Five Disputations of Church Government, Chapter 6
CHAP. VI. Prop. 6. It is not lawfull to make any thing the subjects duty by a command, that is meerly indifferent antecedently, both in it self, and as cloathed with its accidents.
§. 1. THE reason is evident: because Nothing but Good can be the just matter or object of the Governours desire: and therefore nothing but Good can be the just matter of his Laws. By [Good] I mean, Moral, or Civil Good, or Relative Physical Good: the Good of Profit, or Honesty: And by [Indifferent] I mean not [that which is neither a flat sin, nor a flat absolute duty.] For so an Indifferent thing may be sometime commanded. Nor do I mean any Middle thing between Bonum Metaphysicum and non bonum: for there is none such. But I mean by indifferent, that which is not antecedently Appetible, a Desirable Good, though it be not it self an evill to be avoided, or a hurtfull thing. Bonum publicum, the common good is the End of Government, and therefore it must be somewhat conducing to the Common good, (or at least to the good of some particular person) that is the just object of the Governours desire, and matter of his law. For nothing but Good, doth conduce to Good, of it self. Nay it is therefore Good, bonitate medii, as a Means, because it conduceth to that which is Good, bonitate finis, as an End; or that is Desirable for it self. Desire hath no object but quid appetibile, a Desirable Good. And a Governour should make no Laws but for somewhat that is desirable to himself as Governour.
§. 2. And 2. Nothing should be made the matter of a Law but what is Desirable to the Common-wealth, as well as to the Governour. For men must be Gover…ed as men. Punishments indeed are not desirable for themselves: but yet by accident they are desirable to the Common good: and the matter of Precepts should be much more d…sirable then Punishment.
§. 3. And 3. If unprofitable things be made the matter of Laws, it will tend to the contempt of Laws and Government: and people will think it a burden and not a benefit, and will desire to be freed from it; and this will tend to the dissolution of Societies.
§. 4. And 4. All Government is from God, and for God, and should be by him: God is the Beginning and End, the first efficient and ultimate final cause of all just Government: And therefore all the parts of it must favour of the Goodness of the first Efficient, and be levelled at God as the ultimate end, which nothing but Good is a means to. Of him, and by him, and for him are all things, Rom. 11.36.
§. 5. Moreover 5. If idle words and idle thoughts be sins that must be accounted for, then idle Laws much more. And idle they must be if they be about unprofitable things. And they are not only idle themselves, but occasion idle words and actions in others.
§. 6. Moreover 6. It is the judgement of the Imposers that disobedience to their Laws is a sin against God, which deserveth condemnation; (For Protestants know no venial sins, and Papists take sins against the Popes and Councils Decrees to be Mortal.) But it is a cruelty next to Diabolical, to lay before men an occasion of their Damnation for Nothing. When they first make their Laws, they know (or else they are unworthy to be Governours) that some will obey them, and some will not. If therefore they think that some (and many) will incur the guilt of sin unto damnation by their disobedience, they must have somewhat of greater worth then the souls of those men to encourage them to make those Laws. For had there been no such Laws, there would have been none of that transgression, and consequently no damnation for it.
§. 7. Yea 7. It is sufficient to prove that nothing but some Good may be the Matter of a Law, in that they inflict penalties, and so great penalties upon the breakers of them. There must be a proportion between the Precept and the Sanction. The Commination or penal part of the Sanction, depriveth men of some Good: and therefore it should command, as great a good at least as it depriveth men of: Especially when the penalty is to be cast out of the Church and service of God, this is not to be done for nothing.
§. 8. Quest. But is it not the Law that is the Rule of Moral Good? and consequently nothing Good or Evill, but as Conform or Disconform to the Law? And if so, then nothing but things indifferent must be commanded. For all things are Morally indifferent, till the Law take away the Indifferency, by its precepts or prohibitions.
§. 9. Answ. You must distinguish between Divine and Humane Laws, and Primary and subservient Laws, and between the several sorts of Good before mentioned. And so I answer, 1. The Law is not the Rule of Natural Good, though it be of Moral. And therefore that which is commanded, is supposed to have some Natural Good or aptitude to be a Means of Good, that so it may be the fit matter of a command. 2. Gods Laws are the Primary Laws, which are the first Rule of Moral Good. Mens Laws are but …, to procure the due execution of Gods Laws. And … in the greatest cases the Indifferency is taken off before by the Law of God: and mens laws are to second Gods Laws, and rather to drive men on to that which already is their duty, then to make them new duties: Though New duties also they may make in subserviency to, and for the performance of the Old. But there must be a Physical Goodness, which is the Aptitude of the matter to attain the End as a means, before that matter can justly receive the impress of a command, and be made a Duty. Gods own Law of Nature is Antecedent to his Positive Laws: and in supernatural Positives, there is a supernatural adapting of the Matter before it receive the supernatural stamp of a Duty.
§. 10. Object. But if a Magistrate may not make Laws about Indifferent things, then may he not make any Laws at all: For Evill may not be commanded: And that Good which God hath commanded already, having a higher stamp then mans authority, needs no such Law.
§. 11. Answ. I have heard this Argument insisted on in the reign of the Ceremonies, above any other: but it deserveth not such high esteem. For 1. The work of the Magistrate, at least about the worship of God (and so of the Pastors) is not directly to make new duties: but to procure Obedience to the Laws of God. And therefore they are to command the same things again that God hath commanded, and to forbid the same that he hath forbidden. If a Magistrate make a Law, and see it disregarded, he may make another to quicken men to obedience and execution of the former. 2. And this is not vain, though it have the stamp of a higher authority before (unless you will say that humane Government is vain;) For Magistrates are seen when God is unseen; Corporal penalties are felt, when Hell fire is unseen, unfelt, and too little believed. Present things have an advantage for operation. 3. And we grant that some things neither commanded nor forbidden before, may be commanded or forbidden by a Magistrate, so they be not Indifferent as to their Vsefulness and Aptitude, to be a means for the obtaining of that which is the end of the command.
§. 12. It is charged on Mr. Iacob by Dr. Iohn Burgess and others, as an error, that he thought nothing indifferent at all: and Dr. Burgess confuteth him by instancing in various gestures in hearing, where it is indifferent which we use; and if I have two Eggs of a quality and quantity equal, before me, it is indifferent which I eat: therefore, &c. —
§. 13. To this I say, 1. Many things simply considered are Indifferent (as to marry or not marry, which Paul disputeth of,) which yet being cloathed with accidents, or Circumstances, shall ordinarily be a Duty, or a sin in the Vse to a particular person. 2. Nothing is Indifferent between Lawfull and Vnlawfull; but many things are Indifferent between a Duty and a Sin. 3. I conceive that where any thing is Indifferent between Duty and sin, in the Vse, as Circumstantiated, it is not actus humanus, a proper morall act. But as Permission is vainly numbred with proper acts of Law, it being but a Non impedire, a Negation of an act; so Indifferency is as vainly annumerated to the products of a Law. For there needs no act of Law to make a thing Indifferent, that is Neither commanded nor forbidden. For instance, it is Indifferent for me to wink with my eyes ordinarily, because it is not a Moral act that a man is to use his reason about, to bring every twink of the eye to an Election, or Refusal; but we may leave it to Natural instinct. So in Dr. Burgesses instances, Whether I sit or stand at Sermon, (if I be equally disposed, & caeteris paribus) is not a humane Moral act: Whether I eat this Egg or that when they are equal, is not a Moral act: Nor do I properly Choose, but take indifferently without choice. And where there is no use of choice, the act is not Moral, except in the Intention of the end, or in deliberating accesses.) Yet I grant that Moral acts may be exercised about these objects: A scrupulous mind may be put to consider, whether this Gesture or that, this Egg or that is to be chosen: but it must conc…ude, that neither is to be chosen, but either to be taken Indifferently. Which is but to say, that the Deliberation was a Moral act; but the choosing was not, for it was but a Taking, and not a Choosing: And the Deliberation stopt before it came to a choice, yea and purposely avoided it, concluding that the object was not a Matter of choice, and the act was not to be a Moral act: Morality hath but two Species, Good and Evil: and Indifferency is no third Species, but a Negation of Morality: viz. of Good or Evil.
§. 14. Yet may one Accident take off the Indifferency, and make the action Good or Evil. And though the Governours themselves should well weigh Accidents, and prefer the chief, and lay no more upon them then they deserve: yet because the Accidents are oft distant, and unseen, and the Ruler is the Judge of them, therefore the people should ordinarily obey, when they see them not themselves.
§. 15. Object. But in case the Genus is commanded by God, and the Species are equal, may not the Governour limit us to one of the two? Especially in case the people are d…vided about them, or else will do nothing, because they cannot resolve which way to do it. For instance: if sitting, standing and kneeling be equally convenient at the singing of Gods Praises, if the people be in a doubt which to use, or at least if they fall into contention about it, may not the Governours interpose, and limit them to one? If you be the conductor of Travailers or Souldiers, and they come to a place where the way divideth, though both wayes are equally good and neer, yet you must command them one way, and choose for th…m, because else they will go no way at all.
§. 16. Answ. 1. In this case you are not to choose one Gesture or one Way rather then another, unless they make it necessary by Accident. But tell them of the Indifferency and Equality, and drive them on to Action. And so you only choose and cause them to choose Action before Cessation, but not this way before that. 2. If this will not serve, but they will do nothing, unless you determine of their Gesture or Way, you must then command one rather then another, because they can use but one, and some one they must use. But in thus doing, your comparing, taking This rather then the other, is not to be done by Election, nor be a humane act, there being no more Reason (thats supposed) for one then for the other. But though you name them one Way or Gesture only (when they necessitate it,) you do it but as choosing their Action before their cessation; this therefore is all that is Moral in your Act: and that you Determine them to Action by Naming This way and not the other, is good (for the Determination for Duty sake was eligible:) but that it was rather to This then the other, was Indifferent, and not Moral: For of that you had no Reason: and where there is no Reason, there is no Morality.
§. 17. All this considered, I leave it to the consideration of common Reason, and of men that have any pitty for the Church or their own souls, whether it be a Prudent or Christian course to make Laws for the Church about things Indifferent, that have nothing in the Nature of them to induce them hereunto: and then to cast out Ministers and other Christians for not obeying them, and deprive men of the greatest blessings, on the account of things indifferent.
§ 18. If God have left us at Liberty by not commanding or forbidding, then man should not take that Liberty from us without great cause, and without some Accidental good that is like to come by depriving us of that liberty, and the Good must be greater then the Accidental evill. Why should any man on earth deprive the Church of Liberty in that thing where God thought not meet to deprive him of it, unless he ca… prove that time, or place, or some special accident hath altered the case? In any case which standeth with us just as it did in Scripture times, we must no more be deprived of our freedom by man, then we are by God: Had it been best for us, God would have done it.