A Treatise of Justifying Righteousness, Book 2 · Aphorism 66 – Aphorism 71
Aphorism.
BƲt the Covenant-Conditions are not Page 163.broken, when-ever the Precept of the Gospel is transgressed, or the Covenant neglected, except it be final.
Animadvers.
This seems more acute than solid. For may not the Conditions of the Covenant be broken, though they be not finally broken? The Conditions of the New-Covenant are, to repent and believe. Now if they to whom the New-Covenant is tendered, be impenitent and unbelieving; so long as they are so, they break the Conditions of the New-Covenant, whether it be only for a time, or to the end. Indeed if the Covenant-Conditions be at length performed, they are not absolutely broken; but yet broken they are, whilst they are not performed, and yet ought to be performed. The New-Covenant you grant, may be neglected; but it is not neglected, if the Conditions of it be performed: And to distinguish between not-performing the Conditions of the Covenant, when it is tendered, and breaking the Conditions of it; I think is not sound.
Reply.
1. You seem (by your silence) to grant the main thing I here intend; viz. Thes. 33. That Christ died not to satisfie for the Violation of the Covenant of Grace, but of Works only.
2. I did explain what I meant by [Violating the Conditions] in the last word of the Thesis, [So as that the offend … should fall under the Threat]: But more fully in the Appendix.
3. By [the Threatning,] I mean not [every discovery of an imminent danger;] but that proper act of the Law, which is obligare ad poenam.
4. I still confess, that for Ʋnbelief and Impenitency, men remain obligati ad poenam per Legem naturae, till they believe, and so that Obligation be dissolved.
5. But still I deny it, as to the proper Obligation of the New-Law: For I conceive that is peremptory, remediless and undissolvable. And therefore I think it both sound and necessary to distinguish between the proper Violation of the Covenant, and the temporary non-performance of the Conditions. Yet I resolve not to contend about the Word or Name: If you think the one is as properly to be called a Violation as the other, and I think not, this is a matter of no great moment. But as to the thing intended by that word, I say, that Ʋnbelief not final, is no such Violation of the New-Law, as to make us obligati ad poenam hujus Legis propriam, or that this Law should oblige us to punishment. For else we must say, that Christ came to satisfie his own Law, and be a Mediator between himself, as Mediator, and sinners, which I am loth to say. Indeed the Gospel-Covenant doth non-liberare, while men continue their unbelief. But I conceive it doth not obligare ad poenam propriè, viz. ad non-liberationem & ad poenam majorem, but for final non-performance. For if it do, it is either absolutely, or conditionally: Not absolutely (which you here confess;) for then there were no remedy: For the absolute Threat of the New-Law is irrevocable and remediless. And if but conditionally, then it is no Obligation: For it were no Condition, if it suspend not the Act of the Law. If a King say to a company of imprisoned Murtherers, He that will promise a new-life shall be pardoned; and he that will not, shall not be pardoned, but at the Assizes suffer a double torment. Here the Condition of present Liberation indeed is present, promising amendment; and for want of present promising, he shall want present Liberation. But the Condition of Liberation or Condemnation at the Assizes, is promising any time between this and then. And so here: The Gospel doth not remediare, dissolve the Laws Obligation, as long as we continue impenitent. But it obligeth us not to Condemnation at Judgment, but upon final Unbelief. If yet any say, that this present non-Liberation is poena novae Legis, and so far it may be said obligare: Though I should rather say, it doth non dissolvere obligationem, yet I shall confess, that this non-Liberation may in some sort be called poena, and I will not stick at this. Only remember that this is nothing to the Obligation, to sentential Condemnation de futuro, which we speak of. 2. And that Christ need not die for this: For this non-liberatio dum non credo, is a penalty that I bear my self (non enim liberor;) and therefore Christ need not bear it for me.
But I come so lately from a fuller handling this point with another, that I must say no more of it now.
Aphorism.
THe Condition is, Whosoever believeth Page 164.shall be saved, not limiting it to a particular season.
Animadvers.
It's true: He only shall be damned as a Transgressor of the New-Covenant, who is a final Unbeliever; yet all the time that any refuse to believe, they are liable to Damnation, as …ansgr…ssing all that time the New-Covenant, and breaking the Condition of it.
Reply.
If by [Lyable,] you mean [actually obliged to Damnation,] I deny it. If you mean, they are in danger of it, because God may cut them off when he will; or that supposing their Unbelief to be final, they would be obliged; or that there wants nothing but the finality to oblige them; or that they are obliged even for that sin, to death per Legem naturae, and are non liberati per Legem gratiae, I grant all this.
Aphorism.
BEcause the punishment which naturally Page 165.and implicitely is due to them, is not so much as threatned in this gentle Covenant, &c.
Adnimadvers.
Perhaps this place is mis-printed: Otherwise I do not see how these words make for the proof of that which went before; viz. [The sins of Believers against the Gospel-Precepts have need of pardon, and are properly said to be pardoned, in reference to their deserved punishment.] Is Punishment therefore deserved, because it is not threatened? Or do you mean (as perhaps you do) by those words, [which is naturally and implicitely due to them,] that Punishment is deserved, but not threatned? But if Punishment be not threatned, there s…m, no need of pardon. Because what need is there to fear that which is not threatned? As what ground is there to hope for that which is not promised? Somewhere before your self sa…s, What God doth not threaten, we need not fear.
Reply.
The mis-printing is, that there should have been a Parenthesis to enclose six lines, from [1. Both.] till [because:] And so the word [Properly] I intended only to joyn with the second Section; and intended the first as improperly, called Pardon, arguing, not as you suppose, [It is not threatned, therefore not deserved;] but thus, [It was threatened by the Old-Law, and is not so much as threatned by the New; therefore it may improperly be said to be remitted.]
Aphorism.
ACts have not the respect of an Adjunct Page 173.to its Subject, but of an Effect to its Cause.
Animadvers.
Every Act is an accident, and therefore must have a subject: for it cannot subsist by it self. And whereas transient Acts are subjected in the Patient, immanent Acts are subjected in the Agent, because here the Agent is also the Patient.
Reply.
Because I will not vainly enter into a Logical Dispute with you, I will only answer you in the words of Schibler, Metaphys. l. 2. c. 10. Art. 4. Tom. 3. punct. 1, 2. §. 51. 54, 55. Accidens est in alio loquendo per foreign. Omne scil. accidens est in alio sensu negativo quatenus non habet esse foreign, sive per se subsistens. Alias autem loquendo de generalia essentia accidentis, non est ea inhaerendo, si rigorose loquamur; sed in eo, quod id quod accidens est, afficit substantiam extra-essentialiter, sive extra essentiam, aut rationem ejus existendo, &c. vid. ultra. Et n. 54. Quod ad actionem immanentem attinet, dicitur immanens ab immanendo quia in agente maneat. Existimo tamen eam non esse intelligendam positivè sed negativè. Nempè actio immanens qua talis est in agente hoc sensu, quia non transit ad patiens. In ipso autem agente non est per modum adjuncti, sed simpliciter ad ipsum comparatur ut ad causam. Ʋnde haec propositio, homo intelligit vel disputat, non est ut adjuncti de subjecto, sed ut effecti de causa: Et patet. Nam actio transiens nullum habet subjectum, ne quidem ipsum patiens, ut visum est: ergo etiam actio Immanens à fortiori non postulat subjectum. Consequentia firma est: quia actio transiens magis est ex subjecto, & magis postulat subjectum, quam actio immanens. Sed actio transiens in esse actionis nullum habet subjectum ut visum est, ergo idem à fortiore est in actione immanente. Et confirmatur, quod actio ut sic, non dicit nisi egressum à virtute activa alicujus agentis. Egressus autem opponitur foreign esse in. Et hinc relinquitur, generatim loquendo de actione ut sic, eam non postulare subjectum, &c. I think it fitter to say, Actio est agentis, than Actio est in agente. Yet I confess my self in doubt about Scotus Doctrine, that [Immanent Acts in their perfection, are not in the predicament of Action, but of Quality:] And if that be so, you may well say they are in Agente ut subjecto.
Aphorism.
BƲt grant that all God's immanent Page 174.Acts are eternal (which I think is quite beyond our understanding to know,) &c.
Animadvers.
Immanent acts (as that very word it self doth shew) abiding in the agent (for therefore they are called immanent.) Lither God's imman…n… Acts must be eternal, or there must be some…hing in God which is but temporal: Whereas quicquid est in De… est Deus: othe…wise he should not be a most pure and simple Essence, as he is.
Reply.
I use to speak as you do; and thus oppose those that think otherwise: But let me profess, it is but my Opinion, and not my Faith. I have no such clear knowledg of the Divine Essence, as peremptorily to conclude these things as certain. I know God is eternal, and that he is perfect: But whether his perfection lye, in having no Acts but his Essence; or whether God do agere at all; or whether his Acts have extrinsick objects; or whether those Acts which have such extrinsick objects, are properly immanent, as those are whose object is God himself, &c. I dare not conclude as certain, though I think as you. Oh how little know I of God's Essence!
Aphorism.
RElations are but mere entia Rationis.Page 175.
Animadvers.
Why then is Relation put among the Predicaments? Is there not a …e…l Relation betwixt the Father and the Son? a Relation which hath its being in Nature, and not in mans int…le…t …?
Reply.
I am so far from believing all the Predicaments to be real Beings, that I doubt whether any two of them Herebr. saith, Quare inepte dicitur & falso, Relationes more accident tum caeterorum inesse sujectis, cum subjecto tantum modo attribuantur. Voces quippe Relative non significant aliud, quod subjecto proprie ac per se inest, sed tantum declarant quomodo subjectum se habeat ad terminum, &c. And he saith, That Relation is Medium inter ens reale & nihil, non participationis sed negationis: Of which there are also other sorts, Disp. Phil. 5. page 178, 184.wholly are so, as much as Carpenter did. Yet I take them to be as Burgersdicius speaks, aliquid inter nihil & ens reale: And I think that Scotus his formalitates or modi, and ens rationis, contain much that now commonly goes under another Name. I think the subjectum & fundamentum Relationis, is sometimes quid reale (usually, but quid modale is the fundamentum.) I think that the comparing or collating act of understanding is not a mere fiction, or false, when it makes Relation. But whether when the Foundation is laid, the Fabrication of the Essence of the Relation ut sic, be not by the Intellect, is my question. If Peccatum be but ens rationis (which is accounted a real Relation of Disconformity to the Rule) as is ordinarily said: And if veritas be but ens rationis (as Durandus saith) why may I not say so of others? Relation-terms are as properly ascribed to God, as any terms of Humane Language, I think. But was God from Eternity a Creator? If yea, then there was a Creature, or a Relation without a correlate. If no; then it begun in time. If so, then if it were any real Being (remember your last arguing) it must be God himself, and so eternal, or God not eternal. But I am resolved not to dispute this with you: Only that Relation is not verè ens (of which I am more confident, than what it is) save me the labour of transcribing, and read Burgersdicius, l. 1. c. 5. &c. 6. and Hereboord, Disp. Phil. 5. per tot. (I will not refer you to Carpenter) vid. & quid de Relat. Rationis dicit Twissus Vind. Grat. l. 2. part. 1. §. 13. pag. (minor. volun….) 208. praecipue ex Vasquio.