The Christian Sabbath Vindicated, Part 1 · Chapter 7
CHAP. VII.
Generall Conſiderations about Time, and its Profitableneſſe, in Reference to Morall Actions of Importance.
THe Neceſſity and Morality of Solemne VVorſhip having been in the former Chapter diſcourſed of;I. Scope of the enſuing diſcourſes about Time. We are now to take in hand the conſideration of the Time, which may be, or is to be allotted to it, both generally, and for the performance of the ſeverall kinds of Worſhip Noted: Driving it to this ſcope, to ſhew by the Profitableneſſe that may be in a wiſe determination of Time for Religion and Gods Solemne Worſhip. [That the determination of one day in ſeven for a Sabbath, (which we find in the fourth Commandement:) is a Law ſubſtantially profitable for all men in all ages to be bound unto.] Which then, (upon the grounds formerly laid, of the Morality of ſuch a Law, though but Poſitive, unleſſe God be found to have clearly repealed it) if we can vindicate from the ſuppoſed repeale, which ſome contend for, (as we believe we ſhall) we ſhall have demonſtratively proved the perpetuity of that fourth Commandement in that Conſideration; and gained the Principall Fort ſtriven for in this Cauſe. And then the reſidue will be eaſie to be diſpatched and made ours.
To this end, we ſuppoſe it convenient to diſcourſe firſt,II. Why we firſt handle it generally with reſpect to Civill Actions. concerning Time in generall, as it may referre to humane Actions, even Civill; and that for two Cauſes. 1. That hereby, if it be poſſible, we may gaine upon mens prejudices, and take them of, while we make it appeare, that we wreſt not things about Time to our purpoſe beyond the Nature of them; but that whether we ever meddled with Religion or not; Yet the conſiderations we ſhall note, are reall and certaine even in ordinary buſineſſes and civill affaires. And ſo bringing our Cauſe before the barre of Reaſon and Nature (to which our adverſaries have appealed, from the words of the Scripture,) we may take from them all evaſions, and wayes of ſhifting. 2. That hereby the whole matter may be more cleare and diſtinct, for every one to conceive and beare away; when it is firſt ſet down generally with an Application to Civill Actions, and afterward particularly ſhewed to agree to matters of Religion and Gods Solemne VVorſhip.
III. Why we uſe ſo many diſtinctions and diviſions; And apply them a ſecond Time. Melim eſt doctos onorare notis, quam rudes fraudare diſcendis. Leo Magnus. Phil. 3.1. To write the ſame things, to me indeed it is not grievous, But for you it is ſafe.And if in the former part we ſhall ſeeme to ſome, ſomewhat too curious in ſpinning out diſtinctions and diviſions, we crave a reſpite of ſuch cenſure, untill we have added our Application: wherein it will appeare, that not one of all thoſe diviſions, how nice ſo ever it ſeems, but hath ſome Profitable (not to ſay Neceſſary) Vſe, toward the clearing, and giving light to, this moſt important controverſie. On the contrary, if we be charged by others to tautologize in our Application of things to Religion in the following part; We wiſh ſuch to conſider, that many of the Notions being New, and not of ordinary obſervation; it may be more excuſable to ſay ſome things a 2d. time over, which pregnant wits might have ſufficiently underſtood and remembred by once mentioning them, then by a ſingle mention of any thing of importance, to endanger the looſing of any ordinary readers apprehenſion or memory, in a diſcourſe of ſuch length and weight as this is. Theſe things thus premiſed, we fall to our worke, to ſcanne the Nature of Time in reference to Humane and Morall Actions.
IV. Time an adjunct, yet may be ſubſtantially profitable.Time generally conſidered, is a naturall adjunct, and circumſtance accompanying Humane Actions of what kind ſoever. But yet ſuch a circumſtance, as hath, (according as it may be ordered) a reall, as I may ſay, a ſubſtantiall influence into the buſineſſes, for which ſuch Action is performed; and ſo may be ſubſtantially Profitable unto the maine buſineſſe; even according to naturall reaſon, and in a conſtant courſe; ſuppoſing the buſineſſe not to be effected by one ſingle and momentaneous Action.
V. This conſideration hath been hurtfully neglected. And Place unfitly paralelled with Time in Religion.Which reallity of the effect of Time toward Morall Actions, being not obſerved, or not regarded by diſputers in this Cauſe, hath bred much confuſion, and occaſioned manifold miſtakes: as appeares, even by that one moſt common Aſſertion of all the adverſaries. [That Time and Place are equall circumſtances in Religion,] Which how falſe it is, and how prejudiciall, not to our Cauſe only, but to Religion it ſelfe; If we doe not (anon) demonſtrate beyond the poſſibility of any reaſonable deniall, we ſhall deſpaire of ever prevailing in the Cauſe we have undertaken. But on the contrary, if we ſhall make manifeſt (as we are confident, by God helpe, we ſhall) That the one (namely Time) is of exceeding importance in Religion, even without reſpect to any particular inſtitution or determination of it from God or man; and for that cauſe, calling neceſſarily for ſome determination, which, if wiſely ordered, and ſtrongly authoriſed, makes it undeniably and moſt ſingularly profitable to the ſoule and ſpirit, and ſo to Religion. And that the other, namely Place, to have nothing at all of importance in it toward the ſoule and ſpirit, beyond the Naturall and Phyſicall conveniencies of the body, (except 1. the Typicall references of Places, expreſly commanded by God himſelfe, as the Tabernacle and Temple: And 2. the Memoriall of any act of Gods providence, or the like, at Gods appointment, or from the inſtitution of men, which are meerly accidentall things, and wherein alſo Time doth fully match Place, having been as well as it allotted to the ſame purpoſes, while withall, we ſay, it exceeds it, beyond all proportion in other reſpects) VVe hope we ſhall have gotten ſo main an advantage in our Cauſe, as that we ſhall very much prevent all poſſibility of future Reply.
VVe ſay then, That Time being conſiderable in Philoſophie,VI. Three diſtinct reſpects of Time obſervable in actions. under a double Predicament: One is that of Quantitie, or the Proportion of Time; which again hath a double reſpect, 1. Of Continuance ſo long together; 2. Of Revolution ſo often againe. The other is that of Quando, or the ſeaſon of Time: Hence ariſeth a threefold common affection, or reſpect of Time, obſervable in every action or buſineſſe:
1. Quamdiu? The extent of Time,1. The length. How long together it is continued?
2. Quoties? The frequencie of Revolution,2. The number. How often it is reiterated and repeated?
3. Quando? The ſeaſon or order of Time, VVhen it is begun?3. The order. All which are very much confounded and jumbled together in the Diſcourſes of our Diſputers, to the great diſappointment of a right conceiving of the Truths in queſtion.
VVe ſay, the ſeaſon when it is begun; for the ſeaſon when it is ended, belongs properly to the Continuance, or Quamdiu.
Now each of theſe reſpects of Time may be conceived,VII. All three conſidered as denominated by Nature, Art, Accident. either according to denomination of Diviſions, taken either 1. from Nature; 2. Or from Art; 3. Or from Accident. 1. From Nature, as yeers, moneths, dayes, which are diſtinctions of Time obſervable in Nature. 2. From Art, as houres and minutes, into which, not Nature, duplicate page duplicate page but Art divides Time. (And to theſe, for the avoyding of an uncertain diſpute, we are content to adde Weekes. Though there be ſome great Scholars that have given more then an intimation, that the diviſion of Time by Weekes (that is, by ſeven dayes) is a more exact Naturall diviſion according to Dayes, then either Moneths or Yeeres. But this we leave for the preſent to thoſe Authors to maintaine.) 3. From Accident, as any remarkable thing paſt, or which may occaſionally happen, or continue; and the like. We may, and doe often ſpeak of the Reſpects of Time, according to ſuch Accidents: As of the Continuance, while ſuch a thing continued; and the Frequencie, as oft as ſuch a thing hapned, (or the time came about, wherein it hapned) and of the Beginning, when ſuch a thing fell out, and the like. And whenſoever we ſpeak any thing diſtinctly of any reſpect of Time, we doe and muſt needs ſpeak of it in ſome or other of theſe phraſes, denominating it ſo by Naturall, or Artificiall, or Accidentall diviſions. 3. Alſo one and the ſame denomination may ſometime be applied to all the reſpects of Time in a diſtinct and ſeverall conſideration: As to ſay, Such a man ſtayes at home on Fridayes, implies 1. the continuance, all day: 2. The frequencie, every week: 3. the order, which day of the week.
VIII. Time is indeterminate, or determinate: Each reſpect having a double limit.4. Moreover, Time, in each of the forenoted reſpects, is further conſiderable two wayes: 1. As indefinite and indeterminate: 2. As definite and determinate.
And either way according to a double limit or terme, in regard of which it may be determined or not, which we may call
1. Initiall.
2. Concluſive.
The Initiall terme or limit of the
Quamdiu, or Continuance, is the leaſt or ſhorteſt that is or may be for that action or buſineſſe.
Quoties, or Frequencie, is the ſeldomeſt Revolution.
Quando, or Seaſon, is the lateſt Beginning.
Contrarily, the Concluſive limit or terme of the
Quamdiu, is the longeſt Continuance.
Quoties, or Frequencie, is the ofteneſt Revolution.
Quand…, or the Seaſon, is the ſooneſt Beginning.
Alſo between theſe Termes there is great latitude oftimes, and much variety of degrees in each of the reſpects of Time forementioned.
Now by Time indeterminate, we underſtand,IX. Indeterminate Time deſcribed. that which is altogegether uncertaine in any reſpect, before the action to which it belongs is performed: uncertaine for the Continuance, untill the action be finiſhed: uncertain for the Frequencie, (whether oftner then once) till a man actually goe about the action or buſineſſe a ſecond time, and ſo forward: and uncertain for the Seaſon, when it ſhall be begun or gone about, till the very inſtant of ſetling upon it. And ſuch indeterminate Time is obſervable, in the ſeverall reſpects of Time, in many actions, and buſineſſes of ſeverall kindes.
By determinate Time (contrarily) we underſtand, That, X. Determinate Time, threefold.which before the action is performed, is appointed out in any reſpect for that action or buſineſſe: which may be from a threefold Efficient:
1. The Nature of the Action.
2. The Command of a Superior.
3. A mans own peremptory Reſolution.
1. Sometimes the nature of the action, XI. 1. By the nature of the action.or buſineſſe to be performed, determines the Time beforehand, in one or more of the reſpects; when according to Nature it cannot be done, But 1. in ſuch a continuance of time: as a man cannot read over a Chapter of ſuch length, but in a proportionable continuance of Time ſpent in it. And ſo, 2. when the buſineſſe in Nature is not diſpatched by one action, how much Time ſoever a man allot to it: as ſome Land muſt be ploughed over more then once, or elſe it will bear no good Corn. And likewiſe, 3. when the buſineſſe is loſt, if not begun at ſuch a ſeaſon: as they ſay of the gathering of Saffron, if it be not taken in the juſt day, it is loſt. All theſe are determinations by the Nature of the action or buſineſſe in it ſelfe.
2. Sometimes Superiors, XII. 2. By a Superior.having ſufficient authority to oblige to the obſervation of any reſpect of Time, doe accordingly (at their pleaſure) determine it, and command inferiors to apply it anſwerably to ſuch action or buſineſſe as they aſſigne.
3.XIII. 3. By a manſelfe. Somteimes a mans own peremptory reſolution determines the reſpects of Time (for any action or buſineſſe) to himſelfe. And theſe two latter doe ſpecially make Time to be properly called determinate.
And now although it be true, that, when an action is once done, or a buſineſſe finiſht, it is all one, in Naturall reaſon, whether the Time belonging to it were antecedently indeterminate, or determinate, as being then exactly equall one to another, and as exactly meaſurable or computable one to the other. Yet is there between them before-hand, even in Civill actions, a great and remarkable difference, (namely, as much as between may and muſt) for which they deſerve to be carefully obſerved and diſtinguiſhed into their natures and degrees.
XIV. Indeterminate Time is attendant on buſineſſe.To begin with indeterminate Time. The nature of this is, to be meerly an attendant upon actions and buſineſſe, and a meere circumſtance. Neceſſary indeed, but not in any Ethicall or Morall conſideration, but meerly Phyſicall and Naturall (as a ſhadow is a neceſſary, that is, a naturall attendant upon any body in the ſunſhine) in as much as it is ſimply impoſſible in Nature to performe any action, without the concomitance and attendance of Time. But on the other hand, the nature of determinate Time is, to be a commander of buſineſſe, requiring the aitendance of ſuch actions as are for the buſineſſe. And it is as neceſſary Ethically to performe ſome ſuch actions according to the determinations of Times, as it is Phyſically to have ſome Time to accompany actions.
But withall it is to be obſerved, and the obſervation will prove of much weight (as we ſhall ſee) That even indeterminate Time, to ſome buſineſſes, (and namely ſuch as admit of variety of degrees) may prove a circumſtance of much importance to the advancement, or diſappointment of a mans end in his actions, even according to Reaſon and Nature, and in an ordinary and conſtant courſe. We will inſtance in the buſineſſe of Learning, which to attaine to, is a Students buſineſſe, and his end, (though not ultimate) and unqueſtionably admits of great varietie of degrees. And toward it divers actions are directed, as attendants on his Maſters or Tutours teaching, and to give him account of his learning; and converſing with his Fellow-Scholars, or Fellow-Pupils, or Fellow-Students, in acts and exerciſes of Learning, Diſputations, and Orations, and the like: As alſo ſtudying, reading, and meditating by himſelfe,XV. Yet profitable even voluntarily applied: Proved. for his further progreſſe and increaſe in Learning.
Now to all this we ſay, even Indeterminate Time may in ſome reſpects be of much importance towards the furtherance or hinderance of his buſineſſe of Learning, according as any voluntarily (without any antecedent determination) applies himſelfe, and imployes his Time. Namely, this is true of the two firſt reſpects of Time, the Quamdiu, or Continuance, and the Quoties, or Frequencie, (which are the two affections of the Quantity or Proportion of Time.) Theſe are in themſelves, though indeterminate, very materiall, and as we may ſay, ſubſtantiall circumſtances in the buſineſſe of Learning. But it is not ſo with the Quando, or ſeaſon of Beginning. For take that altogether indeterminately, and it is of no value or efficacie at all, to the ſpeeding, or putting back of Learning, that is, not in it ſelfe, though, perhaps it may be ſomewhat by accident. A little further to explaine theſe things, will be worth our paines: and ſo we will conſider each of theſe reſpects ſeverally, as alſo joyn the two firſt together, as far as they agree in this Obſervation in hand.
Here then, 1. we affirm, that [the Quamdiu, or continuance of Time, XVI. 1. In the Continuance.even altogether Indeterminate and uncertain before-hand, and only prolonged by a mans own will, according to preſent affections and occaſions, or ſhortened accordingly, doth anſwerably promote a mans Learning, or defeat it.] For infallibly, the longer (ſuppoſing his bodily ſpirits not tyred) a Student continues attending his Tutour, and receiving directions and inſtructions from him, or exerciſing himſelfe with others in matter of Learning, or hearing them, or ſtudying by himſelfe; and ſo in any of theſe (or all theſe) continues the purſuit of Learning, the more he proſpers: and the leſſe while he continues, the leſſe he advances in ſuch learning. So that a man may both foretell of two Students of equall capacitie, (and opportunity of helps) that he who hath beſtowed, even altogether voluntarily, and without any antecedent determination, a longer Time, ſuch Day, upon Learning, hath gotten more that Day, then the other that beſtowed leſſe Time. As alſo by obſerving the progreſſe of two ſuch, any Day, he may, even without all examination which of them continued longeſt at his ſtudy, (or with his Tutour, and the like) conclude and pronounce demonſtratively, That he who hath profited moſt, did continue longeſt; and he who hath profited leſſe, did continue a ſhorter time.
2. We ſay the like of the Quoties, or reiteration of Time, XVII. 2. In the Frequencie.even altogether uncertaine and indeterminate, (till a mans own minde made him voluntarily returne to his ſtudy) That the frequencie of ſuch returne to ſtudy, and to his Tutour for helpe, and the like; or the ſeldomneſſe of it, doth exceedingly ſet forward, or keep back a mans Learning. For infallibly, he that reiterates it every day, twiſe a day, (or ſo) proſpers and goes on; and he that returnes to it but once or twiſe a week, or monethmonth, or yeere, makes little or nothing of it in compariſon: Other things being equall, as we touched before. So that here again a man may both foretell and judge infallibly between two, (otherwiſe equall) which is or will be the better Proficient, namely he that is more frequent in returning to his ſtudy, and he the worſe that reiterates it (remarkably) ſeldomer. Alſo by diſcerning their different progreſſe, he may without examination ſay demonſtratively, Such an one ſtudied more Dayes in a Week, or MonethMonth, or Yeere; and ſuch an one fewer.
XVIII. 3. In both.3. Inſomuch, as taking theſe two Conſiderations of Time together, they are the uſuall Periphraſis of a good Scholar or Student, [He is one that continues and keeps cloſe to his ſtudy for a good while together, when he is at it; and is diligent in returning to it conſtantly day by day, Or in going often to his Tutour, or frequenting Acts and Exerciſes, and the like, whereby Learning is gotten.]
XIX. 4. An evidence of Affection.4. Withall, it is not to be forgotten, That even ſuch [Voluntary applying of Time indeterminately, much, or little together, and often, or ſeldome] where there is no neceſſary or juſt impediment, is a moſt evident and undeniable demonſtration, what ſpeciall affection a man hath to Learning, much, or little. Neither is it almoſt poſſible for a man to expreſſe his own love (or anothers) to Learning, or want of love to it but by imploying at leaſt ſomewhat about the Proportion of Time; the Continuance, long, or ſhort; and the Reiteration, often, or ſeldome, for ſuch imployment.
XX. 5. And Wiſdome.5. Finally, This application of the continuance and frequencie of Time to any thing, hath ſo great an influence into all buſineſſe of importance, that we uſually count a man wiſe, or unwiſe, according to the ſpending of his Time, (even voluntary) Reckoning him vain and light-headed, that ſetles not for any remarkable continuance, to ſome one buſineſſe or other; or that purſues one thing to day, and another thing to morrow, and a third thing the third day, and ſo returnes not in any frequencie to the ſame imployment, particular or generall. And eſteeming him wiſe, that doth the contrary.
But now, none of all this will be found concerning the Quando, XXI. But not in the Quando, unleſſe by accident.or ſeaſon of beginning, any Time, to ſet to ſtudy, or the like, voluntarily and indeterminately, It is not at all of any importance, that is, not in it ſelfe, though by accident perhaps it may be ſomewhat, as was touched before. By accident, we ſay, it may be of ſome importance, and that in three caſes ſpecially. 1. When his body, and bodily ſpirit may be more fit, or unfit, by beginning ſooner, or later, at this houre, or that. 2. When at ſuch or ſuch a ſeaſon, a man may have more or leſſe helpe, from his Tutour, or others, then at another time. 3. When the delay, or haſtening the beginning to ſtudy, fals in with, or croſſes the other reſpects of Time foreſpoken of, (which are in themſelves of importance) as when a man thereby ſhall have liberty and opportunity, or not, to continue longer, or reiterate oftener his ſtudy, and the advantages of getting Learning. But all theſe are accidentall things, and not conſtant to ſuch ſeaſons of Time; wherein indeterminately and voluntarily ſtudy may be begun, or a Student may repaire to his Tutour, or the like.
And ſo ſetting aſide ſuch Accidentall Conſiderations, It will, we ſay, appeare, that in the Quando, or beginning of Time, (according to any denomination of Nature, as this or that Day; or of Art, this or that Houre, as we ſpake before) there is no materiality at all toward the advantage, or diſadvantage of Learning. One part of Time (according to which, every moment, a new Quando begins, wherein a man, if he pleaſe, may begin to ſtudy) is as behovefull as another, one Minute as another, one Houre as another, one Day as another, and none more then another. So that here a man can neither rationally foretell, nor conclude any thing, (as he might in the former reſpects) what Progreſſe, much or little, a man hath made: Nor 2. whether more or leſſe, compared with another, who begun at another ſeaſon, ſooner or later: Not yet 3. what Affection he hath to Learning; For a man may ſometimes begin to ſtudy in the Morning early, meerly by having nothing elſe to buſie himſelfe in at that ſeaſon; and he may forbeare to begin, not for want of affection, but through interruptions of other buſineſſe: Nor 4. by ſeeing any ones progreſſe in Learning, can it be judged (unleſſe from ſome accidentall thing withall) what Day or Houre he began to ſtudy; or which Houre or Day he took for ſtudy, out of any number, if he intermitted any. And ſo 5. in concluſion, it appeares, that the Quando, or Seaſon of beginning (at this or that particular Time) indeterminately, and voluntarily (without reſpect to ſome accident that may fall in with it) is a thing meerly indifferent, and no matter of wiſedome, or importance at all toward Learning, or any other like buſineſſe.
Which difference, between the Quando or beginning of Time even indeterminate, and the other two reſpects, of the quantity or proportion of Time, the Continuance and the Frequencie, muſt be remembred againſt hereafter. For it will be of ſpeciall uſe, to more purpoſes then one.
XXII. Time determinate diſtinguiſhed.And ſo we proceed to the conſideration of Time determinate, and ſpecially as it is determinate by the command of another; or by a mans owne peremptory reſolution. And ſo the determination of the Affections or Reſpects of Time admits of a double difference, namely in regard
1. Of the Reſpects themſelves.
2. Of the manner of determination.
1. In regard of the reſpcts themſelves.In regard of the reſpects themſelves, Time may be determined.
1. In any one of theſe reſpects, ſingle.
2. In any two of them joyntly.
3. In all three of them together.
1. There may be a determination of any one of theſe affections of Time ſingle, the other being left undetermined, as—
1. Any one alone.1. Of the Quamdiu, or Continuance, alone, ſaying, [Let an houre together be beſtowed on ſtudy] not determining whether more then once, or when for the ſeaſon.
2. Of the Quoties, or Reiteration alone, ſaying, [Every day beſtow Time on ſtudy] not determining how long at once, or what houre.
3. Of the Quando, or Seaſon of beginning alone, ſaying, [At ſeven in the morning begin to ſtudy] not determining how long to continue, or whether oftener then that one day.
2. Any two jointly.2. There may be a determination of any two of theſe reſpects of Time joyntly, and the third left undetermined, as—
1. Of the Continuance and Frequencie joyntly [Let an hour… together each day beſtowed on ſtudy,] not determining at what houre to begin.
2. Of the Continuance and Beginning joyntly [Let an ho… together beginning at ſeven in the morning be beſtowed ſtudy.] not determinating whether oftener then that one
3. Of the Frequencie and Beginning joyntly [Every day begin at ſeven in the morning to ſet about ſtudy,] not determining how long to continue.
3. Likewiſe there may be a determination,3. All three together. of all the three Reſpects of Time together, ſaying [Let an houre together each day, beginning at ſeven in the morning be beſtowed on ſtudy.]
Again,XXIII. 2. The manner of determination. in regard of the manner of determination of theſe Affections or Reſpects of Time, (any of them or all of them) there are conſiderable differences, for it maybe
1. Remiſſe and at large.
2. Strict and exact.
A remiſſe determination, 1. Remiſſe.is when Time (in any of the reſpects) is ſo determined in ſome Generall expreſſion, as that both the termes or limits are left undetermined, as to appoint—
1. For the Continuance [Let a good while, or a little while together be beſtowed on ſtudy] not determining how long, or how little while, clearly.
2. For the Frequencie [Often, or ſeldome, beſtow Time upon ſtudy,] not determining how often, or how ſeldome, particularly.
3. For the Seaſon [Begin betimes, or late to ſet about ſtudy,] not determining, how early or how late, diſtinctly.
A Strict and Exact determination, contrarily is,2. Exact or ſtrict …hreefold. when both the limits are (or at leaſt one of them is) ſo particularly and punctually expreſt as no doubt can be made, how long or ſhort, often or ſeldome, early or late, is required for ſtudy by the determination, as namely, in all thoſe mentioned, of one reſpect ſingle, or two, or all three.
Yet againe, this ſtrict and punctuall determination, admits of ſome variety, for it may be three fold;
1. Initiall.
2. Concluſive.
3. Excluſive.
We call that an Initiall determination, 1. Initiall.when the Initiall terme of the Reſpects of Time, is expreſly mentioned and determined, that it muſt be ſo long, ſo often, and ſo ſoone, and no leſſe while, nor no ſeldomer, no not later; But yet with an intimation, that ſomewhat more is (and will be) required, in each reſpect, or in any, by ſome other determination, though not by this.
2. Concluſive: This addes ſtrictly the concluſive terme to the Initiall.On the other ſide, we call that a Concluſive determination, which though it forbids not, more then the determination Names for Continuance, Frequencie, or ſoone beginning. Yet ſtrictly commands no longer, nor no oftener, nor no ſooner, only commands ſo long without faile, and ſo often, and ſo ſoone, and forbids a ſhorter Continuance, a ſeldomer revolution, and a later beginning.
3. Excluſive.Alſo we call that an Excluſive determination, which both affirmatively and negatively, by way both of command and prohibition, preſcribes ſo peremptorily the limits on all ſides, as that nothing is allowed on any reſpect otherwiſe then is expreſt. As that the Continuance muſt be ſo long infallibly, and no longer, as well as no loſſe while; and the Frequencie ſo often, and no oftener, as well as no ſeldomer; and the Beginning, on that ſeaſon, or point of Time, and no ſooner, as well as no later, according to the direct words of the Determination, as to ſay [Beſtow ſix houres upon ſtudy] every monethmonth, the firſt of the monethmonth, from ſix in the morning, till noone, without variation, augmentation or diminution.
XXIV. Yet admitting a reſervation.After all, it is to be obſerved, concerning all theſe determinations of Time in any reſpect. That every one of them may upon the pleaſure of the determiner, (if it be a Superiour) either declared concurrently with the determination, or any Time after, admit of a Reſervation, or diſpenſation, for ſome particular thing or occaſion, which may interrupt ſomewhat the determination, in any reſpect, according to the manifeſtation of ſuch pleaſure or allowance of his: And for the reſidue, the determination may remaine firme and obligatory to all purpoſes. As a Maſter may determine his ſcholar to ſtudy a whole weeke together every day, from ſix in the morning, to ſix at night, and yet admit the interruption of meale Times, and ſuch like occaſions of neceſſity.
XXV. The profitableneſſe of this determination, by the 5. Cauſes of it.And now, having thus layd downe the maine diſtinctions that belong to Time generally conſidered; We come to make further way, toward our ſcope, by conſidering the ſpeciall profitableneſſe of determinate Time in one or two, or all the three Reſpects; and that in a threefold Gradation, ſutable to the ſteps we have already troden. 1. The profitableneſſe (or even neceſſity) of having any determination of Time at all, for any humane buſineſſe, and namely for Learning, to keepe ſtill to that inſtance. 2. What kind of determination of any one of the reſpects of Time, ſingle, or of any two of them ioyntly, or of all three of them together, is profitable (or neceſſary) for it? 3. What manner of determination, Remiſſe, or Exact, Initiall, Concluſive or Excluſive, is ſpecially profitable (or neceſſary) towards it, according to the rules of Naturall Reaſon and experience.
The firſt of theſe is diſcernable by the Cauſes, that ſhew generally a profitableneſſe, (and even a neceſſity for ſome perſons at leaſt) of having ſome determination of Time for Learning, or any ſuch like buſineſſe. Which Cauſes may be reduced to 5. Heads. And one or other of them is perpetually to befound in all wiſe determinations of Time for any buſineſſe whatſoever; and commonly divers of them concurre to the profitableneſſe, and ſpecially to the neceſſity of ſuch determination.
1. The importance (and ſpecially the neceſſity) of the buſineſſe; XXVI. 1. The importance of the buſineſſe.learning to be attained by a profeſſed Scholar or ſtudent, is the fundamentall ground of a wiſe and profitable determination of any reſpect of time for it. This makes it worthy to have time ſet apart for it, which elſe were vaine and fooliſh.
2. The impoſſibility of attending that buſineſſe, XXVII. 2. The impoſſibility to attend it and other buſineſſe.the purſuite of Learning, Sufficiently, together with other buſineſſes, (alſo important and neceſſary in their nature and degree,) at the ſame inſtance of Time: Each of them taking up the whole Man for the while: This is a further Recommendation of the convenience and Profitableneſſe, of ſome Determination of Time, at leaſt for one of thoſe buſineſſes, and namely for that which is moſt important, (as we ſuppoſe Learning to be a profeſſed Student) that that may be ſo farre ſecured thereby, and then in the reſidue of Time the other buſineſſe (or buſineſſes) may alſo be conveniently attended.
3. The unwillingneſſe of minde in ſuch, XXVIII. 3. The unwillingneſſe to it.whom that moſt important buſineſſe concernes, to be at all (or ſufficiently) converſant in it; (which unwillingneſſe is found often enough in ſundry profeſſed Schollers and Students) Recommends not onelyonly as profitable, but as Neceſſary (equally with the neceſſity of that buſineſſe of learning, to ſuch ſpirits,) that there be ſome determination of time allotted to it: and namely ſuch, as may conveniently Secure and Promote the attainment of neceſſary learning for them.
XXIX. 4. The danger o… interruptions.4. The danger of interruptions, preventing the ſetting about ſuch buſineſſe (of learning) or calling of from it, when one is about it: (Even ſuch interruptions, as are unworthy to hinder or divert, & yet are apt to be allowed by minds not over deſirous of purſuing learning;) addes to the Profitableneſſe (and neceſsity) of ſome determination of Time for it; which may forbid, and ſo diſappoint, the admitting of any ſuch unneceſſary preventions and interruptions of learning, and ſtudy.
XXX. 5. Want of Wiſdome.5. The want of Wiſdom, to reſolve ſteadily upon the ſudden, and Iudge conſtantly at the inſtant, what Time or Times are neceſſary or ſufficient to be imployed for the Attainment of Learning, and to leave ſufficient for other buſineſſes; Makes up not the profit only, but alſo the neceſſity of having a convenient determination of Time for Learning. Whereby both the Ʋnwilling may be put from his frivolous excuſes, and vaine pretences, whereby he would cover his unwillingneſſe: As alſo a Man willing to ſhare his Time prudently between his variety of Buſineſſes, may not be diſquieted (as otherwiſe he would often be, whether he ſtudied or ſtudied not) but his minde may now reſt ſatisfied, that there is a faire allotment of Time for his chiefeſt buſineſſe of Learning; as alſo conveinent roome left for other buſineſſes of importance, which may be ſhared among them either determinately again, or otherwiſe, as occaſions are. Theſe are the cauſes that recommend as Profitable, or even cal for as Neceſſary, ſome determination to be made for ſome perſons, in matter of learning, either by themſelves, or by ſome Superiour over them.
XXXI. For the kindes of determinations. The determination of the continuance and frequency is very profitable.In the next place to ſpeake of the kindes of determination in regard of the reſpects of times themſelves. It is to be conſidered,
1. That thoſe reſpects of Time, which have in them a Materiality, and Subſtantiality, toward the buſineſſe of Learning; when they are but Voluntarily, and Indeterminately Applied to it (as hath been ſhewed of the Quamdiu or Continuance, and the Quoties or Frequency) as they cannot looſe of their Validity, by being determined (if it be wiſely done in regard of degrees) ſo may they undoubtedly be Profitably determined: and upon the former ſuppoſitions muſt be Neceſſarily (and that whether we take them ſingly, or jointly, as we ſhall ſee by and by) For ſuch a Determination, wiſely ordered, makes the Profit that may ariſe from the obſervation of ſuch proportions of Time, Certaine, which was before (in the moſt willing) Contingent, becauſe of the hazard of interruptions, or want of wiſdome: and in the Ʋnwilling, was not to be hoped, would be had at all, becauſe it is certaine without ſome determination, they would not obſerve any ſuch Times at all.
2. But now for the Quando, the Seaſon (or Order) of beginning:XXXII. Not of the Quando, but by accident. As we have ſhewed that there is no Validity or Efficacy in it (except by Accident) towards a mans benefiting himſelfe in learning, (or any like buſineſſe) ſo it is obſervable, that a determination of it, is no further Profitable (or much leſſe Neceſſary) or capable of any exerciſe of Wiſdom about the degrees of it, then ſo far as it may appear that any Accidentall reſpect, doth or will make it ſerviceable, and beneficiall: As having (or being likely to have) 1. More freedome and better temper of Spirits at that ſeaſon then at another: Or 2. Better help and leſſe interruption: Or 3. Better ſecurity of obſerving the other reſpects of continuance and frequency, being before Profitably determined. Unto which laſt purpoſe, although it ſeem neceſſary, that there be ſome determination of the Quando or Seaſon, as to the obſerving of an hour certainly every morning for ſtudy, it ſeemes in a ſort neceſſary to determine the particular houre, leaſt it elſe be ſlipped: Yet in exact conſideration, this needs not abſolutely be done beforehand, by another, or ones ſelfe: For even the nature of the former determination doth it thus far ſufficiently, that even it determines the laſt houre, if a former were not obſerved. And ſo ſtill the determination of this or that particular Quando, or ſeaſon (or order) of beginning is of it ſelfe of no ſubſtantiall profit toward Learning, or any ſuch like buſineſſe.
3. Whence it followes clearly,XXXIII. Therefore an alteration of it, is not hurtfull. That whereas a determination of the Continuance and Frequencie of Time for Learning, cannot be altered in any remarkable degree, without an anſwerable alteration in the profit of it, (whether more or leſſe according as the determination now is;) and ſo being once wiſely made, remaines conſtantly ſo farre forth profitable for Learning: It is quite otherwiſe with the ſeaſon or order of Time. For of the determination of that, there may be a remarkeable alteration, (as from the laſt houre to the firſt, or from the ſecond day to the ſixth, or the like;) and yet no alteration at all in the profit of it: There being ſtill as much advantage, (ſubſtantially in the Continuance and Frequencie unaltered, and accidentally in the new ſeaſon determined) for the getting of Learning as there was before. And ſo, if any new accident recommend a new ſeaſon, in the leaſt degree, it may without any prejudice at all to the maine buſineſſe be removed to that; while yet the determination of the Continuance and Frequencie is ſuffered to remaine, becauſe of the conſtant profitableneſſe of it.
XXXIV. The profitableneſſe of the determination of the Continuance as largly as may be.4. In a buſineſſe, which requires intention of mind in the purſuite of it (as it is moſt unqueſtionably in matter of Learning) a determination of the Continuance in ſome ſort largely, is certainly profitable; and moreover it is even neceſſary, that it be determined in ſo large a proportion as may conveniently ſatisfie the intendment of the occaſion: (if it were but even once, and ſo one ſingle Continuance determined without any joynt Frequencie or revolution) even as much as any one ſingle Continuance can. Neither can any ſuch Continuance be too largely determined, unleſſe a mans naturall Spirits will not hold out to the whole length of the Continuance, or that ſome other buſineſſe of preſent neceſſity ſhould call for a ſhare, during that Continuance: (Both which caſes may yet perhaps be ſatisfied by a Reſervation made for them, and ſo the determination of the Continuance may hold on notwithſtanding.) But except thoſe caſes, we ſay againe, that the determination of a large Continuance is moſt mainly profitable (and neceſſary) even the largeſt that can be; by reaſon. 1. That the mind is not alwayes in temper readily to apprehend the Notions of Learning, even when a man ſets himſelfe to it; comming newly from other buſineſſe which hath filled his head and heart with conceptions different enough from that which he now ſetles to: And ſo if he have not a convenient. Continuance determined, he may get little or nothing at all at that Time, being taken off againe before his mind fixes ſtrongly and throughly upon the matter. 2. For that alſo divers peeces of the buſineſſe of Learning are difficult enough: So as if a man have not a conveniently large Continuance, to digeſt the Notions throughly, he may ſoone looſe and forget, even thoſe which he ſeemed to have gotten; and even though his returnes to his ſtudy ſhould be very frequent. Short ſnatches and ſudden fits, how often ſoever reiterated doe (in experience) make a ſtudent but a ſlow proficient. Neither indeed do we uſually count a man a good ſtudent, that doth not allot, (or at leaſt voluntarily imploy,) a conſiderable Continuance of Time to it, how often ſoever he takes up a booke in his hand to ſtudy, or makes frequent returnes to it, as well as frequent interruptions from it.
The ſame profitableneſſe (and even neceſſity) of a very large Continuance determined is evident, where a buſineſſe calls for variety of actions toward the advancement of it: As for a ſtudents progreſſe in Learning to attend upon another to read to him and inſtruct him, Alſo 2. to attend, and beare part in diſputes and conferences, and other exerciſes of Learning, private and publike (according to opportunities,) And 3. ſpecially to ſtudy alone, reade and meditate and write by himſelfe: All theſe require the largeſt Continuance that may be, to ſecure and promote the generall buſineſſe of Learning, by affording a convenient ſpace, not only for the proſecuting of each of theſe, but alſo for the drawing out of every one of them ſo competently as to make the mind a gainer in Learning by them all, ſeverally and joyntly.
5. Furthermore, as where the buſineſſe is permanently of importance, XXXV. The profitableneſſe of the determination of the Frequencie as largely as may be.& not wholly diſpatcht by one attendance upon it, how long ſo ever the Continuance be extended; (As it is with the buſineſſe of Learning to the profeſſed Scholar, which is ſtill of as much importance and neceſſity as ever;) There it is profitable (and even neceſſary) that there be ſome determination of the Frequencie of Revolution, ſuch namely as may conveniently ſecure and promote the buſineſſe of Learning; as was in part toucht before: So we are to obſerve more particularly; That, where the buſineſſe is alſo liable to decay, and to be put backward (as well as capable of advancement) Which cannot be denied in matter of Learning, a man may looſe as well as gaine, decreaſe as increaſe in it: There it is profitable (and neceſſary) to have a determination of very great Frequency of returnes to it, even as Frequent as can be imagined compatible with other neceſſary buſineſſes; [As to ſay with the Painter nulla dies ſine linea,] a Frequencie of every day, or twiſe every day:Even though it be but a ſingle determination of it alone. even although by reaſon of other neceſſary buſineſſes, which muſt alſo have their Times and Turns as often, it be convenient not to make any determination of the Continuance at all, (or at leaſt only Remiſſe) with theſe ſo frequent returnes, but leave that to occaſions, which even ſo will ſometimes ſerve to afford a man that is any thing willing to follow Learning, faire Continuance to attend it, when he is once at it, and ſo make by fits a very remarkable gaine, when interruptions call him not off, for a good while together, as now and then it will happen. However, the very Frequencie of Returnes will greatly help to prevent much decay in Learning, and keep him in breath toward it, and in it. Specially if there be (beſides this ſingle determination of ſo great Frequencie) added a joint determination of a convenient large Continuance, with a convenient frequent Returne: Of which our next Conſideration is to ſpeak.
XXXVI. The Profitableneſſe of a joynt determination of the Continuance and Frequencie both, with convenient largenſſe.6. And upon the former ſuppoſitions of the importance of the buſineſſe of Learning permanently, and its requiring intention of mind to get and retaine the notions of it, when one is about it, and prevent decayes afterward, it cannot be denied, but ſuch a joint determination of a large Continuance frequently, is profitable and neceſſary for it, beſides the ſingle determination of the great Frequencie forementioned: Or elſe, conſidering the Unwillingneſſe, and danger of Interruptions, and want of Wiſedome forenoted; There will be not only no conſiderable advancement in the buſineſſe of Learning, but infallible decayes alſo, though perhaps not greatly ſenſible ſoon, yet after a while diſcernable to every eye that looks after it. Withall it is to be noted, that ſuch a joint determination of a large Continuance, with frequencie of Returne, cannot but be [The chiefe determination of Time] for the proſecution of that buſineſſe of Learning,XXXVII. Such a determination is the cheife and moſt ſubſtantially profitable of all other. that is, the moſt ſubſtantially-profitable determination of all other, ſuppoſing the degrees of both be rightly ordered, in reference to mens naturall abilities to hold out ſo long at once, and other neceſſary buſineſſes to admit of ſo frequent a continuance to be determined for that. We ſay, ſuch a determination is the moſt ſubſtantially-profitable of all other, as having in a juſt and convenient proportion the ſtrength of both the profitable reſpects of Time, the Continuance and Frequencie joyned. And ſo the Time accordingly determined by it, may fitly be termed, [The neceſſary and ordinarily ſufficient cheife Time determinate for Learning.] As without which no other Time is ſufficient, nor any other extraordinary Time, ſo neceſſary for the generall buſineſſe of Learning; and the neceſſary ordinary Time every day, being not ſo chiefe a Time for gaine in Learning, as wanting a determination of the Continuance with all. This then, being wiſely determined, muſt needs be the chiefe Time, and is both neceſſary, and for the chiefe Time, ordinarily ſufficient. Therefore it is very conſiderable, by what Rules of Wiſedome it may be made. Of which, beſides what we have implied already, of the holding out of naturall abilities ſo long, and other buſineſſes not refuſing ſo frequent a Continuance, to be determined for this one buſineſſe of Learning; We have a particular Conſideration to adde, On which ſide the waight ſhould be put in this joint determination, whether on the ſide of the Continuance to determine the largeſt Continuance that may be, with a convenient Frequencie, or a very great Frequencie with a leſſe or ſhorter Continuance? Of which we thus propound our apprehenſions.
7. Where the buſineſſe requires various actions towards the advancement of it, XXXVIII. In the joint determination of the Continuance, and Frequencie. The largeſt Continuance, with a conveniencie, is more profitable then the greateſt Frequencie, with a leſſe Continuance ſuppoſing the proportion in generall to be equall in both.and each of them requires intention of mind to a right performance of it, as it is evidently with the buſineſſe of Learning, as hath been noted; And that withall there are divers other buſineſſes of importance, which muſt have alſo frequently their juſt ſpaces allotted to them: There, of the two, it is more profitable in both conſiderations, (of promoting Learning, and ſerving others occaſions and buſineſſes) to have the determination weigh moſt upon the ſide of the Continuance, and make that as large as may be, with ſome competent Frequencie, rather then to make the Returne more frequent, with a remarkably ſhorter Continuance. This, we conceive, may eaſily be made good, if we ſuppoſe any proportion of Time, in the whole equall, to be divided firſt between a large Continuance, and leſſe Frequencie; 2 between a ſhorter Continuance, and greater Frequencie. As for inſtance: A whole Day, of ten or twelve houres, or more, as a mans naturall ſpirits are able to hold, (even with the reſervation of a dining time, if he will) will be more profitable for the advancement of Learning, though but with a determination of a ſcanty Revolution, once in a Week, (remembring withall the former ſuppoſition of a ſingle determination of ſome Time every Day, or even twiſe a Day) then to ſhare thoſe ten or twelve houres between five, or ſix, or ſeven Dayes in a Week, and ſo make each Day to have but between an houre and two houres continuance at the moſt: For the former ſhall have full ſcope for all variety of actions forenamed toward Learning, and for his mind to ſettle it ſelfe fully to improve each of them: The other can only meddle with one or two at the moſt, to doe any good of it, and oftentimes ſhall find the greateſt part of his Continuance ſpent, before he can throughly bring his mind to fix upon it to any purpoſe. And if we ſuppoſe a leſſe Continuance, ſtill the thing will be more cleare. Alſo on the other hand, conſidering other buſineſſes, it will be far the more profitable determination, to take the chiefe Time for Study and Learning, at one large Continuance leſſe frequent, then with more frequent revolutions and returnes of leſſe Continuance: For the frequent returnes, though with the continuance of no more then an houre at once, (or even leſſe) would prove very often greatly prejudiciall to thoſe other important buſineſſes; and ſo hazard either the diſappointing of them, or the trenching upon the determined houres for Learning: whereas the larger Continuance, and leſſe frequent returnes, would have been more out of danger both wayes, and prevented the inconvenience of either incroaching upon the other.
XXXIX. The ſame Quando profitably determined to many.8. Where the buſineſſe equally concernes divers, who live in a neerneſſe one to another, and ſo may, (and accordingly ſhould) help one another; and contrariwiſe may poſſibly interrupt and hinder one another: As it is with Scholars in a Schoole, or Students in an Univerſitie: There, as the common concernment of the buſineſſe equally recommends as profitable (and neceſſary) the ſame joynt determination (upon the former ſuppoſitions of conſiſtencie with Naturall ſpirits, and other neceſſary occaſions) from that known Axiome, [A quatenus ad omne valet conſequentia:] And the cauſe being the ſame to all, brings forth the ſame effect for all. So is it Profitable and even Neceſſary (from thoſe accidentall occaſions) to have not only ſome Quando, Seaſon (or Order) of Beginning, determined with the Continuance and Frequencie, and ſo make a compleat determination of all the three Reſpects of Time together: But alſo to have the ſelfe ſame; as the ſame Day in a Week or MonethMonth, the ſame Houre of the Day, and the like, for Beginning, and ſo to run along together till the end of the Continuance; at leaſt ſo far forth as may ſecure the poſſibility of helping one another in Learning, and prevent the hindering one of another; In that all, from the firſt to the laſt, are to be ſo buſied about Learning, as none is allowed to interrupt another, or admit of an interruption from another wholly out of the way of Learning. Thus far, we ſay, a determination of the Quando, the Seaſon, or Order of Beginning, may alſo be profitably determined, with the other reſpects of Continuance and Frequencie: and when it is ſo, then is it a moſt compleat determination, which is ſo made of all three, for the kinde of it: Though ſtill for the degree (or particularity) of the Quando, Seaſon, or Order, there is no ſpeciall profitableneſſe in this, or that; but another might, and would have done as well.XL. For the manner, 1. An excluſive determination is not profitable.
In the third and laſt place, we muſt alſo ſay ſomewhat, what manner of determination may be conceived profitable, of any of the forementioned kinds. We ſay then,
1. Where the buſineſſe is of ſo chiefe importance, all a mans life time, as that the more it proſpers, the better it is with a man, (as it is in point of Learning, with a profeſſed Scholar) There, an excluſive determination cannot be profitable, (much leſſe neceſſary) relating to the generality, or whole, of the buſineſſe of Learning, (how large ſoever the proportions be made either for Continuance or Frequencie) as that a man may never look after Learning, longer at once, nor oftener, nor ſooner, then the determinations expreſſe. Though for ſome particular caſes, by accident, (as to a ſickly man, or in the foreſight of ſome other buſineſſe of ſpeciall waight) it may poſſible be fit, and even neceſſary.XLI. 2. An Initiall is,
2. Where there is wiſedome to make a determination, and not to trench upon other neceſſary buſineſſe; There it is (ſo far) very profitable to make at leaſt an initiall determination, clearly of ſo much Continuance, and no leſſe while together; and ſo often Returnes, and no ſeldomer, (and even of ſo ſoon, and no later Beginning.) And upon the former ſuppoſitions of Unwillingneſſe, and danger of Interruptions, and want of preſent Wiſedome at all inſtants, it is even neceſſary to make at leaſt ſuch an initiall determination. For ſo (and ſo only) ſhall the unwilling be neceſſitated, and certain, to afford to the purſuit of Learning ſuch a proportion of Time; and the willing ſhall be at liberty for it, and ſecured from others offering, or at leaſt from their own admitting any unneceſſary interruptions.
3. Where there wants either 1. Wiſdome, XLII. 3. Not a Concluſive to ſome.to diſcerne certainly how much Time is ordinarily neceſſary and ſufficient to be imployed in purſuing the buſineſſe of Learning; Or 2. Willingneſſe to imploy. Time in it; Or 3. Sufficient Authority, to awe unwilling Inferiors, whom the determination muſt concerne: There a concluſive determination of the chiefe time for Learning, in all probability cannot be profitably made by ſuch perſons. For either through want of Wiſdome, they will miſſe the juſt degrees and proportions for Continuance, or Frequencie, or both, and they may erre on either hand: Or through Ʋnwillingneſſe, they will be ſure to determine the proportions too ſcantly, too ſhort, or too ſeldome, or both: Or laſtly, their determination, how wiſely ſoever made, will be to little or no purpoſe; For the want of Authority will make it be deſpiſed infallibly, by the unwilling; And a determination not obſerved, (ſpecially not likely to be obſerved, beforehand) is all one in effect with no determination at all. As appeares often in Scholars, when their Maſters or Tutours are abſent, and leave them to ſuch as they ſtand not in awe of.XLIII. 4. Though to others.
4. Contrariwiſe therefore, a concluſive determination of the chiefe Time for Learning, made by ſuch as have ſufficiency of Wiſedome, and 2. Affection to have it promoted, and 3. Authority to awe inferiors to obſerve it, is certainly a profitable, even a moſt ſingularly profitable determination. In that hereby all, of all ſorts and diſpoſitions, whom ſuch a determination concernes, ſhall have their own want of Wiſedome ſupplied, and a neceſſary and ſufficient tye laid upon the unwilling; and affording the willing a welcome and pleaſing liberty and ſecurity to the utmoſt of ordinary convenience.XLIV. 5. A remiſſe determination is profitable to try affections.
5. Where one is willing to try others affections, to the buſineſſe of Learning, (ſpecially Inferiors) There a remiſſe determination may be ſo far profitable to be made, in any of the reſpects of Time, or in all, (As, Continue a good while at your ſtudy, when you are at it; Or, Study often; Or, begin betimes in a morning, for feare of wanting Time, or being interrupted) yet particularizing nothing in any reſpect. Thus much (generally recommending the buſineſſe) may be a pregnant triall of their willingneſſe or unwillingneſſe: For the willing will readily improve this, to a remarkable advantage: And the unwilling will ſhift and make excuſes, as if ſtill uncertain what they were determined unto: and ſo diſcover their want of affection, as the other their good affection to it. But otherwiſe, this manner of determination is in no wiſe ſufficient, for the whole, or even for the chiefe Time for Learning, toward either 1. the unwilling, or 2. thoſe that are in danger of Interruptions, or 3. thoſe that want Wiſedome, (as was forenoted) to ſhare that Time equally between the varieties of buſineſſe, and ſo to ſecure ſufficiently their maine buſineſſe of Learning.
6.XLV. A particular determination may be taken away. A determination for a particular action within the compaſſe of the buſſneſſe of Learning, I may poſſibly for a while be profitable for that; and afterward be ſo no more: and ſo though it might have been of ſome uſe ſtill in ſome reſpect, yet withall it may now become a burden convenient to be taken away. Notwithſtanding which, a concluſive determination for the chiefe Time for Learning, may (upon the grounds forenoted) remain perpetually and undeniably, a ſubſtantially-profitable determination: and for this cauſe may be perpetuated, when others are diſcharged of leſſer conſequence, and whoſe primary immediate end now no longer recommends them ſo profitable as they were before.
7. Finally,XLVI. A reſervation is profitable when interruptions are foreſeene. (to end theſe Conſiderations about the manner of Determinations, and withall the whole about Time generally:) Where there is evidently to be foreſeen ſome neceſſary Interruptions, that will certainly, (or may in likelihood) call off from the ſtrict obſervation of the Time determined in any reſpect: There it is profitable, (and even neceſſary) to make it with ſufficient reſervations, generall or particular, for all ſuch neceſſary Interruptions, (as refreſhing the naturall ſpirits by eating or drinking, or the like; or diſpatching any preſſing ſudden buſineſſe) and after thoſe occaſions ſatisfied, that the ſtrength of the Determination ſhall returne, and ſtand in its proper force and validity, for the reſidue of the Time determined. Which will prevent its being really burdenſome, and all pretences that it is ſo, when there is no cauſe to complaine.
And now how far all theſe Conſiderations of Time in Nature are appliable to Religion, and the ſolemn Worſhip of God, XLVII. The concluſion.though we cannot doubt but judicious eyes doe much diſcern already; Yet for the ſatisfaction of all Readers, we muſt diſtinctly and particularly ſet down in the enſuing Chapters; And hope to doe it ſo clearly, as to give ſatisfaction to the moſt, if not to all; which in matters of Controverſie, indeed, ſeldome happens to the moſt rationall Diſcourſe.