The Portraiture of the Image of God in Man, Part 2 · Chapter 1
CHAP. I. Of the Paſsions of man in generall.
A Paſſion, Prop. is a motion of the ſenſitive appetite, ſtirred up by the apprehenſion, either of good or evill in the imagination, which worketh ſome outward change in the body.
They are called paſſions, Illuſt. to put a difference betwixt them and the faculties of the Soule, Tria inſunt animae potentia, habitus, & paſſiones.which are naturally inbred in it; and betwixt the habits which are infuſed and acquired; but the Paſſions, although they be naturally inbred in the ſoule, yet they muſt be ſtirred up by outward objects. They are not like habits, which are alwayes alike and permanent, neither are they like bare imaginations and phantaſies drawne from the objects, and reſerved in the memory: but they ariſe from a knowne object laid up in the imagination, appearing to us either pleaſant or hurtfull. They are wrought by an apprehenſion in the imagination, becauſe the imagination ſtirreth up immediatly the ſenſes, then the underſtanding faculty judgeth them to be true or falſe, and the will conſidereth them as good or evill. As the understanding judgeth them to be true or falſe, it ſtirreth not up the appetite, but as the will judgeth them to be good or evill; yet not abſolutely, but as good or evill to us, or ours: and theſe faculties are rightly joyned together, for the ſenſitive facultie of it ſelfe is blind, neither could it follow or decline any thing unleſſe the underſtanding faculty directed it: ſo the understanding faculty were needeleſſe, unleſſe it had theſe paſſions joyned with it, to proſecute the truth, and to ſhun the falſehood.
Queſt. Whether are theſe paſſions placed in the ſenſitive part, or in the reaſonable?
Anſw. They are placed in the ſenſitive part, and not in the reaſonable, becauſe the reaſonable doth not imploy any corporall organs in her actions, for when wee reaſon, there is no alteration in the body. But the paſsions appeare in the blood, by changing and altering of our countenance, and they are a middle betwixt the body and the minde, and have correſpondency with both; Hence it was that God commanded his people, to abſtaine from bloud, Gen. 9.4. and that they ſhould offer bloud in their ſacrifices, Heb. 9.22. that ſo the ſoule might anſwer for the ſoul which ſinned, Levit. 17.11.12.
Although theſe paſſions be in the ſenſitive part, as in the ſubject, yet the underſtanding is the principall cauſe which moveth them. If there were a commotion amongſt the common people, moved by ſome crafty Achitophel, the commotion is properly in the people as in the ſubject, but it is in the craftie Achitophels head as in the cauſe, who moveth the ſedition. So theſe paſſions are in the will and underſtanding, as commanding and ruling them; but in the ſenſitive part, as in the proper ſubject. In beaſts the phantaſie ſets the ſenſitive appetite on worke, but in man the phantaſie apprehending the object, preſents it to the understanding, which conſiders it either as true or falſe, and the understanding preſents it to the will, and thence ariſeth the proſecution of the good; or ſhunning of the evill in the ſenſitive appetite, with an alteration of the ſpirits in the body.
The paſsions of man ruled by reaſon. Prop.
Wee ſee by experience that theſe paſsions that draw nereſt to reaſon, are ſooneſt ſubdued; Illuſt. and theſe paſsions that are furtheſt from reaſon, are more hardly ſubdued. A man will ſooner ſubdue his paſſions than a woman or a childe, becauſe he hath more reaſon, and a man will ſooner quite his anger, than his fleſhly luſts; becauſe they are all further from reaſon; and the Philoſophers ſhew this by the example of a Horſe or a Bull, they are ſooner tamed, becauſe they draw nearer to reaſon, but the fiſhes cannot be tamed, becauſe they have no reſemblance of reaſon.
Whether are the paſsions that antevert the will ruled by reaſon or not? Anſ. Queſt. The paſsions which antevert the will are not from the will and reaſon, neither are they altogether againſt the will and reaſon, but partly with the will and partly againſt the will. Theſe paſsions which antevert the will, doe not excuſe but extenuate the fact, in tanto, ſed non in toto, they excuſe the fact in a part, but not fully.
Theſe paſsions excuſe ſinne, in tanto, ſed non in toto; Conſeq. therefore it is a falſe diviſion which the Church of Rome maketh of the paſſions of the ſoule. Triplices motus in anima, primo primi motus, ſecundi primo-motus, ſecundi motus.They ſay there are firſt primo-primi motus in the ſoule, which ariſe ſodainly before reaſon thinke of them; theſe thoughts the will cannot repreſſe, becauſe they proceed from our naturall inclination; and are neither mortall nor veniall. Secondly, they ſay that there are ſecundo primi motus, which ariſe ſodainely after the firſt motions, theſe the will may repreſſe (they ſay) if ſhee take diligent heede to them: theſe they make veniall ſinnes. Thirdly, (ſay they) there are in the ſoule ſecundi motus, when the will gives the full conſent: they make theſe mortall ſinnes. But the firſt motions of all without conſent are ſinne, and damned in the laſt Commandement; and the motions which ariſe with conſent, are damned in the ſeventh commandement by Chriſt, Mat. 5.28. Hee that luſteth after a woman hath committed adultery with her already in his heart; then the motions which ariſe without conſent, are damned in the laſt commandement.
Theſe perturbations doe not extenuate ſinne ſo farre as ignorance doth. Prop.
The perturbations are ruled by prudencie, Illuſt. but becauſe theſe perturbations follow not the light of reaſon, their ſinne is greater than the ſinne of ignorance, which is want of knowledge in the underſtanding: The ſervant that knoweth his Maſters will and doth it not, ſhall be beaten with many ſtripes, Luke 12.47.