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The Reduction of a Digresser · Richard Baxter

The Reduction of a Digresser, Section 5 – Section 6

§. 5.

R. B. REmember that I say not that your Doctrine is Untrue, but Uncertain. It may be possibly as you say; but whether you can tell that it is so, or prove it to be so, I doubt. To your great Argument, I expect better proof of your major Proposition, which indeed hath none at all. Two things I expected you should have proved: 1. That God hath an Understanding and Will which act; properly so called: or that you know what it is that is improperly called Gods Understanding and Will? 2. That God hath no immanent Act but of his Understanding or Will. To begin with the last: I will not say, datur tertium. For I dare not say properly dantur duo: But I will desire you to prove your major: and I think that in the same sense as God is said to have an Understanding and Will, for ought you know he may have other acts, which those two notions will not express. …or 1. You are uncertain whether Angels may not have other faculties or acts-immanent, besides Understanding and Will: (If you say, you are sure they have not, prove it:) and so others may be ascribed to God by Analogy from them, as these be by Analogy from man. You know perhaps how many senses you have your self: but how can you prove that no other creature hath a sixth sense, which you are uncapable of knowing the name or nature of? So how know you but Angels may have powers or immanent acts beside Understanding and Willing, which you know nothing of for name or nature? Must all Gods superiour creatures be needs measured by poor man? How much more noble creatures hath God, then these below that dwell in dust! 2. But if you were acquainted with all the Angels in heaven, and were at a certainty about the number or nature of their powers or acts, how prove you that God hath no other act then what Understanding and Willing doth express? That one unconceivable perfect act in God, which Eminenter (by an unconceivable transcendent eminence) is Understanding and Willing, (yet but Analogically so called) but properly and formally is neither, but somewhat more excellent; is in all likelihood very restrainedly or defectively expressed by these two words; even as to the objective extent. How know we but that in some of Gods creatures, or at least in God himself there may be something found besides Entity, Verity, Goodness; or any thing that is the object of Intellection or Volition, whereof no man had ever any conception. However, is it not unlikely, yea a dangerous imagination, That the powers or acts of such wretched worms as we, should be so farre commensurable with the Infinite Majesty, that as we have no immanent act but of Understanding or Will (or subordinate to these) so God hath no other? or none but what are expressed in these two notions! Alas, that silly worms should so unreverently presume! and pretend to that knowledge of God which they have not! and might so easily know that they have not!

And for the former, How farre God hath an Understanding or Will, I will peruse your words to Master Goodwin when I have done with this Section.

This were enough to your Argument and Challenge: but I proceed to the confirmation of your implied minor. And 1. I easily grant you, that it is certain there is no Addition to, or mutation of Gods Essence. 2. I think all the Acts ascribed to God are his Essence, and are one in themselves considered. Pardon▪ that I do but say [I think:] For though principles of reason and Metaphysical Axioms seem to lead plainly to this Conclusion; yet I am afraid of pretending to any greater Certainty then I have; or of building too much on the doubtfull conclusions of mans slippery Reasonings, about the nature of the Invisible Incomprehensible God. I think it most sutable to Gods Unity and Simplicity, that all his immanent acts (so called by us) are Himself and are One. But I dare not say I am certain that God cannot be Simple and Perfect, except this be true: both because He is beyond my knowledge, and because the doctrine of the Trinity assureth us that there is in God a true diversity▪ consisting with Unity, Simplicity and Perfection of Essence. 3. You know not what the subject of your Proposition is, (Gods acts of Understanding and Will:) and therefore you are uncapable of such peremptory concluding de Modis, knowingly and certainly, as here you pretend to. 4. You cannot prove that there's any such thing in God as an Immanent Act, or an Understanding or a Will in proper sense: but something there is which we cannot fitlier or more profitably conceive or express then under such notions, drawn Analogically from mans acts of Understanding and Willing. Now if we will speak of Gods Incomprehensible nature by such Analogy, and put the names of Understanding and Willing on God, as borrowed from mans understanding and willing, then must we accordingly conceive of Gods understanding and willing, as like to mans in the form of these acts (for we can reach to no higher conceptions, though these be utterly improper.) Now mans actual intellection doth connote and suppose an intelligible object, and his Will doth connote and suppose an appetible object: and consequently it cannot be expected according to the utmost imaginable natural perfection of them, that either should go beyond the extent of their objects, or be such acts without their proper objects: *Even as Gods Omnipotency is but dicta ad possibilia, Vid. Aquin. 1. q. 25. a. 3. c.These things thus premised, some will perhaps think you sufficiently answered (when you say, it inferres that God was not Omniscient, knew not all, &c.) by telling you 1. That as Omnisciency signifies a Power of Knowing all things, Analogically ascribed to God ad captum humanum as distinct from the act of knowing; so God was yet Omniscient. 2. As Omnisciency signifieth the actual Knowledge of all intelligible objects, so God was Omniscient And no more is requisite to the perfection of his Knowledge. 3. But an Object may have not only its real but its *See Buridane of that question in his Ethicks so far as to shew the great difficulty.intelligible Being de Novo which it had not before; and therefore as Omnisciency signifieth the Knowledge of all things that will be intelligible, as well as those that now are intelligible, so (say they) it belongs not to Gods perfection to be Omniscient; for it is unnaturally and improperly called Science (and so Omniscience) which hath not an Object. Their foundation (which may seem absurd to you) viz. That some things may de novo become the objects of Knowledge, they declare thus: 1. They suppose, that though God be Indivisible, and so his Eternity be Indivisible, and have neither in it, Praeteritum nor Futurum, nor Nunc neither, as we understand it, as expressing a present instant of time; yet as God knoweth not Himself only, but the creature also, so he knoweth not E…e…nity only but Time: He knows how things are ordered and take place in mans Divisible measure of motions: and therefore he knows things as Past, Present and Future, quoad hominem & tempus, which are so past, presen… and future. And he doth not know a thing Past to be Present (quoad tempus & hominem) nor a thing Future to be Past: but knows things truly as they be. 2. This being premised, they will then assume, that Peter and Paul did not actually exist from eternity: Christ did not actually suffer from eternity: and so the actual existence of Peter in nunc temporis, was not an intelligible object from Eternity: and therefore they think they may conclude, that it could not be known from Eternity. They will urge their reason thus: 1. There was no Time from Eternity (that is, before time:) therefore it could not be intelligible, that Peter did actually then exist in Time. 2. Else you will confound Futurition and Present existence: God did know from Eternity▪ that Peter would exist in Time, i. e. futuritionem Petri: therefore it was not Peter's present actual existence that he knew. 3. The nature of foreknowledge is to know things as future, and therefore must not be confounded with knowledge of things as existent. 4. This proposition before the creation was not true [Peter doth actually exist:] therefore God could not know it to be then true. But after Peter's birth it did de novo become a true proposition: and therefore must be de novo known to be then true. Before that, it was only true that [Haec Propositio vera futura est] but not [vera est:] therefore no more but the futurition of the Truth could be known, and not the actual present existence (as referring to time:) It is not all one to say [Petrus erit] and [Petrus est] nor all one to know it. 5. The contradictory Proposition was then true [Peter doth not exist:] But both contradictory Propositions could not be known to be true together, that is from Eternity. Therefore God did then know the Negative Proposition as then true [Petrus non existit:] and the Affirmative de futuro to be true [Petrus futurus est, vel existet:] but he did not know the Affirmative de existentia praesenti to be true from Eternity [Petrus in nunc temporis existit] no nor [Petrus in nunc Aeternitatis existit:] for they were then false Propositions: nor yet was it then true that [Tempus actu existit.] If you say, That there were no Propositions from Eternity, and therefore they could not be true or false: this alters not the case: for 1. We speak on supposition that there had been creatures to have framed these Propositions. 2. If we conceive not of Gods Understanding as knowing the truth of Propositions, concerning things, we shall scarce have any conception of it as an Understanding at all. 3. The Schools commonly speak of the Eternal truth of Propositions, e. g. de futuris contingentibus. 4. There are Propositions in Time, and these God knows: and thats all one to the present case. At Noahs …ood God knew not this Proposition to be then true [Petrus existit:] for it was not then true. Nor did he know then that [it is true in nunc temporis quo existit Petrus] but only, that i… will be true: For Futura and not things presently existent are the objects o… Foreknowledge: and that [Nunc temporis] it self did not then exist. 6▪ Otherwise it▪ would be true that All things do coexist with God from Eternity: (which is disclaimed by those that are now opposed:) and so that they do exist from Eternity. For if this Proposition were known to be true from Eternity [Petrus existit, vel Deo coexist…▪] then the thing expressed is true, Peter did so exist and coexist. For that which is false cannot be known to be at the same time true. If it be granted therefore that Peter did not exist from Eternity, and consequently that that Proposition was not then true, nor intelligible as then true, but only as of fut…e Verity, then when God in time knows it to be of present existent Verity, he knows more then when he knows it to be only of future Verity and of present falshood: And so about the crea…ures, When he knows that they do exist and knows them as existing, he knows more then when he knew them only to be future and as future. For if it be not more to know a thing as existent then as future, and so knowledge be not diversified from the object, then it is no more to know something then nothing: For the reason is the same: and future is a term of diminution as to existent. And then it will be all one to know [Judas is damned] and [Peter is saved:] [Jacob is loved] and [Esau is hated.] Yea then it would be all one i… (per possibile vel impossibile) it were known [Peter is damned] and [Judas is saved] or [Peter is saved and damned:] and so it would be all one to know falshood and truth.

Many such reasonings as these will be used against you. Of which if you would know my own opinion, I think they are de ignotis, dreams, fightings in the dark, yet much like your own. And though I know severall things that you may say against this reasoning, so do I know much that may be said against yours: and, I think, both sides would do better to profess that ignorance which they can neither overcome nor …ide. How constantly do the Schools distinguish between Gods Abstractive and Intuitive Knowledge? Scientiam simplicis intelligentiae & purae Visionis? and tell us that the former in order of nature goes before the other? If this be so, then God hath a Prius and Posterius in the acts of his knowledge. The like we may say between Gods Knowledge of Himself and the creature. If they think it not absurd that etiam in mente Divina there should be a transition of things è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum, and this sine mutatione; why may they not admit a knowledge of things as existent only when they are existent, and of things as future when they are future? and this sine mutatione too? For the distinction quoad momenta temporis, will make but a gradual difference, in point of mutation, from that quoad ordinem naturae, vel momenta Rationis. All distinction, that hath real ground, denotes imperfection, according to our highest speculators, and so must all be denied of God. I refuse not to say (if I must say any thing) of both as Mr. Barlow doth Exercit. 5. (think him not pedantick, because he is bound with Schibler:) Mutatio illa est solum in objecto cognito, non in cognoscente, seu cognitione; cum cognitio divina ab objecto non dependet, nec ad mutationem objecti mutationem ullam patitur, &c. Cum ideo admittit Alvarez res primo esse possibiles solum in ordine ad potentiam & futuras in ordine ad voluntatem, necesse est ut prius cognoscat cognitione abstractiva (quia ut possibiles ea solum cognitione cog…sci possunt) & postea cum per voluntatem fiunt futurae, & etiam actu existentes, illas cognitione intuitivâ cognos…et Deus. At hinc nulla in Deo mutatio sequetur, sed solum in objecto (ut fateatur necesse est) Et per consequens hoc dato, quod scientia Dei ab abstracti…a in intuitivam mutarctur, tamen non sequetur Deum esse mutabilem, vel cognitionem suam ex parte rei: sed solum quod objecto variato, intellectus noster, varias ei denominationes attribuit: ut quod sit intuitiva, quod …bstractiva, quae solum sunt denominationes variae cognitioni divinae ab intellectu nostro impositae, pro diverso respectu ad creaturam, cum in s… sit omnino simplex & invariata.]

But then I would fain know whether there be not the same necessity that the difference between objects [only future] and [presently existent] should cause our understandings to put the forementioned various denominations on Gods Knowledge, as the difference inter Possibilia & Futura, doth so cause us to put on it? And also whether in the same impropriety and imperfection, the very notions of [Understanding, Willing, Acting, Immanently, &c.] be not Denominationes ab intellectu nostro impositae, or assumed by God in condescension to humane weakness, expressing but some little, very little, of that Divine—I know not what. For that same thing which man hath a true formall conception of under the notion of [Knowing, Willing] is varied according to the variety of objects: But if it be not so with God (as I must think and say, It is not, if I presume to think and say any thing of it,) that is because Knowledge and Willing in Him are not the things that we by those terms use to express; nor yet any thing that we can have formall proper conceptions of: And by the same necessity and warrant as we do bring down the Divine nature so low, as to apply to it the notions of Acting, Understanding, Willing; may we also apply to it the notions of Acting, Knowing and Willing de novo; confessing a further addition to the impropriety of speech. And therefore as God himself doth in Scripture accomodate himself to our capacity, by assuming the terms and notions of Understanding and Willing, so doth he also of loving where he before hated, with divers the like, which in man would imply an innocent mutation.

I have here given you some reason of several passages of mine, which your following Pages carp at, before you discerned my meaning, as I shall shew you further anon.

So much to your proof that there is no new immanent act in Gods Understanding. One word to what follows about his Will.

Where you argue thus: [If of his Will, then this new act is either for the Better, or Worse, or Indifferent, &c.] Ans. In strict propriety, it is taken as unproved, that he hath Will, or Immanent acts. But ad captum humanum as we are necessitated to ascribe Willing and Acting to him, so they that think they may on the same grounds ascribe New acts of Will to him (as the Scripture undoubtedly doth,) will think that your Argument is sufficiently answered thus:

1. This arguing supposeth mans silly intellect capable of comprehending the Reasons of the Acts of the Almighty; as if it cannot be, except we can apprehend the reason of it, and whether it be for the better or worse or indifferent; or what it produceth, or to what end it is: which is a most bold arrogant presumption in such moles as we are. As I said before, you know not whether there may not be more Affections or Modi entium open to the Divine Intellect and Will, or Nature, then we have any name for or conception of: And though mans will look only at the goodness or appetibility or conveniency of objects, yet you know not what Gods will is; and therefore know not what is its adequate object. Many other reasons also of the obscurity of this might be given.

2. It will be answered you, that the said New act of Gods will, is for the Better: But then they will distinguish of [Better.] 1. They will say, It is Better quoad rerum ordinem: and it is Better to the creature: (as for God to love him that before he hated: or approve of him, whom before he disapproved.) 2. They distinguish also between that which may be said to be Better to God himself: Either Really, by a real addition to his perfection; and so nothing can be Better to God: Or 2. Relatively and Reputatively; as God is said to be Blessed, Glorified, Honoured, Well pleased, Exalted, Magnified, &c. And thus it may be Better to God, though he receive no real addition of felicity; and so not Vain or Indifferent.

3. They will desire you to Answer your own Argument as to transient Acts, and they think it may serve as to immanent acts. (Remembring that they suppose that there be new acts in God without mutation; because they suppose that those very things that we call immanent Acts in him are but denominations of his simple Essence, according to the various aspects or respects of the objects, which make no more mutation then relations do.) Was Gods act of Creation, of raising Christ from death, &c. for the Better, or Worse, or Indifferent? I think you will say as before, that it was not Better as to God in the adding of any real felicity to him: But to God Reputarively and Relatively, and to the creature really, it was Better. So will they say about immanent acts, which may perfect the whole (as the Honour of the Prince is the good of the Commonwealth) and may be necessary to the Good of particular persons; and the reputative Good of God himself. Its said, God made All things for himself, Was it for Better to himself, or Worse, or Indifferent?

4. Is it Better or Worse for a looking Glass that it receive a hundred various species de novo? You will perhaps say, It is no disparagement to the Glass to be receptive of new species without being made Better or Worse: as also that its reception is passive, and so is not Gods Understanding or Willing. I know not what it is: but I confess i… must needs be a very improper conception to conceive of God as passive in knowing. And yet man hath no true apprehension of a knowledge which is wholly sine passione: But how prove you that God cannot, if he please, by his active Knowledge, Know de novo, without becoming Better or Worse? or doing it in vain? Are you sure that every new act of intellection (even in a dream) doth make mans understanding better or worse? or else is vain? I confess more may be here said.

5. Having done with your Argument, they will further tell you, that, If God may have new relations without any real change, then, for ought you know, he may have new immanent acts without a real change: But the Antecedent is unquestionably true: (God was not a Creator before he had creatures: nor is he our Father before we are his children; nor our King, Master, &c. before we are his subjects, servants, &c. except de jure only:) The Consequence they prove thus: Relations have as true an Entity, as, for ought you know, these which we call Immanent Acts in God, may have: Therefore the Novation of them will make as great a change. Here they suppose that Actio and Relatio are both accidents (taken properly) and neither of them meer Entia Rationis (for in so thinking they go in the more beaten road) much less nothing: Or if you will say, that Relatio is but Modus entis, they will say so of action too: Or however they tell you, that it may be so for ought you know, with that which we call an Act in God. And here they suppose that his Acts are not his Essence absolutely and in it self considered; and that it signifies not all one to say, God is God, and to say, God willeth the existence of this worm: And therefore they will say, that these which we call Acts, may be, if not Relations, yet some of Scotus his formalities, or something to us unknown, which have either no more Being then Relations, or at least not so much as to make a real change in God. And that there is in his simple, indivisible Essence, a Trinity of persons, without any imperfection: so there may be in his Essence, distinct formalities (or somewhat that we cannot name or conceive of) of a lower nature, then Personality, without any inconvenience: and as th…se may be superadded to the meer absolute Essence of God (as Agere, Intelligere, Velle, are added) without dividing, or multiplying it: so may …bey on …e …ame grounds be New, or renewed, without any Mutation of Gods Essence; but only of the formality of intellection or Volition, which is added to his Essence.

6. They further think that the nature of transient acts, doth prove that immanent acts may be renewed: Bu… …his will be more spoke to anon, when we come to your doctrine of transient Acts. They say, A transient act is not a meer Relation or Passion or Effect: But there is in it that which may be called action … agente, as well as passion à patiente. Now if actio be efficientis actio here, and God in creating the world did verè agere, then either the world was created from eternity, or else God did create it from Eternity, and yet it was created only in Time, and the Causation or Causing creating Act was infinitely before the Effect; or else there was a new act really performed by God in Time. The first none will maintain, that I deal with. The second, say they, is against common reason: For Gods act is the Causa proxima creaturae; and omnis causa proxima reciprocatur cum suo effectu: i. e. Posita causa proxima in actu, necesse est effectum poni: If it be causa totalis, yea and requireth nothing else to the effect so much as by preparation, or disposition, no nor a subject matter, then the act of creation must needs immediatly produce the creature; and the Creare and Creari must needs be inseparable: Its answered that Gods creating act was from eternity, but the effect, or creature, was not till its Time. But it will be replied, That either God did more for the creatures production or creation at the time of its passive creation, then he did from Eternity, or he did no more: If more, then he did something de novo: If no more, then either the creature would have had its Being from Eternity, quia posita causâ ponitur effectus; or else if you ask whats the reason that the creature was not in Being sooner or later, no cause can be assigned▪ and so God should not be the cause. This holds equally (say they) whether you make the creating act to be only Gods Velle, or … superadded execution of that will, as being the effect of power. For either God willed the creatures present existence from eternity, as much as at the time of its creation, or as at this day▪ or he did not. If he did not, then he willeth de novo: If he did, then the creature would have existed, as soon as it was willed. To say, that God willed from Eternity that the creature should be in Time, is true: But is it as much to Will that it shall be, as to Will its present existence? If it be answered, That there is no Past or Future with God; I answer 1. That this was prevented before; when it was said, that God understandeth Time, and propositions concerning time, though time be only mans measure, and propositions mans instruments. 2. The men that I speak to, maintain that all things coexist not with God from Eternity (though indeed the term [from] as here used, contradicteth Eternity:) and they distinguish between Gods willing rerum futuritionem & existentiam praesentem: and therefore this seemeth to make against their answer. (But indeed none of all this arguing is solid, because of the different manner of producing effects per voluntatem, & per potentiam excquentem voluntati superadditam.) Perhaps it will be said, that if all this be granted, yet it followeth not that immanent acts may be de novo without a change in God, because the Creating act, or any transient act is so: For the former is God himself, but the later is not. To which it may be replied, 1. We speak not now of a product or effect, called the Creation, but of the creating act and then why should not that be God himself, as well as an immanent act? If you say it i… a Being, then it is God or distinct from God: If distinct from God, it is a substance or accident, or some modus, or who knows what? Accidents God hath none: Substance it cannot be; except it be God. If you say it is any modus, you know what School contradiction you must expect: Or if you say it is a Reality or a Formality, those that you deal with will tell you, that they can as well prove the immanent acts to be formalities, or such like, as you can the transient. For 2. they say (with others) that these acts are not called Immanent, Pos…ively, as if they had any effect or terminus in God himself; but Negatively, because they have no effect, ad extra; and do nihil ponere in objecto. So that as to the nature of the act it self, they say, it is the same, or at least, the later as much essential to God, as the former (though not their effects.) And I have paper converse with a Divine, if I mistake not, full as Learned as Mr K. (to speak sparingly) who maintains, that those which you call immanent acts (viz. Gods Knowing and Willing other things besides himself) are transient, and so to be called; as having as much an extrinsick object, as those that you and I call Transient; though they make no real change on them: and that those only are to be called Gods immanent acts, whose object is himself. 3. Moreover you will acknowledge that Gods Velle i… an immanent act▪ But how many and how great are they that maintain that Gods Creating act, was but his Velle that things should be! I need not tell you of Schoolmen that are for this: but when you (doubtless) know that D• Twisse himself affirms it, in his Vindic. you must either be of his minde, or handle him unworthily by your Dissent, as … did in another case. Now if the act by which God produced the creatures be but his Velle, then it is an act which you call immanent. And you well know how commonly it is maintained that Deus operatur per essentiam: and that there is no act but his essence it self, requisite to any effect, which he produceth, as it is the effect of the first Cause. But this is but ad hominem; for these are not their principles whose arguings I now recite. They suppose that creation and other transient acts, are not meer Volitions, but acts of power, in execution of Gods will. To which purpose …ow largely many famous Schoolmen have argued, is obvious to them that are conversant in them. Aurcolus hath fifteen Arguments to this end. Gregor. Arminiensis hath many Arguments to prove that how ever Creation or Conservation be taken, neither of them is God himself. Capreolus I know and other Thomists answer these Arguments: and much may be replied and is, to those answers: so that in so dark and unsearchable a Controversie, strong wits may finde something to say, against each other, longer then the patience of the wisest of their Readers will hold out to know the issue of their disputes. Aegidius, Thom. de Argent. Occam, and others plead also for a necessity of an executive act of power, distinct from the meer act of willing, or that Creation is not God. So do Jacob. Martini, Suarez, Schibler, and other later Authors. And if (as Aquinas saith) transient acts be formaliter in agente, as well as immanent, then the inception of new immanent acts seems to have no other inconveniences, then the inception of transient acts as to the form. But indeed the Thomists say the same of both, that they are only Gods essence, and that God hath no transient act at all, but only that his Essence or Will or Understanding may be so denominated for the rational Relation of the Object thereto. And therefore Aquinas (1. q. 25. a. 1.) maintaining that there is in God Potentia activa (though not passiva) withall maintains it to be the samething, as the action, and as his Will and Understanding. (And yet sometime be calleth Gods actions transient! but in this he speaks unconstantly or doubtfully, as Suarez noteth Met. disp. 20. §. 5.) And the substance of all Capreolus answer to Aureolus fifteen Arguments is this same distinction, between Gods act of Creation it self (which is his Will and Essence, immanent and eternal) and the Relatio rationis between God and the object; from which Gods will is denominated a transient act. But yet in this transient act, it is only the relation, and not the act it self (which is God himself) which may be diversified or renewed. Now if this meer relatio rationis be sufficient ground for our denomination of Gods act to be [Transient] and these transient acts to be new, then it may seem that the relation of the same act to some extrinsick terminative objects (as of Gods knowledge to the present existence of things in n…nc temporis) doth give the same ground to call those acts new, though not so properly transient. For if one may be denominated from its respect to its object, why not the other: Nay why the same relatio rationis may not as well denominate those acts transient also, which we now call immanent, is not easie to discern: For both have respect to an extrinsick object, if that suffice. Nay doth not that act which is called immanent, produce or effect? seeing it is only Volendo without any other executive action that God effecteth all things that are effected: and this Vel…e from eternity is (say they) causa in actu of those things that are produced in time. And therefore many say, that God hath no Will as to extrinsicks, but what is effective: and so that his Will hath no extrinsick object properly so called, but only products or effects. That omne velle Dei est operativum & efficax eorum quae vult, and that therefore he may not be said to will any thing but what he doth effect. See Gibi…uf de Libert. li. 2. c. 24. & 1.

So that in Conclusion, according to the Doctrine of the most Learned Thomists, there is in God neither immanent nor transient act in Mr K's sense. (Except those that are terminated, as they call it, in himself as the object.) Not immanent; for they are not terminated in the Agent, as Mr K. saith, such are; nay they have respect to things extrinsick; nay, say many, they are productive of these extrinsick things. Not transient; for Gods essence doth not transire in objectum extraneum, but only cause it without any other executive action; and so respecteth it. In the same sense therefore, and on the same grounds as you will maintain the transient act to be in time, and not eternal, will these men think to prove it also of the immanent. For even the transient acts of God (so called) are not in the creature, but only respect and effect them. As Capreolus saith (li. 2. dist. 1. q. 2. art. 3.) Talis actio praedicamentalis & quae est motus, est subjectivè in passo: Divina autem actio non est motus, nec mutatio, licet causet motum & mutationem.

7. But they much insist on that before intimated, that if it be no wrong to Gods simplicity to have diversity or multiplicity of immanent acts ascribed to him, then it is not any wrong to his immutability to have such acts ascribed to him de novo: For the reason will prove alike. But that it is no wrong to God to have diversity of immanent acts ascribed to him, is evident by 1. The use of Scripture. 2. The use of all Divines. 3. And the necessity of the thing. 1. I need not tell any man that hath read the Bible, that Scripture distinguisheth of Gods attribut… that it ascribeth to him Understanding, Will, Memory, &c. that it speaketh not of his Love and Hatred, his Approbation and Disallowance, his Justice and Mercy, as being one, not to be distinguished. 2. And what Divines sp…wise? even of them that make the boldest enquiries into Gods nature, and pass of it the most consident conclusions, as if they had seen the invisible Majesty: I mean the Schoolmen of all sorts: To how little purpose were many a Volume in … m Sent. for the most part, if it were enough to apprehend in God undivisible Unity? How easily on these grounds might we answer all Bradwardines, all Twisses sublime disputes, about Gods willing sin, his order of intention, and of his Decrees, his Election and Reprobation, whether absolute or conditional, definite or indefinite, and de rerum possibilitate & futuritione ab aeterno, with many the like? Its easie to say, that all these are one and the same thing: and the same is not before or after it self, &c. Yet this is not taken for a satisfactory way of disputing. 3. Yea is it not apparent, that there is a necessity of such distinguishing language? How many souls would you be likely to convert, and save? how many sins to prevent, by telling your Auditory, that in deed and truth it is all one thing in God to Decree a man to salvation, or to decree him to damnation? Its all one to Will that you shall sin, and that you shall not sin: that you shall die this day, and that your Neighbour shall live fourty years longer: Its the same thing, without any true difference, for God to Love you now you believe, and to Hate you while you were a worker of Iniquity; to be pleased and displeased, to Approve and dislike; His Love to Peter, to Jacob, and his Hatred to Judas, to Esau was the same thing, only the effects are not the same. I say, how savoury and profitable would this doctrine be?

And are there not the same Reasons for our ascribing to God, the beginning and ending of Immanent Acts, as the Diversity of them? Is not one as consistent with his Immutability, as the other with his simplicity? Doth not Scripture ascribe to God the Inception and ending of Immanent Acts, as well as the Diversity of them? And is ther enot as great a necessity of our using that language as the other? How many souls were you like to save by telling them [God Loved you as well before you believed, yea before Christ died for you, as he doth since! God doth Hate you now as much as he did when you were a worker of iniquity, and is as much offended with you since you believed as he was when you were a childe of wrath! He had the same thoughts of you when you were blaspheming, murdering and committing adultery, as when you repent and pray. God is now decreeing to create the world; he is now decreeing to give the Law by Moses, to save Noah by the Ark, Lot out of Sodom: he is now Decreeing that Christ shall suffer for us; he now knows all these as future: he is no more Reconciled to the world by Christ, or Pleased in or by his Sufferings and Merits then he was before: God knows now that [Christ is now on the Cross] or [Christ is not Risen] is a true Proposition, because he did once know that it is a true Proposition: and he ceaseth not to know it:] would this kinde of doctrine seem sound and edifying? Do you use to preach thus?

But you'le say, That Gods Knowledge, Will, Power, Goodness, Justice, Infiniteness, his Willing the End and the Means, the futurition of things, and their present existence, mens salvation or damnation are all diversified onelyonly as to extrinsick denomination, and not really: from the variety of objects it is, that one act of God is variously denominated.

Answ. 1. But Scotus with his followers, Sirectus, Basolis, Trombeta le Roy, Gothutius, Mayro, Faventinus, and the like, tell us of more then extrinsick denominations: And if there be in God a Diversity of Formalities; it may as well be said, that there is an inception and ending of these Formalities in him. This doth no more derogate from the Immutability of God, then the other from his simplicity.

2. Have these extrinsick Denominations any true Ground in the things denominated, or not? If not, it seems they are all false, and therefore not to be used. If they have, then what is it? The difference of names should suppose an equal difference in the Things. A meer Relative difference, some are loth to grant. If they should, as they plead for a diversity of Relations, others may as well plead for an Inception and Cessation of Relations: (Could they prove Immanent acts to be but Relations.) If they say they are Modi or Entia rationis, or what ever title rash adventurous wits may impose on them, still others will say as much for their Beginning and Ending, as they do for their Diversity, and that one impli…s no more a Change in God, then the other denieth his simplicity. The describers of Extrinsick Denomination that place it between Ens and Nihil, make it to signifie the order of a thing to the subject which yet it is not in. But then it is a meer Relation which is Denominated; or if any more, it should be ex parte objecti only in our case.

3. But suppose that it be but a meer extrinsick Denomination, and have no Reall Ground in the thing denominated; see what follows: But this much: That Gods Knowledge, and Will, and Power, and Justice, and Mercy, his Knowing me to be Godly or ungodly, his decre…ing Peter to life, and Judas to death; his loving Jacob and hating Esau, are all one; his knowing one thing to be future, and another not future, is all one: But yet because of the Diversity of objects it is meet and needfull, that we Denominate extrinsecally Gods acts to be divers: and so to distinguish his Intention of the End, from his Election of the Means; his Election from his Reprobation, his Approbation from his dislike, &c. Even so, these acts in God have in themselves no Beginning or End: God did never Begin to Love, to Will this or that, to Know &c. But yet because of the Beginning and Ending of objects, it is meet and needfull to Denominate Gods acts extrinsecally as Beginning and Ending, as the objects do, and changing with them. For here the case is the same as to Gods Immutability, as in the other to his simplicity. And if this hold, then those men that should write Voluminous Disputes, about the Beginning and Ending of Immanent acts, would do as warrantably as Dr Twiss and others do in writing so of their diversity, priority and posteriority in nature. Nay is it not much more Justifiable then many of their Volumes? For from Eternity there was no reall diversity of objects to denominate Gods Immanent acts from. For that esse cognitum vel volitum, which they'le flie to, could be no where, but in mente & voluntate Divina: and if there were no Diversity in mente Divina at all, then what ground can be imagined of the extrinsick Denominations? For example, Possibilia & futura being nothing, could not in themselves differ from eternity: Yet how great a fabrick doth Dr Twiss build upon this Proposition, that [the transition of things future è numero possibil…um in numerum futurorum, being from Eternity, it must needs have an eternal Cause which can be no other then Gods Will.] Now if there were no such transition, but in mente divinâ, and if there were no such notion from Eternity any where else, as is [Future and Possible] and so it must be imagined to be an Ens raetionis Divinae, then it plainly follows that there was no such thing as Future, distinct from Possible: for in God is no distinct Immanent acts, (as knowing Possibles, and Knowing things future;) and in the things was no distinction, for they are nothing.

It seems therefore that upon your own Grounds it is as Justifiable and necessary, to Denominate extrinsecally Gods Immanent acts, as having Beginning and End, when the objects have so, as it is to Denominate them divers from the diversity of the object: and that if we made this our ordinary speech in voluminous Disputes, you could no more blame us for it, then all the exactest School-Divines are to be blamed for the other.

Moreover, some may think, that you do teach Infidels to destroy the Christian Faith, or teach a man to prove or disprove what he will, because Contradictories may consist, e. g. If they would prove that [Christ is not Risen] thus: That which God knoweth to be true, is true: But God Knoweth this Proposition to be …rue [Christ is not Risen] Therefore. The minor they prove thus: God did once know this Proposition to be true: Therefore he doth so still: for there is no Ending of any Immanent act of God. It will be answered, That this onelyonly shews a difference in the object, that it was once true, which now is not: but Gods act is the same by which he knoweth these mutable objects. Be it so: (yet whether it be certain and can be proved still, is by them doubted:) but is it fit for us to speak of this act as one only? It seems then, it is all one, in God to know a Proposition to be True, and to know it to be false. For the fore-said Proposition [Christ is not Risen] was True one day, and False the next; and God knew both. You'le say, It is all one in God to Know that to be True which is True, and that to be False which is False: but in both he knows Verè, etsi non verum. But then you must tell us further, what it is for God to Know [Truly:] Is it the Congruency of his Knowledge to the Object, which we call the Truth of it? I think you will say so: And if so, then it is not obvious to shew how there was such a Congruence from Eternity, when there was Nothing but God; and so no other object for his knowledge to agree to: For in God they were all but one, either in esse cognito, or esse volito; for in him is no reall diversity: and out of him, or in themselves they were not at all: and therefore if God knew all things as many or divers, when they were not at all, and as existent, when they did not exist, where is the Congruence of the act with the object? But all this arguing is but light.

But they further argue thus: Gods Immanent acts, which we are speaking of, are not Himself: and therefore as they may be either diversified or multiplied without his Division or Composition, so they may begin or end without his Mutation. The antecedent they prove by that common Argument: These Immanent acts about the Creature, are Free; God Freely Willeth the existence of this worm or pile of grass: he so Willed it that he could have not willed it, or nilled it. But his own Being is necessary, and cannot but be: Therefore, &c. It seems hard to say, that God did as necessarily Will the pardoning of your sins, as he is necessarily God: Or that he could no more have Willed one pile of grass more or lesse on the earth, or one sand more or lesse on the Sea-shore, or one day more or lesse to any mans life, then he could cease to be God. This is a short way of answering Beverovicius question, and of answering the presumptuous enquiry, Whether God could have made any thing better, and a thousand more? Itane etiam ipsum Numen fato constringitur? Is it a good Argument? Deus est: ergo n…cesse est Creaturas esse, nec plures, nec pauciores, nec priùs, nec posteriùs, &c? One of my Rabbi's (by whose name I have acquainted Mr. K. with my ignorance) answereth that Gods Decrees are Free, Solum per terminationem ad extraneum, seu in quantum Volitio Dei, circa objectum aliquod extrinsecum practicè est. But this is as much as to say, No Immanent act is Free: For Immanent acts (at least if Mr. K. know) are not terminated in any thing wihtout: Or if a man should say, that those that have an extrinsick object, are objectively terminated in something extrinsick; yet this seems none of the Authours sense (as the word practicè shews:) and if it were (as perhaps it is) his words would run thus: [Gods Decrees are free, onelyonly as they are such and such Decrees about such objects:] which would but yield the cause, that as such Decrees they are not the same formally with the divine Essence. And were it not for the Connotation of the Object, it were no Decree, nor to be called, but simply Gods Essence. I am sure Dr. Twisse will be fully and earnestly enough for those that maintain the liberty of the Divine Decrees which we now mention: and therefore I suppose Mr. K. will be of the same minde.

And that there is not such clear Evidence in this case, as to embolden men to such confident Conclusions, or to build so much on them, as some do, let Suarez perplexed Dispute Metaph. Disp. 30. Sect. 9. testifie, Quomodo cum divina libertate stet Immutabilitas? Where after the producing of many opinions, and the Arguments and Answers, he concludes, Ex his quae circa has opiniones dicta sunt, satis (ut opinor) declaratum est quanta sit hujus opinionis difficultas; faciliusque esse quamlibet ejus partem impugnare, quam aliquam probe defendere, aut explicare. Quapropter non vereor Confiteri nihil me invenire quod mihi satisfaciat, nisi hoc solum, in hujusmodi rebus id de Deo esse credendum, quod ineffabili ejus perfectioni magis sit consentaneum, quodque ab omni imperfectione alienum sit, &c.] And how uncertain are men, that some of those things may not consist with the Divine Perfection, which yet they confidently affirm to be inconsistent with it? If it be a point that is so farre past the reach of Suarez and many other such subtil Disputers, I think Mr. K. should not pretend to so full an insight into it, which may raise him to that confidence which is here expressed; much lesse should he think it so obvious to the understandings of his inferiours.

How light so ever Dr. Twiss make of them, certainly they are accounted no children among the most learned of their side, who do …each, That there may be so far a Beginning and Ceasing of Gods Immanent acts, which have a mutable object, without any change in God himself, as that they may have a new transition to the object, and so God may Will that which before he Willed not, though yet it be all by one simple act. Of this minde is Penottus, Lychetus, Fr. a Sancta Clara: And the said Sancta Clara▪ citeth others as countenancing his Doctrine. But though there are but few for this opinion, yet for the formal distinction of Gods Immanent acts (which as is said, seems to be as inconsistent with his simplicity, as this with his Immutability) there are many and that of the most Learned: Vid. quae habet Scotus in sent. l. 1. dist. 8. Qu. 3. & dist. 2. Qu. 4. & 7. & dist. 34. & passim. And Rada saith, that Scoti sententiam ab ejus diebus universa Pariensis Schola semper amplexata fuerit, necnon & Lovaniensis atque Bononiensis Academia; Et in universa Italia apud omnes vivos doctos est celebris & famosa. In Contr 4. And their Reasons are not contemptible, which may be seen in their several Writers: Specially in those that have wrote whole books of the Formalities. Or Rada (a man of a clear understanding and expression) will afford you many in that one Contr. 4. which are worthy consideration. And if Ph. Faber Faventinus his reconciling Interpretation of their Distinction Rationis Ratiocinatae, will prove their sense, then many of the Thomists are also of the same minde. Vid. Faventin. Tract. de formalitat. cap. 3.

I do not mean by this Argument to conclude that there must be (or in all cases may be) an Inception or Cessation of those Acts which admit of a formal Distinction: But only thus, that if a formal Distinction be consistent with the Divine simplicity, then an Inception and Cessation of some such formalities (or acts, quoad formales differentias) may seem consistent with Gods Immutability: (And I know no other Argument of moment then left, if that be solved.) What these formalities are, I do not wonder, if they give but a dark account: Yet that they are different objective conceptions they agree. And as Rada saith, ad Distinctionem formalem duo requiruntur. Alterum est, quod utrumque distinctionis extremum dicat aliquid Positivum in re, seclusa operatione Intellectus: Alterum est, quod utrumque extremum dicat propriam formalitatem, secundum quam sit in rerum natura extra suam …ausam. And Scotus himself saith of this as applied to God; Quod Forma in creaturis habet aliquid imperfectionis, scilicet quod est Forma informans aliquid, & Pars compositi: aliquid etiam habet quod non est imperfectionis, sed consequitur …am secundum suam rationem essentialem sive formalem, scilicet, quod ipsa sit quo aliquid est tale, e. g. sapientia in nobis est Accidens, hoc est imperfectionis: sed quod ipsa sit quo aliquid est sapiens, hoc non est imperfectionis, sed essentialis rationis sapientiae. In divinis autem nihil est forma; secundum illam duplicem rationem imperfectionis, quia nec Informans, nec pars: est tamen ibi sapientia in quantum est quo illud in quo ipsa est, est sapiens, & hoc non per aliquam compositionem, &c. Sent. 1. dist. 8. Q. 3.

Some think yet clearer Arguments might be fetcht from the Hypostatical Union, from the Acts of generation and spiration, or Love, whereby the Son is begotten of the Father, and the holy Ghost proceedeth from the Father and the Son, and from the distinction of Persons in the Trinity. But I will stop here (as having run further then I intended) lest you should mis-interpret me, and think, that I own all these Arguments that I touch upon. I know what D. Twiss against Pennotus hath said to one or two of them, and what the Schoolmen commonly say to the same▪ I mention these only to shew that a full or clear solution of these doubts is not also facile and obvious, as you seem to imagine.

I must again intreat you, and every ingenious Reader, to fasten no opinion on me, but what I own, at least none which I disclaim. If I must be of one side in this Controversie, I will be of Mr. Kendals side, and say, that God hath but one act immanent, and that is Eternal. But my thoughts are, that we know not what we talk of when we speak thus, and therefore I will not be of any side in this.

I think, 1. That God hath no Act at all in proper speech: but both Acting, and Understanding, and Willing are by a very, very, very low remote Analogy ascribed to him.

2. Yet I am ready to think, that as we are fain for our own understanding, to speak of God as Acting, Understanding, Willing, Loving, &c. and also for our own understanding to distinguish his Perfections, Properties, Acts, &c. which are but one, so may and must we as much speak of some of his Acts, as beginning and ending (which yet perhaps do not in themselves:) For the Reason and Necessity seems to be the same. For because the word [Knowledge or Understanding] is first used and applied to mans act of Knowledge, and signifieth first only such a Knowledge as is diversified by objects; yea and man can have no proper positive Conception of a Knowledge which is not diversified by the diversity of Objects (but onelyonly a Negative Conception;) therefore it is that we are forced to speak of Gods Knowledge (and so of his Will and other Acts) as divers or distinct: as Divines generally do. And on the same Grounds, as man hath no positive Conception of any Knowledge or Will, about mutable objects, which is not varied with these objects, as to the Being, Beginning and Ending, therefore we must as necessarily denominate Gods acts about such objects, as Beginning and Ending, as we must denominate them Divers. And so we may well say, God willed from Eternity the futurition of the worlds Creation, and Christs Death, &c. But now he doth not will their futurition, but their preterition: and that he Loveth now (as believers in Christ) those whom he before Hated as Workers of Iniquity; and that he is satisfied and well-pleased in his Son, and his Sacrifice, who was not so before. Me thinks Mr. K. should think this language as fit for the mouths and pens of Divines, as the former, and not to be blamed or accused as erroneous, because improper, as long as we must speak improperly of God, or not at all. And I am sure that Scripture speaks of God in this language, ascribing to him Immanent acts, as new or as ceasing, and as moved by exteriour causes: Therefore this way of speaking is not unfit or intolerable.

The Summe of all that I say therefore is but this, That we cannot conceive of Gods Immanent acts, as in themselves they are (nor are they truely the same things that we conceive of, when we apply the several denominations to them:) and therefore we must conceive of them by Resemblance to the Acts of Man so denominated, still acknowledging the Impropriety of the terms, and disclaiming all those Imperfections which in man they do express.

But because Mr. K. hath spoken so much to this point already, its like he will take it ill if I take no notice of it. I will therefore a little insist on the consideration of what he saith on it, to Mr. Goodwin, pag. 93, 94. (but briefly, as being not to me.)

§. 6.

Mr. K. THis is such a Reason as most of your Disciples needed your favour to reade a Logick Lecture to them, that they might be in a Capacity to give their Judgements on it: You not having been pleased to do it, I will for once gratifie them with a Cast of my old Office; and now supposing my self again in my Deans Chair, I gravely begin thus. That Univocum is that which is attributed to several things according to the same Name, and Nature signified by that name; as Animal to a Man and an Asse, to which are opposed on the one hand Aequivocum, which is attributed according to the same Name, but not signifying the same Nature, as Canis which is said of a Starre, a Beast, and a Fish: either hath the same name Canis, but their natures are as different as Heaven, Earth and Water. On the other hand Analogum, which is attributed according to the same Name, and as signifying the same Nature; but not in the like manner. Now this same Analogum is of two sorts; The terms are promiscuously jumbled together by the Logickmongers, but let that be, 1. Proportionis; when the same Name is given to things of the Like, but not the same Nature: as Laughing, &c▪ 2. Attributionis: where the same Name is given to divers things, according to the same Nature: but this same Nature doth not agree to them alike; but to the one first, to the other afterwards, secundum priùs & posteriùs: yea to the later dependantly on the first: as Substance and Accident are each of them Ens, a thing, &c.