The Catholic Hierarchy, Chapter 17
CHAP. XVII. Of the Limits of Magiſtratical Power in matters of Religion.
§ 1. THe third Enquiry propounded, is concerning the true bounds and limits of the Magiſtrates power in matters of Religion; a great and difficult Queſtion, but of very great concern to us that it be rightly reſolved. I do not expect to be ſo happy as to give others full ſatisfaction in it, I being not able to do it to my ſelf ſo far as I would; I ſhall onelyonly go as far as I can, and is convenient for this undertaking, with all poſſible brevity and demonſtration.
We ſpake before in the two former Queſtions concerning the Magiſtrates power in matters of Indifferency, both Legiſlative and Executive, on the behalf of the Church. This Queſtion is of larger extent concerning his whole power in matters of Religion, and enquire how far he may and ought to go, and how far he may not go, i. e. he cannot go without Uſurpation.
§ 2. Matters of Religion is a large word, and it comprehends not onelyonly Religion it ſelf, but all circumſtances and attendances thereof; which are Indifferencies in themſelves, neither moraly good or evil; but in regard of their tendency and reſpect, they are ſo. Concerning the Magiſtrates Legiſlative power in theſe things, we have ſpoken ſomewhat already.
I ſhall ſpeak no more here of the nature of Religion, than to make way for my preſent Undertaking. Religion is uſually underſtood to comprehend all moral Duties and all inſtituted Worſhip; to which if we adde the aforeſaid attending circumſtances, we uſe a larger way of expreſſion, and call them matters of Religion.
§ 3. The Moral Law is a general ſtanding Rule to all ſorts of Actions, Perſons, and Societies of the children of men, whereby God himſelf hath challenged the firſt right of dominion; as of particular men, ſo of all neceſſary Fabricks of Rule and Government in the world: So that all Actions, Perſons, and Societies, duely meaſured and ſquared thereby, are rightly called Religious, and the contrary Irreligious. Hence particular, Domeſtick, Eccleſiaſtick, and Civil Juriſdictions in a Chriſtian Commonwealth, are in proper ſence called all of them Religious.
§ 4. Religion, taken in a ſtricter and more limited ſence, is underſtood of a holy life and converſation of particular Perſons and Societies, not onelyonly according to the general Rules of moral Obedience, but according to the more, particular and ſpecial appointments and Goſpel-inſtitutions of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, whereby he ſeparates unto himſelf the moſt choice and peculiar Societies in the world, under his proper and more immediate Rule and Government, which are called his Church.
§ 5. Therefore, 1. The civil Chriſtian Magiſtrate hath no power (in the ſtrict ſence) in matters of Religion, quatenus Magiſtrate, no more than a Heathen hath: for though the embracing the Chriſtian Religion doth much capacitate the civil Magiſtrate, as to his inclinations and endeavours for the improvement of his Magiſtratical power toward the advantage of Religion; yet it adds no new power or juriſdiction to him over Churches, Families, Chriſtians, or others: for a Heathen Magiſtrate is as much in his place the ſupream Head and Governmnour of the Church (conſidered in a civil capacity under his Government) as the moſt Faith-defending Chriſtian, or Catholick Prince in the world: Neither by his embracing Chriſtianity doth he attain any augmentation of his Magiſtratical Power, Headſhip, or Supremacy. A Chriſtian is no more bound, as a Subject, by the Rules of the Goſpel, to a Chriſtian Magiſtrate, than to a Heathen or Heretical Magiſtrate. The Rules are indefinite to a Magiſtrate as ſuch, though a Chriſtian Subject will be the better man and Subject, and a Chriſtian Magiſtrate the better man and Magiſtrate; Chriſtianity making every one the better man, and better qualified for the performance of the relative Duty of his place that he is ſet in.
§ 6. Secondly, No civil Magiſtrate can be an Eccleſiaſtical Head and Governour of the Church, as ſuch: It's Chriſt's Prerogative to be the Supream, and to conſtitute what other Heads and Governours he in his wiſdom thinks beſt. But I finde not that he ever made any Magiſtrate a conſtitutive Eccleſiaſtical Head or Governour to his Church virtute Officii: for if ſo, in every Chriſtian Dominion the Prince ſhould be the Metropolitan and the true Paſtor to that National Church.
§ 7. Thirdly, No civil Magiſtrate can by virtue of any authority granted by Chriſt, challenge to himſelf a Legiſtative power in religious matters touching Faith or Worſhip: he cannot null or diſpenſe with one of the Laws of Jeſus Chriſt; neither may he make any new Laws to binde us to believe any thing more concerning God, than is manifeſtly by his Word revealed; or binde us to practice any alteration or addition in the Worſhip of God, more than what Chriſt himſelf hath enacted. This we have ſufficiently proved in handling the Doctrine of Indifferency.
§ 8. Fourthly, No civil Magiſtrate can by any deputation from Chriſt, claim an Executive power of the Political Laws of Chriſt in his Church: for as Chriſt hath his own proper Laws in his Church, his militant Kingdom, diſtinct from other Laws for the right and exact Goſpel-management of all his Political affairs therein, and is more faithful than Moſes in that very reſpect; ſo he hath ſet in his Church his own Miniſters and Officers, diſtinct from all other ſorts of Officers and Miniſters in the world: As Chriſt's Miniſters are no civil Magiſtrates as ſuch, ſo no civil Magiſtrate is a Church-Miniſter as ſuch. Hence, as a civil Magiſtrate hath no power to execute Chriſt's Political Laws or Inſtitutions in his Church; ſo he hath no power to execute any moral Laws in the Church, i. e. he cannot puniſh a criminal offence by Eccleſiaſtical cenſures. The moral Law runs through all Societies, as the natural fundamental Rule to diſcern Good and Evil; and Political Laws of all ſorts ſhould mainly reſpect it as the Standard and Magna Charta of all Laws and Juſtice which in reſpect of it are derivative; though every particular Polity hath its own proper way and manner of diſtribution of moral Juſtice; The civil State by a civil political Adminiſtration and Magiſtracy; Families Oeconomically, by the Heads thereof; the Churches Eccleſiaſtically, by its Paſtors and other Officers; all endeavouring by their diſtinct way and manner of Adminiſtration, to ſecure the honour and juſtice of the Moral Law: but none of theſe are to intermix their governments and political way of diſtribution, ſeeing the God of Order hath fixed each one to his proper ſtation and limit of juriſdiction. Hence the civil State can no more puniſh the breach of moral Laws Eccleſiaſtically, than the Church can puniſh them civilly; and the Church can no more uſe the Magiſtrates Sword, than the Magiſtrate can the Churches, and vice verſa; neither can the Church or civil State puniſh the breaches of the moral Law Oeconomically, any more than a Maſter of a Family, as ſuch, can puniſh them Eccleſiaſtically or Civilly, and upon that account may take upon him to be Magiſtrate or Paſtor. And though there was a mixture or rather conjunction of theſe Authorities in the ſame perſon, in the infancy of Polities, yet they have been ſeparated in diſtinct perſons by God himſelf for many Ages; neither do any perſons bearing diſtinct Offices, make the Offices the ſame, or neceſſarily mingle them in the performance of their ſeveral Functions.
§ 9. Fifthly, It is not in the power of the civil Magiſtrate or any humane Laws, to binde or looſe Conſcience. As Magiſtrates cannot reach it directly to charge it with either duty or guilt, ſo it's the greateſt piece of Tyranny to attempt it by Penal Laws; whereby Chriſtians may be drawn in, to enſnare their Conſciences in guilt, by ſinning againſt God for fear of Man, and a Chriſtian is to obey the juſt Laws of man for Conſcience ſake, i. e. for the Lords ſake. It is extrinſick to the Laws of men, to binde Conſcience; it's God that by his authority gives them a mediate Sanction, and binds them on Conſcience; but where God lends not to humane Laws his binding power, they are of no more force unto Conſcience, than Withs to binde Sampſon. It's not the wit or ſtrength of all Men and Angels that can binde one Conſcience under guilt, without a Law of God, or divine authority to give force to humane: their Penal Laws, i.e. corporal Puniſhments or pecuniary Mulcts, are very indirect and vain Mediums to enforce Conſcience, and very ſinfully applied by Magiſtrates or others for that end, in matters of Faith or Worſhip.
§ 10. Sixthly, That the ſupream Magiſtrate hath not the determination of Cauſes meenly Eceleſiaſtical; and theſe are of two ſorts, either controverted Doctrinals, or Cauſes diſciplinary controverted: for by Cauſes are to be underſtood here, things under diſpute (and they controverted Doctrinals) or under debate (and they controverted Cauſes diſciplinary;) and thoſe Eccleſiaſtical things which are of this nature, fall under one of theſe heads, Doctrinal or Diſciplinary. Firſt, In doctrinal Cauſes controverted, the Magiſtrate is not appointed by Chriſt as Judge, neither is he a competent Judge. 1. If he be quatenus a Magiſtrate, then every Magiſtrate is a competent Judge, and then a Heathen, Mahometan, or Heretical Magiſtrate; and then you'll ſay the determination muſt needs be very ſound and good. 2. Again, how few Chriſtian Magiſtrates are ſtudied enough in Polemical Divinity (being not bred to that learning, or having ſo many recreations and ſecular concerns to divert them from it) ſo as to be fit to have the ultimate determination of the moſt difficult and weighty points, that learned Scholars in Divinity, yea, ſuch as are ſtudious and conſcientious Chriſtians, after long ſtudy, ſcrutiny, and prayer, cannot attain to a right underſtanding of, ſo as to demonſtrate the truth to the full and clear ſatisfaction of themſelves or others? Is it fit to make an Aſſembly of Divines, Judges of a great and difficult caſe in Law? There is the ſame reaſon for one as for the other. 3. What determination a Magiſtrate makes dogmatically, it's ſimpliciter but his private Judgment and Opinion, though he be a publick perſon: And why ſhould any mans private opinion (be he what he will in the world) be a binding Rule to the Faith of another in matters of Religion? 4. It's impoſſible that it ſhould be ſo; for man cannot make a Law to bound Faith in ſuch things as are not founded on the light of Underſtanding; and where they are ſo founded, no man believes becauſe of the Law of man, but becauſe of the evidence of Truth. What Law can make any man believe that two and three make ſix? but if it be, that we muſt believe that three and three make ſix, we do believe it; but not becauſe of the Penal Law, but becauſe of the evidence the Truth carries with it: Non lex penalis, ſed veritas eſt ratio formalis fidei. 5. The Faith of a Chriſtian, or the Underſtanding of a Rational man, can no more reſt in the opinion or determination of a Chriſtian Magiſtrate, without a ſufficient light of Truth to convince him, than in the opinion and determination of another man: for he that tenders the honour of God, and loves Truth, cannot receive that which he is convinced of (or at leaſt ſuſpects in his moſt ſerious judgment) to be contrary to the truth of the Word of God. 6. The Magiſtrate cannot be conteded to be ſuch a Judge, nor is uſeful as ſuch, unleſs he may be acknowledged to be infallible. A ſupream Judge in our ſence, and that which muſt be here underſtood, is one into whoſe judgment our Faith hath its laſt and utmoſt reſolution; but we cannot acquieſce in a humane fallible determination. And beſides, what Prerogative hath the Magiſtrates judgment above another mans? and what eaſe and advantage is it to us, if our minds lie open to doubt as much after as before the determination? No Chriſtians minde can reſt ſatisfied in a humane fallible opinion of divine things; the authority cauſing Belief, muſt have the ſame original that the Revelation hath: therefore Faith built upon a Teſtimony, muſt be onelyonly on his own fidelity as one infallible; as we believe that Truth alſo which carries its own Evidence with it axiomatically delivered, or evinceth it ſelf from the light of another Truth dianoetically.
§ 11. The ſecond Caſe conſiſts in Cauſes diſciplinarily debated, being Differences ariſing within one particular Church, or between Church and Church, or between Paſtors and Churches, &c. All Cauſes uſually handled and determined in Eccleſiaſtical Courts. The Queſtion is, Whether the civil Magiſtrate be the ſupream Judge, or Head and Governour? By Cauſes Eccleſiaſtick, are without doubt meant in the Oath of Supremacy, all diſciplinary Cauſes handled in Spiritual Courts, the ſupream Head and Governor whereof was the Pope; in whoſe name and authority thoſe Courts were called and managed, and to whom it was lawful for any grieved party to appeal, before the reign of King Henry the 8th; who by the Oath of Supremacy cut off the Popes Supremacy, and eſtabliſhed his own. Now I thus reſolve, as followeth.
§ 12. If Eccleſiaſtical or Spiritual Courts be not jure divino, nor held jure divino (Epiſcopacy as it's ſetled in the Hierarchy, and all its Offices and Appurtenances, being onelyonly a humane politick device, as hath been abundantly by the Oppoſers thereof proved, and by many of the Aſſerter; and Defenders confeſſed;) then, I ſay, it's fitter that man ſhould be ſupream Head there; and if any man, the ſupream civil Magiſtrate, within whoſe Realm or Dominion their Courts and Cauſes Eccleſiaſtical be. The nature of this Supremacy is or ſhould be, that 1. That all Eccleſiaſtical Courts be called and kept in the Kings Magiſties name. 2. That the Sentence denounced ſhould be alſo grounded on ſome penal Law of the King; for all the Kings Courts ſhould judge by his Laws. 3. That any party grieved may appeal to a ſuperiour Court of the Kings, or to himſelf, from whom there is no Appeal. 4. That the King hath power by himſelf or Judges, to prohibit or ſuperſede the proceedings of the ſaid Court at his pleaſure. This is the true ſence of the Oath of Supremacy, which the Biſhops, notwithſtanding all the noiſe they make againſt Diſſenters from their Church, will leaſt ſubſcribe unto; whereas moſt others of the Kings Subjects that refuſe to own the divine right of Epiſcopal government, will willingly ſwear the Kings Supremacy in their Eccleſiaſtical Courts and Cauſes in the largeſt extent. And though that ſort of ruling men uſe all endeavours to ſuggeſt the diſloyalty of the ſaid Diſſenters, yet I doubt not but moſt Puritans in England would rather refer themſelves to the Kings judgment, and ſtand or fall at his Tribunal, than at the Churches; and have generally found more relief from under the ſeverities of Excommunication in the Kings Courts, than in the Eccleſiaſtical. Suppoſing that all Eccleſiaſtical proceedings in Spiritual Courts of Judicature, and the whole Fabrick of Church-government, as now it ſtands, is a humane Polity, as is not denied by the moſt ingenious, I know not why any Puritan or Papiſt ſhould refuſe for to take the Oath of Supremacy, for it is no more than to acknowledge the King to be ſupream Head and Governour in his own Courts; which is but Reaſon, Juſtice, and Religion, that he ſhould be.
§ 13. But if Eccleſiaſtical Cauſes be underſtood of diſciplinary Controverſies, ſuch as follow upon the execution of Laws, and adminiſtration of the Inſtitutions of the Lord Jeſus in the viſible Goſpel-churches; of ſuch Eccleſiaſtical Cauſes it is not the Magiſtrates part to be the determinating Judge of: for, 1. To judge and determine a Cauſe in the Church of Chriſt, is to judge Eccleſiaſtically; and ſuch an act of Judicature is a Church-act, which is always preceded by a Church-Officer, and no other, in foro Eccleſiae; and if the agrieved party appeal, it muſt be to an Officer of the ſame kind, it's not to an Officer of another State. 2. He that is ſupream Judge of a Church-cauſe on Earth, muſt be an Officer ſubſtituted by Chriſt; for none can hold any Place or Office in the Church, but by Subrogation from Chriſt, much leſs the higheſt Authority: but none can ſhew that Chriſt hath ſubſtituted the Magiſtrate his Church-Vicar on Earth. 3. If the civil Magiſtrate be ſupream Head to the Church Eccleſiaſtically, then, becauſe he was always ſo ſince Chriſt was on Earth, then there was times when Heathen Magiſtrates, in whoſe juriſdiction the Churches was, were his Vicars: and Chriſt himſelf, when on Earth, was ſubject Eccleſiaſtically, though Head of his Church, to Heathen Church-Officers; for he was no civil Magiſtrate, diſclaim'd it, nor could be appeal'd unto as ſuch. 4. If the civil Magiſtrate be ſupream Judge, he is the ſupream Church-Officer; for he cannot be denied to be an Officer of that ſtate wherein he doth acts of Judicature as his right: And if a Church-Officer, then the civil State hath power to chuſe and conſtitute a Church-Officer, and that of the higheſt rank; for if he become a Church-Officer, his Calling and Conſtitution muſt needs be Civil, and not Eccleſiaſtical: So that the civil State hath the power of Peter's Keys both to diſpoſe of them and give them to whom ſhe will, and the Church cannot be entruſted with them; they muſt ſtill be kept in the Magiſtrates pocket. Hence it will follow, that Chriſt hath not left power enough in the Church for the management of its own political affairs, nor wiſdom enough for the determining her own Controverſies.
§ 14. Seventhly, No civil Magiſtrate can impoſſe Articles of Faith on any of his Subjects, to be owned, ſubſcribed, or ſworn to by a Penal Law: for quatenus a Magiſtrate he is not an univerſal competent Judge; for it's not neceſſary that he ſhould be religious, underſtanding, found in his principles, becauſe he is a Magiſtrate. 1. If he can do it as a Church-Officer, we have ſhewed that Chriſt hath made no ſuch Officers in his Church. 2. If he were, Chriſt never empowered any Church-Officer to uſe a Magiſtratical Sword; he never put Temporal Crowns on their heads, nor Scepters into their hands: if any of them, out of ambition, have got Miters and Croſier Staffs, they had them from Antichriſt, and not from Chriſt. 3. He never ordained that force of Arms and Penal Laws ſhould be the way of propagating his Faith. 4. Forced Faith is neither pleaſing to Chriſt, nor profitable to us; for indeed it's no Faith at all. A force may lay hold of the Outward man, but it cannot make the Underſtanding to believe that which it ſees no reaſon for to believe, no more than the Senſes in the natural ſtate can be forced to own things to be contrary Objects; as the Eye to own white to be black, the Taſte to own that for ſweet which is bitter, &c.
§ 15. Eighthly, No civil Magiſtrate can impoſe a form of the Worſhip of God by a Penal Law. 1. Becauſe he cannot receive into the Church nor caſt out of it at his pleaſure. 2. If he could, then the Subjects form of Worſhip muſt be ſuch as the Magiſtrates; for if it be juſtifiable in one Magiſtrate to enforce his Subjects to a form of divine Worſhip, becauſe he thinks it beſt, then it's juſtifiable in another: If the Epiſcopal Magiſtrate may jure enforce his form of divine Worſhip, then the Popiſh Magiſtrate may enforce his form, and the Presbyterian Magiſtrate his form, and an Anabaptiſt his form, and every form muſt become lawful and neceſſary to be practiſed, becauſe the civil Magiſtrate commands it: for we muſt not ſuppoſe any one Magiſtrate, as ſuch, to be more infallible than another; and ſo upon every change of the ſupream Magiſtrate of a differing Perſwaſion, the Peace and Conſciences of the moſt religious people muſt be wracked and torn in pieces. Again, it's the moſt irrational thing in the world to force a man to ſerve his God in ſuch a way as he conſcientiouſly judgeth or ſuppoſeth to be diſpleaſing unto him. Likewiſe if the form of Worſhip impoſed by the Magiſtrate be pleaſing to Chriſt, his impoſition cannot, becauſe there cannot be a readier way to the prophanation of the holieſt things, than to force them to come to them that are not onelyonly wicked and prophane in their lives, and corrupt in their hearts, but ſuch as are profeſſed Enemies unto them, and would have nothing to do with them, but to ſave themſelves from the ſmart of Penal Laws; and the beſt of ſuch perſons that make a more plauſible compliance, can be no Better than Hypocrites, that the Law being removed, their Religion would be diſſolved.
§ 16. Ninthly, As the civil Magiſtrate cannot enforce his Subjects to Particular forms of real or ſuppoſed inſtituted Worſhip, ſo he cannot enforce them to poſitive acts of moral divine Worſhip. As 1. We finde no Precept or Example for forcing a poor Pagan to the Worſhip of the true God; and for whipping, impriſoning, or any other way afflicting his carcaſe by a Penal Law, becauſe of his not worſhipping the true God. To puniſh a poor Jew till he would acknowledge Chriſt and worſhip him, would ſeem hard. 2. And among ſuch as do own the true God, the Magiſtrate cannot, puniſh omiſſions or refuſals of acts of poſitive Worſhip. As for inſtance in Prayer, the Magiſtrate cannot enforce a man to pray to his God, and puniſh him for not doing it. Theſe are things, though ſins, and that of the higheſt rank, yet ſuch as God intended the Sword of civil Juſtice ſhould never reach. There is in every Command of God a prohibiting and preſcribing part: The ſins againſt the prohibiting part, is the doing ſome act forbidden by the Moral Law; and here uſually is the place for the execution of a Penalty by the hands of humane Juſtice. Puniſhable ſins by man are commonly acts of Commiſſion, and ſuch acts muſt be apparent, not ſecret, brought before the Judge per allegata & probata; and they are uſually criminal direct breaches, not conſequential, dubious, and ſmall. I know there lies an Objection againſt this; which is, That a Father may correct a childe for not doing his command; and ſo a Maſter a ſervant. Anſw. It's granted, and ſo will God puniſh the children of men for all omiſſions of their duty: He that knew his maſters will and did it not, ſhould be beaten with many ſtripes. Then there is a great difference between the conſtitution of a State-government and of a Family-government: In a Family a Father, being a natural Relation, hath (ſo far as his power goes) a more Arbitrary way for the management of it, as he can correct his childe upon his mere ſuſpicions of evil in him, or refuſal of good, without poſitive proof; ſo for omiſſions in not doing his duty; and ſo for ſervants: the reaſon is, becauſe it's ſuppoſed children and ſervants are under tutorage as well as bare government, and therefore muſt be kept up to poſitive acts of duty, being under education of Parents and Maſters. But it's not ſo with Subjects; they are ſubjected to a Magiſtrate for another end, viz. in order to the maintaining the due execution of Commutative Juſtice, and in caſe of the failure thereof, of diſtributive; and all things are to be brought before the Magiſtrate by evidence, of matter of mere fact, and acceſſories thereunto. God hath not required that Laws ſhould be ſo diſtinct and expreſs in a Family, as in a State, the government of a Family being for the moſt part diſcretionary: if an eye be had chiefly to the general Rules of God's Word, though Omiſſions of ſome kind come under the cognizance of the Magiſtrate, it's principally in caſes of commutative Juſtice, when ſuch Omiſſions are injurious to our Neighbours right; but thoſe are not reckoned criminals.
§ 17. Having had ſome ſhort view of what we judge (upon good grounds) comes not under his inſpection as a Magiſtrate, we would conſider a little in the next place how far a Magiſtrate may go in uſing his Magiſtratick Sword in matters of Religion. We have ſhewed that matters of Religion, taken in a more limited ſence of Faith and inſtituted Worſhip in the Church of Chriſt, are not within the circumference of the Magiſtrates Penal Laws. But if we underſtand matters of Religion in a larger ſence, then we mean that all States and Societies of men ought in a Chriſtian Commonwealth to be religious, i. e. the Moral Rules of Juſtice ſhould be the foundation of all Juſtice adminiſtred in the Church, Civil State, and Family; and each of them ought to have a main reſpect to every branch of the Moral Law, and adjudge the breaches thereof to be ſin, and each Polity to puniſh it according to its merit, ſo far as is allowed by the Charter of Juriſdiction from the Lord Jeſus Chriſt. Exemp. gra. Suppoſe Theft be the ſin, the Parent can correct his child with the Rod, the Church puniſh him with a Cenſure, and the State by ſome Corporal Exemplary ſuffering. Though the Tranſgreſſion be the ſame, and juſtly puniſhable in all, yet the puniſhment is not of the ſame kinde, but various under the different Juriſdictions.
§ 18. We ſay then, if religious matters be underſtood of that moral goodneſs, fundamentally neceſſary to all actions becoming a Chriſtian Commonwealth, then ſo far the Chriſtian Magiſtrate hath power more or leſs, ſo far as may conduce to the due maintaining of the being or well-being of a Chriſtian State; and therefore is to be conſervator unriuſque Tabulae, he hath the conſervation of the ſecond Table committed to his care, that it may be a civil State; of the firſt, that it may be a Chriſtian State. And therefore as a Family is to preſerve the honour and juſtice of the Moral Law by an Oeconomick Sanction, and the Church by an Eccleſiaſtick, ſo the civil State by Civil Sanction; each according to their juſt derived Laws whereby they are reſpectively to govern, and diſtinctly to adminiſter.
§ 19. The great Queſtion here is, How far the Magiſtrates power extends in the making and execution of Penal Statutes? We have ſhewed that the Lord Jeſus hath not reſerved to himſelf ſo neer a propriety in the government of civil States, as of his Church; having taken it as his peculiar Prerogative to give Laws unto his Church: and preſides there as the only Legiſlator. But unto States he hath onelyonly given them the Magna Charta of the Moral Law, and hath allowed unto them a Legiſlative power in all matters concerning the various Exigences, and divers Requiſites, with attending Circumſtances in the due management of State-juriſdiction; ſo as the ſaid Laws are promoting of the common Peace and Juſtice of their Dominions, and deducible from and founded on the ſaid Rules of Diſtributive and Commutative Juſtice.
§ 20. The Laws of men that are juſt and reaſonable, may take place in all things conducing to the being and well-being of a Chriſtian Commonwealth, both as to the matters of the firſt and ſecond Table, ſo far as is neceſſary to the managing of it under the due qualifications of a civil State; and therefore may not onelyonly puniſh crimes committed againſt the ſecond Table, but ſuch as are againſt the firſt alſo. And there are theſe eſpecially that they are concerned in: 1. Blaſpheming of the true God, under which is comprehended common profane ſwearing, tranſgreſſion eſpecially of the third Command. 2. Worſhipping of falſe Gods; a ſin againſt the firſt Commandment. 3. Idolatry, or the worſhipping of God by Images; a ſin againſt the ſecond Commandment. 4. Prophanation of ſuch times as is by God appropriated to himſelf for publick Worſhip; a ſin againſt the fourth. So that theſe are palpable as to matter of fact, clear as to the nature of the offence, and of dangerous conſequences, tending to the eminent ruine and apparent danger of a civil State.
§ 21. In the concernments of the ſecond Table, God hath left the civil Magiſtrate more Arbitrary in making or executing civil Laws, as the neceſſity of the State doth require, laying the general Rules of Moral Juſtice, and the particular and relative benefit of the Commonwealth and Subject before his eyes. Now in the matters of the firſt Table (being the moral Rule of duty towards God) he onelyonly requires the Magiſtrate to puniſh and reſtrain thoſe Vices in this kind that are notorious, infectious, and peſtilent to a Chriſtian Commonwealth, in matters of natural Worſhip; reſerving inſtituted Worſhip, built fundamentally on the ſame precepts, to another manner of diſpenſation, wherein the civil Magiſtrate is not to intermeddle as ſuch, neither as to Legiſlation, nor Execution of Penalties, nor deligation of Officers.
§ 22. As Murthers, Rapines, Adulteries, Perjuries, &c. are deſtructive to Properties, Communities, and Relations, and ſo to all civility in a State where ſuch Vices predominate, and are not generally ſuppreſſed by Juſtice, it cannot be denominated a civil State, but rather a Pagan Salvage nation. So, where falſe Gods are multiplied and worſhipped, the true God is blaſphemed openly and notoriouſly, and all times for publick Worſhip of him by his own appointment, prophaned publickly and generally: And ſuch Vices not ſuppreſſed by Magiſtrates, ſuch a State cannot be called a Chriſtian civil State, but Heatheniſh, whatever moral Juſtice there is between man and man.
§ 23. Though all ſins be alike breaches of Gods Law, yet none but thoſe of a more groſs, external, and exemplary nature, fall under the cognizance of mans Juſtice. The Blaſphemy, Profaneneſs, and Concupiſcence of the heart, are not puniſhable by man; it muſt come to the Magiſtrate per allegata & probata, that ſuch an one blaſphemed God, worſhipped an Idol, prophaned the Name of God by ſwearing, &c. and that openly, either in contempt of that God that is worſhipped, or that Worſhip ſet up, or in order to the deluſion and ſeduction of others: for it would ſeem very hard to break into the private houſes or appartments of Idolaters that may dwell in the land, and proceed judicially againſt them for that Religion which they are peacibly retired to, without any endeavour to publiſh or prvpagate to the diſturbance of the publick, or infection of others. But no Magiſtrate ought to ſuffer that God to be openly blaſphemed, which he worſhips: If Heathens in a falſe Worſhip are zealous upon this account, how much more ought Chriſtians? Though no Magiſtrate can enforce any Subject to worſhip his God, or ought to do it by a Penal Law, as hath been ſaid, yet he may puniſh him for blaſpheming him, or for ſeducing any from the Worſhip of the true God; yea, for Apoſtatizing from the Worſhip of the true God, after he hath owned it. Precepts and Perſidents, in the Old Teſtament, are pregnant to theſe purpoſes, which I need not enlarge on; thoſe that read the Scriptures are acquainted with them: But we finde no Precept nor Example for endeavouring to reduce a poor Heathen from bare Idolatry to the Worſhip of the true God, by pecuniary Mulcts and corporal Puniſhments; and I am ſure Chriſt never practiſed it nor commanded it in the New Teſtament.
§ 24. The great difficulty that yet attends this caſe (allowing the Magiſtrate a power, as ſuch, in ſome matters concerning our duty directly to Godward) what are adaequate and proportionate Penalties in ſuch caſes as theſe: for the Magiſtrates power is always inſignificant, whatever the Law is, if there be not a Penalty annexed to it, and vigour in the juſt execution thereof. Now the Enquiry is, Of what kind and degree of puniſhments of ſuch Tranſgreſſions, ought to be? Anſw. I apprehend it is a hard thing to determine to all mens ſatisfaction; I know ſome have recourſe to the proceedings of the Judicial Law, which was but the reduction of the Moral Law into Civil Practice for the State of the Jews, and look upon them as binding to Chriſtian Magiſtrates. But I ſuppoſe the Judicial Laws to be rather preſidential onelyonly, that Chriſtian Magiſtrates may take a meaſure thereby for the degree of Penalty, ſetting aſide their different Emergencies of State, and extraordinary caſes, when God would make one ſinner in a caſe exemplary to all ages, by his Prerogative and ſpecial Command; as in Achans theft, and the prophanation of the Sabbath by picking up of ſticks: And ſetting aſide much of the ſeverity which appeared in that more legal Diſpenſation, which was both Typical and Temporal, and much of it in ſpecial caſes, and by ſpecial command by God; It would be accounted very ſevere now to put a man to death for prophaning the Name of God, though it were by repeated acts of ſuch horrid curſing and ſwearing as is frequent now-a-days; or for prophanation of the Sabbath, &c. Then ſetting aſide the relation the Judicial Law had to the Levitical, and neceſſary dependance on it, which is ceaſed; and conſidering that our Judicial Laws cannot ſo much depend upon Evangelical inſtituted Worſhip, Chriſt having not ſo ſtrictly tyed Church and State under a neceſſity of the ſame Emergencies as he did the Jewiſh Oeconomies; I conceive likewiſe the juſt proportionating of Penalties in this kind, ought to be done with great caution, and depends much on the Magiſtrates prudent management of the Helm of Government, for the ſafety and preſervation of the Chriſtian State; and Penalties cannot be poſitive and unalterable, becauſe caſes do ſo frequently differ in the aggravating circumſtances.
§ 25. The Chriſtian civil State ought to be very neighbourly and cheriſhing to the Eccleſiaſtical; and the civil Magiſtrate is to improve his Magiſtratick capacity to the utmoſt, for the intereſt of Chriſt's Church, and advantage of the Goſpel. 1. By ſubordinating as much as is poſſible, all State-intereſt to the intereſt of Chriſt in his Church. 2. By giving all poſſible encouragement to the purer Worſhippers of God, and to the embracers of the Chriſtian Religion. 3. By encouraging the faithful preaching of the Goſpel, and propagation thereof by able Miniſters duely called thereto by the Church, and affording them external helps and ſupports in ſo doing. 4. By maintaining the Churches in the due execution of the Laws of Chriſt, and in the enjoyment of their Eccleſiaſtical and Civil Liberties, defending them from invaſions and diſturbances in Gods Worſhip, from the rage of profeſſed Enemies, from tyrannizing uſurping Impoſers. 5. By being a nurſing Father to the Church, both as a Chriſtian in an eminent capacity, going before others in the exemplary practice of Piety, and calling upon all others of all ranks and degrees whatever, to diſcharge their places in the fear of God, as Hezekiak and Jehoſaphat did, 1 Chron. 29.25, 26, 27, &c. 2 Chron. 19.8, 9, 10. and as a Magiſtrate defending them by his power, as hath been ſaid.