, or beare down the preſent Government, and to advance a new: by which meanes the civill power ſhall be alway tottering, as in an Earthquake; the peoples minds inceſſantly poſſeſſed with expectations of change; and the publique State (together with every mans private) ſtand in perpetual jeopardy of falling under all violence, ſpoyle, and confuſion. The invitation is, he needs no more to make him the Soveraign Lord, and to lay a tye of ſubjection upon the conſciences of the community unto him, as unto the power ordained of God, but to get into poſſeſſion, or actuall command of the territory: Unto which the next, and eaſieſt way being the concurrence of the common people, or a ſtronger, or more ſucceſsful party of them, any man that is of a wo…king, crafty head, and of a high reſolution may at any time be within the poſſibility, and by caſting for it, not ſeldome have the opportunity of putting to a ſhrewd hazard the effecting thereof: as the example of Abſalom, and Sheba in the reign of David, and of Jeroboam upon the death of Solomon do witneſſe.
7. To ſay that there can be no unjuſt poſſeſſor, no unlawful, or diſorderly occupant of rule in the Common-wealth, no ſuch thing as we call uſurpation, meaning by it a culpable, or injurious tenure of the place of civill dominion. For he that hath a warrant, ordination, or deputation from God for the place, muſt needs be rightly in, and authoriz…d for it; and if this deputation infallibly come with, and by, and be the reſult of poſſeſſion, then he that is in, muſt needs be rightly in.
CHAP. IX. SECT. V.Upon this account no man can be wrong, or out of his calling (in reſpect to government) that can get into command, quocunque modo: neither is there any poſſibility of foreign in this buſineſſe: neither in this matter can any man juſtly be blamed in the words of Moſes to Korah, and his company, Yee take too much upon you. Seeing, let a man take all he can upon him that he can graſpe into his hands, he is commiſſioned by this that he doth take it upon him: neither did Moſes do well to charge the ſaid company as thoſe that were gathered together againſt the Lord, or to defer the determination of the queſtion of uſurpation, which they charged upon Aaron, and him, and theſe again retorted upon them, unto Gods former choice, and conſecration of him, or them, or to Gods manifeſtation of his minde, then to be made at the door of the Tabernacle of the congregation; for he ſhould have pleaded, or decided it by poſſeſſion, at leaſt, ſo far as the queſtion concern'd Politicall rule.
SECT. V. Argueth from that State-maxime, Political power is originally in the people, and in the Magiſtrate, only derivatively from them.
5 THat principle, that civill power is originally in the people, or community, and from them paſſeth to the ſupream Magiſtrate (if it may ſtand) quite overthroweth the poſſeſſory title. I ſhall not undertake to make it good, I had rather ſay, power is originally in God,CHAP. IX. SECT. VI. and from him paſſeth by means of the peoples conſent to the Magiſtrate. But this I ſhall ſay for it, it hath gone of late for a chief Maxime in Politicks, and hath been laid downe as the principle to beare up, and juſtifie the high proceedings that have been, and to induce the owning of them; it hath received the ſtamp of publique avouchment, and not onelyonly hath it obtained the ſaid late authority, but it hath had before theſe times the approval of ſome of our learnedſt men (as Mr. Richard Hooker, Mr. Hooker polit. Book 8. p. 150.& Mr. Banes. Mr. Banes, his Dioceſans Tryal. pag 83.) That this principle quaſheth the title of the meer poſſeſſor is very evident. A meet poſſeſſor is one that is in the place of power without any call, conſen…, or conſtitution of the people, or that is one that is in it only by his owne act. If then the power be originally in the people, and in the Magiſtrate onelyonly derivatively from them, the meere poſſeſſor (whoſe very being, definition, or ratio formalis is, that he rules without the peoples conſent) is utterly deſtitute of it.
SECT. VI. Argueth from the Riſe, or nature of civill government.
6 THere is nothing more directly oppoſite, or abhorrent to the nature of government then this pretenſion. For, what is government, but the ſubjecting, or reſigning up of the community, and of every part therein, whatſoever their ability, or naturall power is, to the arbitration, or rule of one, or a few c…rtain perſons, for peace, and orders ſake, and for prevention of thoſe dangers, vexations, and violences, which ſingle perſons, private ſocieties, and ſmall parties are continually expoſed to, and have no ſtrength to repell, nor authority to over-awe, or reform the authors of them? And for what end is government ordained by God, and ſet up and upheld by men, but that the ſtronger may not domineer at pleaſure over the weaker? and what is Anarchy, or ſedition (the direct contrary to government) but the riſing up, and the playing the Rex of a head-ſtrong party of their own minde, and accord, without, or againſt authority.
It is generally ſuppoſed that the miſchief of rapine and ſedition, or the dominion of the ſtrong hand, was the inducement, and occaſion that firſt led, and as man-kind hath multiplyed, and ſpread further over the earth, ſtill hath prompted the people of the world to come out of that community, and equality which in the ſimplicity, and inoffenſiveneſſe of infant-times, and while ſocieties have been but few, and ſmall, they for a time lived in, and to agree upon a diſtinction of property, and a courſe of order, and of the politicall ſuperiority, and dominion of ſome over the reſt. And now to lay this principle, that the prevailer ought to be, or is the civill power, is to proſtrate that order ſo erected, to reduce the world to that ſuppoſed original parity, and maſterleſneſſe, and to introduce, or give opportunity to alll thoſe confuſions, and harms which Government was ſet up to fence out, to curb, and to ſuppreſſe.
SECT. VII. CHAP. IX. SECT. VII.Argueth from the received Diſtinction betwixt a Soveraigns publique, or legall, and his perſonall, or private capacity.
7 BOth Lawyers, and Divines have found it neceſſary, in regard of many caſes of law, and conſcience occurrent to them reſpectively, to diſtinguiſh of a double capacity of him that is a Magiſtrate, viz. 1. His legall, civill, politick.
2. His private, perſonall, and humane capacity. And this diſtinction is grounded upon that of power before given (in Chap. 1.) to wit, that there is,
1. A naturall, or phyſical. 2. A moral power. The difference betwixt thoſe two capacities they have aſſigned to be, that his perſonall private capacity in it, all that he is, and doth, or may, and can do either naturally, or ethically, that is, by vertue of any naturall, or morall power diſtinct from the Civill, or Magiſtratical. His politick capacity is conferred on him, and exerciſed by the Law; it is ſtill incluſive of the Law, both as it is originall, and inſtrument of working; and it ſignifies onelyonly that which he is, doth, and may doe legally, or by the Lawes of the Land. The neceſſi…y, and uſe of this diſtinction is to ſtate the riſe, and extent of the Magiſtrates authority, and both the ground, or reaſon, and the meaſure, or latitude of the Subj cts obligation unto the power.
This diſtinction hath been much uſed by them that have defended the late Parliaments cauſe. See it in the fuller anſwer to Dr. Ferne, pag. 9. 16. And the anſwer to Dr. Fern's Reply, pag. 36. The vindication of the Treatiſe of Monarchy, pag. 27. The Anſwer to Doubts, and Queries upon the Oath, and Covenant, pag. 6. Mr. Burroughs upon Hoſ. cap. 1. Lect. 4. pag. 111. Yet had it not its effiction from them, but was unto the very ſame ſenſe delivered by our Divines before; as Biſhop Bilſon, in his true difference of Chriſtian ſubjection, &c pag. 520. Dr. Willer Hexap. … Rom. cap. 3. queſt. 17. pag. 593.
Yea, the ſubſtance of this diſtinction hath been owned by both the Parliaments, and the Royal party. Yea, both by Prince, and People; hence theſe generally received maximes. The King hath no power in him, but what is inveſted in him by Law. The Law is the meaſure, and bottome of the Kings power. He can claim nothing but what the Law gives him. He is our Li…ge, (that is, legall) Lord, we his liege, (or, legall) Subjects. Whatſoever power is exerciſed, and is not ſetled by Law, it is not authoritative. See the Kings Declaration from New-Market, March 9. 1641. Judge JenkinsJudge Jenkins ſaith, The Kings prerogative, and the Subjects liberty are determined, and bounded, and meaſured by the written Law what they are. We doe not hold the King to have any more power, neither doth his Majeſtie claime any other but what the Law gives him. his vindication, pag 19. Treatiſe of Monarchy, pars 3. cap. 1. and ſect. 2. pag 31, 32. and the vindication of that Treatiſe pag 58, 61.
This diſtinction, and the import of it (if it may paſſe for good, as it is no leſſe cleare bo…h in …eaſon, and Religion then generally acknowledged) doth quit, and clean di…claim, and ſhut out this potation, and title of the poſſeſſory power, and that ſo plainly, as it is ſupe…fluous fu…ther to forme, or draw out the argument. For how can you diſtinguiſh of theſe two capacities in a meer poſſeſſor? where is his legall, civill, politick capacity (to wit, that which is conferred on, or exe…ciſed by him by the Lawes) diſtinct from his naturall, private,CHAP. IX. SECT. VIII. and perſonall capacity? and conſequently, where is any ground, or riſe of the peoples obligation unto obedience to him, as their civill power?
SECT. VIII. Argueth from the being of civill power, by the law of nature.
8 UPon ſuppoſal of the truth of that Poſition, that civill Magiſtracy is by the Law of nature, (for the proof of which I have ſaid ſomething before*Chap. 5. Sect. 4. Subſect. 2.) I would thus argue, If the law of nature doth, and from the beginning hath dictated that civil Government be in politick ſocieties; it muſt alſo be preſumed to direct, and authorize a way, how in particular communities it may be erected; and that way which it hath determined is to be practiſed; and no other can (unleſſe it derive an expreſſe poſitive rule from God) be admitted; eſpecially none that is contradictory, or ſubverſive to that: now no man can reaſonably imagine that meeer poſſeſſion, which muſt be ever ſuppoſed to be againſt the wills of the community, and for the moſt part is in prejudice, and wrong of anothers title, yea which alway is by unnatural, violent, and diſhoneſt meanes introduced, and maintained, can be by order, or law of natur, or otherwiſe then by encroachment upon, and violation of it.
CHAP. IX. SECT. IX.SECT. IX. Argueth from the generall ſolemn diſclaim of Arbitrary Government.
9 ARbitrary rule, & government is a thing that we (to wit, this kingdom generally) did condemn, and decry, as a publique evill; and in oppoſition to it we entred into a publique, and ſolemn promiſe, vow, and proteſtation (See the Preface to the Proteſtation of May 3. 1641.) I do not in the leaſt reprehend that action, but upon it I argue. If that were well, and juſtly done, then is not Arbitrary government an ordinance of God, neceſſarily to be ſubmitted to, and maintained, and that which may not be reſiſted: On the other hand, if Arbitrary government be an ordinance of God, &c. then were we externally extreamly out in the ſaid action: but then the queſtion is, what is Arbitrary government? and wherein doth it, and that government which we owned, and took upon us to aſſert and ſtand for, differ? Doubtleſs, arbitrary, is oppoſed to lawful, or legal, or that which is ſetled by National convention, pact, and conſtitution. The government then we have in that Proteſtation obliged our ſelves to, is that eſtabliſhed by Law, and that which is otherwiſe (and without controverſie meer poſſeſſory dominion is otherwiſe) we bound our ſelves from, and againſt.
SECT. X. CHAP. IX. SECT. X.Argueth from the impoſsibility of determining what meaſure of poſſeſsion ſhall make a power.
10 LAſtly, If poſſeſſion will ſerve to make a power, and to breed an obligation in the people to it, I aske, what ſort, ſize, or degree of poſſeſſion is it that will do it? If you ſay, partial poſſeſſion will ſuffice; I reply, poſſeſſion of a part cannot give title to the whole. For that may at one, and the ſame time be in divers oppoſite competitors, as it hath been in England in our late Wars, and is in every Territory, where there are wars for Dominion. One contrary party may be ſeiſed on one City, or Province, another of another within the ſame Commonwealth.
If then the title follow partiall poſſeſſion, it may appertain to many at once. But this cannot be; The intire title, or intereſt over a Kingdome cannot be wholly in divers contra-diſtinct, and oppoſite parties, neither can the peoples allegiance be owing, or yielded to many contrary claimers.
1. It hath often come to paſſe that the forcible occupancy of one part of a Kingdome by one, and another by another power, hath been the occaſion of dividing the ſame into ſeverall, and diſtinct Kingdoms or Principalities. So was the Greek Empire parcelled after the death of Alexander the Great: and ſo hath the Roman Empire ſince been ſhared into a multitude of diſtinct ſoveraignties. Now this could not be, if poſſeſſion of a part gave a title to the whole; for then, notwithſtanding ſuch diſtinguiſhed poſſeſſions, and denominations, the bodie politique would (as when it was united under one Soveraign) be one ſtill, and would remaine entitled to one Soveraign, though but partiall poſſeſſor; and how inconſiſtent would this be? and therefore we in Europe account that claim of the Turkiſh Emperour frivolous, and abſurd, challenging a right to all the Dominions of the Weſtern Roman Empire, as ſucceſſor of Conſtantine, becauſe he ſucceeded him in that of Conſtantinople, which was in Conſtantines time one Empire with this of the Weſt*Keckermani logic. lib. 1. cap. 23. pag. 203. & the Turkiſh hiſtory in Solymā pag. 615..
2 If it be ſaid, that it muſt be plenary poſſeſſion that can give a title, and oblige the people to the poſſeſſor, I return: This is ſo tickle, and momentaneous a ground, as no civill authority can any while ſt…nd by it. For, how often, how eaſily is plenary poſſeſſion interrupted? If a ſorein enemy, or an inteſtine inſurrection, or a ſmall ſeditious Rout, or a band of Pirates, or Robbers ſeiſe but on one Towne or Village in a whole Kingdome in oppoſition to the ſupream Lord thereof, this breakes off his plenary poſſeſſion, and ſo (by this opinion) annuls his Title, and diſobeyeth his Subjects. There are few Dominions of any great extent, but are often infeſted in ſome part, or other with ſo much of commotion or invaſion as may abate of plenary poſſeſſion in the Soveraign. Witneſſe the long continuing, or frequently renewed troubles of all, or moſt of the larger-Principalities of Europe in this age.
Have the Emperours, Kings, and Princes of Germany, F…ance, Spaine, Italy, &c. been ſo long diveſted, and deprived of their ſaid Dominions, as their plenary poſſeſſion hath been impeached in them reſpectively? But this conceit is utterly rejected by the generall vo…e, and uſe of Nations, who do univerſally and conſtantly reckon their government to ſtand, and their Allegiance to hold notwithſtanding partial counter-ſeiſures, yea, or the diſmemb…ing of ſome particles. You can ſcarce finde in Scripture ſtory a King whoſe reign is hiſtorified but at ſome time, or other, if not often,CHAP. X. and for much of his time he was by ſome or other occupant imped of plenary poſſeſſion; yet did not that cut off his reign, or diminiſh his computed time.
CHAP. X. Anſwers to ſome Objections, and Doubts concerning that ſenſe of the Text which the aforegoing Chapters have ſtated, and confirmed.
THis laſt Chapter is to return anſwer unto ſuch Objections, and Queſtions, the ſolution whereof may ſeeme neceſſary to the further clearing of that interpretation of this Text which this Trea…iſe hath hitherto held forth, and aſſ…rted.