The Anatomy of Arminianism, Chapter 32
CHAP. XXXII.
Of Free-will: The opinions of the parties.
I. HOw much that purity and integrity in which man was at the firſt created, is deformed by ſinne, and how the image of Sathan is drawne ouer the image of God, we hauehave taught, Chap. 7. Yet a liberty from conſtraint, and phyſicall neceſſity hath remained to the will: for if the will could be compelled, it were not voluntas, a will, but noluntas, a nill & vnwillingnes. Or if by an externall principle, by a naturall and immutable law, it ſhould be neceſſarily determined to one thing; it were not a will, but either a violent impulſion, or a naturall inclination and propenſion, deſtitute of knowledge and iudgement, ſuch as is the inclination of all heauy things to the center of the world. For ſeeing there are three kindes of liberty; the firſt is from conſtraint, and phyſicall or naturall neceſſitie; the ſecond from ſinne; the third from miſery: Man, while he is in this preſent life, ſhall neuer be fully free from ſinne and miſery; but to theſe two liberties he ſhall come in the life to come: The liberty from conſtraint and phyſicall neceſſity is eſſentiall to the will, and inſeperable from it.
II. The ſeate of this liberty, is in the will; becauſe it hath gotten the dominion, concerning voluntary actions: For although the will in particular actions doth follow the perſwaſion of the vnderſtanding, yet the vnderſtanding doth not iudge nor deliberate, vnleſſe it be commanded by the will; for the dominion whereof man doth apply himſelfe to deliberation and ſearching out of the truth: After the ſame manner that a blinde Maſter doth in eueryevery thing obey his ſeruant, leading him and perſwading him; which ſeruant, notwithſtanding, doth it that he may obey his Maſter, who will hauehave himſelfe led, and admoniſhed by him.
But ſeeing the Scripture ſaith, that man is the ſeruant of ſinne, Rom 6.17. and ſould vnderunder ſinne, Rom. 7.14. And dead in ſinne, Epheſ. 2.1.5. and Coloſ. 2.13. it is worth the labour, to know how farre this liberty of mans will doth extend it ſelfe, as well vnderunder the eſtate of ſinne, and before regeneration, as vnderunder the eſtate of grace and regeneration.
III. The will is the reaſonable appetite, which of his owne nature, is alwaies carried to good, whether it be good truely, or in appearance: for it is impoſſible that one ſhould deſire euill, as it is euill, and not vnderunder the reſpect of good.
IV. The liberty of the will, whereby it may will ſomething, or not will it, is called the liberty of contradiction; but the liberty whereby it may will ſome. thing, or the contrary of it, is called the liberty of contrariety.
V. Now there are onelyonly two things, which wee can will, for we either will the end, or the meanes to the end; the firſt whereof, is called by Ariſtotle, Ethi. 3. cap. 4. foreign, the will; the other, foreign, the choiſe. Wee doe abſolutely deſire the end, wee chooſe the meanes. And if any one doth abſolutely, and without deliberation will ſome meanes to obtaine the end, he doth will that meanes, not ſimply as a meanes, but as the end; & that he might obtain that, he doth chooſe other meanes: Now in chooſing, the will doth follow the iudgement of the practicall vnderſtanding; vnleſſe when the vehement and inordinate actions ouer-ruling, doe darken reaſon, or doe reſiſt the iudgement of it.Ariſt. Eth. 3. c. 3. foreign.
VI. We call that vnvoluntary, which is not onelyonly ſtrained, and to which we are compel…ed by force, but alſo that which is done by ignorance.
VII. That which is voluntary, diffreth from that which is ſpontaneus, and done of its owne accord, becauſe that which is ſpontaneus, doth extend it ſelfe further then that which is voluntary: for eueryevery thing which is voluntary is ſpontaneus, but not contrarily: For euen cattell are m…ued of their owne accord, and they hauehave their ſpontaneus appetites and inclinations; but thoſe are done voluntarily, which are done with ſome knowledge and reaſon: whether the reaſon be right, or onelyonly hauehave a ſhew of right and truth.
VIII. Ariſt. Eth 3.1. foreign.And of thoſe things that are done voluntarily, ſome are more voluntary then others: For there are ſome things which one doth foreign, willing and nilling, and ſlowly, as loath to doe them; as when the ſicke man ſtretcheth forth his arme to be cut off, that the Gangrene might grow no further; or as when the Merchant caſts his goods into the ſea, with his owne hands: which actions are yet more willingly done, becauſe they are done for their good: For the leſſe euill by, which men come to a greater good doth put on the forme of good.
IX. We all doe neceſſarily will the laſt & chiefe end, to wit, felicity; neither doth the deſiring of the laſt end fall into deliberation: For no man can procure from himſelfe, that he ſhould will himſelfe to be miſerable: But yet we will that end freely, becauſe we doe will it without conſtraint, and with knowledge and iudgement; whence it commeth to paſſe that this deſiring is not onelyonly ſpontaneus, but alſo voluntary, and therefore free.
X. Furthermore, there are many kindes of humane actions: For ſome are meerely naturall, as the contrary motion of the Arteries, and beating of the pulſe, the digeſtion of nouriſhment, &c. Which becauſe they are not in our power, nor at mans pleaſure, the will is neyther occupied about them, nor doe they fall within the compaſſe of Election or deliberation.
XI. Some actions are partly naturall, and partly voluntarie, as to eate, to walke, &c. Which although they be naturall, yet they are gouerned by the will. In theſe actions the will is free, vnleſſe when ſome externall force compels, or ſome vnauoidable neceſſity doth vrge, men being vnwilling.
XII. There are alſo ſome actions that are ciuill, as to ſell, to buy, to bargaine, to play, to build, to paint: In theſe things the will of man is free, and doth freely incline it ſelfe to one or other: For hee that doth theſe things at the command of another, yet is willing to obey him that commandeth, and therefore is driuen to doe it, not onelyonly by anothers will, but alſo by his owne. Of this liberty the Apoſtle ſpeaketh, Corinth. 7.37. He that ſtandeth stedfaſt in his heart, hauing no neceſsity, but hath power ouer his owne will, & hath ſo decreed in his heart, that he will keep his virgin, doth well: For in this place the Apoſtle vnderſtandeth, by that which is done well, not that which is done agreeable to Gods law, but that which is done prudently, and fitly, to the preſent time and purpoſe.
XIII. Alſo in actions that are ciuilly honeſt, the will of man is moued by its owne pleaſure, as when a heathen man helpes vp him that is fallen, or ſheweth the way to him that is out of it.
XIV. The like liberty is in the obſeruation of Eccleſiaſticall pollicy, and in thoſe workes commanded by the law of God, which doe belong to an outward operation; for the moſt wicked men, doe performe holy rites and religious ceremonies, doe beſtow almes, doe heare and reade the word of God.
XV. But eſpecially in euill actions man is free. For hee is not onelyonly of his owne accord carried to ſinne, but alſo of two or more euills, moſt freely hee doth chooſe eyther, and doth voluntarily apply himſelfe to that, to which his minde leads him. Wherefore ſeeing man, that is naturally euill, is gouerned by his owne euill will, and that one is for that cauſe ſaid to be free, becauſe he doth what he liſteth, it is manifeſt, that man is therefore the ſeruant of ſinne, becauſe he is in ſubiection to his owne will, and becauſe he doth ſinne voluntarily and freely, and that man is therefore a ſeruant becauſe he is free.
XVI. They that ſay that an vnregenerate man by this ſeruitude & naturall deprauation doth neceſſarily ſin, ought not to be reprehended; for an vnregenerate man muſt needes ſin: Thus the diuels doe neceſſarily ſinne, but yet freely; for they ſinne being not conſtrained, nor determined and appointed to any one thing onelyonly, by any outward cauſe forcing them: But they are led by their owne motion, by their ingrafted wickedneſſe, and with their knowledge; after the ſame manner that the Saints that are glorified, are neceſſarily and immutably good, but yet voluntarily and freely: For it is not credible, that the Saints hauehave loſt their liberty by their glorification. There is a kinde of neceſſity which is voluntary; neither is liberty contrary to neceſſity, but to conſtraint and ſeruitude. Wherefore Saint Auſtin, Enchirid. Chap. Auguſt. lib. 22. de ciuit. Cap. 30. Nec ideo libertō arbitrium non habebunt quia peccata eos delectare non poterunt, &c. Enchirid. cap. 105. Multo liberius… erit arbitrium quod omnino non poterit ſeruire peccato.105. & ciuitat. lib. 22. Cap. vlt. doth teach, that by the neceſſity of not ſinning, which ſhall be in the Saints, their free-will ſhall be rather increaſed and confirmed then diminiſhed. What is more free then God? And yet he is neceſſarily good and doth good things: For as Thomas ſaith, Tom 8. De libro arbitrio. Queſt. 24. Art. 3. It is no part of free-will, to be able to chooſe euill. The ſame man doth in many places ſay, that conſtraint, and not neceſſity, is contrary to the liberty of the will, but eſpecially in the ſame Tome, Queſt. 10. De proceſs. diuin. perſonarū. Art. 2.
XVII. There are moreouer, habits and actions, that is, vertues and workes, which doe helpe forward to ſaluation, and which are proper to the faithfull. Such as are the true knowledge and feruent louelove of God, ſaith and repentance, and holy actions flowing from theſe vertues. In and about theſe things, the will of a man that is vnregenerate, and ſtanding in his pure and meere naturals is not free; here is no freewill of man, no inclination, no diſpoſition: Surely it had beene a very hard thing to finde in Paul, raging againſt the Church, and in the theefe, crucified for his robberies, whom Chriſt conuerted in the very agony of his death, any diſpoſitions or preparations to repentance.
XVIII. I doe not deny, but that there are memorized many things of heathen men, which were done honeſtly, and profitably for ciuill ſociety, for concord, and for the defence of their countrie: But ſeeing, Without faith we cannot pleaſe God, Heb. 11.6. And ſeeing that that action alone is acceptable to God, which is done with Faith (for, Whatſoeuer is done without faith is ſinne, Rom. 14.23.) and which is referred to the glory of God, as the Apoſtle commandeth, 1. Cor. 10.31. It is plaine, that thoſe honeſt deedes of the heathen were not without fault, and that they could not come to ſaluation by ſuch ciuill vertues, nor that any one could by them be diſpoſed to faith or true repentance. The right outward duties of ciuill vertues, are of one ſort, the duties of faith and Chriſtian piety are of another ſort. And truly in my iudgement, the heathen iudge, who in giuing ſentence, and in diuiding poſſeſſions doth iudge equally and well, is no more iuſt before the tribunall of God, then the theeues who equally and iuſtly diuide the pray among themſelues: For whoſoeuer doth want faith in Chriſt, is not the Sonne of God, and therefore cannot be an heire and iuſt poſſeſſor of worldly goods, although he excell in ciuill vertues. For a kinde of doubtfull light, and ſome ſeedes of equity are left in man for ciuill ſociety: And they to whom the light of the Goſpell doth ſhine, if they giuegive themſelues ouer to vices ſhould be confounded with ſhame, being vrged by theſe examples.
XIX. But after God hath enlightned the minde of any one with his light, and hath touched his heart with repentance, and hath wrought in him faith in Chriſt, then the will of man beginneth to moue it ſelfe willingly and freely to holy actions, to which it is not forced by phiſicall or naturall neceſſity, but it is ſo turned by a milde and effectuall, eyther perſwaſion or influence, that the will may freely and willingly follow God calling: For otherwiſe that were not a good worke, whereunto one ſhould be drawne by conſtraint, or ſhould be compelled by a naturall neceſſity. He that doth good vnwillingly, doth wickedly: Such a man is ſufficiently rewarded, if God pardon his obedience; for although God hate euill, yet he will not therefore compell to good: Becauſe a good worke is not good, but when it is voluntarily.
XX. And although man is freely moued to the workes of piety, yet the whole praiſe of the good worke is due to God, who worketh in vsus to will, and to doe, of his good pleaſure, Phil 2. So, although the infant in the mothers wombe doth moue it ſelfe, and doth helpe forward his owne natiuity, yet it hath that power of mouing from God: Therefore, euen as if any one doth aſcribe the whole praiſe of the forming of the infant, the generation and birth of it to God alone, he doth not thereby hinder the birth of the infant, or diminiſh the vigour of it: So he that doth aſcribe to God the whole praiſe of our regeneration and holy actions, doth not thereby hinder the endeauour of good workes, nor weaken the will of man, or binde it with the bonds of naturall neceſſity.
XXI. Here therefore a diſtinction is to be vſed: For if it be ſpoken of the beginning of conuerſion, and of the firſt entrance of regeneration and faith, that is, of the procuring or forming of faith and repentance in our ſoules, wee contend that free-will doth nothing here, and that our ſoules in the very beginnings are, not onelyonly meerely paſſiue, but alſo that they doe with their greateſt endeauour reſiſt the worke of God, forming in vsus the rudiments and draughts of the new man, ſo that man in this caſe is not free, vnleſſe it be to reſiſt God. But after regeneration begunne, and after God hath giuen to man a heart of fleſh for his heart of ſtone, then man doth freely moue himſelfe to thoſe workes which are acceptable to God. And as there are ſecret, but yet certaine increaſings of regeneration, ſo this liberty doth increaſe by little and little, fainting eueryevery day with the reſiſtance of our luſts. By this meanes mans will doth cooperate and worke together with God, yet ſo, that whatſoeuer good is done, is due to God alone: No otherwiſe, then as when a ſcriuener doth guide the ſhaking hand of the childe, and doth at the firſt frame it to make letters; the childe indeede doth indeauour to forme the letters, and doth ſtriue with all his power, yet the right forming of the letters is not to be aſcribed to the childe, but to the ſcriuener: This example ſeemeth to me to be moſt fit, becauſe it teacheth that God doth not onelyonly worke with our will (as the Semipelagian Synergiſts, or maintainers of our cooperation with God, of this our age, would hauehave it) but alſo that God doth worke by our wills, and doth bend them by an effectuall motion, which motion after what manner, and how farre man may reſiſt, ſhall hereafter be taught.
XXII. Wee therefore ſay that the act of beleeuing and repenting, is ſo farre the act of man, in as much as man himſelfe beleeueth and repenteth, and not God; and in as much as no man beleeueth and repenteth, but he doth it willingly. But we ſay, that the grace of God alone, doth create and giuegive the firſt being to faith in vsus, and that it is the gift of God, and by the power of the regenerating ſpirit, that wee doe willingly and freely beleeue and repent. For the queſtion is not who beleeueth, whether man or God; but what doth bring forth faith in man, and whether it be in the power of free-will, helped with grace, to beleeue or not to beleeue, and to vſe grace or not to vſe it.
XXIII. From this doctrine (the foundations and proofes whereof ſhall be brought out of the holy Scripture in the next chapter) Arminius, and his Sectaries doe infinitely and exceedingly differ: For, they are of opinion, that an vnregenerate man hath power of beleeuing and repenting. The Arminian conferrers at the Hage, Page 272. doe affirme, that conuerſion doth goe before faith, and that man doth helpe ſomewhat to his owne conuerſion before hee hath faith. And turning ouer the writings of theſe Sectaries, I finde that they determine, that by the corruption of nature, mans vnderſtanding is darkened, and his affections are depraued; but I no where finde in their writings, that his will is of its owne nature depr…ued, and prone to ſinne: But they attribute to it, proneneſſe eyther to good or euill, and an equall in…anation to either part: Wherefore in the regeneration of a man, they will indeede hauehave his vnderſtanding to be enlightned vnreſiſtably, and his affections to be drawn (for ſo they ſpeake) but they ſay, that the will keepes her owne liberty of beleeuing, or not beleeuing, of repenting, or not repenting. And they will not hauehave the viuification and reuiuing of the will in our regeneration, to conſiſt in this, that of being naturally euill, it is made good by the infuſion of ſome vertue, but that by the illumination of the vnderſtanding, the amend…ment of the affections the will is made able to put forth that faculty of willing or nilling, which is ingrafied in it. This the Arminians of the conferrence at the Hage teach, Page 25. And alſo the ſame men, a little after, ſay theſe words: In our ſpirituall death, the ſpirituall gifts are not properly ſeperated from the will of man, becauſe they were neuer engrafted in it. Surely thoſe men are of opinion, that the will of Adam, before his fall, was not furniſhed with righteouſneſſe and holineſſe: For it cannot be denyed but that theſe vertues are ſpirituall gifts; which certainely is a prodigious and monſtrous diuinity.
XXIV. The ſame men doe affirme, that ſufficient grace is giuen to all men, euen to vnregenerate and heathen men, to whom the name of Chriſt hath not come, whereby they may obtaine faith, if they will: And that an vnregenerate man is not altogether dead in ſinne, Arnold. p 403. Home corruptus poteſtlumine natura recte vti: et habet aliquas reliquias vite ſpiritualis.but that there are in him reliques and remainds of ſpirituall life, and power of fulfilling the law of nature: for they thinke that God doth exact and require nothing from man, to the performing whereof hee would not giuegive him ſufficient power: otherwiſe (ſay they) God ſhould gather, where hee hath not ſcattered: They ſay therefore, that God is bound to giuegive to all men the power of fulfilling that which he commandeth, and of beleeuing in Chriſt.
XXV. Notable are the words of Arminius, pa. 244. againſt Perkins. Doeſt thou (ſaith he) deny that free-will is flexible and pliant to either part? I adde further, and that alſo without grace: for it is flexible of its owne nature, and as it is addicted to euill in the ſtate of ſinne, ſo it is capable of good, which capableneſſe, grace doth not giuegive it, for it is in it by nature. Hee therefore doth differ from himſelfe, when hee addes, that free will is not bowed to good, without the grace of God. For how doe theſe things ſtand together? that free-will is flexible to good, without grace; and yet it is not bowed to good without grace? In vaine is that power which is neuer brought into act: For whence doth hee gather that that thing may be done, which he himſelfe knoweth neuer was done, nor neuer ſhall be. Hitherto pertaineth that which he ſaith, pag. 257. To be able to beleeue is in nature, to beleeue is of grace: therefore to be able to beleeue is not of grace. There is indeede naturally in man a poſſibility of hauing or receiuing faith; but it is not in him by nature to be able to beleeue; for theſe things doe very much differ. The firſt notes the ſuſceptability and poſſibility of receiuing faith: the other ſigniſieth the actiue power and faculty of beleeuing, which ſurely is not in man by nature, but is onelyonly from grace.
XXVI. Arnoldus, pag. 271. layeth this to our charge, as a very great errour, that we ſay that the regenerate man cannot doe any good, vnleſſe hee be moued by grace. Truely a great crime, and that which is common to vsus with the Apoſtle, who doth pronounce, that we are not ſufficient of our ſelues to thinke any thing, as of our ſelues, but all our ſufficiency is of God. 2 Cor. 3.5. The ſame Arnoldus, pag. 447. doth make the vſe of grace ſubiect to mans will: It is determined, ſaith he, that the vſe of grace is ſubiect to mans will, that man may vſe it, or not vſe it, according to his naturall liberty: And a little after he doth confeſſe, that the effect of the mercy of God, was made by Arminius to be in the power of man, but ſuch a man as is already ſtrengthened with grace. To vſe which grace, or not to vſe it; to beleeue, or not to beleeue, he thinkes is in the power of mans freewill. Finally, the Arminians will hauehave the efficacy, that is, the efficiency and working power of it, to depend on free-will. Arnoldus againſt Bogermannus, pag. 263. and 274. All the operations of grace, which God doth vſe, to worke our conuerſion being granted, yet the conuerſion it ſelfe doth remaine ſo free in our power, that we may not be conuerted, that is, that we may conuert, or not conuert our ſelues. Greuinchouius, pag. 198. I ſay, that the ſffect of grace, after the ordinary and vſuall rule, doth depend on ſome act of free will, as on a foregoing con…ition, without which, it is not. The ſame man, pag. 203. and 204. doth ſay, that there c…n no other common cauſe be guten of the whole (why this grace ſhould be…eſſectuall, rather in Paul or Peter then in another) then the liberty of the will. Perkins ſaid; As there can no good either be, or be done, vnleſſe God doth it; ſo there can no euill be auoided, vnleſſe God hinder it. This true and holy ſentence, Arminius carpeth at and doth depraue. pag. 113, and for the words, can be auoided, he puts, is auoided: for he ſaith, that there is in all men power of doing good, and auoiding euill, and that a man may auoide euill, and abſtaine from ſinne, although God doth not hold him from it; but that the act it ſelfe, is partly from grace, and partly from free-will, which as it pleaſeth, doth either admit, or refuſe grace. Here the words of Arnoldus, pag. 381. The good vſing of freewill, is principally from grace, but yet ſo, that man himſelfe doth vſe well his owne free-will: and the liberty of vſing, or not vſing grace is left to him. For theſe ſectaries are of opinion, that the power of beleeuing is vnreſiſtably giuen to all, and that the act of beleeuing is ſo helped by grace, that it is left to mans free-will to beleeue in act, or not to beleeue, & to vſe grace either well or ill.
XXVII. And they deny that faith is from grace alone, but that it is partly from grace, and partly from free-will. Greuinchouius, pag. 208. and 210. It is manifeſt, that free-will and grace are together cauſes in part: And pag. 211. We ioyne grace and free-will together, as cauſes in part: He muſt ſo ſpeake, who ſaith that Election is for faith fore-ſeen: For God would be very vnfitly ſaid to fore-ſee that which he alone is to do; for this is not to fore-ſee, but to decree: Hitherto alſo pertaineth that conditional decree of ſauing men, if they ſhal beleeue; for by this it is placed in the power of man to beleeue: For this were a fooliſh decree; I will ſaue him, if I ſhall giuegive him faith. Arminius againſt Perkins, pa. 223. and 224. ſaith, that the totall cauſe why one beleeueth, and another not, is the will of God, and the free-will of man. Arnoldus, pag. 228. ſaith, that Arminius gaue the chiefe part of the working of faith, to grace. viz. becauſe in the working of faith, he will hauehave free-will to hauehave a part; which part, that it is not the leaſt, yea, that it is the greateſt, in the ſence of the ſectaries (although they would make another ſhew) Arminius, and after him Arnoldus, pag. 125. doth ſufficiently acknowledge: We deny (ſaith he) that this difference of calling grace, is not placed ſo much in mans free-will, as in the will of God. And truely in the conuerſion of man, free-will muſt hauehave the chiefe part, if it be true that the Arminians contend for, to wit, that the efficiency and working power of grace, doth depend on free-will, and that the right vſe of grace is made ſubiect to mans will. And that which Arnoldus ſaith, pag. 444. That God doth ſo worke in man, that in the meane while man is not wanting to himſelfe, he can conuert himſelfe. And Greuinchouius againſt Ames, pag. 205. Grace doth not determine and conclude, vnleſſe free-will worke with it: in which reſpect and manner, what if we ſhould ſay, that the efficacy of grace, doth after a certaine manner depend vponupon free-will, as concerning the euent? If therefore the efficacy of grace, as concerning the euent, that is, the effect, doth depend on mans free-will; it muſt needes be, that free-will hath farre the greater part in our conuerſion and regeneration. The ſame man, pa. 214. In comparing betweene themſelues, Arnold pa. 234. & 235.the effectuall helpe of God, and the inſluence of free-will, there is no priority betweene them both. And ſeeing it is in the power of freewill, ſo to vſe grace that he may beleeue, and obtaine faith, we being by faith the ſonnes of God, Gal 3.26. It appeareth (if we may credit Arminius) that to be made the ſonnes of God, is a thing proper to free-will, and although it cannot be done without the helpe of grace, yet the effect doth depend on mans will: So that God is willingly indebted to man; for hee is beholding to free-will that he hath ſonnes.
XXVIII. This is the malicious and blacke iuyce of the fiſh Loligo; and this is their moſt peſtilent doctrine: of which, what is to be iudged it is eaſie to coniecture by thoſe ſpeeches which eueryevery where meet vsus in the bookes of theſe ſectaries. That Lydia opened her owne heart, when yet, as Luke witneſſeth, Act. 16.14. God opened the heart of Lydia: And that a man doth ſeparate himſelfe, although Saint Paul ſaith, who ſeperates thee? 1 Cor. 4.7. And that an vnregenerate man is not altogether dead in ſinne: and that God doth giuegive man power of beleeuing, if he himſelfe will: when yet God giueth both to will, and to doe, Phil. 2.13. And that ſufficient grace which is giuen to all men, yea, to the reprobates, doth take away the impotency, and doth ſtabliſh the liberty of free-will; as Arminius againſt Perkins, pag. 245. and 246. teacheth. Let vsus heare the proud words of Greuinchouius, p. 253. I ſeparate my ſelfe: for when I might reſist God and his predetermination; yet I hauehave not reſiſted, and therefore why may it not be lawfull for me to boaſt in that, as of my owne? For that I was able, it was of God ſhewing mercy, but that I was willing, when I might hauehave beene vnwilling, it was my owne power. It is a venter, but this little worme will ſwell ſo big, that he will breake. O it is the part of a magnanimious & great minded man, to be vnwilling to owe too much to God, and not to be ouercharged with his benefits. Thoſe things which the ſame author ſaith, pag. 279. ſauour of no leſſe pride: You will ſay that in this manner of working, God doth after a certaine manner, depend on the will of man: I grant it, as concerning the act of free determination. Indeede this one thing was wanting, to the very height of pride, that God ſhould be ſaid to depend on man.
XXIX. There meete vsus in the writings of theſe innouators, ſome places, in which they ſay, that man in his corrupted ſtate was altogether dead, and that of himſelfe, he can neither thinke, nor will, nor doe, any thing that is good. But theſe things are ſaid but for a colour, and that they might deceiue the vnwary reader: For they ſay, that a man is able to doe no good without grace; but by this grace, they vnderſtand vniuerſall grace, which is common to all men, and ſufficient grace, which is giuen, euen to them to whom Chriſt was made knowne, and which doth extend it ſelfe as farre as nature: They ſay indeede, that grace is the cauſe of beleeuing, but they neuer adde, that it is the cauſe alone. The Arminian conferrers at the Hage, in the third and fourth Articles, doe ſo ſpeake as if they were of the ſame opinion with vsus: For there they profeſſe, that man hath not ſaning faith from himſelfe; and that the grace of God is the beginning, the proceeding, and the finiſhing of all good, and that all good actions are to be aſcribed to the grace of God in Chriſt: But the ſubtle men, when they ſay that a man hath not faith from himſelfe, they vnderſtand, that he hath it not from himſelfe alone: And when they ſay, that eueryevery good worke is to be aſcribed to grace, they are very wary, leaſt they ſhould ſay to grace alone. Then alſo in the word grace, they lay a ſnare, and being the Apes of the Pelagians, they faigne a certaine grace, which is common to all, which doth extend it ſelfe as farre as nature: Alſo they diſtinguiſh grace from the vſe of grace; for indeede, they will hauehave grace to be from God, but the vſe of grace to be in the power of mans free-will: With the like craft, they ſay, that the power of beleeuing is from grace: for they preſently draw backe what they hauehave reached forth, while they ſay, that to beleeue it ſelfe, is of mans freewill; and that grace is giuen to man to beleeue, if he will. But whenſoeuer they will hauehave a kinde of ſpeciall grace to come to that generall grace, they make the vſe of this ſpeciall grace to depend on free-will; and they roundly, and without any circumſtances affirme, that the efficiency, and working power of grace, doth depend vponupon it.
We ſhall alſo ſee, that by that vniuerſall and ſufficient grace, common to all men, is vnderſtood naturall gifts, & notions that are naturally engrafted, and that they cloath nature with the goodly name of grace; (which thing alſo Pelagius did:) Which thing, when they doe with their greateſt cunning, yet their diſſembling is neuer ſo wary, but that their Pelagian eares and errour doe appeare: and although they doe imitate the ſpeech of truth, yet their vizard doth often fall from them vnawares; and their vlcers being preſſed, doe preſently caſt forth ſtinking corruption.
XXX. Yet Vorſtius here doth differ from his Maſter: For when Arminius ſaith, that no man is conuerted, and doth beleeue in act, by that vniuer ſall grace alone, which is common euen to the reprobates, but that there is alſo ſome ſpeciall grace required: Vorſtius on the contrary ſide, doth affirme. Collat. cum Piſcat. pag. 57. that ſome are conuerted by vniuerſall grace (which he calleth the leſſer mercy) that is, without ſpeciall grace, which he calleth grace more then ſufficient, and ſuper abounding helpe: Therefore if this man be beleeued, ſome men come to ſaluation by that grace alone which is common to all heathen men.