The Anatomy of Arminianism, Chapter 5
CHAP. V.
Of the Antecedent and conſequent will of God.
DAmaſcen in his ſecond Booke of Orthodox faith, Chap. 29. doth ſet downe two wils of God; the one foreign, or Antecedent; the other foreign, that is, Conſequent. Arminius hath catched this diſtinction, and doth place in it the chiefe ſtrength of his Doctrine; and as often as he is vrged by our ſide, he creepes into this denne, as the Lyzard into the thickets.
I. The Antecedent will of God, hee ſaith is that, whereby God doth will any thing to the reaſonable creature, before all the actions of it, or before any act of that creature; but the conſequent is that, whereby he doth will any thing to the reaſonable creature, after any one act, or after many acts, of the creature. To the explication of which diſtinction, he bringeth theſe examples. God (ſaith he) by his Antecedent will, would ſtabliſh and confirme for euer the kingdome of Saul; by his Conſequent will, he would put him from his kingdome, and ſubſtitute in his place a man better then he. Chriſt by his Antecedent will, would gather the Iewes as a Henne gathereth her Chickens; but by his Conſequent will, hee would …atter them through all the Nations. By his Antecedent will, they are cited to the marriage; which by his Conſequent will, were declared vnworthy, Matth. 22. By his Antecedent will, the man without the wedding garment was inuited; by his Conſequent will, he was caſt out. By his Antecedent will, the talents are giuen; by his Conſequent will, the talent is taken from the ſeruant.
II. The one of theſe willes is called the Antecedent will, the other is called the Conſequent; not becauſe that will goeth before this, for in this ſenſe, this diſtinction may be admitted, becauſe there is a certaine order among the purpoſes of God: Thus his will of creating man, was in order before his will of feeding or cloathing him: But with Damaſcen and Arminius, it is called the Anrecedent will of God, becauſe it goeth before the act of mans will; and they call that the conſequent will of God, which is after the will of man, and doth depend vponupon it. This Arminius doth cleerely teach in his definitions before laide downe.
III. Betweene theſe two willes of God hee puts this difference, that the Antecedent will of God, may be reſiſted, the conſequent cannot. Hee would hauehave it, that God ſhould be diſappointed in his antecedent will, and faile of his propounded end; But the conſequent will of God cannot he fruſtrated, but it muſt neceſſarily be fulfilled: for hee thinks that God doth not alwaies attaine to that which hee intends, and that ſometimes hee is diſappointed of that particular end which he propounds to himſelfe; and that God is prepared to doe that which from eternity he knoweth he ſhall not doe; whence it comes to paſſe, that he hath prepared himſelfe in vaine, and that by his conſequent will, which is eternall, certaine, and immutable, hee hath decreed to harden thoſe reprobates, which by his antecedent will he is prepared to mollifie and conuert: And ſo he is prepared to doe, that which he hath decreed not to doe.
IV. Betweene theſe two wils of God (if any credit may be giuen to Arminius,) doth mans will come in, which doth cauſe, that God doth reuoke his antecedent will, which is farre the beſt; and being driuen from his propounded end, doth turne himſelfe to another thing, then that which at the firſt he had intended: ſo farre, that Vorſtius ſaith, Diſput. de Deo. p. 65. that God afterward will not doe ſome things, which before he had promiſed, yea ſworne that he would doe.
V. If any Doctrine be contumelious againſt God, this is, accuſing him of folly, putting vponupon him humaine affections, and falſely attributing to him wiſhes of no ſtrength, and a deſire of no force: as if they ſhould bring in God ſpeaking thus: I doe indeed earneſtly deſire to ſaue you, but ye hinder, that I cannot doe what I deſire; I would if you would: therefore ſeeing by you I am fruſtrated of my intent, I will change my purpoſe of ſauing you, and my will being otherwiſe bent, I hauehave determined to deſtroy you for euer. It is certainely plaine, that this Antecedent will of God, is not a will; but a deſire and wiſh, which God doth obtaine onelyonly by entreaty, and as much as he may, by mans good pleaſure. Armin in Perk. p. 196. Affectus quo Deus deſideratomnium hominum & ſingulorum ſalutem, eſt in deoſimplex naturalis & extra conditio…em.Therefore Arminius doth oftentimes call this will, a deſire and naturall affection, and it is common to theſe ſectaries to take thoſe places, Pſal. 81.14. Eſa. 48.18. where God is brought in ſpeaking, as one wiſhing and deſiring, and diſappointed of his wiſh, as if they were properly ſpoken, when theſe things are ſpoken by an Anthropopathy and after the manner of men.
VI. Furthermore, how grieuous a thing it is to be defrauded of ones deſire and naturall affection, and how diſagreeing this is to God, who doth not ſee, vnleſſe it be he that will willingly be deceiued? For if God be moſt perfectly good, yea goodneſſe it ſelfe, it muſt needes be, that his affections and naturall deſires (if he hauehave any) are of higheſt ſanctity, iuſtice, and perfection: and therefore nothing is ſo much to be wiſhed, as that that naturall affection might be fulfilled, and that God might obtaine his deſired end. There is cauſe therefore that wee ſhould grieue for Gods cauſe, who is deceiued of that end which is farre the beſt, and who might be made partaker of his wiſh, if man would let him. See whether the wit of theſe nouators doth plunge it ſelfe, and how honourably they thinke of God. Hitherto belong thoſe impious and wicked ſpeeches of Vorſtius; who doth affirme, Collat. amic. cum Piſcat. Sect. 27.that ſomething doth happen vnexpected to God, and which is bitter and very diſtaſtfull to him, and doth (although it be vnproperly ſpoken) bring very great griefe to him, and which doth proceede, not from his Antecedent, but from his Conſequent will, hauing tryed all things in vaine; Which ſpeach, doth doubtleſſe abaſe God below the ſtate of man: For if any ſuch thing ſhould happen, euen amongſt men, and any ones endeauour, hauing tryed all things in vaine, ſhould be deluded, it would be an argument, either of imprudency, or weakeneſſe, or infidelity. There is cauſe therefore we ſhould lament the ſtate of God, who vſing an vnproſperous ſucceſſe, hath ſo ill performed the buſineſſe.
VII. It is alſo abſurd, yea impious to affirme, that God, to whom all things from eternity are not onelyonly foreſeene, but alſo prouided for; ſhould intend any thing that from eternity hee knew would not come to paſſe, and to hauehave propounded an end to himſelfe, to which he knew he ſhould not attaine; as if one ſhould leuell at a marke which is not, nor euer will be: For if God from eternity knoweth that this man ſhall be damned, in vaine doth hee wiſh from eternity, that he ſhould be ſaued: and hee doth from eternity know that he ſhall not be partaker of his naturall deſire, and his antecedent will.
VIII. What a thing is it, that hereby there is brought in reſiſtance betweene theſe two wils of God, the latter of which doth correct the former? for by this Antecedent will, God doth deſire to doe that, which from eternity he is certaine hee ſhall not doe. And God is imagined doing ſomething hardly and vnwillingly, and againſt that end which hee had firſt intended, becauſe mans will comes betweene, by which it comes to paſſe, that God doth ceaſe from that end propounded to himſelfe, which was farre better, as if per foreign, vponupon a ſecond aduiſe, he ſhould obtaine ſome ſecondary good. Arminius doth not diſſemble this, whoſe words are theſe: In Perlin. Pag. 195.God doth ſeriouſly deſire all men ſhould be ſaued, but being compelled by the ſtubborne and incorrigible malice of ſome men he will hauehave them make loſſe of their ſaluation. But God doth nothing vnwillingly, neither can he be compelled by man, to the changing of his will.
IX. And if theſe weake affections and ineffectuall deſires, of which he is diſappointed, by the ſtepping betweene of mans will, be attributed to God, there is no doubt, but that God created man floting betweene his Antecedent and Conſequent will; as not without griefe fore-ſeeing the fall of man, and knowing that hee created a creature which would certainely periſh, and yet hee would not abſtaine from his creation, becauſe his decree of creating man could not be aboliſhed: ſo that God bound himſelfe in thoſe ſtraights, out of which hee could not quit himſelfe.
X. It is not alſo to be indured, that the will of God ſhould remaine vncertaine, vntill the condition, vnderunder which God doth Antecedently will any thing, be either fulfilled or broken. For although the generall affection of God towards all men, be not made to depend on mans will, yet (according to Arminius) the effect thereof is vncertaine, vntill God by his conſequent will hath decreed to ſaue this or that man. But Arminius makes this Conſequent will in God to depend on mans free-will, and doth make it to come after faith, and the right vſe of grace: Therefore Vorſtius, Vorſtius. Amic. Coſtat. cum Piſcat Sect. 79. & 217.a man of a ſharpe wit, but of an vnfortunate audacity, is bold to write that the will of God is after ſome manner mutable, and that ſome change may be made in ſome part of Gods decree.
XI. But although all the counſels of God are eternall and immutable, neither can God be ſaid to will any thing anew, which he hath not willed from eternity; yet whoſoeuer ſhall exactly conſider this Conſequent will of God ſhall finde that it is made to come after his Antecedent will, not onelyonly in order, but in time: For it is impoſſible that God ſhould at one time deſire to ſaue all men, and to damne ſome. And it muſt needes be, that the Antecedent will of God muſt ceaſe, as blotted and raced out by his Conſequent, before there can be place for his Conſequent will.
XII. And when the Apoſtle, Rom. 9. doth affirme, that the will of God cannot be reſiſted; by this diſtinction, there is made a will of God which may be reſiſted, and the execution whereof may be hindred by man.
XIII. And here, if any where, we may ſee how little conſtant the Arminians are. For they doe contend, that in the ninth Chapter to the Romanes, it is ſpoken of the Antecedent will of God, by which God will hauehave mercy vponupon ſome, (for ſo they ſpeake) that is, vponupon ſuch as beleeue, and not of his Conſequent will, by which he hath determined preciſely and abſolutely to hauehave mercy on this or that man: And yet they forgetting themſelues, ſay, that this Antecedent will may be reſiſted; when notwithſtanding Saint Paul ſaith in the ſame place. Who can reſiſt his will? Either therefore let Arminius deny, that the Antecedent will of God is a will, but rather call it a wiſh, deſire, or affection; or if he doth contend that it is a will, let him confeſſe that it cannot be reſiſted.
To which purpoſe, excellently Saint Auſten, Enchared. Cap. 95. Our God in heauen doth whatſoeuer things hee will, both in heauen and earth; which is not true, if hee hath willed ſome things, and hath not done them: And which is more vnworthy of him, hath not therefore done them, becauſe the will of man hath hindred that the Almighty ſhould not doe what hee willed.
XIV. Arminius indeede doth confeſſe, that God doth not want power to fulfill that Antecedent will, whereby he doth earneſtly deſire all men to be ſaued: But it is not true (ſaith he) that the thing which he doth wiſh & ſeriouſly deſire, that he will effect the ſame by what meanes ſoeuer he is able, but by thoſe meanes by which it is decent and conuement, that he ſhould effect it. The Father wiſheth, and doth earneſtly deſire, that his Sonne would obey m…n, but he doth not violently draw his Sonne to obedience: and a little after. The ſimilitude of a Merchant, who doth deſire his wares ſhould be ſafe, and yet caſteth them into th… ſea, doth very well ſquare and agree to the purpoſe. God doth earneſtly deſire that all men ſhould be ſaued, but compelled by the ſtubborne and incorrigible malice of ſome men, will hauehave them make loſſe of their ſaluation. For although God doth earneſtly will and intend the ſaluation of all and ſingular men, yet he will not then put forth his omnipotency, leaſt hee ſhould force mans free-will. I anſwere. Nothing is effected by theſe ſimilitudes; for they are plaine diſſim…litudes. Arminius vſeth examples of men which cannot be made partakers of their vowes, but by meanes that are not conuenient; and of them who are oftentimes diſappointed of their intention. But to God there are neuer wanting iuſt and conuenient meanes, by which he ſhould obtaine that which he intends; neither can he be diſappointed of his intent. But you ſay, if God ſhould exerciſe his omnipotency, in conuerting man, he ſhould force mans free-will, and compell mans voluntary liberty. But that I deny: For he can without conſtraint ſo bend the will, that it ſhould follow of its owne accord. Without conſtraint hee ſuddenly changed the minde of Eſau, Gen. 33. and the minde of Saul, 1 Sam. 19.23. and the minde of the Aegyptians, Pſal. 105.25. and of Kings, Pro. 21.1. If God doth make this change of the will in wicked men, the liberty of mans free-will vntouched; how much more may hee doe it in good and faithfull men? God without conſtraint did change the heart of the Theefe on the Croſſe, and ſo doth he of all, from whom hee takes their ſtony heart, and giues them an heart of fleſh, Ezek 36.26. and of thoſe, who when they were dead in ſinne, hee raiſed vp with a ſpirituall reſurrection, Epheſ. 2.5. We ſhall ſee Arminius is of opinion, that the vnderſtanding is vnreſiſtably indued with light by God, and that God doth vnreſiſtably giuegive power of beleeuing the Goſpell to all men, to whom the Goſpell ſhall be preached, and that hee drawes their affections: But when the minde hath fully receiued in this perſwaſion, and the affections doe ſtir vp the will, it is impoſſible but their will ſhould moue it ſelfe, whether the minde, inſtructed by God, doth appoint it, and whether the appetite doth force it; for theſe are the onelyonly incitements of the will, neither is it moued by any other impulſion. The ſchoole and followers of Arminius, are alſo of opinion, that the Elect are drawne of God by effectuall and powerfull grace, the effect whereof is moſt ſure, becauſe God doth draw them in a congruent and fit time and manner, in which he knoweth they will infallibly follow him, calling them: And yet the Arminians meane not hereby that any force is offred to the will of man, but that it is ſo vehemently affected with a morall and ſweet perſwaſion, that it followeth of its owne accord. The example of the Theefe, doth ſeeme to mee to be notable aboue all the other; whoſe heart ſo ſuddendly changed in a time of aduerſity, when the faith of the Apoſtles themſelues did ſhake, is an euident leſſon, how great the efficacie of the holy Spirit is on them who are called by the purpoſe of God, Rom. 8.28. But of this efficacy of calling, it ſhall be ſpoken more at large in his proper place.
XV. Hence appeares with how prepoſtrous diligence Arminius hath turned his wit to the defence of free-will. For there lay open to him a moſt ſure and plaine way, whereby God might ſhew forth his power in the conuerſion of man, without the diminiſhing of our liberty. Nor, while hee doth patronize and defend free will, ought he to ſtrike againſt the wiſedome and perfection of God, whom hee would fruſtrate and diſappoint of his owne end and naturall deſire, and wiſh thoſe things which he knowes hee ſhall not obtaine, and propound an end to himſelfe which ſhall neuer be.
XVI. In the meane while, the prudent reader ſhall eaſily diſcerne whereto that ſimilitude of the marchant making loſſe, and caſting his wares into the ſea, with his owne hands, may belong. For Arminius doth not onelyonly expreſſely ſay that God is compelled to doe ſomething which he had not intended, (for the marchant did not intend to doe this, but doth it foreign, nolens, volens, betweene willing, and nilling) but alſo by theſe hee doth inſinuate, that God being driuen from that better end which he had propounded to himſelfe, turned himſelfe to another end leſſe to be wiſhed; which things, whether they be ſpoken by prudent men to the reproach of God, or by vnwiſe men through ignorance, it doth ſtrike horror into pious mindes.
XVII. But in this diſtinction of the will of God, into Antecedent and Conſequent, the firſt whereof doth goe before, the other doth follow mans will; this is farre the worſt thing, that by it, the will of man is made to goe before the election of God: For according to Arminius, God by his antecedent will would ſaue all men, and giuegive them power of beleeueing in Chriſt; but by his conſequent will, doth elect or reprobate ſeuerall men, according as hee fore-knowes their faith, or infidelity. A deadly doctrine, by which the election of man doth depend vponupon mans will, and our faith is made the cauſe, and not the fruite of our election, and man chooſeth God, and applyeth himſelfe to God, before he is choſen of God: Whence it comes to paſſe, that on the one ſide, mans pride is blowne vp, as it were, with bellowes, and on the other ſide, faith is vndermined, as it were, with trenches, and confidence doth decay: For what certainty can there be of our ſaluation, if our election depend vponupon ſo inſtable a thing. But of theſe things more at large in their proper place. Now thoſe examples with which Arminius doth ſupport that double will of God, are to be examined.
XVIII. God (ſaith he) by his antecedent will would ſtabliſh the throne of Saule for euer; but by his conſequent will, he would ouerthrow it, as it is 1. Sam. 13 13. but there is no ſuch thing to be found; for Samuell doth not ſay, that God would ſtabliſh the kingdome of Saule; but he ſaith, God had eſtabliſhed thy kingdome for euer; betweene which there is a great deale of difference: If God had eſtabliſhed it, it had beene his will to ſtabliſh it: But becauſe hee did not eſtabliſh it; it is certaine it was not his will to eſtabliſh it.
XIX. There is no more force at all in the other example. Chriſt (ſaith hee) by his antecedent will, would gather the Iewes, as a Hen gathereth her chickens; but by his conſequent will, hee would ſcatter them through all nations. Math. 22.37. But this place ſignifieth quite another thing. Chriſt ſpeakes to Hieruſalem, and ſaith, that hee would hauehave gathered his children together; but Hieruſalem her ſelfe reſiſted, with all her power. Hieruſalem is one thing, and her children another, who here are expreſly diſtinguiſhed from the citty: By Hieruſalem vnderſtand the Prieſts, the Leuites, the Scribes, and the prince of the people, for theſe did moſt of all withſtand Chriſt: By the children of Hieruſalem, underſtand the people. Chriſt ſaith, that hee would hauehave gathered together theſe children; neither is it to be doubted, but that he gathered together many of them, although the rulers were vnwilling. This place, therefore, maketh nothing for that Antecedent will, which theſe men would hauehave not to be fulfilled, when indeede it was fulfilled as much as ſeemed good to God. Then alſo theſe words, how often would I, they miſvnderſtand them of the Antecedent will, which is the decree of God; when to will, is here nothing elſe, then to inuite and command: So Saint Auſten thinkes, Encherid. Chap. 97. Or rather (ſaith he) ſhee indeede would not hauehave had her children to be gathered together by him: but euen ſhee vnwilling, hee gathered thoſe of her children whom he himſelfe would ….
XX. The other examples are vnworthy that we ſhould ſtay long vponupon them. By his Antecedent will. (ſaith he) thoſe were called to the wedding, which by his Conſequent will were declared vnworthy: By his Antecedent will, hee without the wedding garment is inuited; by his Conſequent will, hee is caſt out. By his Antecedent will, the Goſpell is offered to the Iewes; by his Conſequent will, it is taken away. In all theſe things, that will of God, whereby men are called, is no other thing, then to command, and inuite, not to decree that by his Antecedent will, which afterward hee hath broken off by his Conſequent will.
XXI. Neither are wee ſcrupulouſly to enquire why God hath called them, whom hee knoweth will not follow. The end why God doth this, is euident, to wit, to require of men, that which they owe. To ſearch any farther into the intent of God, is to make God obnoxious to accounts, and to breake into his ſecrets.
XXII. It is not to be ouerpaſſed, that Arminius will hauehave God, equally deſire to ſaue all men by his Antecedent will, but when he is prepared to the effect, & execution of that will, he doth thoſe things which are contrary to that will. For hee preacheth the Goſpell to thoſe that are very wicked, as to the men of Capernaum; he doth deny that fauour to thoſe that are leſſe wicked, as to the men of Tyrus & Sydon; and he doth ſuffer many wilde people and ſtupid, with their barbarous cruelty, to be ouerwhelmed in darkeneſſe. But why ſo? becauſe (ſaith hee) their Anceſtors refuſed the Goſpell. O ridiculous reaſon! Should hee that doth equally deſire the ſaluation of all, be hindred with ſo light an impediment, and which is contrary to his iuſtice, as ſhall afterward be taught? Thus though Arminius doth teach, that God would by his Antecedent will ſaue all ſeuerall men; it is yet manifeſt by experience, that God through many ages hath denyed, and doth yet deny, to moſt nations, thoſe meanes without which they cannot be ſaued, and doth onelyonly ſupply thoſe meanes, which meanes alone, none euer vſed well.
XXIII. But God (ſaith he) ſeeing hee is very good by nature, cannot but wiſh well to all men by his Antecedent and primary will; as being created after his own image. Theſe things were ſpoken by them rightly, & agreeably to the nature of God, if we were borne without originall ſinne: But ſeeing the image of God is almoſt blotted out, and in place of it, the image of the Diuell hath ſucceeded, no reaſon doth compell vsus to beleeue that God is willing to ſaue all and ſingular men; but the holy Scripture doth teach, that ſome are ſaued by the meere grace of God, and by election, according to his purpoſe, the reſt being left in their naturall perdition, and appointed to damnation for thoſe ſinnes which they were to commit of their owne accord.
XXIV. All theſe things are not therefore ſpoken, that we ſhould reiect this diſtinction of the wil of God, into his Antecedent and Conſequent will: For we know, that among the decrees of God, ſome are before, and ſome are after in order. But wee denie that there are two decrees of God, betweene which mans will ſteppeth in; as if mans will came betweene the decree of creating man, and the decree of condemning certaine men. But we denie that the will of man doth ſo come betweene the two decrees of God, that the firſt, or Antecedent decree is broken off by the will of man, and that God is compelled to abſiſt from that end which he had propounded to himſelfe, and which he did ſeriouſly intend: We deny alſo, in the worke of our election, the preciſe will of God to depend on the fore-ſeeing of any power or action of mans free-will; or the Conſequent will of God to be ſuſpended on mans will: Concerning which thing, it ſhall be diligently ſpoken in the proper place.