The Elements of Logic, Book 2
The ſecond Booke, Which is OF THE PLACES OF INVENTION.
The firſt Chapter. How theſe ſimple Notions are of vſe for an Argument.
TO ſhew how theſe ſimple Notions enter into an Argument, or Syllogiſme, and how they are of vſe for Reaſoning & diſcourſe, they muſt be cloathed with other names. For if wee ſhould conſider them no otherwiſe then as they are handled in the Categories, they would never ſerue to open a diſcourſe, and to frame a reaſon. For as it is one thing to conſider Leather or wood in themſelues, & another thing to conſider them as they are a fit matter to make a ſhoo or a bench: So it is another thing to conſider things as they are in themſelues, and another thing to conſider them as they are meanes or inſtruments of reaſoning. We hauehave conſidered in the Categories things as they are in themſelues, now we are to conſider them as they may ſerue to argue and diſcourſe.
And therefore when a man will ſearch out the truth of any queſtion, (as for example, Whether voluptuouſneſſe be a good thing) and deſires to gather proofes to proue or to impugne the queſtion propounded; all that can be brought, is either,
1. The Genus of that which wee deſire to proue.
2. Or the Species.
3. Or the Difference.
4. Or the Proper.
5. Or ſome Accident.
6. Or the Whole or ſome part of the Whole.
7. Or the Definition.
8. Or the Diviſion.
9. Or ſome thing coupled vntounto it.
10. Or the Cauſe or Effect.
11. Or the Etymologie.
12. Or ſomething Like or Vnlike.
13. Or the Oppoſit.
14. Or a Compariſon in the things.
15. Or a Compariſon in the Probabilitie.
16. Or ſome Teſtimony.
Of all which heads we are now to treat of in particular, that wee may know what they are, and how to make vſe of them.
The ſecond Chapter. Of the Genus.
THe Genus is a nature which belongeth vntounto many things differing in Species. As this word, Animal, is a Genus ſignifying a nature common both to man and beaſt: Animal is the Genus; man and beaſt are the Species. So Plant is the Genus of Trees and of Herbes; and vertue is a Genus whoſe Species are Iuſtice, Temperance, &c.
There is a Supreame and moſt Generall Genus; and an Inferiour and Subalternall Genus. As Subſtance is a ſupreame Genus, which can never be a Species: but Animal is an inferiour Genus. For though it be a Genus to man and beaſt, yet it is a Species to Bodie: as alſo Bodie is a Species to Subſtance. As in this Table;
Subſtance
without bodie.
with bodie
liuing
Plants.
Animals
man.
beaſt.
not liuing.
Such Genuſes are equally attributed to their Species, and vponupon the ſame ground. But there are ſome Aequivocall Genuſes, which are attributed to divers Species vponupon divers grounds. As this word, Wolfe, is attributed to a terreſtriall devouring creature, and to a Fiſh, and to a certaine diſeaſe.
A Genus Analogicall is that which is attributed to divers Speci…ſes, though not altogether in regard of the ſame cauſe, yet for ſome reſpect or ſimilitude. As this word, Foot, is attributed to the foot of a liuing creature, and to the foot of a Table, and of a Verſe, and of a mountaine, and of a drinking glaſſe. So the word healthfull is attributed to the bodie, and to the Aire, and to exerciſe, and to vrine in divers ſenſes, and yet with ſome agreement too. Commonly ſuch a Genus agreeth primarily to ſome one of the Species, and then ſecondarily to the reſt, by reaſon of ſome relation which it hath with them, as may appeare by the forenamed examples. For the word Foot, firſt and properly is ſaid of the foot of a liuing creature, and afterward of the foot of a mountaine or of a Table by a certaine reſemblance or proportion. So likewiſe to be healthfull is ſaid firſt of the body, and then of exerciſe, and of vrine, becauſe they are helpes or markes of bodily health.
The Table of Genus.
Genus
Supreame
Inferiour
Vnivocall, as, Animal, Plant.
Aequivocall in
whole, as Wolfe.
part when there is ſome relation or agreement among the Species, As, foot, healthfull.
The third Chapter. Of the Species.
SPecies is a nature comprehended vnderunder the Genus, which beeing joyned with a difference maketh a Species. So man is a reaſonable creature: creature is the Genus of man, and the word reaſonable is the differēce which diſtinguiſheth man from other ſorts of creatures.
There be two ſorts of Species. The one moſt ſpeciall, which can never be a Genus, as, man, lyon, elephant, gold: For ſuch Specieſes cannot be divided into other Specieſes: but onelyonly into ſingular Subſtances or Individuals.
The other is a Subalternall Species, which being compared with an inferior Species is a Genus. As, the word, Animal, is a Species in regard of a Bodie: but a Genus in regard of man.
From the Genus and Species are drawne Arguments for Diſcourſe; and ſuch arguments are grounded vponupon theſe Maximes following.
1. Whatſoever agreeth with the Genus, Maximes.agreeth alſo with the Species. For whatſoever may be ſaid of a tree in generall, may be ſaid alſo of the Laurell, &c. Excepting that which is attributed to the Genus, as it is a Genus. As to be more generall then the Specieſes, and to containe them.
2. That which agrees not with the Genus, agrees not with the Species. For that which cannot be ſaid of animal, cannot be ſaid of man.
3. It is not neceſſary that the Species be whereſoeuer the Genus is. For if ſuch a thing be an animal, it followeth not that it muſt therefore be a man.
4. But on the other ſide. Where the Species is, there the Genus muſt needs be alſo. For whoſoever is a man, is alſo an animal. And whoſoever ſaith, that this is a lettice, doth by conſequent affirme, that it is an herb.
The fourth Chapter. Of Difference.
DIfference is that, whereby one thing differeth from another.
Of differences ſome are greater then others. For there are things which differ onelyonly in number; as Peter and Iohn. There be others which differ in the Species, as, man and beaſt. There be others alſo which differ in the Genus, as, a man and a ſtone. But the greateſt differēce is, when two things are in two divers Categories, as, a horſe and whitenes.
There be alſo eſſentiall differences, and accidentall differences. As, a man differeth from a horſe in eſſence, and definition. But a French man differs from a Moore onelyonly in colour and complexion, which are accidents, and not things which make man to be man.
Among the eſſentiall differences, the principall and moſt conſiderable is that, which is called Superficiall, by which the Specieſes of the ſame Genus differ eſſentially. This difference hath theſe two properties. That it conſtitutes the Specieſes; And divides the Genuſes. Thus the life ſenſitiue, is the difference which conſtitutes the animal, and maketh the animal to be Animal. The ſelfe ſame difference divideth the Genus; namely, Living. So likewiſe to be reaſonable, is the difference which divideth animal, and conſtitutes man. And the ſame perfection which maketh man to be man, is that which maketh him differ from other Animals.
The fift Chapter. Of Proper.
PRoper is of two ſorts. For there be ſome properties moſt-proper, and others leſſe-proper to a thing.
The properties moſt-proper, are ſuch as are attributed to the ſingulars of the ſame Specieſes, and with them onelyonly, and that alwayes. As, it is the propertie of the Loadſtone to draw Iron. And it is the propertie of man, to be able to laugh, and ſpeake: and of a horſe to neigh: and of an oxe to bellow.
The properties leſſe-proper, are ſuch as agree onelyonly to the ſingulars of a Species, but neither alwaies, nor to all. As it is proper to a man to be a Philoſopher, or a Muſician: but neither to every man, nor at all times. So it is the propertie of the Moone to be Eclipſed, but not at all times. And the propertie of Plants to looſe their leaues in Winter; but that agrees not with all, nor alwayes: for there be ſome that are alwayes greene.
Maxime.Whereſoeuer a difference is, there alſo is the Species, and the propertie moſt-proper. For theſe ever goe all together.
The ſixth Chapter. Of the Accident.
BY Accident in this place, we doe not vnderſtand whatſoever is in the world, Subſtance excepted. For Accident ſo taken at large comprehendeth alſo the Proper, and is of no vſe to frame a Diſcourſe or Argument.
But by Accident we vnderſtand the mutable, or ſeparable circumſtances of a Subject, which may be, or not be in a Subject, without deſtroying the ſaid Subject. As, whitenes in a wall, and valour in a man are accidents, which may be or may not be in a wall, or in a man, and that without deſtroying either man or wall, or cauſing them to be more or leſſe man or wall.
Of theſe Accidents compared together, ſome goe before, and precede by order of nature the thing which wee intend to proue. Others doe accompanie the ſame. And others doe follow it. The firſt are called Antecedents. As, weariſomneſſe, and ſhaking before an Ague; the foaming of the Sea before a tempeſt; the dawning of the day before the day: The ſecond are called Concomitants, that is to ſay, accompanying, becauſe they goe together, As, Pride and folly; The Eclipſe of the Moone, and the full Moone: The third are called Conſequents. As, raine, after a red morning; an ague after diſtaſt and weariſomneſſe without former labour.
Antecedents and Concomitants are vſed to proue probably that a thing is, or ſhall be. As, by paleneſſe we argue fear…: and by bluſhing ſhamefaſtneſſe, or the touch of conſcience: and by blunt hornes of the Moone, we conclude that we ſhall hauehave raine: and by the rednes of the ſame, that wee ſhall hauehave winde.
But thoſe proofes are moſt forcible that are drawne from ſubſequent accidents, which cannot be vnles ſome other thing hath gone before. As, we know there hath beene a battell by many ſlaine bodies lying in a field; and ſhipwracke by ſun…ry plankes ſ…o…ng on the S…a.
The M…ximesMaximes. are.
1. The Antecedent being granted, the Conſ…qu…nt …th probably follow.
2. The Conſequent being granted, the Antecedent muſt needs hauehave gone before. E…pecia ly when it is ſuch an Effect as cannot be produced, but by one cauſe: A… we proue, that becauſe it is day, the Sunne is riſ…n. But if it be …n Effect, which may ariſe from divers Cauſes (As, the corruptions of an Eſtate; and Agues) the proofe is not neceſſary.
The ſeventh Chapter. Of the Whole and Parts.
THe Whole is that which hath all the Parts joyned together in a convenient order and ſituation. As, the whole and entire of a houſe is not onelyonly when all the parts are there, but when every part is convenien…ly placed.
There be two ſorts of Whole: the one which may be divided into formall parts; the other into materiall parts.
The Formall parts are thoſe whereof the Definition is compounded. As, the Genus and the Difference are the parts of a Definition. So animal and reaſon be the two formall parts of a man. So the formall parts of a houſe, or of an image of ſtone, are their matter and their externall formes or figures. Such parts may eaſily be diſcerned and diſtinguiſhed by our vnderſtanding, but cannot be really ſeparated.
The Materiall parts are thoſe which differ in Situation, and which for the moſt part may really be ſeparated. As the materiall parts of the world are the heavens and the foure Elements: the materiall parts of a houſe are the foundation, the walles, and the roofe.
Every materiall part hath a ſituation by it ſelfe, except there be a mingling or commixtion of the ſaid parts. As when wine is mingled with water, or when the foure Elements are mingled in a Bodie. Materiall parts are either alike among themſelues (As, the parts of water, Bloud, Butter, Oile:) or els are vnlike, as, the parts of a mans bodie, or of a houſe. The parts alike among themſelues hauehave no certaine number; becauſe they may be infinitely divided.
The parts vnlike are either Integrals, or not Integrals.
The Integrall parts are thoſe whereof the whole is immediately compounded. As, a Kingdome is immedidiately compounded of a King & the three eſtates. The world is compounded of the heavens and the foure Elements. An animal is compounded of a bodie and a ſoule.
But vnderunder one of theſe parts are oftentimes contained other little parts which are not Integrals: that is to ſay, whereof the Whole or the Entire is not immediately compounded. Among which there are ſome that are not neceſſary, ſerving rather for ornament and conveniencie, then for neceſſitie. As, in a Common-wealth, hunters, perfumers, muſicians, and Poets. In a houſe, ſhuts to windowes, gutters, and weathercockes.
Sometimes in a Common-wealth the more neceſſary parts are ſuch as appeare leaſt, and are leſſe in account then ſuch as are for ornament or pleaſure. A… Bakers are leſſe in account then Cookes, and Plowmen leſſe then Goldſmiths.
There are little p…rts and not Integrall, which are notwithſtanding principals, and altogether ne…eſſary. As, the heart and braine in man. A vault hath that prope…ie, that all the parts how little ſoever they be, are principals; becauſe if one of them be taken away, the reſt fall to the ground.
There are certaine parts which are not neceſſary for the being, and yet are neceſſary for the well and commodious being. As, the eye in a mans bodie, lockes in a houſe, Merchantdrapers in a towne.
The Nayles are part of mans bodie, as alſo the teeth: but haire is not. For it is an excrement.
A ſmall quantitie of our bloud is not accounted a part of the bodi…; becauſe though it be taken away, the bodie remaines compleat, and oftentim…s is the more healthfull. But the who…e maſſe of bloud is part of the bodie.
Now to argue and ſeeke the truth by the helpe of the Whole and Parts, theſe Maximes are to be vnderſtood.
1. Whereſoever the Whole is, Maximes.there alſo all the Integrall parts requiſit to being, muſt neceſſarily be. As, where man is, there neceſſarily is the bodie and ſoule. 2. Take away any of the Integrall and neceſſarie parts, and you deſtroy the Whole. As, take away the foundation or walls, and you deſtroy the houſe.
3. Whatſoever is ſaid of the Whole compounded of parts alike, may be ſaid alſo of every ſeverall part. Except that which is ſaid of the Whole, as it is Whole, namely, to containe all the parts. For example, to be ſalt is ſaid of the whole Sea, and of every part of it: but to encompaſſe the earth, is attributed onelyonly to the Sea, as it is a Whole: and therefore it is not attributed to any part of the Sea.
The Table of the Whole and Parts.
The Whole is compoſed of parts
Formall.
Materiall which are among themſelues.
alike.
vnlike
integrall.
not integrall
neceſſary for
being.
well-being.
not neceſſary.
The eight Chapter. Of Definition.
DEfinition is a ſpeech which expreſſeth the eſſence of the thing. The perfect definition of a Subſtance is that, which is compounded of the next Genus and the ſpecificall difference. As, the definition of a Plant is, to be a bodie liuing a vegetatiue life: of man, to be a reaſonable creature. There are but few ſuch Definitions; becauſe the formes and eſſentiall differences of ſubſtances are not ſo well knowne vntounto vsus. God onelyonly who made them, doth exactly know them.
The perfect definition of an Accident is compounded of three parts, namely, of the next Genus, of the proper Subject, and of the next Efficient or Finall cauſe. As for example, death is an accident, whereof the Genus is, the end or deſtruction of life, the Subject is, a liuing bodie, and the next Efficient cauſe is, the extinguiſhing of vitall heat.
This therefore is the perfect definition of death, namely, that it is the deſtruction of the life of a liuing bodie by extinguiſhing the vitall heat. Thus are defined anger, griefe, ſicknes, thunder, earthquake, the Eclipſe of the Moone, and that of the Sunne, Civil-warre, reſpiration, and divers other things, whereof wee ſhall produce ſome examples in the end of this Chapter.
Now but Proper Accidents can be thus defined. For mutable and caſuall Accidents, or ſuch as hauehave no certaine knowne cauſe, or that depend vponupon the will of man, cannot be exactly defined. And therefore in ſtead of a Definition, we deſcribe them, as well as we may, expreſſing their Genus, and ſome certaine propertie. So whitenes is defined, when we ſay, that it is a moſt ſimple and moſt cleare colour. And light is defined to be the chiefe of all whiteneſſes; or, the whitenes of the bodie of the Sunne ſending forth his likenes through tranſparent bodies.
Naturall inſtruments, as, the eye, and the hand; or, artificiall, as, a hammer, or ana xe, are defined by their Genus, and by their fitnes for that vſe for which they are ordained. So the Eye is the inſtrument of ſeeing, and a Hammer is an inſtrument to knocke withall.
Definition ſerveth to diſcourſe and to argue by the meanes of this Maxime.Maxime.
To whatſoever thing the definition agreeth, vntounto that ſame alſo the thing defined doth agree. And reciprocally, to whatſoever the defined thing agreeth, to the ſame the definition agreeth alſo.
The Table of Definition.
Definition is either of a
Subſtance which is compoſed of the
Next Genus.
Difference.
Accident which is
Proper defined by the
Next Genus.
Proper ſubject.
Next cauſe
Efficient.
Finall.
Improper or caſuall, defined as the Subſtance, ſo far as may be.
Certaine examples of the definition of a Proper Accident.
THunder is a ſound in the cloud, by the breaking out of a flaming exhalation.
Death is the deſtruction of a living creature by extinguiſhing the vitall heat.
The Eclipſe of the Moone is the darkning of the Moone by the interpoſition of the earth.
Anger is a perturbation of the mind ariſing from the opinion of a ſuſtained wrong.
Civill warre is the trouble of an Eſtate ariſing from the diſcord of the parties.
Baldnes is the loſſe of the haire of the head through the want of radicall humour.
Reſpiration is the drawing in of aire into the lungs to refreſh the heart.
Sicknes is an Indiſpoſition of the bodie cauſed by the diſtemperature of the Humours.
The Earthquake is the ſtirring or moving of a part of the earth through the violence of winds therein encloſed.
Blindnes is a privation of light in the eye by the corruption of the inſtruments of ſeeing.
Sorrow is a griefe in the iraſcible facultie, through the griefe of ſome evill.
The Eclipſe of the Sunne is the darkning of the aire by the interpoſition of the Moone.
The ninth Chapter. Of Diviſion.
THere are divers ſorts of Diviſions. For either we divide the Genus into the Species, or the Whole into the Parts, or the Subſtance into divers Acc…dents, or an Accident into divers Subjects, or a Word into divers ſignifications.
1. Firſt we divide a Genus into the Species. As, a liuing creature into man and beaſt. Actions into naturall and voluntarie.
2. Or els we divide the Whole into Par…s. So man is divided into Soule and bodie. A houſe into the foundations, walls and roofe. Which diviſion is made either in thought or in deed.
3. Or els we divide the Subject into divers Accidents. As, when we divide men into free and bond, into males or females, into fooles or wiſemen.
4. Or els we divide an Accident into other Accidents. As, when we divide Phyſicians into rich and poore ones: ſouldiers into great or little ones, ſtrong or weake.
5. Or els we divide Accidents into divers Subjects, As, ſicknes, into the ſicknes of the bodie, and ſicknes of the ſoule. So we may divide corruption into the corruption of ſimple bodies, or into the corruption of mixt or compounded bodies.
6. Or we divide an Aequivocall word into divers ſignificatiōs, As the word, linke, which ſignifieth a Sauſage, a Torch, and a linke of a chaine.
Rules for Diviſion.1. A good diviſion muſt hauehave but few parts, and thoſe oppoſit, if it may be. As, animal is divided into reaſonable and vnreaſonable; Number into even and odd; A line into ſtraight and crocked. But that is not alwayes poſſible. As when we divide the externall ſenſes into fiue. And France into ſeventeene governements.
2. In a Diviſion nothing muſt be either ſuperfluous, or wanting. As, if a man ſhould ſay, that the ſenſes are, hearing, ſeeing, ſmelling, and the two eyes; there were in ſuch a Diviſion ſomething wanting and ſomething ſuperfluous.
3. The parts of a Diviſion muſt not over-reach one another. As, who ſhould ſay that all cloathing of the bodie is either garments, or habillements, or gownes. Or that Iuſtice conſiſteth in three things, to liue honeſtly, to hurt no bodie, to giuegive every man his owne. In theſe diviſions the parts are but little or not at all differing, and are in a manner the ſame thing.
The Table of Diviſion.
Diviſion is of the
Genus into the Species.
Whole into the Parts.
Subject into Accidents.
Accidents into divers Subjects.
Aequivocall word into divers ſignifications.
The tenth Chapter. Of things Coupled, called in Latin Conjugata.
COupling is conſidered either in Words or in Things.
Words coupled or conjoyned are ſuch, as come from the ſame beginning, and differ in termination, As, iuſt, iuſtice, iuſtly: white, whiting, to white, whitenes. The linke and affinitie of which words is grounded vponupon ſome affinitie which is in the nature of the things ſignified by theſe words.
But there are certaine things coupled in Nature which are not coupled in Words. As the ſleepe, and to ſlumber.
There are alſo certain words coupled, which notwithſtanding for matter are not of neceſ…tie linked together. As, buckle and a buckler.
Now for argument and diſcourſe, the coupling and affinitie which is in words is of no vſe, except there be alſo affinitie in the thing: but where the affinitie of words proceeds from the affinitie in the thing, we vſe this Maxime.
Maxime.To whomſoever one of the Coniugates or things coupled doth belong, the others alſo belong vntounto the ſame. As, he that lyeth is a lyar. And, to whomſoever it belongeth to doe a iuſt thing, to him alſo belongeth iuſtice, and to liue iuſtly. And, ſeeing thou art a knaue, thou muſt be given vntounto knavery.
This Maxime is not without Exception. As, may appeare by the example of Cambyſes, who being very vnjuſt, did notwithſtanding ſome juſt actions. As in that he covered the ſeat of juſtice with the skinne of an vnjuſt Iudge, whom he cauſed to be fl…ad, as a warning to all that ſhould ſit vponupon the ſaid ſeat. And ſo there may be a Prince loving treaſon, who notwithſtanding hateth the traitour.
The eleventh Chapter. Of Cauſes and Effects.
A Cauſe is that which bringeth forth an Effect: or that by which or for which any thing is.
There be foure kinds of Cauſes: the Materiall, the Formall, the Efficient, and the Finall. For example, the matter of a houſe is ſtones, wood, and tyles: the forme is the ſtructure and manner of building, which ariſeth from the placing or ordering of the parts: the efficient cauſe is the Maſter-builder: the finall cauſe is for dwelling or habitation.
The efficient and finall cauſes are called Externall, becauſe they are out of the thing, and are not parts of it. As the builder is no part of the houſe: for ſuppoſe the builder were ſhut vp in the houſe, which he hath built, yet were he ſtill an externall cauſe, by reaſon that he is not of the eſſence or definition of the houſe, nor any part of it. But the matter and forme are Internal cauſes, becauſe the thing is compoſed of them.
The cauſe Materiall.Matter is that whereof the thing is compoſed. As, leather is the matter of a ſhoe, becauſe a ſhoe is made of leather.
Matter is of two ſorts: the one is called matter of Generation, as, the ſeed is the matter of the Generation of a tree; ſlime is the matter of the Generation of frogs; ſo water is the matter of ice. The other is the matter of Compoſition. As, the foure elements are the matter wherof a bodie is compoſed; wood and ſtone are the matter of a houſe.
Sometimes matter is taken improperly for the ſubject whereof we ſpeake or write. Thus battails and louelove are the matter of the booke of Arioſt. And ſometimes for the occaſion and ſubject whereabout man doth labour and occupie himſelfe. As, numbers are the matter of an Arithmetician, and dangers and troubles are the matter of proweſſe and patience.
Forme is that which giueth being to a thing.Formall.
Of Formes ſome are Naturall. As the forme of an Animal is the ſenſitiue ſoule: and the forme of the eye is the facultie of ſeeing: Others are Artificiall. As the forme of a ſtatua, of a houſe, or of a clock.
Naturall formes are part of the ſubſtance, and are multiplied by generation. But Artificiall formes are qualities, and no parts of the ſubſtance, neither are they multiplied by generation or propagation. If we engraue the image of Caeſar vponupon a nut, that nut being planted will bring forth fruit and nuts, but not the image of Caeſar. And thence it is that children are not heires of the learning or piety of their fat…ers.
The EfficientEfficient. cauſe is that by which a thing is. As the Sunne is the efficient cauſe of the day: and the fire of burning: and ſicknes of death: and the interpoſition of the Moone, the cauſe of the eclipſe of the Sunne.
VnderUnder the Efficient cauſe we comprehend the cauſe which is called Meritorious. As murther is the cauſe of puniſhment.
Likewiſe vnderunder the Efficient cauſe we comprehend the cauſe which is called Defectiue. As the want of ſight is the cauſe of going aſtray; and the abſence of the Sunne, is the cauſe of night, howſoever by nature it be the cauſe of day.
All inſtruments, both naturall, as, the eye and the hand; and artificiall, as, an Axe and a ſword, are in ſome ſort Efficient cauſes. For though they act not by their owne proper power, yet they helpe the action; and without them the naturall action would either be weake or altogether hindered.
The FinallFinall. cauſe is that for the which a thing is done. So the end of Phyſick is to heale the ſick, and the end of Studie is to get learning.
We muſt warily diſtinguiſh the ſcope from the end. As, the ſcope of walking is health, but the end is the laſt ſtep; the one is the end of the intention; the other the end of progreſſion.
The finall cauſe may alſo be the formall and efficient cauſe, but …n divers reſpects. As, the forme of the houſe is the end of the builder: and the forme of a horſe engendred is the efficient cauſe of the operations of the ſame horſe, and alſo the finall cauſe of the horſe engendring. And that which is the final cauſe, i… commonly an effect. As to ſee is the finall cauſe, and alſo the effect of ſight.
Of cauſes the finall is the beſt, and moſt excellent: becauſe all the other tend vntounto it, and ſerue it.
The finall cauſe as it is the laſt in execution, ſo it is the firſt in the intention.
Efficient and finall cauſes bring forth their effects,Cauſes of themſelues, or by accident. either of themſelues and of their owne nature; or by accident. Thus the Sunne giueth light of it ſelfe, and of his owne nature; but by accident it blindeth Owles. And the neighing of Darius his horſe was the accidentall cauſe of his raiſe to the kingdome. And thirſt may be an accidentall cauſe to ſaue a man out of the battaile; if being thirſtie and gone out of the armie to drinke, it ſo happened that whileſt he was a drinking, the armie was ſuddenly diſcomfited. So a Muſician that buildeth a houſe, is not the cauſe of the building as he is a Muſician, but as he is an architect or builder. It is the ſame of the finall cauſe. For example, healing is the proper end of Phyſick, but the gaine of the Phyſician is an accidentall end: the one is the end of the Art, and the other of the perſon.
Cauſes next or remote.Againe, there be ſome next, and ſome remote cauſes. For example, the next end of the art of a ſouldier is warre, and the remote is victory, and the end more remote is a happie peace. So the next efficient cauſe of death is ſicknes, of ſicknes exceſſe, and of exceſſe bad company.
The ſame may be ſaid of formes and matters. The next matter of a Table is the wood, but the remote matter are the foure Elements. The next forme of any thing is that which wee call Specificall; but the remote formes are thoſe of the next or of the remote Genus. So the next forme of a man is to be reaſonable, but to hauehave ſenſe is the forme of a liuing creature, which is the Genus of man, and by conſequent alſo is the forme of man, but remote.
Moreover, there be cauſes,Cauſes ſufficient, or not ſufficient. which are Sufficient of themſelues to produce an effect. As, the Sunne is of it ſelfe ſufficient to giuegive light, and fire to burne, and the favour of God to make a man happie. But there are ſome cauſes, which are not of themſelues Sufficient, & muſt hauehave many together. As, to make a fertile ſoile, the ground muſt be luſtie, it muſt be well tilled, raine muſt moiſten it, and the Sunne muſt heat it in due ſeaſon, and moderately. To attaine vntounto learning, a man muſt hauehave a good wit, good inſtructions, and be diligent and painefull. So divers things are the cauſes of victory, experience in the Generall, valour in the Souldiers, military Diſcipline, neceſſary weapons, &c. but aboue all the will of God.
Now to argue from the cauſes and effects, theſe MaximesMaximes. are of vſe.
1. That which agreeth with the matter, agreeth alſo probably with the thing compoſed of that matter. As, the earth is heavie, and therefore terreſtriall bodies are heavie. This Maxime is ſometimes faultie. For example, Ice is hard, yet notwithſtanding the matter of it is ſoft and liquid, namely, water.
2. Where the matter is wanting, there alſo the thing compoſed is wanting. As, where there is no iron, a ſword cannot be made.
3. The next efficient and neceſſary cauſe being granted, or denied, the effect alſo muſt be granted, or denied. As, if the Sunne ſhine, it is day, if it ſhines nor, it is not day. And this effect being granted, the efficient cauſe is alſo granted.
4. When divers cauſes are neceſſarily requiſit to produce an effect, one of the ſame cauſes being wanting, the effect alſo is wanting.
5. Such as is the efficient cauſe, ſuch commonly are the effects. As of wicked Fathers, come wicked Sonnes: and ſtrong things beget ſtrong things; and Moores hauehave blacke ſonnes. This Maxime is often falſe, eſpecially in remote and vniverſall cauſes. As the Sunne groweth not, and yet it cauſeth plants to grow, it hath no ſent, and yet cauſeth flowres to ſmell ſweet, and carions to ſtinke. And God mooveth all, but yet is immoovable. Alſo in cauſes which act by accident. As a Whetſto…e is not ſharpe, yet cauſeth ſharpeneſſe: the Sunne is not hot, yet warmeth by accident, in clearing and purifying the ayre by the reflection of his beames.
6. If the ſelfe ſame qualitie be attributed vntounto the agent and vntounto the patient, it muſt much more be attributed vntounto the agent. As, the hand is warme by reaſon of the fire which acteth vponupon it, therefore the fire is hotter then the hand. And the Sunne cauſeth the water to ſhine, therefore it is brighter then the water.
This Maxime is falſe in the fourth ſpecies of qualitie, namely, in the forme and figure; becauſe this qualitie receiues neither more nor leſſe. As, if the Seale be round, it followeth not that the figure printed in the waxe be leſſe round, then the Seale.
7. The end being granted, thoſe meanes alſo without which the end cannot be attained vntounto, are likewiſe granted. As, if you grant that a man liveth, you grant alſo that he eats, drinkes, and breaths. And happineſſe being granted, vertue, and the favour of God are likewiſe granted.
8. The meanes to attaine vntounto the end being granted, it followeth not that the end muſt therefore alwayes be granted. For it is no good reaſon to ſay, Philip hath bookes, therefore he is learned: he hath horſes and weapons, therefore he ſhall obtaine the victory. So alſo, the end being taken away, the meanes are not alwayes therefore taken away. For many, though they hauehave the meanes in their hands, never attaine vntounto the end.
9. Cauſes by chance or hazard are not fit to argue withall.
10. If neceſſary effects be taken away, the cauſes alſo are taken away. I ſay, neceſſarie; For there are ſome cauſes which act not neceſſarily, and which do not alwayes produce their effects. As, ſickneſſe brings not alwayes death.
11. Cauſes are more excellent then their effects, vnleſſe the effect be a finall cauſe. And therefore, to ſee, and heare, are things more excellent, then the faculties of ſeeing, and hearing; becauſe thoſe faculties are ordained onelyonly for theſe effects, namely, to ſee, and to heare.
12. The cauſes ever goe before their effects in the order of nature, but not alwayes in time. Thus the Sun-beames are as ancient as the Sunne; and the flame is never without cleareneſſe or brightneſſe.
The Table of Cauſes.
Cauſes are
Internall
Matter of
Generation.
Compoſition.
Forme
Naturall.
Artificiall.
Externall
Efficient
Properly.
Improperly, as the cauſe
Meritorious.
Inſtrumētall
naturall.
artificiall.
Finall.
All cauſes are either
1.
Next. or
Remote.
2.
By themſelues. or
By accident.
3.
Sufficient. or
Inſufficient.
The twelfth Chapter. Of Etymologie.
ETymologie is the derivation of a word.
Etymologie in regard of the word, is as a Definition in regard of the thing; and ſerveth to argue and diſcourſe. As when we ſay, Such a one is not a Counſellour, becauſe he giues no Counſell. And Philip cannot be called a Philoſopher, becauſe he loues not wiſedome.
Thus by the Etymologie of theſe names Ieſus and Chriſt, wee gather what our Saviours calling and office is. And wee encourage ſuch as hauehave a name importing ſome vertue, in ſtirring them vp to vertue by the Etymologie of their names. So Euſebius and Pius may be exhorted to Pietie, and Andrew to valour, and Celeſtinus to giuegive himſelfe to heavenly things, leaſt they belie their names by a contrary converſation. And ſo one gathereth probably, that all things in times paſt were common, the Robe excep…ed, becauſe when a theft is committed, we vſe to ſay, Such a one hath beene robbed: and that the firſt Warres were againſt Beaſts, becauſe the Latin word Bellum, cōmeth from Bellua. But theſe kinde of proofes are very weake, becauſe names are given vntounto men, before it can be knowne whether they will be vertuous or no; nay, ſometimes names are given by contraries, and by way of deriſion. As, when a dwarfe is called a Goliah.
Good Etymologies in the Engliſh tongue, are for the moſt part taken from the Latin; but ſuch as are drawne from the Engliſh tongue are commonly abſurd and ridiculous. For example, if a man ſhould ſay, that the woman is the woe of the man; and beere, quaſi, be heere.
The thirteenth Chapter. Of things alike or vnlike.
THoſe things are called Alike which hauehave between them ſome Analogie and correſpondencie or proportion.
The analogie is knowne by the end and vſe. As the Shepheard in regard of his flocke, and the Paſtor in regard of his Church, are things Alike.
There be certain things differing, which the vulgar take for the ſame things, and none but Philoſophers doe diſtinguiſh them. As, louelove and friendſhip; continencie and temperance; the flatterer and the man-pleaſer; memory and remembrance; chance and fortune; hate and envie; whoſe differences are learned by the Ethicks and Phyſicks.
Similitudes are rather ornaments of a ſpeech, then any proofes. As, when we ſay, Even as cracks in a veſſell are knowne when the veſſell is filled with liquor: So the ſecret vices of the heart are diſcovered by plentie and proſperitie. And, that Hypocrites are like vntounto Bees which hauehave hony in the mouth, and a ſting in the tayle. And that covetous perſons are like vntounto Chriſtmas-boxes, out of the which money cannot be gotten …efore they be broken. And falſe frie…ds are l…ke vntounto Swallowe…, that d…part from vsus in hard weather.
Metaphors well drawne are ſimilitudes reduced to one word. As when we ſay, to feed the flocke, that is, to teach: and to ſtaine ones reputation, that is to ſay, to backbite.
Similitudes hauehave two parts, the propoſition and the reddition. The propoſition, namely this, even as ſwallowes, &c. The reddition as this; So falſe friends, &c.
Examples are taken from things done, and from humane actions: but Similitudes are oftentimes drawne from things fained, and from that which is obſerved in nature.
Now to argue from the like, wee vſe this probable Maxime.Maxime. To things alike agree things alike.
EXAMPLES OF ANALOGIE.
The Analogie between an Animal and a Plant.
In an Animal,
In a Plant.
The skinne
The barke or rinde.
The heart
The pith or marrowe.
The armes
The branches
The mouth
The roote.
The excrements
The leaues and gumme.
The veines
The graine of the wood.
The Analogie between mans bodie, and a Common-wealth, or Eſtate.
In Man,
In an Eſtate.
The head
The Prince.
The eye
The Councell
The armes
The ſouldiers and tradſ-men.
The belly
The idle perſons.
The ſinewes
The money.
The joynts
Concord and good order.
The Analogie between a building and a mans bodie.
In a building,
In Mans bodie.
The kitchin
The belly.
The kitchin kniues
The teeth.
The ſtudie
The braine.
The windowes
The eyes.
The fiue dores
The fiue inſtruments of the ſenſes.
The Maſter of the houſe
The ſoule.
The ſinke
The conduits of the excrements.
The Analogie between the indiſpoſitions of the Bodie and of the Soule.
In the Bodie,
In the Soule.
Blindnes
Ignorance.
Paine
Griefe
The dropſie
Covetouſneſſe.
The itch
Impatience.
Swelling
Pride.
A fit of an ague
Choler.
Shaking
Feare.
Contagious aire
Bad examples.
Painting
Hypocriſie.
Collicks
Troubles of conſcience.
Weakneſſe
Puſillanimitie.
The foureteenth Chapter. Of things Oppoſit.
OPpoſites are ſuch as cannot ſtand together in the ſame ſubject, at the ſame time, and in the ſame regard. As a man cannot be at the ſelfe ſame time both white and blacke in the ſame part of his bodie, and not compared to other things: though he may be blacke and white, in divers parts of his bodie, either at divers times, or comparatiuely, white in reſpect of a Moore, and blacke in reſpect of a Swan.
There are foure ſorts of Oppoſits. 1. Relatiues. 2. Contraries. 3. Privatiues. 4. Contradictories.
1. Of RelatiuesRelatiues. wee hauehave alreadie ſpoken. lib. 1. cap. 7.
2. ContrariesContraries. are two qualities or two actions which being vnderunder the ſelfe ſame Genus, are moſt remote one from the other, and are incompatible. As blacke and white hauehave the ſame Genus, namely, colour: Ʋertue and vice are ſpecieſes of habits, which being vnderunder the ſame Genus are of a contrarie nature.
Contraries are either Mediate or Immediate. Thus, there is a middle between black and white, namely, pale and browne: and between hot and cold there is lukewarme. But between the number even and odd, between the ſtraight and crooked line, there is no third. The middle or meane doth vſually participate of the two contrary extreames: the meane between good and bad actions excepted. For the meane is that which is called an Indifferent action, participating neither of good nor evill.
Between two contrary vices, vertue is the meane. As between covetouſneſſe and prodigalitie, there is liberalitie, and good husbandrie: between raſhneſſe and cowardneſſe, there is valour.
This mediocritie or meane participating of two extreames, is not in the vertue it ſelfe; for that hath no participation with vice; but it is in thoſe actions and things about which vertue is occupied. As, to avoid danger, and to lay out money. For theſe actions partly imitate the covetous man, and partly the liberall. And it fals out oftentimes that to each of the extreames there is a contrary vertue: as to prodigalitie, good husbandry; to covetouſneſſe, liberalitie: ſo cowardneſſe and raſhneſſe are two extreames; and to cowardneſſe, valour is contrary; and to raſhneſſe, diſcretion.
If two contraries happen to be vnderunder two next differing Genuſes, (as, iuſtice vnderunder vertue, and iniuſtice vnderunder vice) theſe two Genuſes muſt needs be contraries one to another, and Species of the ſame Genus. By this meanes all contraries, if they be not vnderunder the ſame next Genus, they are vnderunder the ſame remote Genus.
Words are ſometimes wanting to expreſſe one of the contraries. Thus we hauehave no word to expreſſe the habit contrarie to an ague, nor to a rheume, nor to the Phyſicks, nor to Grammar.
3. PrivatiuePrivatiues. oppoſits are a qualitie, and the abſence and privation of that qualitie. As, light and darkenes; ſight and blindneſſe.
There can be no privation, when the ſubiect is not capable of the contrary qualitie. Thus in a ſtone there is no blindneſſe, becauſe it is not capable of ſight. And a childe in the wombe cannot be ſaid to be blind, nor a whelp before it be nine daies old, becauſe they are not come to that time wherin they ſhould ſee.
The privation of Actions may be remedied and recovered. As the privation of the act of ſeeing is recovered, when he that ſleepeth openeth his eyes to ſee. But the privation of the Facultie of ſeeing is irrecoverable.
Knowledge and ignorance ſimple and childiſh or brutiſh, are oppoſits privatiuely. But wilfull ignorance that armes it ſelfe with reaſons againſt the truth, is oppoſed vntounto knowledge as a contrary, and not as a privation.
4. ContradictoriesContradictories. are ſuch betweene which there is no meane or middle. As, to be, and not to be; man and no man; horſe and no horſe. For there is nothing that is not either man or not man; horſe or not horſe.
Now when we will argue and proue any thing, Oppoſits are of great vſe. The MaximesMaximes. are theſe.
1. Whoſoever grants one of the relatiues, doth neceſſarily grant the other. As he that calleth ſuch a one a father, affirmeth that he hath a childe.
2. One and the ſame thing may be two relatiues; As, to be a father and ſonne, maſter and ſervant, right and left: but in divers reſpects.
3. Contrary things hauehave a contrary conſequence. As, vice makes a man wretched, therefore vertue maketh him happie. Here are excepted ſuch things as doe belong to the Genus of the two contraries. For if blackneſſe be viſible, it followeth not that whiteneſſe be inviſible; becauſe to be viſible, belongeth to the Genus of whiteneſſe and blackeneſſe, namely, to colour. We muſt alſo except ſuch cauſes as doe act by accident. As, if a white man buildeth his owne houſe; it followeth not, that a black man muſt pull downe his; and if heat doth harden the ground, it followeth not that froſt muſt ſoften it.
4. The ſelfe ſame cauſe may bring forth certaine effects, when the action of the cauſe dependeth from the diſpoſition of the matter againſt which it acteth. So the Sunne giues a ſweet ſmell to flowers, but it makes a carrion ſtinke: and fire hardens the earth, and ſoftens waxe.
5. Every ſubiect that is capable to receiue the one of the contraries, is alſo capable to receiue the other. Thus, whatſoever may be heated, may be cooled; and whatſoever may be hardned, may be ſoftned.
6. One of the contraries being granted, the other is overthrowne. Thus, he that is not free is a bondman. But it followeth not that if one of the contraries be denied, the other muſt be granted; except they be ſuch contraries, as hauehave no meane between them. As, if the bodie be not white, it followeth not that it is black. But in contraries that are without meane, this conſequent i… good. As, if this line be not ſtraight, it is crooked.
7. Of two good things whereof the one is leſſer and the other greater, the contrary to the greateſt good is the greater evill. As, vertue and health be two good things; if vertue therefore be a greater good then health, vice muſt be a greater evill then ſickneſſe.
Except when one of the two good things is compriſed in the other. As, to hauehave the skill of reading, and the skill of Philoſophie. For though the skill of Philoſophy …e a greater good, then the skill of reading, yet it followeth not, that not to be skilfull in Philoſophie is a greater evill, then not to be skilfull in reading, becauſe the skill of reading is comprehended vnderunder the skill of Philoſophie.
8. Contradictories cannot ſtand together, and one of them muſt of neceſſity be. As, there is nothing that is not either man or not man; and it is impoſſible to be both the one and the other, at the ſame time.
The fifteenth Chapter. Compariſon of things.
THings are oft compared according to their goodneſſe and excellency, and then the compariſon is made by theſe Rules or Maximes.Maximes.
1. Whatſoever is deſired in regard of it ſelfe, is better then that which is deſired onelyonly in regard of ſome other thing. As, life is better then money, and ſight is more to be deſired then ſpectacles, and health then Phyſick.
2. That which is good to all, is better then that which is onelyonly good to ſome, and which is vſed but ſeldome, and for certaine reſpects. Thus light is better then darkneſſe, and to hauehave two armes is better then to be maimed. For darkneſſe is of vſe onelyonly for theeues, and debauched perſons; and to hauehave but one arme is of vſe onelyonly to beggars, who thereby ſet forth their miſery.
3. That which is good of it owne nature, is better then that which is good onelyonly by accident, or which is of vſe onelyonly to avoyd a greater evill. Thus, health is better then Phyſick; and to hauehave our wares in our ſhip, is better then to caſt them into the Sea; and prudence is better then chance.
4. One good which when we hauehave, wee need not the other, is better then that, which when we hauehave, we hauehave yet need of the other. Thus to be loved of God, is better then to be loved of men; and to hauehave the perfect knowledge of an Art, is better then to hauehave it written in a booke.
5. Of finall cauſes, the laſt is ever the beſt. Thus happineſſe is better then vertue, and the skill of managing a horſe, is better then the skill to make a ſpurre.
6. Permanent goods are better then the tranſitory. As, vertue is better then money.
But in generall without any reſpect to the goodneſſe or excellency of things, they may be compared by theſe Maximes following.
1.Other Maximes. That which is ſuch of it owne nature, is more ſuch then that which is onelyonly ſuch by participation. Thus the Sunne is cleerer then a looking glaſſe, when the Sunne ſhineth on it.
2. That which is ſuch of it ſelfe, is more ſuch then that which is ſuch onelyonly by accident. As, exerciſe and good nouriſhment is more healthfull, then the cutting off of an arme: and the death of the Sonne of God hath beene more beneficiall to ſalvation, then the treaſon of Iudas, howſoever God vſed it as a meanes for our good.
3. That which is moſt remote from his contrary, is more ſuch then that which is leſſe remote. And therefore the cold in Norway is greater then that in Italy, becauſe it is more remote from the South, from whence the heat commeth.
4. That which acteth more forcibly, is commonly more ſuch, then that which acteth more weakely. As, that which hurteth more is worſe then that, which hurteth leſſe, and that which pricketh more is ſharper pointed, then that which pricketh leſſe. This rule hath exceptions. Aire and water are equally moiſt, nay, Ariſtotle holds the aire to be moiſter; yet water moiſtens more then aire. So the flame is hot, or rather hotter then the hot iron, and yet a hot iron burneth more then the flame doth.
The ſixteenth Chapter. Compariſon of Probabilitie or Likelihood.
THings are compared in probabilitie, when we queſtion whether of the two is the more credible. And this is done, when to proue ſome one thing, wee bring in another equally, or more, or leſſe probable, then that which is in queſtion.
This compariſon may bee made three manner of wayes.1. Probable alike. For
Firſt when we will proue a thing in queſtion, we may bring in another thing as probable as it. For example, if a Prince hath granted ſomething to one Citizen, another Citizen may pretend, that the like grant ought to be made vntounto him alſo; becauſe he is a Citizen as well as the other, and nothing inferiour to him. So a fault which is pardoned to ſome one in regard of his youth, muſt be pardoned to another as young as he. This reaſon is grounded vponupon this Maxime.Maxime.
Of two things equally probable, or equally iuſt, the one being granted, makes the other to be eaſi…y beleeved.
2. More probable.Secondly, to proue a thing in queſtion, wee may bring another thing more probable then it, arguing thus. If that which is more probable is not, much leſſe ſhall that be, which is leſſe probable. For example, if a Father will not hauehave his children goe richly apparelled, much leſſe will he ſuffer it in his ſervants. And if the Apoſtles were not without ſinne, how much leſſe are wee; This is called arguing from a more probable to a leſſe, and grounded vponupon this Maxime.Maxime.
If that which is more poſſible, and more probable be not; much leſſe ſhall that be which is leſſe probable and poſſible.
The concluſion of ſuch arguments muſt alwayes be negatiue.
Laſtly,3. Leſſe probable. we may proue a thing in queſtion, by bringing in another thing that is leſſe probable, ſaying thus: If a thing leſſe probable, and harder to be beleeved, is notwithſtanding, or hath beene; much more ought we to beleeue, that which is more probable and eaſier to be done. So if one at twelue yeares of age can carry a waight of a hundred pound; by a ſtronger reaſon one may carry the ſame weight at the age of twentie yeares. And if Alexander tooke Tyre, much more eaſily might he hauehave taken Ieruſalem, which was weaker then Tyre, if he had beſieged it. This is called arguing from the leſſe probable to the greater, grounded vponupon this Maxime.Maxime.
If that which is leſſe probable and leſſe poſſible may be, much more ſhall that be, which is more probable and more poſſible. The concluſion of ſuch arguments muſt alwaies be affirmatiue.
Wee muſt warily diſtinguiſh between the greatneſſe of the thing, and the greatneſſe of the probabilitie. For greateſt things are oft leſſe probable, and more difficult. For it were no good argument to ſay thus. If birds can flie, how much more bulls. And if a threed can goe through the eie of a needle, how much more a cable. And if Michael Angell could paint very excellently, how much more the Emperour Charles the fift.
The ſeventeenth Chapter. Of Teſtimony.
TEſtimonies are often vſed to argue and proue a thing.
Teſtimonies are of force and doe perſwade, when they be ſuch as may not be denied, by reaſon of the qualitie, authoritie, ſufficiencie, or multitude of perſons.
Teſtimonies are either divine or humane.
Divine teſtimonies are Oracles, and all that is called the Word of GOD: likewiſe dreames, viſions, miracles, be they true or falſe, if they be delivered as true. Alſo rules to liue well, derived from nature.
Humane teſtimonies, if the queſtion be about matter of right, are humane lawes, cuſtomes, the teſtimonies of Anceſtours, or ſuch as are skilfull in their owne art, the conſent of nations. But if the queſtion be of fact, then are to be produced ſchedules, acquittances, confeſſions, eye or eare witneſſes.
Such witneſſes, Maxime.as doe not affirme or denie a thing to be or not to be, are of no force. For there is a great difference between theſe two ſayings; God ſaith not that ſuch a thing is, and God ſaith that ſuch a thing is not. The latter is a good proofe, but the former hath no conſequence or ſequel. And likewiſe this proofe is of no effect: Ariſtotle hath not ſaid ſo, therefore it is not ſo. Or, the Word of God ſaith not that man is a reaſonable creature, and therefore man is not a reaſonable creature.
Notwithſtanding, if it be a thing which cannot be knowne, but by the teſtimonie of one alone, then this kinde of arguing is good and firme. Such a one ſaid not …o, and therefore you cannot maintaine that it is ſo. For example, if we had no knowledge of China but by the report of one man onelyonly; whoſoever would affirme any thing without the warrant of ſuch a one, without queſtion would be prooved a lyar; or i… he ſpake the truth it were but by chance, and not knowing himſelfe whether he ſpake true or no. So likewiſe ſeeing that nothing that is neceſſary to ſalvation can be knowne without warrant from the Word of God; whoſoever in things neceſſarie to ſalvation, affirmeth any thing not contained in the ſaid word of GOD, ought not to be beleeved, & affirmes that which he knowes not.
The eighteenth Chapter. Of the vſe or Practice of the precedent Doctrine.
THis Doctrine contained in the ſixteene precedent Chapters is called the doctrine of Places; becauſe it ſhewes the places whence matter is drawne for argument and furniture for proofes. For example, if wee vndertake to proue, that, Death is not to be feared of a vertuous man, wee muſt runne over theſe ſixteene places, and take notice of ſuch as will beſt furniſh vsus with matter. To make this plaine we will runne over the ſaid places, and apply them to this example.
The Genus of Death.
Death is the end of mans life. Now the end is to be deſired, when it is not onelyonly the end, but alſo the ſcope that wee muſt ayme at; ſuch is death, vntounto which a wiſe man ought to prepare himſelfe every day, as being the end of his hope.
The difference.
This death comes by the ſeparation of the ſoule from the bodie, now wee muſt not feare the ſeparation of ſuch things, as being ioyned doe hurt one another: the ſoule conſumeth the bodie with cares, like vntounto a knife that cuts its ſheath; the bodie is to the ſoule as a burden or a priſon; God ſeparateth them to reioyne them againe in a better eſtate and condition.
The Species.
There be two kindes of death; the one naturall cauſed through age, the other violent, which happens by ſickneſſe, or when a man is killed. Philoſophers ſay that death which comes through age is without paine, becauſe it is without combate or reſiſtance; and who would liue when all his ſtrength is ſpent? violent death is not alſo to be feared of a vertuous man, for what matter is it, whether I dye of an ague, or by the ſword? Whether by the diſtemper of humors, or by the diſtemper or commotion of people? Whether I yeeld vp my ſoule by the mouth or by a wound, ſo it may goe to God.
The properties and accidents of Death.
Death makes all alike, both great and ſmall; It diſmasketh and diſcovereth thoughts; then diſſimulation hath no more place; The words of the dying are ſerious and of great weight, their prayers are fervent, their confeſſion humble, their admonitions to their children are received with attention, the ſpirit of God comforteth them within, the Angels guard and aſſiſt them without, and Ieſus Chriſt reacheth them out the crowne.
Of things conjoyned with Death.
If we muſt not bewaile the dead, why ſhould we then feare death?
The cauſes of Death.
The efficient cauſe of death is the will of God, which wee were better to yeeld vntounto willingly then by compulſion; why ſhould we reſiſt Gods will, ſeeing it is iuſt and vnevitable? Againe, the law of nature vnderunder the which we are borne is the cauſe of death: plead not therefore againſt your owne hand writing. Wouldst thou hauehave the lawes of the world changed for thee? The finall cauſe of death in regard of the world, is that we may giuegive place one to another; thy father hath given place to thee, giuegive thou place to thy children. The finall cauſe of death in regard of every vertuous man is to put an end to all his miſeries, and to bring him home to God. For all theſe cauſes of death a vertuous man ought not to feare it.
Cauſes wherefore a thing ought not to be fea…ed.
A thing is not to be feared: firſt if it is vnevitable; ſecondly, if it hurteth not; thirdly, if it be profitable. Death hath in it theſe three things. For it is vnevitable; therefore as it is a folly to hope for things impoſſible, ſo it is a folly to feare things vnevitable. Againe, death … not hurtful becauſe our Saviour Chriſt hath taken away the curſe thereof. Laſtly, it is profitable, and that is knowne by the effects which follow.
The Effects.
Death is profitable before death, for it abateth pride. Thou ſeeſt now a triumphing Monarch, and ere long toads will breed in his skull, and wormes in his entrails. The thought of death keepes a man in feare and ſobriety, as alſo from ſinning. Without it man would hardly be tamed. It makes vsus deſpiſe the world, and to acknowl…dge the vanitie of all our toyle. It makes vsus more earneſt in prayer, and increaſeth our faith through reſiſtance. After death, it makes vsus fully know that which we here ſee but a farre of, and very obſcurely. It ioineth vsus with the Saints and placeth vsus with Chriſt Ieſus. To feare death is to offer wrong vntounto Chriſt, as if it were ill being with him. It maketh vsus to ſee the face of God, which changeth them that ſee it into his owne likeneſſe. It bringeth vsus into the poſſeſſion of peace without end, of contentment without interruption, and felicitie without meaſure.
The Similitudes.
If new borne babes had the vſe of reaſon, they would never crie, but rather much reioyce that they part from ſuch an vncleane and obſcure place, to enter into the light of this world: So, if we had the right vſe of reaſon, wee would not be ſad when death comes, becauſe our ſoules goe out of an vncleane, ſtraight, and obſcure place, or rather priſon, to enter into the light of heaven. Death is like Samſons Lyon, whereof it is written, that from bitterneſſe came ſweetneſſe. Or like vntounto the harſh ſound of a boult at the opening of a doore, which notwithſtanding is very pleaſing, if it be to come out of a priſon. Or as when Chriſt came to his Diſciples walking on the waters, they ſaid it was a ſpirit; but when they ſaw him neerer hand, they ſaid of him, and ſo muſt we of death, it is the Lord that commeth vntounto vsus.
The Oppoſits.
Preſent life is oppoſed vntounto death, now if there be no cauſe to deſire life, no more is there to feare death. Ʋpon this occaſion you may run through every age of mans life, as alſo through the d…vers conditions that are from the Prince to the beggar, and ſhew that all is but miſerie. Beſides thoſe evils and accidents which are common to all.
The Compariſon in regard of Goodneſſe.
Mutable and tranſitorie things are not ſo good as thoſe that are eternall and permanent. Againe, the good which ſufficeth alone, is better then that good, which when we hauehave, wee hauehave yet need of another. He that hath happily ended his life, needeth neither money nor apparell, nor honour, nor health, &c. but he that hath nothing but the preſent life, hath need of all theſe things; and beſides them eternall good things.
The Compariſon in regard of Probabilitie.
Probable alike.If Martyrs feared not to dye in the fl…mes of fire, why ſhould we feare to dye in ſickneſſe, ſeeing we hauehave the ſame hope?
Leſſe probable.If the Heathen went to their deaths with as ioyfull a countenance, as others that returned ſafe from thence; why ſhould wee feare it that hauehave a better hope? Why ſhould ambition hauehave more force in them, then faith in vsus? If a ſouldier doth adventure himſelfe vponupon the mouth of the Cannon-ſhot, and offereth himſelfe the firſt vponupon a breach for the pay of ſix-pence a day; what ſhould wee doe for an everlaſting kingdome.
Teſtimonies.
Here muſt be alledged the paſſages of the word of God, the ſentences of Philoſophers, the examples of ſuch as hauehave dyed conſtantly; As, of Regulus, of the two Decius, of the Gymnoſophiſts, of the Indian Women, of the Tribals, of the Martyrs, &c.
Finally, by theſe ſixteene places, as by certaine directions, we are furniſhed with abundance of matter for argument and diſcourſe. And by theſe helpes we are put in remembrance of all that we hauehave read, heard, or ſeene, which may ſerue to amplifie the matter propounded. But the Maximes which are added to every place, are of vſe to teach vsus how the argument may bee well grounded, for they are as lights vntounto our reaſon. And note alſo, that theſe places furniſh vsus with matter to argue, as well for Death, which is the Subject of this queſtiō, as for Not to be feared, which is the Attribute thereof, as wee ſhall ſee hereafter. But the Arguments which are drawne from the attribute are the ſtrongeſt and moſt forcible.
ANOTHER EXAMPLE. The praiſe of Sobrietie. The Species of Sobrietie.
WE ſpeake not heere of that Sobrietie which the Phyſicians appoint by dyet: nor of that which is through neceſſitie, when we hauehave nothing to eat: nor of that cold gravitie of the Germans a… the beginning of their meales: nor of that of covetous perſons, who grudge themſelues things neceſſarie: nor of that which is performed by a ſcrupulous abſtinence. But of that which is a morall vertue.
The Definition.
Sobrietie is a temperance, which preſcribeth a moderation in eating and drinking.
The Whole and the Parts.
Neither doe we ſpeake of that Sobrietie which conſiſteth in certaine meates, and not in other, in eating and not in drinking, in his owne h…uſe and not in companie. For ſobrietie giues lawes for all times, and all places, and for all ſorts of meates and drinkes.
The Etymologie.
foreignThe Grecians hauehave rightly derived ſobrietie from a word which ſignifieth to keepe the vnderſtanding ſound; becauſe it preſerveth the health, and the libertie of the vnderſtanding.
The Genus.
I ſay it is a ſpecies of Temporance. Now Temperance is the nurſe of all other vertues, the guardian of bodily h…al…h, and of the light of the minde, making it not to be ſubi…ct to the belly; it keep…th in brutall concupiſcence, and teach…th how to eat to liue, and not to liue to eat.
The cauſes.
The cauſe why a thing is to be commended or deſired is, if it be honeſt, delightfull, and profitable. Now ſobrietie hath all theſe three; for it is a good and comely thing to hauehave an vpright body in old age, to hauehave a freſh and liuely countenance, not to be ſeene drunke nor croaking in an Alehouſe among debauched perſons &c.
It is a delightfull thing to be cheerfull and affable, and to hauehave peace at home; for drunkennes breedeth quarrels. Pleaſures ſeldome vſed are ſweeteſt.
It is a profitable thing to hauehave a ſtrong body, a free minde, fit to goe about civill affaires, to hauehave a good memorie, not to waſt goods, to provide for the neceſſitie of the familie; to husband the time well, not to reveale ſecrets; ſobrietie is of vſe for all theſe.
The Effects.
The cauſes for the which ſobrietie is commendable, are alſo effects of ſobrietie, and therefore we ſhall not need to repeat them.
The Oppoſits.
Here a drunkard muſt be ſet forth in all his colours, his ſpeech, his geſture, his countenance, his troubled mind, the gout accompanying it, the red and bleer'd eyes, the memory overthrowne, the vnderſtanding becōmeth more brutiſh, the leaneſs proceeding from exceſſe is worſe then that which commeth of want. Add vntounto theſe the ſhame and reproach, when as the diſeaſes of old age are imputed to the exceſſe of youth, by ſuch as will be readie to ſay; 'tis well beſtowed, he hath not left his vices, but his vices hauehave left him. Againe, the good of the familie is waſted, time is miſ-ſpent, the body and mind corrupted, quarrels are pickt in drinking, and laſcivious deſires are ſtirred vp, a man becomes a babler diſcloſing his moſt hidden ſecrets. It is a bottomles gulfe, for a little will content nature, but a greedie deſire hath no end. Intemperance either kindles or diſcovers all manner of vices.
The cauſes of drunkenneſſe and gluttony.
Bad company doth cauſe exceſſe: ſo doth the opinion of a falſe pleaſure. For what pleaſure is there to drinke without thirſt, and to ſtirre vp an artificial hunger when the belly is full. Alſo vaine glory cauſeth exceſſe, when men will imagine it to be a thing praiſe-worthy to be able to hold more drinke then another; and yet ſuch a man ſhall never hold ſo much drinke as a hogs-head; and though he hauehave a more capable bodie, he ſhall not therefore be accounted a man of greater capacitie.
Compariſon in the Probabilitie.
Seeing the very beaſts do not overdrinke themſelues, why ſhould a man by his drunkenneſſe make himſelfe worſe then a beaſt? Shall the inſtinct in a beaſt be of greater force, then reaſon in a man?
Similitudes.
A man cannot ſtudie neare a Kitchin; a drunkard is not fit for a Sentinell. God hath not made our bodies to be like Spunges, which are filled and then ſqueeſed out. Exceſſe in drinke kindles concupiſcence, as Oyle powred on a fire.
Teſtimonies.
Adde to thoſe divine and humane teſtimonies. That God hath given man very long and revolved inteſtines, to the end that the meat being long in the paſſage, he ſhould not need to feed againe ſo ſoone. That God hath placed the braine farre from the belly, which is the Kitchin of the bodie. That the Lacedemonians would ſometimes make one of their ſlaues drunke, and point him to their children, to m…ke this vice odious vntounto them.
All theſe things afford matter of argument: Of all theſe proofes ſome are more forcible then others. The force and ſoliditie of the proofes, is knowne by the helpe of the Maximes, which we hauehave added to every place.