A Treatise of Justifying Righteousness, Letter · Section 14
§. XIV. Pag. 23, 24. You talk as if my supposing that both [Justice] and [Imputation], are capable of Definitions which are not the Things, were a Fallacy, because [or] is a disjunctive; viz. When I say that the Definition of the one, or the other, is not the Thing. Do you grant it of them Disjunctively, and yet maintain the contrary of them Conjunct? Yes, you say, [Imputed Justice cannot differ from its true definition, unless you will have it to differ really from it self]. And, pag. 34. you say, [I am ashamed you should thus over and over expose your self—as if supposing (Definitions) true, they were not the same Re, with the Definitum.—Good Sir, talk what you please in private, to such as understand not what you say, and let them give you a grand foreign for your pains; but you may do well to use more Civility to the reason of a Scholar, though he hath not yet worn out his Freshmans G…wn….
Answ. This is no light or jesting Matter: The comfort of Souls dependeth on it. I see some Men expect that Reverence of their Scholarship should give them great advantage: But if one argued thus with me for Transubstantiation, I would not turn to him, to escape the Guilt of Incivility.
If the Definition, and the Definitum, as in question now, be the same Thing, wo to all the Unlearned World, and wo to all Freshmen, that yet have not learnt well to define, and wo to all Divines that differ in their Definitions, except those that are in the right.
I know that a Word and a Mental Conception, are not Nothing: They may be called Things, but when we distinguish the Things from their Signs, Names, or Definitions, we take not the word [Things] so laxly, as to comprehend the said Signs, Names, &c. When we say, that the Thing defined is necessary, but to be able to Define it, or actually to Define it, is not necessary (to Salvation) it is notorious that we take Definition (as Defining) actively, as it is Actus definientis, and Definire sure is not the same with the Thing desined. I have heard before your Letter told me, that Definitum & Definitio idem sunt: But, I pray you, let us not quibble almost all the World under a sentence of Damnation. As long ago as it is since I read such words, I remember our Masters told us, (I think Schibler in his Topicks for one) that when they are taken Pro terminis Logicis defini…io & definitum non sunt idem; but only when they are taken Pro rebus per eos terminos significatis; and that there they differ in Modo significandi essentiam, the definitum signifying the Essence confusedly, and the Definition distinctly. If you will take the Res definita, for that which is strictly nothing but Rei conceptus inadaequatus seu partialis, (that is, a Species) and that not as the thing is Existent extra intellectum, but as the conception is an operation of the Mind, so I confess, that he that hath a true Conception of a Species as meerly denominated, or as defined, hath the same conception of it: And also the Thing named, and the Thing defined, is the same thing … it self. Homo & Animal rationale, are the same, that is, it is the same essence, which is denominated Homo, and defined Animal rationale. And it is the same Conceptus mentis, which we have (if true) when we denominate, and when we define. But as Things are distinct from the knowledg and signs of Things, nothing is Res, that is not existent; and nothing existeth but in Singulars (or Individuals): And as nothing can be defined but a Species, so a Species, or any Ʋniversal, is nothing but a Notion, or Ens rationis, save as it existeth in the said Individuals. And in the Individuals, it is nothing but their being as partially, or inadequatly taken, or a Conceptus objectivus partialis, (whether it be of a thing really, or only intellectually partible, or any thing which our narrow Minds cannot conceive of, Ʋno & simplici conceptu activo). Now if you take the word [Definition] for the Species, as existent in Individuals, it is really a part of the thing, that is, a Partial objective conceptus, or somewhat of the Thing as Intelligible: But this is to take [Definition] in Sensu passivo, for the Thing defined; which our Case distinguisheth.
But Sir, I crave your leave, to distinguish Real objective Beings, from, 1. The Knowledg. 2. and the Names, and other Logical Organs, by which we know them, and express our knowledg of them: God, Christ, Grace, Glory, Pardon, Justification, Sanctification, the Gospel-Doctrine, Precept, Promises, Faith, Hope, Love, Obedience, Humility, Patience, &c. are the Res definitae in our Case, not as they are in esse cognito, or in the notion or idea of them, but in esse reali. To Define properly, is either, 1. Mentally to conceive of these things; 2. or Expressively, to signifie such Conceptions, agreeably to the nature of the things known, or Expressively defined: Which is, if the Definition be perfect, under the notions of a Genus, and Differentia. The Definition as in Words, is but a Logical Organ, (as Names are also Notifying signs): Mental defining, is but the said distinct knowledg of the thing defined, and is neither really the Thing it self, nor usually of necessity to the Thing: Which two, I shall prove distinctly as to the sense of our Case.
1. The Definition of Justification, is either our Distinct knowledg, or Expression of it: Justification is not our Distinct knowledg, or Expression of it: Therefore the Definition of Justification, and Justification, are not the same.
Justification In sensu activo, is not an Act of God, and In sensu passivo, is the Relative state of Man thereby effected: But the Definition of Justification is neither.
The Definition of Justification, is a work of Art; but Justification is a Work of Grace.
A wicked damnable Man, or a damned Devil, may define Justification, and so have the Definition of it; but not Justification it self.
The Definition of Justification, Faith, Love, &c. is Quid Logicum; but Justification, Faith, Love, &c. are things Physical and Moral.
A Man is Justified (or hath Christs Righteousness imputed to him) in his sleep, and when he thinketh not of it; but he hath not the Active definition of Justification in his sleep, &c.
Other things be not the same Really with their Definition, therefore neither is Justification, Faith, &c.
The Sun is not really the same thing with a Definition of the Sun; nor Light, Heat, Motion, &c. A Brute can see, taste, feel, smell, that cannot define them. If you have a Bishoprick, because you define a Bishoprick, or have a Lordship, a Kingdom, Health, &c. because you can define them, your Axiome hath stood you in good stead.
The Definition is but Explicatio rei: But Rei explicatio non est ipsa res.
Individuals (say most) are not Definable: But nothing is truly Res, but Individuals. Ʋniversals as they are in the Mind, are existent Individual Acts, Cogitations, Notions: As they are out of the Mind, they are nothing but Individuorum quid intelligibile.
The Definition of Learning, of a Doctor, &c. may be got in a day: If Learning and Doctorship may be so, what useless things are Universities and Books?
Perswade a hungry Scholar, that he hath Meat and Drink; or the Ambitious, that he hath Preferment; or the Covetous, or Poor, that he hath Money, because he hath in his Mind, or Mouth, the Definition of it; and quibble him into satisfaction by telling him, that Definitio & definitum sunt idem re. We know and express things narrowly by Names, and largely and distinctly by Definitions: The Definition here, is Explicatio nominis, (as Animal rationale, of the name Homo); and both Name and Definition, as they are Verba mentis vel ori…, or Verborum significatio, are surely divers from the things named and defined, known and expressed; unless by the Thing you mean only the Knowledg, or Notion of the Thing.
Therefore though Cui competit definitio eidem quo{que} competit definitum, & contra, & quod convenit definitioni convenit definito: Yet say not that Imputed Righteousness in Re, is the same with the Definition, as it is the Definers act.
By this time you have helpt Men to understand by an Instance, why St. Paul so much warneth Christians to take heed lest any deceive them by vain Philosophy, even by Sophistry, and abused arbitrary Notions.
Remember, Sir, that our Case is of grand Importance; As it is stated in my Direct. 42. which you assaulted; it is [Whether if the Question were of the Object of Predestination, of the nature of the Will's liberty, Divine concourse, and determining way of Grace, of the Definition of Justification, Faith, &c. a few well studied Divines are not here to be preferred before Authority, and the major Vote. Such are my words. I assert, 1. That the Defining of Justification, Faith, &c. is a work of Art. 2. And I have many and many times told the World (which you seem to strike at) that Christians do not differ so much in their Real conceptions of the Matter, as they do in their Definitions. 1. Because Definitions are made up of Ambiguous words, whose Explication they are not agreed in; and almost all Words are ambiguous till explained, and ambiguous Words are not fit to define, or be defined, till explained. And, 2. Because both selecting fit terms, and explaining them, and ordering them, are works of Art, in which Men are unequal; and there is as great variety of Intellectual Conceptions, as of Faces. 3. And I have often said, That a Knowledg intuitive, or a Simple apprehension of a thing as Sensate, or an Internal experience, or Reflect act, and a general notion of some things, may prove the truth of Grace, and save Souls, and make us capable of Christian Love and Communion, as being true saving Knowledg. 4. And consequently I have often said, that many a thousand Christians have Faith, Hope, Desire, Love, Humility, Obedience, Justication, Adoption, Ʋnion with Christ, who can define none of these: Unless you will speak equivocally of Definition it self, and say as good Melancthon, and as Gutherleth, and some other Romists, that Notitia intuitiva est definitio, who yet say but what I am saying, when they add, [Vel saltem instar definitionis]. If all are without Faith, Love, Justification, Adoption, who cannot give a true Definition of them, how few will be saved? How much more then doth Learning to Mens salvation, than Grace? And Aristotle then is not so far below Paul, or the Spirit of Christ, as we (justly) believe.
The Case is so weighty and palpable, that you have nothing to sa…; but as you did about the Guilt of our nearer Parents sins, to yield all the Cause, and with a passionate clamour to tell Men that I mistake you, or wrest your words; of which I shall appeal to every sober Reader, that will peruse the words of mine which you assault, and yours as they are an Answer to mine.
In a word, you go about by the abuse of a trivial Axiome of Definitions, 1. To sentence most Christians to Hell, and cast them into Desperation, as wanting the Grace which they cannot define. 2. And to destroy Christian Love and Concord, and tear the Church into as many Shreds, as there be diversities of Definitions used by them. 3. And you would tempt us to think much hardlier of your self, than we must or will do; as if your Faith, Justification, &c. were unsound, because your Definitions are so.
I know that Ʋnius rei una tantum est Definitio, speaking, 1. Not of the Terms, but the Sense. 2. And supposing that Definition to be perfectly true; that is, the truth of Intellection and Expression consisting in their congruity to the Thing; while the thing is one and the same, the conception and expression which is perfectly true, must be so too. But, 1. Our understandings are all imperfect, and we know nothing perfectly but Secundum quaedam; and Zanckez saith truly, that Nihil scitur, if we call that only Knowledg which is perfect: And consequently no Mental Definition is perfect. 2. And Imperfections have many degrees. 3. And our Terms, which make up that which you know I called a Definition in my Dir. 42. (as it is in words) are as aforesaid, various, mutable, and variously understood and used.