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Second Vindication of the Protestant Grounds of Faith · Edward Stillingfleet

Second Vindication of the Protestant Grounds of Faith, Chapter 2

CHAP. II. The Principles of E. W. about the certainty of Divine Faith laid down and considered.

§. 1. HAving met with so little satisfaction from the Guide The Principles of E. W. laid down.in Controversies, I now betake my self to the Rule; no Fancies, Toys, Trifles, or Fallible Glosses, I assure you, for those E. W. cries out upon almost in every page of his worthy work; but Reason and Religion, or The Certain Rule of Faith. What can any man desire more? unless it be to see Mr. Stillingfleet joyned in the Title-page with Atheists, Heathens, Jews, Turks and all Sectaries. And that he might own a greater obligation to him, than all that Rabble; he dispatches them all, after a fashion, in 30. pages, and spends above 600, upon him. O what a pestilent Heretick is this Stillingfleet! that deserves so many lashes beyond Atheists, Heathens; Jews or Turks! If he had been any one of those, he might have been gently used, for never were they fairlier dealt with by any man that undertook them. But he is not so much their Friend to thank him for this kind usage: and E. W. thinks he will have enough to do to defend himself. I confess I think so too, if either of his Books against me, were to be thrown at my head; for they are very thick and as heavy as is possible. And to my great comfort, I never yet saw two such bulky books, whose substance might be brought into a less compass; for setting aside Tautologies and tedious repetitions, frequent excursions and impertinent digressions the pith and marrow of both his Books lies in this one word Infallibility. But it is time to fall to my business, for fear of more Advertisements; and Infallibility being the main design of his Books, that shall be the subject of my present debate with him. And because this E. W. is a great pretender to Principles; the method I shall proceed in shall be first to consider his Principles, and then to defend my own. For which I shall chiefly make use of his last Book, it being in effect but another edition of his former, the other as I suppose being disposed of to better purposes than to be read; for I never heard of one person in England that read it over. However, what there is material in it, different from the last, as to the present controversie, I shall upon occasion take notice of.

The two main Principles he builds upon are these.

1. That without an Infallible Church, there can be no certainty of Faith.

2. That the Roman-Catholick Church is this Infallible Church.

If he can prove these two, he shall not need any more to establish their Religion, or to overthrow ours. And I will say that for his praise that he hath brought the controversie into a narrow compass; for he confesses it is endless to dispute out of Scripture and Fathers, since witty men by their fall…ble, Glosses can turn and winde them which way they please, but there is nothing so stiff and inflexible as a standing infallible Oracle in the Church, which being once believed all Controversie is at an end. But we may as soon hope to see all other controversies ended by dry blows, as this Principle proved to the satisfaction of any reasonable man.

The main proofs for the necessity of the Churches Infallibility, which he insists upon are these. 1. That there can be no Divine Faith without it. 2. There can be no certainty as to the Canon, or edition, or sense of Scripture. 3. There can be as little certainty as to the sense of the Fathers or the Primitive Church.

1. That there can be no divine Faith without it. This he frequently insists upon in both his Books; and with so much vehemency, as to make the deniers of Infallibility to overthrow all Faith and Religion. Which being a charge of the highest nature, ought to be made good by the clearest evidence. Whether that which E. W. produces, be so I shall leave any one to judge, when I have given an Account of his Principles as to this matter. In his first Book called Protestancy without Principles, he begins with this subject; and lays down these assertions, upon which all his Discourse is built.

1. That Gods infallible Revelation requires an infallible Assent of Faith; or an infallible verity revealed to us forcibly requires an answerable and correspondent infallible assent of Faith in us: the contrary he calls wild Doctrine; this subjective infallibility, as he calls it, he offers very wisely to prove from those places of Scripture, which speak of the assurance which Christians had of the truth of their Religion.

2. This infallible assent of Faith doth require infallible Teachers; for infallible believers and infallible Teachers are correlatives. And in the second Chapter, he goes about to prove it, because, if Christs infallible Doctrine be only fallibly taught, no man hath certainty what it is; and seeing what is fallible may be false, Christs Doctrine may not be taught at all; which is infallible and cannot be false; and he that should abjure this fallible Doctrine, doth not deny therein Christs Doctrine, and cannot be upon that account an Heretick. But to Disc. 1. c. 2. p. 24, 27.make Faith Infallible, he asserts, That every Preacher sent by the infallible Church, as a member conjoyned with it, is infallible in his Teaching: and on the contrary, whosoever renounces an Infallible society cannot teach with certainty Christs infallible Doctrine. From whence he saith, follows an utter ruine of Christian Religion. In his third Chapter he further proves, That if the Church were fallible in her Teaching, God would oblige us to believe a falsity; because God commands men to hear the Church, and if the Church may erre, then men are obliged to believe a false Doctrine taught by her. And all other means short of this Infallibility would be insufficient for preserving Christian Religion in the world. In the fourth Chapter he comes to a particular consideration of divine Faith, and from thence proves the necessity of infallibility. Faith, saith he, requires two things essentially, an object which is Gods Revelation, and a Proposition of this object; by Vertue of which the elicit act of Faith follows in a believer, and intellectually lays as it were hold, both o… Gods Revelation and the thing revealed. Now to prove the necessity of such an infallible Proposition in order to divine Faith, ho… lays down some abstruse Propositions.

1. That Gods infallible Revelation avail… nothing in order to Faith, unless Christian… by their Faith lay hold on the certainly thereof, or owne it as infallible and the assured ground of their Assent.

2. That the measure and degrees of certitude in the assent are according to those which the Proponent gives to the Revelation. If he teaches doubtfully, the assent is doubtful, if probably, the assent is probable, is infallibly, the assent is infallible: the reason which he gives of this, is, because an object revealed receives its light from the proposal, as an object of sight doth from the light of the air. As long therefore, saith he, as the infallibility of a Revelation stands remote from me, for want of an undoubted application made by an infallible proponent, it can no more transfuse certainty into Faith, than Fire at a great distance warm; that is, no more than if it were not certain in it self, or not at all in Being.

3. From hence he saith, it follows that Protestants can only doubtfully guess at what they are to believe, and consequently never yet had nor can have Divine, certain and infallible Faith. Because they cannot …ropose Faith infallibly. Hence he proceeds Chapter fifth and sixth, to disprove Moral Cer…ainty, as insufficient in order to Faith; and destroying, as he saith, The very being and …ssence of Divine and supernatural Faith; because the sole and adequate object of divine and supernatural Faith is Gods infinite veracity actually speaking to us; but this infinite veracity, (when it is duly proposed), transsuseth more certainty into the elicit act of Faith, than any Moral Certainty derived …rom inferiour motives can have. For all Moral Certainty is at least capable of falsity and may deceive us: Gods infallible veracity cannot be false nor deceive if Faith rest upon that Motive, and if it rest not there, it is no Faith at all. Nay he asserts, that supernatural Faith is more certain and infallible, than all the Metaphysical Sciences which nature can give us; For which he gives this plain reason, Because the infinite veracity of God which only supporteth Faith with greater force, energy, and necessity transfuseth into it, a supereminent insallibility, supereminent, he saith, and above all the Certainty, which the principles of natur… can afford. This is the substance of E. W… principles of Faith in his first Book: which is somewhat more enlarged in the second In one Chapter he designs to prove if the Roman Church be not infallible, there is no tru… Disc. 2. c. 5.Faith in the world, the reason of which in his own easie terms is this, For the meer possibility of deceiving Christians in one Article Disc 2. c. 14.impossibilitates the Belief of all she proposeth. In another Chapter, That she is not only infallible, c. 15.but that the Adversaries of her infallibility destroy the very essence of Christian Religion. And in the next, That divine Faith in this present state of things necessarily requires a Church infallible, because the infallibility of faith necessarily requires not only an Infallible Revelation, but a… infallible Proponent. Ruine one or the other Infallibility, faith can be no more but an uncertain Assent and consequently can be no faith at all; This reason he diversifies into many shapes, and represents it in different words, but it comes in at every turn. So in the next Chapter he proves the Catholick c. 16.Church Gods infallible Oracle, because infallibility once taken away, no man can have assurance so much as of one Christian verity; the reason is, no man can be assured of what is fallibly taught: because what is so taught, may by vertue of the Proposition be …alse, but a doctrine so far removed from in…allible certainly, for want of a due application of its infallibility, comes not near to the doctrine of Christ and his Apostles, which was applied, taught and proposed infallibly: And in the same Chapter he saith, It is utterly impossible, that an infallible verity C. 16 n. 14.as revealed, though fallibly proposed should have influence upon faith, or work in believers a most firm assent. Not long after, he asserts, That infallibility being taken C. 18 n. 4.away, no man can tell, but that Christian Religion is a fiction; for these are his words. A feigned and fallible Religion are near Co…sin Germans. The one is a Fiction, the other at least may be so, and for ought any man can know is no better: And in the same Chapter he saith, That without infallibility Religion N. 12.is meer Scepticism: because all other means, infallibility being set aside, may be equally pleaded by Hereticks, (as Arians and such like,) as by any other. To the same purpose in the following Chapter, where he proposes that which he calls the last proof of the Churches Infallibility, which is still the C. 19. n. 3.very same over and over; (for he out-does the Cook of Brundusium in serving up the the same meat in several dresses) viz. That the denyal of it overthrows Christian Religion; be pleased to observe his concise way o… reasoning. If the infallibility of reveale… doctrine be lost as it were in the way between God and us, If the Revelation appear not as it is in it self infallible, whe… we assent to it by faith, that is, if it be no… infallibly conveyed and applied to all by a… …nerring proponent, as it subsists in its first cause, infinitely infallible, faith perishes, w… are cast upon pure uncertainties, and ma… justly doubt whether such a doctrine, separated from that other Perfection of Infallibility be really true or no? In his third Di… course we meet with a convincing Argumen…, as he calls it, for Infallibility. If all Authority imaginable, whereupon faith can depend, Dis. 3 c. 4. N. 2.conveyed or delivered these verities both as infallible Truths and infallibly, and I assent to the doctrine with a belief not infallible, but only morally certain, I leave by my fallible moral assent the true infallible teaching and conveying Oracles of Christian doctrine, and believe upon a meer phansied Authority, which was never impowered to convey Gods verities to any. Before I come to examine these things it will be necessary to lay down his notion of faith in his own terms, viz. That it essentially trends obsecurely to its own object; (no matter for understanding it, but the words found c. 8. …. 1c.well together) and by this saith we l…y hold upon the most supream and all comprehending infallibility proper to God alone. But withal we are to take notice of a twofold certitude N. 14.in faith; the one a certitude of Infallibility arising from the supernatural principles which concur to the very act of belief, and these being not liable to error can never operate, but when the divine Revelation really is, and implies not only the meer truth of the act, but moreover an infallible determination to Truth: the other a certitude of adhesion not grounded on evidence, but upon most prudent motives proposed to Reason, (which clearly discover'd) the Will by her …pious affection commands and determines the intellectual faculties to assent indubitably. After all which he concludes, that the plain c. 10, 11.and easie Resolution of Faith, is into Gods veracity as speaking to men by an infallible Church. Thus I have laid together so many parcels of E. W's. rambling discourse, as were necessary in order to the examination of it. And indeed I cannot compare his reasoning to any thing better than his own pretty notion of faith, for just as he saith, Faith essentially tends obscurely to its object, so his principles do to his conclusion.

But that I may proceed with the greater clearness, I must premise these two things;

1. §. 2. That the Question is not concerning Some things premised to the S…a…e of the Question.the necessity of any internal Assistance o… divine Grace, but of an external insallibl… Proponent in order to divine Faith. So tha… whatever certainty of saith is derived from the Spirit of God, is no ways pertinent to ou… present debate. I do not deny that a trul… divine faith, doth suppose a divine and super natural assistance; I do not deny, that th… Holy Ghost may confirm mens minds to suc… a degree of certainty, which may exceed th… rational grounds they are able to give t… others of their faith. But I say all this i… very far from the purpose. For I had expresly laid down this caution before, that o… Question in the Resolution of Faith, did no… relate to the workings of the divine Spirit o… our minds of which no satisfactory accoun… can be given to others; but to the externa… Rational Account, part 1. c. 7. Sect. 1.motives and grounds of faith, whether the… must be infallible or not? To what purpos… is it then, for E. W. to talk of a certitud… of Infallibility, as he calls it, arising from the supernatural principles which concur t… the very act of belief, and these not liable t… error, can never operate, but when the divine Revelation really is? Granting all thi… to be true; yet what doth this prove, concerning the necessity of an external infallible Proponent such as the Church is? All that ca… hence follow is that those whom the Spirit of God enables to believe, cannot believe a falshood; but what then? Hath he proved that the supernatural principles of faith do never operate, but where the Church first infal…ibly proposes? No, this he never attempts, either not understanding what was fit to be proved, or knowing it impossible to be done. But if the infallible certainty of Faith doth depend upon inward illumination and divine concurrence; the Infallibility of Faith may be had without an external Infallible Proponent. And so all his first principles signify nothing to his purpose, for supposing an Infallible assent of Faith necessary to an Infallible Revelation; yet that doth not prove the necessity of Infallible teachers, unless it can be had no other way. But here he tells us, That Infallible certainty is derived from supernatural principles concurring to the act of Faith; which he elsewhere calls, The interior illustration of Grace imparted to a Reason and Religion, Disc. 3 c 9. N. 4. p. 562.Soul, which he saith, is wholly necessary to make faith certain; and after saith, we come to an absolute certainty of Faith, upon tbis interiour sacred Language of God, N. 6, 7.or his internal illumination; the necessity of which he proves from Scripture and Fathers. But when he hath done all, he hath most effectually confuted himself; For if this inward illumination, can, as he saith, supply N. 9.the inefficacy of external motives; How comes the Infallibility of an external proponent to be necessary in order to that certainty of Faith which may be obtained, by divin… Grace making up what is wanting in the outward motives? Did ever any man shew more kindness to his Adversary in helping him with weapons to destroy himself than this E. W. doth? When after a most tedious endeavour to prove the necessity of an externa… Infallible Proponent in order to the certainty of Faith; he sets down these words, Now what we assert in this particular, is, that the N. 11.Infallible certainty of faith comes from th… interior illumination, as it more lively set… forth the formal object assented to, or help… to a clearer proposal of the divine mysteries. Doth the Infallible certainty of Faith indeed come from this interior illumination? What then becomes of the necessity of an Infallible Church? We often hear of the great Assistance the Jesuits have in writing their Books; I should rather have thought some enemy of E. W's. had put in these things to overthrow all he had spent so many impertinent words about before. But lest such expressions should be thought to have dropt from him unawares, observe with what care he sums up the whole progress of Faith in this State.

First, A natural Proposition of the mysteries N. 12.precedes; this begets a natural apprehension of their credibility; after some consideration there may arise an imperfect judgement of credibility: but should the will offer as yet to incline the mind to assent only upon what appears hitherto, it could not move to a Faith which is an assent super omnia or most certain. Therefore the illustration, or powerful invitation of Grace (by which as I said the object appears another way and more clearly) is infused, whereof the soul is recipient. The Will now after other Preparatives thus strengthned a new commands boldly the understanding to Assert upon the safest Principles imaginable, viz. upon Gods infallible Revelation accompanied with his own Divine Light, which makes faith to grow higher in certainty, than all the reason or knowledge in this life can arise to. For as S. Thomas observes, humane knowledge derives its certitude from mans natural Reason which may err, but faith hath its infallibility, ex lumine divinae scientiae, from the light of divine wisdom which cannot deceive, and therefore is most certain.

Who, upon reading these words, would not have thought this E. W. more conversant in Calvins Institutions, than Aquinas his Sums? For in all this Resolution of Faith, how can a man edge in the necessity of an infallible Church in order to the certainty of Faith? I will not say E. W. was wholly inapprehensive of this snare he had brought himself into, but he takes the worst way imaginable to get out of it. For to shew the difference between this way and that of Hereticks, he makes the exterior humane proposition N. 13, 14, 15.of Divine Revelation necessarily preceding the true light of Faith; which canno… be made but by one that makes the Proposition good by a Miracle, or some supernatural wonder; but no Protestant is able to do thus much. And is any Papist think we? I would withal my heart see some of the miracles wrought by their Preachers to convince me; I profess the greatest readiness of mind to be perswaded by them, in case they do but work such miracles as Christ and his Apostles did. But of this subject at large afterwards. At present it may suffice to take notice. 1. That no proposition of Faith is supposed sufficient by E. W. but where the Proponent doth work Miracles: and therefore we may safely question the Churches Proposition till we see such Miracles wrought by her, as were by Christ and his Apostles. For thus, saith he, Christ our Lord Sent by N. 15.his Eternal Father, thus the Apostles sent by Christ and the Church ever since (all shewing wonders above the force of Nature) proved their mission; and withal evinced that God only impowred them to teach as they did. And because the poor Protestant doth not pretend to miracles, therefore the light he pretends to is a meer ignis fatuus vain and void of all reality. I must say that of my Adversary, that he puts the controversie upon the fairest issue that can be desired. For if their Church work such miracles as Christ and his Apostles did to attest their divine commission, the evidence from thence to believe her infallibility ought to over rule the opinions of such who say she hath erred; in case the doctrine attested by Christ and his Apostles and that of the Roman Church do not directly contradict each other. 2. Although this exterior Proponent prove himself so commissioned yet by the Progress of Faith laid down by E. W. this is not enough to beget an infallible certainty of Faith. For, he saith, after the exteriour proposition only a natural apprehension of their credibility succeeds; then a judgement of credibility, then the inclination of the Will; but yet no infallible certainty till the illustration of Divine Grace comes. So that it evidently follows according to E. W. that an infallible Proponent cannot beget an infallible Assent of Faith; but that doth arise from the inward illumination of the mind by the Holy Ghost. Which I have already shewed doth lay men open to all the absurditie… the highest Calvinists were charged with in resolving Faith; and is withal impertinent to our dispute; which relates to the necessity of an external infallible Proponent in order to the Certainty of Faith. But surely the Jesui… are not so berest of all their subtilty to comply with their greatest Adversaries without some advantage to be gained by it. Yes, E. W. will shake hands with some old enemies, the better to assault some later Protestants, who seem to attribute, he saith, no other certainty to the very act of Faith, than what is Moral; which doctrine, he saith, N. 16.if it be defensible it's impossible to declare, how Faith it self or the illustration previous, can proceed from the Holy Ghost. For did the Spirit of God work with a soul, when it believes, the certainty of Faith, would without all doubt, go beyond that assurance, which is only humane, moral and fallible. I think that I escape well, that E. W. hath not transcribed a great part of Bradwardin de Causâ Dei against me; for I plainly see, he takes me for an Absolute Free Willer, and a denier of the Grace of God. It is true indeed, I set aside the consideration of Divine Grace in this matter, but I assure him, not that I questioned the Truth or necessity of it; but because it was not pertinent to …his business. For to what purpose should we argue about that which can only serve for …he satisfaction of those which have it? and …eaves men entangled in the same difficulties they object to others? But the Question was plainly put by me concerning the outward inducements to faith; viz. whether an infallible Testimony of the Church were necessary in order to it? or whether a certainty short of that, which I called Moral, were sufficient for Divine Faith? Not opposing this Moral Certainty to the concurrence of Divine Grace, but to an external infallible Proponent. I took it then for granted on both sides, that the Grace of Faith doth not come meerly from our selves, but that it is the Gift of God, that whereever God doth immediately concur he doth direct the mind to the belief of what is certainly True, that there might be unaccountable ways, whereby an inward certainty might be produced, and so firm an adherence to the Truth believed, which all the arguments and torments in the world could never shake, of which the Primitive Martyrs were undeniable Instances; But this internal perswasion could be made no matter of debate, nor any argument to convince another, any further than the effects of it did manifest that it came from God: yet withal I did not Question, but faith being an act of the mind of man which is rational and discursive, had sufficient grounds to proceed upon, and such which without any absurdity might justifie mens belief to any prudent or considerative men, and to the severest enquiries of a mans own mind. Now concerning these Grounds the Question was put by me; taking in then the efficiency o… Divine Grace, this is the true state of the Controversie, whether the spirit of God may not by moral arguments work in mens minds such a certain assent of Faith, as the Scripture requires for Salvation? or whether in order thereto, an Infallible Testimony of the Church be necessary? But because the inserting the operation of the Holy Ghost doth rather perplex the controversie, than explain it; since this was granted on both sides, I thought it better to leave it out and to manage the dispute as it ought to be only concerning the necessity of an infallible Testimony of the Church, which is asserted by my Adversaries, and denied by me.

2. The Question is not, concerning that Foundation of Faith whereby we believe what God saith to be true; but that, whereby we believe this to be revealed by God. For those two Propositions must be supposed to any particular act of Faith, viz. that whatever God saith is true: and that God hath said this …articular thing which I am bound to believe. Concerning the first of these there is no dispute between us, for Gods veracity founded …pon …his Infinite Wisdom and Goodness is agreed to be the ultimate reason of our assent …o whatsoever God reveals. Only E. W. to Protest. without Principles, Disc. 1. C. 5. n. 10.…phold the supernatural certainty of Faith will not have the veracity of God to be the Foundation of Faith, as it is known by natural Reason; for if it were, saith he, Faith would at last be resolved into one natural …rinciple, thus, I believe God to be the high…st verity imaginable, not because he saith so, …ut because I know this great Truth scienti…ically. Now, saith he, no science gives the …ast or least degree of intrinsick certitude to …aith. This is profound reasoning: but which … dare say, no faith can be built upon. For …ither I must be convinced of Gods veracity …y natural reason, from the consideration of …he divine nature and attributes, or by Re…elation from God; but if by Gods revela…ion, then see what an excellent way this Scholastick Divine hath found for resolving Faith as to this Principle (for as it is a mat…er revealed it is an immediate object of …aith) If you then ask him why he believes any thing to be true which is revealed by God, his answer is, because he believes Gods supream verity, or that he neither can nor wi… deceive: but if you ask him again why h… believes this veracity of God, he answers because God hath revealed it. And is n… this a likely man to escape circles, th… makes them where any common understanding would avoid them? But besides, supposing God had never discovered his own veracity in Scripture, I would fain know of E. …. whether there could have been any suc… thing as Divine Faith or no? if there coul… then this principle of Gods veracity mu… have been the Foundation of divine faith … known by natural Reason. And supposin… Gods veracity not to be embraced antecedently to a divine Revelation, it is impossible to suppose there should be any argumen… sufficient to perswade me to believe any Divine Revelation. For the greatest Miracle cannot convince me of Gods Truth though they may of his Power; and the… may perswade me to believe that God se… such men who work Miracles, but they canno… perswade me to believe that all they say is true. For if God can deceive men, he may imploy men as his messengers and deceive the world by them: and if this opinion be rooted in a mans mind it is impossible he should yield a firm assent to any thing because it is revealed by God. But E. W. saith Divines say so as he doth. I suppose he means School Divines and then I grant they do and a great …any silly things besides, wrapt up under the …ame of subtilties. If any one hath a mind …o try the truth of what I say, he need do no more than read their unintelligible subtilties …bout the nature and resolution of Faith: Which Cardinal Lugo himself complains of; and saith they make the doctrine of the Schools Lugo de virtute Fidei Divinae Disp. 1. Sect. 7. n. 114. Sect. 6. n. 82. Suarez de Fide Disp. 3. Sect. 6. n. 8.…ard and unintelligible; and in this particu…ar of believing Gods veracity on the account of Divine Revelation, he saith, it carries men into an inexplicable circle. Suarez finding no better way to clear this difficulty …uns to a mystery in it; and makes it a great part of the mysteriousness of faith, that although it doth not clearly see its object nor the things revealed, yet it receives it by its own light; and this act of faith, he saith is wholy supernatural, he might have said, unintelligible. But he gives an admirable reason for it, which is; that this intrinsecally follows from the nature of a divine testimony, as it is altogether infallible, and can oblige to believe those things which God speaks, as infallible, for in speaking any thing he thereby declares his own veracity in what he affirms; for by this means h… induces men to believe the truth of what he saith and consequently his own veracity; a man being obliged to believe the testimony infallible, and therefor… from the intrinsecal nature of such an act o… faith and such an object, it follows that th… same testimony which suffices for the beli… of the thing revealed, will likewise suffice t… believe Gods infallible veracity in revealing. This reason I grant is very well accommodated to the mysteriousness of Faith; but I do not know how it would satisfie any man that should doubt of Gods veracity in all his Revelations: which ought to be the more considered since in the foregoing section, he names some of their own Writers, who assert that there is no intrinsecal evil in a falsity, and therefore God may is he pleases, reveal one so as to oblige manking to believe it. I would willingly know then how the obligation on our parts to believe what God saith, can satisfie any man of the infallible veracity of the revealer? For all that there is in this reason, is, that God cannot oblige men to believe a falsity, which it seems, some of their own Schoolmen would not yield to. But it is not enough, that God hath declared he never will do it? no: Suarez himself Sect. 5 n 9.plainly refutes that by saying, that no man can be certain that God doth not make use of his absolute power in those declarations: and if he can tell a lie, he may not perform his own promise, and therefore Gods ordinary power cannot serve the turn, since by his absolute power he can act against it. Cardinal Lugo, although he saw all the reason in the world to reject the former opinion of Suarez, yet he asserts, That the assent to Gods veracity must be supernatural and elicited Lugo, ib.from the habit of infused faith: which is not easie to understand, since they all make this supernatural infused Faith, to be an obscure inevident assent, and himself grants this to be an evident assent from natural reason: but how the same assent should be evident and inevident, is a Question fit to be debated among the Schoolmen.

§. 3. But all this perplexity and confusion among men of wit and subtilty arises from Of the notion of Divine Faith.their false notion of divine and supernatural faith, which as E. W. most Scholastically speaks, essentially tending obscurely to its object, (like a blind man running at Tilt) it makes them so much afraid of the least crevise of light or evidence, lest the meritoriousness of it be utterly destroyed. For it infinitely obliges God in their opinion to believe without evidence. Therefore though a humane and acquisite faith, such as Hereticks may have, may be grounded on substantial reason; yet this supernatural and meritorious faith, much like a Mole, works without light, and expects the more wages for working in the dark. I confess this essentia… obscurity of faith suits very well with thei… Discourses about it; which as E. W. speaks seems to have transfused its obscurity int… their writings concerning it. But for us, t… whom they will only allow a humane faith I wish they would afford a little more evidence for what they say; and not overthrow the fundamental ground of all certainty o… Faith, by deriving the perswasion of it from divine Revelation, and not from the natura… conceptions we have of God. But I canno… but commend the Ingenuity of one of thei… late School-men, who yields That the ver… city of God as it is the foundation of fait… Francise. bo…ae Spei To. 3 Tr. 1. de side. disp. 1. dub. 2.must be known by natural light; and to the objection, that divine Faith must then be resolved into a natural assent; he answers 1. That natural notices may be an inadaequate formal object of faith. 2. That fait… properly goes not beyond a Testimony; th… other being rather an act of knowledge tha… faith. It is all one to me, so the thing be granted, by what name men call it; That which I aim at is, that the veracity of God which is the foundation of our assent to what God reveals, must be received antecedently to divine Revelation. And so the principles of natural Religion must be supposed true, before it is possible for us to judge of revealed Religion; and among those principles we …ust allow of the veracity of God, without which we cannot imagine any firm assent to …e given to divine Revelation: which is …hat I understand by the name of Faith. Wherein a divine Testimony being implyed, …hat assent which I give to any thing as true …pon the account thereof may be called Di…ine Faith; as that which I give to the Truth of a thing not upon knowledge, or experience, but the credit of another Person, is …ustly called humane faith, i. e. when it goes …o farther than meer humane Testimony, but …f that humane Testimony at last leads me to …hat which is divine, then the Faith must receive its denomination from that which it …ests upon. As suppose some persons in Persia at the time of our Saviours being in Judaea, had been made acquainted with the Doctrine which he Preached and the holiness of his Life, while these persons received all only upon the credit of their Friends, we may call this a humane faith; but if they were fully satisfied afterwards of the mighty works which were done by him to attest his divine Commission on which account they believe him to be the true Messias, their faith might now more properly be called a divine faith, because it fixeth it self upon an immediate Testimony of God. But then we are to consider,

1. That there is no sixed and determinat… sense of a divine faith; it being no term… used in Scripture, but taken up by men to express thereby the difference between the assent we give to the Word of God, and to the Testimony of men. But then this Faith may be called divine either as it relates to the material object, or the formal object, or the divine effects of Faith; that Faith may be said to be divine in one sense, which may not b… in another. For a man may believe tha… which God reveals and upon the account u… his Testimony, and yet that Faith may neve… operate effectually; and so be no effect o… divine Grace upon the mind of man. Therefore one of the great mistakes of the Schoolmen in this matter, hath been the making the belief upon a divine Testimony, to be th… act of divine and supernatural Faith, which the Devils and Judas might have; and ex…luding Faith built upon fallible grounds from being divine, which yet might effectually lead men to the obedience of Faith, and consequently was truly more divine than the other.

2. The same Faith in several respects may be called both humane and divine. Human… as it is first grounded upon the Testimony of men, and Divine, as it finally rests upon the Testimony of God. And in the present condition of mankind, it is not reasonable to suppose, that any Faith should now immediately rest upon the Divine Revelation, without some rational evidence antecedent to it. For the thing to be believed being the Testimony which God gave at the distance of above one thousand six hundred years, we must either suppose an immediate Revelation of it, or it must be conveyed to them by the credit of others. Which according to this notion can beget only a humane faith, for to resolve the belief of one Divine Testimony into another is to proceed without end; but this humane faith, if it be so called, satisfying a mans mind, concerning the Testimony which God gave, and thereupon assenting to what was delivered upon that Testimony, this Faith proceeding in the same way of rational evidence, becomes a divine Faith by resting upon the Testimony which God gave to those who declared his Will.

3. The Faith whereby we must first embrace a Divine Revelation cannot in this sense be called a Divine Faith, i. e. as divine Faith doth rely upon a divine Testimony. For that Faith is built upon those two Foundations, viz. That whatever God saith is true, and that this is his Revelation: Now neither of these two can be entertained at first o… the account of a Divine Testimony, th… first I have shewed already cannot be withou… a circle, neithe… can the second, for still th… Question will return on what account you believe that Testimony. So that although thi… be commonly cal…ed an act of divine Faith yet if Faith be taken in this strict sense fo… believing upon a divine Testimony, we must find out some other name for this Assent; no… thereby to take off from the certainty or excellency of it; but to prevent that confusion which the not observing these things hat… caused in these Controversies. And if th… Terms of Divine, Supernatural, Infallible▪ Obscure, and Inevident were banished th… Schools, the School-men themselves would be forced to speak sense in these matters. And it would be a pleasant sight to see how pitifully E. W's. Discourses would look without them. For the main force of all he saith, lies in the misapplying those terms, and th… rattling noise they make, is apt to keep in awe a vulgar understanding, especially that hath been bred up with some more than ordinary Reverence to these astonishing terms.

§. 4. These things were necessary to be The true State of the Question.premised before we could come to the true State of the Question; which we now plainly see doth not relate to that Assent whereby we believe whatever God saith to be true; but to that, whereby we believe this particular Revelation contained in the Scriptures to be from God? And so the Controversie is brought to this issue, Whether in order to the certainty of our faith concerning Gods Revelation an Infallible Testimony of the Church be necessary? which he affirms, and I deny. For in order to the certainty of Faith, we have already seen, he frequently asserts the necessity of an Infallible Oracle; and makes all degrees of certainty short of Infallibility insufficient for Divine Faith.

But that we may the better understand his opinion, we must take notice of his own explications of it, and the distinctions he thinks necessary for that end.

1. He distinguisheth between the judgement Reason and Religion. Discours. 3. c. 1. n. 8.of credibility necessary to faith, and the act of faith it self; and the Resolution of these two though they have a due subordination to each other, yet depend upon quite different principles: the judgement of credibility, whereby the Will moves and commands the intellectual faculty to elicit faith, relies not upon that object which finally terminates faith it self, but upon extrinsecal motives which perswade and powerfully induce to believe super omnia.

2. He distinguisheth between the nature o… Science and faith; Science is worth nothing unless it prove, and faith purely considered as faith, (these words he desires may be well marked) is worthless if it prove. For faith reasons not, nor asks how these mysteries can be, but simply believes: O… as he expresseth it in his former Book; Fait… solely relies on Gods revealed Testimony, Protest. without Principles Disc. 1. c. 11. n. 2.without the mixture of reason for its motive. And here he asserts, That there is a more firm adhesion to the infallibility of that Divine Testimony for which we believe, than the extrinsecal motives inducing to believ… either do or can draw from us.

3. He distinguisheth between the Humane and Divine Authority of the Church; the Humane Authority, being as such fallible is not sufficient to ground divine faith. But the first act of faith whereby every one believes the Church to be Gods Oracle, is built upon her infallible divine Authority manifested by miracles and other signal marks of Truth. By the help of these distinctions we may better understand his Resolution of Faith, which he delivers in this manner. Demanded why we believe the mystery of the …. ….Incarnation, it is answered, Scripture asserts it. Ask again why we believe the Divinity of that Book called Scripture? It is answered, the Church ascertains us of that. But how do we know that the Church herein delivers truth? It is answered if we speak of knowledge previous to faith: then he brings the motives of credibility, which make the Churches Infallibility so evidently credible, that we cannot if prudent and manifest reason guide us, but as firmly believe whatever this Oracle teaches, as the Israelites believed Moses and the Prophets. This one would think were enough of all conscience; but he thinks otherwise, for there is saith he, but one only difference and that advantageous to them, that in lieu of Moses they have an ample Church; innumerable multitudes in place of one servant of God, the incomparable greater Light, the pillar and Ground of Truth, the Catholick Church diffused the whole world over: and a little after asserts, That they have the very same way of Resolving faith which the Primitive N. 6, 7.Christians had in the time of Christ and his Apostles. Here is enough asserted, if it could be proved.

§. 5. Against this way, laid down by my My first Argument laid down and defended.first Adversary T. C. I objected these three things, 1. That it was unreasonable. 2. That it did not avoid the main difficulties. 3. That it was notoriously false; these three waies of attacking it, (of which a short account is given in the entrance of this Discourse,) I must now more largely defend.

I shewed this way to be unreasonable: and that upon these grounds,

1. Because an assent is hereby required beyond all proportion or degree of evidence for the act of Faith being according to E. W. an insallible assent; and no other grounds assigued for it besides the motives of credibility; he must make an Infallible assent only upon fallible grounds. And it is not sufficient to say, that the Infallibility of the Churches Testimony makes the Assent Infallible; for Assent is not according to the objective certitude of things, but the evidence of them to our understanding. For is it possible to assent to the truth of a Demonstration in a demonstrative manner, because any Mathematician tells one the thing is demonstrable? For in that case the assent is not according to the evidence of the thing, but according to the opinion such a person hath of him, who tells him it is demonstrable. Nay supposing that Person Infallible in saying so, yet if the other hath no means to be Infallibly assured that he is so, his Assent is as doubtful as if he were not Infallible: Therefore supposing the Testimony of the Roman Church to be really Infallible, yet since the means of believing it are but probable and prudential' …he Assent cannot be according to the nature of the Testimony considered in it self, but according to the reasons which induce me to believe such a Testimony Infallible. And in all such cases, where I believe one thing for the sake of another, my Assent to the object believed is according to my Assent to the Medium on which I believe it. As our light is not according to the light in the body of the Sun, but that which presseth on our Organs of Sense. So that supposing their Churches Testimony to be Infallible in it self, if one may be deceived in judging whether it be Infallible or no, one may be deceived in such things which he believes on that supposed Infallibility. It being impossible, that the assent to the matters of faith, should rise higher, or stand firmer than the assent to the Testimony upon which those things are believed. But now to prove the Churches infallibility, they make use only of the motives of credibility, which themselves grant can be the foundation only of a fallible assent. This was the reason I then urged, I must now consider what E. W. saith in answer to it. And the force of his answer lies in these things.

1. That all this proceeds from ignorance Disc. 3. c. 2. n. 3, 4.of the nature of faith, which Discourses not like to science. For he grants that the article of faith which concerns Gods Rev… lation cannot be proved by another believe… article of faith wholly as obscure to us … that is, for that would proceed in infinitum; therefore all rational proofs avail t… …get faith in any must of necessity be extrinsecal to belief, and lie as it were i… another Region more clear yet less certain than the revealed mystery is, we assent to by faith. And so in that article of faith, the Church is Gods infallible Oracle, he saith, that antecedently to faith it cannot be proved by arguments as obscure and of the same Infallible certainty with faith, for then faith would be superfluous, or rather we should believe by a firm and infallible assent, before we do believe on the motive of Gods insallible Revelation, which is impossible. So that the extrinsecal motives of faith whereby the Churches Infallibility is proved independently on Scripture are not of the same certainty with supernatural faith it self, and only prove the evident credibility either of the Scripture or the Church.

2. That the force of this Argument will hold against our selves, and those who believed in the Apostles times, whose infallible assent of faitb doth as much exceed all proportion or degree of evidence as theirs does in believing the Churches Infallibility on the motives of credibility.

In order to the giving a clear and distinct Answer, it will be necessary to enquire …. What those acts of Faith are, we now Discourse of? 2. What influence the mo…ives of credibility have upon them?

1. For the acts of Faith, there are two assigned by E. W. 1. That whereby men be…elieve the Scripture to be the Word of God. 2. That whereby men believe the Church to be Infallible; both these he acknowledges …re Articles of faith, and to be believed with …an Infallible assent. But here mark the shuffling: the first of these cannot be believed, but by an Infallible Testimony, viz. Of the Church; for that end the Churches Infallibi…ity is made necessary, that the Faith may be divine and infallible, because divine faith can rest only upon Infallible Testimony; but …hen in the other act of faith, whereby the Churches Infallibility is believed, we hear no more of this infallible Testimony; because then it is impossible to avoid the circle. I propose therefore this Dilemma to E. W. Either it is necessary to every act of divine Faith to have an Infallible Testimony, or it is not: if it be not necessary, then there is no necessity of asserting the Churches Infallibility in order to believing the Scriptures to be the Word of God, and so the cause is gained; if it be necessary, then the faith whereby the Churches Infallibility is believed, must have such a divine Testimony, and so either a process in infinitum, or a circle are unavoidable by him. If he considered this, and yet wri… two such Books to prove the necessity of Infallibility in order to faith, he betrays too much insincerity for a man to deal with him; if he did not, he need not complain so much of others Ignorance, he may easily find enough nearer home. And therefore all the fault of these men does not lie barely in making the assent to be more certain than the motives of Faith; but in requiring so strictly in one act of Faith a proportionable certainty to the assent and not in another. For what is there I beseech E. W. in believing the Churches Infallibility, which should not make it as necessary for that to be supported by an infallible Testimony as that whereby we believe the Divine Revelation? If faith hath n… grounds and doth not Discourse as Science doth, then I hope the case is alike in both… and so the necessity of an Infallible Testimony must be affirmed of the one, or equally denyed in the other.

But he seems to assert, That faith whatever object it respects doth not Discourse as Science doth; but solely relies on Gods revealed Testimony without the mixture of reason. Grant this at present, but then I hope both these acts of faith equally do so; and still …he Churches infallibility cannot be made …ecessary to faith; for if faith immediately …elies on Gods Testimony, what need any other to ascertain it? or any other proposition, than such as is sufficient to make known …he object of faith, to which end no infalli…ility in the proponent is necessary. Any more than it is necessary for the act of love …oward a desireable object, that he that shews a Beauty should be infallible in the description of her. If all the necessity of the Churches proposition be no more, than to convey the Divine Testimony to us, as E. W. sometimes …mplies, let him take pains to a little better Disc. 3 c. 4. …. 18.purpose, in proving that such a conditio applicans as he calls it must have infallibility belonging to it. For Infallibility is then only necessary, when it is relied upon and is the ground of believing, and not where it is a meer condition of understanding. If a Prince sends an Ambassadour about a match to a foraign Princess, declaring that he will wholly rely upon his Testimony of her, in this case there needs the greatest judgement and veracity in the Person trusted; because the Prince resolves his judgement into his Ambassadours Testimony; but if he only imploys a Person to bring her into the Room where he may see her and judge of her himself, in this case there is no necessity of any other quality th… only obedience and fidelity. So we say as the Church, if the Churches Testimony to be relied upon as the Foundation of o… belief of the Scriptures, then it is necessa… the Church should be infallible if there c… be no faith without such a Testimony; b… if all the office of the Church be only to pr… pose the object of faith to be viewed and co… sidered by us, then a common veracity m… be sufficient for it. And in this case I gran… faith is not to be resolved into the conditio… of applying the object of faith; any mo… than love is into the light whereby a m… sees Beauty, or the burning of Fire into th… laying near of the fuel: but if it be assert… that there can be no divine faith without … infallible Testimony, that, this Testimony i… that of the Church, and therefore upon thi… infallible Testimony we must build our saith he is blind that doth not see in this case tha… it must be resolved into this infallible testimony. And therefore E. W. very impertinently charges me with this constant errour, viz. making the motives of faith the Foundation …. n. 19.of it, and that hereby I confound th… judgement of credibility with the assent of faith; by making the infallible testimony of the Church to those who believe it, the formal object of faith. For although the common motives of faith should do no more than …ake the object of faith appear evidently …edible, and so the faith of such persons be …e…olved into a further reason than those mo…ves; yet they who do believe upon the ac…ount of the infallibility of the Churches …estimony, must resolve their faith into that, which to them is the only infallible and adaequate Ground of Faith.

§. 6. 2. To lay open the Foundation of all these mistakes, about the nature of Faith. Of the motives of credibi…ity; and their instaence on faith.I shall inquire into the influence which the motives of credibility have upon believing. And therein give an account of these three things. 1. What the motives of credibility are? 2. How far they are necessary to faith? 3. What influence they have upon the assent of Faith?

1. What these motives of credibility are? Suarez brings them under four heads.

1. From the qualities of the Christian Suarez de side disp. 4. sect. 3.doctrine and those are, 1. Its truth without any mixture of falshood; but faith he, if there be many things true and some false, it is a sufficient sign that doctrine is not from God, as it was among the Philosophers of old. The way to judge of this quality he thus laies down, those things which the Christian Religion speaks of, which may be know… by natural light are very agreeable to th… common reason of mankind, those othe… things which are above it are not repugnan… to any principle of it, but are agreeable t… the infinite and incomprehensible Majesty o… God. 2. The sanctity and purity of this doctrine, as appears by the excellency of the precepts of it; the moral precepts not only agreeable to the Law of nature, but tend much to the improvement of it; the spiritual precepts have nothing contrary to the rules of morality, and are suitable to the perfections of the Divine Nature. 3. The efficacy of it, which is seen by the strange and miraculous ways of its propagation, by such instruments as were never like to effect their design without a Divine Power.

2. The second Motive is, from the number of witnesses, of the whole Trinity at the Baptism of Christ, of Christ himself in his holy and innocent life, of Moses and the Prophets before him, of the Apostles after him, of the Devils themselves, of the multitude of Martyrs of all kinds suffering with so much patience and courage, and Christian Religion increasing by it.

3. From the Testimony God gave to the truth of it; by the Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of the Doctrine preached, in which ought to be considered the nature, the effects, the frequency, the manner of working them, and the end for which they were wrought, which must be not meerly for the benefit of the person on whom they are wrought, but for a testimony to the truth of the Doctrine delivered; otherwise he grants a Deceiver may work Miracles.

4. From the continuance of this Doctrine in the world, being so hard to believe the Doctrine and practice the precepts of it; meeting with such multitudes of enemies of all kinds; out of all which the credibility of the Christian Religion may be demonstrated, a Divine Providence being supposed to take care of the affairs of mankind. Greg. de Valentiâ Greg de Va… nt. Tom. 3. disp. 1. q. 1. p…act. 4. Med n… de rect â in Deum…side l. 2.reckons up these motives to 19. Michael Medina follows …cotus and makes 10. or 11. of them: on which he largely insists, viz. the fulfilling of Prophesies, the consent of Scriptures, their Authority and truth, the care and diligence of the first Christians in examining the Doctrine of Christianity, the excellency of it in all its parts, the propagation of it in the world, the Miracles wrought for the confirmation of it, the testimony of enemies, the justice of providence, and the destruction of its Adversaries. To the same Lugo de side. disp. 5. s…l. 4.purpose Cardinal Lugo and others of the Schoolmen make an enumeration of the… Fincisc. Valent. Co…dia juris Po…isicii cum Caesareo part. 1 q. 1. sect. 6.motives of credibility; but a late Jesuit ha… reduced them all to the four chief Attribute of God. His Wisdom, Goodness, Powe… and Providence, but inlarges upon the… much in the same way that Suarez had don… Thus much may suffice for understandin… what these motives of credibility are: wh… are acknowledged to make up a demonstr… tion for the credibility of the Christian Religion

2. How far these are necessary to faith for that we are to consider that faith bein… an assent of the rational faculty in man, mu… proceed upon such grounds as may justifie th… assent to be a rational act: which cannot b… unless sufficient reason appear to induce th… mind to assent, which reason appearing … all one with the cre…bility of the object which doth not imply here what may be believed either with or without reason, but wha… all circumstances considered ought to be believed by every prudent person. And in thi… sense Suarez asserts the necessity of the evidence of credibility to the act of faith: for Suarez. de Fide disp. 4. sect. 2. n. 3.saith he, it is not enough, that the object o… faith be proposed as revealed by God, but i… is necessary that it be proposed with such circumstances, as make it appear prudently cr… dible in that way it is proposed. For levil… of judgement and rashness of assent he makes …nconsistent with divine faith; and every man ought so to believe as to exclude all fear of the contrary, and so as that he can never …rudently disbelieve what he now believes; but if a man believes upon bad grounds, he may afterwards prudently reject those grounds. But this is not all, for he makes such a proposition of the object of faith necessary, whereby it appears evidently credible as revealed by God, and consequently as certain N. 4.and infallible. For which he gives this reason; because an inclination of the will to assent must precede the assent of faith before which there must be a judgement determining that act of the will; this judgement must either be certain, or uncertain; if uncertain it is not sufficient for divine faith; if it be certain then there must be such an evidence of credibility in the objects of faith. And although a practical certainty as to matters of humane faith may be sufficiently founded upon a judgement of probability, i. e. a man may judge it fit for him to believe where he sees only a greater probability on one side than of the other; yet in matters of divine faith a higher judgement than of meer probability is necessary, viz. that which is founded upon the evidence of credibility; for with a meer probability a prudent doubting is consistent, which is not with divine saith, and withal the certainty of faith is not meerly practical but speculative, i. e. of the truth of the thing in it self, and therefore requires a speculative evidence of the credibility of the object. From whence he concludes, that a bare credibility is not sufficient, but a greater N 6.credibility of the doctrine believed than of any other contrary to it; for if two doctrines appear equally credible there can be only a doubtful assent given to one of them: and a man might choose which he would believe: but in the assent of faith it is not only necessary that there be a greater credibility of one doctrine than of the other; but that this be evident to natural reason: which dictates N. 7.that in matters of Salvation that doctrine is to be believed which appears more evidently credible than any other. To the same purpose Cardinal Lugo determines that the will cannot command a prudent assent of faith, Lugo de vi…t. sidei divinae disp. 5. sect. 1. n. 21.where there precedes only a probable judgement of the credibility of the object, because there must be the apprehension of a certain obligation to believe, which must arise from the evidence of credibility in the object of faith. And Aquinas himself had determined, that no man would believe, unless he saw that the Aquin. 2. 2. qa 1. art. 4.things were to be believed, either sor the evidence os miracles or something of a like nature: which Cajetan interprets of believing Cajet. in loc.truly and vertuously: truly, i. e. without fear of the contrary, and vertuously, i. e. prudently. So that although men may rashly and indiscreetly believe things without sufficient evidence of their credibility, yet no man can by the acknowledgement of the most learned of the Schoolmen, yield a rational and prudent assent of faith without it.

3. The main thing is to consider what influence the evidence of credibility hath upon the act of faith? For E. W. asserts that all that results from thence is only a judgement of credibility, but that the act of faith it self relies wholly upon other principles; and by the help of the distinction of these two he labours to avoid the force of my arguments. Thus then the matter stands, it is agreed that faith must have rational proofs antecedent to it, but these proofs he must say do not perswade men to believe, or which is all one, have no influence upon the act of Faith. If all that were meant by this talk were only this, that we are then said properly to believe when we fix our assent upon Gods testimony, but that all acts of the mind short of this may not properly be called believing, but by some other name, this would presently appear to be a controversie about words, which I perfectly hate. But more must be understood by such men as E. W. or else they do not speak at all to the purpose; for the Question is, whether in requiring an infallible assent of faith to the Churches Infallibility upon motives confessedly fallible, an assent be not required beyond all proportion or degree of evidence? to this he answers, that this argument proceeds upon ignorance of the nature of faith which doth not discourse as Science doth: and he grants that the motives of credibility have not the same certainty that faith hath. What then can hence follow, but that faith is an unreasonable assent, and hath no grounds; or that it may be stronger than the grounds it proceeds upon? But if it appear, that faith must have grounds, and that the assent of faith can be no stronger than the grounds are, then it follows that they are very unreasonable in requiring an infallible assent of faith to the Churches Infallibility barely upon the motives of credibility.

§. 7. 1. That faith must have grounds, Of the grounds of faith.If a man had not to deal with persons who have confounded their own understandings with an appearance of subtilty, one would think this as needless a task as to prove that man is a reasonable creature; for if faith be an assent of the mind, taking it as strictly and properly as they please, it must have the nature of a rational act, which it cannot have unless it proceeds upon reasonable grounds. The grounds I grant are different in several assents, but it must always have some. Those which are accounted the most immediate assents have the clearest and most evident reason, such as the assents to first principles are, as that the whole is greater than the part. &c. and for conclusions drawn from them, the readiness and firmness of the assent is proportionable to the evidence of their connexion with those principles from whence they are drawn. In other things that depend upon the evidence of sense, the reason of our assent to the truth of them, is from the supposition of the truth of our faculties and that we are so framed as not to be imposed upon, in matters that are plainly and with due circumstances conveyed to our minds by our Organs of sense. But if there appear an evidence of reason overthrowing the certainty of sense, Scepticism immediately follows and the suspension of all assent to the truth of things conveyed by our senses; for no man can then be certain of any thing by the evidence of sense, but only of the appearance of things. I may be certain, that things do appear with such difference of colours, and tasts, and smells; but I cannot be certain that there are really such differences in the things themselves. If therefore the Scepticks arguments should prevail upon any mans mind so far, as to make him question whether sense be a certain medium to convey the truth of the things to his mind, it is impossible that man should yield a firm assent to the truth of any thing on the account of the evidence of sense. So that still, assent proceeds upon the grounds of reason which satisfie the mind, that all circumstances considered it ought not to suspend any longer. Let us now consider such things which are not so evident of themselves, nor conveyed by our senses; and unless we distrust all mankind we have reason to believe some things to be which we never saw our selves, and this is the fundamental ground of that we call believing; which is nothing else, but taking truth upon trust; or receiving a thing as true upon such testimony which I see no reason to question. If I see any reason to doubt either the skill or fidelity of those persons upon whose credit I am to rely; it is impossible for me firmly to believe upon their Authority; if I see none, then on that account I believe what they say; wherein it is as evident that my assent is according to the grounds I proceed upon, as that two and two make four. What is it then that hath thus confounded these mens minds, to make them to contend that the act of divine faith is of such a nature that nothing like it is to be found in any other act of the mind? Must we cease to be men by being Christians? or where the strongest reason is most necessary, must there be none at all? to what end then were there arguments ever used to perswade men to believe Christianity? were those arguments able to perswade men or not? if they were, then men did believe upon the strength of those arguments; and is it possible for men to believe upon the strength of arguments and yet those arguments have no influence upon the act of faith? This is horrible nonsense and fit only for those to write who believe contradictions; for such an act of faith indeed can have no reason for it. But to come closer yet to our matter: The Churches infallibility is to be believed, saith E. W. with divine faith; is there any ground for that act of faith, or not? If there be none, shew what obligation to believe there can be, where there is no ground for it: if there be, I desire to know, whether they are able to perswade me or not; if not, shew then why I ought to believe on insufficient grounds; if they be, may not I then believe upon those grounds? and if I do, doth not that act of faith rely upon those grounds▪ Besides, of those who plead for the necessity of the Churches infallibility, I desire to know on what account they do it? Is it not, that faith may have a sufficient Foundation to be built upon, which in their opinion cannot be without such infallibility? and yet after all this, must not faith stand upon this ground? Why then are, Scotus, Durand, Canus l. 2. c. 8. Lugo de virt. fidei disp. 1. sect. 5.Gabriel, Medina and others charged by some of the Roman Church with resolving faith into the Churches testimony? What is this else but only to make the Churches Testimony the ground of faith? Nay, why are there any disputes at all about the formal object of faith? For the formal object is nothing but the reason of believing, and what account can be given of the reason of believing if there be none at all? But it may be all this while I mistake my profound Adversary, it being hardly possible that a man of common sense should write such stuff. To prevent any suspicion of this nature I shall lay down his assertions in his own words; from several places of his worthy works. Faith solely relies on Gods revealed Testimony Protest. without Principles disc. 1. c. 11. n. 2. Reason and Religion disc. 3. c 1. n. 10.without the mixture of Reason for ill Motive; the previous Motives well pondered, bring with them an obligation to believe and not faith it self. For, Faith reasons not, but simply believes: Faith contrary to science goes beyond the certainty of all extrinsecal inducements. And afterwards, where he attempts to answer the main difficulty, as he C. 8. N. 4.calls it, in the resolution of faith, (which in short is, since the motives of credibility seem to leave the matter doubtful, what that is, which determines the assent to the objects of faith as infallibly true?) waving at present that answer, that it is from the command of the will, he seems to attribute so great an evidence to the Motives of credibility, that they do infallibly prove the truth of divine Revelation, there being an insiparable connexion between the Motives and divine Revelation; but then he starts an untoward objection, viz. that then the Revelation must appear evident and so faith would be evident; to which he answers by denying the consequence, because this assent is science and not faith; now this evidence arising from the motives of credibility, faith, saith he, as faith leaves, or lays aside, and firmly adheres to the Divine Revelation only for it self, as contradistinct both from the Moral evidence of the Motives, and their apparent connexion with the Revelation. The reason is taken, saith he, from the notion of faith, which essentially N. 10.tends obscurely upon its own object, as the most ancient Fathers assert. From whence it is clear, if you believe him, that no evidence of the testimony assented to can move to faith, not only because we should in the case of evidence be necessitated to believe, but upon this account also, that the certitude of faith, taken from the supreamest verity, i… of a higher strain and far surpasses all the certitude we find in nature, or in the Motives inducing to believe. But which is more pleasant he yet adds, It is true, the more evident N. 11.these motives appear the better they induce to believe, yet for that reason have less to do with the very act of faith, which as he said, rests upon and lays claim to no lower a verity, than the most pure and supream only, and if it rests not here, it is no faith. And yet after all this he asserts, that the evidence of credibility apparent in Disc. 3. c. 10. n. 7.those manifest signs and marks which illustrate true Christianity is abundantly sufficient to induce the most obdurate heart in the world to believe with such an Assent as suits Gods great Majesty, i. e. with a faith most firm and infallible. Here we have Motives, such Motives as give evidence of divine Revelation, such motives as are sufficient to induce the most obdurate person to an infallible assent of faith; and yet after all this evidence by these motives in order to believing; this believing hath nothing to do with them, and the more they induce to believe, the less influence they have upon faith, for that fixeth on the divine Revelation solely for it self, and hath a certainty beyond that of the greatest arguments that are used for believing. He that hath the faculty of understanding these things ought to oblige mankind with a clearer discovery of them, than E. W. hath made; who doth not seem to understand what he writes himself and therefore it cannot be expected that others should. But the Foundation of all this Nonsense, is a strange apprehension of the nature of faith, which the School-doctrine hath so rivited into him, that it seems to be of the nature of a first principle with him, which must be supposed as the Basis of all his discourse; which is, that faith is an obscure and inevident assent, or that it essentially tends obscurely to its object, and therefore no motives, or arguments how clear or strong soever can have any influence upon faith. For he imagines as great an opposition between arguments and faith as between light and darkness; he first conceives faith to be a kind of deep Dungeon of the soul full of darkness and obscurity, and then bids men have a care of bringing any light into it, for if they do, it ceaseth to be what he described it. A light may serve a man very well to shew him the way to this Dungeon, nay it may direct him to the very door; but then farewel to all light, no… the least crevise must be left to let in any to the mind that is once entred it; but the excellency of it is, that the soul fixes more certainly on its object in this state of darkness, than it could do being environed with the clearest light. Just as if a man should say there is a particular way of seeing with ones eys shut, which is far more admirable and excellent, than all the common ways of beholding things; being far more certain and piercing than seeing by the help of eyes and light is; for the light and sight may both fail in the representation of an object; but this seeing without eyes is an infallible way to prevent all the fallacies of sense. Much in this way doth E. W. talk; for all arguments are fallible, and therefore by no means must faith proceed upon them; O but this believing without, or above, or it may be against arguments, is the most infallible thing in the world; for that man need never fear being deceived with reason that disowns the use of it. Upon these grounds a skilful Painter may make a shift to bungle and to draw some rude uneven strokes by the help of his Pencil and a good light; but if he would be sure not to miss making an excellent Piece he ought to shut his eyes or darken his Room, for then to be sure that fallible thing called light can never deceive him. An indifferent person that only consulted the nature and reason of things could never have fallen into these dotages; but it hath been the interest of some men to cry down light that have had false wares to put off. But of all things I wonder if this be the whole nature of Christian faith to believe no man knows why nor wherefore, (for if he doth, his faith ceases to be faith being built upon reason) why all this ado is kept about an infallible Church and motives of credibility? cannot a man believe without reason at first as well at last? cannot faith fix upon Gods Revelation for it self, without troubling those motives of credibility to no purpose? If a man hath a mind to leap blindfold from a Precipice, why cannot he do it without so much ceremony? must he have all his attendance about him, and his Gentleman-usher to conduct him to the very brink of the Rock, and there bid him Goodnight? If all these motives of credibility contribute nothing to the act of believing, what use are they of in such a Religion, where Faith is look'd on as the great Principle of practice and the means of salvation? If the judgement of credibility would save men, they might still be useful; but this will be by no means allowed, for nothing in their opinion, but this blind Guide (which they call faith) can conduct men to Heaven.

§. 8. But what is it that hath made me… Of the Scripturen…ion of the obscurity of Faith.so in love with nonsense and contradictions? Hath the Scripture given any countenance to this notion of faith? Yes doubtless; they are such lovers of Scripture, that they da…e not take up any opinion in these matters without plain Scripture. Then I hope Scripture may be plain in clear things, if it be so in the description of so obscure a thing as they make faith to be. But doth not the Scripture say, that Faith is the Substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen? Heb. 11. 1.and is not this all one as if it had been said that faith essentially tends obscurely to its object, and that it is an inevident assent and therefore cannot make use of arguments? This I know is all the pretence they have for this notion of faith; but is it not very pretty, because faith is called an evidence therefore i… must be inevident, or to follow the vulga… Latine because it is called an argument therefore it can use none? No man is so senseless to deny, that we believe things we do not see, and things which cannot be seen; we believe some things which might have been seen, and were seen by some whose credit we rely upon; as the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ: we believe other things which are uncapable of being seen by our senses, as the Joys of Heaven and the Torments of Hell; and as to such things faith supplies the want of the Evidence of sense to us; and by it our minds are assured of the truth of them though we do not or cannot see them. Which is all that is intended by this description of faith; but how doth it hence follow that our faith must be an immediate, inevident, obscure assent, on which all the arguments that perswade men to believe, can have no influence? May not I believe that Christ died and rose again, and will come to judge the quick and the dead, because I see all the reason in the world to perswade me to believe it, from the testimony of those who saw him and have delivered his doctrine to us, and have given the greatest evidence of their fidelity? Doth the strength of the argument hinder me at all from believing what I did not see? I had rather thought the more obscure the object had been, (for it is little better than nonsense to call an act of faith obscure), the greater necessity there had been of strong evidence to perswade a man to believe; not such evidence as doth arise from the nature of the thing, for that is contrary to the obscurity of the object, but such as gives the greatest reason to believe from the Authority of those on whose Testimony I rely. So that the greatest clearness and evidence as to the Testimony is not repugnant to the nature of Faith; this only shews that in Christian Religion we do no… proceed by meer evidence of sense or rigorous demonstrations in the things we assent to; but that the great things we believe are remote from sense and received upon the Authority of the Revealer; yet so, as that we assert we have as great evidence that these things were revealed by God, as the matter was capable of; and such evidence we say ought to perswade any prudent person. This is all which the description of faith so much alledged doth imply; which was never intended for an accurate definition of it; for as Hugo de sancto Victore saith of it, non indicat quid est fides, sed signat quid facit; it doth not shew what faith is, but what it doth; by making things future and invisible to have as great power and influence on mens minds as if they were present and visible. And when the Fathers speak of the obscurity of Faith, they do not mean an assent without grounds, but the belief of things out of our view; and that obscurity is understood by them in comparison with the clearness of a future state: or in opposition to the way of proving things by meer reason without Revelation. So Cardinal Lugo truly answers the Testimonies of Fathers to that purpose, by saying that when they exclude reason and arguments Lugo de virtut. fid. Divin. disp. 7. sect. 2. n. 16.from faith they take them as they are opposed to Authority; but in as much as they suppose the mysteries of Christian faith to be believed for the sake of Divine Revelation, a discourse is thereby implied from the Authority of God revealing to the mysteries believed. Neither is such discourse only requisite, but that in the first place which doth assure men of the truth of this Revelation; for upon that, the other must proceed. All mediums used for the proof of this, must be extrinsecal to the nature of the thing, and therefore cannot be repugnant to faith; and in this I have the consent of some of the most learned of the Schoolmen, who make evidentiam in attestante as they call it, consistent with faith.

But saith E. W. No thanks to thee poor creature, Dis. 3. c. 8. n. 16.to assent hadst thou Evidence. This it is now to hope to merit at Gods hands by a blind faith! for so elsewhere, he saith, evidence C. 10. n. 5.is incompatible with that merit and obsequiousness of faith; which God requires of his rational creatures who are to walk to Heaven by an humble and dutiful faith. A very humble saith certainly that hopes to merit by believing! And very dutiful in expecting so large a reward for doing it knows not what! We think it our duty to believe firmly whatever God saith; but withal we think it our duty to enquire carefully whether God hath said it or no before we believe: and according to the evidence we have of this we assent to the former. But this is not to proceed Nobly with God, saith E. W. Brave man! It hath been reported of a Hector in this Town that a little before his death he said he hoped God would deal with him like a Gentleman: It seems E. W. would deal so with God. We have often heard of works of super-erogation; but our noble E. W. is not content with them, he will have a faith of super-erogation too. We poor creatures, are contented to do our duties, and take it as a great Favour, for God to accept of the best we can do: We dare not so much as think of such terms of kindness and favour from us to God, as to proceed Nobly with him. Neither do we believe, that God is so hugely pleased with the blind and the lame, when they are offered in sacrifice to him. Whatever E. W. imagines, it is no such Noble proceeding to believe infallibly upon confessedly fallible grounds. For that is the present case, he grants that the motives of credibility are not infallible, and that there are no other motives in order to faith above these, and yet he supposes we ought to oblige God by giving an infallible assent upon these Motives. But the bottom of all is That our Faith ought to be suitable to Gods infallible veracity, which Faith immediately rests upon and from whence and not …rom the motives, infallible certainty as E W. speaks, is transfused into it. This deep speculation by no means satisfies me; for though I know it to be impossible for God to lie or to deceive; yet our question is not about believing the truth of what God saith, but about believing this or that to be revealed by him. And while the Question is whether Gods veracity be concerned in the thing, how is it possible for his Veracity to transfuse an Infallible Certainty into my Belief of it? Suppose E. W. be acquainted with as honest a man as ever lived, and one comes and tells him from him that such a Friend of his was dead, and gave him five hundred pound; I would fain know whether the unquestionable veracity of the Friend, from whom the Messenger saith he received it, can transfuse an unquestionable certainty in his mind of the truth of the thing, while he is yet in doubt whether his faithful Friend said it or no? If his assent here be not according to the veracity of his Friend, unless he be first assured of the fidelity of the reporter; No more can it be in the present case of believing. For no one questions what God saith, but our only doubt is whether God hath said it; and whilst one gives no infallible assent to the one, he cannot infallibly rest upon the other. But may not credible arguments as to the Messenger be sufficient for infallible belief of the thing upon the Authority of the other? For that, I appeal to E. W. whether his belief of the thing would not in that case be according to the grounds he had to believe the Messenger? and the Authority of his Friend would make him so much the more Question whether his name might not be abused by a Person that had a design to put a trick upon him; especially if that Messenger challenged to himself so much credit that he ought to be believed without any dispute at a…l. For in this case, the over eager affirming would give a man cause to question the more the truth of the person, if his evidence bear no proportion with his confidence. So it is in our present case: it is granted on all sides, if God reveals any thing it must be true: our enquiry is how far we are to believe that God hath said such a thing upon the credit of those who convey it to us; if they desire no more credit with us than they give sufficient evidence for, then we are bound to believe them; but if they exact an infallible assen… and offer only fallible grounds we have reason to mistrust their design; and so long as we do so, we must question the thing which we are to believe upon their credit. If they require only an assent suitable to their evidence it would be unreasonable to deny it, but still the degree of our assent to the Revelation is proportionable to the degree of evidence that it is a divine Revelation. Which Dr. Holden thinks to be so evident, that he accounts it lost labour for a man Holden Analys. fidei l. 1. c. 3.to go about to prove it to any one that hath common sense: viz. That no assent of divine Faith can have any greater true and rational certainty, than the assent of the medium hath, by which the object of Faith is applied to the understanding. For whatever certainty we can attribute to an intellectual assent upon the Authority of God revealing it is necessary it should come from and depend upon the certainty of the medium, by which this Authority of God revealing is conveyed to the understanding. For as it is impossible that a man should believe or yield assent to any thing because it is revealed by God, unless he thinks and knows that God hath revealed it; so it is impossible that he should believe the things revealed by God with greater true and rational certainty, than that by which he knows that God revealed them. For whatever degree of uncertainty or doubt there is in the mind of a believer of the certainty and truth of the medium, there must be the same in that assent whereby he believes the things which are proposed by that medium. Because with what degree a man doubts whether God hath revealed this or that, he cannot but doubt in the same degree of that which is said to be revealed by God. For what man in his wits doth not presently perceive that no man can be more certain of that thing which God is said to reveal, than he is certain that God hath revealed it; as no man can be more certain of the things done by Caesar, than they are that Caesar was; or of the mysteries revealed by Christ, than that Christ was. This he saith he had never mentioned, unless some later Divines, (such as E. W.) discoursing vainly and Sceptically, and not considering the true reason of believing, had feigned to themselves he knew not what kind of divine and supernatural certainty in Christian Faith (passing by the true and rational) which it is clearer than noon day, is but an idle and imaginary thing. Good Reader, observe the power of reason over an ingenuous mind; I know not what entertainment Dr. H. might have given E. W. on other accounts; but it is plain by this Discourse he thought a dark Room the fittest for him, since he pronounces that no man in his senses can assert the things which he confidently doth. Although therefore he thought this needless to be proved, yet I must proceed to shew,

§. 9. 2. That the Assent of Faith can be Of the power of the Will in the assent of Faith.no stronger than the Grounds are. For if it doth proceed upon Grounds, those are of the nature of Premises and the assent of faith as the conclusion drawn from them, and therefore must be stronger or weaker according to them. In every act of Faith which hath a particular Revelation for its object; there must be two distinct premises conceived from whence that which is the proper act of believing follows. As suppose the Question be concerning the Resurrection of the dead, why I believe that article of Faith to be t…ue, the present Answer is because God hath revealed it; but therein lies the force of a Syllogism, by which it will appear that the act of Faith follows as the conclusion from the premises. Whatsoever God reveals is true, but God hath revealed the Resurrection of the dead, therefore it is true. Now since the force of a conclusion depends upon the premises, the assent of Faith cannot be supposed stronger and firmer than the Premises are from which it results. For however it may hold in other causes; in those which are moral and final, it is an undoubted Maxim of reason, That which makes an other thing to be so, must be much more so it self: As that end which makes any thing desirable for its sake, is much more desirable it self, because it is that which moves the Soul to desire the means; and so it is likewise in whatever moves the understanding to assent as well as the will to desire: but the Premises do move the understanding to assent to the conclusion, therefore the consent to the conclusion must be agreeable to that of the Premises. This difficulty hath so racked and tormented the minds of the Schoolmen, that Arriaga relates he hath heard the most Learned and Arriaga Curs Philo. disp. 16. Sect 4.Ingenious among them profess they could find no way through it. While they did require an infallible assent in the conclusion, when there could be no infallible assent to one of the Premises, viz. that God hath revealed this. Which some have thought they got over when they asserted the necessity of the Churches Infallibility, as the foundation of that assent. But granting them the truth of that, yet they have given the difficulty but one remove by it, for it speedily returns again, concerning the belief of the Churches Infa… libility, which they agree must be believed infallibly, and yet here again they offer at no more than motives confessed to be fallible to prove it. And so at last they are fain to take up with other Answers, which make the Churches Infallible Proposition of no use at all in this matter: for if the assent be said to be immediate to the Revelation, if the strength of it arises either from the Spirit of God, or the pious inclination of the Will, and not from the motives of Faith, if any of these waies can solve the difficulty; then however from hence it follows that all these will equally do it without ever so much as supposing the necessity of the Churches infallible Testimony. I shall not now trouble my self with others, but consider my Adversary who after making several attempts this way and that, at last bethinks of a good Friend in a corner, called the Power of the Will, and to this he is willing to attribute the strength of the assent, when it exceeds the motives of Disc. 3. c. 8. n. 14, 15, 16.Faith: which he thinks the more plain and easie way; and therefore asserts that after the previous judgement of credibility, the Will C. 9. n. 5.works by h…r pious affection, and that moves the understanding to elicit the infallible assent of Faith. For saith he, if it be demanded how the understanding dares rest C. 10. n. 10.most firmly on an object not evidently seen, we pass …rom that Power to the Will and say, she can by her pious affection command the intellectual faculty to captivate it self in Obsequium fidei and believe most undoubtedly. This is the last Reserve in this matter, which is as weak as any of the former. For if the Will can determine the understanding to assent beyond the strength of the motives, it may determine it to assent without any motives at all; because that degree of assent which doth exceed the evidence of the motives hath nothing to incline or move it besides the meer power of the Will: and if it can command the highest and most Infallible assent withou… Infallible grounds it may equally command a fallible assent without fallible grounds, and by this means there will be no need of any motives of credibility at all. Besides, this takes away any such thing as the formal object of divine Faith; for if the Infallible assent of Faith do come from the power of the Will; then to what purpose is any formal object of that assent enquired after? For the formal object doth assign a reason of believing from the object it self, of which there can be none if the Will by her own Power elicit that which is the proper assent of Faith. And all other material objects of Faith may be believed in as infallible a manner by the same power of the Will. But if the Will can command the understanding to assent beyond the degree of evidence; why may not the understanding dictate to the Will to desire a thing beyond the degree of goodness appearing to it; and by this means both those faculties would tend to their objects in a way disagreeing to their nature.

All these ways being found in sufficient, Cardinal Lugo saith some had recourse at last Lugo de fide disp. 1. Sect. 4. il. 38.to a mysterious elevation of the understanding, beyond all connatural ways of its operation, whereby it lays hold on the matters of Faith in a way wholly inexplicable; and however the Cardinal slights this way, and expresseth a great detestation of it, as that which renders the matters of Faith incredible and imperceptible; yet I think it absolutely the best for those of the Roman Church that hath yet been thought of; and I would particularly commend it to E. W. who loves to talk so unintelligibly and confusedly, as if he had this habit of believing infused already.

And thus much in vindication of the first argument, I proposed against making the Infallible Testimony of the Church the foundation of Faith, and yet that Infallibility to be only proved by the motives of credibility, viz. that hereby an infallible assent must be built upon fallible grounds. As to what E. W. saith by way of recrimination it shall be answered, when I come to defend our own grounds of Faith.

§. 10. The next Argument, which afford… Rational Account part 1. c. 5. S…ct. 6. The second Argument defended against E. W.any new matter to my Adversary, whereb… I shewed this way of resolving Faith to b… unreasonable was, because by making the Insallible Testimony of the Church necessary to Faith, they make that necessary to Faith, which was not made so by Christ or his Apostles. What then, say I, will become of the Faith of all those who received Divine Revelations, without the Infallible Testimony of any Church at all? With what Faith did the Disciples of Christ at the time of his suffering, believe the Divine Authority of the Old Testament? was it a true Divine Faith or not? If it was whereon was it built? Not certainly on the Infallible Testimony of the Jewish Church, which at that time consented to the death of the Messias, condemning him as a Malefactor and Deceiver: Or did they believe it because of the great rational evidence they had to convince them, that those Prophesies came from God? If so, why may not we believe the Divinity of all the Scriptures on the same grounds and with a Divine Faith too? With what Faith did those believe in the Messias who were not personally present at the Miracles which our Saviour wrought, but had them conveyed to them by such reports as the womans of Samaria was to the Samaritans? Or were all such persons excused from believing, meerly because they were not spectators? But by the same reason all those would be excused, who never saw our Saviours Miracles, or heard his Doctrine or his Apostles: but if such persons then were bound to believe, I ask on what Testimony was their Faith founded? Was the woman of Samaria Infallible in reporting the Discourse between Christ and her? Were all the persons Infallible who gave an account to others of what Christ did? Yet I suppose, had it been your own case, you would have thought your self bound to have believed Christ to have been the Messias, if you had lived at that time, and a certain account had been given you of our Saviours Doctrine and Miracles by men faithful and honest, though you had no reason to have believed them infallible: I pray, Sir, answer me, would you have thought your self bound to have believed or no? If you affirm it (as I will suppose you so much a Christian as to say so) I pray then tell me whether persons in those circumstances might not have a true and divine Faith where there was no infallible Testimony, but only Rational Evidence to build it self upon? And if those Persons might have a divine Faith upon such evidence as that was, may not we much more who have evidence of the same nature indeed, but much more extensive, universal, and convincing than that was? And how then can you stil… assert an Infallible Testimony of the conveyers of divine Revelation to be necessary in order to a divine Faith? Nay further yet, how few were there in comparison, in the first Ages of the Christian Church, who received the Doctrine of the Gospel from the mouths of persons Infallible? and of those who did so, what certain evidence have men, that all those persons did receive the Doctrine upon the account of the Infallibility of the Propounders, and not rather upon the Rational evidence of the Truth of the Doctrine delivered; and whether the belief of their Infallibility was absolutely necessary to Faith, when the report of the evidences of the Truth of the Doctrine might raise in them an obligation to believe, supposing them not Infallible in that delivery of it, but that they looked on them as honest men, who faithfully related what they had seen and heard? and to which evidence of sense the Apostles and Evangelists appealed; so that when there 1 Joh. 1. 1. 2 Pet. 1. 16. Luk. 1. 1, 2was certainly an infallible Testimony, yet that is not urged as the only Foundation for Faith, but Rational Evidence produced even by those Persons who were thus infallible, If we descend lower in the Christian Church, or walk abroad to view the several Plantations of the Churches at that time, where do we read or meet with the least intimation of an Infallible Testimony of the Catholick Church, so called from its Communion with that of Rome? What Infallible Testimony of that Church had the poor Britains to believe on? Or those Barbarians mentioned in Irenaeus, who yet believed without a written Word? What mention do we meet with in all the ancient Apologeticks of Christians wherein they give so large an account of the grounds of Christian Faith, of the modern method for resolving Faith? Nay, what one ancient Father or Council give the least countenance to this pretended Infallibility, much less make it the only sure Foundation of Faith as you do? Nay how very few are there among your selves who believe it, and yet think themselves never the worse Christians for it? If then your Doctrine be true what becomes of the Faith of all these persons mentioned? Upon your principles their Faith could not be true and Divine Faith; that is, let them all think they believed the Doctrine of Christ never so heartily, and obey it never so conscientiously; yet because they did not believe on the Infallibility of your Church, their Faith was but a kind of guilded and splendid infidelity, and none of them Christians, because not Jesuits. And doth not this principle then fairly advance Christianity in the world, when the belief of it comes to be settled on Foundations, never heard of in the best and purest times of it; nay such Foundations, as for want of their believing them, their Faith must be all in vain, and Christ dyed in vain for them.

And what now saith E. W. to all this? First, he saith, I do not bring Instances enough. Secondly, That I bring too many.

1. That I do not bring enough; for he much wonders I omit to touch upon an instance Disc. 3. c. 3. n. 6.far more difficult than any of these concerning rude and illiterate persons, which I and all others are bound to solve. Me… thinks he might have been contented with those I had brought, unless he had answered them better; and should not have blamed me for omitting that which I purposely take notice of and give a sufficient answer to in these words. Although the Ignorance and carelesness of men in a matter of so great consequence Rational Account pa…t 1. c. 6. Sect. 15.be so great in all Ages, as is not to be justified, because all men ought to endeavour aster the highest ways of satisfaction in a matter so nearly concerning them (and it is none of the least things to be blamed in your Church, that she doth so much countenance this ignorance and neglect of the Scripture) yet for such persons who either morally or invincibly are hindred from this capacity of examining Scripture, there may be sufficient means for their Faith to be built upon. For although such illiterate persons cannot themselves see and read the Scripture, yet as many as do believe do receive the Doctrine of it by that sense, by which Faith is conveyed; and by that means they have so great certainty as excludes all doubting, that such Doctrines and such matters of Fact are contained in these Books, by which they come to the understanding of the nature of this Doctrine and are capable of judging concerning the Divinity of it. For the Light spoken of in Scripture is not a light to the eye but to the mind; now the mind is capable of this light, as well by the ear, as by the eyes. The case then of such honest illiterate persons, as are not capable of reading Scripture, but diligently and devoutly hear it read to them, is much of the same nature with those who heard the Apostles Preach this Doctrine before it was writ. For whatever was an Argument to such to believe the Apostles in what they spake, becomes an Argument to such who hear the same things, which are certainly conveyed to us, by an unquestionable Tradition: So that nothing hinders but such illiterate persons may resolve their Faith into the same Doctrine and Motives which others do, only those are conveyed to them by the ear, which are conveyed to others by the eyes. But if you suppose persons so rude and illiterate, as not to understand any thing, but that they are to believe as the Church believes; do you if you can, resolve their Faith for them; for my part I cannot, and am so far from it that I have no reason to believe they can have any. Judge now, Reader, what measure I am like to meet with from such men, who can so impudently charge me with omitting a difficulty, which I give so punctual an answer to.

2. But those instances I have brought are too many for him; as will easily appear by the shuffling answers he makes to them. My design was from them to prove that the Churches Infallibity was not necessary in order to Faith; he puts it thus: If the Infallibility C. 3. n. 5.of the Church be a sure Foundation of Faith, &c. Is not this a good beginning to put Sure in stead of Necessary, or only sure? For that may be sure which is not necessary, and it was the necessity I disproved by these Instances. To them however he attempts to give an Answer.

1. In general. That none make the Roman Catholick Church in all circumstances the only …. 7.sure Foundation of Divine Faith. For the first man that believed in Christ our Lord before the compleat establishment of his Church had perfect faith resting on that great Master of Truth, without dependance on the Christian Church, for Christ alone was not the Church, but the Head of it. Faith therefore in general requires no more, but only to rely upon God the first verity speaking by this or that Oracle, by one or more men lawfully sent to teach, who prove their mission and make the doctrine proposed by them evidently credible. In like manner the Apostles preached no doctrine in the name of the new Christian Church, whilst our Saviour lived here on earth, but testified that he was the true Messias by vertue of those signs and miracles which had been already wrought above the force of Nature. A very fair concession! which plainly destroys the necessity of the Churches infallibility in order to Faith. For if no more be necessary in order to faith, but to rely upon God the first verity speaking by this or that Oracle, &c. how comes the infallible testimony of the Church to be in any Age necessary to faith? For God spake by Christ and his Apostles as his Oracles by whom his word is declared to us, therefore nothing can be necessary to faith but to rely upon God the first Truth speaking by them. And this we assert as well as they. But he must prove that we cannot rely on God as speaking by them, unless he hath an insallible Church in every Age, if he will make this infallible testimony of the Church necessary to faith; which I despair of ever seeing done while the world stands.

2. In particular, 1. To the instance of the disciples of Christ believing the divine Authority of the old Testament without any infallible testimony of the Jewish Church; only upon the rational evidence they had to convince them that those Prophesies came from God: he answers; that it is hard to say where the force of it lies, seeing there were N. 8.innumerable Jews then dispersed all Jury over and the other parts of the world who most firmly believed the Divine Authority of those Books, upon whose Testimony the Apostles might believe those Books to be divine. A most excellent answer if we well consider it! Have not they of the Church of Rome proved the necessity of infallibility in the Church from Deut. 17. 10, 11, 12. (of which abundant instances might be produced, and particularly the Considerator of my Principles) which words if they imply any Infallibility at all do necessarily prove that it is lodged in the supream Ecclesiastical Judges and no where else; so that if there were no infallibility in them it could not be supposed to be any where else; therefore I proposed the case at that time when these Ecclesiastical Judges consented to the death of Christ, and my Question will not only hold of the Apostles but of any common Jews among them, who might not believe Christ infallible, any more than the Sanhedrin, I ask whether such might not have seen sufficient ground to believe that the Prophesies came not in old time by the will of man, but by the Will of God? if such persons had reason sufficient for their faith without any infallible Testimony; the same I say may all Christians have of the Divine Authority of the New Testament. For if the concurrent Testimony of the dispersed Jews firmly believing the divine Authority of the Old Testament were a sufficient ground for a person then to believe the Divinity of those Books; why may not the concurrent Testimony of all Christians afford as sufficient a ground to believe the Authority of the Books of the New, though no Ecclesiastical Senate among Christians be supposed any more infallible, than the Jewish Sanhedrin was at the death of Christ? and by this I hope E. W. may a little better perceive what this objection aims at. But, saith he, hence it follows not, that then there was no Jewish Church which believed the divine verities of the old Scripture: O the monstrous subtilty of Jesuits! who is able to stand before their terrible wits? What have we to do with a Churches believing the divine verities of the Old Scripture? we only enquire for the Testimony of a Church as necessary in order to others believing it. If they firmly believed and yet had no infallible Testimony of a Church at that time what can be more to our advantage than this? seeing it hence follows, that there may be a firm faith without any Churches infallible Testimony. Well, N. 9.but he verily thinks, I mistook one objection for another; perhaps I would have said that the Apostles lost faith of our Saviours Resurrection at the time of his Passion, but this difficulty is solved over and over. And then falls unmercifully to work with this man of clouts; he throws him first down and tramples upon him, then sets him up again to make him capable of more valour being shown upon him, then he kicks him afresh, beats him of one side and then of the other, and so terribly triumphs over him, that the poor man of clouts blesseth himself that he is not made of flesh and bones, for if he had, it might have cost him some aches and wounds. But I assure him I meant no such thing; yet if I had, I do not see, but after all his batteries, the argument, such as it is, would have stood firm enough; for supposing the Infallible Testimony of the Church to rest in the Apostles after our Saviours death, it must have prejudiced the faith of others who were to believe that article upon their Authority, if they lost the faith of Christs Resurrection.

2. I instanced in those who believed in Christ and yet were not personally present at the miracles which our Saviour wrought, but had them conveyed to them by such reports as the womans of Samaria was to the Samaritans. Of these I ask what infallible Testimony their faith was built upon? And if those persons might have a Divine Faith meerly upon rational evidence, may not we much more who have evidence of the same nature, but much more extensive, universal and convincing than that was? To this he answers, by distinguishing between the Motive or the natural Proposition of faith, which comes by N. 10.hearing and the infallible Oracle whereupon it relies; and he thinks it strange I did not see the distinction. It is far easier to see the distinction than the pertinency of it to his purpose; for our Question is not about the necessity of an Infallible Oracle in order to Faith, but of an infallible Proposition; we still yield that which our faith relies upon to be an infallible Oracle of God, but if a natural Proposition of that be sufficient for faith, we have all we contend for. But to what purpose the Legend of S. Photina, and the dispute whether she were the Samaritan woman, is here inserted, is very hard to understand, unless he thought it the best way by any means to escape from the business in hand. Next, he tells us, what he might answer i… N. 11.these instances, by saying with good Divin… that all immediate Propounders or Conveyer… of Divine Revelation in such particular case… need not to be infallible. I am glad to hear of such good Divines among them: only I would know why in these particular cases an infallible proposition was unnecessary to faith, if in the general case of all Christians it be now become necessary? But he saith although N. 12.infallibility be not necessary for young beginners seldom molested with difficulties against saith, yet it is not only convenient but absolutely necessary for others more learned, who often struggle to captivate their understanding, when the high mysteries of Christianity are proposed. Never was there certainly a more senseless answer: for who are molested with difficulties against faith, if those who are to be converted to Christianity are not? who have none of the advantages of education to recommend the doctrines of Christianity to their minds; and are filled and prepossessed with contrary prejudices. Never were there such happy Converters of Infidels as the Jesuits are, if they meet with such Converts who are never molested with difficulties against faith; only as they grow up, they begin to grow Infidels again, and then it is necessary to choke them with an Infallible Church. I do not at all wonder, that the more learned in the Church of Rome seeing the weakness of the grounds of Faith among them do struggle with themselves about believing the mysteries of their faith; but I very much wonder if so unreasonable a pretence as that of Infallibility can ever satisfie them. I desire to know of these more learned believers, whether they believed the Churches Infallibility before those strugglings or not? if they did not, how came they to be believers, since there can be no divine faith, without an infallible testimony? if they did, how came they to question whether they were to believe the particular mysteries of faith, if they did believe the Church Infallible which proposed them? But I suppose these learned believers, were such as questioned the Infallibility of the Church, and Christ and his Apostles too; of which sort I doubt not there are many in Rome it self.

But yet he hath two other ways to solve these difficulties. 1. By Gods special illumination; N. 13.and that I hope, may serve all as well as these; and then let him shew the necessity of an infallible Proponent. 2. That every particular proponent as a member conjoyned with Christs infallible Oracle may be said to teach infallibly. A most admirable speculation! and so may every one we meet with in the streets, be infallible not as considered in himself, but as a member conjoyned with truth: or every Sectary; as a member conjoyned with Gods word, which I hope is an Oracle, altogether as infallible as the Church, But the question is, whether such a one may be divided from Gods infallible Truth or not? if not, he is absolutely infallible: if he may; then what security hath any one to rely upon him upon such a conditional Infallibility which he can have no assurance of?

But still he hopes to retort the Instances N. 14.upon me: I never saw such a way of retorting in my whole life. My design was to prove by these Instances that an infallible Testimony of a Church was not necessary in order to Faith; he saith I must solve my own difficulties. I confess I see none at all in my way that need to be answered; for I assert that men may have sufficient Grounds of Faith without an infallible Proponent. Well, but he supposes, all these Barbarians converted to Christ to have had true Faith and consequently prudent Motives to believe, before they firmly assented to the Divine Revelation. And so do I too. But what were these motives? To this Question, he saith, I return the strangest answer he ever heard; for I seem to make the motives inducing to faith nothing but the Rational evidence of the Truth of the Doctrine delivered and therefore I grievously complain that they destroy the obligation which ariseth from the Rational evidence of the Christian Religion; upon which he discourses, as though by rational evidence the self-evidencing light of the doctrine, and consequently all the miracles wrought by Christ and his Apostles were to no purpose. Have not I reason to applaud my good fortune that I have met with so ingenuous an Adversary? But I see those who write Controversies must be true Nethinims, not only hewers of difficulties, and drawers of the waters of contention, but bearers of burdens too; even such, as their Adversaries please to lay upon them. Could any thing be further from my meaning than by the rational evidence of Christianity, to understand the self-evidencing light of the Scriptures? But it is not what I say, but what E. W. finds in his Commonplace-Books? a little before, when I had proposed an argument he had not met with in those terms, he presently fancied I meant another argu…ent which he found under the title of Defectilility of the Church, and then in comes that with the answers he found ready to it. Now for the rational evidence o… Christian Religion, he finds not that Head in his Note-Books; and cannot therefore tell what to make of it. But an argument he had ready against the self-eviden…ing ligh… of the Scriptures; and therefore the Seraphims seather must serve instead of St. Larence's Gridiron. He might have been easily satisfied in that very Paragraph, what I mean by the rational evidence of Christian Religion; viz. the unquestionable assurance which we have of the matters of fact, and the miracles wrought by Christ for confirmation of his Doctrine: and this within four lines after the words by him produced. And in the foregoing paragraph, I insist very much on the evidence of sense as to the miracles wrought by Christ as a great part of the rational …vidence of Christianity, which is destroyed by the doctrine of the Roman Church, while transubstantiation is believed in it. For what assurance can there be of any object of sense such as the miracles of Christ were and his Body after his Resurrection; if we are so framed not only that our senses may be, but we are bound to believe that they are actually deceived in as proper an object of sense as any in the world? And if such a thing may be false what evidence can we have, when any thing is true? For if a thing so plain and evident to our senses may be false, viz. that what I and all other men see is bread; what ground of certainty can we have, but that which my senses and all other mens judge to be false may be true? For by this means the criterium both of sense and reason is destroyed and consequently all things are equally true and false to us; and then farewel sense and reason and Religion together. These things I there largely insist upon; which is all very silently passed over, the Schools having found no answers to such arguments; and therefore they must be content to be let alone. But however, though arguments cannot be answered I desire they may not be mis-represented; and that when I fully declare what I meanby rational evidence, such a sense may not be put upon my words as I never dreamt off.

There is nothing after which looks with the face of an answer to the…e Instances, unless it be that he saith, that none can have infallible assurance either of our Sav…ours Miracles, N. 19…or of any other verity recorded in Scripture, independent of some actual living, actual infallible, and most clear evidenced Oracle by signs above the force of nature, which in this present state is the Church. These are good sayings and they want only proving; and by the Instances already produced, I have shewed that Persons did believe upon such evidence, as implied no infallible Testimony; and if he goes about to prove the Church infallible by such Miracles wrought by her as were wrought by the Apostles, I desire only not to believe the Church infallible till I be satisfied about these Miracles; but of that afterwards.

But I demanded if we can have no assurance of the Miracles of Christ and his Apostles without an Infallible Church, what obligation can lie upon men to believe them, who see no reason to believe any such Infallibility? And since the Articles of our Faith are built upon matters of fact such as …he death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, whether these matters of fact may not be conveyed down in as unquestionable a manner as any others are? Cannot we have an unquestionable assurance that there were such persons as Caesar and Pompey, and that they did such and such things, without some Infallible Testimony? If we may in such things why not in other matters of fact which infinitely more concern the world to know, than whatever Caesar or Pompey did? This his Margin calls an unlearned objection, and in the body of his Book saith, I might have proposed a N. 20.wiser Question; an …asier I grant I might, as appears by the answer he gives it. For two things, he saith, may be considered. 1. That the man called Christ dyed upon the Cr…ss, and this, he saith, both Jews and Gentiles yet assent to upon Moral Cer…ainty, but therefore do not believe in Christ. 2. That the man called Christ dying for us was the only Messias, truly God, the Redeemer of mankind. Here we have, he saith, the hidden verities of Christian Religion, the certain objects of faith, conveyed unto us by no moral assurance but only upon Gods Infallible Revelation. A very wise answer I must needs say: if intolerable shuffling be any part of wisdom. Read over my words again, and be ashamed. If so, then men cannot have any unquestionable assurance that there was such a Person as Christ in the world, that he wrought such great miracles for confirmation of his doctrine, that he died and rose again. Is all this no more than the common consent of Jews, Gentiles and Cbristians that Christ died on a Cross? Was ever any man so senseless as to make only the belief of the death of Christ on the Cross, the reason of believing his Divinity? But I say his Miracles before and Resurrection a…ter gave abundant testimony that he was sent from God, and therefore his doctrine must needs be true; and when we believe the truth of his doctrine, w… are bound to believe every part of it, such are his being the only Messias, the true God, the Redeemer of mankind, and all other divine verities contained therein. Let the Reader now judge whether the Objection or the Answer savours of more ignorance and folly. But it is the mischief of this School-Divinity, that it adds confidence to Ignorance, and it makes men then most apt to despise others, when they most expose themselves.

I proceeded to shew, that instead of setling Rational Account Pa…t 1. c 5. sect. 9.faith on a sure foundation by the Churches Infallibility, they bring it to greater uncertainties than it was in before; because they can neither satisfie men what that Church is, which they suppose Infallible, what in that Church is the proper subject of this Infallibility, what kind of Infallibility it is, nor how we should know when the Church doth define Infallibly: and yet, I say, every one of these Questions is absolutely necessary to be resolved in order to the satisfaction of mens minds as to the Foundation of their Faith. His Answer to these Questions refers us to his proofs of the Roman Churches Infallibility, as Disc. 3. C. 3. …. 22.the only society of Christians which hath power to define Infallibly by her representative moral Body; which when I see proved I shall confess an Answer is given to those Questions. Only one thing he thinks fit to give a more particular Answer to; which is, that this Infallibility should be the only Foundation of C. 5. a. 1.believing all things in Religion, and yet so many things and some of them very strange ones must be certainly believed before it. Here his common-place-Book again fails him, and therefore wanting his Compass he roves and wanders from the point in hand. He tells me it is hard to guess at my meaning, for I name not one article thus assented to. Perhaps I would say, that the verities revealed in some Books of Scripture called Protocanonical known by their own proper signitures or motives, as the Harmony, Sanctity, and Majesty of the Stile, may be believed without this Testimony of an Infallible Church. Well, he doth not know what I meant, but he knew an Argument, he had an Answer ready to; and therefore that must be my meaning. But are not my words plain enough to any one that reads them? And what a vast measure of faith, say I, is necessary to believe the Papal Infallibility; for unless a man believes the particular Roman Church to be the Catholick Church, unless he believes that Christ hath promised an infallible assistance to the Pastors of the Church, and that not as separate, but as assembled in Council; and not in every Council, but such as the Pope calls and presides in and confirms, he cannot believe this Doctrine of Infallibility. Nay further, he must Infallibly believe the Church to be Infallible, though no Infallible Argument be brought for it; that this Church doth judicially and authoritatively pronounce her sentence in matters of Faith though we know not what that Church is which must so pronounce; that he Infallibly know that this particular sentence was so pronounced, though he can have no other than moral means of knowing it; and lastly, that the Infallibility must be the first thing believed, although all these things must be believed before it. Could any man well in his senses after reading these words imagine that I meant the self evidencing light of the Scriptures again? But they write for those that believe them, and that never dare look into the Books they pretend to consute.

Yet he hath a mind to prove the name of Roman Catholick Church to be no Bull: which I said in a Parenthesis, was like German universal Emperour: This gives a new start, another common-place Head is searched, Title, Catholick Church, there he finds ready the old weather beaten Testimonies, Rom. 1. 8. Your Faith is renowned the whole world over: ergo Roman and Catholick are all one. A plain demonstration! What need they talk of the obscurity of Faith, where there is such convincing evidence? But what if it should have happened that S. Paul had said the same thing of the Faith of the Corinthians, or Thessalonians, would it not have been a most evident demonstration that the Church of Corinth was the Catholick Church at that time, and was to continue so in following Ages? But Scripture though never so plain cannot serve their turn, they must have Fathers too. So E. W. brings in St. Hierom, St. Cyprian, St. Athanasius, St. Ambrose, all evidently proving that the Church of Rome was once Catholick: and what then I beseech him? Were not other Churches so too? But these very Testimonies, as it unhappily falls out, had been particularly and largely examined by me in a whole Chapter to that purpose. Rational Account part 2. c. 1.But it is no matter for that, I had not blotted them out of his Note-Books, and there he found no answers, and therefore out they come again.

§. 11. 2. The second thing I objected Of the Circle in the Resolution of Faith, not avoided by E. W.against this way of resolving Faith, was that it did not effect that which it was brought for, for supposing that Chuch Infallible, and that Infallibility proved by the motives of credibility, they do not escape the circle objected against them: Which I shewed, 1. from the nature of divine Faith as explained by them. 2. From the consideration of the persons whose Faith was to be resolved. 3. From the nature of that Infallibility which is attributed to the Church. I must now consider how E. W. attempts the clearing of these difficulties.

1. As to the nature of divine Faith. I ask whether a divine Faith as to the Churches Infallibility, may be built upon the motives of credibility? If it may, then a divine Faith may rest upon prudential motives, if not, then this way cannot clear them from a circle in the resolution of divine Faith. For I demanded why with a divine Faith they believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God? Their answer is, because the Church which is Infallible delivers them as such to us. If I then ask, why with a divine Faith they believe the Churches Infallibility? I desired them to answer me if they can any other way than because the Scriptures which are Infallible say so. It is a very pleasant thing to see how E. W. is miserably put to his shifts about this difficulty, for although in his former Discourses he had pressed the necessity of divine Faith so much, that from thence he might introduce the necessity of Infallibility; yet he now seems wholly to have forgotten any such distinction, of Faith humane and divine; although he could not but see that the force of my Argument did depend upon it. The substance of his answer is, That the first act of Diss. 3. c. 5. n. 5.Faith whereby we believe the Churches Infallibility relies not on Scripture, but upon the Church it self, as the most known manisested Oracle. Be it so: but the Question is, whether this first act be divine Faith or not; if not, it is nothing to the purpose, if it be, then divine Faith may want an Infallible Testimony: for this first act of Faith concerning the Churches Infallibility hath nothing to rely upon, but the fallible motives of credibility, and consequently divine Faith may want an Infallible Testimony. And I say still let them answer this if they can; without apparent shuffling and running away from the Question in hand.

2. From the consideration of the persons whose Faith is to be resolved: for I say, 1. The Question is not which way they will prove the Insallibility of their Church against those who deny it, but which way they resolve their own Faith of the Churches Infallibility. 2. In disputing against their Adversaries they cannot avoid the circle; for while they prove Infallibility from Scripture, the Question arises how they come to know Infallibly, that this is the sense of those places? for which they must again appeal to the Churches Infallibility in delivering the sense of Scripture: which if it be not a circle, I say, there is hardly such a figure in Mathematicks. To this he answers. 1. That they both resolve and prove; but then if they do resolve N. 7.their Faith into this Infallibility, it is no sufsicient answer to say they only prove it to Adversaries: which was all I intended by that first particular. But what answer doth he give to the second concerning tbe sense of Scripture? Here again he makes use of his distinction of the first and second act of Faith; the first he saith, is not at all founded N. S, 9.upon the sense of Scripture, but upon the Churches own Infallible Testimony made by it self and for it self immediately credible. Now if we speak, saith he, of another distinct, consequent, and more explicit act of Faith, when we believe the Churches Infallibility upon this ground, that she declares the Scriptures genuine sense which proves her an Infallible Oracle, there is no difficulty at all, because this very Exposition or Interpretation of Scripture is ultimately resolved into (and therefore again believed upon) the same Infallible Authority of the Church, or rather upon Scripture and the Churches Interpretation together. For thus joyntly taken they ground Faith, and not like two disparate principles, as if we first believed the Scriptures sense independently of the Churches Interpretation, and then again believed the Churches interpretation to be Infallible, because the sense of Scripture known aliunde, or without depending on Church Authority, saith she is Infallible; This cannot b… if Scripture and the Churches interpretation indivisibly concur to this latter act of Faith, whereof we now speak. Here then is a Dilemma that clears all and frees us from the least shadow of a circle: we either know (or believe) the Scriptures N. 10.sense independently of the Churches interpretation, or receive it upon her Infallible Authority; grant the first there is no danger of a circle; grant the latter, there are … two imaginable propositions to make a circle of, whilst that sense internal to the letter cannot be Infallibly propounded otherwise, than by the Church. I have set down these words more at large to let the Reader try his faculty upon them; what tolerable sense he can make of them. My objection was plain and easie, they offer to prove the Churches Infallibility by Scripture, at least as to the second act of Faith, which is alone pertinent to our purpose; I asked what way they come to believe Infallibly themselves and assure others this is the sense of those places; and in this case they are forced to return to the Churches Infalli…ility; judge now, Reader, whether here be not a plain circle because they believe the Church Infallible because the true sense of Scripture saith she is so; and again they believe this to be the Infallible sense of Scripture, because the Infallible Church saith so. No saith E. W. Here is not the least shadow of a circle. I would he had told us first what a circle was, and then applyed what he had said to the description given of it. But for all that I can see by his answer he had a mind to amuse his Reader by seeming to say something; but no great matter what. Is not that a circle when the Argument made use of to prove another thing by, must it self foreign. Sexius Empir. Pyrr…o. hypo…p. l. 1. c. 15.be proved by that very thing, which it is made use of to prove? For in this case the mind hath nothing to fix it self upon, and therefore must suspend all assent: which must have some certain foundation to proceed upon, on which it may rest it self. As the will could not love Physick for the sake of health, if it loved health for the sake of Physick, so neither can the understanding assent to one truth for another, if it assent to that other only for the sake of the former. For then the same Proposition would be more certain than the other, as it is the antecedent by which the other is proved; and less certain as it is the consequent proved by the other as it's antecedent: and so in different respects would be more and less certain than it self. Let us now apply this to our present case. The thing to be proved is the Churches Infallibility, the Argument to prove it by, is the Infallible sense of Scripture; but if the Infallible sense of Scripture can be proved by nothing but the Churches Infallible interpretation; then it is plain that is assumed as an Argument to prove Infallibility by, which cannot be otherwise known than by this Infallibility. Now let any man attend to the answer he gives: he saith, there is no difficulty at all in believing the Churches Infallibility upon this ground, that she declares the Scriptures genuine sense which proves her an Infallible Oracle. No difficulty at all! Nay, that is a little strange, that there should be no difficulty at all in believing the Churches Infallibility upon the sense of those Scriptures, whose sense could not be insallibly known without the supposal of that Infallibility, which is to be proved by them. But how comes there to be no difficulty at all in this matter? Because this very Exposition or Interpretation of Scripture brought to its last principle is ultimately resolved into (and therefore again believed upon) the same Infallible Authority of the Church, or rather upon Scripture and the Churches interpretation together. What a strange thing the difference of mens understandings is! That which he thinks makes it no diffic…lty at all, makes it to me the greatest in the world. For by the Exposition or Interpretation I suppose he means, the Infallible sense of Scripture: and if this be resolved into and believed upon the same Infallible Authority of the Church, then I still enquire how this Infallible Authority of the Church comes to be proved by this Exposition of Scripture the Infallibility of which doth suppose the thing to be proved, viz. the Churches Infallibility. And if the sense internal to the letter cannot be infallibly propounded otherwise than by the Church; I would fain know what assurance any man can have of this sense but from the belief of this Infallible Interpreter? But, saith he, Scripture and the Churches Interpretation indivisibly concur to this latter act of Faith. This indivisible concurrence, is to me an odd piece of mystical Divinity: the meaning must be (if there be any) that I believe the Church Infallibility by those Scriptures, from the Churches Infallibility appearing in the Infallible sense of those Scriptures. But whence, say I, doth this appear to be the Infallible sense of them? For if the sense of any places of Scripture be doubtful, theirs is; since their meaning is so doubtful, how come men firmly to believe this to be the true and Infallible sense of those places and none else? Can men come to an Infallible sense of Scripture, without an Infallible Church? if so, what need of any such Infallibility? if not, then the Infallible sense of these places cannot be known but from the Churches Infallibility: and therefore the Circle unavoidably follows, viz. that they must prove the Churches Infallibility by the Infallible sense of Scripture, and the Infallible sense of Scripture by the Churches Infallibility. And any man might easily guess that E. W. was in a Circle by his Conjuring, and speaking things which neither he, nor any one else can understand.

3. I shewed, that they avoided not the circle by this way, from the nature of the Infallibility, which they attribute to the Church. Which is not by an immediate Revelation, but but by Divine assistance promised in Scripture; and therefore the utmost the motives of credibility can do in this case, is only to notifie or distinguish the Church; but still the formal reason of believing this Infallibility, cannot be from those Motives, but from those promises which are supposed in Scripture to imply it. So that still the circle returns, for they believe the Scriptures. Infallible because of the Churches Testimony, and the Church Infallible because of the promis… of Scripture. This he gravely calls, a… N. 11.unlearned objection. That is even as i… pleases him; but I have no reason to take him for an Infallible judge of Learning: how ever it is no great matter, learned o… unlearned, it is more than he gives any tolerable answer to. But I see no reason why he calls it so unless it be, because he saith it is in effect the same objection repeated again. And he thinks a man may be allowed to call his Creditor Rogu… or Rascal, that comes a second time, because he could get no good answer at first. However such is the civility of E. W. that he will not send it away without a sufficient answer; and yet after all we have nothing for payment but the first general act of Faith; one would have thought it had been the Act of Publick Faith, by the badness of the payment. And this first general act of Faith, he saith, w…olly relies upon the Churches own Infallible Testimony, without depending on Scripture. But what is this to that divine Faith we enquire after, and which, he saith, must rest upon an Infallible Authority? For since Faith must rest upon its motives, and those motives are confessed to be fallible; this cannot be that assent of Faith, which himself makes to be necessary and we have made appear, notwithstanding all his shusfling, unavoidably brings them into a Circle.