Several Treatises of Worship and Ceremonies, Treatise 3
A Treatiſe OF Things Indifferent.
CHAP. I. Of Things Indifferent in general.
A Thing Indifferent (in the largeſt extent of ſenſe) is any Mean between two Extreams.
2. Extreams (properly) are the uttermoſt bounds and limits of any thing, being in direct oppoſition one unto the other.
3. To be a Mean between two Extreams, is ſo to be ſeated between them, as that it ſtand equally affected to either, enclining no more to the one than to the other.
4. Hence the Latines call things indifferent, Res mediae (middle matters) and that by reaſon of that analogy and proportion that is between them, and thoſe things that in Phyſical or Mathematical Dimenſions poſſeſſe the middle place in any line, figure or body: For, that is properly called the middle of any thing, that in poſition being as near as can be to both extreams, enclineth no more to the one than to the other, but is alike equally diſtant from both.
5. And they are therefore called things indifferent, becauſe in their relation to thoſe Extreams between which they are ſeated, and unto which they are referred, they ſtand indifferently diſpoſed, and affected to either; whence of the Greeks they are called Adiaphora, unto which our Engliſh term doth preciſely anſwer. For, as that is juſt the middle of a line, that leaveth on both ſides ſo much to either extream, that there is in reſpect of it no difference between the one and the other; but unto it, both are equal and alike: So thoſe things are called Indifferent properly, that without any difference, do equally agree unto, or diſſent from thoſe Extreams, unto which they have reference and relation.
6. By all this it may appear that things Indifferent, are not ſuch ſimply in themſelves and of themſelves conſidered, but as they are compared and have relation to the ſaid oppoſite extreams, as the Center in a circle, conſidered in it ſelf and by it ſelf, is not the middle of any thing, but only as it hath reference to the oppoſite extreams in the Circumference: from any of which it is equally diſtant, and in that reſpect only, is it called the mean or middle of ſuch a figure.
7. The very eſſence therefore of a thing indifferent, conſiſts in that equal and indifferent reference and relation that it hath to ſome two oppoſite terms or extreams, unto which either in ſence or reaſon it is compared, and by which only it is meaſured. So that it is in the number of thoſe things that in Schools are called Relatives, all which have only but an accidental being, the Subjects thereof being variable, according to the divers references and reſpects that they have unto divers things. For as a man ſimply conſidered in himſelf, is neither Husband, Father, nor Maſter, but only in reſpect of Wife, Child and Servant. And as the ſame man in divers reſpects may be a Father and a Son, a Maſter and a Servant: So nothing is in and of it ſelf indifferent, but only in relation and reference to ſome oppoſite extreams: And thoſe things which in ſome ſuch reſpect may be indifferent, in ſome other reſpect may be Extreams.
CHAP. II. Of things more commonly called indifferent.
1. THough things Indifferent may in that former generality, ſpread themſelves to any mediocrity whatſoever: Yet Cuſtom the Miſtreſſe of all ſpeech and language, hath reſtrained and limitted the name to ſuch things only, as are a Mean between good and evil. So that (to omit what in rigorous propriety of ſpeech may be comprehended under the name that is given unto them) In common uſe of ſpeech, a thing indifferent is only any mediocrity between good and evil.
2. The proper Extreams therefore of things indifferent, being good and evil, they cannot (retaining the nature of their indifference) communicate or partake of either; for whatſoever ſtandeth equally affected to good and evil, cannot in that affection, have in it either good or evil: It being impoſſible, that either of the extreams ſhould be found in the Mean, without deſtruction of the nature thereof.
3. Whatſoever then void of all evil,aSuch they ſay are our Ceremonies. For thoſe things are good that are decent, orderly & means of edification. participateth but the leaſt meaſure of good; or void of all good, partaketh but thebSuch we ſay and have proved the Ceremonies to be. leaſt degree of evil, cannot bear the name of a thing indifferent: for there can be no indifferency in that, which inclineth more to the one extream, than to the other.
4. A thing indifferent therefore being a mean, between good and evil, it iscSo are not theſe Ceremonies. ſo ſeated between them, that it is as far removed from good, as a thing not evil can be; and as far removed from evil as a thing not good can be, and as near unto good and evil, as any thing can be, that is neither good nor evil. So that whatſoever is Indifferent, is neither good nor evil, whatſoever is either good or evil, is not indifferent, whatſoever is not indifferent is either good or evil.
5. Things Indifferent being equally divided from good and evil, are in like manner divided from all the properties of either; For every property being unſeparable from that ſubject, from the nature whereof it ſpringeth, no one can be communicated to any thing, but unto that, unto which the ſubject it ſelf communicateth it ſelf: If therefore the property of any Extream be found in a thing Indifferent, the Extream it ſelf is to be found likewiſe therein. Which to imagin, is as abſurd, as to look to find the Circumference of a Circle in the Center.
6. No indifferent thing therefore as it is an indifferent thing,dBut they ſay that the Ceremonies in controverſie have. For that which is a grace and ornament to good, maketh the better. hath power to make any thing good or evil, better or worſe: For it is the property only of good and evil, either to make or increaſe good or evil in any thing.
7. ThateBut ſuch are the ceremonies in controverſie. which doth more hurt or good, than ſome things that are good or evil, is not indifferent, but either good or evil: for nothing but good can exceed in goodneſs that which is good; and nothing but evil, can exceed in hurt, that which is evil.
8. WhatſoeverfThis do the ceremonies in controverſie. worketh upon any affection of man, ſtirring up in him love, hatred, delight, ſorrow, zeal, malice, envy, jealouſie, hope, fear, &c. cannot be apprehended as a thing indifferent, by him in whom theſe paſſions are wrought. For it is the property only of thoſe things that preſent themſelves as good or evil, to beget and move ſuch paſſions in the ſoul of man. For it is impoſſible that a thing indifferent apprehended as a thing indifferent ſhould beget any thing in the ſoul of man but Indifferency, and a Stoical apathy or ſenceleſſeneſs: So that whatſoever agAs our Prelates do the ceremonies. man intirely loveth and delighteth in, admireth, commendeth, purſueth with zeal, commandeth with authority. Whatſoever alſo a man ſhall abhor, condemn, forbid, puniſh, perſecute, he cannot in any ſincerity affirm, that he judgeth that thing to be indifferent, but to be in ſome degree either good or evil.
9. The omiſſion of that is indifferent, the commiſſion whereof is indifferent: and that whoſehSuch is the omiſſion of our ceremonies ſaid to be, and that in a high degree. omiſſion is evil, is certainly good.
10. All the former Premiſes conſidered, this muſt needs follow, ThatiTo command our ceremonies is to command as they ſay, a great good, yea a publick common good. to command a thing indifferent, is to command no good; to forbid a thing indifferent, is to forbid no evil.kBut to uſe the ceremonies is to do much good, if they edify the ſoul. To do a thing indifferent, is to do no good: To forbear a thing indifferentlNone are more ſpitefully intreated than thoſe that forbear theſe ceremonies, and therefore ſure therein they do much evil. is to do no evil. And therefore to puniſh for a thing indifferent, is to puniſh for no evil.
CHAP. III. Of things Indifferent in special.
1. THE Eſſence of things Indifferent, conſiſting in a meer and equal privation of Good and Evil, there cannot be given any true kinds or degrees of them: For all privatives conſidered in themſelves, are of the ſame nature.
2. Though there be no true kinds of them, yet they may be varied according to the diverſity of thoſe Extreams with which they are compared: And therefore may be diſtinguiſhed according to the common diſtinctions of good and evil.
3. That good that hath not an evil oppoſite unto it in the ſame kind, cannot be the Extream of any thing Indifferent, and therefore cannot vary, diſtinguiſh, or denominate a thing indifferent. As, if there be not an oppoſite colour unto white, then it is impoſſible to imagine how white ſhould be an extream to any other colour, or any other colour a mean unto it.
4. That which is properly a mean, muſt agree with the extreams in all things in which the extreams do agree: for Example, If black and white be both of them colours, that which is properly a mean between black and white muſt be a colour alſo; for it were abſurd to call any thing but a colour, a mean between black and white: ſo that the mean followes the common natures and qualities of both the extreams, for as it is ſaid before, That onelyonly is a mean that is not only equally diſtant from two extreams, but withall is as neer to both as may be, which cannot be verified of that mean that ſhall not be found to agree with the extreams in thoſe things wherein the extreams do agree within themſelves, and therefore things indifferent follow their extreams. As therefore that cannot be an extream that hath not in the ſame kind an oppoſite, ſo that can be no medium to any extreams, that doth diſſent from them in that wherein they ſhall accord and agree. So that that denomination and predication that belongs to both extreams, belongs alſo to their mean. The mean between two oppoſite Qualities is a quality; between two ſubſtances, a ſubſtance; between two actions an action; between two goods a good; between two evils an evil; between two quantities a quantity, &c.
5. Hence it will follow, that noaAll ſubſtances therefore are indifferent only by accident, in reſpect of ſome uſe. ſubſtance (as it is a ſubſtance) can be called a thing indifferent, becauſe that there is no ſubſtance that is evil as it is a ſubſtance. For an indifferent ſubſtance, muſt needs (if there were any ſuch) be a mean between a good and an evil ſubſtance. If then there be no evil ſubſtances, it cannot be imagined how there ſhould be any indifferent.
6. The like may be ſaid of allbAs alſo of all artificial which imitate natures. created ſpecies and kindes of things, conſidered not only in their ſubſtances, but qualities and diſpoſitions. For the voice of God pronouncing them all to be good, none of them are evil: and if none of them be evil, none are indifferent. For indifferent created things can have no place, either real, or imaginative, but between a created good, and a created evil. There is therefore no Creature of God, nor no created property or quality of any creature, that is by creation a Thing Indifferent.
7. Alſo upon the ſaid grounds it appears, that there is no aAnd therefore there cannot be made an abſolute and perpetual law concerning any thing, under the name of indifferent; for a law bindeth only to good, and puniſheth for evil: and therefore to imagine a law that bindeth to the doing of a thing indifferent, when that thing indifferent turns evil, as the moſt indifferent thing may, then the force of the law ceaſeth.abſolute Indifferent thing, becauſe there is nothing in nature either abſolutely good, or abſolutely evil: In being impoſſible that any thing ſhould be an abſolute Mean, whoſe extreams are not abſolute, for where one extream is abſolute, and the other not abſolute, the Mean cannot be abſolute; for if it be, it enclineth more to one extream than the other, which is to deſtroy the nature of a thing indifferent.
CHAP. IV. Of the firſt Diſtinction of Things Indifferent.
1. THings Indifferent therefore, being to be diſtinguiſhed according to thoſe diſtinctions of Good and Evil that are equally common to them both, we are in the next place diſtinctly to propound the ſame, and by them accordingly to diſtinguiſh the other.
2. Firſt therefore Good and Evil is ſuch, either in appearance only, or indeed alſo. Whence ariſeth the firſt diſtinction of things indifferent, for accordingly ſome things are indifferent in appearance only, ſome indeed.
3. A Thing indifferent in appearance only, is that which is a mean between that Good and EvilConſider whether the myſtical Rites of an Idolatrous Religion and Worſhip, be not at leaſt an evil in appearance and ſhew, and therefore cannot be ſo much as in appearance indifferent. that is in ſhew and appearance only. For that appeareth to be indifferent, that being good or evil indeed, appeareth or ſeemeth to be neither.
4. A thing indifferent indeed, is that which is a Mean between thoſe things that are in truth and verity Good or Evil. So that ſuch an indifferent is void of all true good,bIf our Ceremonies were ſuch, the Devil and Antichriſt, and all ſuperſtitious and lewd perſons would not ſo much dote upon them, and the hearts of ſo many learned and godly men would not burn againſt them as they do. and evil.
5. As that which is good in appearance only, is indeed either evil or indifferent, and that which is evil in appearance only, is indeed either good or indifferent; and that which is indifferent in appearance only, is indeed either good or evil: So that which is indifferent indeed, is in truth, neither good nor evil.
6. AscIf Turciſme, Judaiſme, Pag…niſme, and the groſeſt Idolatry that ever was amongſt the Heathen were eſtabliſhed by that law and authority that theſe Ceremonies are, any point or parcel thereof might be maintained by the ſame or the like grounds, that Mr. Hooker, Covel, Wilk s, maintain the Indifferency of theſe Ceremonies: And there is no Article of Faith and Religion, but (by the ſame method that the Surveyor uſeth againſt the Diſcipline of other Reformed Churches) it may be traduced and oppugned as moſt odious, groſſe, and impious. the groſſeſt evil may by means of ſome counterfeit or ſhadow caſt upon it, be in appearance the greateſt good, and the greateſt good may be diſguiſed, and in ſhew transformed into the greateſt evil: So with much more facility may either of them by the wit of man have caſt upon them the formes of things indifferent.
So that there muſt be ſpecial heed taken that we admit not of all things as indifferent indeed, that preſent themſelves to us under that name and ſhape: Florentines can diſguiſe and colour any thing; and it is now adayes the common exerciſe of the greateſt wits of the world to transforme Good into Evil, Evil into Good, and both into indifferent; ſo that in theſe dayes ſcant any thing is as it appears, or appears as it is.
CHAP. V. The ſecond Distinction of Things Indifferent.
1. GOod and Evil is either Internal or External, according to which difference ariſeth a ſecond Diſtinction of Things Indifferent.
2. An External Indifferent is whatſoever hath in it neither outward good noraSome of our ſtate Divines think all external things indifferent: which ſhews that they that talk moſt of them, know leaſt what they are. evil.
3. An Internal Indifferent, is whatſoever hath in it neither inward good bWhat inward hurt and evil is in theſe Ceremonies they beſt know, that are beſt acquainted with the ſtate of their flock.nor evil.
4. SomethingcThe Doctors of Oxford ask what hurt can a wiſe man ſee in a ſquare Cap, and a Surplice? Indeed there is no outward hurt or evil in it; but it muſt be conſidered, whether there be not any inward hurt therein; for if it can be proved, that by them the ſoules of many are poyſoned with ſuperſtitious conceits, then it is apparent that they have inward hurt in them. External Indifferent may have in it internal good or evil; and ſome things internally Indifferent may have in them outward Good or Evil.
CHAP VI. Of the third diſtinction of Things Indifferent.
1. THirdly, Good and Evil is either of it ſelf or by accident: which alſo make the 3d Diſtinction of things Indifferent.
2. An Indifferent by accident is a mean between thoſe Extreams thataIf it can be proved that theſe Ceremonies are but evil by accident, (they being not good of themſelves) it is enough to argue that they are evil, and not indifferent. For, if many things that are good in themſelves be to be forborne, when by ſome accident they do hurt, much more ought a thing indifferent when it hunteth, though but by accident. are Good and Evil by accident, and not of themſelves: for, that muſt needs be only accidentally indifferent, whoſe Extreams (by which it is limited and defined) are but accidentally Good or Evil: So that whatſoever is Indifferent only in relation of ſome accidental Good or Evil, is Indifferent not of it ſelf, but by accident.
4.bErgo, There is nothing abſolutely Indifferent (as our Divines of State dream) but by ſome circumſtance of time, place, perſon, uſe, it may …e …ither very good, or very evil. There is nothing ſo Good of it ſelf, but it may be made Evil by accident; nothing ſo evil of it ſelf but it may become good by accident: Nothing ſo good or evil but it may become indifferent by accident; nothing ſo indifferent of it ſelf but it may become good or evil by accident.
5. Unto this head may be referred ſuch things as are Indifferent by compariſon; for, as there are ſome things good ſimply, that are evil in compariſon, and ſome things evil ſimply, that are good in compariſon; ſo alſo there is ſome good and evil, that in compariſon with others is indifferent.
CHAP. VII. Of a fourth Diſtinction of things Indifferent.
1. THings are good or evil, either Actively or Potentially: So are alſo Things Indifferent.
2. A thing Actually Indifferent, is that which hath in it neither actual good nor hurt.
3. A thing Potentially Indifferent, is that which in act doth either hurt or good, though in poſſibility it may do neither.
4. There is nothing actually Indifferent but is potentially good oraA poſſibility of evil in a thing indifferent, maketh it evil and worthy to be removed. Nature teacheth to prevent evils, and a man cannot do leſſe in the prevention thereof, than to leave off a thing in it ſelf indifferent, which doth no good, and may do hurt. evil: There is nothing potentially only indifferent, but it is actually either good or evil. Therefore there is nothing abſolutely Indifferent.
CHAP. VIII. Of the fifth Diſtinction of Things Indifferent.
1. LAſtly, Good and Evil is either Corporall, in reſpect of the body; or Spiritual, in reſpect of the minde; In which reſpect Things Indifferent do alwayes vary.
2. A Thing Indifferent in reſpect of the body, is any ſuch thing that applyed to the body, doth it neither good nor hurt. As that which maketh a man neither rich nor poor, ſtrong nor weak, beautifull nor deformed, hungry nor yet ſatisfied, ſick nor healthy, &c.
3. That may be GoodaCircumſtances of time and place do alſo vary the things of this kind exceedingly. For that in ſome time, and ſome place, is indifferent to ſome body, that in another place, and at another time is good or evil. to the body in one reſpect, that is Evil in another, & contrà; and that may be indifferent unto it in one reſpect, that is good or evil in another: Alſo that may be good or evil to one part of the body that is indifferent to another part: And a thing may be indifferent to one, that is good or evil to another.
4. A thing indifferent in reſpect of the minde or ſoul, is whatſoever having reference and relation to the ſoul,bEither indeed or appearance of it ſelf, or accident, actually or potentially. doth it neither good nor hurt.
5. The Goods and Evils of ſoul, are either diſpoſitions, qualities, or habits in the ſoul, or ſuch actions as proceed from them, As thoughts, words, deeds; all which are called moral. A Moral good is whatſoever in Man or from man is agreeable and correſpondent to the Law of Nature, Reaſon, or the Divine Law of God revealed ſupernaturally in his word; unto this head are to be referred, all true wiſdom, knowledg, underſtanding, providence, diſcretion, and all actions flowing from the ſame; Alſo all Moral vertues, as, Juſtice, Temperance, Holineſs, &c. with all the Actions proceeding from them, all which are ſquared and ruled by ſome or other of the former Laws. A Moral evil is whatſoever is any waies repugnant (whether in general or particular) to any of thoſe former Laws. As Ignorance, Folly, Injuſtice, Intemperance, &c. with all Actions proceeding from them.
6. Thoſe things are in a Moral reſpect indifferent (whether they be Qualities, Inclinations, Habits or Actions) That have in themcSee cha. 8. ſect 4. marg. neither vertue nor vice. Herein ſuch Actions of mans will are moſt frequent, that are neither commanded nor forbidden in the Word of God.
7. There is no Action of mans will ſo indifferentdSo that (by Mr. Hookers favour) a man may by taking up a ſtraw or a ruſh commit a Moral vice. For example, if he ſhould uſe to do it in the time of prayer. but the doing thereof (by ſome circumſtance) may be repugnant to the Law of God, and by conſequent be hurtful to the ſoul of man.
8. An Action that in ſome one reſpect unto ſomeone ſpecial Law, is Indifferent, in reſpect of ſome other Law may be Good or Evil. As that action may be either Religious or Superſtitious, that hath in it neither Temperancy nor Intemperancy.
9. Any action done by man that is not commandedeSuch are the Ceremonies in Controverſie: They are no where in general or ſpecial commanded, no more then the ſhaven on crown and holy water, and yet they have been and are the ſpecial means and occaſion of the Schiſm of many hundred Browniſts. Of much ſuperſtition in many thouſand ignorant Proteſtants, and of confirmation of many infinites of w…lful Papiſts in their Idolatry, as is moſt evident. Alſo, (if it be a ſin to diſlike our Lords ſpiritual) there is no one greater cauſe that moveth thoſe that the prophane call Puritans to do it, then theſe Ceremonies, which if they might be freed from, as all other reformed Churches are, there is no other Civil obedience or ſubjection due unto them, that they would refuſe to perform, in as low a degree as any other whatſoever. by God, either expreſly or by direct conſequent, that is a means either of it ſelf or by accident of any hurt either to the body or ſoul of a mans ſelf, or of his Neighbour, either by bringing evill into them, or nouriſhing or encreaſing evill in them, cannot bear the name of an Indifferent action; For there is no indifferency in that▪ which being not required of God (and therefore is not Good) doth hurt (any waies) a man: which muſt needs be againſt the Law of God. For the ſum of the Law of God being the love of God and our Neighbour, and love aiming only at the good of the loved: That action, that (beſides the Law) doth any hurt to any, muſt either have an exception in the Law, or elſe be againſt it, and then it cannot be indifferent.
10. Moral Actions, whether vertues or vices, reſpect ei…her God immediatly, or our ſelves or our Neighbour, as is intimated before. So do alſo all indifferent Actions.
11. That Action is indifferent in reſpect of God, that doth neither advance nor obſcure the glory of God: For this is the only good or Evil we can do unto God.
12. There is no ActionfWhat honour receiveth God by our Ceremonies? It is certain that Antichriſt receiveth great honour by them. that a man can do by the power of his will, but either in it ſelf, or by accident, it doth either glorifie or diſhonour God, and therefore no action, in reſpect of God, is meerly and abſolutely indifferent, but thereby God receiveth ſome honour or diſhonour.
13. All Actions of Religion (amongſt whichgSuch are the Ceremonies and Rites that are peculiarly acted in Divine Worſhip, if they be good and lawful. thoſe are ſpecial that are peculiarly done in Divine Service) are (if they be as they ought to be) in a ſpecial manner good, tending more directly to the glory of God than any other Actions, therefore no Action of Religion, whether it be Moral or Ceremoniall, is indifferent, but either good or evil.
14. No Action of Religion, whether Moral or Ceremonial,hSuch are our Ceremonies elſe they are not indifferent. grounded only upon the will of man, and not upon the Word of God, can bring any ſpecial glory to God, and therefore no ſuch Act can be an Act of Religion, but of Superſtition, and therefore cannot be indifferent.
15. There being ſome myſtical Ceremonies of Religion Good, and ſome Evil. If there be any myſtical Ceremonies indifferent, they muſt then in ſome ſpecial and material point differ from the Evil, even as far as from the good. But there is no myſtical Rite of ReligioniCroſſing in Baptiſm being no more commanded, nor no leſs forbidden then breathing upon the child, or anointing, which are rejected as evill. It muſt needs come nearer to theſe, than it doth to Baptiſm which is commanded. but doth come many degrees nearer to the evil than to the good. And therefore there can be no myſtical Rite of Religion indifferent.
16. An evil Ceremony of Religion being therefore only evil becauſe it is forbidden of God: A good Ceremony of religion is therefore only a good Ceremony becauſe it is commanded of God: and th…t muſt be an indifferent Ceremony that is neither forbidden nor commanded: But all Ceremonies in Religion that are not good, are evil, and therefore there are no indifferent Ceremonies of Religion.
17. As no man by his ſole will can make that Ceremony good in Divine Worſhip that God forbiddeth to be done therein, or make that evil that God commandeth to be done therein. So can he not make that which is but indifferent to be good: For he cannot make that to be commanded of God that is forbidden of God; Or that which (though it be not forbidden) is not commanded: If therefore what Ceremony of Religion ſoever is good be commanded of God; and if every Ceremony of Religion ought to be good, and if whatſoever Ceremony is commanded of God is not Indifferent, hence it will follow: That no Ceremony of Religion is indifferent.
18. Thus much of Actions indifferent having reference to God. Thoſe actions of man are indifferent in reſpect of a mans ſelf, or his neighbour, that being committed, bring neither moral hurt nor good unto himſelf, or them. For thoſe actions are evill to the doer, and ſuch as hurt his ſoul, that are a means of bringing either upon himſelf or upon his neighbour any evill forbidden. And thoſe actions are good to his ſoul, that are a means of affecting with any good commanded himſelf or his neighbour.
19. Whatſoever therefore, doing a man no good, is a means either tokBut we ſhall be ready to prove, that ſuch is the Law that requires theſe Ceremonies. take from a man any good thing that God hath freely granted unto him, as Life, Health, Liberty, Name, honeſty, Piety, &c. Or to bring upon a man that evil that God otherwiſe withholdeth from him, that cannot be indifferent.
20. All ſuch humane Laws therefore, thatlMuch more thoſe Laws that lay greater penalties upon the omiſſion of ſome Indifferent than the omiſſion of the greateſt good, or commiſſion of the groſſeſt evil, as do the Canons and Laws that require theſe Ceremonies. upon any penalties, bind men to thoſe things that are confeſſed indifferent, which are ſuch things as God hath left to the free liberty of man to do, or not tomThis hindereth not, but that the Magiſtrate may, and ought (if it be for the good of the Commonweal) command fiſh daies, and ſuch like the neglect whereof may do much hurt, and the obſervation much good, for in ſuch caſes eating of fiſh and fleſh is not a thing indifferent, but that which men ſtand bound either to forbear, or to do according to the Civil Laws of Magiſtrates. do, is a depriving of men of that liberty that God hath granted unto them, and therefore ſuch a Law is neither good nor indifferent, but evil to the ſoul of him that enacteth it, though not of him that obeyeth it. For it is no indifferency in any man to take that away from a man that God hath freely given unto him.
21. All moral actions of men that are good or evill, are either private, or common and publike: The common and publike are either Domeſtical, Political, or Eccleſiaſtical. Actions alſo in their Indifferency may vary according to their divers references to theſe.
22. A private good or evil action, is that which affecteth with good or evill only a mans own perſon that doth it, and which ſpreadeth not to the good or hurt of any other (except ſecondarily and by accident) as he that eateth and drinketh) doth himſelf only good properly: Though ſecondarily and by accident, he may, in that ſtrength he receiveth, thereby do his Family or the Commonwealth good.
23. That action is indifferent, in reſpect of a mans private ſelf, that doth his own private Perſon any good or hurt.
24. Thoſe Domeſtical, Political, Eccleſiaſtical actions are good or evil, that tend to the good or hurt of a Family, Commonwealth, or Church; and thoſe are indifferent, that, being done, do bring neither good nor hurt, or as much good as hurt unto any of the ſaid Societies.
25. That may be good, evil, or indifferent to a private perſon, as he is a private perſon, that is not ſo unto a Family, Commonwealth or Church, or unto him, as he is a member of all or any of them.
26. That may be Indifferent to be done by a Family, or the Commonwealth, as it is ſuch, That is evil and not indifferent to be done by a Church. That may be indifferent to one member of a Houſe, Church, or Commonwealth, that is not indifferent to another; that may be lawful or indifferent for the Church to do in one place, and at ſome one time, that is unlawful in another place, and at another time.
27. All which premiſes, or the moſt of them, being granted, it will eaſily appear, to any that can rightly apply theſe principles and general aſſertions, that the Ceremonies, in preſent controverſie in our Church, are not (as is pretended by the forcers of them) meerly indifferent, but either excellent parts of our Religion, or notorious parts of Superſtition.
FINIS.