The Catholic Hierarchy, Chapter 10
CHAP. X. Some plain Propoſitions concerning things Neceſſary and Indifferent.
§ 1. HAving thus briefly deſcribed and unfolded all ſorts of Neceſſities and Indifferences requiſite to our purpoſe, and ranked them to ſeveral Heads, that we might not be miſtaken in the following Diſcourſe when we ſpeak of any of them diſtinct from the other; We judge it now convenient in the firſt place, before we come to argue the matter in controverſie, to lay down a few general Propoſitions to the intelligent Reader, whereby the nature of theſe things will further and more clearly appear.
1. No created beings or actions had any thing of moral neceſſity or indifferency antecedent to a moral Law: for where there is no Law, things cannot reſpect it as good or evil; and if the two extreams cannot be without a Law, neither can the middle be in reſpect to the ſaid Law; and if ſome things are not made morally good or evil by commanding or forbidding, other things cannot be morally indifferent as to good or evil.
2. Though things have no indifferency antecedaneous to a Law, and without reſpect thereto, yet they have a poſſibility of neceſſary goodneſs, evil, or indifferency; and thoſe things that are good or evil by one Law, may be left indifferent by another, & vice verſa.
3. The ſame Law that ordains things or actions neceſſarily good or evil, doth excluſivè & implicitè determine things indifferent in reference to its ſelf; for ſuch things as are neither commanded or forbidden, are neither good or evil, and therefore may be done or not done without ſin, being indifferent.
4. There is none can looſe or abſolve from a binding Law, but he that hath the Legiſlative power, or one ſuperiour to him; men may by alteration of Statutes, change their neceſſities into indifferences, & vice verſa; or God by his ſupremacy may do this in mans Laws, but no man can aboliſh God's Laws, or make new ones of the ſame kinde by changing things that he hath left indifferent into neceſſities, it is his Prerogative onelyonly.
5. All appearances of things to be what they really are not, by the ſeveral reſpects they have to the Law they are under, are errours and hallucinations of the Underſtanding; for good ſometimes appears evil, and evil good; neceſſary things indifferent, and indifferent things neceſſary: And though our walking muſt be and can be but according to the illumination of our Underſtanding, yet doth not our Judgement or Conſciences alter the true reſpect that things have in themſelves.
6. All religious actions, as ſuch, practically circumſtantiated, whether moral or ceremonial, are good or evil, and cannot be called indifferent, unleſs in an abſtract conſideration from all religious reſpects.
7. Abſolute good and evil are not of the ſame extent with lawful and unlawful; for an indifferent action is lawful which hath no determination by a Law to good or evil, becauſe not onelyonly the Precept, but even the permiſſion of the Law makes a licitum, but it's onelyonly the Prohibition that makes it unlawful. Hence indifferent things are not media inter Licita & illicita, for they are contradicentia, and indifferent things are licita, and upon that account referred to the Law, and confirms that indifferent things cannot be ſaid to be ſo but in reference to ſome Law, lawfulneſs being an eſſential property of an indifferent thing.
8. To ſay that an indifferent thing is a mean between commanded and forbidden, is all one as to ſay it is a mean between good and evil; for there is nothing good or evil, but by vertue of ſomething carrying the force of a Law in it, that by a Command or Prohibition puts the nature of good or evil upon it correſpondent to the ſaid Law: As the Law of the Creation makes things naturally good or evil, the Law moral makes them morally ſo, &c. and that which is prohibited as not anſwering the ends of the one or other, is neceſſarily evil. That which is commanded as anſwering the ends, and requiſite, is good neceſſarily. That which in itſelf may or may not anſwer, and is not abſolutely commanded or forbidden, is neither good nor evil, (in reſpect of that Law, though it may be in reſpect of another) and therefore indifferent.