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Judgment of Nonconformists About Difference Between Grace and Morality · Richard Baxter

Judgment of Nonconformists About Difference Between Grace and Morality, Tract 3 – Title page 4

THE JUDGMENT OF NON-CONFORMISTS OF Things Sinful by Accident, and of Scandal.

COuld we but have prevailed with Men of confuſed Conceptions, and conſounding Pra…s, to have been reconciled to Diſtinctneſs and …engruity of ſpeech; or at leaſt, with Men of haſ…e, temer…ty, and …aſſion, to have endured it, and patiently heard us diſtinctly tell them what we hold, we might have ſpared this trouble to the Reader and our ſelves.

Thoſe that cannot bear d…ſtinct explication, but in the Dungeon of Confuſion ſtill deride or r…ge at the Light, which rendering things intelligible, doth open the unlovelineſs of Ignorance, and the errour and ſin which are its Progeny, are not the Reader… for whom this is publiſhed; but ſuch as have retained ſo much of Humane Nature, as to love the Light, and be willing to know the truth, and to be patient of a little ſober conſideration that they may know it.

That we may make the matter in queſtion Intelligible, we muſt open the Nature of Morality, and ſo of Moral Evil (or Sin,) and what it is to be Evil by Accident; and what Accidents make a thing unlawful to be commanded, and what not; and what Scandal is, and how far to be avoided; which we ſhall do in theſe Propoſitions following.

Prop. 1. MORALITY is either Regulans, or Regulata, (menſurans, or menſurata:) The firſt is Radically in God's own Mind and Will, and is called by many Lex aeterna; and it is ſignally, and expreſſively in Gods Laws; and ſubord…nately in Man's Laws, as they are a Rule to Subjects: Of theſe we are not now to ſpeak; that is, not of the holineſs of God or his Laws, nor of Man's, as they are truly a Rule to Subjects.

Morality as Regulated is ſubjected in the Minds and Actions of the Creature; ſpecially in the WILL, and in our Actions, as VOLUNTARY; and ſo even the Laws of Men, as thoſe Men are God's Subjects, and their Laws are Actions good or evil, as Regulated by God's Superiour Laws, are the Subjects of the Morality now in queſtion.

Prop. 2. This Morality in Man's Will and Actions is nothing elſe, formally, but their Relation of Conformity or Diſconformity to God's Law, as their Rule; (and ſubordinately to ſubordinate Rules;) and materially to the End and O…jects.

Prop. 3. How far this Moral Relation is immediately founded in a Phyſical Relation, which is before it in order of Nature, viz. in the ſaid Relation of the Will and Action to the End and Object as ſuch, antecedently to the Relation to the commanding or forbidding Law, we would willingly open, were it not leſt we ſeem, with Men that love not much diſtinction, to juſtifie or excuſe them that cenſure us as guilty of exceſs herein; and we may do what is now neceſſary to be done without it.

Prop. 4. No Being as ſuch, no Subſtance as ſuch, no Habit as a Habit, no Act as an Act, is Morally Good or Evil: For ſo they are but Quid Naturale; and God doth not command and forbid Natural Beings as ſuch.

Prop. 5. All Moral Good and Evil is ſubjected in Natural Beings, or Privations, but not immediately as ſuch; but as modified, circumſtantiated, and related.

Prop. 6. Good and Evil make up all Morality; there is no third Species: There are many things that are Indifferent as to Morality; that is, neither Morally Good, nor Morally Evil; but there is nothing Moral-Indifferent: Meer Natural Beings and Acts are Indifferent as to Morality; that is, they are not Moral: But whatever is Moral, is Morally Good or Evil, and not Indifferent.

Prop. 7. The Subject and quid abſolutum Fundamentale, of all moral good, is, quid poſitivum, or a real Being; but the Form of moral evil is ever found indeed in a real Subject, but not always in a real fundamentum. For it is (oft at leaſt) in total Omiſſions and Privations of the Act, and in Privations of ſome modal or accidental qualification, or rectitude.

Prop. 8. Yet the formal relations of moral good and evil, are both tru… Relations; even Diſ-conformity as well as Conformity, (as curv…tude and diſ-ſimilitude are, as well as rectitude and ſimilitude:) And a Meer Negative is neither good nor evil, e. g. Negative Non-conformity, which is not Privative Diſ-conformity, is no ſin; becauſe there being not the Debitum ineſſendi, the non-ineſſe is inculpable. It ſeemeth indeed to ſome Learned Men, that non agere may be moral good; e. g. Non odiſſe Deum, au… proximum, non ment…ri, not to murder, ſteal, &c. And it's true, that the … is the thing remotely commanded, or, loco materie …; but the thing imm…ately commanded, is the … agere: The Will by all theſe Commands is bound poſit…ely to nill the forbidden Act, e. g. Murder, Adultery, Lying, &c. To nill them is the prime Duty or moral Good (that we ſay not with Ockam, the only) and not-to-d…-them is the ſecondary, but that is as they are Acts reſtrained, or forborn, by a Commanding Will: For a Man in Infancy, or the Womb, or in an Apoplexie, or when he is wholly taken up with ſome other ſin, not then to Steal, Lye, Murder, or commit Adultery, is not at all a moral Good. But a meer incogit…y, non agere, non velle, may be a true moral Evil: The reaſon is, becauſe when a right Volition is commanded, (as to love God or Man,) or …ight Action, (to do good…) not to do it is a breach of the Command: And not to will and not to do when we ought is the commoneſt kind of ſinning.

Prop. 9. Right ordered Actions, Diſpoſitions, and Habits then as in, or of the Will, directly, and remotely ſome non agency, are the only things commanded, called morally Good; (ſave that eorum gratia the Soul and whole man (or perſon) is well and truly called morall… Good:) And the P…ivation and I…ordination of Voluntary Actions, Diſpoſitions, and Habits, are the only moral Evil; (ſave that the perſon is alſo called ſuch eorum gratia.)

Prop. 10. An Action may be Indifferent, or of no Morality, as to Election, or Performance; and yet to Deliberate about that Act may be morally good. e. g. I may doubt of two ways which are equal to my End (as far as can be known by me,) whether they be ſo or not; or which is the better: I may be obliged to deliberate whether they are equal or not, to guide my Progreſs, and end my Doubt: And when I have found them equal, I have found that Comparatively neither of them is matter of Election, as by reaſon to be preferred to the other: But yet becauſe I muſt chuſe to g… on, therefore I muſt take one way and not the other, becauſe I cannot go both: But this is only a chuſing to go, and a taking that way, but not a chuſing it, which ſignifieth a rational preferring it. Here my Deliberation is a moral Act, and ſo is my chuſing to go; but my chuſing this way, rather than the other, is none: For upon deliberating I found that neither was Eligible, and Choice no Duty.

Prop. 11. As the ſmallneſs of the leaſt Phyſical Being, though undiſcernable, proveth it not to be Nothing; ſo the ſmallneſs of any moral Good or Evil, (Duty or Sin) proveth not that it is no Duty, or Sin at all.

Prop. 12. Moral Good and Evil is it ſelf only an Accident; for Habits, Diſpoſitions, Actions, and Relations, are Accidents; and Privations are either reductively Accidents (as ſome call them) or leſs than Accidents, even meer nothings, (though from a Nullity or Privation a moral Relation truly reſult on the Perſon.)

Prop. 13. Therefore when we ſay that a thing is Good or Evil by Accident, we mean ſomewhat more than that the Good or Evil is an Accident it ſelf, (for there is no other:) We mean that it is ſomething acciding (or added) to the former Accident or State that maketh it now Good or Evil.

Prop. 14. In an Action there is conſiderable, 1. The Action as ſuch, or as ſpecified only by the Faculty, (Intellection, Volition, Imagination &c.) 2. The Action as farther ſpecified by the terminating Object; 1. In the firſt reſpect, the Gradus Actus is Accidens accident…: And an Act may become Good or Evil, by ſuch Intenſeneſs or Remiſſneſs as is ordinate or inordinate. And the Timing it may do the like: (As to be thinking when I ſhould ſleep.) 2. In the ſecond reſpect, an Accident ſupervening or added to the Object, is ſaid to make that Action Good or Evil by Accident; that is, by an alteration of the ſpecifying Object by ſome Accident. And this is the commoneſt Caſe, and the Senſe in which this Controverſie in hand is moſt concerned; which therefore we deſire to be moſt obſerved.

Prop. 15. Any Man therefore that knoweth what true Knowledge is, may eaſily perceive that he that will Diſpute about Bonum vel Malum per ſe & per accidens, if he would not loſe his labour, or deceive muſt uſe more diligence in explaining theſe Terms, than they do that toſs them about unexplained, as if they were ſufficiently intelligible of themſelves, to ſuch as ſome uſe to make the Receivers of their cholerick and ſplenetick evacuations. Even Bonum & Malum per ſe, is not ſuch Ver ſe qua ſubſtantiam, nor per ſe qua Actum, nor per ſe qua Intellectionem, Volitionem aut Praxin execu ivam; but per ſe ut Accidens ſubſtantiae (ſcilicet Actum) circa Objectum (quod eſt accidens plerum que ) ſine altero accidente ſuperaddito. So that the ſame which now is Bonum vel Malum per accidens, is called Bonum vel malum per ſe, in reſpect to a ſupervenient Accident: And excluding all Accidents, or all Good or Evil by Accident; ſo nothing in the World is Bonum or Malum morale per ſe (except what is anon excepted. E. G. To Love is an Act; that Act (as is the Habit alſo) is an Accident: To love a Man as godly or wiſe, or as my King or Teacher, is to love him for Accidents; that is, Godlineſs, Wiſdom, Authority, &c. This is Bonum per accidens, and yet Bonum per ſe, ſtating the Object thus, without farther Accidents. To love him as an Enemy, and Perſecutor, and Silencer of Godly Miniſters of Chriſt, is Malum per Accidens, and yet Malum per ſe, in reſpect to farther Accidents. To love the Man is not Evil, but to love him for his Evil. The Exception here is, when we are bound to love the ſimple Eſſence, as ſuch, abſtracting from all Accidents: The principal Inſtance is of our love to God, (of which more anon;) becauſe God hath no Accidents, and therefore is loved meerly as in his Eſſence: And no doubt but God is to be loved as in his Eſſential perfection. But yet we are nono of thoſe that againſt Pet. Hurtado Mendez, and other Nominals, will undertake to prove, that Relations to the Creatures (which are Accidents) do not truly belong to God; ſuch as that of Creator, Owner, Ruler, Benefactor, &c. we leave that Task to the Thomiſts; and to other Mens judgements how well they perform it.

The next Inſtance is (our love to Man as Man,) and ſo to other Created Eſſences; which we deny not, but add, 1. That Man's Relation to God, as he ſheweth his Maker's perfections is a Relation, and that's it that is to be loved morally in Man, at leaſt principally, and never left out: The ſame we ſay of other Eſſences. 2. And the Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and ſo the moral amiableneſs of Man (at leaſt the principal) is it ſelf an Accident. The Word of God, and the Worſhip of God, are Accidents. But yet we ſay, that the propereſt Notion of Bonum per ſe, is, when we love a thing (but ſpecially God himſelf) as in the ſimple Eſſence, … a ſupervening obliging Accident: And of malum per …, when God's very Eſſence is hated, or not loved: But that any morally hate the very ſubſtantial Eſſence of a Creature, we leave others to prove.

Prop. 16. This holdeth about the very Negative Laws of the Decalogue, e. g. To kill a Man is in it ſelf no moral Evil; elſe it were ſin to Execute Malefactors; and Kings, Judges, and Souldiers were the moſt criminal ſinners: To kill a Man Authoritatively, that is, a Traytor, or Murderer, is good; that is, an Act with its due Mode and Object, which are Accidents that make it good. And to kill the Innocent, or without Authority, is ſin by this Accident, of an undue Mode and Object.

To take another Mans Goods or Money is not Malum per ſe; for it may be done as a Mulct, or by Law on juſt Cauſe, or for the Publick defence by Authority, or by his Conſent: But to take it without Conſent, Right, or Authority, is ſin by this Accident. So alſo of the ſeventh Commandment. The Law forbids the Act as Clothed with its undue Accidents. The Names of Injuſtice, Coveting, Murder, Adultery, Theft, Falſe-witneſs, &c. all ſignifie the Acts with the undue prohibited Accidents. One of our Caſuiſts excepteth only Lying, as ſimply per ſe Evil: But he that Lyeth, ſinneth not becauſe he ſpeaketh thoſe ſame words, but becauſe he ſpeaketh words that, in relation to his own mind, and to the matter, and to the hearers underſtanding, are falſe and deceitful: And that Relative Incongruity of the words is the accident that maketh them ſinful.

Prop. 17. Man paſſeth his life among ſuch a multitude of accidents and circumſtances, that it is not one, but very many, that every one of our actions is Clothed with, or concerned in, which tend to make it Good or Evil.

Prop. 18. A chief diſtinction here to be obſerved, is between Immutable Duties, (ſuppoſing our own continued Faculties) and mutable ones; and thoſe things are principally or eminently called Good or Evil per ſe, which are ſo immutably, and no ſupervenient accident can ever make them otherwiſe: And in the moſt notable Senſe thoſe things are called Good or Evil per accidens, which by ſupervening accidents may be changed from what they were before.

Pr. 19. That which is thus immutably Good per ſe, is Mans Duty to God himſelf immediately, as he is our Owner, Ruler, Benefactor, and End: Conſidering this Duty not in this or that time, but in kind, in its ſeaſon; and ſuppoſing our Faculties and Con-cauſes. For if a Man ſhould be exerciſing even Love to God when he is bound to ſleep for the ſupport of Nature, or if a Man ſhould love God with ſo paſſionate an affection as would diſtract him, this, as ſo uſed, is not good; but we never knew any in much danger of ſo over-doing: Nor is it a Duty for a Man in Infancy, or an Apoplexy, or deep ſleep, &c. actually to love, fear, or truſt God; and in other ſuch Caſes of Impoſſibility. But when poſſible, or in its ſeaſon, it is immutably a Duty: Not ſo rarely as the Janſeniſt chargeth the Jeſuite Caſuiſts to hold, once in many Weeks, or Months, or Years; but Love conſtraining us to its holy Fruits, muſt be the very New Nature as it were of our Souls, and the Buſineſs of our Lives.

Prop. 20. That which makes this to be Bonum per ſe immutabile, which no accident can alter, is, 1. Becauſe the Foundations of our Obligations are Immutable, while our Faculties and Powers endure (elſe they would ceaſe,) for the de…itum is a Relation reſulting from the meer Being or Poſition of the Humane Nature, as related to God: And God will never change: Therefore unleſs Man ceaſe to be man, or to be able to act as man, the obligation can by no accident be changed. 2. Becauſe it is a duty to the ſupreme Ruler and abſolute infinite Good; and therefore the very performance of it is excluſive of all changing accidents: For he that loveth God as a means to his fleſhly pleaſure and proſperity only, and as leſs good to him than the world, loveth him not as God: And he that loveth him as God, loveth him as the abſolute Power, Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, and therefore excluſively as to all Competitors, unleſs as this love is ſinfully defective; but that accident of defectiveneſs maketh not our love to God to be a ſin, but the defe…t of it as to degree or frequency of exerciſe is the ſin. 3. And alſo becauſe that God is the Final Object, and Love the Final Act; which together make up the ultimate end of man (including the Viſion that kindleth love, and the praiſe joy, and obedience which expreſs it:) But though mean… may be oft changed, and may be too much loved, yet the ultimate end is unchangeable, and cannot be too much loved (by true mental love, diſtinct from diſtracting paſſions;) therefore our Obligations to it are according. So that Love to God is the moſt immutable Moral Good.

And the ſame in their place and time muſt be ſaid of holy Fear, Truſt, and Obedience to God, from which no Accident can diſoblige us; no Command or Prohibition of man; no ſuffering of body, or danger of life it ſelf; much leſs the allurements of ſenſual delights.

Pr. 21. Accordingly to hate God, to diſtruſt his known Promiſe, to diſobey his known Law, to oppoſe or perſecute his known Intereſt in the world, in his Word and Worſhip, Church and Servants, are immutably evil per ſe; which no Accident can make good or lawful: For the Reaſons before given.

Pr. 22. But where the object is mutable, and the circumſtances of things which the Obligation preſuppoſeth, there the duty or ſinfulneſs is by ſupervening Accidents mutable: Even Inceſt, which is a hainous ſin, was a duty to Adams Children, becauſe of accidental difference of the caſe. The killing of an innocent Son, was well conſented to by Abraham, when the Lord of Life and of all the world had commanded it; and that conſent was an act of eminent goodneſs, and accordingly rewarded. The borrowing of the Egyptians Goods without intent to reſtore them, and the robbing of them by taking them away, was well done, when the abſolute Owner of the World had by his Precept altered the Propriety. Thus the altering of the Caſe may alter Obligations.

Pr. 23. But beſides the immutable Obligations to God himſelf, there are many inſtances of our actions towards men, and worldy Things, which are ordinarily unchanged; and only ſome rare or ſupernatural declaration of the will of God doth change them: For as God the Author and Orderer of Nature, ſheweth us by experience, that he delighteth much in the ordinary Conſtancy of his operations, and rarely changeth the courſe of Nature; ſo there is an anſwerable conſtancy in the ordinary ſtate and order of Things; and conſequently of obligations or duty. And theſe are the matter of Gods common univerſal Laws, which ordinarily oblige all mankind; Theſe are the matter of the ſecond Table of the Decalogue; and are ſeconds in point of immutable Obligation to the firſt (mentioned) ſort (our natural duty to God:) For though man be mutable, and God immutable, yet God preſerveth ſo much conſtancy in Humane Affairs, as is juſt matter of conſtant univerſal Laws, (though they are lyable rarely to diſpenſations or exceptions.) And as not murdering, not committing Adultery, not ſtealing, not lying, or falſe witneſs bearing are ſuch, ſo alſo are the meer Poſitives of the firſt Table, ſuch as are the acts of Inſtituted Worſhip, and the holy obſervation of the Lords day.

Prop. 24. The Caſes of Mans Life, which are more mutable, are the matter of mutable Duty and Sin, which are moſt uſually called Good or Evil per accidens, becauſe that mutable accidents, added to the more conſtant accidents, make them ſuch by change. And ſo it is greatly to be noted, that the Act which is a Duty to one Man, in one Place, at one Time, &c. may be a ſin to another Man, or at another Time, Place, &c. And that new accidents may again come in, and make that Action, that was a ſin, to become again a Duty: And more new accidents may make it a ſin again; and ſo over and over: Even as when you are weighing in the Ballance, one Grain may turn the Scales the other way, and two more in the other end may turn them back again; and three more in the other end may yet return them, and ſo on many times over and over. For Inſtance, Suppoſe an honeſt Man cannot pray without ſome unſeemly faults in utterance; in ſecret it is his Duty to pray vocally if that moſt profit and affect his heart; if an exceptious Perſon be known to over-hear him, it may be a ſin to do it audibly: If his Family be capable of bearing it, it is his Duty to do it as he can: If ſtrangers come in that would by ſcorn make it do more hurt than good, he may be bound to forbear till they are gone: When they are gone it is his Duty again: A Fire breaketh out, or one falleth into a ſwound, and it is his Duty to forbear: When that is over, it may be his Duty again, &c.

Pr. 25. Two ſorts therefore ſin againſt God, that would tye Men to do the very ſame things, of ſuch a mutable Nature, without excepting the mutation of accidents: 1. Thoſe that will tye them to it by peremptory Laws: 2. Thoſe that will cenſoriouſly reproach or condemn them as ſinners, that do not do juſt as they do, when the Circumſtances alter the Caſe: Many are ſo guilty who complain of other Mens Impoſitions.

Pr. 26. Hence it is evident, that Prudence, diſcerning how the alteration of accidents alter our Obligations, is a very needful thing to Chriſtians, for the ſame guidance of their hearts and lives: And as Men picture Juſtice as holding the Ballance, ſo ſhould Chriſtian Prudence be thought on, even as judging of Good and Evil with the Ballance in our hand, and putting every Grain of conſiderable accidents into each end: And much errour, cenſoriouſneſs, diſorder, and other ſin is in the World, by ignorant Mens judging of things by ſome miſtaken word of Scripture, without prudent weighing of Circumſtances, and diſcerning which preponderateth: There were Circumſtances in which Paul would ſhave his Head, and Circumciſe Timothy, and become a Jew to the Jews; and there were Circumſtances in which he ſaith, If ye be Circumciſed Chriſt ſhall profit you nothing: Stand faſt in the liberty with which Chriſt hath made you free.

Pr. 27. Hence the common People, who cannot be expected to have a ſufficient meaſure of ſuch ponderating Prudence, do need ſpiritual Guides; who ſhould be good Caſuiſts, and endowed with ſo much accurateneſs of Sapience, and Prudence, as to be able to examine all the Circumſtances of Actions, (as Phyſicians muſt do about their Patients Caſe) and to ſee when one Grain or Accident doth indeed determine them to be good or evil.

Pr. 28. And the Laws of juſt Governours being made by Men that muſt be preſumed to be wiſer than the ordinary Subjects, in the matters which belong to their own Office; as alſo the deciſion of a ſpiritual Caſuiſt and Paſtor; if either of them be put into a Ballance that before ſtood equal, are an additional Accident which muſt turn the S…ales: Suppoſing that the former equality, or ſuſpenſe, was not from the Perſons ſinful ignorance, or negligence.

Prop. 29. But in ſuch variety of Caſes and intricate difficulties, God doth not lay our ſafety, peace, and comfort, upon ſuch degrees of accurateneſs and Prudence as we cannot attain, though truly willing and faithfully endeavouring it by ſincere diligence: Nor is God pleaſed that Men be over ſcrupulous, or over ſolicitous, about leſſer doubtful Circumſtances; that is, that we neglect the Duty it ſelf, or too much delay it, or live in ſelf-diſtracting uncomfortable deſpondencies; making God's ſervice burdenſome and grievous to us, either by an over troubleſome and tedious care of ſome leſs accident, or becauſe we can do the work no more exactly: Like a Servant that inſtead of his days work and journey, would ſit down and ſpend half the day in crying becauſe he can do no better, or in curious enquiries about leſſer Circumſtances: But God would have us upon our ſincere willingneſs, and a proportionable fidelity in enquiry, to do his ſervice chearfully as well as we can; and to go on as believing that we have a merciful God, a ſufficient and a pardoning Covenant, and expect with joy his acceptance of our ſincerity.

Pr. 30. He that would tell Rulers that they may lawfully command every thing which is not evil in the Phyſical Action, conſidered without its Accidents; or that is not evil in the firſt Accidents or Circumſtances that cloth it, will teach them to caſt off Religion and common honeſty and juſtice, and to own more iniquity than ever Mahomet, or any falſe Prophet to our knowledge, hath defended, and ſuch as Satan himſelf hath confeſſed to be evil.

Pr. 31. No man may command others any action, which is by accident unlawful to be commanded: For it is ſin, if ſin by accident.) But Rulers may command many things, which the Subject may by accident make ſinful for himſelf to do, (as ſhall be ſhewed.)

Pr. 32. For there are ſome accidents rendring the act ſinful, which a Ruler may and ought to make proviſion againſt, or prevent: And there are ſome which he neither can prevent, nor is bound therefore to forbear or change his Law. For inſtance,

Pr. 33. No man is bound to forbear a Law or Practice, which is commanded of God, or is neceſſary to a greater good, (as Gods Glory, the Publick ſafety, the ſalvation of many, or himſelf, &c.) leſt ſome man ſhould turn it to his own ſin and ruine: Gods Laws muſt not be broken, nor the Publick Welfare hazarded, to ſave a particular perſon from himſelf, and from his ſinful inclinations to ill doing.

Pr. 34. As to a circumſtance that is indifferent antecedently to further accidents, and if it be determined one way will do accidentally a great deal of good and a little hurt; and if the other way, it will do a little good and a great deal of hurt; the Ruler, if he foreſee it, muſt determine it the firſt way, notwithſtanding the accidental hurt (whether ſin or ſuffering) which will follow. Becauſe a greater hurt is more carefully to be avoided than a leſs, and a greater good more carefully to be endeavoured than a leſs: E. g. If the Army be appointed to meet at ſuch a day and place, ſome few Souldiers (one of a thouſand) will mutiny and not appear: If at another time and place, moſt of them will mutiny. Or if a congregation be appointed to meet at ſuch an Hour and Place for …ods Worſhip, and join with ſuch a worthy Teacher, one of an hundred will ſchiſmatically ſeparate: If in another Place, at another Hour, with another worthy Teacher, an hundred to one will ſeparate. Here the Ruler muſt firſt avoid the greater Evil that by accident will follow. If one pe…viſh hearer will ſinfully ſeparate if the Preacher uſe Sermon Notes, or if he uſe ſuch a Tranſlation, ſuch a Metre, ſuch Tunes of Pſalms, if he pray freely without a Form, or if he uſe the ſame words often as a Form; and it an hundred to one are for the contrary, and would ſeparate if he did otherwiſe, the greater Evil by Accident muſt be avoided before the leſs.

Pr. 35. So much are wicked Men inclined to turn all things into ſin, that it is not poſſible to command any thing ſo good, which bad Men may not make a ſinful uſe of: Sin taketh occaſion of God's own Commandments, Ro. 7. 8.

Pr. 36. No Ruler is bound to ſuſpect and prevent ſuch unuſual dangers of mens ſin, or ruine, as fall out beyond all rational fore-ſight or expectation, of whoſe probable event, or poſſible at leaſt, there was no juſt evidence.

Pr. 37. Caeteris paribus, an equal certain hurt muſt rather be avoided, than an equal uncertain hurt, much more an improbable one.

Pr. 38. The equal danger of a more Publick worthy Perſon is to be avoided more than the danger of a Private, or leſs worthy Perſon. And ſo in other Inſtances: Rulers muſt weigh all diſcernable Accidents, and prudently pr…fer the greateſt Good, and moſt avoid the greateſt Evil.

Pr. 39. Seeing it is Accidents that make moſt Actions Good or Evil, it is the Office, Skill, and Honour of Rulers to avoid as many ill accidents, and prevent as many ſins by accident, as is poſſible: And as the Multitude of his Patients Funerals is the Phyſicians diſhonour, and the Multitude of Cures is his honour; ſo is it to the Ruler (allowing neceſſary diſparities) as to Mens ſins by accidents.

Pr. 40. If Good as Good be amiable, then the greateſt Good as ſuch is moſt amiable, and to be preferrd before the leſs: And when the difference is known, or ſuch as Rulers are obliged to know, the leſs cannot be preferred without ſin; and ſuch as is againſt the very Nature of Goodneſs, and of Man's Will. It is not therefore a thing indifferent, nor the matter of God's Counſel, which is no Law.

Pr. 41. But to know of ſeveral Goods which is moſt eligible, or the greateſt, is a matter of great difficulty in many Inſtances, in which conſiſteth no ſmall part of the Chriſtian Wiſdom, Work, and Life. The Rules of ſuch diſcerning are elſewhere laid down, by ſuch as have written on that Subject; ſee Chriſtian Direct. p. 137. &c.

Pr. 42. A Good that in it ſelf is Leſſer may be the matter of a Greater Duty, pro hic & nunc, becauſe the Greater may have another ſeaſon when the Leſſer cannot: E. G. to ſave a Soul, or to build a Church may be a better work than to quench the Fire in an Houſe: And yet for that time the quenching of the Fire may be the greater Duty, becauſe it can be done no other time, when the other may; and ſo both done in their ſeveral ſeaſons are better than one alone.

Pr. 43. A greater Good may be no Duty to him that is not called to do it; as preaching to a Woman, or unable Lay-man: To Rule well as a King is a greater Good than private Buſineſs; and yet private Men muſt not uſurp it, but let it alone as no work of theirs. The Subject muſt not take up the Rulers work, nor the Child the Fathers, nor the Wife the Husbands, nor the Scholar the Teachers, becauſe it is better.

Pr. 44. A Rulers Command will not juſtifie all ſcandal given by the Act commanded, nor make that Act lawful: Nor will all ſcandal, that we foreknow will thence be taken, excuſe us from obeying the Rulers Command in the offending Act. It is therefore a matter of great difficulty and prudence ſometimes to diſcern, whether the Rulers Command, or the ſcandalouſneſs, or accidental hurtfulneſs of the Act, put into the Counterballance, do weigh down the other.

Pr. 45. If Governours determine Circumſtances antecedently indifferent, (as the place and hour of Aſſemblies, &c.) that way which ſome will be ſcandalized at, and turn to their ſin and hurt, when they might have avoided this occaſion of their ſin, by another way, without any, or ſo great a hurt; this is the Governours ſin ſo to miſ-do: But it may, notwithſtanding, be a Duty in the Subject to obey that Determination; becauſe, 1. It is a Command of a Ruler in his place: 2. The thing is ſuppoſed not only lawful, but ſuch as doth more good for Concord, as it is a Determination of Authority, than it doth hurt by Mens miſtake: (of which we have ſpoken in another Paper.) As, e. g. ſome are ſo offended at the old Metre of our ſinging Pſalms, that they will ſeparate from the worſhip on that account: Suppoſe that the Magiſtrate, and Paſtors, will uſe them and no other: If they ſin in chuſing no better, and if my uſing them be offenſive to them that ſeparate, yet is it my Duty and the reſt of the Peoples to obey the Magiſtrate and Paſtor, and joyn with the Church in uſing them, rather than ſeparate as others do (for many reaſons.)

Pr. 46. Of the Nature, Kinds, Cauſes, and Cure of Scandal given and taken, one of us hath written ſo much (Chriſtian Directory, Tom. 4. p. 80. &c.) as may excuſe the omiſſion of the ſame in this writing.

But we muſt ſtill deſire the Reader to note, that the word [Scandal] is among us variouſly uſed: 1. Sometime by the vulgar for meer diſpleaſing or grieving another, eſpecially in matters of Religion: 2. Sometime for [a ſeeming ſinfulneſs:] So a Scandal is ſaid to be raiſed of a Man when he is (truly or falſly) accuſed of ſin, eſpecially a diſgraceful ſin: And a Man is called ſcandalous, and ſcandalized, when others (juſtly or unjuſtly) report him to be a diſgraceful Sinner; and he is called a Scandal in the place where he liveth for that Infamy: 3. The uſe of the word in the Goſpel is, for any thing that is a Snare or Trap or Stumbling-block to others, to keep or hinder them by Temptation, from Faith, Repentance, Holineſs, or Salvation.

Pr. 47. Love kindled by Faith, and Faith kindling Love, and Love working in the order of Obedience, is the Sum of all our Duty, or Religion. To love our Neighbours as our ſelves, and exerciſe Love in doing good to all as we are able, is indiſpenſible Duty: (We ſpeak of Natural and Moral-legal Power Conjunct: Illu… poſſumus quod & animae corporiſ que viribus, & jure poſſumus:) Seeing then that Love is the fulfilling of God's Law, no Rulers Law can diſoblige us from it; no, not to our very Enemies: Nor are they diſobliged themſelves.

Pr. 48. He breaketh the ſixth Command [Thou ſhalt not Murder] who doth not do his beſt to ſave his Neighbours Life in danger: Much more if he voluntarily and unneceſſarily do that, which he knew, or ought to know, would be the occaſion and means abuſed to effect it. He that oweth maintenance to another, and denyeth it him, is guilty of his ſuffering though he take nothing from him: E. G. He that provideth not Food for the Life of his Child, and famiſheth him by ſuch omiſſion: He that ſuffereth his Neighbour to famiſh when he might relieve him: Yea, or his Enemy, except when in Wars, or a Courſe of Juſtice, he may take away his Life. He that ſeeth his Neighbour in Fire, or Water, or among Thieves, and could ſave him by lawful means, and doth not, is guilty of his Blood. So is he that ſeeth his Neighbour in Drunkenneſs, Folly, or Paſſion, making away himſelf, and doth not ſave him from himſelf, if he can.

Much more is be guilty of Murder, who wilfully ſelleth Poyſon to him, who he knoweth doth intend to kill his Neighbour, or himſelf; much more his Prince with it: And if we have any Caſuiſts more looſe than the Jeſuites accuſed by Montaltus, who will juſtifie this, becauſe that ſelling Arſenick, &c. is lawful per ſe, and unlawful only per accidens, ye we ſuppoſe that the Judges would be ſtricter Caſuiſts, in judging him to puniſhment that ſinned thus per accidens: And as Gods Laws reaching the Conſcience are ſtricter in ſuch things than Mans, ſo ſhould the Expoſitors of them be than the Judges. And we hope that our Caſuiſts will never ſee a Law ſo made, that ſhall Command (or tolerate) all Apothecaries to ſell Poyſon to thoſe that they know mean to uſe it to Treaſon, or Murder; and ſhall ſay, you are not bound to neglect your Trade, your Right, or Liberty, to prevent another Mans ſin, and abuſing it to his own, or others hurt: Our Law-makers will never ſay, we may Command this, becauſe it is ſin but per accidens: When Intereſt is againſt their Errour, who by Intereſt were led into it, it will then be eaſie to ſee the evil of ſuch commanding (yea, or conniving at) ſin per accidens. Till then it is hard curing them, whom miſtaken Intereſt blindeth, of the moſt Inhumane Errour.

Pr. 49. We therefore who are called Non-Con…ormiſts, (and Puritans, by Men whoſe Intereſt dictateth reproaches) do now confeſs, that, whereas we once hoped that we had differed but in leſſer things from our Accuſers, we do find our ſelves ſo far miſtaken, as that ſome of them, who have thought it worth their labour to write vehemently for our reproach and increaſed ſufferings, do differ from us in the Vitals of our Religion, even of our Belief, our Love, and Practice. We mean ſuch as hold [That all the Obligations of Scandal proceed purely from that extraordinary height of Charity, and tenderneſs of good Nature, that is ſo ſignally recommended in the Goſpel:—But if it proceed from humour, or pride, or wilfulneſs, or any other vitious Principle, then is the Man to be treated as a peeviſh and ſtubborn Perſon; and no Man is bound to part with his own freedom, becauſe his Neighbour is froward and humorous: and if he be reſolved to fall, there is no reaſon I ſhould forego the uſe of my liberty, becauſe he is reſolved to make that his Stumbling-block. Eccleſiaſt. Polit. page 231.]

Becauſe this is contrary to that very Religion in which only we hope for Salvation, we take the boldneſs to put theſe few Queſtions to them who thus judge.

Q. 1. Is not Love the fulfilling of the Law, and the End of the Goſpel, and Faith working by Love, the Sum of Chriſtian Religion? Doth not the Law of Nature oblige us to love our Neighbour as our ſelves?

Q. 2. Doth not God beneficently love his Enemies; even the ſinful, the humorous, the proud, and the peeviſh? Did not Chriſt come to ſeek and ſave them? Is there not joy in Heaven for their Repentance? Doth not God welcome ſuch Prodigals when they return, Luke 16. and call, invite, and intreat them to return?

Q. 3. Are we not Commanded to be merciful as our Heavenly Father is merciful; and to love even our Enemies, and pray for Perſecutors, that we may be like him? And is not this a Natural Common Duty?

Q. 4. Hath not God ſent out his Miniſters to preach home ſuch ſinners; and commanded them to do it inſtantly, in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon, reproving and exhorting, and with meekneſs, to inſtruct oppoſers, if God peradventure will give them Repentance to the acknowledging of the Truth? And muſt we not labour hard, and ſuffer much, for to win ſuch Souls?

Q. 5. Should not every thing be valued according to its worth? And are not the Souls of ſuch as you call humorous, peeviſh, or wilful, worth more than ſome of that which you call your Liberty? Are they not worth more than a Pipe of Tobacco, or a Cup of Sack, or a Stage-play, or a needleſs Ceremony; which you account part of your Liberty? Would you deny none of theſe to ſave many Souls?

Q. 6. Would you not deny your Liberty in a Cup of Drink, or a Pipe of Tobacco, to ſave the Life of one that in humour would deſtroy himſelf? or his Houſe, who would ſet it on fire?

Q. 7. If not, doth this Religion of yours much commend it ſelf to the Nature of Mankind? Or is he that writeth this fit to report us of the other mind, unfit for ſubjection, or Humane Society? Can Chriſtians be of your Religion?

Q. 8. Are not Souls more worth than Bodies? And ſhould not the Soul of a Sinner be as compaſſionately ſaved by us as his Body, as far as we are able, and at as dear a rate?

Q▪ 9. Is that Man like to profit his Hearers, or be taken for a faithful Paſtor, or an honour to the Church of England, who would tell them, [I would not forſake a Pipe of Tobacco, or a lawful ſport or jeaſt, to ſave any of your Souls, who are vitious, humourous, or peeviſh?]

Q. 10. Doth not this doleful Doctrine tell Men conſequently, that they ſhould ſeek to ſave the Soul of no Sinner in the World? For if you, 1. Except all that have humour, pride, wilfulneſs, or any other vitious Principle; 2. And that but ſo far prevalent as to be reſolved to make a Stumbling-block of ſome liberty of anothers: What Sinner almoſt is not here excluded from your Charity? Who is it that hath not as great ſin as ſome humorous, or peeviſh ſtumbling at ſome lawful thing? or who is it that hath no pride, no peeviſhneſs, no humorouſneſs, or at leaſt that hath no vitious Principle at all? Is not that Man perfectly holy? 3. And if to ſave ſuch an one you would not ſo much as deny any of your liberty for him, what would you do for him at all? Who can expect that you ſhould beſtow any great labour or c…ſt to do good, or ſave a Sinner, that would not loſe a Cup of Sack to ſave him?

Q. 11. Do you not thus reproach Chriſt, that ſet a higher price on Souls, when you value them not at the price of a Cup of Drink? Would you have it believed that they are purchaſed by his Blood?

Q▪ 12. Would you have God care no more for your ſoul, and value it at no higher a rate? Doth he believe the immortality of Souls who will ſay ſo?

Q. 13. Should God give ſuch a Law to all his Creatures, for their acting towards your ſelf and one another; q. …. [D…ny not ſo much as a lawful Jeaſt, or Sport, or Ceremony, to win and ſave any one in the world, that out of any vitous principle will ſtumble at your liberty;] what Family, or Common-wealth, could ſubſiſt under ſuch an inhumane privation of love?

Q. 14. If you loved your Neighbour as your ſelf, and did as you would have others do to you, would you deny no lawful thing to ſave his Soul, though he had ſome vitious principle?

Q. 15. What will people ſay of ſuch men as you, if you ſhall ever preach for Love and Good Works, and would make people believe that its you that are for them, and we againſt them; when they compare this Doctrine with your words?

Q. 16. Why do ſuch men call us Puritans, as if we ſucceeded the old Cathariſts (or Perfectioniſts) and the Novatians, when we are ſo far from ſo vilifying ſinners that have a vitious principle, and ſin againſt ſome lawful thing, by taking it for unlawful, that we know none in the world that hath no vitious principle, and is not to be helped at a dearer rate?

And ſeeing we find ſuch real difference in our very Religion it ſelf, from ſuch as this, we cannot wonder if men of ſuch Principles uſe us and the Nation no better than they do: But we crave their ſolid reſolving of theſe Doubts, if they will loſe ſo much of their Eaſe and Liberty, for the convincing of perſons judged ſo unworthy.

Pr. 50. For our parts we muſt profeſs, that we take it to be our duty not only to deny a lawful thing, or our liberty therein, for the ſaving of Souls that have vitious principles and humours, but to beſtow our labours, and endure poverty, reproach, perſecution, impriſonment, and, when God calls us to it, death it ſelf, to ſerve Chriſt in the ſaving of ſuch Souls.

Pr. 51. We ſuppoſe that Chriſt and his Apoſtles were of the ſame mind, when Chriſt would have a right hand or a right eye rather loſt, than the Soul ſhould be hazarded by the ſcandal or temptation of it. And when he would pay Caeſar Tribute when he was free, rather than o…end men. And when he ſo dreadfully ſpeaketh of them that offend or ſcandalize one of the little ones, even weak Believers, as that it were better for them that a Milſtone were hanged on their necks, and they were caſt into the Sea: Mat. 5. and 18. 8. Mar. 9. 42, 43. Mat. 17. 27. and 18. 6. Rom. 14. 13, 14, &c. This was S. Paul's judgment, [Let us not judge one another any more, but judge this rather, that no man put a ſtumbling block, or an occaſion to fall, in his Brothers way. I know, and am perſwaded by the Lord Jeſus, that there is nothing unclean of it ſelf; but to him that eſteemeth any thing unclean, to him it is unclean. But if thy Brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkeſt thou not charitably: Deſtroy not him with thy meat for whom Chriſt dyed: Let not your good be evil ſpoken of: For the Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteouſneſs and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost: For he that in theſe things ſerveth Chriſt, is acceptable to God, and approved of men: Let us therefore follow after the things that make for peace, and things wherewith one may edifie another. For meat deſtroy not the work of God: All things indeed are pure; but it is evil for that man who eateth with offence. It is good neither to eat Fleſh, nor drink Wine, nor that whereby thy Brother ſtumbleth, or is offended, or made weak. Haſt thou faith? have it to thy ſelf before God: Happy is he that condemneth not himſelf in that thing which he alloweth: And he that doubteth is damned if he eat, becauſe its not of faith: For whatſoever is not of faith is ſin. This was Paul's Doctrine then, even to all the Church of Rome.

So on, Rom. 15. 1, &c. We then that are ſtrong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to pleaſe our ſelves. Let every one of us pleaſe his Neighbour for his good, to edification: For even Chriſt pleaſed not himſelf.— Now the God of patience and conſolation, grant you to be like minded one towards another, according to Chriſt Jeſus.

So 1 Cor. 8. 9. But take …eed leſt by any means this liberty of yours become a Stumbling-block to them that are weak.—13. Wherefore if Meat make my Brother to offend, I will eat no Fleſh while the world ſtandeth, leſt I make my Brother to o…end.]

Remember that he that ſpake this had as great Church-authority as any Biſhop, and ſpake this as an Apoſtlers and not as a meer private Man.

Pr. 52. The ſame Author ſaith, (Eccl. Polit. p. 230.) that this School-diſtinction (of ſcandalum datum & acceptum) is apparently falſe and impertinent, and the main thing that hath perplexed all diſcourſes of this Article.]

But we ſee no Reaſon to think, that the generality of both Proteſtants & Papiſts are herein miſtaken, & this Writer is in the right, or that the School Doctors need go to School to him to reform ſuch Errors: It is a Moral Subject, & Given and Taken are morally meant; that is, There is ſcandal culpably given, and there is ſcandal culpably taken only, and not ſo given. The diſtinction is of the Parties culpable. All which is culpably taken is not culpably given: A man that either purpoſely or negligently ſpeaketh injurious provoking words, doth give the temptation of wrath to the hearer: But he that ſpeaketh words which in themſelves have no tendency to provoke, nor was obliged to foreſee that they would provoke, doth give no ſcandal; (no nor he that juſtly and aptly reproveth:) But a peeviſh or impatient ſinner may yet take ſcandal from them. He that leaveth Arſenick where he ſhould know that another is like to take it to his death, whether he do it purpoſely or negligently (that is by the Wills commiſſion or omiſſion) is the reputed Giver, or Moral Cauſe, of that Man's death. But he that leaveth it where he could not know, and was not obliged to fear, that another would ſo take and uſe it, may ſay, It was taken by him, and not given by me.

An alluring Habit, Actions, and Geſtures, which have a Natural tendency to provoke others to ſinful luſts, have ever been condemned by all ſober Divines as Scandal Given; which yet chaſte Perſons may re…uſe to Take: But if the ſobereſt and modeſteſt Habit prove a Snare, it is a Scandal Taken, and not culpably given: (As a Thief, if he ſteal my Knife and cut his own Throat with it, cannot ſay that I gave it him.) He that ſpeaketh words which are apt to tempt the hearer to Treaſon or Rebellion, doth give the Scandal: But if by the reading of any Chapter in the Bible, any will be incited to Rebellion or Diſloyalty; or if by the innocent, neceſſary, and ſober defence of a juſt Cauſe, any will be tempted to think unworthily of his Governours or Judges, he Taketh Scandal that is not culpably Given him.

Pr. 53. If a Man were bound to forbear all that others will turn into an occaſion of ſin, he ſhould not only loſe all his liberty, but omit all his Duty: And to think that we are bound to deny no liberty, or nothing indifferent to prevent or cure the ſin of others, is to deny the common Principles of Humanity; and on pretenſe of Juſtice to renounce common Charity, and to become an Adverſary to the great Precepts of Chriſt and his Apoſtles. Therefore the difficulty is to reſolve how far, and in what caſes, our liberty muſt be denyed, to ſave other Men from ſin; and conſequently from damnation; which muſt be determined by the great General Canons: [Thou ſhalt love thy Neighbour as thy ſelf: Whatſoever you would that Men ſhould do to you, ſo do to them: Let all be done to Edification: Prefer a greater Good before a leſs; and moſt avoid the greateſt Evil: Caeteris paribus, the moſt Publick good (of many) is the greateſt: Sin is a greater Evil, than bodily wants and ſufferings.]

No Ruler may Command any thing which is contrary (though but by accident) to the Law of God, in Nature and Scripture expreſſed: Charity and Juſtice are Commanded by the Law of Nature and Scripture: When accidentally the Man that fell among Thieves was wounded, and naked, Charity obliged the Prieſt and Levite to have relieved him. If by accident Fire conſume Mens Habitations, Charity requireth others to relieve them.

Eſpecially where the Obligation is great and ſpecial, As for Parents to feed their Children: If Rulers forbid them, and ſo would have them murder them by Famine, the Command is ſinful, and the Obligation null; becauſe they cannot diſſolve the Obligation of God's Natural Laws.

And the exerciſe of Charity to Believers, that are the Members of Chriſt, is a Duty that none may Countermand; and the Commands of none can diſoblige us from: For Mat. 25. Chriſt tells us that he will judge Men, according to their exerciſed Charity to his Servants, to everlaſting Life, or everlaſting Puniſhment. Yet Chriſt foreknew, and foretold Men, that much of this Charity muſt be exerciſed againſt the Wills of many of the Rulers of the World.

Much leſs may Rulers prohibit the due exerciſe of Charity to Mens Souls, or can oblige Men by ſuch prohibitions: As to inſtruct an Unbeliever, exhort a Blaſphemer, Idolater, Adulterer, a Thief, a Murderer, &c. to repent.

And much leſs yet may Rulers forbid the means of Mens Salvation, to be uſed by the faithful Miniſters of Chriſt, who by Covenant in their Ordination are ſpecially thereto obliged.

And leaſt of all may any Rulers Command, or can oblige Men, to kill Men unjuſtly, or to draw Men to ſin, or to deceive them by falſe teaching, or any thing elſe, that directly, or by accident, is like to procure their damnation, except in the Caſes hereafter excepted.

Pr. 54. Though Rulers cannot deſtroy Charity, they may Regulate it in due Subordination to God's Laws: E. G. They may make Laws that the Poor ſhall be kept in their own Pariſhes, and not beg abroad; and forbid relieving them that ſo beg. They may forbid Parents to cram their Children to exceſs. They may forbid Miniſters the unneceſſary, and irregular, intruding into other Mens Pulpits, or Aſſemblies, or Families; and ſuch like.

Pr. 55. And they may forbid Men doing hurt on pretenſes of Charity: E. G. Phyſicians to give Men pernicious Drugs; or Preachers or others, to ſeduce Men to Idolatry, or blaſpheme Chriſt, or draw Men to Mahume…aniſme, Socinianiſme, &c. or to preach Rebellion, or ſeek to bring the Subjects into ſubjection to a Forreign Prince, or Eccleſiaſtical Uſurper; or uncalled and unfit Men, to make themſelves unneceſſarily Publick Teachers, to the diſgrace of the ſacred Doctrine which they abuſe, and hindrance of Mens ſalvation, and of the Publick peace and ſafety.

Pr. 56. In a word, Rulers may forbid all things not Commanded by God, though ſeemingly Charitable, or good by accident, when contrary accidents notoriouſly preponderate, and it is certain, or moſt probable, to Men of true judgement, to whoſe Cognizance it belongeth, that the thing will do more hurt than good, and tendeth more to deſtruction, than to edification▪

Pr. 57. The Time, Place, and other Circumſtances of a Duty may be at the Governours Determination, when the Duty it ſelf is not: And they may forbid the Duty it ſelf, as to that Time, and Place, &c. when a greater good, at that Time, requireth it. E. G. They may forbid reſting on the Lords-day, in time of a Fire, Inundation, or a Siege, when defence is neceſſary: They may forbid ſome Publick Aſſemblies in time of a great Peſtilence, to prevent infection: They may Command Men out of the Church to quench a Fire, &c.

Pr. 58. It is certain that Rulers have not Power from God to deſtroy the Duties Commanded by God, on any pretenſes of Regulating, or duly Circumſtantiating, or ordering them; or of being the Judges: (As is elſewhere ſhewed.) For they have their Power to edification, and not deſtruction; and are the Miniſters of God for Good. E. G. If on pretenſe of forbidding hurtful Preachers and Seducers, they forbid ſound Doctrine, or neceſſary preaching of it. Conſtantius and Valens might not ſet up Arrians, and caſt out and forbid the Orthodox, on pretenſe that they were the Judges. So if on pretenſe of reſtraining unneceſſary ſupernumeraries, they forbid, or ſilence, one half the neceſſary Number: Or if on pretenſe of keeping Order, they commit the charge of Fifty Thouſand or One Hundred Thouſand Souls to one, or two Men, who cannot poſſibly ſupply the real neceſſities of Five Thouſand of them; and forbid all others to help the reſt, as intruders into another Mans Charge: (On which pretenſe they might keep almoſt all the People from the Goſpel, by committing a Kingdom or County only to one Man:) So alſo if on pretenſe of any croſs intereſt of their own, they would prohibit Chriſt's Goſpel: Or if they will forbid Men to preach, becauſe they will not make a Covenant againſt ſome Law of God, or will not lye, or be perjured, or prophane God's Ordinances, or own falſe Doctrine, or diſown the very Law of Nature, calling this Non-conformity, Diſobedience, or Schiſme. Yea, if they forbid neceſſary helps to Mens Salvation, becauſe the Teachers be not all of one Opininion about ſome unneceſſary Controverſie, or Ceremony: As if all the Lutherans would ſilence all called Calveniſts, or they the Lutherans, or Arminians: Much more unlawful is it for Rulers themſelves to be the Makers of ſuch ſnares and occaſions of diſſent, and then to impoſe them by ſuch penalties, that none ſhall preach the Goſpel of Chriſt, that will not conſent to them, how great ſoever the neceſſity be. As, e. g. God hath not forbidden wearing a pair of Horns: If Rulers ſhould make Laws that none ſhall preach the Goſpel that will not wear Horns in preaching, in token that the Word of God ſhall puſh down the Powers of Sin and Satan, this is an unlawful Command. So if on pretenſe of ordering the Place of Worſhip, Men be commanded to ſuch a diſtance, or confined to ſo ſmall a room, as deſtroyeth the End of the Work it ſelf, and depriveth moſt of all poſſibility of the Benefit.

Pr. 59. Rulers ought not to command any thing which will notably do more harm than good, nor make an unneceſſary thing a means or occaſion of excluding the neceſſary Worſhip of God, or Preaching of his Goſpel. Nor will their ſaying that neceſſary Teaching is not neceſſary, or that they are the Judges of Neceſſity, or that Hereticks are Orthodox, or the Orthodox are Hereticks, or that Uſurpers only are duly called, and others are Schiſmaticks, or that ignorant inſufficient Preachers are ſufficient, or that more in number are not neceſſary, when indeed they are; none of this will excuſe their ſin, nor diſoblige Chriſts Servants from the obedience of his Laws.

Pr. 60. If ſtill ignorant or fraudulent men ſhould ask us, ad rancedinem uſque, who ſhall be Judge of Order and Neceſſity, we again and again repeat our undenyable Anſwer; 1. That the eſſe rei is before the ſcire: Either the thing is really true and good which they judge true and good, or it is falſe and bad; and no mans falſe judging will change the thing: (e. g. Our Preaching is ſound and neceſſary, or it is not.) 2. The Magiſtrate is the Publick Judge who ſhall be protected or puniſhed by the Sword. The Paſtors are the Publick Judges who is fit for Church-Communion, and who not. And all the Subjects are the rational Private diſcerning Judges of their Duty: This no man can with a face of Reaſon deny. But all theſe are Subjects to God, and limited by him in their Judging Power, and not enabled to judge falſly, that Evil is Good and Good is Evil: what Good is ſuch by Nature or Accident, they cannot make Evil, and forbid what God commandeth on pretenſe of judging. They have Power to judge that all the Articles of our Faith are true, but not that any of them are falſe: They are Judges that the Commands of God muſt be all kept, but have no power to judge the contrary. In what Caſes we may be bound to obey them when they erre, we have opened in another Paper, and may partly be diſcerned from what is here ſaid.

Pr. 61. The Biſhops or Paſtors of the Church are above others obliged, to exerciſe paternal tender love to all the Peoples Souls. If they are peeviſh, and humorous, and quarrelſome, and proud, and have other vitious Principles, it is their Office and Work under Chriſt to cure them, and to uſe all that gentleneſs and forbearance which is needful to their cure; and to become all things (lawful) to all men, to win and edifie them: (not doing greater hurt by injuring others, or the Publick Good, for the ſake of thoſe that are few or leſs conſiderable.) If therefore they ſhould either ſcandalize them and hinder their ſalvation by things unneceſſary, or whoſe good will not countervail the hurt; or if they ſhould ſay, we are not bound to forſake our own Liberty (no not in a trifle) for the ſake of ſuch as are inclined to offence by their vitious Principles, they ſeem to us much to forget or renounce their proper Callings, as well as Humane Charity to Souls; as if a Phyſician ſhould ſay, I am not bound to medicate any that are ſick, but only thoſe that are in health. And if all that have vitious Principles be ſo far from under the Miniſters …are, we ſee no Reaſon why the Kingdom ſhould maintain ſo needleſs a Miniſtry, at ſo dear a rate; nor why they ſhould be had in ſo much honour, and why we ſhould not all be ſilenced at once.

Pr. 62. The ſin of tyrannical abuſe of Power is ſo contrary to the Nature of all Good Rulers, and ſo contrary to their own true intereſt, peace, and comfort, and final juſtification before God, and ſo contrary to the welfare of all Mankind, and doth at this day ſo much miſchief in the world, by ſerving Satan, maintaining Idolatry, Mahometaniſm, Popery, and Prophaneneſs, and keeping out the Goſpel from the moſt of the whole world, that the Flatterers that would for their own ends and carnal intereſts promote it, and make all odious to Rulers that diſlike it, will one day be known to be the great Enemies of Princes and People, of Church and State, of Jeſus Chriſt and God the Soveraign Lord of all.

Pr. 63. And Confuſion, Anarchy, Popular Rage, Faction and Sedition, diſhonouring our Rulers, and all Rebellions and Schiſms, muſt be odious to all men of Intereſt, Wiſdom, and true Religion, as being ultimately againſt the God of Order, and the Glory of his Wiſdom and Soveraignty in Government, who is to be honoured and obeyed in Kings, in Paſtors, and Parents, and all that are under him authorized to Govern us.

Pr. 64. Perjury, juſtifying thouſands in perjury, deliberate lying, covenanting againſt great and known Duty, corrupting Gods Worſhip and Church Government, cruel denying chriſtendom and ſalvation to the Infants of thouſands of godly Chriſtians, and caſting out godly Chriſtians from the Churches Communion cauſeleſly for a geſture, pronouncing all Atheiſts, Infidels, Adulterers, and other wicked Perſons ſaved, ſo be it they be not unbaptized, excommunicate, or make away themſelves; none of theſe, nor any ſuch other, in our judgment will ever be made lawful by any Command or Accident, nor will ever be lawfully commanded; nor ſhall we ever number them with Things Indifferent, nor revile or perſecute any as humorous, obſtinate, diſobedient, Schiſmaticks, or ſeditious, for refuſing them.

FINIS.

What Meer Non-Conformity is not: THE PROFESSION OF SEVERAL WHOM THESE TIMES Have made and called NON-CONFORMISTS.

Printed in the Year, 1676.