A Persuasive to an Ingenuous Trial of Opinions in Religion, Section 5
§ 5.
II. Becauſe the duty of proving all things ſuppoſes certain Rules and Teſts, by which Doctrines are to be examined and tryed, I proceed to ſhew what they are. Now it is very certain that the Rules by which we are to try Doctrines for our own ſatisfaction about them, are no other than thoſe want of Argument by which a wiſe man would prove the truth of his Perſwaſion to others for their ſatisfaction. And therefore it is plain that thoſe Rules muſt be common to me and to other men whom I would alſo guide ſo into the knowledge of that Truth to which I have attained. And they are theſe three.
1. Reaſon, which is a common Rule to all men. 2. Scripture, which is a common Rule to all Chriſtians. 3. Antiquity, or the uniform Judgment and Practice of the Church in the firſt Ages of Chriſtianity; which is a common Rule to thoſe who are verſt in the Hiſtories of the Primitive Church, and in the Writings of the Fathers.
The two former Rules are the principal and moſt neceſſary, and we are ſafe if our Perſwaſions in Religion will bear the Teſt of Reaſon and Scripture, and withal thoſe Rules are near at hand for every mans uſe amongſt us. But the laſt Rule is alſo of good uſe to thoſe that can uſe it, for their own confirmation in the truth, and ſtopping the mouths of gain-ſayers. But more particularly,
1. By Reaſon, I do not underſtand that Faculty by which we are men, and can compare one thing with another, and argue and conclude, &c. for this is that Natural Power by which we uſe any kind of Rule whereby to judge of the truth or falſhood of Opinions in Religion; but I underſtand by it, thoſe common Truths which are natural to the minds of men, and to which we give a ready aſſent, without any need of having them proved by any thing elſe. For by theſe fundamental Truths we are to prove all things elſe; and if there were none ſuch, we could prove nothing. And they are ſuch as theſe, That nothing can make it ſelf; That the ſame thing cannot be and not be at the ſame time; That common ſence is to be truſted; That God is a being abſolutely perfect; That the Good is to be choſen, and the Evil to be refuſed; and that Contradictions cannot be true, and the like. Now whatever is by true conſequence deduced from ſuch Principles, is thereby proved to be true; and whatſoever is repugnant to them, or can be diſproved by them, is falſe. They are the forementioned Propoſitions, with others as ſelf-evident as they; which make up that which we call the Light of Nature or of Reaſon. And I mention this Rule in the firſt place, becauſe it muſt be preſuppoſed to all other ways and means of enquiring after Truth, and without which nothing could be done in it; inſomuch that the belief of that Truth which is not to be deduced from mere natural Reaſon, but depends upon a divine Teſtimony, is at laſt reſolved into a rational Act, and relies upon this natural Principle, that God cannot lye.
Wherefore they that cry down Reaſon, as if it were at no hand to be truſted in matters of Religion, and call it carnal, blind, and fooliſh Reaſon, and ſuch-like vile names, if they are in good earneſt, they are incapable of ſearching after Truth themſelves, and of receiving any ſatisfaction from others. While they are in this humour, I may as well take a Beaſt to diſpute with, as go about to convince them. And if all men were thus ſenſeleſs, it were impoſſible that men ſhould be ſerviceable to inſtruct one another in the things of God. But to abandon the uſe of Reaſon in matters of Religion, and to ſcorn a man when he ſpeaks conſiſtently, and argues clearly from common Principles of Truth, is ſuch a wretched ſort of unmanlineſs, that I cannot but think it is for the moſt part taken up in deſigne, by thoſe men that have brought Nonſence, and Contradictions, and abſurd Opinions into Religion; which no man can admit, without doing violence to his own underſtanding. For when Hypocrites have for their worldly intereſt debauched Religion in this manner, they know that the meaneſt people will never ſwallow their groſs abſurdities, unleſs they can firſt prevail with them to believe that 'tis a dangerous thing to truſt their own eyes, or to hearken to any diſcourſe from Principles of Reaſon, though it be never ſo clear and ſtrong; and that it is a kind of merit to believe things incredible, and to ſtick to a concluſion the faſter, the more impoſſible it ſeems to be true. But by the way, if Reaſon be one, and that the firſt means by which we are to judge for our ſelves in matters of Religion, as I ſhall make bold to ſay it is, I ſhould vehemently ſuſpect, without farther examination, that they know their Opinions to be very fooliſh, who at firſt daſh renounce the moſt general and neceſſary Rule by which they are to be tried.
I ſhall onelyonly adde, that becauſe the fundamental Principles of Reaſon are the ſame all the World over; Reaſon is therefore the moſt publick Rule and Teſt, whereby to judge between Truth and Errour. And therefore if a Council defines things in that manner, that I muſt forſake right Reaſon to follow its Definitions; when I make this plain, this is not oppoſing a private Spirit to a publick Judgment, but appealing from a leſs publick Judgment, to the moſt publick Sence and Judgment of mankind.