The Reduction of a Digresser, Section 7 – Section 8
§. 7.
R. B. 1. I Would rather say that Substance and Accident are Analogata, then Analoga; but you may use your Liberty, and call the Analoga, Analogata. 2. I should think that it is not directly and strictly [Because of the dependance of Accidents on the Subject, that Substance and Accident are Analogata: but because of the Imperfect Entity which through this dependance the Acdents have in the more perfect Entity of the Subject. 3. It is not that most Generall Analogum, [Ens] as appliable to God and the Creature, that we are now in question of. But it is those inferiour of [Fore-knowledge, Knowledge, Will, Election, &c.] 1. Your [Because] is unsound, and I conceive your Consequence is false, viz. [then whatsoever is predicated of God and the Creature must be predicated Analogically] Do you think that nothing may be spoken equivocally of God and the Creature? If you do, you are a singular man. 5. I hope you do not think that our knowledge depends on God, as Accidents on the Subject: If you do, then God hath many Accidents indeed, were that true: I had rather say plainly, that God effecteth our knowledge (by way of natural Causation in some respect, and by moral Causation in other respects) as that which had no Being before, then to talk of Emanation as a Beam from the fountain of Light; considering what ill use many in these times have made of the doctrine of Emanation. 6. It seems by your former Conclusion [whatsoever is predicated of God and the Creature, must be predicated Analogically] and by your present predication of [The fountain of Light which is in God] that you judge [Light] or [the fountain of Light] to be predicated Analogically of God too. Which if you do, and this also must be by Analogy of Attribution, then it seems Heat, Cold, Gravity, Levity, Density, Rarity, Composition, or what ever is in the Creature may be thus attributed to God. 7. As to the point it self in question, 1. I will not meddle with that old Controversie, Whether Ens be spoken of God and the Creature Univocally, Aequivocally or Analogically. I have seen what Scotus saith for his opinion in Sent. 2. dist. 12. & alibi. & 1. dist. 3. q. 1. & 3. And what Anth. Andreas 4. Metaph. q. 1. Meurisse Metaph. Scot. l 1. Qu. 8. p. 108, &c. And Phil. Faber. Faventin. Phys. Scot. Theorem. 95. pag. 654, &c. Rada, and others say for it: And what Occham in 1. Sent. dist. 2. q. 8. And Guil. Rubio, say for the Nominals opinion: And what Cajetan saith against the Scotists. (By which Scotists the sense of Univocation, Aequivocation, and Analogy, is a little more subtilly opened, then Mr K. doth out of his Deans Chair.) But the Question that I speak to, is onelyonly how farre Intelligere, Velle and Agere, may be Attributed to God. 2. And for the distribution of Analoga, and the sense of Analogy, I think, it will be long ere the Chair-men are agreed. Meurisse out of Rubio saith, Univocum opponi soli aequivoco, non verò Analogo, & denominativo: quia Univocum se habet ad aequivocum si cut Unum ad Multa: Unum autem propriè solum multis opponitur: se hahet autem ad Analogum & denominativum, tanquam veluti superius ad sua inferiora: Quia Univocum aliud est purum, aliud est non purum: Non purum est aut Analogum, aut Denominativum. Nullum superius autem oppenitur suis inferioribus: Itaque Ʋnivocum non opponitur Analogo & Denominativo; sed ab Analogo distinguitur tanquam Univocum purum, & à Denominativo Ʋnivocum quidditativum, seu illud quod est & praedicatum Ʋnivocum & Univocè praedicatur. Others innumerate Analoga with the Homonyma, distinct from Synonima.
Goclenius (who speaks largely of it) gives this distribution, Lexic. Philos. p. 100. I think in fitter terms then Mr. Kendal.
Analoga sunt Proportione
Propriâ: ut Ens, bonum, principium, natura, motus, &c.
Impropria
Attributionetantum: ut sanum ad animal & medicamentum.
Translataproportione: Risus, comparatione bominis & prati.
But I think poor contemptible Keckerman and Burgersdicius have better explained and distributed Homonyma and Analoga, then all that ever I had the hap to be acquainted with, not excepting the subtillest Scotists. 3. As for the application hereof to our Question, I still affirm, That the thing which the word [Knowledge] is spoken of, in God, is not only more eminently and perfectly in him then the Creature, but is only in him, and not in the creature at all: And the thing which the word Knowledge is spoken of, or doth signifie in man, is not at all formaliter in God, but there is in him something of an Infinite, transcendent Excellency above it, which makes it useless; and in God it would be Imperfection: And therefore it may be said to be in God eminenter non formaliter: The word [Knowledge] is first used to signifie the knowledge of man: It is translated to press to us that Incomprehensible perfection of God, which we cannot otherwise conceive of or express. Yet when ever we make use of the term, we cannot by it our selves attain to a conception, positive and true, of any higher thing then such knowledge as our own, with some negative additions, for removal of the Imperfections; as that it is Infinite, &c. so that man can have no true positive Conception of the Nature of that which in God we call Knowledge: Only he apprehendeth it to be somewhat like that which in man is called Knowledge. But Like is not the same. As Goclenius out of Aristot. foreign non sunt foreign. similia Analogia non sunt ejusdem generis: non sunt eadem genere. It is therefore a proper speech to say [Knowledge is not in God] and proper to say, it is in man: But yet it is a necessary speech to say [God knows] because we have no fitter expression for that perfection of God, which we so call. Aquin. de Veritate Mater. zda Qu. 1. saith, Et quia nulla Ratio significata per ipsum nomen definit ipsum Deum, nullum nomen à nobis impositum est propriè nomen ejus; sed est propriè creaturae quae definitur ratione significata per nomen: Et tamen ista nomina quae suns Creaturarum nomina Deo attribuuntur secundum quod in Creaturis aliqua similitudo ejus representatur. The third Opinion which he there rejecteth is, That Knowledge is attributed to God Metaphorically, as Anger is; against which he opposeth his fourth, Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod scientia Deo attributa significat aliquid quod in Deo est.] As if these might not well consist! Even a Metaphorical expression doth expresse something that is in God, though it expresse it but Metaphorically. And in Qu. undecima, he hath no better answer to the fifth Objection, which is drawn from [the greater distance between God and us, then between Ens Creatum & non Ens] then this, Ad 5m dicendum, quod Enti & non Enti aliquid secundum analogiam convenit: quod ipsum non ens analogicè dicitur Ens: ut dicitur in 4o Metaph. Ʋnde nec distantia quae est inter creaturam & Deum communitatem analogicè impedire potest. If the Analogy between Gods Acts, Knowledge, Will, and ours, be no nearer then between Ens & non ens, sure it is not such as you imagine, and here express. And contra Gentil. l. 1. c. 31. he confesseth, that in omni nomineà nobis dicto, quantum ad modum signandi imperfectio invenitur quae Deo non competit, quamois res signata aliquo modo eminenti Deo conveniat. Now scire, velle, agere, a…e terms properly fitted only to mans imperfect Mode of Knowing, Willing, Acting and do afford us no positive Conception of any other: so that if we could devise some genus which did comprehend Gods acts perfectè and mans imperfectè, as Ens doth substance and Accident, yet that must not be Knowledge or Will: For these are the proper names of the Genus imperfectum: As if you should say, Substantia est Accidens. A certain kinde of Comprehension of the Creature God hath, whose Nature being to us unknown, the proper name is unknown too, and therefore we are fain to call it by the proper name of mans comprehension, i. e. Intellection and Science. And all Divines confess, that as to the order of knowing, and so as to the name we must first begin with the creature, to whom the name is first applicable. So Aquinas contra Gentil. l. 1. c. 35. Quia ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominatim de Deo & aliis rebus dictorum, per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum; sed ratio nominis per posterius: unde & nominari dicitur à suis causatis. So Goclenius Lexic. Philosoph. de Analog. Duo sunt distinguenda; nimirum res ipsae per nomina significatae, & nominum impositio. Ad res ipsas quod attinet, prius ex de Deo prae dicantur, quam de creaturis. Atque hic propriè ordo est & convenientia, quam habent creaturae ad Deum; cujus ordinis causa dicuntur nomina Analogicè de Deo & de Creaturis praedicari. Quod vero attinet ad nominum Rationem & Impositionem prius iis nominibus app…llatae sucrunt res creatae quam Deus. Quare quod dicimus analogicè praedicari nomina de Deo & de Creaturis, quia prius de Deo quam de Creaturis: de Analogia reali seu secundum rem, non autem secundum nominis rationem intelligendum est. Zanchy hath the same words, whose they are first I know not. How fit a speech this is, de Analogia reali, I leave to others to judge: but all grant that the Name is first applied to the Creature, and thence to God. Now all this holds of meer Metaphorical expressions.
To use Burgersdicius dist…ibution, I yield that these names applied to God and the Creature, are not Homonyma à casu, (such as Aquinas cont Gentil. ubi sup. expresseth his meer aequivocals to be) but à consilio. But whether the Ratio Homonymiae be in Rebus, or in nobis, is not easie certainly to determine. Keckerman saith, Ambigua ex similitudine conceptus est, cum rebus toto genere diversis, ut Deo & Creaturis, idem nomen tribuitur ex cognatione quam mens format. Nimirum intellectus noster ut atque idcircò in Deo nihil concipit directè, sed obliquè ex similitudine quadam, & imagine rei sinitae tanquam objecti sibi congruentis. Hinc a nobis Deo & attributis ejus voces certae, propriae ac direct… imponi nequiverunt, sed indirectae tantum, homonymae, & ex similitudine eâ qua Deus nobis repraesentatur in creaturis tanquam effectis, quae repraesentatio valde imperfecta est. Nomen Jehova, i. e existentis, sibi ipsi imposuit Deus, at nos ne id quidem directè concipimus: reliqua autem quae Deo tribuimus, ut misericordiam, Justitiam, &c. cjusmodi vocibus exprimimus quae directè impositae sunt virtutibus hominum significandis, indirectè autem ad Dcum pertinent, quatenus nos tales in Deo virtutes similitudine earum quae in hominibus sunt virtutum concipimus. Ʋnde non minùs pic quam scite Cyrillus, in his quae de Deo dicuntur, Maxima scientia est Ignorantiam confiteri: & Augustinus, Deus, inquit, magnus est, sed sine quantitate, Bonus, sed sine qualitate: ut verò à nobis magnum sine quantitate, bonum sine qualitate directè & plenè concipi, est impossibile, &c. Et Julius Scaliger, Nullis, ait, vocibus tam plenè Deum significamus, quam iis quae Ignorantiam nostram praetendunt.
But suppose it be granted, that the Ratio Homonymiae is not only in nobis, sed in rebus, the question will remain, Whether it be ob inaequalem generis attributionem, or only ob similitudinem, vel mutuam rerum ad se invicem habitudinem? and so be Tropical? Mr. K. asserteth the former (under the name of Analogy of Attribution.) The Scotists have long defended then Doctors Assertion, that Deus non est in genere. Vid. Fab. Faventin. Phys. Scot. Theorem. 96. his Vindication against Greg. Ariminensis and Bacconius: and many others of them have done this at large. So doth Wickleff. in his Trialog.
And if this hold, then nothing can be attributed to God and the Creature by this Analogy, per inaequalem generis attributionem. Yea Aquinas himself oft saith, Deus non est in genere (as Sarnanus notes) in 1. p. q. 3. a. 5. & 1. d. 8. q. 4. a. 2. 3m. & 1. cont. Gent. c. 25. though after in q. de Potentia q. 7. a. 3. ad ult. Concedit Deum esse Genere substantiae reductivè: which Scotus refuteth. So Estius in … m Sent. d. 8. §. 10. denieth God to be in ullo genere. And Sarnanus hath no more to say for it in his Conciliation (pag. 15) then this, Esse in genere stat dupliciter: primo modo ut pars subjectiva contenta in illo genere: Et sic negatur Deum esse in genere. Secundo modo, ut principium Continens ipsum Genus: Et hoc modo Deus per appropriationem est in Genere substantiae. Vid. Gab. Biel. 1. Sent. dist. 8. q. 1. But this is not for God to be in genere, but for that Genus to be in God.
As Burgersdicius saith, Omnium longissimè à Synonymis absunt homonyma a Casu, quae{que} causam homonymiae habent in nobis: propriùs ad synonymorum naturam accedunt Tropica, ac imprimis Analoga: at omnium proximè quae ambigua sunt ob inaequalem attributionem. That these words are not spoken of God and the creature univocè all of us agree, and the Schoolmen have fully evinced. Also that they are not spoken purè aequivocè, we are also agreed, and the said Schoolmen have evinced (as particularly Aquin. in sum. de Verit. ubi sup. by many Reasons: And Zanchius de Natura Dei borrows many of them.) But which of the other kindes of homonymy they belong to, is the doubt. Mr. K. thinks that which of all other is the nearest to synonymy: I think not so: but rather to the Tropical or Analogical, strictly so called, that is, vel propter similitudinem simplicem, vel proportionem (if not some of them, to those that have the Rationem homonymiae in nobis) Jacchaeus saith (Metaph. l. 1. c. 6.) Ego vero mallem istam Analogiam r…ferre ad proportional…tatis Analogiam, non Metaphoricam illam (quomodo videre attribuitur oculo & menti) sed propriam, quomodo principium dicitur de corde, & fundamento domus. So he disclaims Mr. K's Analogy of Attribution: If the thing be not utterly uncertain to us, who know so little of Gods nature. But that we may venture on a conjecture, I should rather set the Creature at a greater distance from God then they do: and think that these Attributes are all Tropical, somewhat Metonymical, but mostly Metaphorical. I never saw (in Aquinas or any other Schoolman that spoke for it) any cogent Reason to prove, that Intelligere, Velle, Agere, Amare, are attributed to God in any other kinde then Reminisci, Gaudere, Odio habere, Irasci, &c. Only a gradual difference, I easily acknowledge, viz. That Intelligere & Velle having lesse Imperfection, have therefore lesse impropriety. And who knows not that there is a wide difference of this sort among Metaphors, some being very near, and some so farre fetcht, as to be Catachrestical Durandus saith (in 1. sent dist. 34. q. 4) Nullum nomen attribuimus Deo nisi ex Creaturis: non enim ponimus nomen nisi rei quam intelligimus; & quia non intelligimus … eum, nisi ex creaturis, & tantum quantum concludimus excreaturis, ideo nullum nomen imponimus Deo nisi excreaturis, & quantum ad illa, quae concludimus convenire Deo excreaturis: constat autem quod non omnia nomina quae attribuimus Deo dicuntur de eo translativè & metaphori…è, &c. Solum autem illa nomina dicuntur de Deo translativè & metaphoricè quae significant speciales qu dditates rerum creatarum: vel perfectiones secundum modum creaturis convenientem, ut Leo, Agnus, Sentire, &c. Quia res significata per haec nomina non est in Deo, sed aliqua ejus similitudo, ut fortitudo, mansuc…udo, & cognitio singularium, quae in nobis pertinet ad sensum. But I would fain see it proved, That Intelligere, Velle, Agere, do not as properly signifie perfectiones secundum modum Creaturis convenientem, as sentire doth? And when we say segetes fluctuant, fluctnation is no more proper to the motion of the waters, then Intelligere, Velle, Agere, are to the perfections and action of man, or other rational creatures. And whereas they say that the terms are applied to God, with a Remotion of the Imperfections which they imply in us, I answer, So they may say of those lower terms, which they confesse to be Metaphorical, only allowing a gradual difference of impropriety. Nor doth it follow therefore that there is no truth in these expressions of God, or that they are no helps to our knowledge of him, or means of demonstration. For Metaphors are not as pure equivocals: There's some common reason in the similitude, though in the first and proper sense the name be proper to one. When we say, Segetes fluctuant, we expresse not only Motion, wherein both agree, but a motion of the Corn like that of the Water. I think, as I said before, that it is no more proper to call God Scientem, Volentem, Agentem, then to call the Firmament a Nut-shell, because both seem to have a convexity or concavity, or contain something else within, &c. Or to call the Sunne Reptile, or a creeping thing, because it moves, and so do creeping things: or then it is proper to call Knowledge, Light, or to put Video for Intelligo (as Mr. K. cals God the fountain of Light before.) The Scripture saith, God is Light: yet I think this will be easily confessed a Metaphor: and I think it is but Metaphora propinquior, to say, Deus Intelligit, Vult, Agit, &c. And this I judge after long consideration of what Aquinas hath said, 1. q. 14. a. 1. & q. 19. a. 1. & alibi: and many other Schoolmen to the like purpose.
Shall I adde one Argument for the Negative (that it is not by Analogy of Attribution, that Knowledge, Will, Power, &c. are attributed to God and the Creature; as Ens is to Substance and Accident) ad hominem specially? That Knowledge which is the same thing with Will and Power, cannot be the one of the Analogates with our Knowledge which is not the same; in this kinde of Analogy ob inaequalem generis distributionem: (supposing Knowledge to be the Genus Analogum.) But Gods Knowledge is maintained by those that I dispute with, to be the same with his Will and Power) many say, they differ but denominatione extrinsecâ:) Therefore, &c. For the proof of the major, consider: Else on the same grounds [Power] might be thus analogically spoken of Gods Knowledge and mans Power: For where there is no difference in the Thing, there needs to be none in the Name, as requisite from the Nature of the Thing (but only from some extrinsick respect or use) But Power may not Analogically be spoken de Potestate humana, & scientia divina Ergo, &c. Common reason and use of speech confirms the minor. It seems therefore to be evident truth, that as it is from similitude, or some Tropical respect, that Gods Immanent acts, have divers names, rather then one alone: so is it from the same reason that they have these particular names, rather then other: And consequently that these names are not Analoga inaequalis Attributionis naturae communis; but Analoga Proportionis, or Tropical. Durandus (in sent. 1. dist. 2. q. 2.) saith, Alia est opinio quae mihi videtur verior, viz. quod distinctio attributorum, secundum rationem non potest sumi, nisi per comparationem ad aliquam realem diversitatem actu existentem in creaturis, vel possibilem. Quod prob. 1. sic. Differentia Rationis, nisi sit falsa & vana, licet sit completive ab intellectu, oportet tamen quod habeat fundamentum in re: sed differentia attributorum secundum rationem non potest habere sufficiens fundamen… in natura divina absolutè accepta; nisi comparetur ad realem diversitatem quae in creaturis est, vel esse potest, ergo differentia attributorum divinorum secundum rationem, non potest verè sumi nisi per comparationem ad creaturas. Major patet: ratio enim, quam intellectus format, nisi fundetur aliqualiter in re, ficta est & vana, &c. Vide reliq.
I will only adde the words of Burgersdicius Metaphys. l. 2. c. 8. §. 1. sequuntur ea (attributa) quae creaturis communicari posse diximus, saltem foreign: quae tamen analogia non in ipsis Dei attributis, sed in ipsorum effectis fine operationibus quaerenda est. Nam cum attributa infinita sint, aeque atque ipsa Dei essentia, & attributa incommunicabilia, nullam habent c…m creaturis foreign, nisi in suis suis operationibus circa objecta Creata & finita. Apply this to Immanent Acts.
§. 8.
Mr. K. pag. 94. IF Fore-knowledge in God and the Creature be not univocally the same, as surely they are not, then is this Fore-knowledge attributed to God and the Creature, either Equivocally or Analogically: If Equivocally, then hath the Fore-knowledge of God and the Creature only the same Name: But that is not so; for God, I hope, fore-knows as truly as the Creature, and the Creature may sometimes truly fore-know. So that here is more then a nominal agreement between Gods and the Creatures fore-knowledge. It remains therefore that this fore-knowledge be attributed to God and the Creature Analogically: but is this Analogie either of Proportion or Attribution? If of Proportion, then either God or the Creature is is said to fore-know, but either Metaphorically or Metonymically. If only Metaphorically; I pray which of them is but Metaphorically said to fore-know? Not the Creature, &c. And surely much less may God be only Metaphorically said to fore-know these, and all other things that shall come to pass in all Ages. If only Metonymically, as some things are said to be healthy, because they have the signs of sanity in them, (I am bold to use the Boyes instance in this case) Is either God or the Creature only Metonymically said to fore-know? Not the Creature, &c. Not God, for he is the Author of our fore-knowledge: and therefore though his essence be not the subject of his fore-knowledge, …or his fore knowledge an Accident of his Nature, yet is he said to fore-know without being beholden to any such poor Trope for it. It rests therefore that fore-knowledge is attributed to God by more then this Analogie of Proporoion, and consequently by that of Attribution Now I demand which is the famosius Analogatum? Gods fore-knowledge, or the Creatures? Questionless Gods: there being infinitely greater Cause to set the Crown on Gods fore-knowledge, then on that of the Creatures, then there is to set it on substance rather then accident. If so, &c. then onward, as Analogatum per se posi…um stat per famosiori Analogato, so true fore-knowledge mentioned by it self, must alwayes be construed of the fore-knowledge of God: and therefore fore-knowledge is most properly attributable to God. And thus being now willing to resign my place, Haec sufficiant pro nunc.