The Anatomy of Arminianism, Chapter 13
CHAP. XIII.
Of the obiect of Predeſtination, that is, whether God predeſtinating, conſidereth a man as fallen, or as not fallen.
ALthough God hath elected to ſaluation, theſe men rather then others, for no other cauſe, then that it ſo ſeemed good to him, nor is the cauſe of this difference to be ſought in man; yet what is the obiect of Predeſtination, that is, whether God electing or reprobating men, hath conſidered them as fallen and ſinners, or as not fallen, but as men in the Maſſe, not corrupted, it may be doubted. The Paſtors of the Valacrian Churches, ſtrong maintainers of the truth, in their moſt exact Epiſtle, the coppy whereof they hauehave ſent to vsus, doe profeſſe that they thinke that God conſidered thoſe men which hee did elect, and which hee did paſſe by, as fallen in Adam, and dead in ſinnes: All the anciens thinke ſo, to none of whom (as farre as I know) it euer came in their minde to ſay that God reprobated men without the beholding of ſinne. I ſee that of the ſame opinion is Caluin, Zanchy, Melanchton, Bucer, Muſculus, Pareus, famous lights in this age of the Church, out of whoſe writings, I hauehave added ſome gathered ſentences at the end of this worke, leaſt they ſhould ſtay the haſtening reader, and ſhould breake off the thread of the diſputation begunne againſt the Arminians: The confeſſion of the churches of France doth keepe it ſelfe within theſe limits, in the twelth Article, where out of the ninth Chapter to the Romanes, and other places of Scripture, Election and Reprobation is proued to be out of the corrupt maſſe. The reuerend Synod of Dordt (then which for many ages there hath beene none more famous, nor more holy) harh allowed this opinion: I doe not ſee what can be oppoſed to ſo great authority. A holy aſſembly gathered together out of diuerſe parts of the Chriſtian world, hath prudently ſeene and diſcerned, that this opinion is not onelyonly more modeſt, and more ſafe, but alſo that it is moſt fit to put back the obiections of theſe innouators, which doe impudently triumph in this matter: Thus are their frames diſſolued, and their ſinnewes are cut from them; for Reprobation without the beholding of ſinne being taken away, which they aſſaile with all their forces, they beate the ayre, neither hauehave they any thing that they ſhould ſtrike at: the cauſes by which our confeſſion, and alſo the reuerend Synod is led, that they thought it fit for them to reſt in the Predeſtination, wherein man is conſidered as fallen, I ſuppoſe be theſe.
I. Firſt, that Phraſe of Scripture which calleth the Elect, the veſſels of mercy, offers it ſelfe: Now there is no place for mercy vnleſſe towards the miſerable. He cannot be elected to the ſaluation, to be obtained by Chriſt, vnleſſe he be conſidered as one that hath neede of a redeemer: And ſeeing that the appointment to an end, doth include the meanes by which that end is come by, and the meanes to ſaluation is the remiſſion of ſinnes, nor is there remiſſion of ſinnes without ſinne, it is plaine that they are appointed to ſaluation, who are conſidered as ſinners.
II. Neither could God, with the preſeruation of his iuſtice, puniſh thoſe men whom he conſidered without ſin, for God doth not puniſh the guiltles: Damnation is an act of the iuſtice of God, which iuſtice cannot ſtand, or agree with it ſelf, if innocent man for no fault be appointed to that deſertion, and forſaking, which eternall deſtruction muſt neceſſarily follow; or if God had determined to deſtroy men, before he did determine to create them.
III. Then as God doth not condemne, vnleſſe it be for ſin; ſo it is certaine that hee is not willing to condemn, vnleſſe it be for ſin: But to reprobate men, & to be willing to condemne, are the ſame thing, euen as to elect & to be willing to ſaue, is the ſame thing: Therefore God doth not reprobate vnleſſe it be for ſinne.
IV. Furthermore it cannot be denied, but that reprobation or reiection of the creature from God, is the puniſhment which can be inflicted on the reaſonable creature, becauſe eternall torments doe neceſſarily follow it, which if we get to be granted; it will thence follow, that it is not the part of infinite goodneſſe and higheſt iuſtice to forſake his owne creature, and that not becauſe he hath ſinned, but becauſe it ſo ſeemed good to God, that hee might ſeeke matter for his glory out of the deſertion, and forſaking of the ſoule which hee created. Can the father, who knoweth that the happineſſe of his ſonne depends on him, without the crime of cruelty, and want of naturall affection, forſake his ſonue that is innocent, and found guilty of no wickedneſſe, eſpecially if by this forſaking, his ſon ſhould fall into eternall torments, and by it be made not onelyonly moſt miſerable, but alſo moſt wicked?
V. Neither ſhould God deale iuſtly, if he ſhould giuegive more euill to the creature, by infinite parts, then he hath giuen good: To which, when he had giuen eſſe, a beeing, a while after, without any fault of it, he gaue it, male eſſe, an euill and miſerable being, for euer. Indeede if God ſhould onelyonly take away that he hath giuen, and ſhould bring the creature to nothing, there were no cauſe at all of complaining: But to giuegive an infinite euill to that creature, to whom he gaue a finite good, and to create man to that end onelyonly that he might deſtroy him, that out of this deſtruction he might get glory to himſelfe, the goodneſſe and iuſtice of God abhorreth.
VI. Yet this is the moſt grieuous thing, that by this, eyther reprobation or deſertion of man, being conſidered without ſinne, the innocent is made not onelyonly moſt miſerable, but euen moſt wicked: For the auerſion and turning away of the will, doth neceſſarily follow the denying of the ſpirit of God; and ſeeing according to this opinion, God hated man, that was made by him, before man hated God, it cannot come to paſſe, but that the hatred of God, whereby he hates man, by the ſame opinion, ſhould be made the cauſe of that hatred whereby man hates God, and ſo God ſhould be made the author of ſinne.
VII. And if God hated Eſau, being conſidered in the vncorruptible maſſe, as not a ſinner, it muſt needes be, that God hates the innocent creature; and hatred in God, although it is not an humane affection, nor a perturbation, yet it is a ſure and certaine will of puniſhing, and puniſhment cannot be iuſt, if it be without offence; neither can a man be iuſtly puniſhed, vnleſſe he be conſidered as a ſinner.
VIII. If any man ſhould ſay that God is obnoxious, or ſubiect to no lawes, and therefore his actions are not rightly examined, according to the rule of iuſtice, ſeeing hee is tyed to no rules: I will anfwere, that the nature of God, is more mighty then any law: That naturall perfection, by which it is impoſſible that God ſhould lie, or that he ſhould ſinne; is alſo the cauſe, why he could not hate his guiltleſſe creature, or appoint man to eternall torments, for no fault of his: Yea if theſe things were true, it were the part of a wiſe man to ſuppreſſe theſe things, not to moue this anagyris or offenſiue matter, and rather to command ſilence or ignorance to themſelues, then to breake into theſe ſecrets, which being declared, doe caſt in ſcruples and doubts, and yeeld occaſion to the aduerſaries, of defaming the true religion, and by which, no man is made fitter to the duties of a Chriſtian, or of a ciuill man, or to any part of piety.
IX. That could not eſcape which ſhould ſay, that by reprobation, men are not appointed to damnation, but onelyonly are paſſed by, or not elected, Thus they ſeeke gentler words, that by them the ſame thing might be ſaid; for it is all one, whether God doth appoint a man to damnation, or doth that, from which damnation muſt neceſſarily follow. Whoſoeuer God doth not elect, whether hee be ſaid to be omitted and paſſed by, or to be reprobated, hee is alwaies excluded from the grace of God, damnation doth certainely follow this excluding; becauſe without the grace of election, there is no ſaluation. For ſeeing it is manifeſt to all, that men by election, are appointed to ſaluation, I would hauehave it told mee, to what they that are not elected, but paſſed by, are appointed: Surely if election doth appoint men to ſaluation, it is plaine, that by reprobation, which is called omiſsion or paſſing by, the reſt are excluded from ſaluation, and appointed to deſtruction.
X. And if God hauehave appointed the innocent creature to deſtruction, it muſt needes be, that hee hath appointed it to ſinne, without which, there can be no iuſt deſtruction, and ſo God would be the impulſiue and mouing cauſe of ſinne: Neither could man iuſtly be puniſhed for that ſinne, to which he is eyther preciſely appointed, or compelled by the will of God.
XI. That the decrees of God are eternall, and that he hath fore-knowne all things from eternity, doth not hinder this opinion, which doth maintaine, God in election and reprobation, to hauehave conſidered man as fallen, before he conſidered him as condemned: For although the decrees of God are certaine, yet there is ſome order among them; as the eternall decree of ouerthrowing the world by fire, was in order after the decree of creating the world: So although God, from eternity, had appointed the wicked to puniſhment, yet nothing hinders but that the conſideration, whereby hee conſidered men as ſinners, ſhould be in order before that whereby hee conſidered men as reprobate, or appointed to puniſhment.
XII. Neither doth it follow of the opinion of the reuerend Synod, and the confeſſion of our Churches, by which man fallen is the obiect of predeſtination, that God created man to an vncertaine end, or to hauehave miſſed of that end which he propounded to himſelfe. The laſt end, propounded to God, was the illuſtration, and ſetting forth of his glory, by the manifeſtation of his goodneſſe and iuſtice; that hee might come to this end, hee decreed to create man iuſt, but mutable and free: The fore-knowledge of the fall of man doth follow this decree, not in time, but in order, and election and reprobation doth in order follow this fore-knowledge.
XIII. They are very farre from the truth, which would hauehave God, in electing and reprobating, to hauehave conſidered man as not created; for they doe as much as if they ſhould ſay, that God conſidered man as nothing, and therefore as not man. Surely in that very thing, that they call him a man, they call him ſomewhat; but to conſider ſomething as nothing is a thing well-nigh a dreame: He that will ſaue or puniſh a man, muſt neceſſarily, firſt hauehave willed him to be a man: For if God had appointed man to puniſhment before he had appointed to create him, he ſhould ſo doe, as if any one ſhould determine to beate his children, before he hath determined to beget them.
XIV. Finally, ſeeing the firſt act of his omnipotency was buſied about nothing, it muſt neede, be that it went before the act of his mercy or iuſtice, which cannot be buſied but about ſomething that hath being.
XV. They ſay the ſame thing in other words, which would hauehave God in predeſtinating to hauehave conſidered man, as one that might be created and might fail: For he which ſaith he might be created, ſaith he was not yet created; and hee that ſaith hee might fall, ſaith that he had not fallen, but that to other inconueniences, they adde this increaſe, that they put a power and potentiall faculty in that thing which is nothing In God indeede there was the actiue power of creating the world, before he created it: But there was not in the world the paſſiue power for creating, before it was created: So neither could there be power for the creation, or for the fall, in man being not created, and it is plainely contrary to reaſon, that of him which is not, it ſhould be ſaid that he may fall. Then alſo if God elected man that might be created, what doth hinder that it may not be ſaid, that he elected ſome whom hee neuer would create? For theſe alſo may be created; but if God elected thoſe whom he preſuppoſed hee would create, the will of creating muſt needes goe before the election.