The Morning Exercise Methodized, Sermon 5
MANS CREATION IN AN HOLY, BUT MƲTABLE STATE.
Eccleſ. 7.29.
Lo this only have I found, that God hath made man upright; but they have ſought out many inventions.
IN theſe words you have the reſult of a ſerious inquiry into the ſtate of mankind. In the verſe immediately foregoing, the Preacher ſpeaks his own experience, touching each ſexe diſtributively; how rare it was to meet with a wiſe and good man, how much rarer with a prudent and vertuous woman (ſo he muſt be underſtood, though theſe qualities are not expreſt) then in the Text gives this verdict touching both collectively, tending to acquit their Maker of their univerſal depravation, and convict them. Lo this only have I found, &c.
The words contain two Propoſitions.
The firſt touching mans perfection by his creation, God made, &c.
The ſecond touching his defection by ſinne, but they have ſought, &c.
Together with a ſolemn Preface introducing both, and recommending them as well-weighed truths, Lo this only have I found, &c. q. d. I do not now ſpeak at randome, and by gueſſe; no, but I ſolemnly pronounce it, as that which I have found out by ſerious ſtudy and diligent exploration, That God made man upright, &c. The Termes are not obſcure, and are fitly rendered. I find no conſiderable variety of readings, and cannot needleſſely ſpend time about words. Only in ſhort,
By man] you muſt underſtand man collectively, ſo as to comprehend the whole ſpecies.
Making him upright] you muſt underſtand ſo as to refer making not to the adjunct only, ſuppoſing the ſubject pre-exiſtent, but to both ſubject and adjunct together; and ſo 'tis mans concreate and original righteouſneſſe that is here meant.
By inventions] underſtand (as the antitheſis doth direct) ſuch as are alien from this rectitude. Nor is it altogether improbable that in this expreſſion, ſome reference may be had to that curious deſire of knowing much that tempted Adam and Eve into the firſt tranſgreſſion.
Many inventions] ſeems to be ſpoken in oppoſition to that ſimplicity and ſingleneſſe of heart which this original rectitude did include; truth is but one; falſhood, manifold. God made man upright, foreigni. e. ſimple, plain-hearted, free from all tortuous windings, and involutions (ſo the word rendred upright in the Text doth ſignifie; and Jeſhurun derived therefrom, which God thought a fit name for his people Iſrael, the ſeed of plain-hearted Jacob to be known by; anſwerably whereto Nathanael is ſaid to be a true Iſraelite in whom was no guile)John 1.47. Such man was at firſt; now in the room of this ſimplicity, you find a multiplicity; he was of one conſtant uniform frame, and tenour of Spirit, held one ſtraight, direct and even courſe; now he's become full of inventions, grown vafrous, multiform as to the frame of his ſpirit, uncertain, intricate, perplexed in all his wayes.
Sought out] this notes the voluntarineſſe, and perfect ſpontaneity of his defecti n; 'twas his own doing. God made him upright; he hath ſought out means to deform and undo himſelf.
The words thus opened, afford us two great Goſpel-truths.
Doctrine 1 1. That God endued the nature of man in his creation, with a perfect and univerſal rectitude.
2. That mans defection from his primitive ſtate was purely voluntary, and from the unconſtrained choice of his own mutable and ſelf-determining will.
(Though the latter part of the Text, would afford a ſufficient ground to treat of the ſtate of man now fallen; yet that being by agreement left to another hand, I obſerve no more from it then what concerns the manner of his fall, and that only as it depended on a mutable will.)
In handling theſe truths, I ſhall
1. Open them in certain explicatory Theſes.
2. Improve them in ſome few praictcal and applicatory inferences.
1. About the former, that God endued, &c. take theſe Propoſitions for explication.
Prop. 1 1. All created rectitude conſiſts in conformity to ſome rule or Law.
Rectitude is a meer relative thing, and its relation is to a rule. By a rule, I here mean a law ſtrictly taken; and therefore I ſpeak this only of created rectitude. A law, is a rule of duty given by a Superiour to an Inferiour; nothing can be in that ſenſe a rule to God, or the meaſure of increated rectitude.
Prop. 2 2. The higheſt rule of all created rectitude, is the will of God, conſidered as including moſt intrinſecally, an eternal and immutable reaſon, juſtice, and goodneſs.
'Tis certain, there can be no higher rule to creatures than the divine Will;Rom. 7.12. Rom. 12.102. Ezek. 18.25, ch. 33. and as certain that the government of God over his creatures, is alwayes reaſonable and juſt, and gracious; and that this reaſonableneſſe, juſtice and goodneſſe by which it is ſo, ſhould be ſubjected any where but in God himſelf, none that know what God is (according to our more obvious notions of him) can poſſibly think.
Prop. 3 3. Any ſufficient ſignification of this Will, touching the reaſonable creatures duty is a law, indiſpenſably obliging ſuch a creature.
A law is a conſtitution de debito, and 'tis the Legiſlatours will (not concealed in his own breaſt, but) duly expreſſed that makes this conſtitution, and infers an obligation on the Subject.
Prop. 4 4. The Law given to Adam at his creation was partly natural, given by way of internal impreſſion upon his ſoul; partly poſitive given (as is probable) by ſome more external diſcovery or revelation.
That the main body of laws whereby man was to be governed, ſhould be at firſt given no other way than by ſtamping them upon his mind and heart, was a thing congruous enough to his innocent ſtate (as it is to Angels and Saints in glory) it being then exactly contempered to his nature, highly approvable to his reaſon (as is evident in that being faln, his reaſon ceaſes not to approve it, Rom. 2.18.) fully ſutable to the inclination and tendency of his will, and not at all regretted by any reluctant principle that might in the leaſt oppoſe or render him doubtful about his duty.
Yet was it moſt reaſonable alſo, that ſome poſitive commands ſhould be ſuperadded, that Gods right of dominion and government over him as Creatour, might be more expreſly aſſerted, and he might more fully apprehend his own obligation as a creature to do ſomethings, becauſe it was his Makers Will, as well as others, becauſe they appeared to him in their own nature reaſonable and fit to be done (for ſo the whole of what God requires of man, is fitly diſtinguiſhed into ſome things which he commands, becauſe they are juſt; and ſome things that are juſt, becauſe he commands them.)
Prop. 5 5. Adam was indued in his creation, with a ſufficient ability and habitude to conform to this whole Law, both natural and poſitive; in which ability and habitude his original rectitude did conſiſt.
This Propoſition carries in it the main truth we have now in hand, therefore requires to be more diſtinctly inſiſted on. There are two things in it to be conſidered.
The thing it ſelf he was endued with.
The manner of the endowment.
1. The thing it ſelf wherewith he was endued, that was uprightneſſe, rectitude, (otherwiſe called the image of God, though that expreſſion comprehends more than we now ſpeak of, as his immortality, dominion over the inferiour creatures, &c.) which uprightneſs or rectitude conſiſted in the habitual conformity, or conformability of all his natural powers to this whole Law of God; and is therefore conſiderable two wayes, viz. In relation to its
Subject.
Rule.
1. In relation to its ſubject; that was the whole ſoul (in ſome ſenſe it may be ſaid the whole man) even the ſeveral powers of it. And here we are led to conſider the parts of this rectitude, for 'tis coextended (if that phraſe may be allowed) with its ſubject, and lies ſpread out into the ſeveral powers of the ſoul; for had any power been left deſtitute of it, ſuch is the frame of man, and the dependance of his natural powers on each other, in order to action, that it had diſabled him to obey, and had deſtroyed his rectitude; for bonum non oritur niſi ex cauſis integris, malum vero ex quovis defectu. Davenant de justitia habituali, &i.And hence (as Davenant well obſerves) according to the parts (if I may ſo ſpeak) of the ſubject wherein it was, Mans original rectitude muſt be underſtood to conſiſt of
1. A perfect illumination of mind to underſtand and know the Will of God.
2. A compliance of heart and will therewith.
3. An obedient ſubordination of the ſenſitive appetite, and other inferiour powers, that in nothing they might reſiſt the former.
That it comprehends all theſe, appears by comparing Col. 3.10. where the image of God, wherein man was created, is ſaid to conſiſt in knowledge, that hath its ſeat and ſubject in the mind, with Epheſ. 4.24. where righteouſneſs and holineſs are alſo mentioned; the one whereof conſiſts in equity towards men; the other in loyalty and devotedneſs to God; both which neceſſarily ſuppoſe the due framing of the other powers of the ſoul, to the ducture of an inlightened mind. And beſides, that work of ſanctification (which in theſe Scriptures is expreſly called a renovation of man according to the image of God wherein he was created) doth in other Scriptures appear (as the forementioned Authour alſo obſerves) to conſiſt of parts proportionable to theſe I mention, viz. illumination of mind, Epheſ. 1.18. converſion of heart, Pſal. 51.10. victory over concupiſcence, Rom. 6.7. throughout.
2. Conſider this rectitude in relation to its Rule; that is the Will of God revealed,1 John 3.4. or the Law of God; ſin is the tranſgreſſion of the Law; and accordingly righteouſneſſe muſt needs be conformity to the Law, viz. actual righteouſneſſe conſiſts in actual conformity to the Law; that habitual rectitude which Adam was furniſhed with in his Creation (of which we are ſpeaking) in an habitual conformity, or an ability to conform to the ſame Law. This habitual conformity, was, as of the whole ſoul, ſo to the whole Law, i. e. to both the parts or kinds of it, natural and poſitive. He was furniſh't with particular principles inclining him to comply with whatſoever the Law of nature had laid before him, and with a general principle, diſpoſing him to yield to whatſoever any poſitive Law ſhould lay before him as the Will of God. And if it be ſaid (in reference to the former of theſe) that this Law of nature impreſſed upon Adams ſoul, was his very rectitude; therefore how can this rectitude be a conformity to this Law?
I anſwer,
Aquin. Summ.1. A Law is twofold
Regulans.
Regulata.
2. The Law of nature impreſſed upon the ſoul of Adam, muſt be conſidered
1. As ſubjected in his mind; ſo it conſiſted of certain practical notions about good and evil, right and wrong, &c.
2. As ſubjected in his heart, ſo it conſiſted in certain habitual inclinations to conform to thoſe principles. Now theſe inclinations of the heart, though they are a rule to actions, they are yet ſomething ruled in reference to thoſe notions in the mind; and their conformity thereto makes one part of Original rectitude. And thoſe notions, though they are a rule to theſe inclinations, yet they are ſomething ruled in reference to the Will of God ſignified by them; and in the conformity thereto, conſiſts another part of this Original rectitude.
2. We have to conſider the manner of this endowment. And as to this, 'tis much diſputed among the Schoolmen, whether it were natural, or ſupernatural. I ſhall only lay down in few words, what I conceive to be cleare and indiſputable.
1. If by natural, you mean eſsential (whether conſtitutively, or conſecutively) ſo Original righteouſneſſe was not natural to man, for then he could never nave loſt it, without the loſs of his being.
2. If by natural you mean connatural, i. e. concreate with the nature of man, and conſonant thereto, ſo I doubt not but it was natural to him.
Prop. 6 6. This rectitude of mans nature, could not but infer and include his actual bleſſedneſſe, while he ſhould act according to it.
According to the tenour of the Covenant, it could not but infer it. And conſider this rectitude in it ſelf, it muſt needs include it: The rectitude of his underſtanding including his knowledge of the higheſt good; and the rectitude of his will and affections, the acceptance and enjoyment thereof;Aug. de civitate Dei. as Auguſtine in this caſe, nullum bonum abeſset homini quod recta voluntas optare poſſet, &c.
Thus far of the holineſſe and bleſſedneſſe of mans firſt ſtate. It follows to ſpeak of the mutability of it, and of his fall as depending thereon.
Doctrine 2 2. That mans defection from his Primitive ſtate, was mearly voluntary, and from the unconſtrained choice of his own mutable and ſelf-determining will.
For the aſſerting of this truth, take the following Propoſitions.
Prop. 1 1. That the nature of man is now become univerſally depraved and ſinful.
This Scripture is ful of*1 Kings 8.46. Pſal. 14.1. Rom. 3.12. — &c. cap. 5.12, 13, &c. 1 John 5.19. &c., and experience and common obſervation puts it beyond diſpute.
'Tis left then, that ſinne muſt have had ſome Original among men.
Prop. 2 2. The pure and holy nature of God could never be the Original of mans ſin.
This is evident in it ſelf. God diſclaims it, nor can any affirm it of him without denying his very being. He could not be the cauſe of u…holi…eſſe, but by ceaſing to be holy, which would ſuppoſe him mutably holy; and if either God or man muſt be confeſſed mutable, 'tis no difficulty where to lay it; whatever he is, he is eſſentially; and neceſſity of exiſtence of being always what he is,James 1.17. remains everlaſtingly the fundamental attribute of his being.
Prop. 3 3. 'Tis blaſphemous and abſurd to talk of two principles, (as the Manichees of old) the one good per ſe, and the cauſe of all good; the other evil per ſe, and the cauſe of all evil.
Bradwardine de cauſa Dei.Bradwardines two Arguments: 1. That this would ſuppoſe two Gods, two Independent beings; 2. That it would ſuppoſe an evil God; do ſufficiently convince this to be full both of blaſphemy and contradiction.
Prop. 4 4. It was not poſſible that either external objects, or the temptation of the Divel ſhould neceſſitate the will of man to ſinne.
External objects could not; for that were to reject all upon God; for if he create objects with ſuch an allective power in them, and create ſuch an appetite in man as cannot but work inordinately and ſinfully towards thoſe objects, it muſt needs inferre his efficacious neceſſitation of ſinne, being it would deſtroy the truth already eſtabliſhed, that God created man with ſuch a rectitude as that there was a ſufficient ability in his Superiour powers for the cohibition and reſtraint of the Inferiour, that they ſhould not work inordinately towards their objects. The Divel could not do it for the ſame reaſon, having no way to move the will of man but by the propoſal of objects; yet that by this means (which he could in many reſpects manage moſt advantagiouſly) he did much help forward the firſt ſinne, Scripture leaves us not to doubt.
Prop. 5 5. The whole nature of ſinne conſiſting only in a defect, no other cauſe need be deſigned of it than a defective; i. e. an underſtanding, will and Inferiour powers however originally good, yet mutably and defectively ſo.
I ſhall not inſiſt to prove that ſinne is no poſitive bang; but I take the Argument to be irrefragable, (notwithſtanding the Cavils made againſt it) that is drawn from that common Maxime,foreign. Dion. de Div. nom. that omne ens poſitivum eſt vel primum, vel à primo. And that of Dionyſius the Areopagite is an ingenuous one; he argues that no being can be evil per ſe; for then it muſt be immutably, to which no evill can be, for to be alwayes the ſame, is a certain property of goodneſſe; 'tis ſo even of the higheſt goodneſſe.
And hence ſinne being ſuppoſed only a defect, a ſoul that is only defectibly holy, might well enough be the cauſe of it; i. e. the deficient cauſe.
Nor is it in the leaſt ſtranage that man ſhould be at firſt created with a defectible holineſſe; for if he were immutably holy, either it muſt be ex naturâ, or ex gratiâ; ex naturâ it could not be, for that would ſuppoſe him God; if it were ex gratiâ, then it muſt be free; then it might be, or might not be; therefore there was no incongruity in it that it ſhould not be. And indeed it was moſt congruous that God having newly made ſuch a creature, furniſhed with ſuch powers, ſo capable of government by a Law, of being moved by promiſes and threats, he ſhould for ſome time hold him as a viator, in a ſtate of tryal unconfirmed, (as he did alſo the innocent Angels) that it might be ſeen how he would behave himſelf towards his Maker, and that he ſhould be rewardable and puniſhable accordingly, in a ſtate that ſhould be everlaſting and unchangeable: The liberty therefore of the Viators and the Comprehenſors Gibieuf well diſtinguiſhes into inchoata or conſummabilis, Gibieuf de libertate Dei & creatur. aeand perfecta or conſummata; the former ſuch as Adams was at his Creation; the latter ſuch as is the ſtate of Angels and Saints in glory; and as his would have been had he held out and perſiſted innocent through the intended time of tryal.
It was therefore no ſtrange thing that man ſhould be created defectible; 'twas as little ſtrange that a defectible creature ſhould deficere.
For the manner of that defection, (whether errour of the underſtanding preceded, or inconſideration only, and a neglect of its office) with the great difficulties ſome imagine herein, I wave diſcourſe about them; judging that advice good and ſober, for to conſider how ſinne may be gotten out of the world, then how it came in. Though 'tis moſt probable there was in the inſtant of temptation a meere ſuſpenſion of the underſtandings act, (not as previous to the ſinne, but as a part of it) and thereupon a ſudden precipitation of will,Estius in ſcil. as Eſtius doth well determine.
6. Man being created mutable as to his holineſſe, muſt needs be ſo as to his happineſſe too.
And that both upon a legal account, (for the Law had determined that if he did ſinne he muſt dye) and alſo upon a natural; for it was not poſſible that his ſoul being once depraved by ſinne, the powers of it vitiated, their order each to other, and towards their objects broken and interrupted, there ſhould remaine a diſpoſition and aptitude to converſe with the higheſt good.
The Uſe follows which ſhall be only in certain practical Inferences that will iſſue from theſe truths, partly conſidered ſingly and ſeverally; partly together and in conjunction.
From the firſt.
1. Did God create man upright as hath been ſhewn, then how little reaſon had man to ſinne? how little reaſon had he to deſert God? to be weary of his firſt eſtate; Could Gods making him, his making him upright, be a reaſon why he ſhould ſinne againſt him? was his directing his heart, and the natural courſe of his affections towards himſelf, a reaſon why he ſhould forſake him? what was there in his ſtate that ſhould make it grievous to him? was his duty too much for him? God made him upright, ſo that every part of it was connatural to him; was his priviledge too little? he knew and loved, and enjoyed the higheſt and infinite good. O think then how unreaſonable and diſingenuous a thing ſin was! that a creature that was nothing but a few houres ago, now a reaſonable being, capable of God! yet ſin! Urge your hearts with this, we are too apt to think our ſelves unconcerned in Adams ſin; we look upon our ſelves too abſtractly, we ſhould remember we are Members of a Community, and it ſhould be grievous to us to think that our species hath dealt ſo unkindly and unworthily with God; and beſides, do not we ſinne daily after the ſimilitude of Adams tranſgreſſion? and is not ſin as unreaſonable and unjuſt a thing as ever?
2. Was our primitive ſtate ſo good and happy, how juſtly may we reflect and look back towards our firſt ſtate? how fitly might we take up Jobs words?Job 29.2, 4, 5, 14, 20. O that I were as in months paſt; — As in the dayes of my youth; — When the Almighty was yet with me; — When I put on righteouſneſſe and it cloathed me; — When my glory was freſh in me, &c. With what ſadneſſe may we call to minde the things that are paſt, and the beginnings of Ancient time? when there was no ſtain upon our natures, no cloud upon our minds, no pollution upon our hearts; when with pure and undefiled ſouls we could embrace and reſt, and rejoyce in the eternal and incomprehenſible good? when we remember theſe things, do not our bowels turn? are not our ſouls poured out within us?
From the ſecond.
1. Did man ſo voluntarily ruine himſelf? how unlikely is he now to be his own ſaviour? he that was a ſelf-deſtroyer from the beginning, that ruined himſelf as ſoon as God had made him, is he likely now to ſave himſelf? is it eaſier for him to recover his ſtation than to have kept it? or hath he improved himſelf by ſinning? and gain'd ſtrength by his fall for a more difficult undertaking; is he grown better natur'd towards himſelf and his God, than he was at firſt?
2. How little reaſon hath he to blame God, though he finally periſh? what would he have had God to have done more to prevent it? he gave his Law to direct him, his threatning to warn him; his promiſe for his encouragement was evidently implyed; his nature was ſufficiently diſpoſed to improve and comport with all theſe; yet he ſins! is God to be charg'd with this? ſins upon no neceſſity, with no pretence; but that he muſt be ſeeking out inventions, trying experiments, aſſaying to better his ſtate, as plainly deſpiſing the Law, ſuſpecting the truth, envying the greatneſſe, aſſerting and aſpiring to the Soveraignty and Godhead of his Maker. Had we (any of us) a minde to contend with God about this matter, how would we order our cauſe? how would we ſtate our quarrel? if we complain that we ſhould be condemn'd and ruin'd all in one man; that is to complain that we are Adams children. A childe might as well complain that he is the ſonne of a Beggar or a Traytor, and charge it as injuſtice upon the Prince or Law of the Land that he is not born to a Patrimony; this is a miſery to him, but no man will ſay it is a wrong. And can it be ſaid we are wrong'd by the common Ruler of the world, that we do not inherit from our father, the righteouſneſſe and felicity we had wilfully loſt long before we were his children? If we think it hard, we ſhould be tyed to termes we never conſented to: Might not an heire as well quarrel with the Magiſtrate, that he ſuffers him to become liable to his fathers debts? and to lie in priſon if he have not to pay?
But beſides, who can imagine but we ſhould have conſented, had all man-kind been at that time exiſtent in innocency together? i. e. Let the caſe be ſtated thus; ſuppoſe Adam our common Parent, to have had all his children together with him before the Lord, while the Covenant of Works was not as yet made, and while as yet God was not under any engagment to the children of men: Let it be ſuppoſed, that he did propound it to the whole race of man-kind together, that he would capitulate with their common Parent on their behalf, according to the termes of that firſt Covenant; if he ſtood they ſhould ſtand, if he fall, they muſt all fall with him. Let it be conſidered, that if this had not been conſented to, God might (without the leaſt colour of exception, being as yet under no engagement to the contrary) have annihilated the whole ſpecies; for wherein can it ſeem hard, that what was nothing but the laſt moment, ſhould the next moment be ſuffered to relapſe into nothing again? Let it alſo be conſidered, that Adams own perſonal intereſt, and a mighty natural affectton towards ſo vaſt a progeny, might well be thought certainly to engage him to the uttermoſt care and circumſpection on his own and their behalf. It muſt alſo be remembred, that all being now in perfect innocency, no defect of reaſon, no frowardneſſe or perverſeneſſe of will can be ſuppoſed in any, to hinder their right judgement, and choice of what might appear to be moſt for their own advantage, and the glory of their Maker.
Can it now poſſibly be thought (the caſe being thus ſtated) that any man ſhould rather chuſe preſently to loſe his being, and the pleaſures, and hopes of ſuch a ſtate, than to have conſented to ſuch termes? It cannot be thought.
For conſider the utmoſt that might be objected; and ſuppoſe one thus to reaſon the matter with himſelf; Why? 'tis a mighty hazard forme to ſuſpend my everlaſting happineſſe or miſery upon the uncertain determinations of another mans mutable will; ſhall I truſt my eternal concernments to ſuch a Peradventure, and put my life and hopes into the hands of a fellow-creature?
It were obvious to him to anſwer himſelf, I but he is my father; he bears a natural affection to me, his own concernment is included, he hath power over his own will, his obedience for us all, will be no more difficult than each mans for himſelf; there is nothing required of him, but what his nature inclines him to, and what his reaſon (if he uſe it) will guide him to comply with; and though the hazard of an eternal miſery be greatly tremendous; yet are not the hopes of an everlaſting bleſſedneſſe as greatly conſolatory and encouraging? and beſides, the hazard will be but for a time, which if we paſſe ſafely, we ſhall ſhortly receive a full and glorious confirmation and advancement. Certainly no reaſonable man, all this conſidered (though there had been no mention made of a means of recovery in caſe of falling, the conſideration whereof is yet alſo to be taken in by us) would have refuſed to conſent; and then what reaſonable man but will confeſſe this to be a meer cavil, that we did not perſonally conſent; for if it be certain we ſhould have conſented, and our own hearts tell us we ſhould, doth the power of a Creatour over his creatures, ſignifie ſo little that he might not take this for an actual conſent? for is it not all one, whether you did conſent, or certainly would have done it, if you had been treated with? Covenants betwixt Superiours and Inferiours, differ much from thoſe betwixt equals; for they are Laws as well as Covenants, and therefore do ſuppoſe conſent (the termes being in ſe reaſonable) as that which not only our intereſt, but duty would oblige us to. 'Tis not the ſame thing to Covenant with the great God, and with a fellow-creature. Gods preſcience of the event (beſides that no man knows what it is, yet) whatever it is, 'tis wholly immanent in himſelf (as alſo his decrees) therefore could have no influence into the event, or be any cauſe of it; all depended, as hath been ſhewn, on mans own will; and therefore if God did fore-ſee that man would fall, yet he knew alſo, that if he would he might ſtand.
From both jointly.
1. Were we once ſo happy? and have we now undone our ſelves? how acceptable ſhould this render the means of our recovery to us? That 'tis a recovery we are to endeavour (which implies the former truth) that ſuppoſes us once happy, who would not be taken with ſuch an overture for the regaining of an happineſſe, which he hath loſt and faln from; 'tis a double miſery to become from an happy eſtate miſerable; 'tis yet as a double happineſſe to become happy from ſuch miſery; and proportionably valuable ſhould all meanes appeare to us that tend thereto. Yea, and 'tis a recovery after ſelf-deſtruction (which aſſerts the former truth) ſuch a deſtruction as might reduce us to an utter deſpaire of remedies, as rendering us incapable to help our ſelves, or to expect help or pity from others. O how welcome ſhould the tydings of deliverance now be to us!Rom. 3 24, &c. 1 Cor. 1.30, 31 Eph. 1.6, 7. Tit. 2.11.—14 how joyful an entertainment ſhould our hearts give them upon both theſe accounts? how greatly doth Scripture command the love and grace of Chriſt under the notion of Redeeming? a word that doth not ſignifie deliverance from ſimple miſery only, but alſo connote a precedent better ſtate as they expound it, who take the phraſe as Scripture uſes it, to allude to the buying out of Captives from their bondage. And how ſhould it raviſh the heart of any man to have mercy and help offered him by another hand, who hath periſhed by his own? how taking ſhould Goſpel-grace be upon this account? how ſhould this conſideration engage ſouls to value and embrace it? 'tis urged (we ſee) to that purpoſe Hoſea 13.9. O Iſrael, thou haſt deſtroyed thy ſelf, but in me is thy help; and verſe 10. it follows, I will be thy King; where is any other that will ſave thee, &c. And chap. 14.1. O Iſrael, return unto the Lord, for thou hast fallen by thine iniquity. Now (friends) do but ſeriouſly conſider this. If you believe the truths you have heard, how precious ſhould Chriſt be to you? how precious ſhould the Goſpel, the Ordinances, and Miniſtry of it be? Do you complain that formerly you were not treated with? by all theſe God now treats with you. Now your own perſonal conſent is called for; not to any thing that hath the leaſt of hazard in it, but what ſhall make you certainly happy, as miſerable as you have made your ſelves; and there's nothing but your conſent wanting; the price of your Redemption is already paid; 'tis but taking Chriſt for your Saviour and your Lord, and living a life of dependance and holineſſe for a few dayes, and you are as ſafe as if you were in glory; will you now ſtick at this? O do not deſtroy your ſelves a ſecond time, and make your ſelves doubly guilty of your own ruine.
2. Was our ſtate ſo good, but mutable? what cauſe have we to admire the grace of God through Chriſt, that whom it recovers, it confirmes? It was a bleſſed ſtate, that by our own free will we fell from; but how much better (even upon this account) is this, which by Gods free grace, we are invited and recalled to?