The Elements of Logic, Book 6
¶ The ſixt Booke. OF SOPHISMES OR FALLACIES.
The firſt Chapter. Of Fallacies in words.
ALL Fallacies or Sophiſmes committed in diſputing are either in the Words, or in the Matter.
Fallacies in words are of ſix kindes. 1. Aequivocation. 2. Amphibologie. 3. Deceipt by Compoſition. 4. Deceipt by Diviſion. 5. Deceipt in the Accent or Pronuntiation. 6. And deceipt in the Figure of the word.
1. Of Aequivocation.
Decipt by Aequivocation is, when the Meane is a doubtfull word, taken in the propoſition one way, and in the aſſumption another way. As,
That which hath neither beginning nor ending, God created not.
The roundneſſe of the Heavens hath neither beginning nor ending.
Therfore the roundneſſe of the Heavens God created not.
In the propoſition beginning and ending is taken for continuance of time: but in the aſſumption it is taken for the beginning and ending of a figure. Or thus,
He that ſaith that thou liueſt, ſaith true.
He that ſaith that thou art a gooſe, ſaith that thou liveſt.
Therefore he that ſaith that thou art a gooſe, ſaith true.
In the propoſition it is meant of an expreſſe ſaying; but in the aſſumption of a ſaying by conſequence.
Thus a man of great capacitie may be taken for a learned man, and ſometimes for one whoſe ſtomacke is able to containe much wine.
The ſame fallacie may be committed alſo when a word is otherwiſe taken in the propoſitions, then in the concluſion.
2. Of Amphibologie.
Amphibologie is an ambiguous conſtructiō, making the ſenſe doubtfull. As, Faith alone iuſtifieth.
It cannot be knowne whether the meaning be, that faith being alone juſtifieth; or els that faith juſtifieth onelyonly. In the firſt ſenſe it is falſe; for faith alone without good works is no true faith, and by conſequent juſtifieth not. But in the ſecond ſenſe it is true that faith onelyonly juſtifieth, becauſe it onelyonly hath the propertie to juſtifie. So it is true in one ſenſe, that the eye alone ſeeth, but it is falſe in another ſenſe that the eye ſeeth alone. For an eye that is out of the head ſeeth not
3. The fallacie in Compoſition.
The fallacie in Compoſition is, when things are taken as conjoyned, which cannot be true, but in a divided ſenſe. As in this propoſition: A man that is ſet may runne.
Which is true if it be meant at divers times; but if it be meant at the ſame time it is falſe and impoſſible. For a man that is ſet cannot runne whileſt he is ſitting. So, that men are male and female, is true of divers perſons; but falſe if it be meant of the ſame perſons.
4. Of the fallacie by Diviſion.
This fallacie of Diviſion is contrary to the former. For this ſeparateth things which cannot be true, except they be joyned together. Thus, though it be true that two and three make fiue, yet it followeth not, that two or three are fiue. If a man ſhould ſay, This wall is white, therefore this wall is; this conſequence were good, becauſe to be white is an accident which could not be, if the ſubject were not. But if one ſhould ſay, Philip is dead, therefore Philip is; the conſequence were not good: becauſe that to be dead is not an accidēt, but a privation, which preſuppoſeth that the ſubject, namely, Philip, was, but now is no more. Whoſoever therefore argueth thus, divideth that which cannot be true except it be joyned. This diviſion may happen ſomtimes in one word onelyonly. As, Ingenioſus, being taken for one word is a commendation, but divided into two, as, Ingenio ſus, it is a reproach.
5. Of the fallacie in the Accent or Pronuntiation.
The fallacie in the Accent is, when a falſe thing is affirmed vnderunder colour of pronouncing it as another thing that is true. For example,
Where no ach is, there needs no ſalue.
In the Gout there is no H.
Therefore in the Gout there needs no ſalue.
Againe, if a man ſhould ſay, I am hot; are you as hot? Or, I am cold; are you as cold? A man cannot diſtinguiſh in faſt ſpeaking of it, whether he ſaith a ſot, in ſtead of as hot; Or, a ſcould in ſtead of as cold. But being written a man ſhall eaſily perceiue this fallacie.
This fallacie is alſo cōmitted when that which is ſpoken poſitiuely, is taken as if it were ſpoken by Interrogation. As if a man commanding ſay to another, Reſt you, and he taking it Interrogatiuely ſhould anſwer; No.
6. Of the fallacie in the Figure of the word.
The fallacie in the figure of the word is, when from the Gender or Number of the word, or becauſe the Verbe is Actiue or Paſſiue, a man will inferre that the nature of the thing is ſuch. For example, if a man ſhould argue, that Prudence, Temperance, or Iuſtice are onelyonly proper and peculiar vntounto women, becauſe they are of the feminine gender, which no way followeth. So likewiſe, becauſe to heare and to ſee be not Paſſiues, it followeth not, that therfore hearing and ſeeing are no Paſſiues. And although I ſay, that I hauehave received letters from my brother, it followeth not, that I hauehave received more then one, though the word be Plurall.
The ſecond Chapter. Of Fallacies in the Matter.
THere are ſeaven fallacies in the Matter; that is to ſay, when the deceipt lyeth not in the words, but in the ignorance or diſguiſing of the thing. Theſe fallacies are, 1. The fallacie by Accident. 2. The fallacie which taketh a thing as ſpoken ſimply or abſolutely, which is true onelyonly in ſome reſpect. 3. The Suppoſing of that which is in queſtion. 4. The fallacie of Inconſequence. 5. The fallacie whereby a thing is taken for a cauſe which is not a cauſe. 6. The fallacie which mingleth divers queſtions as if they were but one. 7. The Ignorance of that which contradicteth the queſtion.
The third Chapter. The fallacie by Accident.
THe fallacie by Accident is, when from an aſſumption which is true onelyonly by accident a concluſion is drawne which is abſolute, ſimple, and without reſtraint. As in this argument:
That which ſtirres vp troubles in a Common-wealth is pernicious.
The Goſpell ſtirres vp troubles in a Common-wealth.
Therefore the Goſpell is pernicious. Thus the Sunne darkeneth the eyeſight: and the law of God hardeneth the ſinner. Whence if a man would inferre, that the Sunne were the cauſe of darkeneſſe, or, that the Law were the c…uſe of ſinne, he ſhould fall into the fallacie of the Accident. For the Goſpell of it owne nature ſtirreth vp no troubles, ſeing it preacheth peace: but men take occaſion thereby to riſe vp againſt it. Neither doth the Sunne blind the eyes by nature, but by accident, when it meeteth with a weake eye-ſight.
The fourth Chapter. The fallacie which taketh a thing as ſimply true, which is not ſo, but onelyonly in ſome reſpect.
THis fallacie is committed, when one of the propoſitions being true onelyonly in part, or in ſome reſpect, wee labour to draw from thence a concluſion to make it true at all times, in all reſpects, and in every part. As,
Every good thing is to be deſired.
Wealth is a good thing.
Therefore wealth is to be deſired.
The aſſumption is true in ſome reſpect onelyonly, and to ſome men. For riches are not good, but to good men, and to ſuch as can vſe them well. And ſo in this Syllogiſme:
He that is borne of a woman had a beginning.
Our Saviour Chriſt was borne of a woman.
Therefore our Saviour Chriſt had a beginning.
The fift Chapter. Of the Suppoſing of that which is in Queſtion.
VVE ſuppoſe that which is in queſtion, when wee make a Syllogiſme, wherein one of the propoſitions is the ſame thing which is in queſtion, though it be couched in other termes. As if I would prooue tha… the world was not created, becauſe God made it not. Or, if I would proue that men are iuſt, becauſe they are without ſinne; that were to proue a thing by it ſelfe.
The ſixt Chapter. Of the fallacie of Inconſequence.
THe fallacie of Inconſequence is, when we breake the rules which are ſet downe in the Chapter of the converſion of Enuntiations, and in the Chapter of Hypotheticall Syllogiſmes. For …ample, wee ſaid in the fourth Chapt… of the third Booke, that an vniverſall affirmatiue enuntiation cannot be converted into any other propoſition, but into a particular affirmatiue, or into an vniverſall, having two negatiues. As, All men are living creatures, is thus converted; Some living creature is a man: Or into this, Whatſoever is not a living creature is not man.
Againe, we ſaid that in Hypotheticall Syllogiſmes we may proceede from the eſtabliſhing of the Antecedent, to the eſtabliſhing of the Conſequent: And that we may proceede from the over-throwing of the Conſequent to the over-throwing of the Antecedent.
Now if any would diſpute contrary to theſe Rules, ſaying, All men are living creatures; therefore all living creatures are men. Or, All men are living creatures; therefore all that is not man is not a living creature, he ſhould fall into the fallacie of a bad Conſequence.
The ſame fallacie is committed if you argue thus,
If Bucephalus be a man, he is a living creature.
But he is a living creature.
Therefore he is a man.
Or thus,
If Bucephalus be a man, he is a living creature.
But he is not a man.
Therfore he is not a living creature.
For ſuch arguments are againſt the rules of Hypotheticall Syllogiſmes, ſet downe in the thirteenth Chapter of the fourth Booke.
The ſeaventh Chapter. The fallacie whereby a thing is taken for a cauſe, which is none.
THe fift fallacie is, when you alledge a Meane which ſeemeth to be the cauſe of the concluſion, but indeed is not. Such was the anſwer of a certaine Pyrate to Alexander the great: who having asked of him what had made him a Pyrate; he anſwered, that he was a Pyrate, becauſe he had but one Fregat or ſmall Barke; but if he had two hundred Gallies, as Alexander had, that then hee ſhould be a King. Such alſo are theſe proofes. The Church of Greece is the beſt, becauſe it is the greatest. Or, This man is learned, becauſe he hath many books. Or, that Charles hath a grey-beard, becauſe he was not hanged ten yeares agoe. Here the ordinary fault is, when the occaſion is taken for a cauſe. For cauſes doe act, but occaſions act not; but are onelyonly the ſubject and matter of acting. Thus truth breeds hatred, not of it owne nature, but by occaſion. So the Law of God hardeneth the hearts of wicked men that oppoſe thēſelues againſt it. It is not the cauſe of the hardneſſe, but onelyonly the occaſion.
The eight Chapter. Of the fallacie which mingleth many Interrogations, as if they were but one.
SOmetimes many Interrogations are cunningly entermingled, that an vntruth may be crowded in amongſt many truths. As, Cyrus, Alexander, Caeſar were they not valiant Kings? Or, theſe qualities, to be bay, olde, tall, one-eyde, are they not in this horſe?
Some will be ready to grant all this, not marking that Caeſar was never King; and that to be one eyde is a privation, and not a qualitie; and that to be olde is not a qualitie, but a quantitie or length of time paſt. Therefore ſuch Interrogations muſt be anſwered by diſtinction.
The ninth Chapter. Of the fallacie which is committed by the Ignorance of that which contradicteth the Queſtion.
THe fallacie through the Ignorance of that which contradicteth, is, when he that argueth againſt me brings a concluſion which he alledgeth as contrary or contradictorie to my poſition, which notwithſtanding is nothing prejudiciall vntounto it, and may be granted. For example, if I ſay that God is no lyar; a Sophiſter will goe about to conclude, that God ſaith not all the truth: which notwithſtanding agrees very well with that which I affirme; neither doth it from thence follow that God is a lyar.
To the end therefore that theſe be not taken for contradictorie or contrarie Enuntiations, which indeed are not: we muſt vnderſtand that if we will make two Enuntiations to be cōtradictorie, the termes muſt be vnderſtood in the ſame ſenſe in both, and without equivocation. Therfore theſe two Enuntiations, Every Cocke is living, and, Every Cocke is not living, are not contradictorie: if the one be meant of a living creature, and the other taken for the cocke of a Gunne. Againe, the attribute muſt agree with the ſubject in the ſame part, & according to the ſame time. Therefore theſe two Enuntiations, Man is mortall; and, Man is immortall, are not contradictorie: if the one be vnderſtood of the body; and the other of the ſoule of man. And, The Grecians were valiant, contradicteth not this, The Grecians were not valiant, for both are true, if you conſider them at ſeverall times.
Againe, the attribute of the Enuntiation muſt not be vnderſtood in divers reſpects. For Cicero is of great ſtature; and, Cicero is not of great ſtature, may both be true, if Cicero be compared to divers perſons: little in compariſon of a giant, and great in compariſon of a dwarfe.
The tenth Chapter. Of the faults in Syllogiſmes.
GEnerally all Syllogiſmes may be faultie, either in the forme, or in the matter. They are faultie in the Forme, when the rules of the figures are not obſerved, committing a fault, either in the quantitie, or qualitie, or the propoſitions, or in the placing of the Meane, or if there be more then three termes.
The Syllogiſme is faultie in the Matter, when one of the propoſitiōs, or both, are falſe, either in the whole, or in part. This faultineſſe happeneth ſometimes through ſimplicitie, and without cunning, bu… ſometimes it is fraudulent and with cunning; ſuch as are the fallacies aboue mentioned. If a Syllogiſme be faulty in the forme, it muſt be brought to the true forme. If it be faultie in the matter, that propoſition which is falſe muſt be denied. And if it be doubtfull or true in part onelyonly, it muſt be diſtinguiſhed.
But if the fault be neither in the forme, nor in the matter, but onelyonly in the fallacie of the ignorance of that which contradicteth the queſtion, by the which the adverſary maintaineth a thing which doth not prejudice the queſtion; in ſuch a caſe wee muſt grant all that the adverſary ſaith, and ſhew him, that in thinking to contradict vsus, be doth it not.
The end and ſcope of theſe fallacies, is not to teach vsus how to deceiue, but how to avoide deceipt.
FINIS.
End of the text · Peter du Moulin Jr, The Elements of Logic (1624)