Examination of Antinomianism, Arguments
THE ARGUMENTS OF The Compaſsionate Samaritan,
Touching the Power of the Magiſtrate in the compulſion of Conſcience, Examined.
THe intent and ſcope of the Book is to ſhew, That the Magiſtrate ought not to puniſh any for the profeſſion of his Conſcience (by Conſcience he meaneth the mans preſent judgement and opinion) though it be contrary to what is determined by Authority. His Arguments be theſe: 1. Becauſe puniſhment is not due to what is neceſſitated. 2. Becauſe no man can preſume of infallibility. 3. Becauſe the Magiſtrate ought not to compel any man to ſin.
The firſt Argument.
VVHere there is a neceſſity, there ought to be no puniſhment, Becauſe puniſhment is the juſt recompence of voluntary Actions, not of neceſſitated. But every man is neceſſitated to be of that opinion which he holdeth: Nor can he chuſe but be of that judgement whatſoever it is; Becauſe his reaſon doth neceſſarily enforce him to it, while it concludeth the Poſition to be true or falſe.
Anſ. Grant indeed, Where there is a neceſſity there ought to be no puniſhment, if there be no concurrence of the will: Or if that neceſſitation proceed not from a faulty cauſe: ex. gr. The ſpider is by inſtinct of nature neceſſitated to make poiſon, as the Bee to make honey: The ſinew that ſhrank in Jacobs thigh, or the joynt that is diſlocated, neceſſitateth a man to halt, he cannot chuſe; Yet here is no puniſhment due, becauſe here is no concurrence of the will, nor is this neceſſitation from a faulty cauſe. But now when drunkenneſs doth neceſſitate ſome to luſt, and others to wrath; Or rather, when corruption doth neceſſitate wicked men and Angels to ſin (ſuch is their preſent condition, they can do nothing but ſin) Yet is not this neceſſitation an excuſe to ſave from puniſhment, becauſe this is not from natural inſtinct, but from voluntary conſent, it is from a faulty cauſe: ſo that it is not always true, that where there is a neceſſity, there ought to be no puniſhment. Conſequently, we muſt inquire, Whence this neceſſity, viz. That he cannot chuſe but be of that opinion, whence, I ſay, it cometh; Whether from a faulty or a faultleſs cauſe: He ſaith, His reaſon concludeth it to be ſo and ſo; And hereby he is neceſſitated to be of this opinion; He cannot believe otherwiſe then his reaſon guideth him: Nor indeed, is it fit he ſhould, during the time that reaſon ſo concludeth: But then, enquire farther, whence is it that his reaſon doth ſo conclude? Is it from the clearneſs of the Argument? Or from the cloudineſs of his underſtanding? In ſome things there is ſuch clearneſs in the Argument, and ſuch evidence in the light thereof, that the judgement cannot but reſt in it: ex. gr. The Articles of the Chriſtian Faith, and the Duties of the Moral Law; The truth of the one, the equity of the other is ſo clear, that reaſon cannot but ſee the evidence, and conclude accordingly. But in reſpect of ſome other things, though no leſs true, and good in themſelves, there may be ſuch cloudineſs and darkneſs in the underſtanding, that it cannot apprehend the evidence and force of that Argument and Reaſon which is aleaged, and ſo for the preſent it is hindred in yielding aſſent to them; But then, the next enquiry is, what may be the ground or ſpring of this darkneſs and obſcurity? Whether weakneſs and ignorance, or wilfulneſs and prejudice. If ignorance, good reaſon that as yet the party be excuſed from puniſhment, till farther information? Not ſo, if it proceed from paſſion and prejudice. And would you know, whether it proceed from the one or from the other; Conſider theſe Rules:
1. If it proceed from weakneſs, and not from wilfulneſs, you ſhall finde in the man a readineſs, yea a diligence to enquire and ſearch for farther information, glad he is to be inſtructed: Not ſo the other, he is negligent and careleſs to enquire, he liketh his preſent opinion, and ſo pleadeth Conſcience, when indeed it is affection, and affectation that doth wholly guide him: He would not be convinced of an Error, leaſt he ſhould loſe what he hopeth to receive in holding this way.
2. If from ignorance and weakneſs, it is attended with meekneſs and humility: Not ſo the other, he is ſwelling, ſupercilious, ſelf-ſeeking and ſelf-conceited, ready to contemn others; at no hand ready to yield, no not even to know truths, if he perceive that they croſs the conceit which he hath taken up. Whereas the weak Chriſtian is ready to acknowledge the gifts and graces of others that are contrary minded; nor will he deny any truth, though he cannot as yet acknowledge this in queſtion to be a truth, and …o ſubſcribe unto it. Nor will he (as doth the other too frequently) cenſure thoſe that are contrary minded.
3. Weakneſs and Ignorance, cauſeth in him ſadneſs and ſorrow of Heart, in the conſideration of his own dulneſs: Grieved he is that he cannot ſee, what other holy Saints and ſervants of God do ſee: Hence alſo, hearty prayer that God would reveal this truth alſo to him, that ſo he may comply with that duty of Obedience which he oweth to Authority. Not ſo the other, He neither grieveth nor prayeth, but pleaſeth himſelf, and pleadeth againſt Authority, yea, and cenſureth their proceedings, as if all the world were bound to learn of him, and ſubſcribe to what he hath concluded. And is it fit that ſuch a man ſhould by the pretence and plea of Conſcience, thus palliate his affected ways, and yet eſcape the juſt laſh of Authority?
The ſecond Argument.
NO ſort of men can preſume of an unerring ſpirit; for evident it is that all of them, Fathers, Councels, Parliaments have been groſsly miſtaken; nor are the preſnet times exempt from error: Why then ſhould one ſort compel the other, in as much as hereby hazard is run, that he who is in the error may be the conſtrainer of him who is in the truth.
Anſ. Grant the truth of what is laid for the ground; viz. That none are free from error, according to that of Rom. 3. Nor can any one preſume of an unerring ſpirit; And yet I deny the inference, viz. That therefore one ſort may not compell the other: For why? Though no man may preſume of ſuch a ſpirit, yet they that are of God may comfortably expect the conduct of the ſpirit, Pſal. 25. 14. Joh. 16. 13. Again, though none may expect to be guided by inſpiration, yet by the manuduction of that Rule which the Spirit of God hath fitted and perfected for the Church of God; by this I ſay may the man of God expect to be throughly furniſhed, 2 Tim. 3. ult. Now then might the Prophets and Apoſtles who were guided by an infallible ſpirit, might they be alowed to compel them that were contrary minded (which is evident both by the preſident of Saint Paul, 1 Tim. 1. ult. and alſo by the mans Argument: For if they that want it may not, becauſe they want it; then they that have this infallible ſpirit, may compel becauſe they have it) might they be alowed; And may not the Paſtors of the Church, who have a Rule which is no leſs infallible? Is not the Text of Scripture as infallible a Rule of Direction to the Church of God in preſent, as the Inſpiration and Revelation was to the Prophets and Apoſtles? If not, why is that exchanged for this? Is the ſpirit leſs careful of the Church now, then in times paſt? Leſſe careful I mean to lead it into all truth. I may grant indeed, that the Inſpiration and Revelation did carry with it a more active impreſſion of light upon the underſtanding of the Prophets and Apoſtles, to evidence the truth of what they received: But the Queſtion is not ſo much, whether that way had not greater evidence, but whether this way hath not as great aſſurance. Things concluded by reaſon, and received by Faith, have in them no leſs aſſurance, then things perceived by ſenſe, though not ſo great evidence. So then, In thoſe things whereof the Paſtors of the Church are infallibly aſſured by the text of Scripture that they are not deceived, they may (even by vertue of the Authors Argument) uſe compulſion to reſtrain the violence of them that oppoſe the truth of God.
Object. But of all ways, compulſion is the moſt unlikely to beget unity of minde, and uniformity of practiſe. Sol. Compulſion is not uſed to this end, but onelyonly ex conſequenti, as the ſuppreſſion of different judgements and practiſes may conduce to unity and uniformity: It is a vain thing to think that by fines and impriſonments the Magiſtrate doth ſeek to perſwade men to piety and honeſty: No, his primary and proper end is to ſuppreſs the contrary? As the weeding of the Garden doth not make the ſeeds to grow, yet in removing impediments, and making room, it doth accidently proſper their growth: So is it here.
Object. But Club-law cauſeth prejudice againſt what is ſo propugned. Sol. It may be ſo in ſome, and for a time; Yet God who is wiſer then man, by his own practiſe hath given us to ſee, that when the way is hedged in with thorns, and when the Back doth ſmart under the Rod, the ear is opened to diſcipline and inſtruction. So that though the Rod do not directly convince or perſwade; yet it hath its efficacy in the way and work of preparation.
The third Argument.
TO compel me to do contrary to my Conſcience, is to compel me to ſin; Becauſe whatſoever is not of Faith, is ſin. Of Faith, i. e. Whereof I am not certainly perſwaded that it is lawful. But the Magiſtrate ought not to tompel any one to ſin; therefore, Not to do contrary to his Conſcience, nor to worſhip God in a way, of the juſtneſs whereof he is not perſwaded, nay is perſwaded that it is unlawful.
Anſ. True indeed, The Magiſtrate ought not to compel any one to ſin, underſtanding the Propoſition of Malum in ſe, of that which is ſimply evil in it ſelf. Not ſo, if we ſpeak of Malum ex accidenti, of that which is accidentally evil: Evil to me, becauſe of a miſguided Conſcience, ex. gr. Nebuchadnezzar did ill, by threatnings to compel the People to worſhip the Golden Image: So that ſecond Beaſt, mentioned Rev. 13. did ill, in cauſing them to be killed, who would not worſhip the Image of the firſt Beaſt, Verſe 15. Not ſo the Magiſtrate in compelling a Papiſt or a Separatiſt to come to Church; Becauſe, though this may be evil to him, in reſpect of his unperſwadedneſs, yet is it not evil in it ſelf: Again, It is not fit that the Magiſtrate do forbid what is good in it ſelf, or lay a reſtraint upon what God hath commanded: It was Darius fault to reſtrain prayer, Dan. 6. 7. And the Scribes and Rulers ſinned in forbidding the Apoſtles to preach in the Name of Jeſus, Act. 4. 19. But lawful enough it is for the Magiſtrate to forbid the doing of ſomething which is only good by conſequence: So likewiſe, to lay reſtraint upon what is only lawful, becauſe not prohibited, ex. gr. if a man will ſay, This is a truth, and therefore I will ſpeak it and publiſh it; Or if he ſay, This is juſt and fit to be done, and therefore I will do it; The Magiſtrate may put in a bar of reſtraint, and puniſh him that ſhall tranſgreſs: For neither is every truth to be publiſhed at all times and in all places; nor is every man alowed to do every thing that is lawful and good: And as for things that are not prohibited by God, but left at large, who knoweth not but that the uſe of them is to be regulated and ordered by the advice and direction of Authority: The Commandments whereof, though they binde not the Conſcience of and by themſelves; yet whoſo doth make no Conſcience of them ſinneth againſt God, whoſe precept it is, to be ſubject to the power, not only for wrath, but even for Conſcience and for the Lords ſake, Rom. 13. 5. 1 Pet. 2. 13.
Now as touching the power of the Magiſtrate in matters of Religion, we muſt look into the Old Teſtament, and thence fetch direction, ſince no particular precepts, as touching his duty are given in the New. In the fourth Commandment, he is enjoyned to look to the ſtranger within his Gates, no leſs then to them of his family: The ſtranger might not be permitted to pollute the Sabbath, nor to prophane any of Gods Ordinances. Was it not upon this warrant, that Nehemiah caſt forth the Houſhold-ſtuff of Tobiah out of the Chambers, and threatned thoſe of Tyrus who made Markets upon the Sabbath?
Aſa compelled the People to ſeek the Lord God; And Joſiah cauſed them to enter into the Oath and Covenant: From which Texts it is evident, that the power of the Magiſtrate in matters of Religion is both Coactive, and Coercive: Coactive in reſpect of them within, Coercive in reſpect of them without the Church: Strangers are not indeed compelled to ſanctifie the Sabbath, but reſtrained from prophaning it. Thoſe that are in Covenant with God, are not only reſtrained but alſo compelled to joyn with the Aſſembly in the worſhip of God: If nor, they are punniſhed: Nor is the puniſhment of theſe an act of perſecution, but a prudent preſervation of the power and purity of Religion and Gods worſhip: Now except we ſhould think that God hath leſs regard to the preſervation of the Purity of his worſhip and ſervice now in the time of the New Teſtament then he had in the Old, we cannot with reaſon deny, but what was lawfully done by the Kings of Iſrael, is not unlawful for the Civil Magiſtrate in the time of the New Teſtament. Wherefore the Magiſtrate hath a power from God to ſee to the obſervation of the Moral Law, and a ſword to puniſh offenders againſt it: Not only againſt the ſecond Table, but alſo againſt the firſt: He is Cuſtos & vindex utriuſ que tabulae.
Object. Not ſo, This was allowed in the Old Teſtament: yet is it not therefore to be practiſed in the New: There, i. e. in the Old Teſtament there was a precept ſo to do: Here, in the New Teſtament there is rather a prohibition, not to do ſo: Let the Tares grow till the Harveſt, Mat. 13.
Sol. Truth it is that this Text of our Saviour hath much prevailed with many of the Ancient and Modern Divines to draw them to the uſe of much (perad venture overmuch) clemency towards Hereticks: but if we do remember that God who is immutable in his eſſence, is alſo unchangable in his will, nor doth he ſo expreſs his minde in any one text of Scripture, that it ſhould draw with it the contradiction of another, if rightly underſtood: And if we hold that rule of Interpretation for good, which Divines deliver, viz. That where there is a ſeeming repugnancy in the Texts, there it is fit that plain precepts ſhould guide our practiſe rather then dark and obſcure parables: We ſhall eaſily conclude, that the meaning of our Saviour is not to forbid the uſe either of the ſpiritual or civil ſword; Both which are the Ordinances of God, inſtituted of God for the Coertion and Reſtraint of them that do evil: And yet if this word muſt ſtand, Let them alone till the Harveſt, there will be no uſe of either the Civil ſword for the puniſhment of Malefactors, nor of the Spiritual Cenſures for the ejection and exciſſion of ſcandalous offenders. For why? Theſe Tares in the Parable are expounded to be the children of the wicked, i. e. of that wicked one the Devil: And why this Text ſhould be ſo expounded as to favor Hereticks rather then Hypocrites, I mean ſuch whoſe practiſe is not anſwerable, nay contrary to their Profeſſion, I deſire to learn from theſe men, who it ſeemeth preſume to know more of Gods minde then he hath revealed in the word.
The precept of Saint Paul, 1 Cor. 5. 13. is plain, and his practiſe according, 1 Tim. 1. 20. Nor could Saint Jerome otherwiſe reconcile theſe two, but by this Interpretation of that parable, That inaſmuch as there is not much difference and diſſimilitude betwixt the wheat and the tares while both are in the herb, the intention of our Saviour is to premoniſh us not to be overhaſty in pronouncing ſentence, where there is any ambiguity and difficulty, but rather reſerve it, and refer all to the judgement of God: And he giveth this reaſon of ſo doing; Becauſe it may come to paſs, that he who to day is depraved in his judgement, may repent and amend to morrow, yea and return to the truth, in which we may rather commend his gentleneſs, then ſubſcribe to his judgement, in the ſence of the parable; the ſcope whereof doubtleſs is not to teach lenity and mildeneſs in proceeding againſt Hereticks (the word is not, Let them alone yet a little, or be not ſo haſty. But, until the harveſt, and that is at the end of world; Till then let them grow ſaith the parable: and yet Saint Paul ſaith, An Heretick after the firſt and ſecond admonition reject) but the intention of the parable doubtleſs is to ſhew, that there is no expectation of univerſal purity in the Church of God during this life: There will be tares always till in the end of the world there be made a total ſeparation. This is the intent, and farther then ſo it is not doctrinal.
I confeſs, they ſpeak reaſon, who granting the tares to be …eant of Hereticks, and this eradication to be done by the ſtroke of death, do yet deny, that the parable doth prohibite this eradication any farther, then when there is alſo danger of plucking up the wheat, grounding this upon thoſe words, Leaſt peradventure ye pluck the Wheat; Intimating, that as the Magiſtrate may juſtly puniſh Malefactors by death, where there is no danger of Sedition, ſo may the Paſtor, where there is no fear nor danger of a Schiſm, proceed againſt Heretical perſons: This I confeſs is rational, yet I ſee no reaſon to depart from the former.
But this farther obſerve, that he who forbad the plucking them up, did not forbid to hinder the ſowing of them. Good therefore is the councel of Saint Jerome, Quam…brem non dormiat qui Eeleſia prapoſitus est, ne per illius negligentiam in i…itus …me ſuperſenti…t zizania i. e. Hereticorum dogmata. Let not the Church-Governor ſleep, leaſt the envious man take that opportunity to ſow tares: And that of Chemnitius is not to be contemned, Quando zizania volunt triticum creſcendo ſuperare, &c, When there is danger and fear leaſt the Tares do overgrow and ſo come to choke the Wheat, ſince God hath ſet up two diſtinct Governments, viz. Eccleſiaſtical and Political, and hath forbidden the Church-Governor to meddle with the ſword, no doubt but in this caſe the Paſtor may with a good Conſcience deſire the help of the Civil Magiſtrate, and deſire him to take care leaſt the field of Wheat ſuſtain any harm by the Tares.
Memorable is that Recantation of Saint Auſtin; Sometimes he had been of that Opinion, N…minem ad Chriſti unitatem eſſe …gendum, verbo eſſe agendum, diſputatione pugnandum, ratione vincendum; Ne fictos Catholicos: haberemus, quos apertos haereticos n…veramus: But afterwards he changed his Opinion, confeſſing that he found it by experience what benefit came to many by the wholeſome ſeverity of the imperial Edicts: Even whole Cities recovered from the poiſonons Doctrine of Donatiſm, while by the Laws they were compelled to return to the Society and fellowſhip of the Church: So then, Compulſion is not unlawful in this caſe; not only Eccleſiaſtical by the Cenſures of the Church, but alſo Civil, by the Sword of the Magiſtrate: Only the doubt is, whether the ſword of the Magiſtrate may puniſh Hereſie with death: But if the Magiſtrate try to reclaim them from their Errors, by thoſe ways which are acknowledged lawful to be uſed, viz. Reſtraining the Ring-leaders; by prohibiting the Pulpit and the Preſs, by diſperſing their Conventicles, by impriſonment of the unruly and obſtinate, So alſo, by compelling the reſidue to attend upon the Society of the Faithful, and publike Miniſtery of the Word [Theſe are acknowledged lawful, even by thoſe who deny it lawful to put any to death, Non prohibet Chriſtus conciliabula haereticorum diſſipare, ora obſtruere, libertatem loquendi concidere, verum interficere & trucidare vetat: So Chryſoſtom, as I finde him cited by Chemitius.] Now if theſe be carefully followed, and made uſe of, either there will be no need to proceed any farther in the way of puniſhing Hereticks; or if there be, it will be ſo plain and palpable, that none will make any ſcruple, except he would have the Magiſtrate ſtand for a Cypher, and ſuffer both Church and Common Wealth to ſink under the unruly diſorders of unquiet ſpirits.
So then, It is evident, that he who forbade to pluck up the Tares, did not forbid to hinder the ſowing of them: And indeed if we mark it, the Queſtion in this point of compulſion and liberty of Conſcience, is not touching what is to be done with them that are of another minde, But what is to be done with them that publiſh their erroneous Opinions, and ſeek to druw diſciples after them: Nor touching them that receive not for truth, whatſoever is decreed by the verdict of Authority, but touching them that oppoſe and contradict it as erroneous. It were, I confeſs, overmuch to binde me to believe whatſoever the Synod concludeth: But it is not unfitting for Authority to reſtrain my hand and tongue from open oppoſition and apparent contradiction.
I cloſe up my thoughts of this Point, with theſe few Rules, which I conceive fit to be thought upon, for the prevention of Schiſm, and the preſervation of peace and unity.
1. In things decreed by Authority, and enjoyned by Superiors, the Queſtion that Subjects are to debate, is not, An hoc ſit optimum, but, An hoc ſit illi citum: Not, whether it might no be better; But, whether this be ſo bad, as not to be endured Reaſon; Becauſe if it be not unlawful in it ſelf, it is for the preſent to be received, and a fitter apportunity to be waited for, when in humility we may tender to Authority a farther light of information.
2. The plea of Conſcience is not an excuſe for our not complying with the Command of Authority, ſave only in the caſe of that weakneſs before mentioned; viz. When having uſed all good means of farther information, yet the underſtanding is not able to overmaſter the ſcruple of Conſcience.
3. Not they who differ in Opinion, from what is decreed by Authority, but they that publiſh their Opinions are juſtly puniſhed. For why? Though the thoughts of the heart fall not under the command of the Magiſtate, yet the publication of them doth; Becauſe, hereby the Peace of the Church, and the Purity of Religion may come into danger; And the care of theſe is committed to him, and only in this care of his doth he ſerve God as a Magiſtrate, and go beyond the ordinary ſervice of the Chriſtian, According to that obſervation of St. Auſtin, Epl. 50. ad Bonifacium, Aliter ſervit Rex quia Homo▪ aliter etiam quia Rex. Quia Homo eſt, Deo ſervit vivendo fideliter; Quia Rex eſt, ſervit Leges juſta praecipientes, & contraria prohibentes conveniente rigore ſanciendo. In hoc ſerviunt Domino Reges in quantum ſunt Reges, cum ea faciunt ad ſerviendum illi, quae non poſſunt facere niſi Reges.
Imprimatur
Novem. 28. 1646. JOHN DOVVNAME.
FINIS.
End of the text · Thomas Bedford, Examination of Antinomianism (1647)