A Holy Commonwealth, Chapter 12

A Holy Commonwealth · Chapter 12

p. 346CHAP. 12. Of due Obedience to Rulers, and of Resistance.

Thes. 317. IT is the Command of God the universal Soveraign, that every soul be subject to the higher Powers, and resist them not; and this not only for fear of punishment, but for conscience sake, Rom. 13. 1. to 7. Tit. 3. 1. 1 Pet. 2. 13, 14, 15.

Because the right understanding of these commands of God, is of great use for our guidance in these weighty points, I shall stay a while upon the search of that Rom. 13. which saith most; and if we understand that, it will be the easier to understand the rest.

Many occasions concurred to make this document of the Apostle necessary to the Romans. 1. There were Hereticks crept in among them that abused the doctrine of Christian Liberty, and perswaded them that subjection to the Rule of Magistrates was against their Liberty. 2. And the weaker Christians were the easier induced to entertain this doctrine in part, because they were Heathen Magistrates that they were under. And the Christians, being (justly) prohibited by the Apostles to go to Law about personal in…juries, before Heaten Judges, but to agree them among themselves, they were readyer to have low thoughts of such Judges as useless or burdensom, or p. 347not fit to be the Governors of Christians. 3. And especially because many of the Christian had been Jews, that were hardly brought to any but a forced submission unto Gentile Rulers; and were ever prone to rebell against them, thinking it an honourable vindication of their holy state and Church, which they thought no Heathen had right to Rule over. The first Hereticks rising from the Jewish Christians, and Judaizing so palpably in this and other things, and the weaker sort of the Jewish Christians being so prone to hearken to them, gave great occasion to the Apostle thus to press the doctrine of subjection.

Where note, that the main question here resolved, is, Whether Magistracy, and Heathen Magistrates should be submitted to as Gods Ordinance for conscience sake? And so it was about the very state of subjection: which among us Christians is a matter past doubt; though we are not all agreed about obedience in some particular cases.

The Precept it self is laid down in the first verse, [Let every soul be subject to the higher powers] The first moving Argument is drawn from the efficient cause, which is God. 1. In general Magistracy is his Institution [There is no power but from God] And so it is he that sets up Magistrates, and they are subordinate to him, and have a power derived from him [The Powers that be are ordained of God.] The conclusions hence inferred are v. 2. that therefore 1. Whoever resisteth the power, resisteth Gods own Ordinance, that is, both breaks his Law, and resisteth a Power derived from him, and consequently resisteth God. 2. And so great a sin as resisting Gods Officers and Ordinance, deserveth a grievous punishment. In the p. 348third vers…, the Apostle doth conjunctly bring in his second Argument, (from the end of Government;) & also answer an objection which thence was brought against it. [What can be expected from Heathens (might the Christians say) but acts of enmity? They will still be persecuting us] The Apostle at once answering this, and arguing à fine for subjection, tells them, that Magistrates have their office to be a terrour to evil works, and not to good: And therefore let us do good, and if the office be used but according to its instituted nature, we shall have praise from Magistrates, and need not fear them. For it is for our good that God hath appointed them. Here the Apostle conjoyneth his two Arguments, from the Author and the End [He is Gods Minister for thy Good] Its pos…ible a wicked man may abuse his office: but this is the End for which God hath appointed Magistracy in the world; and this even Heathen Magistrates profess that they intend; and such vice and vertue as they are acquainted with, they do in some measure deal with accordingly. But if men do evil, then they have cause to fear the Magistrate; [for he is Gods Minister, a Revenger to wrath, to inflict punishment on him that doth evil:] But men must blame themselves and not the Magistrate, if they suffer for ill-doing. Hereupon the Apostle repeateth the Conclusion, that there is a necessity of subjection, not only to escape punishment, but to obey God, even for conscience sake; And hence infers a further Conclusion, that for conscience sake also we must pay them tribute, because they are Gods servants, employed in his work for our good: And therefore on these grounds Tribute, Custom, Fear, Honour must be given to all to whom they p. 349are due. Where he sheweth that it was the Governors in actual possession then that he commanded subjection to, when he argueth from their actual Labour for the Subjects good.

[foreign every soul] is the Synechdoche for [every person,] [foreign, be subject] or subordinate, extendeth both …o a state of subjection, and to the exercise of a Subjects duty; q. d. Let him keep his station as a subject, and live as such: The Apostle puts [foreign, Powers] in the abstract, though it have existence but in a subject; and so it is in the concrete that he meaneth: but subjection is due to the man for the sake of his Authority, and not on any other account: and therefore it is in order of nature first to the Authority, and then to the man. And is is not foreign, natural power or strength, that he speaks of; but that Civil Power which is Jus Regendi. Whether [foreign] be translated as a comparative or superlative, is not considerable in point of doctrine, there being no doubt but the Apostle intendeth our obedience to more then the Soveraign, and yet to none other but those that receive their power from him. But yet why literally [foreign] should be translated [the highest] rather then [high, or higher, or superiour] I know not: Nor have I any mind to tempt men to think that it was only Nero, that he Apostle speaks of, or only the Senate, it being more that wait and labour in this very work, and to whom tribute, custome, fear, honour were to be paid.

For the right understanding both of the Text and Subject, let these Questions be briefly answered.

Quest 1. What is meant by [Power?] Answ. Any p. 350men in the Office of Governours, having Authority.

Quest. 2. What is meant by [Higher Powers?] Answ. All that are in Government, and so above us, but principally the Soveragin.

Quest. 3. What is meant by [every soul?] Answ. Every person except those to whom we are commanded to be subject. For in that all are put under them, it is manifest that they themselves are excepted to whom all are subjected. So far as they are Rulers, they are excepted, though the same persons may be both Rulers and Subjects in several respects.

Quest. 4. What is meant by being [subject?]

Answ. Perturb not the Order of the Common-wealth. Yield your selves voluntary subjects to your Governours, and behave your selves accordingly.

Quest. 5. What is meant by [foreign] Gods ordaining them? Is it an Ordaining by Decree, by Law, or by Providential disposal of Event? Answ. The internal eternal Decrees of God are no Rule of Duty to us, nor the thing here meant: But his Institution of the office by the Ʋniversal Law, together with those Providential disposals that make over the Power to the individual persons.

Quest. 6. But is it not enough to oblige us to subjection, if the Power have bu… the Ordination of Decree, and Disposing-Providence de Eventu? Answ. Tha…s a contradiction. It must have a Law, Grant, Commission, or other Moral Donation, or it is no Power, that is, no Right of Governing. The Kings that give up their Kingdoms to the Beast, may fulfill Gods Decreeing and Providential will de Eventu: The death of Christ p. 351by the Jews, may fall under a certain Decree and Providence: But it is a Grant of Right that must prove the Right. Possession of strength is separable from possession of true Governing Right. If a Plague come upon us, it is by Decree and Disposing Providence: And yet we may do our best to resist it. The Devil rules the children of Disobedience, not without Gods permissive Decree and Providence: but yet he hath no Right to Rule them, nor they any warrant to obey him.

Quest. 7. What is meant by [the Powers that be?] Is it all that be in present Possession? Answ. 1. It is directly all persons that are in Power. But then remembe… that Power is Jus reg…ndi, and not meer strength. 2. Yet it implyeth, that to you and me, and other single private persons, he that is stated in the Possession of the office, and exerciseth it, is to be taken to have the Right of Government, unless the contrary be notorious. And therefore the Apostle argueth for obedience and tribute from their exercise of the office; [They attend continually, or labour about this very thing.] Of this more anon.

Quest. 8. When did God [ordain] the Powers? and by what act? Answ. By the act of Law or Institution he ordaineth the office; and by Acts of disposing Providence he determineth of the person (usually by the Instrumentality or means of men.) 1. In the beginning in the Law of nature, he subjected man to himself, and the woman to the man, and (by appointment) children to their parents, and in general, at least after the fall, made Magistracy and Subjection necessary to the world. The more men sinned, the more he gave them up to humane Government, and p. 352as they rebelled and departed from him, so he forsook them, as to his special Government in way of mercy. He kept himself the Soveraignty over his peculiar people of Israel in a more eminent way of exercise then over any other. 1. He made their common Laws for Government. 2. He chose himself their Soveraign Magistrate; a limited Monarch to be his Deputy or chief Officer. 3. He appointed a course for choice of the Sanbedrim. 4. He enabled them for their work. 5. He kept the chief Judicature in his hands, resolving their doubts, and deciding their most difficult cases by his Oracles. But when they were aweary of this Theocracy, he withdrew from them according to their corrupt desires, and left them to their desired King: Yet did he not wholly forsake them, but only in that measure as they had forsaken and cast off him.

Quest. 9. Who is meant here by [foreign] Answ. The Contraordinate, that break out of the rank o… subjects, and set themselves against Government, as Army is set against Army in fight: All is here prohibited that is contrary to subjection; but not all Resistance; no… is the word properly translated by Resisting: There is a Resistance that is contrary to subjection, and that is forbidden: and there is a Resistance not contrary to subjection: and that is not forbidden.

Quest. 10. What is meant by [Damnation] which the contraordinate or rebellious do receive? Answ. Not only punishment from man, but a most heavy punishment, even everlasting misery from God, whose order and power they oppose: unless by faith and Repentance it be prevented.

p. 353Quest. 11 Must we obey no Rulers but such as are here described, as are not a terrour to the good, but the evil? Answ. If the very drift and work of their Government were for evil works and against good, then they acted as the Devils substitutes, and could not be Magistrates, nor servants of God, but nullifie their office as to them. But if it be but in some particular cases that they are against Good, and for Evil, and such as nullifie not their office; then we must not deny subjection to them: but how far we may or may not resist, shall be shewed anon.

Quest. 12 How could Nero be said to be an encourager of Good, and a terror to evil, and such an one as is here described? Answ. 1. It is directly to Magistracy as such that Paul requireth subjection: And therefore he describeth it as it is in Gods Institution. 2. Yet it is also Magistracy as in those particular men: But then the Apostle considereth them partly as obliged to be such as he describeth, and partly as professing to be such; for so did Nero: and partly as being actually such in many things. In matters of common equity, and against moral evil, and for that good which the Law of Nature revealeth, the Roman Laws might well in the main be said to be a terrour to evil works, and not to good; though in the matters of supernatural revelation they were perverse: And Nero was to Govern by these Laws: And there were multitudes of Officers besides Nero that were to be Judge and execute according to these Laws: And the Apostle had respect to these. And the Senate had part still in the Soveraignty it self. But of this more anon.

Quest. 13. But how could Nero he said to be the p. 354Minister of God, and a Power set over them by God, (especailly as to the Jews) when he had no lawful Call? Answ. 1. The Apostle lookt at the whole frame of Government, Laws, Senate, Officers, as well as at Nero. 2. Nero had the Consent of Senate and people before Paul wrote this. 3. Settled possession signifieth a Consent: For the people are the strength: and the strongest can resist, if they will: and they that can and do not, shew that they will not. 4. The Apostle supposeth that the private Christians to whom he writeth, were not the Judge… of the Titles of Princes, Senates or People.

Thes. 318. A Christians subjection to Magistrates must be participatively Divine, that is, to Magistrates as Officers authorized by God the Ʋniversal King.

He that obeyeth upon any other account excluding this, doth not obey a Magistrate as a Magistrate, but as an Idol, or as one that is able to do him good or hurt: and so it is himself that he serveth in his obedience; and there is no Divine obedience in it. But a Christian understandeth that God is the Alpha and Omega, the first and last; and that of him, and through him, and to him are all things, Rom. 11. 36. And therefore he intendeth God in all, and dependeth on him in all; and doing all for him and by his command, all things are sanctified that he doth, and from God he shall receive his reward. Our Obedience is principally denominated and estimated from the principal Authority. In the last Resolution all the Obedience of a Christian to whomsoever is Divine: and all the Obedience of a wicked man is to an Idol, or p. 355to carnal-self; to which he subjecteth even God himself.

Thes. 319. All persons, even Pastors of the Church, are bound to this subjection to Magistrates, as I have before proved, and it is a double wickedness and treason for them to exempt themselves, that should Preach the doctrine of obedience to others:

Beza on the Text citeth Chrysostoms exposition before mentioned, viz. [That this is commanded to all, even Preists and Monks, and not only to them that are employed in the business of this life, as the Apostle in the very entrance declareth, when he saith, Let every soul be subject to the higher Powers: though an Apostle, though an Evangelist, though a Prophet, or whoever else thou be: For this subjection overthroweth not Piety,] Upon which Beza with exclamation saith, [Good God, if he had but lived at this time, how sharply would that man inveigh against him, that not only refuseth subjection to Kings, but transferreth also Kingdoms and Empires, and yet would seem the Vi…ar of Christ!] But of this before.

Thes. 320. Rulers must be obeyed in all lawful things.

That is, in all things that God hath not disabled them to oblige us in, and hath not obliged us himself to the contrary.

Thes. 321. Kings and Magistrates must be obeyed, p. 356even about the Worship of God, in all lawfull commands.

So much of the circumstances of Worship as God hath left to be determined by men, we must obey a Magistrate in if he determine them: And much more when he doth but enforce Gods own Commandments: Of this also before.

Thes. 322. About the circumstances of Divine Worship, much more about secular things, if the Prince command one thing (not contrary to Gods Law) and the Pastors of the Church command the contrary, we must obey the Prince before the Pastors.

I bring not the Pope or any unlawfull Prelates into question; who are not as such to be obeyed at all: But it is the lawful Pastors of the Church, that I speak of: In the substance of their office, which God himself hath made necessary, they are not to be disobeyed, whatever Princes say, because it were a disobeying God: As if we were forbid to Hear, Pray, Receive the Sacraments, live in Church Communion, &c. But the circumstances of Time, Place, Utens…, &c. though ordinarily they should be left to the Pastors determinations, yet are such things as a Magistrate may determine of, and must be obeyed in. And in these works common to both, he is the higher Power.

Thes. 323. We must obey Magistrates, though we know not that their Commands are lawfull, as long as they are so indeed, and we have no sufficient Reason to believe them unlawful.

p. 3571. It is not our erroneous conceits that a Lawful Command is unlawful, that will excuse any man from the guilt of disobedience: For that very errour is our sin: If you say, that we must go according to our consciences: I answer; Not according to an erring Conscience (it being doubtful whether that be truly Conscience:) unless you will make man a God to himself, as setting him above the Laws of God, and that by vertue of his errors. If you say, that at least we must not go against Conscience; I answer, In sensu diviso you must: In sensu composito you must not. And yet you must not go according to it. So that errour intangleth you in a necessity of sinning, if you will not depose it. What then must be done? Answ. Gods Law stands still the same, and varyeth not with your erring mind. It binds you first to lay by your errour, and then to Obey. Object. But in case I cannot lay it by, what am I bound to? I answer, you are still bound to lay it by, and to use the means that are necessary thereto, with a right disposed mind, that you may be able or apt to do it. You cannot be innocently impotent to your Duty.

2. We know that Obedience to Magistrates is a Duty: If therefore we know not, nor have sufficient reason to believe, that the thing is sinful to the obeyer, we must obey.

Thes. 324. Many things are sinfull… …manded, that are lawfully, yea necessarily to be …yed.

I have given many instances in cases about Worship, in my fifth Disput. about Ch…ch-Government… p. 358It may be sinful in a Governour to lay an unnecessary Tax upon the people; who yet may be bound in conscience to obey the imposition. If the thing be not evil in it self, nor by a more weighty accident, then the Magistrates command is to the doing it, we must obey. Of this more in the Negatives.

Thes. 325. It is lawful for subjects to swear fidelity and obedience to Soveraigns.

1. If it be needful to perform it, it is lawful and just that we promise and swear it. For why should we deny to be engaged to that which we must perform? 2. It is just as to the Prince, who is sworn to the Common-wealth; and obligations here should be mutual. Why should he hazard his life for a People that will not swear fidelity to him? Princes, and Parliaments, and all Soveraign Princes go in continual danger by reason of the plots and malice of the enemies. And shall we not swear fidelity to them? 3. If every husband expecteth it in marriage from his wife; and if Abraham made his servant swear to be faithful in one particular duty, much more is it necessary in this case.

Yet upon a sudden change, while times and Consciences are unsetled, it is a more prudent course for Princes to forbear exacting oathes, left it occasion seruples and divisions (unless some urgent necessity require it) and to stay till Consciences are settled.

Thes. 326. It is the subjects Duty to defend their Prince with their strength, and hazzard of their p. 359lives, against all for reign and domestick enemies that seek his life or ruine.

The way of defence they may be limited in by the Law: Every man is to do it in his place and calling. Fidelity requireth it. The common good requireth it. Else no man that is wise would be a King or Governor. For if the people be not bound to defend him, he is but set up to be the object of envy, and a bait to the ambitious to entice men to invade him, and execute their fury on him.

Thes. 327. It is a most impious thing for Popes to pretend to disoblige Christians from their Oaths and fidelity to their Soveraigns, and to encourage their subjects to rebel and murder them.

That this is their Religion, I have already shewed in the express words of the Council at the Laterance under Innocent the 3. And that it hath been their practice, Germany, France, England and many Nations know. Many Popes have done so against the German Emperors. Math. Paris calls it the [Papal Rebellion] against Frederick; which Christian people then lamented and detested. Roger Hoveden (that flatters the Pope more then M. Paris) tells us (H. 2. pag. 284.) that the Pope undertook to damn the Laws and Customs of England, in perpetuum, and anathematized all that held them, or any way favoured them] not excepting the King himself. These Laws and customs were no Novelties; but such as the King and Nobles called avitas consuetudines & Leges; the customs and Laws of their Ancestors, (And yet the Papists pretend that Papacy is no Novelty, nor the Father p. 360of Novelties.) Math. Paris (in Hen. 2.) tells you what these Laws were. And Becket himself (that was Sainted for such stuff) telleth the King, [Quia certum est, Reges potestatem suam ab Ecclesia accipere, & non ipsam ab illis—ergo non haberetis Episcopis praecipere absolvere aliquem, vel excommunicare, trahere Clericos and Secularia examina, judicare de decimis, de Ecclesiis—& multa alia quae in hunc modum scripta sunt inter consuetudines vestras, quas dicitis avitas.] Here's holy Doctrine! that Kings receive their power from the Church, and may notjudge of Tythes, or Churches, nor bring Clergymen to examination at their Barr! Rog Hoveden H. 2. p. 285. And the same Prelate of Canterbury Epist. ad suffragan. absolveth all Bishops from their obedience, and condemneth and excommunicateth all the Exacters, Counsellors and Observers of the English Laws, [Omnes{que} vos Episcopos à promissione qua contra institutionem Ecclesiasticam, & ad earum observationem tenebamini, auctoritate Dei & nostra absolvimus. Quis enim dubitat sacerdotes Christi Regnum & Principum, omniumque fidelium patres & Magistros censeri? Nonne miserabilis insaniae esse cognoscitur, si filius Patrem, discipulus Magistrum sibi conetur subjugare, & iniquis obligationibus Potestati suae subj…cere? à quo credit, non solum se in terra, sed etiam in coelis ligare posse, & solvi?] O how would Paul and all the antient Church have detested this doctrine of the Papal Saint, that makes it madness for Priests to be subjected to Kings, forsooth because (in another kind) they are their Masters, and can bind or loose them? And so their Tutors in Musick, Physick or any Science should be no subjects? Yea a Prelate we see as p. 361well as a Pope can absolve the Subjects from their promises and fidelity. The King himself he had yet mercy on, and forbore to excommunicate (which was then to depose him) but [in proximo eam laturi] he was ready next to do, if he did not the sooner repent; of what? Of the Laws of England against the Pope, and his Clergies pretended liberties. And these great enemies of Novelty and Friends to Antiquity, made Richard the first swear at his Coronation, [to blot out these ill Laws and perverse customs] R. Hoved. p. 374. yea when the good Bishop Rob. Grosthest had written a faithful Letter to the Pope, the Pope sweareth by Peter and Paul [Nisi moveret nos innata ingenuitas, ipsum in tantam confusionem praecipitarem, ut toti mundo fabula foret, stupor, exemplum, & prodigium. Nonne Rex Anglorum noster est Vassallus, & ut plus dicam mancipium, qui potest eum nutu nostro incarcerare & ignominiae mancipare? that is, [Is not the King of England our Vassal, and to say more, our slave? who can with our nod imprison him, and enslave him to ignominy (or shame)] Math. Paris in H. 3. an. 1253. pag. 872. Here was plain dealing with Kings: And the Papal practises have been as plain, that is, plain Hostility against all Christian Kings and States.

He that hath read but Math. Paris, and the Histories of Germany collected by Pistorius, and those by Freherus, and those by Reuberus, and Goldastus de Monarch. and his Imperial Constitutions (to name no more) hath seen trains and successions of Papal Treasons and Hostilities against Christian Princes, as may make him wonder that Princes suffer such a thing as a Pope upon the earth.

p. 362Saith the Apolog. Henr. 4. Imperatoris (in Marq. Freheri Tom. 1. pag. 172.) Scripsit Hildebrand Papa,—quod ipse exemplo alicujus Romani Pontificis Potestatem habuerit solvere à Sacramento Principes Regni, immo solvere in eis Sacramentum, quo fidem vel pactum promiserant Reg…suo. Miseremini O Principes regni coelestis, populus Dei, si tamen estis pacifici, & si estis in Unitate Ecclesiae Dei: vos inquam miseremini & indignemini, quod aestimavit vos talis momenti, ut putaret vos posse in hanc sententiam adduci, ut id quod non potest fieri, credatis posse fieri. Nam Sacramentum dicitur quoque jusjurandum,—Jurabis inquit Dominus, in veritate, in judicio & in justitia: Quis potest haec solvere, quae sunt opera manum tuarum Domine? Opera quippe virtutis Dei sunt veritas, judicium & justitia—] Et pag. 174. Sed Hildebrand Papa sic scripsit, & sic praedicavit [Quidam (inquiens) Romanus Pontifex Regem Francorum non tam pro suis iniquitatibus, quam pro eo quod tantae potestati non erat utilis, à Regno deposuit, & Pipinum Caroli Magni patrem in ejus loco substituit, omnes Francigenas à juramento fidelitatis quam illi fecerunt absolvit.] Mira quidem videntur nobis quae astruit! ut scilicet Religiosus aliquis Romanus Pontifex Sacramentum fidei in aliquo absolvere tentaverit: quia fides Dei magis quam alicujus aestimatur, quae alicui in ejus nomine datur, atque promittitur—Quando autem à fide aliquis solutus fuerit, & fidem non habuerit, proculdabio mendax est, insuper & perjurus, qualis regnum Dei non possidebit.—] Read the rest ibid. But of this I have said more in other writings.

p. 363Thes. 328. It is a great Controversie, Whether a subject may fight at a Princes command when he knoweth not the cause to be just, or when he knoweth it to be unjust? Answ 1. If he know it to be unjust, he may not; (except Accidentally aliun…è some further prevalent Reason warrant it.) 2. If he know it not to be unjust, when it i… so, because he doth not his duty to know, he is bound to do that duty, and knowing to forbear. 3. If he know it not to be unjust, because he hath no capacity to discover the unjustice, nor to judge of it, then he may bear arms.

1. The guilt of blood is so heavy a thing that no man should draw it upon himself or his Prince: unjust war is murdering: And no man should murder in obedience to a Prince, when God condemneth it. 2. The Accidental exceptions à fine, &c. I shall speak of among the Affirmative Propositions. 3. Wilful ignorance will not excuse a man from the guilt of murder, though a King command it. But the person is at once obliged to use means for his better information, to lay by his errour, and to forbear the sin. 4. But when the sin or unjustness of the war is not notorious, nor within our reach to know it, then we must obey our Rulers that are the Judges or discerners of the case: For, 1. Rulers may not open all causes of a war to all the Souldiers: Sometime the case requireth such secrecie and expedition, as will not consist with that. 2. Subjects by reason of distance and disacquaintance are usually incompetent Judges of such cases. 3. And if they should never fight till they know the Justness of the cause, they p. 364would neglect the Necessary Defence of their Soveraign and Countrey.

Yet, if there be not competent knowledge that it is a good cause, men should not thrust on themselves, nor go to war without some kind of Necessity.

Thes. 329. The same answer serveth to that other Controversie, Whether a subject may execute an unjust Sentence of a Prince or Judge?

If it concern the Common-wealth directly (or nearly) he must suspend his execution till he have competent satisfaction: As if he were commanded to put to death some persons of great Eminency and Interest in the Common-wealth. But if it be but against a private person (as the hanging a man condemned for felony, the shooting to death a Souldier condemned for mutiny) here if the unjustice be not notorious, and you see no great cause to suspect it, and be not negligent in doing what concerneth you in your place, for due information, you may do execution, if you are commanded. But not, if the unjustice be notorious, or such as you may well discover, without transgressing your bounds in the enquiry. In such cases, Princes should find no Executioners: And the Executioners are guilty of the crime: For God is to be obeyed more then man. Doeg was cursed for slaying the Priests at King Saul's command. It cost the Captains and Souldiers their lives that would have surprized Elias at the Kings command. Obadiah is blessed that saved the Prophets; and so are the Aegyptian Mid-wives that saved the Israelites children, p. 365whom the King commanded to destroy. Many that have been Executiones in the Martyrs death, have had exemplary plagues. Its the Legal way of restraining Kings from unjustice, to punish their Executioners that are subjects, that others may fear obeying them in wickedness.

Thes. 330. A Soveraign that is an Heretick, or wicked man, yea Infidel or Heathen, must be obeyed in all lawful things: but with an Obedience answerable to his Authority.

I shall open this together with the next Thesis.

Thes. 331. He that hath no such Right to Govern, as will justifie himself for it before God, may yet be such whom we are obliged to obey.

We have here one of the weightyest and difficultest cases about Obedience, before us. It is very hard to conceive how an Infidel or Heathen can have any Right of Government, because they deny the Universal Soveraign from whom they must derive their Right, or they can have none: And how can a Rebel receive Authority? And why should we obey him that hath no Authority? Nay is it not impossible, when Authoritas Imperantis is the formal object of Obedience? Also will it not follow that the Pope should be obeyed that is no Infidel or Heathen?

And yet Christ, and Paul, and Peter have so plainly decided the case, that the Heathen Magistrates that were in their daies were to be obeyed, that we must needs take that for a certain truth. And therefore we p. 366have only to consider upon what ground, and how f…r they are to be obeyed, and to answer the objections.

Aquinas 22^a. q. 10. a. 10. doth first well distinguish between a Governor to be chosen, and a pre-existent Governour: And then well concludeth that an Infidel is not to be made a Governour, (that is, if he be elective;) but if he be already a Governour—what then? Why then he ill concludeth that the Church having God authority, can take away from them their Jus Domini… & praelationis; but till the Church do depose them, (which it forbeareth sometime to avoid scandal) we must obey them, and pay them tribute to avoid scandal too] And so he interpreteth the Texts of Scripture that command subjection to Infidel Princes, as being only to keep us from offence. But this agreeth not with the words of Paul, that saith, Every soul must be subject even for conscience sake, and as to the Ministers of God. To obey only to avoid offence, is not to obey at all: It is but the matter of that which is Obedience in another: For the Form and Being is wanting, if it be not done for the Authority of the Commander: Even as that is no Belief which is not for the Authority or credit of the affirmer. But sure it is true subjection that is commanded us.

The Truth, as I conceive, lieth thus. 1. If the Infidelity of a Prince be not notorious, he is no Infidel to you and me, and then there is no doubt. As in the Ministry, so in the Magistracy, if he be in the place, and not a notorious Ʋsurper, he is an Officer to me: The Benefit of the subject from Magistracy (and Ministry) is first considerable: They are means to our good. The Duty is in order to the Benefit. We have Title p. 367to the Benefits of the office, though an Usurper be in the place. And having right to the Benefit, must do the Duty.

2. If the Ruler be notoriously an Infidel or Heathen, yet he is supposed to own a God, even one highest God, that is most perfect in Power, Wisdom and Goodness, and to profess himself a subject of God, and an Officer under him to punish evil doers, and encourage well-doers: This the Heathens did profess. But withall they knew not the Redeemer, nor the True God aright, with a saving knowledge, but dishonoured him by worshipping many Idols in conjunction with him. And in the execution of their offices, they persecuted Christianity, though they encouraged Moral Vertue. What then must we think of such? 1. It is better for the world to have such Governours then none. And therefore they did more good then hurt. There never was among those Heathens so bloody a persecutor, that did not save the lives of many from persecution, for one that they destroyed. For it is the rabble rout of the Vulgar that are the bloodyest persecutors: Where the Emperours killed an hundred Christians, had they but turned loose the vulgar rabble, they would have killed a thousand, or made an end of them. We should have ten thousand Persecutors for one, if there were no Rulers to restrain the Serpentine Malignant enmity that is in the multitude of the ungodly. 2. Seeing therefore that we have preservation and benefit by them as Governours, we owe them duty as Governours. 3. They are Analogically Rulers, having an Analogical Authority imperfecti generis. As they own a God, and profess to worship God, and to preserve peace p. 368and order in the world, and punish vice, and promote vertue, according to the Law of Nature, so they are in tantum truly Magistrates. But as they deny the Redeemer, and corrupt the doctrine of the God-head, so they fall short of that dependance on the fountain of Authority; that should make them fully men of power. 4. They are accordingly to be obeyed with obedience proportioned to their Authority, and no more. 5. How far an Atheist or Infidel is to be rejected, I shall mention anon under the Affirmatives. 6. Even those that by Atheism, or doing more hurt then good, do nullifie their Magistracy, may yet be materially, though not formally obeyed to avoid evils that else would fall upon our selves, or upon the Church or Common-wealth. 7. And private men may not lay hands on them, as long as God and the Common-wealth (or body of the Nation) forbear them. If a Justice of Peace renounce the King, and yet go on to execute the Laws, and if the King be one that can seize on him at his pleasure, and willingly forbeareth him, the subject must let him alone, and obey all that he commandeth according to Law, till the King lay hands on him, or forbid obedience to him. 8. Such persons therefore have no right Coram Deo to govern, which will justifie them against the accusation of Usurpation or Treason against God: But yet the people may be bound to obey them (though they know this) not as so Authorized, but as being in the seat or place of Government, and commanding in Gods name by his voluntary permission. If a Traytor come and charge me to obey the Kings Laws, I will obey them as the Kings, though formally I obey not him; But if he be one p. 369that the King permitteth in a place of power, I will obey him also, so it be not against the King. So is it in this case, about Infidel and Heathen Governors.

And now the objections need no further answer. The grand Ob…n (that they are Traytors against God, and ha… Power from him, because they deny him) is answered in this that hath been said. The other Objection (that this would infer obedience to the Pope) is easily answered: The Office it self of the Papacy is erected by man against the Will of Christ. An Infidel King is in an Office of Gods institution, though the person be half unfit: But the Pope is in an Office that God condemneth, whatever the person be. And therefore a sinful office may not be obeyed by us at all.

Thes. 332. To obey a man that is known to have no Powers is not of it self unlawful, so the office or thing commanded be not forbidden.

For we are commanded to subject our selves one to another, 1 Pet. 5. 5. and in honour to prefer each other. I may obey any man that commandeth me, even if it be to give him my Cloak, or Coat, or go with him so many miles: So be it there be not some accident that makes it sinful: As if it seem to own an unjust Authority to the publick scandal; or if it will encourage the Usurper in his sin, &c.

But this also is no plea for the lawfulness of obeying the Pope, whose Office is unlawful, and who is the enemy of Common-wealths, while he proclaimeth himself the Lord of Princes. Saith an old Poet p. 370and Historian, Gunther. Ligurin. Lib. 6. pag. 376.

Cogitet antiquos primaevi temporis annos,

Praeteritos{que} dies, & secula priscarevolvat,

Num Petrus, aut Clemens, num caete…turba priorum

Sceptra Latina dabat? Romanus te…e prisco

Pauper erat praesul, regali munere crevit:

Nec tamen ut fasces & regni jura Latini

Vel dare praesumat, vel cuiquam tollere possit:

Excessere modum magnorum munera regum,

Si tantum cuiquam jus in sua regna dederunt:—

Hoc tamen arbitrium Romanus tempore nostro

Vendicat Antistes, documenta{que} vana figuris

Exprimit, & chartis dat grandia verba superbis.

Read the rest.

When Princes ruled Popes, and placed and displaced them as they saw meet, there was some Peace to be had; but since Popes have placed and displaced Princes, Peace and Honesty are sacrificed to odious pride and arrogancy: and if Princes will not re-assume their right, they shall answer for betraying the people committed to them. Its a part of the Praise of the Emperour Otho, given him by an antient female Poet, that he in a right zeal deposed a faulty Pope, and put a better in his place. Hroswithae Histor. fin. p. 101. ex collect. Reuberi.

Qualiter & recti compunctus acumine zeli

Summum Pontificem quaedam per versa patrantem,

Ejus nec monitis dignantem cedere crebris,

p. 371Sedis Apostolicae fraudari fecit honore,

Constituens alium Rectoris nomine dignum.

Thes. 333. Private men disjunctly are not made Judges of the Title of their Princes, and therefore must obey them that are in Possession and Administration, unless their Ʋsurpation be so notorious as to be past controversie.

Private men conjunctly are the Body of the Common-wealth, who being his strength, must defend their Princes right: and therefore must Judge of it, in order to such defence. But while the Body (real and representative) submit, it belongeth not to private members to try or judge of controverted Titles of their Princes. For their distance and unacquaintedness with State-affairs, doth usually leave them uncapable of Judging. e. g. In the time of the Roman Emperours, there were few private persons fit to judge of their Titles, and therefore the Apostle supposing this, commandeth them to obey the powers that then were. If a private man must first know his Princes Genealogie, or have satisfactory evidence of his Title to the Crown, before he be obliged to obey, then obedience would be rare, and Princes must take another course to acquaint their subjects with their Titles, then hitherto they have thought meet to use. How few in England of the common people were acquainted with King James his Title? or with Henry the sevenths, or many of their Predecessors, from whom they pretended that theirs was derived. The vulgar must see much by the eyes of the Nobles and Senate in these things.

p. 372Thes. 334. If Ʋsurpation be notorious, yet if it be not to the injury of another, the body of the Nation may lawfully afterward Consent, and having consented, are obliged to obey, though still the Ʋsurper is accountable to God for unjust procurement of their consent.

Of the case of injuring another, and of the change of Government from person to person, I have spoken before. But out of that case, there is no prohibition of God to subject our selves to an Usurper.

Thes. 335. It is the subjects Duty to submit to suffering, and not resist the Power of their Rulers, in cases where they may not lawfully obey.

Yet those misunderstand the Apostle Paul, that think by the foreign, Rom. 13. 2. is meant only violent Resisters: meer disobedience may make a man a Resister in the Apostles sense. It is Antisubjection, or breaking out of the rank of subjects, which the Text forbids. And he that unwarrantably disobeyeth, may do that, though he forcibly resist not. But when obedience in the thing commanded is unlawful, yet submission to suffering may be a duty: The excepted cases are after to be mentioned.

p. 373Thes. 336. In many cases where Officers may be resisted, it may be unlawful to resist the Soveraign himself.

I shall only instance now in this general; In case the Law or will of the Soveraign allow us to Resist his Officers upon supposition of such or such miscarriages; but not to resist himself.

Thes. 337. In many cases when it is Lawful forcibly to resist a Prince, in some one particular cause or act, we may yet remain obliged to honour and obey him in all things else, and not to depose him, or hurt his person.

As there is great difference between his injustice in a particular act, and the Nullity of his Power; so is there great difference between Resisting an unjust act, and Resisting his office in the main, and denying him our subjection. When the former may be a Duty, the later may be a damnable sin. A man that holds the hands of an angry Prince from killing himself, or another in his passion, may yet honour him and obey him as faithfully as another man; and do him neither wrong nor hurt.

Thes. 338. Every breach of Oath or Covenant by the Prince, will not warrant the people to depose him, or disobey him.

In two cases this is evident, (which contain the particular cases.) 1. The Covenants between Prince and people contain some particulars oft times that are p. 374not of Necessity to the Being of the common good, but only to the melius esse, or to the good of some particular persons. If the Prince or Senate, or whoever is Soveraign, break such Covenants, they offend, but do not thereby forfeit their Soveraignty; unless (which is not to be supposed) it were agreed between them, that this should be a forfeiture: Nor may men resist, in such a case of breach, in smaller things, unless the Covenants, or Law allow it them. 2. If the Soveraign should violate his Covenants, or the Constitution it self in matters Fundamental, which the common good doth lie upon, and yet do this but in some one Act, which he persisteth not in, but returneth into his way, and is not a stated habituated offender in this kind; it cannot be taken for a forfeiture of his Power, nor sufficient to warrant men to withdraw subjection, unless it were so expressed in the Covenants or Laws. Such a destructive Act of his may be hindred, that is, Resisted, and yet the Regal estate not subverted, while the crime is not stated.

So much for the Negative, How far Resistance is unlawful. Now of the Affirmative, how far it is lawful. A tender point: but so weighty, that conscience should not be unsetled in it.

p. 375Thes. 339. When it is notorious that a man hath no right to Govern, the people are not bound to obey him, unless by accident.

Else we should be bound to take every man for our Soveraign that calleth himself so: And so the people should be bound to Treason, and to have many Soveraigns, when many pretend to it. Materially men may be obliged to obey (that is, to do the thing commanded) in prudence to avoid an evil to the Nation or themselves. But formal obedience is due to none but such as are in Authority, or seem to have Authority, and so quoad nos are truly Governours, though perhaps their Title ceram Deo may not be good. Even as I am not to take any man for a Pastor of the Church that is not lawfully called to it, or being in Possession and Administration doth …eem so to the Church.

Thes. 340. If a Lawful King be limited, if he Command the subjects beyond his Limits, in matters exempted from his power, or else in matters that the nature of his office extendeth not unto, that command is not an act of power; and therefore it is not a resistance of Power to disobey it.

The Resistance of a person in power, in a point wherein he hath no Power, is not to resist Power, (that is, Jus regendi) but the will of a private man: For he is a private man in all things exempted from his Power. 1. A School-master hath nothing to do to command his Scholars in matters about their trades p. 376and callings in the world, but only in matters of learning and manners, because it belongeth not to his Office. A Captain hath no Power (as such) about mens estates, but only about the manners and military actions of his Souldiers, in order to his military ends. If a Judge of one Court step into another without Commission, in alieno foro, his Sentence is null, and no man bound to obey it. So if the Minister presume to command in things belonging to the Magistrate, and not to him, his act is private, vain and null. So if a Soveraign will turn Physitian, and command all men to take this or that Physick only, not in order to publike good, but private health; or if he will turn Pastor and do things proper to a Pastor of the Church, his acts are private and null, as being without the verge of his vocation.

2. And where his Covenants with his people limit him, he hath no power in the excepted points; e. g. if he be restrained from raising Taxes without the peoples consent, if he yet command the payment of such taxes, he doth it not by Authority: For neither God nor man did ever give him Authority thereto. If the Constitution restrain him from raising war without the consent of the Senate, and yet he undertake to do it, it is not an act of Authority, for he never had Authority thereto.

Object. Wbo hath Power to limit a Prince, when he is the Officer of God?

Answ. 1. God hath limited him. 2. God hath not determined in Nature or Scripture of the species of Government, nor of the person or family that shall Govern: The People therefore being his Instruments or means, may l…mit their Soveraigns in things that p. 377God hath not determined of. 3. His own Covenants may limit him. And the people having strength and liberty, may force him to such Covenants as are necessary to their security, before they choose him to be their King. No man or family hath Originally more right to Govern a Nation then the rest, till Providence and Consent allow it them. Few Princes will plead a successive Right of Primogeniture from Noah. If the people then say, [We choose you, (and your family successively) to Rule us on these and no other terms; Accept these terms, or we accept not you.] If he thus accept them, he obligeth himself, and all his successors, that will Rule on that foundation. And therefore he hath no more Authority then another man, in the excepted points.

Thes. 341. He that thus commandeth beyond his bounds and w…thout Authority, may be lawfully Resisted in those Commands, unless the Law or Constitution forbid such Resistance: Provided that the Honour and Authority of the Ruler be preserved, and he be obeyed in all lawful things.

Not obeying, is the first and chief Resisting; And that is proved lawful before, which proveth this also. He Resisteth not Power or Authority, that Resisteth only the will of a man, that (in that) hath no Authority: Indeed if the Constitution should be (which is not to be imagined) that the Prince shall have no Power in this or that, and yet if he assume it, none shall resist him, then men are restrained from resistance. Otherwise in those points he is a private man. Yet accidentally Resistance may become a sin p. 378or a Duty. If it cannot be done without the common loss and hurt, by dishonouring and deposing the Governour, it is a sin by accident. If it be necessary to restrain his usurpation, and to secure the publick good, it will be a duty, and no indifferent thing.

If I be bound to obey or not resist, where there is no Authority to require my obedience, then it must be somewhat distinct and separated from Authority that I am bound to: And what that is, must be discovered. It can be but Accidental: and that's nothing to the point.

Thes. 342. No Law can oblige us to Punishment but for disobedience; And therefore where the Obedience was not due, the disobedience is inculpable, and the punishment not due: And where it is not due, I am not obliged to it by that Law, though possibly some other Law may bind me to submit to undue sufferings.

If there be a Law forbidding Resistance, how undue soever the penalty be, that Law must restrain us. But that Law it self that obligeth aut ad obedientiam, aut poenam, obligeth not to punishment, but in case of disobedience. The action therefore of such an unjust afflicter, is without Authority: And therefore it cannot be formally in obedience unto him that I must submit (unless to some other Law.) But it may be an act of formal obedience to God, that requireth me to submit to the unjust afflictions of men, when they cannot be resisted without deturbing or dishonouring the Governours, to the injury of the Commonwealth. Rulers are not authorized to hurt the innocent at pleasure.

p. 379Thes. 343. Inferiour Rulers have no Authority but what is given them from the Soveraign Power; and therefore in all other things the subjects are not bound to obey them; but may forcibly resist them, by the Consent of the Soveraign.

They are Private men in matters without the verge of their Commissions. If a Constable usurpe the Office of a Justice, or a Justice of a Judge, or one Judge of another, their commands are null and may be resisted by disobedience, and by force too, unless where the Law for Peace and order doth forbid it. No man doubts but the Soveraign may authorize us to resist his Officers, when they transgress their bounds.

Thes. 344. No humane Soveraign hath Authority to forbid what God commands, nor to command what God forbids; but their Laws that are notoriously contrary to the Laws of God, are nullities, and cannot oblige to obedience or punishment.

A Constable or Justice may a thousand-fold more excusably pretend Authority against the King, or independent on him, then a King can claim Authority against God, or independent on him. There is no Power but from God; God giveth none against himself. All Laws or commands of men are null, or void of true obliging Authority, which are against his Laws. They are not words of Authority but of Rebellion or Ʋsurpation, that command us to disobey the God of heaven. To resist such a command, is not to p. 380Resist an act of Power, but of Ʋsurpation. For there can be no Power without, much less against the fountain of all power, the universal Soveraign. It may be this is the meaning of the School-men and Polititians, that say it is no Law which is unjust; and of Augustine that makes Justice essential to the Common-wealth, de Civit. Dei li. 19. [Ʋbi ergo Justitia vera non est, nec jus potest esse: Quod enim jure fit, profecto juste fit: quod autem fit injuste, nec jure fieri potest. Non enim jura dicenda sunt vel putanda quaelibet iniqua hominum constituta: Quocirca ubi non est vera justitia, juris consensu sociatus coetus hominum non potest esse, & ideo nec populus: Et si non populus, nec res populi, sed qualiscun{que} multitudinis quae populi nomine digna non est. Ac per hoc si Respublica Res est Populi, & Populus non est qui consensu juris sociatus non est; non est autem jus ubi nulla est Justitia, proculdubio colligitur, ubi Justitia non est, non esse Rempublicam.] Of this more anon.

Yet as God requireth us to yield for peace sake to men that have no Authority, and rather then be revenged or break Charity and Peace, to go two miles with him that would compell us to go one, and to give our coat to him that takes away our cloak; so much more finis gratia, for the sake of Charity, Peace and Order, he requireth us to suffer wrongs from Kings and Magistrates, and not disturb the publick peace for our private interest. But yet for all this, their acts against God and his Laws, are not acts of Authority, nor oblige to formal Obedience; nor are we tyed from Resistance when the publick good requireth it, and so the end is such as we cannot dispence with.

But yet if upon this pretence any private subjects p. 381or others take on them to judge the Soveraigns actions, that are uncapable, or not called to it, or shall conclude that to be contrary to Gods Law that is not, and shall resist Authority under pretence of resisting a private Will, their temerity and errour will not excuse them from the guilt.

Thes. 345. To speak properly, no Law obligeth any man to suffer, but only to submit, and not resist: And therefore we are allowed to fly to escape undeserved suffering.

Christ himself alloweth his Disciples to fly in case of persecution, unless when accidentally the confessing of his name requireth them to stay. He that flyeth doth not obey, or suffer: and yet offendeth not, because he doth not disobey a Command of Authority, but of usurping Will, nor doth resist to the disturbance of the common peace, nor to the discouragement or di…paragement of Governours. And if flight, then any other lawful means may be used to avoid unrighteous sufferings, as by intreaty, and by mediation of friends, or as Paul by an Appeal; and why not by forcible escape out of prison, or the inferiour officers hands? The Apostles went out of Prison when the Angel let them loose; and the fear of the People often rescued Christ and them. Basil was violently rescued from the Tribunal by the multitude, and many antient Bishops have so escaped: This is Resisting, and violent Resisting: but when it is but an escape from the hands of persecution and injustice, and is no injury to the Governour, nor a disturbing of publick order or peace, it is not the resisting that God forbis, nor any resisting of Authority.

p. 382Thes. 346. In many cases it is lawful to Resist the Officers and Instruments of a King, though against his will.

1. As to their persons, they are subjects, and have not themselves the Soveraign Power. 2. Every man that saith he comes in the Kings name, is not to be believed. 3. Unlawful commands should have no Executioners, if they may be known to be unlawful: And therefore the Executioners deserve punishment, and not obedience. 4. A King may be limited himself, and then cannot give the Power to his Officers that he hath not. And when they are sent by meer Will without Authority, they may be dealt with as private invaders of our rights. Elias destroyed two Captains and their Companies with fire from Heaven, that came to command him to come to the King, 2 King. 1. 9, 10. Though the manner was extraordinary by Miracle, yet the matter (destroying the Kings Souldiers) was the same as if it had been done by war; and was done by his voluntary Resistance. Every souldier is not the King: and the command of obeying the higher Powers, obligeth us not to obey them that have no Power high or low; but are the meer Instruments of will and Arbitrary invasion, and not of Power. A Kings will cannot justifie his own acts that proceed not from Power but usurpation: Much less his Officers or Souldiers acts.

Thes. 347. A King must not be obeyed that commandeth a subject to kill him, or unjustly to kill another, or to do any evil that is or may be known to be such.

p. 383David hewed in pieces him that killed Saul in obedience to him. He was a Traytor that obeyed the King to his destruction. Doeg was a branded wicked wretch that obeyed the King in killing the Priests. It was Joabs sin to set Ʋriah in the place of danger, and be Davids instrument to murder him, though by the enemies sword. Daniel would not forbear open praying in his house for a few daies time at the will of the King: The three witnesses, Dan. 3. boldly told the King to his face, that they would not worship the Image that he commanded them to worship. Man may not be obeyed against God.

Thes. 348. It is lawful and a Duty to Resist a King even by violence upon his person, to prevent the destruction of himself, yea or of the innocent, in case it be done with the due regard of his honour and dignity, and the end of Government.

1. If a King (as Saul) would make away himself, the Subject is a Traytor that doth not Resist him, and preserve him, though against his will. Nature and the common good require it. We must do so for a fellow-subject; much more for a Prince. If in his sickness he would eat or drink that which would kill him, he may be hindred even by force. 2. If in his Passion he would kill his wife or servants, or faithful subjects, he is to be resisted even by force: and he that holds bis hands, and taketh the sword out of his hands, may expect that he will praise him when the Passion is over: But if he do not, God and good men will praise him; and the wickedness of an obstinate p. 384King, cannot make the good action to be evil. He is not [foreign] that only hindreth a King from murder.

Thes. 349. As it is lawful thus to save anothers life from a murderous King, so also to save our own; with the aforesaid caution, and if no other accident forbid it.

No man is bound to love his neighbour, but as himself. We are bound to preserve our own lives as well as anothers: It is as great a sin in a King to murder you as another: And therefore you should equally endeavour to prevent that sin. You may hold his hands, or take away his sword, in case you cannot flie or otherwise escape. For, 1. It is not Authority but Passion that you resist. 2. You hurt him not, nor derogate from his authority, nor disturb the Order and Government of the Common-wealth. 3. You are bound to preserve your life by lawful means. 4. And also to preserve him from such deadly sin. David fl…d from Saul with an Army to defend him: And his question, [Will the men of Ke…lah deliver me into the hands of Saul?] doth intimate that he would have defended that town against him, if the Townsmen would but have stuck to him. The people rescued Jonathan resolutely from the sword of a King and Father, engaged by Oath to have put him to death, 1 Sam. 14. 45. [And the people said unto Saul, Shall Jonathan die who hath wrought this great salvation in Israel? God forbid. As the Lord liveth, there shall not one hair of his head fall to the ground—So the people rescued Jonathan that he dyed not.] The other is, 1 Sam. 23. 12.

p. 417Thes. 348. It is the Duty of a Woman to Resist a King that would ravish her; and the duty of others to assist her.

For 1. To ravish her is no act of Authority, and therefore to Resist is no Resisting of Authority, but of lust. 2. Else the Woman should be guilty of Adultery, being bound by God, to preserve her chastity, and so should those that being bound to assist her, do neglect it.

Thes. 349. Much more should a Nation preserve themselves, or their Representative Body, from the unjust endeavours of a King, that would destroy them.

The Reason is most evident; 1. Afortiore: If the life and chastity of a single person may be rescued by force from the Will and Instruments of a destroying and unchast King, much more may a Nation or Parliament be so rescued.

2. We have a concurrence of many greatest obligations to such a rescue. 1. Parliaments we call out about our work, and trust them to secure our Interest, and therefore to forsake them to the will of the unjust is to betray them. 2. There is the highest Reason for Natural self-preservation, to preserve a whole Nation. 3. The honour and interest of God, is most concerned in publike interest. He that thinks a Parliament or Nation should lay their necks upon the block, or quietly perish whenever a King would have it so, hath soft so much of humanity, that he is unfit to be Civis, a member of a Commonwealth. Jonathan was not p. 418more worth than a Parliament of faithfull Patriots, or than a Nation.

Thes. 350. The destruction of the Body of the People, or of the Common good, can never be an act of Justice in their King or other Governours (except they had a special command for it from God:) And therefore no Justice can be pretended for it.

The Reason is most evident: For, if the King will justly destroy the people, he must do it as a Governour by Vindictive Justice, or as a self-defender, or as an Enemy by warre: But none of these wayes must he do it. An enemy he is not, if a King: or no King, if an enemy. It cannot be a necessary means to self-defence: For he that can destroy a Nation, can much easier remove from them: Nor may the lives of so many be cut off as a meanes to preserve one. And by way of Governing Justice, it may not be: For that punitive Justice, being an act of Government, is to the common end of Government: and that is ever, the common good: and the common hurt (in a vindictive or destructive sort) cannot be sought and used for the common good, they being contraries. All punishment is of particular members for the common good. The lives of particular persons are cut off, for common good. But it is contrary to the end, and so to the essence of Government, and therefore of Governing Justice, to destroy the common good. It's true that Amalek and the Canaanites were cut off, and Nations destroyed; but 1. That was for sin against the Ʋniversall King, that had power over them; 2. And it was by his speciall command; 3. And that to the Israelites, and not to their p. 419own Kings. A Nation so wicked and implacable, as that their peace or lives is inconsistent with the peace and lives of the neighbour Nations, do warrant them to destroy them for the safety of themselves. And if one Province in a Kings Dominions, were such to all the rest, if he could finde no other remedy to preserve the more excellent parts of his Dominions, he might do it by the destruction of the implacable. But the destroying of his own people, even the greatest or most excellent part, cannot be made just or lawfull by any meanes or pretence whatever, without a special command from God.

Thes. 351. No warre can be lawfull in King or Subjects that is against the common good: except as aforesaid, when a Nation is devoted to destruction by God, the Ʋniversall King, or their welf…re is inconsistent with the more desireable wellfare of the Nations round about them.

1. No King hath any power, but what is for God and the common good: therefore he hath no power to make warre against the common good. His Office essentially is to Govern for the common good therefore it is not only besides, but contrary to his Office to fight against it therefore he can give no such power to his Souidiers: therefore it is no Resisting of Power, but of Injustice, to fight against him and his Souldiers in that case, in defence of the Commonwealth.

2. Every subject is by nature, and Relation, bound to preserve the Commonwealth in his place, as well as the King: and therefore none of them can be his instruments against it.

p. 4203. If warre be just, either as a meanes, or as an end: The later no man is so void of reason as to pretend (that is fit for us to dispute with.) If as a meanes, it is either as a meanes to the common good, or to something better, or to something worse: If warre be a meanes to the common good, or else unlawfull, then have we that granted which we seek: then the warre is sinfull that is against the common good. If it be undertaken for a lesser good, it must needs be sinfull: for a greater good is not to be cast away in order to a less. Reason will cry shame on this. Though it were the Right and Prerogative of the King, it cannot be justly preferred before the common good: For even his Prerogative, as his Office and Government it self, are the meanes to this.

Two things indeed are above the common good of a Nation: One is the Interest, Pleasure and Honour of God himself. The other is the good of the world; or of many and greater Nations round about. And the welfare of these (and of the Church universal) may be a higher end then a Nations good, but nothing else.

Thes. 352. Though a Nation wrong their King, and so quoad meritum causae, they are on the worser side, yet may he not lawfully warre against the publike good on that account, nor any help him in such a warre; but propter finem he hath the worser cause.

The Reason it is plain in what is said: 1. If not only his Rights, but his very Office and Administration be propter bonum publicum, then may he not plead or defend those Rights contra bonum publicum: But the p. 421Antecedent is past controversie: therefore so must be the consequent.

2. An excessive penalty beyond the proportion of the offence, may make that cause bad, that else would have been good; The danger or ruin of the Commonwealth, or its felicity is such a punishment. If a King be wronged, he must be righted according to the proportion of his wrong: whatever is against the Commonwealth, especially in the great matters of its safety and felicity, is incomparably above the proportion of his wrong: It is more injustice to seek the destruction of the common good, for a real injury to a single person, then it was in them to do that injury.

Thes. 353. A warre raised against the Body of a Nation, is by them to be construed to be against the common good: Now warre therefore against the Body of a Nation, by any of its members; Prince or peeple, can be lawfull: At least except in the two fore-excepted Cases, viz. the Command of God, and the Interest of the many Nations near them.

Reasons of the Antecedent: 1. The very miseries of a warre do hazzard all the saftety and felicity, yea the being of the Commonwealth.

2. He that raiseth warre proclaimeth hostility with them he warreth against. He that proclaimeth hostility against the Nation, deposeth all friendly Relations, and is supposed to be one that will deal as an enemy. An enemy is to be supposed to be one that intendeth not the good or felicity of the Commonwealth.

Thes. 354. It is not professing in words, that the warre p. 422is raised against a rebellious Party only, or that the King intendeth by it the common good, that should make the Nation take it as warrantable, and for their good, if they be the Party that it is actually raised against.

1. Otherwise they should never use meanes for their security: For it's easie to say, I intend not the common hart: And who will not say it, how hostile soever his actions be.

2. Quid verba audiam, cum facta videam? War is not an act of Government, but Hostility. Men are not in reason to be supposed to intend their enemies good. If they fight, we are to believe they would kill: and nature believeth not killing to be an act of friendship.

3. He that raiseth War but against a faction of Rebels, that hinder or disturb the common Peace, doth not make the Nation or Commonwealth it self, but those Rebels to be a Party: He that makes the Nation the adverse Party, cannot be supposed to intend only a Party of Rebels.

4. A Nation conquered by the sword, hath no security for their safety, liberty or felicity: If they ever have it, it must be from the mercy of the Conquerour. He that puts himself into a garb and state of Hostility, is not to be trusted to for mercy, but when there is no other remedy. When a Nation hath lost their just security for safety, liberty and felicity, they have interpretatively lost their safety, liberty and felicity it self. In the Constitution it is now supposed, that they provided for the security of the Common good, and put not the lives and states of all men, into the arbitrary p. 423power of one man, that all should live or die at his beck, and the Nation perish, if he fell into a phrensie. Now Conquest depriveth them of their security. They are then at the mercy of the Conquerour: therefore the Constitution is altered; and interpretatively all is gone. The King may mean better: But Kingdoms and common Felicity are not all to be ventured, upon the secret unknown good meanings and good wills of Kings.

5. A Prince is not his own strength. If he govern by his own Wisdome and Vertue, yet must he execute by others strength. If it be by the People, it cannot be against them; for they will not be against themselves. If by Strangers, or a Faction at home, (especially Delinquents, or irritated impious men) the Nation is not to trust them with its felicity. Those that the King conquereth by, may master him when they please: They are stronger then he. His good meanings therefore are no security to the Nation, if he conquer them by such as mean them hurt, or as the Nation hath no cause to trust. Especially when it is so commonly, that the Conquerours have a self-interest opposite to that of the conquered; and that self-interest so much ruleth the world. It is a plain case then, that whatsoever is secretly intended, the Nation is to suppose it to be against their felicity, when they are the Party that War is raised against. And consequently that no War can be lawfully raised by a King against his people (that is, the Body of the Nation) because none can be lawfully raised against the common Good.

Object. But then Princes are left without remedy, if they are injured by the people.

p. 424Answ. 1. They think it meet that the People be left without remedy, if injured by them: and therefore they say, they are responsible to God alone.

2. A remedy is to be sought by Government or by War: By Government they may have remedy against particular persons, or the whole by such light and legal penalties, as are not against the Commonwealth. But if this will not do, if their injury be too great to be born, they may lay down their Crowns at pleasure, Crowns are not like Lands, that men hold primarily, Jure Dominij: They are not primarily the matter of Propriety. Government (that's Lawfull, and not Tyranny) is a meanes to publike good. When any mans possession of his Crown doth cease to be a meanes to the publike Good, and this without the peoples injury, it is then his duty to resign it, and no injury to be deprived of it. For the meanes is no meanes when it is against the end. If the Nation injuriously deprive themselves of a worthy Prince, the hurt will be their own, and they punish themselves: But if it be necessarily to their welfare, it is no injury to him.

But the King that by War will seek reparations from the body of the People, doth put himself into a hostile state, and tell them actually that he looks to his own good more then theirs, and bids them take him for their enemy, and so defend themselves if they can.

Thes. 355. Though some injury to the King be the occasion of the War, it is the duty of all the people, to defend the Commonwealth against him; yet so as that they protest against that injury.

p. 425This is a plain consequent of the former.

1. They resist no true Authority, in resisting him that warreth against the Commonwealth, which is the end of Government.

2. All are engaged to defend it.

3. It being the end, no meanes can be pleaded against it.

4. A simili. If my own Father or Mother wrong another by a foul word, and the injured person seek their ruine for it: I must not forbear defending my parents, because they were offenders; so be it I protest against their wrong doing.

2. A Lawyer at the Bar may plead against an excessive mulct or penalty, that would be imposed on a culpable Client. If his Client have done a trivial wrong, and another would therefore take away his estate or life, the party that had the worse cause quoad culpam, hath the best quoad paenam, and the Lawyer may defend him: And so must a Subject the Commonwealth from hurt and danger.

3. If our own King had wronged the Pope or King of Spain, or a savage Indian King; and a War begin upon it; Is it be justly supposed that the enemy if he should prevail, would destroy the happiness of the Commonwealth, we may and must all fight against them, for the defence of the Commonwealth; but not for the justifying of the Princes cause, which we may possibly be called to protest against. Every wrong that's done by a King, doth not forfeit the peoples happiness, nor warrant the enemies to invade it, nor exempt them from defending it.

Thes. 356. If a Nation regularly choose a representative p. 426Body, of the most noble, prudent, interessed members, to discern their dangers and the remedies, and preserve their liberties and safety, the people themselves are to discern those dangers and remedies, by their eyes, and to judge that to be against the common good, which their Trustees do rationally and regularly acquaint them to be so.

Proved. If they must discern their danger either with their own eyes immediately, or with others; it is not necessary that it be by their own immediately. For Countrymen are unacquainted with State-affairs, and with enemies contrivances at home and abroad: And nothing more easie then to bring them past all remedy, before they can see the evil themselves. And what need they Trustees, if themselves immediately were capable. If it must be by others, either by the King, or their Trustees. If they do trust the King absolutely and entirely, they must stand to it: But then what need they choose Trustees. Kings being much trusted against strangers, our case supposeth, that the people do not absolutely trust him, but that in the Constitution, they have provided, that the publike peace and felicity shall be held by reasonable security, and not meer trust in the Princes will: And that Parliaments are appointed to that end. And if so, they are to be trusted accordingly.

And as the Constitution and our Choice requireth it, so their Interests require it; they being many, and their Interest great, and not lying so much within the temptation of an opposition to the peoples interest, as the Princes doth: And it is supposed that the Constitution of the Government, appointeth them for p. 427this very end, to secure the people from the usurpation and tyranny of Kings: and therefore in that case Kings are not by the people to be credited before them; for then they should not appoint or choose them.

Thes. 357. If the said Parliament or Trustees be also legally the Kings chief Council, and so have a double capacity of discerning the dangers of the Commonwealth, the people are the more to see their dangers by their eyes.

For 1. This supposeth them in fullest capacity to …ern them. They that are legally the Kings chief Council, are to be supposed acquainted with State-affairs, and how things stand between him and the people. 2. And the King himself having not his office for himself, but for the people, is to see their danger and remedies by the Council, which the Constitution doth appoint him. The Law therefore supposeth them to be the most credible Judges.

Thes. 358. If the King raise War against such a Parliament, upon their Declaration of the dangers of the Commonwealth, the people are to take it as raised against the Commonwealth, till it be notorious that the Parliament have deceived them and betrayed them.

The Reasons are plain: 1. Because the dangers of the Commonwealth were first declared by competent Judges, and credible Witnesses. 2. Because all their own dangers and oppositions is justly supposed to be p. 428for the sake of the Commonwealth. 3. Because they are the Commonwealth, or people Representative. 4. Because being the only legal Trustees appointed for the Nations security from tyranny, when they are conquered, our security is conquered, and the very Constitution overthrown.

Thes. 359. If a Parliament be moreover the supreme Judicature, by the Constitution enabled to censure and punish Delinquents and enemies of the Commonwealth, and to raise the power of the Nation against them, if they resist, the King himself having no Authority in that case to pardon or prot… them; then is it just for such a Parliament to rai… Arms against such Delinquents, to bring them to due punishment, and to prosecute them, though they have the word or will of the King on their side.

This case is plain: For 1. It is Subjects here that the War is raised against. 2. It is in a legal execution of Justice. 3. It is against no Authority: For it is in a case, where it is supposed that the King hath no power to pardon or protect, it's supposed that his protecting power is restrained unto certain cases, of which this is none. 4. If all Delinquents or enemies shall scape, that will but rise in Arms for their security, Commonwealths are destroyed, and Justice and Judgement are idle names, when a few Thieves may easily kill the Judge. And if Kings shall have power to pardon all Delinquents without limitation, the common good is wholly intrusted to their wils, where the King is absolute and above all Laws, he may protect all offendors. But where the Laws are above the p. 429King, they must be obeyed though his will be against it, and he forbid it: For his will is not his Authority.

Thes. 360. If in the fundamental Constitutions, any rights by contract be reserved to the people, and the King obliged to maintain them, the people may lawfully defend those Rights, (by means proportionable to their worth) against the King that violateth them, unless they have also consented to be restrained from such defence.

1. If the Rights be but such as are needfull ad meli…s esse, or the loss of them be tolerable, the defence of them must not be by deposing the Prince, but by gentler meanes: Though as Thieves are hanged for robbing one man, so divers Subjects may be destroyed for robbing the Commonwealth at the Kings command, of its Rights and Liberties. 2. But if people to avoid a civil War, have expresly tyed themselves not to resist a King or Subjects, that by his command do deprive them of their Liberties, then they are wholly at his will. 3. But such a Consent or Obligation is not to be supposed, unless it be expressed. For 1. The very Covenanting for our Rights importeth, that we secure them, and leave them not meerly to the Princes will. 2. And in Covenanting for them, we exempt them from his power; so that in invading them he is but a private man; and in resisting him we resist not Authority, but Will. For if he have power of our excepted Rights, it is either immediately from God, or mediately by Consent of men. Not the former: For we suppose it to be in cases that God hath p. 430left undetermined. The people can have no Right to that which God himself takes from them: Nor by man: For it is supposed that the people have excepted these things from the Princes power, and he consented.

Thes. 361. The Oaths of Kings, and the Charters or Laws in which they have expressed their Consent to Govern on such and such termes, together with the ancient Customes of the Nation, are the discoverers of the Princes limits, and the Peoples Rights.

Though every breach of Covenant forfeiteth not the Crown, yet every Covenant or Consent of … Prince doth shew the limits of his Power. If he (that naturally had no more right than other men) do accept the Government on such and such termes, or afterward Consent to them, he hath no power beyond or against those termes: and therefore he may not break his Oaths.

Thes. 362. It is lawfull to resist either King or Subjects that are his Instruments, by Law-suits, or by force, where the Laws allow it, if he be not above Law, and do not Repeal them.

I spake before of the peoples Rights reserved from the Kings power: I speak now of the allowance of the Law. If the Law be above the King, then may be do what the Law alloweth, though against his will. If it allow us to sue the King in his Courts of Justice, we may do it: If it allow us to sue his Agents, as subjects that have broke the Law, though by his command, we may do it. If the King bid a man murder another, I p. 431may sue him, and hang him against the Kings will, if the Law allow it. If the Kings Tenant keep an unjust possession against me, it is lawfull for me to sue him at Law, and at last, if he forcibly resist, the Sheriff may raise the Power of the County to eject him, though against the Kings will, when the Law alloweth it. And if the Law allow us to resist his Armies, we may do it: and so doing, we Resist no Power, but strength and will. But where the King is Absolute above the Laws, as being meerly his own Acts, there we may Resist, till he repeal the Law, or forbid us, and no longer (on that account.)

Thes. 363. Where the Soveraignty is distributed into several hands, (as Kings and Parliaments,) and the King invade the others part, they may lawfully defend their own by warre, and the subject lawfully assist them, yea though the power of the Militia be expresly given to the King; unless it be also exprest that it shall not be in the other.

The Conclusion needs no proof; because Soveraignty as such hath the Power of Arms, and of Laws themselves. The Law that saith the King shall have the Militia, supposeth it to be against enemies, and not against the Commonwealth, nor them that have part of the Soveraignty with him. To Resist him here, is not to resist Power, but Usurpation, and private will. In such a case, the Parliament is no more to be Resisted than he; because they also are the higher Power.

Thes. 364. Names are not the only notes of Soveraignty: p. 432If a King have the Title of the Supream head, or only Soveraign of his Dominions, and yet a Senate have an essentiall part without the Names, they lose not their part, nor is to be judged of by the Name.

A people may give an honorary Title to the Prince, and not give the same to others that have part in the Soveraignty: and this is ordinary: sometimes for the Nations honour, which they would have to be abroad conspicuous in their Prince: and sometimes to please him instead of fuller power. Those therefore that will judge of the power of Princes by their Titles or Names, and thence fetch Arguments to resolve mens consciences, know not what a narrow foundation they build on: Of which see Mr. Lawson against Hobbs his Politicks.

Thes. 364. Where the Soveraignty is in several hands, and so the Constitution supposeth their agreement, the dividers are the dissolvers, and upon a Division barely among themselves, in which the Commonwealth is not concerned, the Subjects should obey neither of them against the other, as having no power against each other: but should be against them, that in obedience to either part do raise the War.

The Reason is plain: Because though they are many natural persons, they are all but one civil person; and because that all the power of Arms here is either defensive against Enemies, or vindictive and punitive against offending Subjects. But none in soveraignty while such, are to be taken as enemies: And neither p. 433part that have the Soveraignty, as such, can be offending Subjects; for they are no Subjects. Indeed in such a Senate, the persons considered disjunctly may be Subjects: but it is conjunctly as a house or body, that they have the Soveraignty. Moreover, all lawfull War is for the common good: But the dissolution of the fundamental Constitution, is not to be taken for the common good, but grievous hurt and ruine, though when necessity dissolveth it, the best parts must be first secured from perdition.

Thes. 365. Ʋpon such a division among them that have the highest power, if some Subjects will unlawfully begin as instruments of the divisions, the rest are then obliged to stand up, and that for the fafety of the Commonwealth, more then for either of the parties, and for that party that is for it; and against them both, if they be both against it.

1. It is notorious to the Nation, when the King and Senate (that are now supposed to be sharers in the Soveraignty) do disagree, and fall into hostility and open War, that the frame of the fundamental Constitution is dissolved. And when the ship is split or sinking, it's time for the passengers to save themselves and their goods as well as they can: When the house is on fire, we must shift for our selves and that we have: When the Government dissolveth it self, they that possessed it turn us loose to rule our selves, and defend our selves. If a man fight against himself, he is to be held as a distracted man: And so should King and Senate be in such a case, being but one civil person: But if any will rush in, and help one hand against p. 434the other, the people must either fall on them, or otherwise secure themselves. In this case the Prince hath no offensive power against the Senate, nor the Senate against the Prince: and therefore we should so obey neither, nor help neither, as such: But if we see that all will not be so wise or honest, but some Delinquents will adhere to one of the parties, and some foolish people to the other, we must then look to the Commonwealth.

And here if one party have the juster cause caeteris paribus, we must adhere to that part; not as authorized primarily against the other, but as justly defending themselves against them. But si caetera non sint paria, that is, if the welfare of the Commonwealth lie on one side more then the other, yea though that side had at first begun the wrong, (much more if that party were just and innocent) we must joyn with that part: yea or against both, if the safety of the Commonwealth require it. For then we go not against Authority; neither King nor Senate having Authoriry (unless to defend themselves and the Nation) against the other. And surely whether we may save the Commonwealth against Authority or not, there is no doubt but we may save it without any governing Authority, when it is not against it. Nature that alloweth self-preservation to all, that sorseit not their lives, doth eminently require a Nation to preserve themselves; their common welfare being a thing that can be forfeited to none but God, and neighbour Nations; not to any within themselves. It is not the falling out of King and Parliament that forfeiteth the Nations happiness, or can make … unlawfull to preserve it. If you suppose them both to be guilty of an p. 435unjust War, as having no power against each other, then may the people de…end themselves against the Souldiers of both, as being but praedones & grassatores: Or make use of either to further their defence. But if one of them as a defender, or on other accounts have the more righteous cause, the people may joyn with them so farre as it is righteous, securing still the Commonwealth. A King may have cause to blame a Parliament, when he hath no cause that will justifie raising a War against them; and a Parliament may have cause to blame a King, and yet none to raise War against him. In this case, when one is originally in the fault, or it's ten to one, both of them in some fault before a War, but neither of them in such fault as will warrant a War against the other, (which is a dissolving of the Government it self, and is an injury to the Commonwealth, more then to themselves) the people may joyn with neither of them as offenders against the other, but must first look to themselves and the common safety which the contenders do forsake, and next consider what use may be made of either to that end; and in subserviency to it, rather to defend the innocent then the guilty: The Law knowes not a Division, but supposeth an Ʋnity; and therefore it hath nothing to do in directing any of the Subjects to fight against either King or Parliament: When it comes to this, the business is resolved into the fundamental Lawes of God and nature, antecedent to all humane Lawes. The Defender may have a just War against the Invader, by the grounds of nature: But neither of their causes is to be preferred to the Commonwealth. And if finis gratia for the common safety, the people should take part with the more culpable p. 436side, not as owning their original causes, but as joyning with them for the common sasety; this maketh not the people guilty of the ill beginning or cause of those they joyn with. e. g. As I said before, if the King abuse the Pope or Turk, and they raise War against him for it, the people taking his part to prevent the Nations overthrow, do not thereby engage themselves in the original of the quarrel, nor become guilty of his fault, nor of any unlawfull War; for they manage it but as defensive, against such as would take unjust revenge of the innocent. And so if a Parliament should somewhat dishonour or abuse a King, (when yet neither of them should go to War for it) the people joyning with the Parliament, are not guilty of that abuse; nor of an unlawfull War, while they interesse themselves only in the business of their own preservation, and not in the original of the difference. The Law of nature stands, when men do sinfully dissolve the Commonwealth.

Thes. 366. If in case of such division, the Constitution (foreseeing it) have determined which side we must adhere to, then that part becomes the Soveraign, which we must obey against the other.

If it be said in the fundamental Contracts, that in case the King and Parliament differ, the Subject shall adhere to King against Parliament, or to Parliament against King; then in that case the other loseth his Authority, or rather had but a diminutive part, which might be resisted. But this is a case that seldom happens: For were there such a determination, that one must not be obeyed, they would not enter p. 437into the contention, unless by force to make a change.

Thes. 367. If the Senate besides their part in the Soveraignty, have a just offensive War against delinquent Subjects, and profess no War against the King unless defensive, and also be the Trustees of the people for the security of their liberties and happiness, and suffer danger, and enter into War upon no account of their own, but the peoples; then are the people bound to adhere unto them by many obligations.

This is most evident from all that is said before, and needeth no more proof. But I suppose some will say here, that then the case is hard with Kings that have Parliaments to joyn with them in the Soveraign power: for the people must alwayes take part with the Parliament, though they do the wrong, because it is they that are their Trustees and Representatives, and so Kings must ever be at their mercy.

I answer, 1. Where this is the Constitution, it is supposed that a King must never fight against his people, or Parliament: and if he receive the Crown on these termes, he meeteth with nothing but what he consented to; he might have refused it, and may leave it when he will. He must never expect upon any pretence of self-preservation, to have the peoples consent, that he shall have power to destroy them, or make War against them or their Trustees.

2. But yet there are cases in which we all must take part with a King against a Parliament: As 1. If they would wrong a King, and depose him unjustly, and p. 438change the Government, for which they have no power, the body of the Nation may refuse to serve them in it, yea may for…ibly restrain them. 2. If they notoriously betray their trust, not in some tolerable matters, but in the fundamentals, or points that the common good dependeth on, and engage in a cause that would destroy the happiness of the Common-wealth; it is then the peoples duty to forsake them, and cleave to the King against them, if they be enemies to the Commonwealth: But this is not to be suspected till it be notorious. But Parliaments are indefectible: Should they ever be so corrupt as to seek our ruine, we should not think our selves obliged to obey them or defend them. They may forfeit their power as well as Kings: But no such thought must be entertained of either, till necessity force it.

Thes. 368. If a King deliberately and obstinately engage himself in the change of the Constitution in the substantials, to the destruction of the safety and happiness of the Nation, he may not only be resisted, but ceaseth to be a King, and entreth into a st…te of War with the people.

1. 'Tis not a change in smaller matters, but the substan…ials of the Government that we speak of. 2. It is not a sudden passionate act, but a setled endeavour that we speak of. 3. And so the case is plain. …or 1. In Contracts each party is conditionally obliged: And we are bound to him, on condition …e be true to us. If one party shall remain bound, though the other violate their fidelity, the Covenants are vain. In other Relations i… is so, and there…ore p. 439in this. 2. He dissolveth the Government: and then he can be no Governour. 3. He becometh an enemy, and therefore can be no King. A destroyer cannot be a Ruler and Defender. He proclaimeth hostility, and is not to be trusted.

Thes. 369. It belongeth to the people to discern among competitors and contenders for the Government, whose cause is best, and to resist usurpers and enemies to their Peace.

That the Nation is thus to have a Judicium discretionis is evident: 1. Because it is their interest that is principal in the business: the good or hurt will be principally theirs. 2. If they do not judge (discerningly) they cannot execute: And then the people must not help their Soveraign against usurpers. But if they must, (and who else shall) then must they discern whose cause is right, that they may know whom to help, and whom to resist.

Thes. 370. Though an Infidel or Heathen King have a Power secundum quid, and may be the Head of an Infidel or Heathen Commonwealth, yet may he not be voluntarily chosen the Head of a Christian Commonwealth.

Not only because the Commonwealth cannot be called Christian when the Head is a Heathen, but because it is treachery against God and the Redeemer, for a People that have their free choise of their Governours to choose such as are enemies to the Universal Soveraign: They should hereby be guilty of p. 440some degree of a National Apostacy: The Kingdoms of the world should be the Kingdoms of the Lord and of his Christ: therefore they must not be given up to Infidelity. But if a Nation be not free to choose their Governours, but are by the Sword or otherwise forced to submit, then whether they should submit to an Infidel to avoid destruction, is a case that I am not now to determine: But it is to be decided, not by the personal present suffering which the Nation by such submission may avoid; but by the interest of their posterity and the Nations round about them. If the present spoil and ruine of a Nation might prevent the captivating of posterity or neighbour Nations more considerable to perpetual Infidelity, or tyranny of Infidels, it should be born: But if they can make better terms for themselves and posterity (without greater hurt to the Christian cause and Nations) by such submission, then without, I see not but they may submit to the Government of Infidels: And if they submit and promise obedience, they must obey in lawfull things, and be faithfull to them: But if Christians live (as the primitive Christians did) in a Commonwealth where Prince and people are Infidels, there they owe obedience whether they promise it or not: For their being subjects, and members of the Commonwealth containeth their obligation. While they have the protection, they owe obedience.

Thes. 371. The chief part of the common good, or happiness, is the enjoyment of the meanes which God hath made necessary to salvation: It is therefore as lawfull for a Nation to fight for the preservation of these meanes to themselves and posterity, as p. 441for their worldly goods and liberties, at least though for neither, without just Authority and License.

The Liberties, Goods, and other accommodations of the flesh, which worldlings so much value and contend for, are dung and dross in comparison of the things of everlasting life. If therefore we may not fight for Religion, much less for Liberties or Lives that are contemptible in comparison thereof. It is therefore either confusion and ignorance of the state of the Question, or palpable errour, in them that maintain, that it is unlawfull to fight for Religion. It is one thing to fight to make others Religious, and another thing to fight to preserve our own Religion, and to preserve the meanes of Religion to us and the Nation and our posterity. They grant themselves what they deny, when they say that we may fight for our Lives and Liberties: For though all that fight for their Liberties, fight not for their Religion; yet all that thus fight to preserve Religion, do fight for their Liberties also. Persecutors will take away our Lives or Liberties, if we worship God according to his will, and use the necessary meanes of salvation. In fighting against this persecution, we fight principally and ultimately for our own and posterities salvation, and next for the necessary means thereto, and proximately for our lives and liberties.

And it is but a delusory course of some in these times, that write many volumes to prove, that subjects may not bear Arms against their Princes for Religion, As if those that are against them did think that Religion only as the end, yea or life or liberty, would p. 442justifie Rebellion? or that the efficient authorizing Cause were not necessary as well as the final? It's as true that subjects may not fight against their Princes for their Lives or Liberties, as that they may not for Religion.

There are other things necessary to warrant an action besides the final Cause. All things are not a means to a good end: nothing can be a means that's against the end: but many things may be unwarrantable, and no just meanes, which by man are intended to the best end. No man may do any thing against his salvation, nor against the publike good, especially in matters of their salvation: But yet all is not lawfull that men do with an intent to further their own or other mens salvation. Where bearing Arms against Princes is warrantable quoad fundamentum, this will warrant it quoad finem. No better end, but there must be a good ground also.

And yet as to the end, it is not every matter of Religion, much less every erroneous conceit of men, that is sufficient. If men that are Equals, yea or Superiours, should think indifferent things to be necessary, or those that are necessary only ad melius esse, to be simply necessary; or those that are evil to be good, and hereupon shall force them by fire and sword on other men, they shall answer for their errour, arrogance and cruelty together. If Papists will first believe their fond opinions to be articles of faith, and necessary to salvation, and then will think that the salvation of men, and the publike good dependeth on them, and therefore will propagate them by the sword, or rebell against Princes to maintain them, their errour will not justifie their wickedness. It must be truly the p. 443cause of God, and the truly necessary meanes of life, and of the common good, and not mistakes or smaller matters, that must be the sufficient end of Warre, even in Princes themselves, that fight for Religion: Much more in people; of which in the next.

Thes. 372. In a Christian Commonwealth, where Rulers in their Oaths or Covenants have obliged themselves to maintain the Christian faith, and necessary meanes of the salvation of their people, and have taken the Government on these termes; if after this they break these Covenants, and cast off Christianity, or cast out the meanes of salvation, which they bound themselves to defend, it is lawfull for the body of that Nation to resist them, and defend their welfare: Much more if those that have but part in the Soveraignty, do this.

Note here 1. That I speak not of an Infidel Nation, where the people never make such Covenants with their Princes, but would doubly persecute, were they not restrained: There an Infidel Prince may be a protection and blessing to those few among them that believe. Whereas in a truly Christian Nation, either no Governour would be better then a persecuting Infidel, (the people associating in Communityes) or at least, they may easily choose a better. 2. I speak not of those Christian States and Nations, that have already promised obedience to known Infidels. But of those that have limited the power of their Princes, in these things: And if the Constitution limit them, their Acceptance of the Government is an implicite Consent and Covenant though there were no more. p. 4443. I say not yet that every private man may resist, but that the body of the Nation in this case may. And the Reason is evident: because 1. They are naturally bound to preserve the common good, especially in the greatest points. 2. And in so doing, it is no power, but arbitrary usurpation which they resist. For God giveth Kings no power against himself; and it is here supposed that the People have excepted this power from their Princes: And therefore in this they have no power, and to resist them is to resist no power.

And to break the Covenants, and reject the termes on which they did receive their Crowns, is to disoblige the people to whom they Covenanted, and cast away their Crowns, and turn into a state of enmity, if it be habituate, and if it be in the Essentials of the Covenant; and especially if they prosecute it by a Warre. What man can pretend to be so independant, and above the God of Heaven, as to have an Authority against him, and consequently not from him, which no men may resist. But if the Cause be Gods, and the Prince disabled to oppose it by the Constitution, the case is then most clear.

Here I shall again annex a Caution, and then answer some Objections.

If private men in doubtfull cases will take on them to be judges of their Governors, and conclude them to violate their Covenants, or their Constitution, or the Common safety when it is no such matter, they grievously sin against the Ordinance of God, and the publike Peace. And in case of a private or less publike injury, it is rebellion to make a publike resistance, by raising a warre. A woman may by personall private p. 445resistance defend her Chastity against a King; but she may not raise a warre to defend it. The Priests did lawfully (Azariah with fourscore more valiant men) withstand Ʋzziah the King when he went into the Temple to burn incense; and told him it belonged not to him, and bid him go out of the Sanctuary: yea when the Leprosie rose upon him, they thrust him out, 2 Chron. 26. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20. But if they had raised a warre against him for this, they had done ill.

And when a people are necessitated to a defensive warre; if thy will proceed beyond a just defence, and …pose their Kings or Governours that have not deposed themselves, nor notoriously made themselves uncapable, they will be Rebels in deposing them, though their defence was just.

A Civil warre doth hazzard the happiness of a Nation, and therefore is not to be enterprized for any smaller crimes, or for the avoiding of any tolerable evil, but for that which is notoriously more dangerous to the Nation than the warre it self.

Indeed where all the Nation agree (as in the defence of Jonathan against Saul) or so many that there is no party to make warre against them, then if the King would break his Covenants, or violate their Liberties in a lower case (as Jonathans death was) they may as one man say, This shall not be: and hinder the execution of the evil, without a warre; yet so that they nevertheless obey and honour the King in all things else.

And now concerning a Peoples defence of their happiness and safety against a King, that was restrained by the Constitution or his Consent; I must answer some of the Learned Hadrians Saravia's Objections, p. 446de Imperan. author. & Obed. li. 4. cap. 4. He argueth from the state of Marriage, 1. That many Covenants about Dowry, Joyntures, &c. may be violated, without dissolving the marriage. 2. That the essential conditions may be violated without such dissolution. 3. That no stipulation can be made that will warrant the offended party to separate.

To these I answer: 1. I grant him, that till a King do actually cast away his Government and become an Enemy, or else habitually make himself incapable or be made so by God, the people may not depart from their subjection. It is not casting off subjection… in state, but resisting in a particular case that is now in question.

2. The case of Marriage and Civil Government so much vary, that the Objection is of no force. For

1. God hath already stated the power of Husband and Wife, and subjected the Wife to the Husband by his Laws, and that for all alike; so that they are not left at liberty to make any alterations, nor several Species of Husbands, as Commonwealths may have several Species of Government. God hath not determined in his Word, whether this or that Nation shall be governed by a Monarch, by the Optimates, or by a mixt Government. He hath left it free to them to put the Soveraignty into the hands of one, or two, or an hundred, or a thousand; and to make the division equall or unequall: much more to limit Rulers in the things that God hath left to their prudentiall determination. 2. Moreover God hath determined that Marriage shall be for life, and not for a limited time; and that it shall not be dissolvable on any terms but those of his description: But he hath not done so p. 447by Governours. He hath no where made it necessary that Kings shall be for life, and unremoveable: A Dictator for a year, or two year is not forbidden: A King for seven year, is not contrary to Gods Word. If a people that are free, may choose whether they will have a King or none, then may they say, If you will accept the Crown for seven years, we will subject our selves to you, else not. If they resolve to have Kings by Rotation as Rome had Consuls, that every year or seven year they might have a new one, though I think it not fit, yet it is not against any word of God. And if they may absolutely stipulate with them, to be Kings but for such a time, then may they conditionally stipulate to be Kings no longer then they do so or so. e. g. To forfeit their Crowns, if they shall raise War against the Nation, or if they introduce a forraign power, or if they set up infidelity, or banish the Gospel, or if they dispossesse the people of their Proprieties. There is liberty for such contracts here, when there is none in Marriage, which God hath not left so much to the will of man.

3. And yet even in the case of marriage, I deny his conclusion, that the violation of the essential Conditions doth not warrant a separation. He confesseth that Adultery and wilfull desertion, are just Causes of divorce: and these are the violations of the essential Conditions. An obstinate perpetuated negatio congressus, is a desertion, His instances of sterility, morosity, and adventitious impotency, are not instances of a violation of the essential Conditions. A scold violateth not the essential Conditions and voluntary sterility, and impotency subsequent were never Covenanted against. Voluntary self-debilitation (yea involuntary) p. 448in many Christian States, is allowed as a just cause of Divorce. But if it be not so, yet

4. The case differeth in this: A Nation must needs have Government: But a man or a woman are not in such necessity of marriage: If a Husband be impotent, the woman may lawfully live without his use. But a Nation may not live ungoverned: And therefore if a King fall distracted, or statedly incapable, they must be governed by others.

5. And lastly I answer, That even about Joynture, and Peace and outward Priviledges, though a Woman may not be divorc't for injury in these, yet hath she her remedy from the Magistrate, who is superiour to her Husband. By your similitude then, you should allow a Nation their remedy, in as great and much greater cases, which yet will not warrant a divorce, or withdrawing of their subjection.

There is somewhat in exercitio, that is essential to Governing; and somewhat that pertaineth but to better Governing. As he that useth not the former is no Governour, so he that is uncapable of it, is uncapable of Governing. If the essential qualifications be wanting, or the essential conditions violated, and the essential ends be statedly subverted, the Government is nullified: Or else the essence is not the essence. If that part of the happiness of the people be subverted that is next to the essential end, they may retain and exercise the power of seeking a due Remedy.

The commonest remedy that Nations have thought meet to use in this case is, to keep all Subjects under the known Laws, and Courts of Justice, that they p. 449may not dare to execute unlawfull Commands, and to restrain Kings from pardoning or defending such malefactors as do endanger the Nations Rights and Peace: And so to let the Person of the King alone, and to punish the Subjects that break the Laws, though he command them. This is a resisting the Lusts, and the Wills of Princes, but not them, as to their Persons or their Power.

Augustine thought that some Justice was Essential to a Commonwealth (Lib. 11. de Civitat. Dei. cited by a great defender of Kings, Apolog. Henrici. 4. Imperatoris in Freher. Vol. 1. pag. 177.) [Populum non omnem coetum multitudinis, sed coetum juris consensu & utilitatis communione sociatum esse determinant; & dicunt, tunc esse Rempublicam, id est, rem populi quum benè ac justè geritur, sive ab uno Rege, sive à paucis optimatibus; sive ab universo populo. Quum verò injustus est Rex, quem Tyrannum more Graeco appellant, aut injusti optimates, quorum consensum dicunt esse factionem, aut injustus ipse populus, cui nomen usitatum non reperiunt, nisi etiam ipsum Tyrannum vocent, non jam dicunt Vitiosam sicut prius fuerat disputatum, sed sicut ratio ex his illis rationibus connexa docuisset, Omnino nullam esse Rempublicam: Quoniam non esset Res Populi quum Tyrannus eam factione capesseret. Nec ipse Populus jam Populus esset si esset injustus. Quoniam non esset multitudo Juris consensu & utilitatis communione societas, sicut Populus fuerat definitus.

To conclude this point: If Princes violating their Covenants, and changing the Constitution, be not to be resisted, then all Princes have equal power, that is, their power is absolute and unlimited as to man: p. 450For then they may all do what they list; which if we tell them, their list to exalt their Wills and Interest will be insatiable: And Covenants are vain, and afford not the least security for our Peace or Welfare, when in foro exteriori, the keeping and breaking them is all one. If Princes were sent down from Heaven, or meer Nature produced Governing Families, this Doctrine might have some pretence, which now hath none.

Thes. 373. A notorious Atheist, and Enemy to the Essentials of Godliness, that sets himself himself to root it out, is an open Traitor or Rebel against the God of Heaven, from whom all Power must proceed: And therefore as he is a Magistrate but secundum quid, so it is but an answerable obedience that we owe him, as one that is tolerated by God in his Rebellion, for the maintaining of external Order among men, for the common good.

Thes. 374. If a Prince that hath not the whole Soveraignty, be conquered by a Senate that hath the other part, and that in a just Defensive Warre, that Senate as the conquering part, cannot assume the whole Soveraignty, but must suppose the Government in specie to remain, and therefore another King must be chosen, if the former be uncapable.

I here respect the Senate as the remaining Soveraignty, and not as the Peoples Representative: And p. 451so the case is plain: Because, 1. They conquered not the Species, but the Individual. 2. They conquered not the People, but the Prince: And therefore they have no Power to change the Constitution, which was formed by Contract with the People. The Commonwealth hath not forfeited its form of Government when a Prince hath forfeited his Interest: And therefore Rex non moritur: The Constitution remains good; and the Conquerours have no power to change it, without the Peoples Consent.

Thes. 375. If the whole Family with whom the People were in Covenant be extirpated, or become uncapable, the People may new forme the Government … please, (so they contradict not the Law of God:) not by Authority, but by Contract with the next chosen Governours; nor as Subjects, but as Free men, the Government being dissolved.

When one party in Covenant is dead (naturally or civilly) the other is free: Subjects as such, have nothing to do to change the Government: nor Subjects while such, unless they expresly reserve that liberty. But when a whole Royal Family is extinct, or all that they were in Covenant with for succession, they are disobliged, and may offer the next, what terms they please, that are consistent with the Laws of God. But they cannot settle the new Government, either as Subjects, or as Rulers, but by Contract: For they can command no man to become their Governour, and submit to their terms; but they may offer it to any that is fit, who is as free to accept it, or refuse it.

p. 452Thes. 376. Where there are not Assemblies Representing the People, or some Trustees enabled to be the Preservers of their Liberties, it will be hard to imagine how a Warre can lawfully be raised for their Defence, in any of the forementioned Cases, unless where they are almost all of a mind.

For it must be some private men that must be the beginners, whose actions are not the actions of the Nation; nor can they know whether the Nation approve of them, and would concurre: so that the Possibility and Lawfulness of Defence will be questionable, where there are no Trustees.

Thes. 377. Though too many lay their Religion and Salvation at the feet of Princes, because they have first laid them at the feet of their fleshly interest and lusts, yet most men have more need to be called on to obey their Rulers, then told how farre they may disobey or resist: And in doubtfull cases, it is safest to suffer, rather than resist.

Every man is naturally selfish and proud, and apt to break the bounds that God hath set us, and to be Kings and Laws unto ourselves. This Rebelling disobedient disposition, therefore should be first resisted and subdued, as a greater enemy to the peace of Nations (at least of many) then the faults of Princes are.

p. 453Thes. 378. The proud censoriousness of Subjects, that think themselves capable of Judging of all their Rulers actions, when they are so distant as never to know or hear the Reasons of them, is the common Cause of sinfull murmurings and Rebellions.

The most ignorant Country people are exceeding prone to pass their censures upon the actions of Kings and Parliaments, and shoot their bolt before they ever saw the Mark. How confidently will they blame and reproach their Superiours, as if they were able themselves to Govern better, or at least were so much honester then their Rulers, that their honesty would supply their lack of wit. In all ages, murmuring against Superiours, and ignorant censuring them, have been the common sinne of the people: Though alas, Princes have given them too much occasion and provocation.

Thes. 379. The most excellent Policy is true Piety: and the principal way for Princes to oblige the Subjects to them, and remove all fears of Seditions and Rebellions, is heartily to devote all their Power and Interest to the Cause of God, and the common good.

This will engage the Lord to own them, that is the King of Kings, and the disposer of all, in whose favour alone their safety lieth. And this will endear them to all that are good, and cause them to be as zealous in loving and honouring them, as children to p. 454their Father. Yea, it will breed much Reverence in the minds of common and ungodly men, who will speak highly of Godliness in a Prince, though they like it not for themselves. And when they see that Princes are Fathers of their Countreys, and seek not themselves, but the common good: it is the most excellent means to procure them common Love and Reverence.

Thes. 380. A Prudent, Godly, Righteous Prince is so rare, and so great a mercy, that the People that enjoy such, are bound exceedingly to Love, Honour and Obey them, and daily pray for them, and cheerfully pay the Tributes they demand, and willingly venture their lives for their Defence.

Oh how few Joshuah's, David's, Josiah's, Constantine's, Theodosius's, &c. have the Kingdoms of the world enjoyed! At this day alas, how few are the Princes that have any zeal for God, and preferre his Kingdom and Interest before their own! How many are fighting their own warres, arising from the lusts that warre in their members, and making havock of the Church of God? But how few are studious to promote the Gospel, and the union of the Churches, and Peace of Christians, and the Conversion of the unbelieving world! Let them that God enricheth with so great a mercy, value it highly, and take heed of murmuring and ingratitude, or of neglect of those earnest prayers, and cheerfull obedience, by which so great a mercy may be continued and improved. How sad a blow was it to England that p. 455Edward the Sixth was so soon taken away! How many would have after redeemed his life with the dearest price, that before too much undervalued their happiness! One serious thought of the state of most of the Nations of the world, should turn the murmuring humour of too many into hearty Praise, and earnest Prayers to God for our Superiours. If that Nation that is most happy of any upon Earth, in a Government suited to the highest Interest, and to Gods Description, (Rom. 3. 3.) should yet murmure and despise that Government, it would be a most hainous sin, and a terrible, Prognostick, especially to the guilty souls.