The Elements of Logic, Book
The firſt Booke, which treateth OF SIMPLE NOTIONS.
The firſt Chapter. What Logick is. How many ſorts of Notions there be in the minde of man.
LOGICK is an Art which giueth rules to argue well, and to diſcerne truth from falſhood.
To be able to form an argument, and to frame a good reaſon, we muſt know, that all the Notions or Conceptions in mans vnderſtanding are, either Simple, or Compound.
Simple Notions are ſuch, as are expreſſed by one word onelyonly; As, horſe, man, whitenes, to ſee, to runne, &c.
Compound Notions are ſuch, as are expreſſed by an Enuntiation or Propoſition, which affirmeth or denieth ſomething; As, Man is reaſonable. God is no lyar.
Of many Propoſitions knit together, an Argument or Syllogiſme is: made, by thoſe meanes and rules, which ſhall be ſet downe hereafter.
The ſecond Chapter. How many ſorts of ſimple Notions there are. Of Things ſingular and vniverſall. Alſo of Subſtance and Accident.
THere are as many ſimple Notions as there be things in the world.
Of Things ſome be ſingular, and ſome vniverſall.
Singular things are thoſe, which are one in Number; As, Frederick, Peter, this horſe, this tree.
Vniverſall things comprehend and containe the Singulars. For an vniverſall is a gathering together of many Singulars vnderunder one nature common to all. As, horſe, man, tree, vnderunder which words conſidered in generall, wee comprehend all horſes, men, trees.
Singulars are knowne by ſenſe, but vniverſals are comprehended by the vnderſtanding. Therfore bruit beaſts know onelyonly Singular things. Singulars in Philoſophie are called Individuals, becauſe they cannot be divided into two parts, keeping the ſame name. As, Alexander cannot be divided into two Alexanders, nor one horſe into two horſes.
A whole compounded of parts alike; As, water, blood, wood, are not called Individuals, becauſe they may be divided into parts, which may keepe the name of the whole. For every drop of water is water, and of a great peece of wood every parcell is wood. But if you will turne theſe things into Individuals, you muſt add the name of the meaſure. For one pint of water cannot be divided into two pintes, nor one acre of ground into two acres.
All things, whether Singular or Vniverſall, are either Subſtances, or Accidents.
A Subſtance is that which ſubſiſteth of it ſelfe; as, man, water, earth, &c.
An Accident is that which cannot ſubſiſt by it ſelfe, but muſt hauehave a ſubject or ſubſtance to vphold it, and vntounto which it muſt adhere; as, whitenes, ſwiftnes, wiſedome, heat. For whitenes can hauehave no being, if it ſubſiſteth not in ſome ſubject; as, in ſnow, or in the skinne: ſo heat is an accident to fire; ſwiftnes is an accident to an horſe; wiſedome is an accident to the vnderſtanding.
Accidents are ſometimes expreſſed by a Subſtantiue; as, iuſtice, beautie; and ſometimes by an Adjectiue; as, iuſt, faire. In the firſt manner, accidents are called Abſtracts, or Separated; In the ſecond, they are called Concretes, or Conjoyned. For he that names iuſtice, or beautie, conſiders juſtice or beautie without any certaine Subject. But he that names iuſt or …ire, conſiders juſtice and beautie, as …dhering to a certain Subject that is cloathed therewith.
Common cuſtome oft confounds …heſe things, ſaying, the true, the …lack the ſweet; in ſtead of ſaying, the …ruth, the blacknes, the ſweetneſſe.
Now becauſe there are divers and …undry kindes of accidents, the Phi…oſophers hauehave ranked them into …ine Orders or Claſſes of things; vn…o which Subſtance being added, …here are ten Claſſes, which the Phi…oſophers call Categories or Predi…aments. So that there is nothing in …he world which is done either by Nature, or by Art, by Councell or Chance, which may not be referred …o, and contained in ſome one of …heſe Categories.
The third Chapter. The Names of the ten Categories.
The ten Categories are theſe.
1. Subſtance; as, man, horſe.
2. Quantitie; as, length, breadth.
3. Qualitie; as, ſwiftneſſe, whiteneſſe, roundneſſe.
4. Relation or Reſpect; as, to be a Father, or a Sonne, a Maſter, or a Servant, &c.
5. To Act, or Action; as, to runne, to ſpeake.
6. To Suffer, or Paſſion; as to be driven, to be burned.
7. Where; as, here, there.
8. When; as, yeſterday, to day.
9. Situation; as, to ſit, to ſtand, to kneele.
10. Habit; as, to hauehave a cap on, to hauehave hoſe on, to hauehave a cloake on.
The fourth Chapter. Of Subſtance.
SVbſtance is that which ſubſiſteth of it ſelfe, and is the ſubject of all Accidents.
Singular Subſtances, are called, Primary Subſtances.
Ʋniverſall Subſtances, are called Secondary Subſtances. Becauſe that …ingular ſubſtances are firſt knowne. So children that hauehave no knowledge but by ſenſe, wanting yet the vſe of reaſon, know nothing but ſingular …hings. This knowledge is common vntounto vsus with bruit beaſts. But afterward reaſon gathering divers Singulars together, comprehendeth them vnderunder Vniverſall things.
The Sunne, the World, the Moone, are primary and ſingular Subſtances; yet in regard that they hauehave a nature and eſſence, which might agree with many, if it ſo pleaſed God, they are alſo ſecondary ſubſtances.
All ſubſtances are either vncreate… or created: the vncreated ſubſtance i… God, all other are created.
Created ſubſtances are cloathed with accidents: but God hath no accident. For he is ſimple, and not compounded: his Attributes beeing his owne proper eſſence, which we… diſtinguiſh in regard of their divers effects; but in truth they are but one and the ſelfe ſame thing.
Of created ſubſtances, ſome are Immateriall, as, Angels and Spirits; others are Materiall, namely, Such as hauehave bodies, whereof here is a more exact Diviſion.
The Table of Subſtances.
Subſtance is either
Vncreated, as God.
Created
Immateriall
Angels.
Separated ſoules.
Materiall, called bodies
Simple, as
Heaven.
The foure elements.
Fire.
Aire.
Water.
Earth.
Compound
Perfectly
Living
Plants, as
Herbes.
Shrubs.
Trees.
Animals
Man.
Beaſt
Perfect, which hauehave fiue ſenſes, and are either
Airie
Birds.
Inſecta, as Flyes.
Earthy
Creeping things.
Foure footed beaſts.
Waterie.
Amphybia, that is, of a doubtfull kinde.
Imperfect, are ſuch as want ſome of the ſenſes, as,
Oyſters.
Zoophyta, or Plant-Animals.
Not living as
Stones.
Minerals.
Imperfectly, which are called Meteors, as, Comets, Windes, Snow, Ice, &c.
Place this Table of Subſtances betweene Page 8 and 9 at this hand ☞
There can be nothing contrary to ſubſtance. Alſo, no ſubſtance is more ſubſtance then another, as, one horſe is not more a horſe then another, although it be a better horſe. True it is that God and the Deuill are ſubſtances, and that there is a contrarietie betweene them. As alſo fire is contrary to water; but this contrarietie is not in the ſubſtance, but in the will of the Divel's, and in the qualitie of fire and water.
The fift Chapter. Of Quantitie.
QVantitie is that by which Subſtances are numbred, meaſured, or divided; and by which they are equall, or vnequall.
There be two ſorts of Quantitie.
The one is compounded of ſevered and disjoyned parts, and therfore is called disjoyned Quantitie.
The other is compounded of continued parts, and therefore is called continued Quantitie.
Quantitie disjoyned or ſevered is called Number, becauſe the parts hauehave betweene them no Continuitie. This Quantitie cannot be meaſured, but muſt be numbred.
Number is of two ſorts; either numbring, or numbred.
Numbers numbring are the numbers of Arithmetick, as, one, three, ſix, &c. Numbers numbred are the things that are numbred, as, ſix men, ten horſes, &c.
Sometimes the number numbred ſtands in ſtead of the number numbring, as, Counters.
Vnitie is no number, but the beginning of number.
The greateſt number of all cannot be found or imagined. For a man may ſtill adde to the greateſt number that can be given.
Continued Quantitie is that whoſe parts are joyned together with a continued ſequell, and which may be meaſured. This Quantitie is either, a Line, or a Superficies, or a Mathematicall bodie, or Time.
A Line is a length without breadth, as, a myle, a meating wand.
Superficies is a length with breadth, as, the ſurface of the water, or of an acre of Land.
VnderUnder the Superficies we comprehend alſo the Place, which is nothing els but the interiour Superficies of a bodie, containing another, as, the inward Superficies of a Hogs-head of Wine, is the place of the Wine.
A Mathematicall bodie is length, breadth, and depth; this bodie differs from a Phyſicall or naturall bodie, which is a materiall ſubſtance, and not a quantitie. Notwithſtanding every naturall bodie hath theſe three dimenſions, and cannot be without quantitie.
Time is the meaſure of the continuance of things. This meaſure is taken from the motion of the heavens, which maketh dayes and yeares.
Time hath two parts, namely, paſt, and to come: as for the preſent it is not time, but it is the inſtant or running moment, which coupleth together the time paſt, with the time to come.
The continuance of God is not called time, but Eternitie, which conſiſteth in two things. Firſt to hauehave neither beginning nor ending. Secondly, not to paſſe away, nor to hauehave ſucceſſion of parts. For the life of God conſiſts in reſt: becauſe that if the life of God had a flux, or ſucceſſion of parts, his life were partly paſt, and partly to come.
As Vnitie is neither number nor quantitie, ſo a Prick is neither quantitie, nor part of a line: as alſo a moment is no part of time, but the end or extremitie of time paſt.
Number is ancienter then continued quantitie, as it appeareth by the number of the Perſons in the Trinitie, which is eternall and without beginning of time. But continued quantitie had a beginning with the creation of bodies.
Again, number may be counted by it ſelfe, and without any other helpe, but continued quantitie cannot be meaſured but by the helpe of the diſcontinued quantity. For every length or breadth is meaſured by the num…ring of the feet, or inches, or metingwands, or myles, or degrees.
Nothing is contrary vntounto quantitie. For great and little are not contraries, but Relatiues or Reſpectiues; and one containes the other, which cannot be in contraries. The leſſe number is contained vnderunder the greater, …nd is part of it: But heat is no part of …olde.
The Table of Quantitie.
Quantitie is either
Diſcontinued, wch is called Number
Numbring
Numbred.
Continued
A Line.
A Superficies.
A Bodie.
Time.
The ſixt Chapter. Of Qualitie.
QValitie is that whereby ſubſtances are qualified, and made like or vnlike one to another. For as things are ſaid to be the ſame things, whe… they hauehave one ſelfe ſame ſubſtance and equall when they agree in quantitie: ſo they are ſaid to be alike, when they agree in qualitie.
There are foure ſorts of Qualities. 1. For they are either Actiue qualities, which be in the objects of our outward or inward ſenſes, and bring vntounto vsus ſome alteration or change in our bodies, or mindes, as, ſweetnes in hony, coldnes in ſnow, beautie in a face, hardnes or roughnes in a ſtone, or in a bodie, which hurteth the ſenſe of touching, delight in a Comedie. The effects which theſe qualities do work in vsus are called Paſſion, whileſt it is received. For when the ſmart of burning is over, the marke or blacknes that remaineth, is no longer called Paſſion.
2. Or els they be naturall qualities or faculties, as, the vertue of hearbs, the faculties of the ſoule, heavines in lead, heat in fire, and coldnes in water.
3. Or els they be habits, or qualities gotten by ſtudie and exerciſe, as all Arts are, whether mechanicall or liberall; and all Sciences. Which when … man hath attained vntounto, and gotten … habit of them, he is thereby made the fitter for any action or exerciſe.
Bruit beaſts that hauehave hearing, as, dogs, horſes, apes, &c. are capable to get a habit, if feare doe not hinder them. For ſuch creatures as are exceſſiuely …imerous cannot be taught, as, mice, &c.
The inſtruments by which the habit is put into practice may be loſt, and yet the habit remaine ſtill, as, the skill of playing on the Lute, when the hand is cut off.
The preparation to a habit is called Diſpoſition, which is when a man hath not as yet gotten a habit, but is in the way to it, and hath beſides his inclination ſome little knowledge.
Naturall faculties are great helpes to get and forme a habit. For he that by nature is vnfit to any Art or ſtudie, can never attaine vntounto a perfection, whatſoever paines he takes in it. 4. Or els they are Figures and outward formes, as, to be ſquare, round, ſharp, crooked, wrong, ſtraight.
Qualities are contrary one to another, as, heat, and coldnes. And naturall powers are contrary to impotencie, as, ſight to blindnes, hearing to deafenes. OnelyOnly Figures & outward formes hauehave no contraries. For roundnes differeth from ſquarenes, but is not contrary vntounto it.
To judge aright of any qualitie, it muſt be conſidered in the abſtract, and as not being tyed to any certaine ſubject: So iuſtice or whitenes are to be conſidered in themſelues, and not the juſt or the white. Becauſe the conſideration of the ſubject in the which juſtice or whitenes are inherent, doe but trouble & divert mans thought. Therfore if you will conſider a thing aright, you muſt conſider it apart and ſeparated.
One ſubſtance can hauehave but one quantitie, but it may hauehave a great number of divers qualities.
Qualities doe act, but quantities doe not, onelyonly they doe helpe the action of the qualitie, as, the greatnes of a ſtone encreaſeth the weight of it.
A Spirit hath qualities, but no quantities.
The excellencie of qualitie aboue quantitie, conſiſts principally in that the quantitie proceeds from the matter, but the qualitie from the forme. Now the forme is ever more excellent then the matter. For by the forme things are made fit to act; but matter is that which makes them apt to ſuffer.
Forme and Figure act not, but they helpe and facilitate the action of him that acteth, as, the roundnes of a ſtone makes it to rowle the eaſier.
The Table of Qualitie.
Qualities are
1. Such as act againſt the ſenſes
Outward.
Inward.
2. Natural power or impotencie.
3. Habits, whoſe beginning is called Diſpoſition.
4. Outward formes and figures.
The ſeventh Chapter. Of Relation and Relatiues.
RElatiues are two things which hauehave a mutuall reſpect one to another, ſo as the one cannot be without the other, and the one is defined by the other, neither can the one be thought vponupon without thinking vponupon the other, as, the Father and the Sonne, the Prince and the Subiects, the maſter and the ſervant, the double and the halfe, the equall and the equall.
The mutuall reſpect between theſe two things is called Relation. There be many Relatiues which hauehave the ſelfe ſame name, as, friend and friend, like and like, equall and equall.
The relation between two friends is called friendſhip; the relation between two things alike, is called reſemblance or likeneſſe.
There be relatiues whoſe relation is imperfect, namely, when one of the two relatiues dependeth on the other, and cannot be without it, but the other may well be alone, and dependeth not on his relatiue, as, the Paſtor and the flock, the Prince and the people, the ſight and the thing viſible. For there may be people without a Prince, but no Prince without people.
There be alſo relatiues, which are not relatiues in their owne nature, but only in regard of vsus, and becauſe we make them ſo to be by our conceiving of them: as, the right and the left between two walls, or two trees: but if we turne our ſelues, then that which was left, is right. For in a tree there is neither right nor left by nature.
If a Father hauehave many ſonnes, there are as many ſundry relations, as there be ſonnes; becauſe the Father is taken divers times as is the center of a Circle, which is taken as often as the lines are drawne from the ſaid center to the circumference.
One and the ſame thing may hauehave the name of two relatiues; as, to be Father and Sonne, to be high and low; but in divers reſpects. For the ſame may be Father to one, and Sonne to another.
There be relations which ſpring from quantitie, as, the relation which is between the double and the halfe; Others that proceed from Qualitie, as, the relation between two friends. Others which come from Action, as, the relation between the mother and the ſonne, the Creator and the creature. Others that ſpring from Situation, as, the right and left, the high and lowe, the formoſt, and the hindermoſt; between which Relatiues the relation hath no name.
We call that formoſt in living things, towards which the naturall motion is made; we call right that part which naturally is fitteſt for ſervice. In a living creature we call that part high, by which the nouriſhment is drawne; as, in Plants, the root is the higheſt part, not in regard of the vniverſe, but in regard of the Plant.
Such relations as are grounded vponupon qualitie, admit of contrarietie, as, friendſhip, likenes: other relations admit of none.
In relations grounded vponupon action, as betweene that which heateth, and that which is heated, there is no contrarietie. For that which heateth, and that which cooleth are contraries; but this contrarietie proceeds from the qualitie, namely, heat, which is the ground of this relation.
Friendſhip, as it is an affection moving the lover, is a qualitie; but as it is a mutuall reſpect betweene two friends, it is a Relation.
Although God, as he is Maſter and Creator, be a relatiue to his ſervants and creatures, there is not for all that any accident in God: becauſe the relation is not in the two relatiues, but between the two relatiues. And therefore it bringeth in no compoſition, nor to the ſubſtance any naturall change.
It is to be noted that two relatiues are commonly called the two termes of the relation.
The Table of Relatiues.
Relatiues are
Either of their own nature
Perfect having
the ſame names.
divers names.
Imperfect.
Or onelyonly in regard of vsus.
All theſe relatiues are groū ded vponupon
Quantitie.
Qualitie.
Action.
Situation.
The eight Chapter. Of Acting or Action.
TO Act is to moue it ſelfe againſt the patient, and to make it receiue the power of the Agent.
Of Actions ſome be naturall, as, the panting of the heart, the motion of a ſtone downeward. Others are voluntary, as, to buy, to ſell, to paint, to fence; which notwithſtanding are not done without the helpe of nature. Others are mixt, that is to ſay, partly naturall, partly voluntary: as, to eate, to walke, to runne; which indeed are naturall actions, but are guided by the will.
Violent actions and againſt nature, are ſuch as are contrary to naturall actions, as, the throwing of a ſtone vpward. But thoſe are contrary to voluntary actions, which are called forced or conſtrained, as, to be pulled or haled into priſon. There be certaine actions that are partly voluntary, partly forced, as, when a Merchant caſteth his merchandize into the Sea to eaſe the ſhip; or when a Patient cauſeth his arme to be cut off.
The naturall actions and motions are ſwifteſt in the end; as, the falling of a ſtone downeward. The voluntary actions are ſwifteſt in the middeſt; as, running. The violent are ſwifteſt in the beginning; as, the caſting of a ſtone; or, ſhooting of an arrow.
Every action importeth a certaine motion. If the motion be in the ſubſtance, it is called Generation, or Corruption. If in the Quantitie, it is called Augmentation or Diminution. If in the Qualitie, it is called Alteration. If in the place, it is called Locall motion, or Tranſportation.
There is no generation without corruption, nor no corruption without generation. But we call it generation, when the matter takes a better forme; and corruption, when it paſſeth into a worſer.
The locall motion is the chiefeſt of all motions, without which the reſt mooue not at all. And beſides there is no other motion belonging to the heavens; where motion is the cauſe of all other motions, as well in Subſtance, as in Quantitie, and Qualitie.
The heavens in regard of the whole doe reſt, but in regard of the parts, doe change place, even as a Top that ſleepeth turning.
The Table of Actions.
Actions are
Naturall.
Voluntary.
Mixt.
Violent.
The Table of Motion.
Motion is on the
Subſtance, and is called
Generation.
Corruption.
Quantitie, and is called
Augmentation.
Diminution.
Qualitie, and is called Alteration.
Place, and is called Tranſporting or Local-motion.
The ninth Chapter. Of Suffering or Paſsion.
TO Suffer is to receiue the power of the Agent.
There are as many kinds of Suffering, as of doing.
Oftentimes the Agent doth ſuffer in acting, as, when a man rowling a weightie ſtone tireth himſelfe, and ſweateth: or when a man hurteth his teeth in cracking a Nut. The Agent doth not ſuffer, when it is out of the compaſſe of the Activitie of the Patient, as, the Sunne ſhining on the water, receiveth not the brightneſſe which the water ſend's back: becauſe it is out of the extent, which limiteth the reflection of the beames ſent back againe by the water.
God acteth alwayes, and every where, but never ſuffereth.
There are Verbs Actiues in Grammar, which are Paſſiues in Philoſophie, as, to louelove, to heare, to learne: for all theſe are Paſſions, and are done by receiving. On the contrary, he which is loved or heard, is he that acteth & moueth the lover and the hearer.
There are ſome Paſſions perfecting, and others which are corrupting, as, the inlightning in the aire, the receiving of learning in the vnderſtanding, or of the images of things in the ſight, are Paſſions, which bring ſome perfection to the aire, to the vnderſtanding, and to the ſight.
The corrupting Paſſions are ſuch as would deſtroy the Patient, if they did continue their encreaſe, or did increaſe aboue meaſure, as, heating, cooling, weariſomneſſe.
The perfecting Paſſions are thoſe which perfect a facultie or naturall power, and giuegive it that perfection for the which God did create it.
The tenth Chapter. Of Where.
VVHERE is not the place it ſelfe, but it is a deſignation, or a note of ſome certaine place. For place is a quantitie, and a ſpace that may be meaſured: But the Where cannot be meaſured. When a man putteth forth a queſtion touching the Place, the demand is, by how much, as for example, how much place doth ſuch a bodie take vp? But here the queſtion is by where or whither, as, where is the King? and, whither goe you?
Concerning Bodies the queſtion may be asked, how much place they take vp: but concerning Angels and ſoules, that queſtion cannot be asked, but onelyonly this, where they are. This is it which the Philoſophers meane when they ſay, that Bodies are in a place Circumſcriptiuely, and Soules definitiuely; becauſe Soules are not limited or circumſcribed by place, and yet a man may ſay of them, that they are here, or there, and not els-where.
We cannot ſay that God is in a place any of theſe waies. For he is infinite, and ſo preſent in all places, as he is neither limited, nor defined by any place. It may be truely ſaid, GOD is here; but it cannot be ſaid, GOD is here, and not there.
The eleventh Chapter. Of When.
VVHEN is not the time it ſelfe, but it is a deſignation, or a note of a certain time, as, yeſterday, to day, to morrow, &c.
When we ſpeake of time, and of the continuance of it, the queſtion is, by how long? as, how long lived Noah? how long did the Romaine Empire continue? But here wee aske by When, as, When ſhall wee hauehave the Equinoxe? When was Iulius Caeſar ſlaine?
Some things are done in time, which notwithſtanding are not meaſured by time; namely, ſuch as are done in a moment, as, the impreſſion of a Seale; the inlightening of a chamber by the aire at the opening of the windowes; the receiving of the images of things in the eye. Concerning theſe things, wee aske not in how long time, but when they were done.
The twelfth Chapter. Of Situation.
SItuation is a Poſition or placing of parts in their whole, whether the ſituation be naturall; as, the ſituation of the arme at the ſhoulders end; or voluntary, as when we ſit, or kneele.
The thirteenth Chapter. Of Habit.
BY Habit we doe not vnderſtand garments, for they belong to ſubſtance; but we meane the applying of garments and other ornaments about the bodie, as, to be cloathed, to be ſhod, to hauehave a Caſſock or a Cloake on.
VnderUnder theſe ten Claſſes or rankes of things, are contained all things in the world, and all ſimple Notions. And of theſe are framed Enuntiations and Arguments or Syllogiſmes, whereof wee ſhall ſpeake hereafter. For there is nothing in the world out of which a man may not draw ſome Argument or Diſcourſe.