A Persuasive to an Ingenuous Trial of Opinions in Religion, Section 2
§ 2.
If we conſider what has been already ſaid, it will not be difficult to anſwer the ſecond Queſtion.
2. Whether a liberty of examining and judging in matters of Religion, doth miſchief in the Church, and be the cauſe of Hereſies and Schiſms? To which I anſwer, that
To affirm this, is in effect to ſay, that it had been much better, in order to the peace of the Church, and the prevailing of Truth, that men had been nearer to ſtocks and ſtones, than endued with natural Abilities of judging, and natural propenſions to uſe thoſe Abilities; which I think would be to reflect upon the Wiſdom of our Maker. For certainly it had been better for men to have wanted the faculties of judging and proving, if it be ſo dangerous a thing to the Church to make uſe of them. Nor is it much for the credit of the Church, that it ſhould be againſt her intereſt for men to examine her Doctrine, and uſe their Reaſon about it as well as they can.
To ſpeak to the thing: It is not the liberty of examination and judgment in order to the knowledge of the Truth, that cauſeth Hereſies and Schiſms, but the not making a right uſe of this liberty, i. e. mens entring upon this work with Pride, and the prevalency of Luſt and Paſſion, and worldly intereſt, their want of care and diligence, and of proving things ſufficiently; their taking up Opinions without reaſonable examination, and then ſeeking for Pretences to colour their obſtinacy. The Luſts and Vices of men are againſt the peace of the Church and the intereſt of Truth, but not the uſe of that Reaſon which is the divine part of our Natures, and which God hath given us to reſtrain and govern our inferiour Faculties.
'Tis true indeed, that if few or none troubled themſelves at all to judge in matters of Religion, there would be no Hereſies. But 'tis true too, that if they had no reaſon to judge of theſe things at all, there would have been no Hereſies; and 'tis as true, that if there had been no Religion at all, it were impoſſible that there ſhould be Hereſies in Religion. But will any men ſay, that Reaſon or Religion is therefore the cauſe of Hereſies? And yet there is as much reaſon to ſay this, as to conclude that the uſe of our own underſtandings in the things of God, is the cauſe of Hereſies. Theſe things are too groſs to need a Confutation.
And yet this Pretence againſt the liberty of proving what is propounded to us in Religion, is intended chiefly againſt private and ordinary perſons, but not againſt the publick Guides and Officers of the Church; whereas in truth, if there be any thing in it, it holds more ſtrongly againſt theſe than againſt the other: And that becauſe the moſt pernicious Hereſies that ever came into the Church, were brought in by men of Learning and Authority in the Church. And if this Pretence be good, they of all men ſhould be forbidden to inquire into matters of Religion; becauſe if they fall into any dangerous miſtake, their Authority is likely to give reputation to it, and to make it go down more eaſily with the common People, than if it had been ſtarted by one of themſelves. So that we muſt not lay the Hereſies that have been in the Church, to the liberty we have been contending for, unleſs we will be content to exclude all from the duty of proving what they have been taught to …. And no man can think this reaſonable, unleſs he … all Religions to be equally true, that is, every one to be alike falſe. And he that believes this, needs not care what Hereſie he is of.