The Covenanters Plea Against Absolvers, Discourse · Chapter 13
CHAP. XIII.
Where the Abſolvers Plea from the force attending the Covenant, is conſidered, and proved vain. Oaths extorted by fear, do obligè in Conſcience, proved from Scripture, Reaſon, the Opinions of Dr. Sanderſon, Aquinas, Azorius, and all ſober Caſuists, for their Obligation.
§. 1. WE are told in the next place, that the Covenant was forced and extorted by penalties, and that not only from Miniſters, and Fellowes of Colledges, and from the vulgar people; but even from his Sacred Majeſty: and therefore it is null and void, and no Obligation can ariſe from it, it being againſt reaſon, that from a wrong, any ſhould raiſe up to themſelves a right, any more than a meer paſſivity in a rape, can oblige her that is ſo forced, to marry him who hath ſo abuſed her.
§. 2. As to his Sacred Majesty, how truly any ſay this, we cannot tell, neither knowing whether his Majeſty did indeed take the Covenant in Holland, before he came under the Scottiſh power; nor how he was treated in Scotland. If when his Majeſty came into Scotland, the Covenant were by them impoſed upon his Majeſty, (he having not in Holland promiſed to take it.) Or (ſuppoſing that) if the Scots uſed any rough and diſloyal Arguments to fright his Majeſty into the taking of it (though indeed our Allegiance and reverence for his Majeſty, conſtrains us to think, that (according to Dr. Sanderſon's determination of the duty of a good and valiant man in ſuch caſes) no fear could ever have wrought upon his Majeſty, ſo far as to have engaged him in any thing, which his Conſcience told him was ſinful and unlawful) yet the Scots are not to be excuſed in point of Loyalty and good manners, to their Soveraign. For many in England, there is no doubt but many Miniſters and people (though not all, nor the major part engaging) took it in ſuch a fright. But we will at preſent ſuppoſe all, viz. That both his Majeſty and many of the people took it, as being feared to it. The Queſtion ſtill is, whether ſuch Oaths once taken (however ſinfully offered and impoſed) do not oblige thoſe who took them, to a juſt performance.
§. 3. Divines in this caſe do diſtinguiſh, betwixt ſimple promiſes, and Oaths, betwixt natural and divine Law, and Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Law, and betwixt metus levis & gravis, a light fear and fright, and a ſolid and weighty caſe of fear, as where a man is threatned with the loſs of his life, &c. in caſe he take not the impoſed Oath, Hence (ſaith Baldwin) it is that Divines and Civilians differently determine the caſe with reſpect to the difference of Natural and Divine Law, Bald win caſ. l. 2. c. 9. caſ 12.and that which is purely Civil and Eccleſiaſtical. And Divines here ſpeak to many caſes; As that of a promiſe or an Oath made to a Thief upon the Road, when for fear of a mans life, he promiſeth the Thief a Sum of money. Whether he that is impriſoned juſtly or unjuſtly, and goeth out upon his Parol, ſwearing to return, be bound by his Oath to do it, though his returne ſhall certainly, or may probably coſt him his life, &c.
§. 4. Divines alſo do here diſtinguiſh, betwixt ſuch Oaths, if impoſed by Lawful Powers, and if adminiſtred by Uſurpers. Sanchez ſaith 'tis no queſtion but ſuch Oaths do oblige,Sanches l. 3. cap. 9. if the powers impoſing have a juſt authority over us; and we ſuppoſe none will deny this, for there are very few Oaths impoſed by lawful Magiſtrates, upon people, but policy directs them to annex a penalty in caſe of refuſal, which as it is more or leſs, ingendreth a leſſer or greater degree of fear: And indeed to deny this, were to take away all poſſibility of Magiſtrates ſecuring themſelves by the Oaths of their Subjects: For it were no more, but for the Subject to ſay he ſware his Allegiance out of fear, and according to ſuch new divinity, he hath abſolved himſelf. So that (although the Scots had no power to impoſe any ſuch Oath upon their Soveraign under a penal fright, unleſs he had firſt given them that power) yet as to all the People of England, in caſe the Lords and Commons of England, legally aſſembled in Parliament, have any ſuch priviledge to impoſe an Oath upon the people, although the King doth not conſent; we ſay (which we profeſs our ſelves not to know) in caſe they have any ſuch lawful power, the Argument from force ſignifieth nothing at all in the caſe.
§. 5. But allowing our Abſolvers all advantage poſſible, ſuppoſing that the Lords and Commons Aſſembled in the Parliament of England legally, have no ſuch power, but did injuriouſly impoſe it: The Queſtion is, whether it being taken at this diſadvantage, doth not yet oblige all that took it, to a juſt and religious obſervation of it? To which we ſay;
§. 6. The Third Commandment ſaies, Thou ſhalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain, for the Lord will not hold him guiltleſs, that takes his Name in vain. This Commandment is further interpreted by divers Scriptures, You ſhall not ſwear by my Name falſly, neither ſhalt thou prophane the Name of the Lord thy God, Lev. 19.12. If a man vow a Vow unto the Lord, or ſwear an Oath to bind his ſoul with a Bond, he ſhall not break his word, he ſhall do according to all that hath proceeded out of his mouth, Numb. 30.2. It was ſaid of old time, thou ſhalt not forſwear thy ſelf, but ſhalt perform unto the Lord thy Oaths, Mat. 5.33. And as to the penalty; I will be a ſwift witneſs againſt the Sorcerers, and againſt the Adulterers, and againſt the Falſe ſwearers, Mal. 3.5. And again, The Curſe of God ſhall enter into the houſe of him that ſweareth falſly by the Lords name, and it ſhall remain in the midſt of his houſe, and ſhall conſume it with the timber thereof, and with the ſtones thereof, Zech. 5.3. It is the obſervation of Filiucius, that the Precept is negative, and therefore no pretence of force can diſcharge us from our obedience to it: Not to diſpute the force of his Argumentation, It is plain from thoſe Texts, that every man is ſeverely obliged to perform his Oaths; and the expreſs obligation of an Oath appearing from Divine Inſtitution, ſo highly oneroſa, (as the Caſuiſts ſpeak) loading the Soul with curſes that neglecteth it. It cannot but to every ſober Chriſtian appear, highly reaſonable, that before we conclude, That Oaths extorted by fear, are not obligatory, we ſhould find either from Scriptural Precepts or Preſidents, a plain diſcharge from the obligation of them: Which we think will be very hard to find.
§. 7. Yet, if we miſtake not, we ſhall find ſome Scriptural Inſtances, which appear to us ſtrong evidences to the contrary: We ſhall inſtance but in two: That concerning the Spies ſent by Joſhua to Jericho, whoſe ſtory we read Joſh. 2. & 5. and that of Zedekiah, which we have recorded, 2 Kings 24. Ezek. 17, &c.
§. 8. As to the former we read, Joſh. 2. That he ſent two men to ſpie out Jericho: The King of Jerichò by ſome of his Miniſters of State, gaines intelligence, that they were come, and to what end they were come, and that they were lodged at the houſe of Rahab; he ſends Meſſengers to Rahab, to deliver them, ſhe acknowledgeth that ſuch were come, but ſaies they were gone again, (while in the mean time they were hidden in the top of her houſe) ſhe comes to them before they went to bed; and v. 12. requires of them to ſwear unto her by the Lord, that as ſhe had ſhewed kindneſs unto them, ſo that when they had conquered Jericho, they would ſave alive her Father and her Mother, and her Brethren and her Siſters, and all that they had: They ſwear accordingly. In the 6th of Joſhua, you read that Jericho was taken by the Iſraelites: V. 22. Joſhua commands theſe Spies to go into the Harlots houſe, and to bring out the woman and all that ſhe had as they ſware unto her. If Joſhua and the reſt of the Iſraelites had been of the Religion of our late Abſolvers, how much might they have pleaded in diſcharge of this Oath?
1. As to the matter of it, there is an appearance of unlawfulneſs in it, becauſe of the Command of God to deſtroy the Canaanites, and not to pity or spare them.
2. It was made without Joſhua's advice.
3. It was impoſed by an unlawful power.
4. The men could not but fear, that if they had refuſed, Rahab might have diſcovered them, which had ſhe done, they muſt unqueſtionably have died. But that age it ſeems was not ſo cunning to quit themſelves of Oaths. It is the probable opinion of Magalianus, that the Precept of God for deſtroying the Canaanites, was with an exception, to ſuch of them as ſhould expreſs ſignal kindneſs to the Iſraelites. And for other things they were to learn that an Oath taken (otherwiſe lawful) was diſcharged by any ſuch pretences.
§. 9. The ſecond Inſtance is that of Zedekiah: The ſtory is this; Zedekiah was a third Son of Joſiah. The Scripture mentioneth three Sons of that good King; Jehoahaz (who ſucceeded Joſiah immediatly) Jehoiachim and Zedekiah, called by his Father Mattaniah; Jehoahaz having reigned wickedly three moneths, was overcome, and carried into captivity by Pharaoh Necho, King of Egypt, where he died (for ought we know) childleſs, 2 Kings 23.32, 33, 34.
The King of Egypt ſetteth up in his ſtead Eliakim, a ſecond Son of Joſiah, and turns his Name to Jehoiachim: he reigneth 11 years. In his daies Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon conquers his Land; He dieth alſo, and leaveth only one Son (mentioned in Scripture) Jehoiachin, called by the Prophet Jeremy alſo Jeconiah (and ſo ordinarily by the 70 Interpreters) Jeremiah alſo in contempt, cals him Coniah. (Domini nomen à Regis nomine avulſum fuit, ſaith Hierom.) This man died childleſs, according to that, Jer. 32.30. Write this man childleſſe. Where and when he dyed, the Scripture ſpeaketh not: probably he died a priſoner in Babilon, 2 Chron. 36.13. The King of Babilon makes Mattaniah (a third Sonne of Joſiah, brother by Father and Mothers ſide to Jehoahaz (they were both the ſons of Hamutal, the daughter of Jeremiah of Libnah, 2 Kings 23.31. ch. 24.18.) King in his ſtead. He took an Oath of Zedekiah by God, 2 Chron. 36.13. That this Oath was extorted by fear is paſt denial. Zedekiah was of the Kings ſeed, Ezek. 17.13. Son of Joſiah, Brother to Jehoahaz, Uncle to Jehoiachin or Jechoniah. There appears nought to the contrary, but that he was the right heir to the Crown. Jehoahaz, and Jehoiachim being dead (and probably Jeconiah dead too) ſure we are he had a right to his liberty: He could neither have this Crown, nor yet his Liberty without taking this Oath to the Uſurper the King of Babilon: he muſt elſe have alwaies lived a ſlave to a Pagan Prince, and have been in daily danger of his life, and the more, as the refuſing ſuch an Oath, would have rendered him to the King of Babilon as ſuſpicious, for hatching ſome deſigne▪ for the recovery of his own, and his Countreyes Liberty. He takes it. And 'tis very like that he had ſome about him of the complexion of our late Caſuiſts, who might tell him, it was an Oath againſt the Lawes of Iſrael, impoſed by an Uſurper, forced upon him as a Priſoner, and therefore did not oblige. What ever the motive was, he brake it, and Ezech. 17.15. ſent Ambaſſadors into Egypt to give him horſes, and much people. But obſerve how God takes this, whether he alſo concurred, that Zedekiahs Oath and Covenant was null and void. God declareth his ſenſe of it by the Prophet Ezech. chap. 17. under the Parable of two Eagles and a Vine, from v. 1. to v. 11. he expounds this Parable, ver. 11. & ſequent. Say now to the Rebellious houſe, &c.
V. 12. Behold the King of Babilon is come to Hieruſalem, and hath taken the King thereof, and the Princes thereof, and led them with him into Babilon.
V. 13. And hath taken of the Kings ſeed and made a Covenant with him, and hath taken an Oath of him, he hath taken alſo the mighty of the Land.
V. 14. That the Kingdome might be baſe: that it might not lift up it ſelf, but that by keeping of his Covenant it might ſtand.
V. 15. But he rebelled againſt him, ſending Embaſsadors into Egypt, that they might give him chariots and horſes, &c. Might he not do ſo (notwithſtanding his Oath?) According to our new Caſuiſts the Oath was null and void, Zedekiah was a priſoner, the Jews in captivity, Zedekiah had never ſworn to be tributary to the King of Babilon ſurely, if it had not been to recover his rights, if he had not been afraid of death, or impriſonment, or perpetual exile, certainly he could not offend God in violating ſuch a forced Oath. But it ſeems the thoughts of God were otherwiſe; for the Prophet goes on: Shall he prosper? ſhall he eſcape that doth ſuch things? or ſhall he break the Covenant, and be delivered?
V. 16. As I live ſaith the Lord God, ſurely in the place where the King liveth, that made him King, whoſe Oath he deſpiſed, and whoſe Covenant he brake, even with him in the middeſt of Babilon he ſhall dye.
V. 18. Seeing he deſpiſed the Oath, by breaking the Covenant, when lo he had given his hand, and done all theſe things, he ſhall not eſcape.
V. 19. Therefore thus ſaith the Lord God, as I live ſurely, mine Oath that he hath deſpiſed, and my Covenant that he hath broken, even it will I recompence upon his head.
Is it poſſible now that any owning the name of Divines, and Interpreters of Scriptures, ſhould tell us, that Oaths extorted by fear do not oblige?
§. 10. Nor have our Abſolvers any better encouragement from the ſuffrage of Divines in the caſe, whether they be Ancient or Modern, Papiſts or Protestants. Azorius tels us, it is Communis ſententia, the common ſenſe of Divines, that Oaths ſo extorted do binde in conſcience: Sanches ſaith, that Quidam antiqui, ſome old Divines did think they doe not oblige, but who they are, we cannot find.Aq. 21 ae. q. 89. art. 7. reſp. ad 3. Sure we are, that Aquinas, Sayrus, Azorius, Filiucius, Sanches, Al. Hales, Bonaventure, Richardus, Gabriel, John Bacon, Panormitan, Durandus, Scotus, Eſtius, Soto, Cajetan, Navarrus, Suarez, Valentia, Layman, Antoninus, Dr. Ames, Dr. Sanderſon, Baldwin, &c. all determine, that ſuch Oaths do oblige. Some of them indeed diſpute, whether the violation of ſuch Oaths be a mortal ſin, or only venial; whether they bind in foro Eccleſiaſtico, or no (according to Civil and Canon Law) whether the Pope can abſolve in the caſe or no; but that ſuch Oathes bind in the Court of Conſcience, we finde none doubting. There is indeed in the Canon Law a caſe of a Biſhop mentioned, from whom Count Arnulph took ſome goods belonging to his Church, and made to ſwear, that he would never endeavour the reſtoring of them. The Biſhops caſe was brought before the Pope, he determines the Biſhops Oath void, and diſchargeth him by a formal abſolution. It is true, that Baſſianus, and ſome others conclude, that the Pope determined the Oath void (in foro Eccleſiaſtico) becauſe of the force he was under. But the Gloſſator upon the Canon Law, and ſo Sanches and others, determine better, that the reaſon why their Holy Father determined the Biſhops Oath void, was not becauſe of the force (under which the Biſhop was) but becauſe the matter of the Oath was unlawfull, he might not alienate the Churches goods, he being but a termer in them. And it ſeems that the Pope himſelf judged his caſe ſuch, that he ſtood in need of his Abſolution.
§. 11. But to leave the Authorities of men, which we muſt confeſs ſignifie very little to us in ſuch a caſe as this is (the obligation of an Oath reſulting from divine inſtitution.) Let us inquire what may be ſaid in reaſon, either for, or againſt the Obligation of ſuch Oaths. We never read, or heard, nor are able to phanſie more than two reaſons in the caſe.
1. Becauſe, what one does under a force, he doth not freely and ſpontaneouſly.
2. Becauſe, he who by threatning forceth us to ſwear to his pleaſure, doth us an injury, and it is againſt all reaſon, that any ſhould from a wrong, raiſe up to himſelf a right. Both which reaſons have been conſidered by the Schoolmen and Caſuiſts, and determined inſufficient. Sanches tels us,Sanches l. 3. cap. 11. Filiucius mor. qu. tract. cap. 6. Suarez De Jur. l. 2. cap. 7. that Spontaneitas non eſt neceſſaria ad obligationem Juramenti. Spontaneity is not neceſſary to make an Oath obliging, and Filiucius tels us, coacta voluntas est voluntas; A will compelled is a will ſtill: Aliquis timoratus poteſt velle jurare, ſaith Suarez; one under a fear may will an act of ſwearing.
§. 12. And for the latter reaſon, it is determined of no value; becauſe the injury done us by men, cannot diſcharge the obligation reſulting from an oath unto God. Dous jusjurandum ſibi delatum non extorquet (ſaith Azorius) God doth no man injury by forcing him, and hence they determine,Azor. inſt. mor, l. 1. c. 11 q. 14. That a naked promiſe made upon a force doth not oblige, becauſe that is onelyonly made to men, and no obligation to God reſulteth from it, but an Oath doth. Though we muſt confeſs, rather to agree with Azorius, who ſaith ſuch promiſes do bind, jure naturali & divino, by a natural and divine right, but not by Eccleſiaſtical and Canon Law. But for Oaths in ſuch caſes, they generally agree them obligatory: And hence Filiucius and others tell us,Filiucius u…ſup. That an Oath added to a Promiſe ſo forced from us, is not confirmative of an obligation, but introductive of an obligation. They conſider a promiſe two wayes.
1. As it contains an aſsertion or propoſition relating to matter of fact to be after done by us.
2. In its proper form, as it is our engagement to our Brother, tending to his advantage: The Oath added to a promiſe forced from us, they ſay doth not confirm the promiſe in its proper form, not oblige us to do the thing, as the doing of it is advantageous to our brother; but it obligeth us to make good the aſſertion or propoſition.
§. 13. The truth is, art Oath obligeth by vertue of Gods Law, and the ſame Law of God muſt provide exceptions to diſcharge the obligation of it. The Word of God no where ſaith, that the injury done us by our neighbour, or the want of perfect liberty when we do the Act, ſhall diſcharge us from the performance of it. We ſhall further offer ſeverall reaſons againſt this novel Divinity concerning the nullity of forced Oaths: Seven or eight we ſhall inſtance in, moſt of which have been pleaded by Divines, and we ſhall give them their honour as we mention them.
§. 14. Firſt in all Reaſon, an Oath into which a man is cheated, is leſſe obligatory than one by fear extorted. Sanches gives the reaſon, quia dolus aufert conſenſum, a man in ſuch a caſe cannot be ſaid to have conſented; but that ſuch an oath is obligatory, is plain from the inſtance of the Gibeonites, upon which we have the Judgement of all the Princes of the Congregation, Joſ. 2.19. (when the cheat was diſcover'd) delivered in theſe words, We have ſworn unto them by the Lord, therefore we may not touch them, becauſe of the Oath which we ſware unto them: God himſelf reſolves this caſe, 2 Sam. 21.1. puniſhing all Iſrael firſt with three years Famine, for the violation of their Fathers Oath, and then Saul eminently, in the Sacrifice of ten of his Sons to appeaſe Gods wrath for the violation of that Oath. Ergo, Oaths extorted by fear much more oblige.
§. 15. Secondly, The injuries and infirmities of men cannot diſcharge any obligation upon us unto God. But fear concludes onelyonly, the injury and infirmity of men. We find the Schoolmen and Caſuiſts generally agreeing in this.
That from every promiſory Oath, there reſults a double Obligation. The one to men whom the promiſe concerneth; the other to God, whoſe Sacred Name is invoked. Aquinas, Sanches, Azorius, Sayrus, Filiucius, all agree in this, and moſt of them uſe it as an Argument to prove the Obligation of ſuch Oaths. Mens injury in forcing us, may diminiſh the Obligation to them, but it cannot acquit us from our debt to God.
§. 16. Thirdly, Every Oath which is licitum & poſſibile (lawful and poſſible) doth oblige, but fear doth not make an Oath either materially unlawful or impoſſible: Baldwin, Dr. Sanderſon, with many others urge this Argument.
§. 17. Every Oath to which a man conſents (if otherwiſe lawful) is (notwithſtanding any pretence of fear) obliging; Baldwin and Dr. Sanderſon both urge this: The latter urgeth well, that the perſon ſo ſwearing, hath his choyce, whether he will ſwear, or ſuffer the penalty like to be inflicted upon him for refuſing the Oath; the will cannot be forced: He that thus ſwears (ſaith Dr. Sanderſon) chuſeth what at that time appeared beſt to him, and is therefore bound by it: Gregorius Sayrus agrees in the ſame reaſon.
§. 18. Fifthly, Becauſe an Oath (notwithſtanding any circumſtance of force) may be kept without any hazard to a mans Salvation. This Argument is urged by Filiucius, the Gloſsator upon the Canon-Law. It ſeems it was a Rule in Divinity in former times (however forgotten now) That every Oath which any man had made, and could keep without the hazard of his eternal ſalvation, he was obliged to keep: In this Rule alſo agree Sanchez, Suarez, Molina, &c.
§. 19. Sixthly, Becauſe the performance of a Promiſe ratified by ſuch an Oath, is a vertuous action, ſuppoſing the matter of the promiſe lawful, though it be not neceſſary, yet when we have promiſed it, the performance becomes actus virtutis, for no act individuo is indifferent, whatever it may be in specie. Sanches ſaith truly, that it is not neceſſary to make an Oath oblige, that the matter be neceſſary: it is enough if it be free and indifferent, and if no more, yet an Oath makes it neceſſary as to us, and a Promiſe in ſuch a matter, ſaith Cajetan (whoſe Argument this is, is a vertuous Act, and ſuch muſt the fulfilling of it be.
§. 20. Seventhly, A multiplication of ineffectual cauſes, though it implieth an addition to their number, yet it adds nothing to their weight, ſaith Filiucius. Here are two cauſes in the preſent caſe, which may be pretended, why ſuch Oaths ſhould not oblige. 1. The Injury. 2. The Fear. Both theſe are inoperative and ineffectual ſingly; 1. Fear alone will not nulliſie an Oath (as we ſaid before) an Oath into which a lawful power doth fright his Subjects by penalties is yet obligatory, and granted ſo by all. 2. The injury of an uſurped power, will not do it, without fear. Caſuiſts agree, that Oaths (otherwiſe lawful) impoſed by unlawful powers (if once taken) do oblige. Now it is againſt reaſon, that theſe two ineffectual cauſes ſhould joyntly do what it is granted, that they cannot ſingly and apart: This is Filiucius his Argument.
§. 21. Eightly, Juſtice requires, that a condition (lawful to be performed by me) ſhould be made good to another, De Jur. prom. prael 4 Sect. 15.when I have obtained the end, for which I ſo engaged. Dr. Sanderſon ſpeaks like a Divine in this caſe; Every conditional Covenant, the condition being fulfilled, obligeth: Whence both he and others conclude, that if any man hath ſworn to a Thief, that upon conſideration that he ſhall ſpare his life, he will pay to him ſuch or ſuch a ſum of money, he is bound to pay it.
§. 22. Ninthly (ſaith Dr. Sanderſon) We ought alwaies to ſuſpect our carnal wiſdom and reaſon, as contrary to purity of heart, and peace of Conſcience. But what can be called wiſdom of the fleſh, if this be not, to oppoſe our own reaſon without any warrant of Scripture, to the expreſs and ſevere Letter of Scripture, concerning the Obligation of Oaths.
§. 23. Laſtly (ſaith Dr. Sanderſon) which is alſo obſerved by Baldwin in the caſe, The Heathens ſtand upon Record commended to poſterity, for the not violating ſuch Oathes: Amongſt whom is Regulus (ſo highly as we remember, commended by Auguſtine) and Pompnius the Tribune, honoured by Tully, who yet elſewhere ſeems to be of a different mind to Divines in this Caſe.
§. 24. Upon theſe and the like Reaſons, we (with the generality of Divines of all ſorts, and in all ages) conclude againſt the Scioliſts and Novelliſts in Divinity, of this preſent age, That Oaths extorted by fear, are (if otherwiſe lawful, notwithſtanding ſuch frights, or pretended force) obligatory.
§. 25. In which Concluſion Divines are ſo highly agreed, that they not only determine, the Traveller bound to pay the ſum of money, which he hath ſworn to pay to a Thief, for the ſparing of his life; but alſo That he who is juſtly impriſoned, and in danger, yea, certain to loſe his life (if he return to his Keepers hands, having ſealed his Parol with his Oath, that he might have a liberty of breathing in the open Air) is bound in Conſcience to return: Yea, the moſt (though Vasquez, Corruvias, and ſome others diſſent) determine him ſo bound, though he be unjuſtly and unlawfully impriſoned.
§. 26. We ſhall only add this; That if this new Divinity be allowed in the world, that Oaths to which one is frighted, do not oblige; the wideſt flood-gate imaginable will be ſet open to Perjury. It is but for any Subject to ſay, he was (by the penalty annexed) frighted into the taking of his Oaths of Allegiance and Obedience to his Superiors, and he will be diſcharged. But enough for ſuch a piece of licentious Doctrine, not fit to ba mentioned amongſt Chriſtians.