A Holy Commonwealth, Chapter 2
CHAP. II. God is the Soveraign Ruler of Mankind.
Thes. 9. The soul of man is capable of knowing that there is a God, whose everlasting favour is his happiness, and of loving him, desiring him, and seeking to enjoy him: and he may know, that nothing here below can be his proper end and happiness.
THE experience of all that have the least time, Godliness doth assure us of the truth of this. Thus it is with them: They are convinced of the vanity of all things else, and their desires are set on the life to come. And what they profess, the rest of men are capable of. The soul liveth quite below it selfe, and without any true satisfaction or content, or any true improvement of its faculties, that lives for no more then temporal things, and looks for no life after this.
These. 10. The nature of man is fitted to be here ruled by the hopes and fears of a life to come: and without these the world cannot be ruled according to the natuture of man.
We see de facto that most of the world is ruled by some hopes and fears of a life to come. Mahometans, and most Infidels profess to believe it; Especially their Law-givers, who therefore make the better Laws. And the same nature of man, and common experience declareth, that were it not for such hopes and fears, the world would turn Cannibals, and be like so many ravenous beasts. Men in Power would have nothing sufficient to restrain them from the greatest wickedness; and secret Murders, Burnings, Stealings, Slanders, Whoredoms, and other Villanies would fill the world. So that the Hopes and Fears, and consequently the Promises and Threats of a Happiness or Misery hereafter, are Gods means agreeable to humane nature, for the due Government of mankind.
Thes. 11. Therefore the soul of man is immortal, and he is made for a life to come, where he shall be for ever happy or miserable.
For God maketh his Creatures suitable to their use and ends. Every work-man will fit his tools, or other work to the end he makes them for. God hath not bestowed these noble faculties on man in vain. If he would have had him uncapable of enjoying God hereafter, he would have left him as he hath done the bruits, uncapable of knowing him, desiring and seeking him. If he would not have given us another life, nor punish the wicked with a future misery, he would not have promised or threatned such things, nor ruled the world by the Hopes and Fears of them. For God is not impotent or defective in Wisdom and Goodness, that he should choose, or be necessitated, to govern the world by deceits and lies. He hath his choice of better means: and tells us in the nature of his works for what he made them.
Thes. 12. Were there not a life to come for man, his Knowledge, Desires, Hopes and Fears, would be his torment, and the nobleness of his nature above brutes, would make him so much more miserable than they, and the wisest men, and the best would be most unhappy: which are things not to he believed.
It is apparent, that the knowledge of a God and Happiness, which we may not enjoy, would tantalize us; and the fore-knowledge of an everlasting misery, as possible and probable to the ungodly, would be a continual cause of fear and care to us: And there is not a Heathen that ever I yet met with, or scarce ever heard of, thar dare say, He is sure that there is no life to come: They all confess, That it may be so, for ought they know, though some of them take it to be unlikely and do not believe it. Now the very Possibility which is discerned by almost all, and the Probability which is discerned by most, must needs excite abundance of cares, and fears, and sorrows, which would be all in vain, and deluso…y, and vexations, if there were no such thing, as a life to come, which is the Object of these affections: yea, the wiser any man is, the more he knoweth the insufficiency and vanity of all below, and the great Probability of a life to come; supposing him to be without a certainty) And therefore if there were no such future state the wisest men should be the most deluded, and so prove in the end the most foolish, which is a thing not to be supposed, that the most wise and perfect Author of nature should be guilty of. God would not have given man wisdome as his Excellency, and the image of his Maker, thereby setting him above the rest of the inferior world, and all this to make him indeed a more miserable, deluded, befooled Creature, and the scorn, as it were of nature! The Lord of nature doth better suite his works unto their ends, and is not the common deceiver of the world.
Thes. 13. If there were no life for man but this, mens pious performance of their duty to God and man, and their prudent care of their own felicity would be their losse; and mens wickedness and folly would be their gain, and the worst would be least miserable: which are things not once to be imagined.
It is impossible that any man should be a loser by God, and by the faithful performance of his duty; Satan himself, when he would make man miserable, endeavoreth to that end to make him sinful, as the onelyonly way; and never dreameth of making him miserable by his duty; nor hath the impudency to move that he may be destroyed for well-doing: It is abhorrent from the wisdome and goodness of the blessed God, to set man in the world upon a course of duty, which the more he performeth, the more he loseth by it. The work is good, or else it could not be our duty: and the doing of good must tend to our good, and not to our hurt. It is mans perfection or excellency to be obedient to his Maker, and to exercise wisdom, piety, honesty, and a due care of his own felicity, to which his nature doth so potently incline him: therefore to think that this is his folly or loss, is a contradiction to the nature of the thing.
And that such a course of duty is naturally incumbent on us is evident: For nature teacheth us that the God that made us should be feared, and loved, and served above all: and that we should live soberly, righteously and piously; Yea, more then so, when the worser sort of Infidels and Heathens cannot say, that they are sure their is no life to come: and when the most of the world believe there is; and when the common reason of man-kind (even of the Heathens) acknowledgeth it to be probable, in this case, the plainest voice of Reason doth command us, to make it the very care and business of this life to make preparation for another. When we all know how short, uncerain and certainly vain, and unworthy to be much regarded, the pleasures, and profits and honours of the world are, or any thing that it can yeild us, Reason tells us that he is worse then mad, that will not prefer a probable everlasting happiness, and the avoiding of a probable future misery, before such things as these. And therefore Reason telleth men, that if there be such a probability of future joyes and sorrows, it should be the principal care and business of our lives to attaine that joy, and avoid that sorrowe (though there were no certainty) so that mans natural Reason concludeth that the principal work of his life on earth, should be to prepare for another life, so exceeding great a matter as that, being not for a lesser to be neglected, or rashly ventured.
But now if after this, there were no such life of future joyes and sorrows for us, then all this care and diligence were lost; and that course of life that wisdome it self directs man to, would be in vain, which is not to be imputed to him that giveth wisdom unto man: And as he that performeth his duty most carefully to God, would suffer most in the world (as experience telleth us) and most be deprived of the pleasures, and honours, and profits which the flesh desireth, and so be deprived of that which sensuality accounteth felicity; so on the contrary side, the most impious and unconscionable men would be freed from all the foresaid cares and fears, and labours of wise men for another life, and would have liberty to please their flesh, and live in all the sensuall delights that they can attain, and so they would be gainers by their folly and badness; and consequently folly would be wisdom, and wisdom would be folly; good would be evill, and evil would be good. It being certain then that a possibility and probability of another life is obvious to the light of nature, and that this possibility and probability obligeth every man in reason, to live here in preparation to another life, and to think no paines or cost too great for so great an end, and consequently that the God of nature, hath in nature prescribed man this work; it must needs follow, that either there is such a life indeed hereafter, or else that God hath made our nature, and appointed our lives to be all but vain, and false, and delusory, and commanded us, or directed us to that as good, which shall be our loss; and shewed us that as evil, which would be our gain; And if God cannot or will not govern the world without this course of delusion, falshood, and frustration, then he is below some of his creatures, or at least not perfect in power, wisdom and goodness: and then there is no God, and then there is nothing.
Thes. 14. It is not the essential constitutive parts of man, by which he is proximately capable of his felicity or end, but his moral perfections and acceptablenesse to God.
1. Otherwise all men should be happy, because all ate men, which is not true. 2. Otherwise there should no means be appointed for man to use, in order to his end; for he hath his natural powers without any industry of his own. 3. Else there should be an equality or felicity to the obedient and disobedient, the vertuous and vitious, and consequently vertue were no perfection and no vertue, and vice no vice; duty no duty, and sin no sin, if all tended to the same end, and were equally consistent with our welfare. 4. The light of nature teacheth all men, that vice deserveth punishment, and vertue praise, and that Murderers, Traitors, and other wicked persons deserve not that happinesse in this world, which others have, but forfeit their accommodations or lives; and that there is a certain laudableness or capableness in humane actions, according to which men should be esteemed and used, and that it should go well with the good, and ill with the bad. 5. And mans happinesse being Gods gift, can be given to none but upon his termes, and to such as are acceptable to him. 6. And the corruption of the best things makes them worst; and therefore a bad man is worse then a beast, and must be more unhappy; as a bad Angel is worse then a man: who otherwise considered in his essentials was much above us.
Thes. 15. Man therefore must be fitted for his felicity and conducted to his end, by moral meanes.
For the means must be fitted to his intellectual nature and the motives to his faculties. God moveth not living creatures, as he doth the inanimate: We cast a stone, but we drive a beast. God can carry a man up and down, as if he had no life of his own: but if he had intended to do thus ordinarily by him, he would not have given him life: for he doth not his excellent works in vaine; so God can move man as beasts are moved suspending his reason, and drawing him by meere sensitive baites, and moving him by objects that shall necessitate his faculties to act; but if he had intended to use him as a beast, he would have made him but sensitive as a beast, and not have given him the nobler faculties of a discursive intellect, and free-wil in vaine. To these therefore must the means be suited.
Thes. 16. Man oweth perfect duty to his Maker, and must have moral means agreeable to his nature to direct him in this duty, and oblige him to it.
He that is capable of duty, and is what he is, and hath what he hath intirely from God, must needes owe himself, and all that he can perform, to God, and therefore must have instructions of his Makers will, and be directed by him concerning his duty, which else he cannot perform.
Thes. 17. Man is a sociable creature, and must be obliged according to his nature, to the duties of relation and society.
We are sociable through naturall inclination, and also through necessity, being every man insufficient for himself, and needing the help of others to our present subsistence, and safe, and pleasant, and comfortable being, and to further us in Gods service, and to our ultimate end: And we are made sociable for the common good, and the propagation and preservation of mankind: and principally because that holy societies honour our Maker more then holy separate persons.
Thes. 18. These Moral means must be the Revelations of our end, and the prescript of duty necessary to its attainment, and the promises of good, and comminations of punishment necessary to provoke us to performance, with needfull exhortations and dehortations, and such subservient helps: that is, man is made a Creature to be instructed by Doctrine, ruled by the use of Laws.
For an unknown end inviteth not the Rationall Creature, nor is intended or sought. As bruits must be drawn by sensitive objects, so man must be drawn by intellectual objects suited to the nature of man. And these objects must be propounded, that they may be apprehended: And as sensitive objects are offered to beasts to work upon their sensitive appetite and fantasie, by way of necessity (because that is agreeable to their nature) so are the objects of the Rational soul propounded to our Intellect and free will, that they may be rationally and freely received, which is agreeable to humane nature. And as we have naturally a power of Volition …nd Nolition, chusing and refusing, and the Affections of Love, and Desire, and Joy, and Hope, and Fear, &c. so none of these are made in vaine; and therefore all must have their objects: and these must be the great things of the life to come which we are made for, with the matters of this life that help or hinder them; or else they cannot be the objects that are most suitable to our faculties, and for which it is that we are men. So that it is plaine from the nature of man, that he is a Creature to be governed by Laws.
Thes. 19. If man must know his End and Meanes, by Doctrine, and be obliged by Laws, then must there be Judgement and Execution of these Laws.
For Laws are vain and delusory without execution, and will dishonour the Government, as if he could not rule without vaine Promises and Threats. Laws are the Subjects Rule of Duty, and the Judges Rule of Judgement: …herefore most certainly if God have Laws, he will have judgement according to his Laws.
Thes. 20. If man must have Laws, and those Laws be executed, then must there be a King, or Soveraign Governour of man.
For there can be no effect without its cause: no Laws without a Law-giver, no Judgment without a Judge Legislation, and judgement with the execution of the sentence, are the parts of Government: and therefore are the Acts of a Governor.
Thes. 21. Soveraign Ruler of mankind must be but one, and one that hath sufficiency or chiefest Aptitude, and highest Title.
1. Mankind hath One Original, and one Common nature, and one End, and their Creator and Governor is that end, which all should intend, and are capable remotely in their naturals to attain and enjoy: therefore they can have but one Soveraign.
2. He that is the Soveraign Ruler of the world must (as to Aptitude) 1. Have wisdom enough to know all the Subjects, and all the secrets of their hearts, and to diserne each vertue and vice, each duty and sin that's done within by their thoughts, wills, or affections: and also he must be wise enough to know all the concernments of all his Subjects through the world, and all at once; and to know what Laws to make for them, and all the means that are fittest for their Government.
2. And he must have so much goodnesse as to be immutably true to the common end of the Government, and to be indefectible in Truth and Justice. 3. And he must have so much power, as to be able to Protect all his Subjects in the world, and to repress all Enemies whatever, and to reward all according to their works, and to punish all that shall offend, and see to the execution of his Laws.
3. And besides this Aptitude, he must have the chiefest Title to be their Soveraign.
Thes. 22. Therefore God, and only God is the Soveraign Ruler of mankind, as having alone the sufficiency or Aptitude in his infinite perfections, and the Highest Title by Creation, and a plenary propriety thence resulting.
1. God and he only hath the fulnesse of Wisdom, goodness, and power, necessary to so great a work. Or if these perfections in any creature were proportionable to the Government of all the world. 1. Yet were all this but in dependency upon God, and therefore that creature were not apt for soveraign Rule, as having and doing nothing of it self, but by a higher Cause. 2. Creation is a Foundation from whence the most absolute Right of Government doth result that is imaginable; but in the order following.
Thes. 23. God having created man, a Rational free Agent, to be Ruled as aforesaid, and conferred on him all the benefits of which he is naturally possessed, doth by a necessary resultancy stand related unto man, in a threefold relation, viz. our Absolute Lord (or Owner) our Soveraign, Ruler, (or King) and our most bountifull Benefactor: and man stands Related unto God as his own, his subject (as to obligation) and his Beneficiary.
Man being first considered more generally as a Creature, whatever he is, must needs be his Makers: Creation gives so perfect a Dominion as leaveth no pretence for a competition, to the Creature himself, or any other Creature, so that making us of nothing, it is impossible but we should be his Own: and therefore Dominion or propriety is the first result of our Creation.
Man being considered as before described, a ratioonal free Agent to be Ruled Morally, or by Laws; it next followeth by necessary resultancy, that his Maker and Owner, is his Soveraign King; having the Jus Imperii, as well as the Jus Dominii, which none else can have but derivately and subordinately to him, we have then evinced from the nature of man (waving other arguments further from our subject) that GOD IS THE SOVERAIGNE RULER OF MAN-KIND.