The Portraiture of the Image of God in Man, Part 1 · Chapter 16
CHAP. XVI. Of the Will of Man.
THere are two principall faculties in the ſoule; the underſtanding and the will, which continually accompany it, both in the body, and out of the body.
The underſtanding, Prop. is an eſſentiall facultie in the Soule, whereby it knoweth, judgeth, and diſcerneth naturally truth from falſehood.
The will, Illuſt. is an eſſentiall facultie in the Soule working freely, having liberty to chuſe, refuſe, or ſuſpend, not determinate to one thing.
It is called a facultie, and not a habite; becauſe a habite is determinate to one thing; but a facultie may make choyce of moe. Secondly it is ſaid; to worke freely, to put a difference betwixt it and naturall agents, which ſtill worke after the ſame manner, and are alwaies carried to the ſame object: as the Sunne naturally cannot but heate, and it is but by accident if it breede cold: againe, it is ſaid, to worke freely, to put a difference betweene it and the actions of the beaſts, which are but ſemiliberae actiones, for the beaſts cannot but chuſe ſtill the ſelfe ſame thing, being alike affected; as being hungry they cannot chuſe but eate, as the ſtone being heavy cannot but goe to the center. Creatures without life, have neither liberum motum, a free motion, (becauſe they are moved by another) neither have they liberum judicium, free judgement, becauſe they are not moved by reaſon: Agens naturale movetur ad finem, agens per intellectum movetur in finem.the beaſts have a free motion, becauſe they move themſelves, according to the natural inſtinct which God hath indued them with; but they have not a free judgement, for they are not directed by reaſon. Man hath both free motion, and free judgement; whereby he worketh freely. Naturall agents determinate no end to themſelves; but reaſonable creatures propound and determinate an end to themſelves: therefore no naturall agent hath freedome, but inſtinct.
There are three properties of the Will. Firſt, Tres Proprietates voluntatis, conformitas, libertas & poteſtas.the conformity of the will with the underſtanding. Secondly, the liberty of the will; for when it followeth the last judgement of the underſtanding, it followes it freely. Thirdly, the power of the will, whereby the will after the election, (which now it hath gotten by the direction of the underſtanding) applieth it ſelfe to the attaining of the object.
The firſt property of the will is, The firſt property of the will.that in the operation it dependeth upon the underſtanding, and followeth the direction of the mind.
The will followes the direction of the underſtanding, Illuſt. 1 either in chooſing, ſuſpending, or refuſing; this is called, ſequacitas voluntatis; the will of it ſelfe is but caeca potentia, and hath nothing but a deſire; which yet hath not deſire to any particular object, except it be led by the light of the mind: hence come theſe ſayings, nihil in voluntate quod non prius fuerat in intellectu; error in notitia parit errorem in voluntate, quod intellectus male judicat, voluntas male appetit; & tantum diligimus quantum cognoſcimus; that is, there is nothing in the will which was not firſt in the underſtanding: So, error, in knowledge breeds error in the will: ſo a falſe judging of a thing, breeds a falſe deſire of a thing: ſo, the more wee love, the more wee know.
There is in the underſtanding, intellection, Duplex inteilectus, ſpeculativus, & practicus in intellectu practico duplex ratio, precedens & ſubſequens. Voluntas ſequitur ultimum iudicium practici intellectus.or ratio ſpeculativa, which is of things to be knowen by Man; and intellectus, or ratio practica; of things uſed to be done by Man, and fall under his election. Againe in Mans practicall reaſon, there is reaſon going before, ſaying, this may be done; and another following the practicall underſtanding, ſaying, this ſhall be done; and this laſt judgement, of practicall underſtanding, the Will followeth, and ſaith, this will I doe, ſhe is in ſuſpence before ſhee heare this laſt concluſion.
Queſt. What is the reaſon that the will doth not alway follow the laſt judgement of the underſtanding? for oftentimes it goeth a plaine contrary courſe in that which the underſtanding hath diſcerned, as Medea ſaid, Video meliora proboque, deteriora ſequor; I ſee the good, but I follow the bad.
Anſw. The ground of this proceeds from the underſtanding: for the underſtanding having diſcerned a thing to be good, the affections draw the minde to a new reſolution, as wee ſee in that complaint of the Apoſtle, Rom. 7. The good that I would doe, that I doe not; and the evill that I would not doe, that I doe; but ſtill the Will followeth the laſt reſolution of the underſtanding; otherwiſe of it ſelfe it is but caecapotentia.
The underſtanding hath a mutuall dependance from the Will, Prop. and is ſet on worke by it.
The Will, Illuſt. wils the end without any deliberation, appetitu innato; and before any deliberation, there goeth an act of the Will ſtill, whereby wee will deliberate upon ſuch a purpoſe, and it ſaith volo diliberere, before the minde enter in deliberation: when the will is ſet earneſtly upon a thing, it ſtirreth up the minde to thinke upon it, and upon the meanes whereby it may attaine unto it, that it may have the appetite ſatisfied; therefore the underſtanding cannot diſcerne a thing to be true or falſe, before the will appoint the end, and ſo ſet the minde on worke.
There is a reciprocall dependance then betwixt theſe two, the Will dependeth upon the deliberation of the minde; both particularly ſetting downe the object, and how it ſhould exerciſe it ſelfe about the object; Duplex actus intellectus ſpecificationis & exercitij. Voluntas ſequitur intellectum quoad ſpecificationem & exercitium actus; intellectus ſequitur voluntatem quoad exercitium actus tantum.but the mind dependeth upon the will, quoad exercitium, but not, quoad ſpecificationem, for when the minde hath given out her laſt determination concerning any particular object, the will muſt chuſe that particular and not another, and neither refuſe it nor ſuſpend it; and it muſt chuſe it in that meaſure of earneſtneſſe, as it is knowne to be good; tantum quiſque vult quantum intelligit ſe velle debere, every man deſireth ſo much as he underſtands. But upon the other ſide the will ſets onelyonly the minde on worke, and conveneth the councell to deliberate, but telleth them not what to conclude, and attendeth their deliberation, and promiſeth to follow their concluſion. Example, when a controverſie ariſeth in the Church the ſupreame magiſtrate conveneth a Synode, and commandeth them to give out their determination and Canon; but commandeth them not to encline more to one ſide than to the other; here he commands exercitium, and leaves ſpecificationem free: but when hee hath heard their determination, according the Word of God, hee taketh him to that ſide which they conclude to be beſt, without either ſuſpending or refuſing; and ſo followeth them both, quoad exercitium & ſpecificationem: Yet in this ſimilitude there is ſome diſſimilitude; for the magiſtrate, yea every private man hath judicium diſcretionis; but the will hath no judgement in it ſelfe, for it meerely depends upon the judgement of the minde, which maketh the neceſſitie of the dependance of the will upon the minde, to be greater than the dependance of the King upon his Councell, or of any private man, upon a Synods determination.
This naturall reciprocation of the minde and the Will, is ſenſibly perceived, by the inſtruments of the underſtanding and the will in the body, whereby they exerciſe their functions, to wit, the heart and the braine: the ſpirits are carried from the heart to the braine, and when the heart waxeth hoate with an earneſt deſire of the will, then the braine is more buſied, and intended to finde out the way how the heart may be ſatisfied; and againe when there is a cleare and a full knowledge in the braine, then the ſpirits runne from the braine to the heart, and ſtirre up the heart to purſue for the obtaining of the knowen good) which reciprocation bringeth foorth a happy worke when the unruly affections, and ſinful appetites, mixe not themſelves with the buſineſſe to marre all.
Queſt. Whether will we a thing firſt, or underſtand we it firſt, and then will it?
Anſw. We will a thing before wee underſtand it, by an inbred deſire and blinde appetite, but we cannot will a thing in reſpect of the meanes, untill the underſtanding give light firſt. Quatuor ſunt activa principia, res apprehenſe, apprehenſiva vis, voluntas, & vis executiva.In all our actions there concurre foure things. Firſt, the Object which is the thing we apprehend. Secondly, the apprehending power or the underſtanding, judging this to be good or evill. Thirdly, the will which is mooved by the underſtanding. Fourthly, the members mooved by the will; here the underſtanding conſidering the object giveth light to the will.
Queſt. Where begins ſinne firſt, whether in the will, or in the underſtanding?
Anſw. The habite of ſinne is firſt in the underſtanding, becauſe all ſinne comes from error which is in the underſtanding. Againe, when the underſtanding is conſidered by it ſelfe without any operation, In actu abſoluto pectatune eſt prius in intellectu, in actu compeſito & prius in voluntate.then ſinne is firſt, in it; but when the underſtanding and the will worke together, then ſinne is firſt in the will.
Here wee may gather that the ſinne in the will is greater than the ſinne in the underſtanding, Pec catum eſt in obiecto occa ſionaliter, in intellectu er iginaliter, in voluntate formaliter, in membris qua oduſum.becauſe in the underſtanding there is onelyonly a habite of ſinne, but in the will there is both the habite and the Act of ſinne, and therfore we ſee that the Will is puniſhed with greater rebellion than the underſtanding is with darkeneſſe; Pharaohs heart was hardned, he knew the judgements of God, but yet his Will continually rebelled.
Queſt. Whether is there a ſinne in the will without errour in the underſtanding or no?
Anſw. Sinne is in the underſtanding two wayes. Firſt, Duplex ignor antia, originalis, & interpretativa.originally when the underſtanding is ſo blinded, that it can give no direction to the Will. Secondly, interpretatively, when the underſtanding hath ſhewen the truth to the will, and the ſinne is committed firſt by the Will; yet for lacke of conſideration, the underſtanding approveth the act of the Will, and ſo followeth it in the ſame ſinne, which is by reaſon of the dependance of the underſtanding from the will: as a man going to murther, the Will ſets downe the wicked end that the underſtanding may deviſe the cruell meanes: yet the underſtanding had ſhowen the truth to the will before, that it was good not to murther.
Quest. Whether doth ignorance in the underſtanding make the will, willing or not willing in the actions?
Anſw. There is a threefold ignorance. Triplex ignorantia, antecedens, cancomitant, conſequens.The firſt is called ignorantia antecedens, when a man is ignorant of that which hee is not bound to know, nor could not know, which if he had knowne he would not have done it; here, ignorance is the cauſe of the fact; as a man cutting wood his axe head flees off and killes a man ignorantly, he doth the thing ignorantly; which if hee had knowne he would not have done; here the ignorance in the underſtanding, makes not the will, willing, becauſe he ſinnes ex ignorantia.
The ſecond is called ignorantia concomitans when a man doth that thing ignorantly, which if hee had knowen hee would not have done, but would have done another thing as bad, and is ſorry that hee hath not done it. A man conceives a hatred againſt ſuch a man, he miſtaking the man, kil les another in place of him ignorantly; when this is told him, hee is ſorry that he hath not killed his enemy; when hee killes the other man, his ignorance is not willing ignorance, neither is it unwilling ignorance: Triplex ignorantia, volens, nolens, non volens.It is not willing ignorance; becauſe he would not have killed the man whom he killed; it is not unwilling ignorance, becauſe hee would have killed his enemy, and was ſorry that he killed him not, ſo that his ignorance was partly willing, and partly not willing; Al quis pecoat dupliciter, ex ignorantia, & ignorater.here he ſinnes ignoranter, but not ex ignorantia: Ignorantly he killed the man, although ignorance was not the cauſe, for hee did it of ſet purpoſe.
The third is called ignorantia conſequens, when a man is wilfully ignorant, and drawes on the ignorance upon himſelfe, and then excuſeth his ſinne; a man in his drunkenneſſe, killes a child ignorantly, this ignorance, is a willing ignorance, becauſe the man willingly was drunk, and contracted this ignorance; and therefore he ſhould be puniſhed both for his drunkenneſſe, and for his murther; this is called an affectate ignorance and willing.
The ſecond propertie of the will, Prop. is the liberty of the will, whereby it chuſeth freely.
Some of the Schoolemen hold that freedome is originally in the underſtanding, The ſecond propertie of the will.and formally in the will, as Aquinas: others hold that this freedome is formally both in the underſtanding, Duplex libertas, originalis & formalis.and the will; but firſt in the underſtanding, and then in the will, as Durandus; but we hold that freedome is onelyonly in the will.That freedome is not originally in the underſtanding.
Wee will ſhow that this freedome cannot be originally in the underſtanding, by theſe two reaſons.
Firſt, the underſtanding is neither free from coaction, Reaſon. 1 nor naturall neceſſitie: it is not free from coaction; for the underſtanding is forced to know a thing which it would not know, contra inclinationem totius ſuppoſiti, contrary to the inclination of the whole perſon, Voluntas ſequitur rationem, ut indicativum, non ut impulfivum.as the Devils are forced to beleeve that there is a God; ſo, a man that is ſicke unto death is forced to beleeve that he ſhall die, contrary to the inclination of the whole man who would live; but the will can no wayes be thus inforced to will. Againe, the understanding is not free from naturall neceſſitie; for if arguments which neceſſarily conclude be propoſed to it, it cannot chuſe but beleeve them: if probable arguments be propoſed to it, then it hath but a conceipt or opinion, with a feare to the contrary: but if arguments of like probabilitie on both ſides be propoſed to it, here it is neceſſitate to doubt, unleſſe the inclination of the will, come in, to incline it rather the one way than the other? we may imagine any thing that we pleaſe, but we cannot give our lighteſt aſſent unto a thing, unleſſe there be ſome colour of reaſon at leaſt to induce.
All the powers of the Soule, Reaſon. 2 are determinate by the will in their actions, and that neceſſarily, without any freedome in them; as the ſeeing eye, cannot but neceſſarily ſee colours, if they be laid before it, ſo the underſtanding is forced to underſtand, when truth is laid before it; but the will although it be determinate by the underſtanding, yet this determination takes not away the liberty of the will and places it in the underſtanding originally; againe, the dnderſtanding is determiate by the object, neceſſarily and naturally: but the will is determinate by the underſtanding, neceſſarily yet freely.
Freedome is radically and originally in the will; Conſeq. therefore Bellarmine halts here, both contrary to himſelfe and to others of his owne coate; he is plainely contrary to himſelfe, as Benius the Ieſuite markes well; for firſt (ſaith Benius) he placeth libertie radically in the underſtanding, whereby the will is determinate by the laſt judgement of reaſon; and yet in the third Booke and eight Chapter, of freewill and grace, Bellarmine ſaith, Volunt as in eligendo libera eſt, non quod non determinetur neceſſariò a judicio ultimo & practico rationis; ſed quod iſtud ipſum ultimum & practicum judicium rationis in poteſtate voluntatis eſt, that is, The will is free in chuſing, not that it is determinate neceſſarily by the laſt judgement of reaſon, but becauſe this ſame laſt judgement of reaſon, is in the power of the will. Benius ſaith, that he cannot ſee how theſe two can ſtand together, that the understanding in the laſt Iudgement ſhould determinate the will, and that the ſame laſt Iudgement of reaſon ſhoud be in the power of the will: ſo that the patrons of free will in Man, doe not agree among themſelves concerning the originall of freedome, ſometimes placing it in the underſtanding, and ſometimes in the will. Here we conclude, that freedome is originally in the will, for when the underſtanding, hath demonſtrate the truth unto the will: although the underſtanding neceſsitate the wil to chuſe; yet it doth not inforce it; but it chuſeth that which it chuſeth freely.
Secondly, That free dome is not formally both in the underſtanding and the will.we will ſhew that this libertie is not both in the underſtanding and the will, formally; for if it were formally in both, then it ſhould follow that there were two free wills in man, one in the underſtanding, and another in the will; and conſequently a double election, and a double cauſe of ſinne; but the formall cauſe of ſinne is in the will; therefore Bernard ſaith Ceſſet voluntas propria, & infernus non crit, that is, Let the will ceaſe from ſinning, and there ſhall not be a hell, therefore there cannot be a formall cauſe of freedome in the underſtanding.
It reſts then that freedome is both originally and formally in the will. Wee muſt not thinke this an idle ſchoole diſtinction, and ſo let it paſſe; for covertly under this, (that they make the underſtanding to be radically and originally free,) they cover their poyſon of free-will, and ſo vent it to the world: for freedome being originally in the underſtanding ſince the fall (unto good;) it directs the will in every action; and the will being determinate by the understanding, then there muſt be yet free-will in Man ſince the fall, naturally to embrace good, as well as evill.
Queſt. What is the underſtanding to the will then, when the will chuſeth, ſeeing it is not the originall of the liberty thereof?Intellectus eſt cauſa determination is, non libertatis.
Anſw. It is the cauſe of the determination of the will, but not of the liberty thereof: It cannot be the efficient cauſe of the liberty of the will although it might ſeeme ſo to be; as for example: remiſſion of ſinnes is promiſed and given, if we forgive men their treſpaſſes: yet our forgiving of men their treſpaſſes, is not the cauſe why God remits our ſinnes, but a condition; ſo, the fire heateth not, unleſſe there be a mutuall touch betwixt the agent and the patient, but yet this mutuall touch of the agent and the patient, is not the cauſe why the fire burneth but a condition; So, although the will chuſe not without the light of the underſtanding, yet the underſtanding is not the cauſe, why the will chuſeth freely, Aliud eſt conditio, aliud cauſa.but a condition without which it could not chuſe; the cauſe is one thing, but the condition is another.
Object. A condition never precedeth an effect; Bellarm. de grat. & lib. arbit.as ye cannot ſee unleſſe the window be opened, and yet it will not follow, that if the window be opened (which is the condition) that yee will ſtreight ſee, unleſſe the light come in; (which is the cauſe why wee ſee:) but when the underſtanding ſhoweth the light to the will, it is not as condition, but a cauſe, why the will chuſeth this thing, and not that; as the light makes the coloures actually viſible, which were but potentially viſible, before the light did ſhine.
Anſw. Conditio duplex, cauſalis, & conditionalis.There is a twofold condition. Firſt, when the condition includes a cauſe: as if a man breath, hee hath lungs; here the condition of breathing is his lungs; which is alſo the cauſe of his breathing. Secondly, there is condition, which is onelyonly a condition, and includeth no cauſe in it; as the opening of the window is the condition without which we cannot ſee: if the window be not opened, the light cannot come in; and yet the opening of the window is not the cauſe of the light, for the cauſe is in the light it ſeife, why the object is viſible. Againe, the light ſhining upon the object is not the cauſe of our ſeeing the object, for the cauſe is the eye, and the light is the condition without which we cannot ſee the object. So, the underſtanding is onelyonly but a condition to the will, and not a cauſe, why it chuſeth freely, becauſe the freedome of the will, is onelyonly in it ſelfe, embracing the object freely, without any externall cauſe mooving it.
The will of God neither turnes nor returnes; A collation betweene the will of the Angels, God and man.it is like the pole which ſtands immoveably in the firmament: the will of the Angell turnes, but returnes not; it is like the winde, which being ſetled in one ayrth ſtands ſtill there: but the will of man both turnes and returnes; Coll. 2 it is like the winde, ſometimes in this ayrth, and ſometimes in that.
In the Angels there was primum inſtans, Betwixt the will of the Angels, in nocent, ſecond, old, and renewed Adam.& ſecundum inſtans; the Angels, in primo inſtanti, were incompletè liberi, they were then but viatores; for although they did at the firſt onelyonly actually chuſe good, in the firſt moment of their creation, yet they were not confirmed in good, Iob 4.18. Duplex inſtans angelorum, primus, & ſecundus.he found not conſtancy in his Angels: but in the ſecond inſtant, the good Angels, were completè liberi and confirmed in good; as the bad Angels were ſetled in evill, the good Angels confirmed in good, were comprehenſores, but not viatores; and the bad were confirmed onelyonly in evill, and are continually viatores. So the firſt Adam was incompletè liber and viator, and therefore might chuſe either good or evill; ſo the renewed Adam is incompletè liber & viator, becauſe naturally he chuſeth evill, and by grace he may chuſe good; but, the ſecond Adam Ieſus Chriſt, being both comprehenſor and viator is completè liber and cannot chuſe evill; the old Adam is viator onelyonly, and chuſeth onelyonly evill.
When the Divels and wicked men are ſaid to be determinate to evill, it is not ſo to be underſtood that they are determinate to one ſort of evill onelyonly, for they may goe from one ſort of evill to another; as the Divell inticed the Iewes to kill Chriſt, and yet he inticed Peter to diſſwade Chriſt from going to Ieruſalem, that he might be ſaved; and yet they are ſtil determinate to evil.
An Angell differeth from the Soule of Man foure wayes. Firſt, naturally, Coll. 3 Betwixt the Angels and Man. Quatuor modis differt angelus ab homine, 1. naturaliter, 2. logice, 3. metaphyſice, 4. theologice.for the Soule doth animate the Body, but an Angell animates not a Body Secondly, they differ in their definition, for the Soule is a reaſonable creature, but an Angell is an intellectuall creature. Thirdly, the Soule may be moved by the inferior faculties, but the Angell is onelyonly mooved by God. Fourthly, the Soule makes choice either of good or evill, but an Angell of good onelyonly, or of evill onelyonly.
Willingneſſe is the moſt abſolute perfection of the will, and therefore when the Saints ayme at this, Conſeq. it is noted as one of the higheſt degrees of perfection in this life to be willing to doe good, Pſal. 110. My people are a willing people.
The liberty of the will is twofold, Duplex libertas volunta. …is, contrarietatis & contradictionis.the liberty of contrariety and the liberty of contradiction: Man had liberty of contrariety before his fall to chuſe good or evill, and liberty of contradiction, to doe, or not to doe: theſe two ſorts of liberties are not the perfecteſt eſtate of the will, for when it hath power to chuſe or not to chuſe, it imports a weakeneſſe in it, but when it is determinate to the good, then it is fully ſatisfied, this is reſerved for Man in glory. The Apoſtle, Rom. 6.18. uſed this word liberty, more improperly, when hee ſaith, free from Iuſtice, and ſervant to ſinne; when hee calleth this freedome, it is moſt improperly freedome; for, if the Sonne make us free, then wee are free, Ioh. 8.36. ſo wee ſay to ſerve God, this ſervice is not properly ſervice, but freedome.
The eſſentiall property of the will, The ſecond property of the will.is freedome, that it cannot be compelled by no externall agent in the free chuſing; although in the externall action thereof it may be forced.
God worketh diverſly upon the will; ſometimes hee changeth the will, and converts it; as when hee changed and converted the will of Saul, and made him an Apoſtle. Secondly, ſometimes he changeth the will, but converts it not; as when Eſau came againſt his brother Iacob, hee changed his will, and made him fall upon his necke and weepe, Gen. 33.4. But yet converted him not; ſo when Alexander the great, came againſt Ieruſalem, minding to deſtroy it, the Lord changed his minde, and made him courteous to the Iewes, by granting them ſundry priviledges, and beſtowing gifts upon them; here his minde was changed, but not converted. Thirdly, ſometimes God neither changeth nor converts the will, but reſtraineth it; as the will of Laban when hee came againſt Iacob, Gen. 31.24. and Attila when he came againſt Rome. Fourthly, ſometimes God neither changeth, nor converteth, nor reſtraines the will, but he over-rules it, as he did the will of the Iewes who crucified Chriſt: all theſe wayes God workes upon the will, but he never compels it.
Although the will cannot be compelled in actu elicito, in the owne free choyce; yet in actu imperato, Duplex actus, e icitus & imperatus.in the commanding act, it may be compelled; as when they drew the Martyrs againſt their will before their idols, putting frankincence in their hands to burne it before them: So Ioh. 21. Chriſt ſaith to Peter, they ſhall draw thee whether thou would'ſt not.
As the will, in the commanding act may be compelled; Prop. ſo the will in the free chuſing act may be neceſsitate. Illuſt.
There is a threefold neceſſitie. Triplex neceſſitas, ab intrinſeco, ab extrinſeco, & ratione finis.Firſt when the neceſsitie ariſeth from within; this is called, neceſsitas ab intrinſeco, as the bleſſed in heaven are mooved, by the proper inclination of their will to love God neceſſarily, Secondly, when the neceſsity ariſeth from without; as when the will is indifferent in it ſelfe, to doe or not to doe, to goe this way or that way. When Nebuchadnezzar ſtood in the parting of two wayes, Ezech. 21. doubtfull whither to goe, towards Ieruſalem or Rabbath; the Lord determinates his will to goe towards Ieruſalem. Thirdly, in reſpect, of the end; as a man is to paſſe over a water, but he cannot goe to the other ſide without a boate. Theſe three ſorts of neceſſities take not away the liberty of the will, although they neceſſitate it; the firſt ſort of neceſſity takes not away the liberty of the will, although it neceſsitate it; for this will is internum principium ſui motus, and this libertie cannot be taken from it, unleſſe it be deſtrayed: the ſecond ſort of neceſsity takes not away the freedome from it; for the will cannot be both inforced, and yet free; as heate cannot be made cold: but yet the will may be neceſſitate; for as the water which is cold may be made hoate, ſo the will which is free may be neceſſitate: and the third ſort of neceſſitie eſtabliſheth the freedome of the will.
Man in his firſt eſtate had free choyce of good or evill, The firſt collation betwixt the innocent, renewed, old, and glorified Adam.but was neceſsitate to neither of them: in his ſecond eſtate, he is a ſervant to ſinne and neceſsitate to it; in his third eſtate, hee is free from the ſervitude of ſinne, but not from the neceſsitie of it: in his fourth eſtate hee is voluntarily good, and neceſſarily good, but hee is not free libertate indifferentiae; as man was before the fall, for that includes a weakeneſſe in it.
In Adam's firſt eſtate his will was free from ſinne, Coll. 1 and neceſſity of ſinne, becauſe he had neither internum, nor externum principium, to move him to ſinne; ſo he was free from miſery but not from mutability. In his ſecond eſtate he is ſubject to the neceſsity of ſinning to miſery, and to the ſervitude of ſinne; but free from coaction. In his third eſtate, hee is free from the dominion of ſinne, from the ſervitude of ſinne, and from compulſion, but not from the neceſſitie of ſinning. In his fourth he ſhall be free from miſery, ſervitude mutability, and neceſſity of ſinning; but not from neceſſity and willingneſſe to love God. In his firſt eſtate he was liber, free; in his ſecond eſtate he was ſervus, a ſervant to ſinne; In his third eſtate hee is liberatus, free from ſinne; but in his fourth eſtate hee ſhall be liberrimus, moſt freed from finne.
The will working freely, Prop. hath power to determinate it ſelfe as it is directed by the underſtanding, in civill and morall actions, and in indifferent things; but in actions ſpirituall it is onelyonly determinate by God.
The will hath power by the light of the underſtanding to determinate it ſelfe, in civill, and morall actions; Illuſt. and God in theſe likewiſe doth determinate the will, Prov. 21.1. The Kings heart is in the hands of the Lord, and hee turnes it as the rivers of water; when the King determinates his owne heart, the Lord alſo determinates it; for every particular agent, determinates his owne inſtrument to his worke; Sola increata voluntas eſt independens.but the will is the inſtrument of God, (for onelyonly the uncreated will hath an independant power) therefore the will being but a ſecond cauſe, is determinate by God. When God determinates the will in civill things, he doth it by changing, reſtraining, or over-ruling it, but when he determinates the will (which cannot determinate it ſelfe) in ſpirituall things, then he converts the will and inclines it, and here he is the ſole and onelyonly cauſe.
Object. That which is moved from a cauſe without it ſelfe, is ſaid to be compelled; but the will cannot be compelled, therefore it may ſeeme that it cannot be determinate by God.
Anſw. That which is moved by an externall cauſe, is ſaid to be compelled, if the externall cauſe take away the proper inclination of the ſecond cauſe; but if it leave the ſecond cauſe to the owne proper inclination, then it is not ſaid to be compelled, but to worke freely.
Object. But the motion is rather aſcribed to him who mooves, than to that which is mooved, as wee ſay not that the ſtone killed the man, but the man who threw the ſtone; if God then moove the will, it might ſeeme that the will were free and not to be blamed in the action.
Anſw. If the will were ſo mooved by God that it mooved not it ſelfe, then the will were neither to be praiſed nor to be blamed: but ſeeing it is both mooved and moves it ſelfe, and is not like a ſtone in a mans hand, which is moved and moves not it ſelfe; therefore it is to be blamed in the ſinfull action.
The Will, in morall and civill actions, is not determinate, in the meanes, which leade to the end: (for that the underſtanding doth onelyonly) but reſpecting the end, it, both determinates it ſelfe naturally, and is determinate by God; but in ſpirituall things, it is onelyonly determinate by God, both in the means and in the end, Philip. 2.13. It is God who worketh both the will and the deed in us.
The grace of God determinates the will onelyonly to good: Conſequence. therefore theſe extenuate mightily the grace of God, who grant, that God in the converſion of Man doth powre in a ſupernaturall grace in his heart; but yet this grace doth not determinate the heart of man, Corvinus c. 43. pag. 642. ſo Fonſeca.for that the will doth naturally and freely; and to draw out the act of Faith (ſay they) there needs no concurrance of the grace of God, but only moral perſwaſions. So Fonſeca, who holds that God onelyonly ſets the will on worke, but leaves the will to worke by it ſelfe, he determinates (ſaith he) onelyonly in ſpecificatione, but not in exercitio; in inclining the will to embrace ſuch an object, but the operation about that object is left free unto the will it ſelfe, this it may performe freely without Gods grace.
Object. But it may ſeeme that God determinates the ſinfull actions of men as well as their morall, both in the meanes and in the end, and is the cauſe of the one as well as of the other, as God knoweth certainely that the Antichriſt will ſinne, therefore the will of the Antichriſt is determinate to ſinne, by the decree of God.
Anſw. Eternum decretum… Dei ponit infallibilitatem conſequentis, ſed non conſequentiae.This followeth not, becauſe putting the decree of God, the Antichriſt will ſinne; theſe two go not together as the cauſe and the effect, for Gods decree is not the cauſe why the Antichriſt ſinnes; but it onelyonly followes Gods foreknowledge and is not an effect of it, for there is a twofold connexion of things; firſt, of the cauſe with the effect, and ſo the effect neceſſarily followeth the cauſe. Secondly, Duplex connexiorcrum, 1. cauſa cum effectu, 2. ante cedentis cum conſe quente.of the antecedent with the conſequent: the finne of the Antichriſt is the conſequent of Gods decree infallibly, but not productively, becauſe the decree is not the cauſe of it.
Object. But it may ſeeme that Gods decree is the cauſe of ſinne, Ioh. 12.39. They could not beleeve, for Eſay ſaid, he blinded their eyes, and hardened their hearts. Here it night ſeeme that the Prophets prediction was the cauſe of the hardning of their hearts, and not the antecedent of it onelyonly.
Anſw. Theſe evill things God foreſeeth to fall out, becauſe they are to fall out; and they fall not out becauſe hee foreſeeth them to fall out: when I ſee a man writing, he writes not becauſe I ſee him writing, but becauſe he is writing therfore I ſee him write; ſo, the Antichriſt ſinneth not becauſe God foreſaw him to ſinne, but becauſe the Antichriſt was to ſinne therefore God foreſaw him to ſinne. God foreſeeth other waies good actions, for he decreeth them, and they fall out as effects of his decree: but it is farre otherwaies in mans ſinfull actions, for they are not the effects of Gods decree, but a neceſſary conſequent of it.
The eſſentiall property of the Will (which is libertie) cannot be changed, but the equalitie of the Will (which is good or evill) may be changed.
There are two things to be conſidered in the will. Firſt, foreign or the eſſence of it. Secondly, foreign or the operation of the Will: the eſſence of the Will cannot be changed but the operation may bee changed: it may loſe holineſſe and ſanctification in the choyce, but not the eſſence of it: a clocke when it is out of frame ſheweth the time but not the true time of the day, and as the ſaylers compaſſe ſtriken with thunder, the point of the needle ſtands alwayes at ſome ayrth, but not at the right ayrth; and ſo when Wine is turned into Vinegar it keepeth ſtill the colour and quantitie, but it hath loſt the right reliſh: ſo the Will of man after the fall, freely chuſeth that which it chuſeth, Non corrumpitur quoad agendi radicem ſed terminum.A collation betwixt the innocent and old Adam.
Man in his firſt eſtatē, willed onelyonly good, both in the end, and in the meanes: but man in his corrupt eſtate wils the end, either as good or apparant good; but he maketh choyſe of the meanes often as evill: the will reſpects the end, and election the meanes; no man wils the end as it is evill; but the meanes leading to this end are oftentimes choſen as evill. The adulterer and the theefe, foreign; ſed media eleguntur plerunque ut mala, ut finem aſſequamur.they will the proper ends of their adultery and theft (which are pleaſure and gaine) as good or at the leaſt good in ſhow; but the meanes they know are oftentimes evill, and chuſe them as evill that they may attaine to their ends. Againe, the unregenerate man ſometimes wils the end but not the meanes, Prov. 13.4. The ſluggard wils, and he wils not; he wils the end becauſe it is good; but he wils not the meanes becauſe they are painfull and laborious; ſo Hoſ. 10.11. Ephraim as an oxe delighted in threſhing but not in plowing; hee delighted in threſhing, becauſe the oxe might not bee muzled when hee did threſh; Deut. 25.4. but hee delighted not in plowing; that is, to take the paines to plow up his heart, and mortifie his ſinnes; Balaam wiſhed, that he might die the death of the righteous, Numb. 23.14. but hee endeavoured not to live the life of the righteous.
Man after his fall had liberty in civill and morall actions. Prop.
This libertie which man hath now in his corrupt eſtate, Illuſt. unto any good hath ſundry impediments both outward and inward; Impedimenta libertatis humana ſunt, vel extra ſe, vel in…ſe.and although our election be free yet the execution thereof is not in our hands. There be three externall impediments in our libertie; firſt, Gods overuling of the will of Man, who although hee take not away the libertie of the will from us, Impedimenta externa ſunt deus, diabolus, & externa obiecta.yet he oftentimes furthers us in good, and hinders us in evill; and bridles ſo the fury of the wicked that they cannot come to the ends which they ayme at; as wee ſee in Ieroboam, 1 King. 13.5. and Sennacherib, Eſa. 37.29. For the wayes of man are not in his owne power, Pro. 16.9. The ſecond inpediment of our libertie is Sathans ſeducing, who oftentimes ſeduceth the will when it is inclyned to good and perſwades it to evill, Ephe. 2.2. which perſwaſion is effectuall in the ſonnes of infidelitie: ſometimes Sathan hindreth the children of God, as hee hindered the Apoſtle that hee ſhould not come to the Theſſalonians, 1 Theſſ. 4.17.18. The third outward impē diment is, the multitude of objects laid before us, which partly allure the minde if they be pleaſant, and terrifie the minde in they be fearefull.Impedimenta interna ſunt, deſtitutio imaginis Dei, caecitas intellectus, infirmitas, violuntatis, naturalis violentia, pronitas ad malū & vehementia affectionum.
The inward impediments which hinder the wills libertie, are. Firſt, the want of Gods image. Secondly, the blindneſſe of the underſtanding. Thirdly, the infirmitie of the will. Fourthly, a naturall violence; Fifthly, a proneneſſe to evill. Sixtly, the vehemencie of the affections, which draw the will after them, and trouble the Iudgement.