Vindication of the Doctrine of Gods Absolute Decree, Tract

Vindication of the Doctrine of Gods Absolute Decree · Tract

p. 1A VINDICATION Of the Doctrine of Gods Abſolute Decree, AND Chriſts Special Redemption.

THe Doctrine of Gods Abſolute Decree (being ſuch a Doctrine as is ſomewhat removed above the reach of mans natural Apprehenſion, and very little agreeing with his corrupt Will and Affections) hath been much quarrel'd at in all Ages. It began to be ſo in that great Apoſtles time, who was the principal Propagator of it, as appears Rom. 9.19. In ſucceeding Ages Pelagius and his Followers ſtrongly maintained this Quarrel. In later times (to ſpeak nothing of the Jeſuits and Arminians, who have kindly cloſed their hands in oppoſing this Doctrine) Caſtellio againſt Beza, Mr. Hoard in his PHILANTHROPY, but eſpecially the Author of Fur Praedeſtinatus, have taken much pains to render this Doctrine to the world as odious and abominable as may be; To theſe Mr. Thomas Pierce hath of late largely contributed his help, in his Treatiſes which he hath put forth, eſpecially in that which he calls The Divine Philanthropy defended: I hope he will not take it ill, if we ſhall in a calm and quiet way (without touching upon his perſon) examine his Arguments, to ſee whether they be as ſtrong as his Words, and whether their Evidence be anſwerable to his Confidence. As alſo ſpeak ſomething in way of Defence of that Innocent p. 2Doctrine of Gods Abſolute Decree, which he chargeth with that great Crime of making God the Author of Sin, and other foul Conſequences, and therefore treads it under his feet with much indignation and deteſtation. And becauſe the Aſſerting and Confirming of a poſitive Truth makes way for the Overthrow of that Error which is contrary to it, we ſhall begin with this, and in the firſt place endeavor to prove, That no conditional Decrees can agree to the Nature of God, and therefore that they muſt needs be Abſolute; and then come to anſwer the Objections that are brought againſt the Doctrine of the Abſolute Decree. In doing of both theſe, it cannot be avoided but we muſt again make uſe of thoſe Conſiderations prefixed before Mr. Barly's Anſwer to Mr. Pierce (which the… were briefly propounded, but now ſhall be more largely inſiſted on) becauſe they moſt properly and intimately concern the Queſtion in hand; as alſo becauſe he hath no… given any Anſwer at all unto them, but onelyonly put them off with a jeer; which whether they have deſerved or no, we leave to the indifferent Reader to judge.

Arguments againſt Conditional Decrees in God.

BY Conditional Decrees, we underſtand ſuch as wherein the Condition doth not onelyonly go before the execution or effecting of the things decreed, but before the Decree it ſelf, before the internal act of Gods will, and that purpoſe within himſelf, whereby he hath determined that ſuch or ſuch things ſhall be.

That ſuch a Decree as this cannot agree with the excellent Nature of God, if we conſider him in regard either of his Eternity, Immutability, Omnipotency, Simplicity, or other Perfections belonging to his Nature, may thus appear.

p. 31. Argument. 1 That which is abſolutely Eternal hath nothing going before it, for it is abſolutè primum; But all Gods Decrees (being acts within himſelf, and therefore not really differing from himſelf) are abſolutely Eternal; Therefore they can have no condition or conſideration of any thing without himſelf going before them: As his Decree of Election was before the foundation of the world was laid, Eph. 1.4. ſo alſo it is with all other of his Decrees.

2. All Conditions are conſequents of Gods Decree, therefore they cannot go before it: they are means fitted for the end: now media ſunt propter finem, therefore the end muſt be firſt intended by the ſame act of Gods Decree whereby he intends Salvation to men, he intends to bring them to it by Faith, Repentance and other fit means; therefore Salvation is firſt intended.

3. Faith and Sanctification (which are the principal conditions of our Salvation) are the effects of Election. He hath choſen us to Salvation through the ſanctification of Spirit, and belief of the Truth, 2 Theſ. 2.13. We are choſen to be holy and without blame, Eph. 1.4. Now theſe conditions being effects of the Decree cannot go before it, for the effect cannot go before the Cauſe, becauſe it receives its being from it; and as the effect in nature always follows after the cauſe, ſo alſo it doth in Gods conſideration; for his conſideration is according to the nature of the thing, elſe it were not a right conſideration.

To this purpoſe Learned Dr. Whitaker ſaith well, Cygnae 1 cantio. p 5.Cum gratia ſit propter praedeſtinationem, praedeſtinatio non poteſt eſſe propter gratiam. If we receive Grace becauſe we are predeſtinate, we cannot be predeſtinate for fore-ſeen grace. If God ſhould chooſe men upon the fore-ſight of Faith or any other grace, where ſhould he fore-ſee this? he could not fore-ſee it in man before man had any being in the world, or the world it ſelf had any being; therefore he muſt fore-ſee it in himſelf and his own will, therefore he muſt firſt will mans Salvation, and in order to that, will to give him faith and other graces that fit him for it.

p. 4Beſides, true Love always flows from true Faith, and by this true Faith and Love we chuſe God to be our God; therefore if he ſhould chooſe us upon the fore-ſight of our Faith, he ſhould chooſe us and love us, becauſe we had choſen and loved him; which contradicts the Apoſtle, who tells us, that we love him becauſe he loved us firſt, 1 John 4.19.

4. That which is abſolutely Eternal, hath neither beginning nor end: but the doctrine of the conditional decree faſtens an end, and a beginning to Gods Decrees: For that which they make the peremptory or abſolute decree, begins not till the conditional decree be at an end, and ſo ſoon as that takes place, this is expired. As for inſtance, God decrees mans Salvation upon condition they will believe and repent; now when they have perſevered in doing ſo, then this conditional decree ceaſeth to be conditional, and becomes abſolute; and the abſolute Decree touching mans Salvation begins not till he hath fulfilled the condition; ſo that by this means, Election muſt needs be in time, and not before all time.

All Gods Decrees are immutable and unchangeable; Argument 2 they being acts within himſelf are of the ſame nature with himſelf, in whom there is no ſhadow of change, Jan. 1.17. Hence it is ſaid, that the Foundation of God (which is his Decree) remaineth ſure, 2 Tim. 2.19. His Decrees are far more firm then the Laws of the Medes and Perſians, which could not be altered. His Counſels ſtand for ever, and the thoughts of his heart throughout all ages, Pſal. 33.11. His Decrees are thoſe mountains of braſs the Prophet ſpeaks of, Zech. 6.1. which can never be removed: but the doctrine of the conditional will and decree, makes theſe to be mutable and changeable; For,

1. By this Doctrine his conditional decree, upon fulfilling the condition, becomes abſolute; and theſe cannot be both the ſame, for they have differing objects; by the one the Salvation and Damnation of all are equally intended, upon condition of believing, or not believing; p. 5whereas his abſolute Decree is peremptorily pitcht upon one of theſe onelyonly, with excluſion of the other.

2. Every man in the world is under ſome Decree or other: ſo long as he continues an unbeliever, he is under the Decree of Damnation; when he comes to be a beleiver, then he comes under the Decree of Salvation; when he falls from his Faith (as by this Doctrine he may do) then he falls again under the Decree of Damnation; when he recovers again, he comes under the other Decree; and ſo Gods Decrees will be made as variable and changeable as are the mutable motions of mans will, then which nothing is more unconſtant and uncertain.

3. When God ſeriouſly wills and intends a mans Salvation, upon condition that he will believe; when he by perſiſting in unbelief to his dying day, comes to be actually damned; then either the will of God touching his Salvation is changed into a will of Damnation, or elſe an unbeleever is damned againſt Gods will. If the former, then Gods will is changeable; if the latter, then after a man is actually damned, God doth ſtill continue ſeriouſly to will and deſire his Salvation, though he never attain his will and deſire. Now how can this agree with his moſt perfect felicity, and with the infinite perfection of his nature, to be always croſt in that which he ſeriouſly wills and deſires. Beſides, Is not juſt Damnation an act of Gods Juſtice, and can any act of his Juſtice be againſt his Will?

The will of God is an omnipotent will; Argument 3 whatſoever he wills with the will of his purpoſe, that he works; For who hath reſiſted his will?

Object. But he wills their Salvation upon condition they do not reſiſt.

Anſw. 1. How can it ſtand with the wiſdom of God ſeriouſly to will and deſire a mans Salvation in caſe he doth not reſiſt, and he knows certainly at the ſame time that he will reſiſt, yea, can do no other, (if his will be not changed) and he is reſolved never to change it? Or how can it ſtand with his perfection to ſubject his will to p. 6the perverſe will of the creature, and to make his moſt ſerious intentions and purpoſes to be ſubordinate to the various motions and mutations of mans will? ſo that when he wills and intends one thing, theſe ſhould make him will and deſire the quite contrary.

2. If mans reſiſtance hinders Gods willing of their Salvation; how comes it to paſs that he wills the ſalvation of any man, or that any man comes to be ſaved, ſince he knows certainly that all men will reſiſt? for whatſoever is born of the fleſh is fleſh, Joh. 3.4. and it is the property of the fleſh to luſt againſt the Spirit, Gal. 5.17.

3 If God ſeriouſly wills and intends mans ſalvation, mans reſiſtance cannot hinder, for he can eaſily remove it; Who hath reſiſted his will? (ſaith the Apoſtle) Rom. 9.19. Our God is in Heaven, and doth whatſoever he will, Pſal. 115.3. Whatever pleaſed the Lord in Heaven or Earth, that did he, Pſal. 135.6. What is the reaſon that when all men reſiſt, he removeth this reſiſtance in ſome, and of unwilling wills cauſeth them to have willing wills? Is it not becauſe he intends their Salvation? And why doth he not the like to others? is it not becauſe he never intended to ſave them? He can do this in one as well as another, and that without offering any violence to the liberty of their wills, if he intended the Salvation of all alike: No man can be ſaid ſeriouſly to deſire that thing, the hindrances of effecting whereof, he will not remove, when it is in his power to do it.

This conditional Decree cannot conſiſt with the ſimplicity of Gods Nature, Argument 4 for he being actus ſimpliciſsimus & perfectiſsimus, being one and the ſame moſt ſimple and perfect act, decrees all things ſimul & ſemel, uno actu ſimpliciſsimo, together, and at once with one moſt ſimple act: There is no priority or poſteriority in Gods Decrees, bu onelyonly prioritas rationis (as D. Twiſſe well expreſſeth it) quando ratio unius petitur è ratione alterius, a priority of reaſon, when the reaſon of one thing is drawn from the reaſon of another: as the reaſon of the means is drawn p. 7from the reaſon of the end. God decrees end and means, and all together; but becauſe in order of Nature the end goes before the means, and we can apprehend it no other way, therefore that order is uſually attributed unto God in his Decrees, that firſt he decrees the end, and then the means, though he decrees both with one and the ſelf ſame act, at the ſame inſtant. Now this Hypothetical Doctrine, which makes Gods Decrees to be conditional, makes alſo a mixture and multiplicity of Decrees. As firſt, that he wills the Salvation of all men; then, that believers onelyonly ſhall be ſaved; then, that this particular perſon ſhall be ſaved, if he believe; or damned, if he will not; then, upon the foreſight, who will, and who will not; the certain ſalvation of theſe, and damnation of the other. Now the Scripture carries on theſe things, in a far clearer and more direct way; teaching that God by one and the ſelf ſame act of an abſolute Decree doth determine the Salvation of his Elect, and to give them Faith, Repentance, and all other Graces that are needfull to bring them to it.

This conditional Decree cannot agree with the perfection of Gods Nature. Argument 5

1. It ſuppoſeth a general Decree of ſaving all believers.

2. Becauſe this will never takes effect, if it ſtayes here, and be carried on no further, it makes God in the next place to proceed to a conditional Decree of ſaving this or that perſon, upon condition if he will believe, and then to an abſolute Decree of theſe particular perſons, upon foreſight of their believing and perſevering. Now here is plainly progreſſus ab imperfectioribus ad perfectiora, a progreſs from the leſs perfect to the more perfect, after the manner of men, which can in no ſort agree to the perfect wiſdom of God, who knows and determines all things ſimul & ſemel.

3. This makes this will of God, touching the Salvation of all, rather to be a Velleietas, then volitio, a wiſhing, p. 8rather then a willing, which is proper onelyonly to weak men, who is not able to accompliſh his own deſires, but cannot agree to the All-powerfull God, who is in the Heaven and doth whatſoever he will. Wiſhing always argues weakneſs and imperfection: when a man truely deſires any thing, he would effect it if he were able: therefore it muſt argue great impotency in God, ſeriouſly to deſire the Salvation of men, and not to be able to effect it, yea, to effect it by juſt means: If he ſeriouſly deſires the Salvation of thoſe who are never ſaved, it follows neceſſarily that his will is not omnipotent and irreſiſtable.

This doctrine of a conditional decree cannot agree with the certainty of Gods Decrees. Argument. 6 How can that be certain which hath no certain ground or foundation? They make the Decrees of God to be grounded upon his foreknowledge: and his foreknowledge to be grounded not upon any thing which himſelf determined to do, but upon the mutable motion of mans will, and the uncertain expectation of what he will do: who hath power to fruſtrate the moſt powerfull influence that God ſhall put forth in the converſion of a ſinner, although he ſhall work as powerfully as he did in the converſion of Paul, (as Mr. J. G. teacheth.)

2. This conditional decree hath no certain object, therefore it cannot be certain: It hath not certain ſalvation, nor certain damnation, for it is equally and indifferently diſpoſed to either of theſe: It cannot have both theſe for the certain object, for they being contrary, cannot conſiſt together.

This conditional Decree agrees not with the Apoſtles Doctrine, Argument. 7 Rom. 9.11, 12, 13. For,

1. He tells us that Jacob was loved, and Eſau was hated, and that before they were born, or had done good or evil: but this conditional Decree takes away all difference betwixt love and hatred, before men are born, before they have done good or evil, for it makes love to depend upon their doing of good, and hatred to depend upon p. 9their doing of evil, and that not in regard of the effects onelyonly of love or hatred, but in regard of Gods Purpoſe and Decree. It takes away all difference betwixt Election and Reprobation: For according to this Doctrine Eſau ſhall be loved and elected, upon condition he will believe, and Jacob ſhall be hated and rejected, if he refuſeth to do this.

2. The Apoſtle ſaith of theſe, that they were loved and hated before they were born; but by this Doctrine no man is loved or hated till he be ready to die, till he hath perſevered in Faith or Unbelief, till the very act of his Diſſolution.

Object. The Love which the Apoſtle here ſpeaks of is underſtood of temporal Priviledges, and Hatred of the contrary.

Anſw. Not of temporal Priviledges onelyonly; For, 1 The earthly Canaan was a Type of the Heavenly Canaan, as Jeruſalem was a Type of the Celeſtial Jeruſalem: as not onelyonly Calvin, Beza, Zanchy, and others affirm, but alſo Bellarmine himſelf acknowledgeth; and Jacob was a Type of the elected Iſrael, as Eſau was a Type of the rejected part, called therefore profane Eſau, who paſſed away all his right and hope of Heaven for ſomething wherewith to fill his belly for the preſent.

2. The Love and Hatred here mentioned by the Apoſtle are the ſame with Election and Rejection: for the Apoſtle makes this the ground, why one was loved and the other hated before they had done either good or evil; namely, That the purpoſe of God according to Election (according to which Jacob was elected) might remain, and that it might appear, that this was not of works, but by him that calleth, Rom. 9.11.

And this holds as well in the hatred of Eſau, as in the love of Jacob; he was hated before he was born, that the purpoſe of God according to rejection might remain: Contra Donat. lib. 1. cap. 16.To this purpoſe Auſtin makes Eſau, together with Cain and Judas, to belong to the Malignant Church.

p. 10Object. Though Jacob and Eſau had not actually dont good or evil, yet they had done it in Gods foreſight, according to which God might love the one, and hate the other.

Anſw. This ſtill croſſeth the Apoſtles Scope, which is to ſhew that the firſt ground of putting a difference betwixt theſe two, in loving the one, and hating the other, was not in themſelves but in God: not of works (ſaith he) but of him that calleth, that the purpoſe of God according to Election (and ſo alſo his purpoſe according to Rejection) might remain firm: For if this difference ſhould ariſe from foreſeen works, yet it ſhould be of works, which the Apoſtle here wholly rejecteth: not of works (ſaith he.) Many who renounce foreſeen works as the ground of Election, yet make Original ſin the ground of Reprobation: but the Apoſtle here excludes both alike, namely all foreſeen works from the hating of Eſau, as from the loving of Jacob: before they had done either good or evil (ſaith he) ſpeaking of both of them alike.

Learned D. Whitaker brings this as an Argument to prove that Original ſin is not the cauſe of Reprobation: Cauſa illius odii quo Deus Eſavum proſequutus eſt nondum natum, Cygna cantio pag. 7.non fuit peccatum originale, quia tum aequaliter odiſſet Jacobum: quare ſi quaeras cur Eſau non invenerit nec acceperit miſericordiam, oportet cauſam aliquam aſsignari quae non conveniat Jacobo: The cauſe (ſaith he) of that hatred, wherewith God hated Eſau before he was born, was not Original ſin, for then he ſhould have alike hated Jacob: wherefore, if you ask why Eſau neither found nor received mercy, ſome cauſe muſt be aſsigned which agrees not to Jacob. Now if ſome other cauſe muſt be aſsigned (for the ſame cauſe brings forth the ſame effect) what can this be, but the good will and pleaſure of God, who hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens?

2. This conditional Decree croſſeth the Apoſtles Doctrine, becauſe it makes the difference betwixt veſſels of honor and diſhonor to ariſe from the diſpoſition of the p. 11matter, whereas the Apoſtle makes it to ariſe from the will of the Potter: Hath not (ſaith he) the Potter power to make of the ſame lump one veſſel to honor, and another to diſhonor? Rom. 9.21. Unbelievers and believers are not the ſame lump, but theſe are a better qualified and more refined lump then the other; but the Apoſtle makes both ſorts of veſſels to be made of the very ſame lump.

3. There had been no ground at all of quarrelling at the Will of God, or ſaying, Who hath reſiſted his Will, if his Will had not been the cauſe of difference betwixt one and another. And the Apoſtle might eaſily have anſwered (Yea for vindicating the Juſtice of God, he was bound to have done it) that God did earneſtly will and deſire their ſalvation, but they reſiſted his will: Yet he goes not this way to work, but anſwers them by checking their malepert and audacious inſolence, that dare enter into conteſt with their Creator; What art thou, &c.

4. This Doctrine is eaſie and obvious to every mans apprehenſion that hath any uſe of his rational faculty; namely, That it is juſt with God to decree that mans damnation, who willingly rejects Chriſt and ſalvation when they are offered unto him, and God ſeriouſly deſires that he might be ſaved; and therefore the Apoſtle needed not to have cryed out foreign, O the depth of the wiſdom and knowledge of God, his judgements are unſearchable, and his ways paſt finding out: Rom. 11.33. this being the great abyſs and hidden depth of the Apoſtles Doctrine namely, How God ſhould hate any man before he was born, or had done either good or evil. To this purpoſe Auſtin ſaith truly, Eos evacuare verba Apoſtoli, Ad Bon…ifa. l. 2 c. 7.qui judicium divinae diſcretionis ad opera reducunt aut praeviſa aut praeterita. That they make the Apoſtle ſpeak to no purpoſe, who reduce the judgement or cauſe of Divine difference of one from another, unto Works, whether foreſeen or already done. Argument 8

This conditional Decree cannot ſtand with the abſolute liberty and independency of the Will of God: For whereas p. 12he ſaith, I will do this becauſe I will, Rom. 9.15. this makes him to will, becauſe the creature wills; and confines the liberty and freedom of his Will, to the motions of mans will: ſo that he cannot abſolutely and poſitively determin and will mans ſalvation, till man hath firſt willed it himſelf, by being willing to believe, and to perſevere in doing ſo. Pet. Mart. loc. commun. loc. de praed. ſect. 24.According to this opinion, as Peter Martyr ſaith well, Deus non operaretur juxta ſuam voluntatem, ſed juxta alienam. God ſhould not act or work according to his own will, but according to the will of others.

Yea this impoſeth a neceſſity upon the will of. God, which is the fountain of all freedom: for it makes his will and decree to be grounded upon his foreknowledge, and his foreknowledge to be grounded upon mans actions and motions: So that if he foreſees man to perſevere in believing, he muſt of neceſſity determine his ſalvation; and that not becauſe it is his good will and pleaſure to ſave him, and in order thereto to work faith in him, but becauſe he foreſees him to perſevere in believing; and if he foreſees him to do otherwiſe, he muſt of neceſſity decree his deſtruction, and can do no otherwiſe: He cannot have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and harden whom he will, till mans will hath made way for him. The Aſſertors therefore of this Doctrine, while they are ſollicitous about maintaining the Liberty of Mans Will, and tender of the leaſt touch that may tend to the contrary, they minde not that they bereave God of the Liberty of his Will, and do as it were caſt fetters upon it; ſo that he can move no otherwiſe in point of mans ſalvation, then man ſhall give him leave.

This conditional decree cannot ſtand with the infinite and moſt perfect Wiſdom of God. Argument. 9 For,

1. It makes him to fetch the Idea, the model and plot, according to which he will frame his greateſt works, and thoſe actions that tend to his greateſt glory, not from himſelf and his own infinite underſtanding, his own wiſdom and skill, but from the actions and motions of the p. 13creature. The more skilful and perfect any Artificer is, the leſs he will borrow from the models and plots of others, in any curious work he is to make, but fetch all from his own ingeny and invention: But this Doctrine makes the moſt wiſe and perfect God to ſtand as it were in ſuſpence, and unreſolved what to do touching mans eternal ſalvation or damnation, till he hath ſeen what man himſelf will do.

2. Pet. Mart. loco de praedeſt. pag. 35.No wiſe man will earneſtly deſire the doing of that which he knows certainly will never be done; yea can never be done unleſs he affords that help for doing it, which at the ſame time he is reſolved not to yield, though he be able to do it, and might juſtly do it. Eſtne ſapientis hominis, Deś ne dicam, ea decernere & velle quae caſſa ſunt? (ſaith Peter Martyr) Is it the part of a wiſe man, much leſs of the wiſe God, to determine and will, and deſire thoſe things that ſhall never be, ſhall never take effect? If God wills the ſalvation of all men upon condition they will believe, and knows certainly at the ſame time, that they neither will nor can believe unleſs he works faith in them, (which is his gift) and yet never wills to beſtow this gift upon them, how can this ſtand with his wiſdom? God is able to work faith in all men as well as he doth in ſome, and that without any impeachment of his Juſtice: and if he would have all men to be ſaved, how comes it then to paſs that there are ſo few true believers, ſince none can be ſaved but by believing?

3. What wiſe man will earneſtly deſire and will the end, and not will the means that tend to it, when he is able to will and to work both? Quomodo ſapientiae Dei conveniat (ſaith Spanheim) ſcire diſpoſitionem neceſſariam ad ſalutem (fidem ſcil.) in nullo reperiri, nec reperiri poſſe, ſine ſuo dono, nolle verò id plurimis dare, & tamen decernere omnes homines ad ſalutem, ſi iſta diſpoſitio in iis reperiatur? How can it ſtand with the wiſdom of God to know, that the diſpoſition which is neceſſary to ſalvation (namely Faith) is found in no man, nor can be found p. 14without his gift, and that he will not give this to very many, and yet decrees the ſalvation of all, if this diſpoſition be found in them?

How many thouſands have lived and died in the world without enjoying any means of faith and ſalvation! How ſhall they believe on him, of whom they have not heard? (ſaith the Apoſtle, Rom. 10.14.) Are there not many thouſands of the Savages, both in the Eaſt and Weſt Indies, in this age (eſpecially in former ages) who never heard any thing of Chriſt or ſalvation? Are there not many Infants of Heathens, that die before they are capable of knowing any thing that belongs to their ſalvation? and can we think that God earneſtly deſires the ſalvation of all theſe to whom he denies all means of bringing them to ſalvation, and to ſome of them, all poſſibility of receiving benefit by the means, had they enjoyed them? Beſides, are there not many to whom God vouchſafes the outward means, and yet denies them the inward work and operation of his Spirit, without which he knows that the outward means will be ineffectual? and can he be ſaid earneſtly to deſire the ſalvation of thoſe to whom he denies ſaving grace, that great grace of Regeneration, without which it is not poſſible for any man to enter into his heavenly kingdom? Were it not a ridiculous thing for a King earneſtly to deſire to beſtow a rich reward upon a blinde man, upon condition he would read on a book; or a lame man, upon condition that he would run ſo many miles; or a dead man, upon condition that he would live, that he would ariſe and work? And is it not as ridiculous to ſay that God earneſtly deſires the ſalvation of ſuch as are in the ſtate of corruption, dead in ſins and treſpaſſes, upon condition that they will repent and believe; it being as impoſſible for unregenerate men to do theſe things, as for a blinde man to ſee, or a lame man to walk, to a dead man to work. Our Saviour ſaith, that no man can come to him unleſs the Father draw him, John 6.44. To come to Chriſt is to believe, Pſal. 35. and no man not p. 15onelyonly doth this, but no man can do this, unleſs the Father draw him by the inward and effectual working of his Spirit: how then can he be ſaid earneſtly to deſire the ſalvation of thoſe whom he will never draw in this ſort?

Object. Againſt this Mr. P. objects, Divine Philant. cap 4 Page 31.That when our Saviour ſaith no man can come to him, it doth not ſignifie that it was impoſſible for them to believe, but onelyonly that they did not believe, as when he ſaith that the Son can do nothing of himſelf, John 5.19. it is no more then if he ſaid he did nothing of himſelf, for God gives ſufficient grace to every man in the world to believe if he will.

Anſw. Is this ſufficient grace ſuch a grace whereby a man is regenerate and made a new creature, whereby he is born again and hath a new life infuſed into him? if not, how can a dead man perform the actions of life? how can one that lies dead in ſins and treſpaſſes perform a principal action belonging to Spiritual Life, namely, come to Chriſt by true believing? The Apoſtle makes this believing to be an effect of that mighty power which wrought in Chriſt when God raiſed him from the dead, Eph. 1.19, 20. and therefore for the performing of this there needs not onelyonly ſufficient but effectual grace, ſuch a grace as is wrought not onelyonly by moral ſwaſion, but by the mighty operation of God, Col. 2.12.

This Doctrine of the conditional Decree derogates from the excellency and efficacy of Free Grace, Argument 10 which is the firſt fountain of all that good that is derived to man: For whereas the Scripture makes God and his Free Grace to be the firſt ground of making difference and ſeparation of one man from another, Who hath ſeparated thee (ſaith the Apoſtle,) and what haſt thou that thou haſt not received? 1 Cor. 4.7. this attributes it to man himſelf and his Freewill; for till man himſelf by the right motion of his will in believing and repenting, hath fulfilled the condition, and ſo made the ſeparation, there is no difference, no not ſo much as in the minde and purpoſe of God, betwixt one man and another, but he ſtands equally affected to the ſalvation p. 16of all men alike, and when there comes to be a difference, a man may ſay that it was made by the motion of his own will, he willingly receiving that which another wilfully rejected, when the other (by vertue of his ſufficient grace) had power to receive what was offered as well as he: And though the Apoſtle in the former verſes had ſpoken of Miniſterial gifts, yet in this ſeventh verſe he ſpeaks generally of all ſorts of gifts, and the Argument holds ſtrongly from the leſſer to the greater; for if in common gifts, if in miniſterial gifts, it be God that makes the difference betwixt one man and another, much more it is ſo in ſpecial graces that tend to eternal ſalvation.

This Doctrine doth faſten ſuch a foreknowledge on God as cannot agree to him: Argument 11 ſuch a knowledge as hath no foundation, no certain object; for before God created the world, there was nothing without himſelf that could be the object of his knowledge, and this doctrine denies that the object of it was within himſelf, for it excludes Adams fall, and all other ſinful actions from being within the compaſs of his will and decree, and ſo from being any way within himſelf; whence then ſhall the knowledge of theſe things ariſe when they have no being at all, neither within him nor without him? ſo that the object of his knowledge muſt be a meer non-entity, a meer nothing; and whereas his knowledge being a moſt perfect knowledge muſt have a moſt perfect ground and foundation whence it ariſeth (namely his own bleſſed ſelf, and his moſt holy will and decree) by this means a meer non-ens is made to be the object of his knowledge, and ſo in effect he is made to know nothing.

God knows himſelf with a moſt perfect knowledge, therefore he perfectly knows his own power, and this is the ground of his knowledge rerum poſſibilium, of things that poſſibly may be, he perfectly knows his own will; and this is the ground of his knowledge rerum futurarum, of things that certainly ſhall be. It is not Gods knowledge that gives a being to things, nor his power, but it is his p. 17will that cauſeth him to put forth his power for the producing of them: ſo that not the knowledge of what he is able to do, but of what he will do, is the ground of his foreknowledge of things. If the knowledge of his power did give being to things, then we ſhould have many worlds, for he knows that he is able to make many.

Beſides, the fore-knowledge whereby God knows things is a direct knowledge whereby he knows himſelf firſt, and all things in and by himſelf, and that uno intuitu, at one and the ſame inſtant: but the knowledge and fore-ſight which by this Doctrine is faſtened on him, is a kinde of reflex knowledge ſuch as is in us, whereby we look on things without us, and come to receive information from them, and to have a knowledge bred in us which was not before, whereby we come to know one thing after another, and ſo to have our knowledge daily increaſed; which in no ſort can agree to God who knows all things together and at once, and that in the moſt perfect maner from all eternity: ſo that when fore-knowledge is attributed to God, this is onelyonly reſpectu objectorum, becauſe one thing comes to paſs after another, not becauſe he knows one thing after another; for it is a moſt true rule, That Deo omnia praeſentia ſunt in ſua aeternitate, etiam praeterita & futura, as he is God from everlaſting to everlaſting, Pſal. 90. ſo he is an all-knowing God from everlaſting to everlaſting and that without any variation, his knowledge not really differing from himſelf.

Laſtly, Argument 12 If the glory of God by the merciful Salvation of ſome, and juſt Condemnation of others, be laſt in execution, then they were firſt in intention, and therefore before the foreſight of ſin. This is an Argument often urged by Dr. Twiſs, to ſhew the incongruity of the Conditional Decree, whereby the foreſight of ſomething done in time, is put before that which was before all time, namely, Gods everlaſting Decree. C…p. 3. Page …7.This indeed Mr. P vilifies, as that which raw Sophiſters in the Schools would be aſhamed of, and with much confidence tells us he will p. 18demonſtrate this Rule to be falſe, when ever it ſhall be required of him. To which we may anſwer with as much confidence, Let him do it if he can. Let him demonſtrate if he can that this old Maxim in Logick (Quod primum eſt in intentione, ultimum eſt in executione) is falſe, if rightly underſtood; if underſtood as Dr. Twiſs underſtands and applies it, namely, De finibus ultimis non intermediis, as it is taken in this Argument. That Doctors known skill in arguing, deſerved a more modeſt cenſure at his hands. As for the Inſtance he brings to diſprove this Maxim, we ſhall not wrong it to ſay it is ridiculous; For (ſaith he) he that firſt intends to take ſhip at Dover, and after ſayl into France, muſt by this Argument firſt ſayl into France, and afterwards take ſhip at Dover: Cujus contrarium verum eſt; for is not the journey into France the firſt thing here intended, and in order to that to take ſhip at Dover? If Mr. P. hath no ſtronger demonſtrations then theſe, they will not much daunt his Oppoſites; but over-much confidence may ſometimes dazle the eyes of thoſe who are quickeſt ſighted.

But to adde a little more ſtrength to this Argument, Mr. P. doth not deny that God doth permit ſin; if he doth permit ſin to be, he doth not permit it againſt his will; and if he wills to permit it, what reaſon can be brought why he ſhould will to permit it, but that hereby he might make way for the manifeſtation of the glory of his mercy in the merciful Salvation of ſome, and of his juſtice in the juſt Damnation of others (neither of which could have been done if ſin had never been) therefore both theſe muſt needs be determined before the permiſsion of ſin, without which there could be no foreſight of it; for how was it poſsible for God to foreſee that ſin ſhould be, before he willed to permit that ſin might be?

Thus we have done with confirmation of the poſitive Truth; it follows now that we endeavour to give ſome ſatisfaction to thoſe difficulties that are objected againſt it.

p. 19Anſwers to ſuch Objections as are brought againſt Gods Abſolute Decree.

BEfore we come to give anſwer to the particular Objections, theſe things may be propounded in general in way of Anſwer.

1. It is very agreeable to right reaſon, that God being a moſt free, abſolute and omnipotent Agent, he might deſign the creatures that were of his own making to what ends himſelf pleaſed, without giving account to any. Why doſt thou ſtrive againſt him, for he doth not give account of his matters? Job 33.15. It was in his power and his own choice, whether he would make them or not make them, and when he did make them, he made them for his own glory, Prov. 16.4. therefore he might appoint them to ſuch ends as ſhould make moſt for his glory.

2. That which the Scripture plainly, clearly and poſitively aſſerteth that God doth, we ought not to deny that he doth it, though we cannot diſcern the maner how he doth it. It rather beſeems us humbly to acknowledge our ignorance in apprehending the maner of his working, then to deny any of his works, then to deny that he worketh all things according to the good pleaſure of his will, or to deny that a ſparrow falls not to the ground, or an hair from our head without the will of the Father, or that he worketh moſt determinately, certainly and infallibly in the various and mutable motions of mans will: yea, moſt holily, juſtly and righteouſly in thoſe very actions, wherein man works moſt perverſly, unjuſtly and unrighteouſly, how elſe can it be ſaid when Joſephs brethren ſold him into Egypt out of envy, that God ſent a man before? &c. and vvhen David numbred the people, it is ſaid not onelyonly that Satan ſtood againſt Iſrael, and provoked David to number the people, 1 Chr. 21.1. but that the Lord moved David againſt them, in that he ſaid, Go number Iſrael, 2 Sam. 24.1. p. 20Miro & ineffabili modo, Euchirid. ad Laurent. cap. 100.id non fit praeter voluntatem Dei, quod fit contra voluntatem ejus (ſaith Auſtin.)

3. The ſum of what Mr. P. or any of his predeceſſors in this Controverſie about Gods abſolute Decree hath objected againſt it, is included in that which the Apoſtle objects againſt himſelf, ſpeaking of this ſubject, Rom. 9.14. Is God unjuſt? and who hath reſiſted his will? Which he anſwers with an Abſit, and, Quis tu es? God forbid that there ſhould be any unrighteouſneſs in him, and, Who art thou, O man, that pleadeſt with God? vouchſafing no other anſwer but this, whereby he gives a ſharp check to the malepert boldneſs and audacious inſolence of thoſe that ſhall dare thus to quarrel with their Creator, as if the ſheard ſhould ſtrive with the Potter: And if we ſhould give no other anſwer but this (having the great Apoſtle for our example) it might ſuffice. But for further ſatisfaction, we ſhall endeavor to give a particular anſwer to the particular objections, that it may appear we deſire not to decline any thing that carries with it any weight of truth.

Object. 1. The firſt and principal Objection againſt the Doctrine of the abſolute Decree, is, That it makes God is be the Author of ſin: For if in the firſt place he decrees to glorifie his Juſtice in the juſt condemnation of ſome men (which is the decree of Reprobation) then it follows, that in order to this, he muſt decree the permiſſiin of ſin, without which there can be no juſt condemnation; and if he decrees the being of ſin, then he is the author of it.

Anſw. For anſwer, It cannot be denied that God doth permit ſin: for if he did not permit it, he could eaſily hinder it; ſo that without his permiſſion, ſin could not be.

2. If he doth permit it, he hath decreed to permit it; for he works by counſel, and what he doth in time, he hath determined before all time: And the Scripture is plain, that God decrees thoſe actions, which when men do, they do very ſinfully. What worſe action then the p. 21crucifying of Chriſt? yet it is ſaid, he was delivered by the determinate counſel and foreknowledge of God, Acts 2.23. here is not onelyonly knowledge, but a determination of the thing to be done. And it is ſaid, That Herod, Pilat and the Jews, did that to Chriſt when they crucified him, which the hand of God and his Counſel had determined before to be done, cap. 4.27, 28. Beſides, if God doth permit ſin, he doth willingly permit it; otherwiſe it ſhould come to paſs whether he will or not, Enchirid. cap. 95.and ſo he ſhould not be omnipotent. Nihil fit (ſaith Auſtin) niſi quod omnipotens fieri velit, vel ipſe faciendo, vel ab aliis fieri permittendo.

2. But though God hath decreed that ſin ſhall be, and therefore hath decreed to permit it, without which it could not be; yet it doth not follow that he is the Author of it.

Object. But if he hath willed and decreed it, Ad amitam collat. Vorſt ſ…ct. 17.his decree is an energetical operative decree, therefore he hath ſome hand in working and effecting of it, as Calvin, Piſcator and others teach, who are for the abſolute decree. Negari non poteſt, illum aliquo modo procurare negotium, cujus conſilio & decreto negotium geritur, ſaith Piſcator. And if his decree be operative, ſo as he hath any hand at all in the working of it, then he muſt needs be the Author of it.

Anſw. For anſwer of this, Two things are to be cleared: 1. That Gods permiſſion is not ſuch a bare permiſſion as is without all action and operation.

2. That though his permiſſion be accompanied with ſome kinde of operation, yet he is no author of evil.

That Gods permiſſion of ſin is accompanied with ſome kinde of operation, appears, Argument 1 Becauſe when he permits ſin, he doth volens permittere, he doth willingly permit it, elſe it ſhould be againſt his will; Auguſt in Enchirid. ad Laurent. cap. 100.which cannot be (as was ſhewed) If he doth willingly permit it, then there is ſome act of his will about it: Deus permittit (ſaith Auſtin) aut volens, aut nolens & in vitus; non certè invitus, quia id eſſet cum triſtitia, & potentia ſe majorem haberet; p. 22ſi voleus permittit, eſt genus quoddam voluntatis. Here Auſtin grants that God hath ſome kinde of will in the permiſſion of ſin, if any kinde of will, this muſt needs be a perfect will, for no imperfect will agrees to God, who is perfection it ſelf: And how can he be ſaid to will any thing without any act of his will?

Scripture-expreſſions do conſtantly hold forth Gods maner of working in ſin, Argument 2 by way of action: It doth not ſay that God ſuffered Joſephs brethren to ſell him into Egypt, but that God ſent him. It was not you that ſent me hither, but God. Gen. 45.8. It doth not ſay that God ſuffered Pharaoh to harden his own heart, but that God hardned it, Exod. 9.12. That he ſuffered the Canaanites to harden their hearts againſt Iſrael; but it was of the Lord that they ſhould harden their hearts againſt them, that he might deſtroy them. Joſh. 11.20. That he ſuffered Abſolom to defile his fathers concubines; but he tells David, What thou haſt done in ſecret, I will do in the ſight of this Sun, 2 Sam. 12.12. So it is ſaid, that God bade Shimei curſe David. That he bade the evil ſpirit go and deceive Ahab, 1 King. 29.22. Go forth and do ſo. Job ſaith that God had taken away his cattel, when the Caldeans and Sabeans took them away. Job. 1. The Prophet complains that the Lord had hardned their hearts againſt his fear, Iſa. 63.13. It is ſaid, that the Lord turned the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people, Pſal. 105.35. That when the falſe Prophet was deceived, he had deceived them. Ezek. 14.9. That he gave up the Gentiles to vile luſts. Rom. 1.26. That he ſmote the Jews with the ſpirit of ſlumber, that they ſhould not ſee with their eyes, nor hear with their ears. Rom. 11.8, 9. That he would ſend to thoſe that loved not the truth, ſtrong deluſions, that they ſhould believe lies. 2 Theſ. 2.10, 11. That God put into the hearts of the ten Kings, to give their power to the beaſt. Rev. 17.17. and many other like places there are that ſpeak in the ſame kinde of language. Now can we think that when the Scripture doth in ſo many places, and ſo conſtantly ſet forth the maner of Gods working in ſin, …y ſuch expreſſions p. 23as denote action, and very ſeldom (if at all) as ſignifie a bare permiſſion onelyonly; as that in the ſelling of Joſeph into Egypt, in Pharaohs refuſing to let the people go, and the reſt before named; God ſhould exerciſe a bare permiſsion onelyonly, without any action, that he ſhould ſit ſtill as a Spectator without doing any thing at all.

Object. To theſe places Mr. P. anſwereth, Cap. 4. pag. 48.That by a common Hebraiſm, verbs active in ſound, are onelyonly permiſſive in ſignification.

Anſw. This indeed he dictates, but he doth not demonſtrate, nor bring the leaſt patch of an Argument to prove it, neither will all his skill in the Hebrew, enable him to do it; and may he not by this ſhift evade the cleareſt and ſtrongeſt Scriptures that are brought againſt him, by telling us that they ſignifie quite another thing then the nature of the words do import, if we will believe him?

2. Why may we not then interpret other Scriptures in the like maner, where the like expreſſions are uſed; as when the Lord ſaith, I form the light, and create darkneſs, I make peace, and create evil. Iſa. 45.7. I have made the earth, and created man upon it, my hands ſpread out the heavens. Pſal. 12. Why may we not by Mr. P. his Hebraiſms, interpret theſe verbs that are active in ſound, to be permiſsive onelyonly in ſignification, and ſay that God hath permitted light and darkneſs to be created, and ſuffered the earth to be made, and the heavens to be ſpread out?

Object. But he further objects, That theſe expreſſions cannot be properly taken, therefore they do not denote any action but onelyonly permiſſion.

Anſw. Though they cannot be ſo properly taken, as to ſignifie that God worketh in the ſame maner in evil actions, as he doth in good, or as evil men themſelves do, yet neither ſo improperly as to ſignifie a bare permiſſion without any action at all, and though we be not able to apprehend his ſecret and wonderful maner of working in p. 24evil actions; yet neither are we to deny that he hath any work at all in them, ſince himſelf doth ſo often and ſo expreſly affirm it; though he doth it miro & ineffabili modo (as Auſtin ſpeaks) yet we are not to deny the doing of it. And by thoſe former Scriptures mentioned, it may appear what little reaſon Mr. P. had to make ſuch a clamor againſt thoſe our Proteſtant Divines (ſome of which God uſed as principal inſtruments in advancing that glorious work of Reformation) as if they made God to be the Author of ſin; when he knows that they poſitively profeſſed, and ſome of them ſtrongly proved the contrary; and what expreſsions they uſed in this ſubject, were but the ſame in effect with Scripture expreſsions, yea not altogether ſo high: Yet he labors, magno conatu, to maintain this charge againſt them, herein complying with the Papiſts; ſo that Bellarmine himſelf is not more eager and induſtrious in carrying on this charge againſt Calvin and Zuinglius, then he is in carrying it on, both againſt theſe and many others, arraigning no leſs then twelve of them as guilty of the great ſin of Blaſphemy, by making God the Author of ſin, when they ſpeak but the very ſame things for ſubſtance which the Scripture ſpeaks about it; as if it were his drift and deſign to make them and their doctrine odious.

That God hath ſome hand in the acts of ſinful men, appears, Argument 3 becauſe the Subſtratum or ſubject of ſin, namely, the natural motion or action whereto ſin cleaves, is that whereof he is the proper cauſe and efficient: therefore he muſt needs have ſome efficiency in it.

Object. Againſt this Mr. P. objects, That it is as impoſſible to ſeparate the wickedneſs of the act, from the act which is wicked, as to ſeparate roundneſs from the Globe, and to ſeparate ſinfulneſs from the ſin, Cap 4. pag. 48.as from the ſinful act.

Anſw. God is little beholding to him for ſo denying him to be the Author of the evil that cleaves to the actions of nature, as withall, to deny him to be the Author p. 25of Nature, for maintaining his Purity, by denying his Omnipotency.

2. Doth not the Scripture tell us expreſly, that in him we live, move and have our being? Acts 17.25. As he is the Author of our being, ſo alſo of all thoſe natural motions and actions that ariſe from our being; as we cannot live without him, ſo we cannot move without him. As we cannot move our hand or foot, ſo not our heart or tongue without him. Omnes cauſae ſecundae ſicut dependent à Deo in eſſe, it a dependent ab eo in operari.

3. Was not Natures work the ſame in Adam, when he ate the forbidden fruit as when he did his neceſſary food, and in David (which is his own inſtance) when he lay with Bathſheba, as when he lay with his lawful wife? in an Executioner when he murders a man out of malice, as when he kills a man by the command of the Magiſtrate? It is a true Rule, That Deus agit iu peccato, non tanquam cauſa moralis, ſed tanquam cauſa naturalis.

4. Every new action and motion is a new entity, now all entities and beings are from the firſt being, and ſo far forth they are good. De Vera Relig. c. 4.Ipſum quantulumcunque eſſe bonum eſt (ſaith Auſtin) quiaſummum eſſe eſt ſummum bonum: the ſmalleſt being of all is good, becauſe the chiefeſt or greateſt being is the greateſt good. If M. P. will have any natural act (quà actus) not to proceed from the God of Nature, he will have a creature without a Creator.

5. Doth not Mr. P. by this Doctrine, juſtly contract on himſelf that guilt which he unjuſtly chargeth upon others, namely, of making God the Author of Sin? for if God be the Author of all natural actions (as hath been proved) and it be impoſſible (as he teacheth) to ſeparate the ſin from the action, then he that is the Author of the action, muſt needs be Author of the ſin alſo which is unſeparable from it. But I ſuppoſe he is not ſo dull-ſighted, but if he pleaſed he could eaſily diſcern a difference between the action and the evil quality of it. The roundneſs may be ſeparated from the Globe, and yet the matter of it remain p. 26ſtill when it is put into another form. There are multitudes of actions wherein Natures work is the very ſame, whereof though ſome of them be evil, yet others of them may be without any evil at all.

So far as Sin makes for the glory of God, Argument 4 ſo far he may both will and work it; for if he neither intends it, nor hath any hand at all in effecting it, how ſhall it make for his glory? there muſt be a cauſe that brings forth this effect, the ſinner himſelf intends it not, nor works to any ſuch end, but rather the contrary: therefore it muſt be the ſecret wiſdom and wonderful working of God that brings forth this effect; and how can he intend to have glory by ſuch or ſuch an action, and never intend the action it ſelf?

If God onelyonly permits, Argument 5 but neither intends nor hath any hand at all in the ſinful actions of men, then he is a meer ſpectator and idle beholder of all the actions of men in the world when ever they do evil. For if a man ſtands and ſees a thing to be done, which he neither wills to be done, nor not to be done, but leaves it to others to do as they pleaſe, without having any hand at all in it, neither helping nor hindring, is he nor an idle ſpectator? and if God carries himſelf in this ſort in regard of the ſinful actions of men, what ſhall become of his providence whereby he ruleth the world, ſince the greateſt number of actions done in the world are ſinful actions?

Object. Mr. P. thinks to ſhift himſelf from this Argument by telling us, Cap. 3. Page 129.That God doth wiſely order and diſpoſe of ſin after the committing of it, but doth not determine that it ſhall be done, or hath any hand in the doing.

Anſw. But then ſtill it follows, that he ſtands as a meer ſpectator in regard of the greateſt part of actions that are done in the world; for all the while they are in acting he doth nothing at all about them, onelyonly afterwards he orders them to the beſt advantage. But how can this ſtand with the All-wiſe and All-working Providence of God (without which a ſparrow falls not to the ground) that he p. 27ſhould ſtand looking on whiles the greateſt part of actions are done in the world, and many of them of greateſt conſequence, and determine nor do any thing while they be done and paſt, onelyonly afterwards imploy his wiſdom in ordering of them? For (to inſtance in ſome of our former examples) how can we think that when Joſeph was ſold into Egypt, God had no hand in it, though his brethren did it out of envy and hatred againſt him, when he tells them that God ſent him before to preſerve them and their poſterity alive, and to ſave them by a great deliverance; yea in them the whole Church of God which was included in Jacobs family? yea why ſhould he repeat it again, ſaying, You ſent me not hither, but God ſent me, Gen. 45.7, 12. if God had not any hand at all in his ſending thither, yea, if he had not the chief hand? How can we think that God had no hand in Pharaohs oppreſſion of the Iſraelites, when he had determined it, and foretold it many years before, Gen. 15.13, 16. or that he had no hand in his obſtinate refuſal to let them go (having received an expreſs command from God to do it) when it is ſaid that the Lord hardned Pharaohs heart that he would not let them go, Exodus 10.27. yea, that he raiſed him up for this purpoſe, that he might ſhew his power upon him? cap. 9.16. How can we think that the defection of the ten Tribes from the Houſe of David (which is called Rebellion, 1 Kings 12.19.) was ſuch a thing as God had no hand in, when as he told J… roboam by his prophet that he would rent the kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and give ten Tribes of it to him? cap. 11.31. Can we think that God had no hand in the deſtruction of Samaria, and carrying away the ten Tribes by the king of Aſſyria, when he calls the Aſſyrian his rod, and the ſtaff of his indignation, and that he would ſend him againſt an hypocritical nation, againſt the people of his wrath, and would give him a charge to take the ſpoil and prey; howbeit he did not mean ſo, neither did he think ſo (namely to do Gods work, but his own) but he thought to deſtroy and cut off nations not a few? Iſa. 10.6, 7. Can we think that p. 28all the ſtrange changes and alterations that have been in Kingdoms and States, whereby the Government and Dominion hath been devolved from one hand to another (which ſeldom hath been done without much violence and wrong, yea without Treacheries, Murthers and Bloodſhed) were ſuch things wherein God had no hand, when it is ſaid that he doth theſe things, to the intent that men may know that the moſt High hath power over the Kingdoms of men, and giveth them to whom he will, Dan. 4.14. Can we think that the ſtrange commotions and ſhakings that of late have been amongſt our ſelves, whereby the whole frame of Government, both in Church and State, is changed from what it was, are ſuch things as God hath had no hand in? Certainly this were to make God a very weak and impotent, or a very remiſs and careleſs Governor of the World, if he ſhould ſtand ſtill looking on while theſe things were in doing, and onelyonly exerciſe his wiſdom, in ordering them afterwards.

Object. But it is further objected, That God hates all ſin, and therefore can have no hand at all, either in willing or effecting of it: for no man will have any hand in doing what he hates.

Anſw. Though he hates it, yet he permits it; (as is granted by all) and why doth he permit it, but becauſe he can get himſelf glory by it? and ſo far as it makes for his glory, he may both will it, and have ſome kinde of hand in working it: Though ſin be in it ſelf evil, yet it may have ſome reſpect of good, becauſe it may be made an occaſion of good. For the rule is true, Malum eſt in bono tanquam in ſubjecto, Enchirid. cap. 96.and actus peccati in genere entis bonus eſt, in genere moris malus. Hence Auſtin ſaith, that Quamvis quae mala ſunt, in quantum mala ſunt, non ſunt bona, tamen ut non ſolum bona, ſed etiam mala ſint, bonum eſt. Although evil things be not good, ſo far as they are evil, yet it is good that not onelyonly good things ſhould be, but evil things alſo.

It is granted by all, Argument 6 that God puniſheth one ſin with p. 29another; as becauſe men received not the love of the truth, he gave them up to ſtrong deluſions, 2 Theſ. 2.10. Now puniſhment is more then a bare permiſſion: It were ridiculous to ſay, that a Judge onelyonly permitteth a Malefactor to be arraigned, condemned and executed.

Thus I hope we have cleared the firſt thing propounded, namely, That Gods permiſſion is not ſuch an empty idle permiſſion, as is accompanied with no action nor operation at all. It follows now to ſhew, that though it be an operative permiſsion, yet he is not the Author of the evil permitted and committed; but when be works in the ſame action with wicked men, what they do wickedly and unjuſtly, he doth moſt holily, juſtly and righteouſly.

That the truth of this may appear, it will be needful to look into the maner of Gods working in evil actions of men. This, though it be done in a wonderful and ineffable maner, yet ſo much may be diſcerned of it, as may ſerve to ſatisfie ſober mindes, and to clear God from all juſt imputation of any impurity or unholineſs.

This in general may be ſufficient to clear him from all ſuch imputations, becauſe all thoſe things that proceed from him, whence evil minded men take any occaſion to be ſtirred up to evil, do in their own nature tend to good, and are occaſions of evil onelyonly by accident, as the ſhining of the Sun may make weak eyes ſee worſe then before: So that he cannot be ſaid to be the Author of any evil, becauſe he is never cauſa per ſe, but onelyonly per accidens, of any evil that falls out upon occaſion of any thing that he doth. All his diſpenſations towards man, do always in their own nature tend to good, and the evil that doth occaſionally reſult from them is praeter ſcopum operis, beſides the ſcope of the work that he doth. When a Phyſitian preſcribes to his Patient wholſome Phyſick, and ſuch as is in it ſelf fit for cure of his malady, and moſt proper for his diſeaſe; if this meets with ſome malignant humor in his body, whereby it occaſions greater ſickneſs, yea the death of the Patient, the Phyſitian cannot be p. 30ſaid to be the author of his ſickneſs or death, becauſe what he adminiſtred was to preſerve health and life, and that it wrought another effect, was onelyonly by accident: So it is in this caſe betwixt God and ſinful men. The truth of this will more plainly appear, if we look into the particulars. There are two ways eſpecially, whereby God may be ſaid to adminiſter occaſion of ſinning, and ſo to have ſome kinde of hand in it, namely, by his word, and by his works.

1. For the word of God, wicked men may ſometime take occaſion from that, to become more ſinful. The Apoſtle ſhews expreſly, that the Law of God hath an efficacy in irritating and ſtirring the corruption of mans nature: For he ſaith, that ſin took occaſion by the command, and wrought in him all maner of concupiſcence, and ſin taking occaſion by the command, deceived him, Rom. 7.11. and that, when we were in the fleſh, the motions of ſin which were by the Law, did work in our members, Ver. 5. That the Law hath an efficacy in ſtirring up ſinful motions, and in working in us all maner of concupiſcence, is plain by theſe expreſsons of the Apoſtle.

Queſt. If it be asked, how the Law of God, that is holy, juſt and good, can be any occaſion of evil;

Anſw. The anſwer is, That it ariſeth from the contrariety that is betwixt Gods holy Law, and mans corrupt heart. It is a true rule, that contraria juxta ſe poſita mogis eluceſcunt: when contraries are put together, their contrariety doth more appear. When fire and water are kept at a diſtance, the contrariety of their natures doth not much appear; but put them together, and then they fight one with another, till the ſtronger hath overcome the weaker. There is nothing more holy then the Law of God, being the perfect rule of all righteouſneſs and holineſs; there is nothing more corrupt then the heart of man, being the ſeat and ſink of all ſilthineſs and pollution, Mat. 15.19. Therefore the more cloſe this holy Law of God be applyed to the corrupt heart of man, the p. 31more the innate corruption of it is irritated and ſtirred up. We ſee this in the example of Pharaoh, the more ſtrongly the command was preſſed upon him, touching letting the Iſraelites go, the more ſtrongly did his rebellious will riſe up againſt it: We may ſee this in the ordinary carriage of wicked men, let a proud profane ſwearer or filthy ſpeaker be rebuked for their ill language, the more they will exceed in this kinde: Look as when a ſtream is ſtopt, it riſeth higher, though no more water be added to it; ſo it is with thoſe who are wilfully wicked, when they are ſtopt in the courſe of their wickedneſs. Many other inſtances might be brought to make it appear, that the good word of God accidentally doth ſtir up the corruption that is in mens wicked hearts. When our Savior Chriſt preached to the Jews, the Phariſees were filled with wrath againſt him, Luke 4.28. When Stephen preached unto them, they gnaſhed their teeth againſt him, Acts 7.54. Chriſts Preaching and Stephens Preaching, had an efficiency in ſtirring up the anger and wrath of their hearers, they were accidental cauſes of it, but no faulty cauſes, they cannot be ſaid to be the Authors of their anger, though their Preaching occaſioned it. So it is when ever the good word of God doth ſtir up evil affections in the hearts of wicked men, neither he nor his word are the Authors of that evil.

The Apoſtle ſaith, that The Law worketh wrath, Rom. 4.15. It worketh wrath no otherwiſe then it worketh ſin, namely, by accident; for it was the end and ſcope of the Law, to keep men from ſinning, and ſo to keep them from wrath: now as the Law works it, God works it, for the Law is Gods inſtrument; and as the Law cannot be ſaid to be the Author of ſin (though it doth accidentally ſtir corruption) no more can God be ſaid to be the Author of it.

Yea, not onelyonly the Law, but the Goſpel may be an occaſion of increaſing mans ſin; for Chriſt tells the Jews, that if they had been blinde, they had had no ſin, but becauſe p. 32they ſaid they did ſee, therefore their ſin remained, John 9.41. and, This is the condemnation of the world, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkneſs more then light, John 3.19. So that the ſhining of the light of the Goſpel, may occaſion an increaſe both of men; ſin and condemnation, and yet be no faulty caſe of it: In this ſenſe alſo Chriſt ſaith of himſelf, that he came not to ſend peace, but the ſword; that he came to ſet a man at variacne againſt his father, and the daughter againſt the mother, Mat. 10.34, 35. that he came to ſet fire on the earth, Luke 12.49. Will Mr. P. tell us here, that Chriſt came onelyonly to ſuffer thoſe fiery perſecutions that were ſtirred up in the world by the Preaching of the Goſpel, or thoſe enmities that were ſtirred up betwixt neareſt relations, upon occaſion of it; or that Chriſt was the Author of theſe perſecutions and enmities, and of thoſe ſtirs and troubles that were raiſed up in the world, when he cauſed his Kingdom to be ſet up; or that the Apoſtles were the Authors of thoſe diviſions and tumults which were ſtirred up at Epheſus and other places, by occaſion of their Preaching, Acts 19.23. and that they were truly charged by their adverſaries, to be ſubverters of the ſtate of the world? Acts 17.6. yet upon the very like ground doth he charge many Orthodox Divines to make God to be the Author of ſin, becauſe they teach that he hath ſome kinde of efficiency in it, by adminiſtring occaſions, as the Preaching of the Apoſtles was the occaſion of theſe tumults, when as all the occaſions that he adminiſters tend to good, as the Apoſtles Preaching did.

2. God may be ſaid ſometimes to adminiſter occaſions of ſinning by his works: As 1. by his works of mercy, Becauſe ſentence againſt an evil work is not ſpeedily executed, therefore the hearts of the ſons of men are fully ſet to do evil, Eccleſ. 8.11. Theſe things thou haſt done and I was ſilent, and thou thoughteſt that I was ſuch an one as thy ſelf, Pſal. 50.21. When Jeſhurun waxed fat, he kicked the heel, Deut. 32.15. The bountifulneſs, goodneſs and long-ſuffering of God do p. 33in their own nature lead to repentance, yet here they are made occaſions of ſinning.

2. As the works of his mercy, ſo of his juſtice, are ſometimes made occaſions of ſinning. When God led his people through the wilderneſs, he ſuffered them ſometimes to want water, otherwhile to want fleſh for their food: and this was to humble them and prove them, that he might do them good in their latter end, Deut. 8.2. But the bad ones amongſt them hence took occaſion to murmure and to open their mouthes againſt God. When the Lord pours out the vials of his wrath upon the followers of the beaſt, hence they take occaſion to blaſpheme the God of heaven for their pains and ſores, and repented not of their works, Rev. 16.9, 11.

3. The works of Gods Providence are ſometimes alſo made occaſions of ſinning: it was the work of Gods power and providence that made the Iſraelites multiply ſo exceedingly in Egypt, which ſhould have made Pharaoh ſo much more to reſpect them, yet hence he takes occaſion to oppreſs them. It was a work of providence that brought David to Ahimelech the prieſt for relief in his flight, at ſuch a time as Doeg the Edomite was there: this might have ſtirred him up to ſuccour, at leaſt to pity David in his diſtreſs, but hence he took occaſion by his falſe ſlanders, to ſtir up Saul to murther all the Lords Prieſts at Nob, 1 Sam. 23.18. It was a work of providence that brought the wiſe men to Jeruſalem, to enquire after the king of the Jews that was then born, yet hence Herod takes occaſion to ſeek to kill Chriſt, and rather then fail, to kill all the male-children that were in Bethlehem, and in the region round about, that were two years old and under, Mat. 2.16.

Thus we ſee that God by the works both of his Mercy, Juſtice and Providence, may adminiſter occaſions of evil to evil minded men, now ſhall we ſay that he is therefore the Author of the evil which they do, when all theſe occaſions are ſuch things as do in their own nature tend to p. 34good, and by accident onelyonly are made occaſion of evil.

Queſt. But how is it poſsible that God and man ſhould work together in the ſame action, and the one be blame-worthy and the other blameleſs?

Anſw. Becauſe they differ both in the ground, maner, and end of their working. 1. They differ in the ground: the ground of Gods working is the counſel of his own will, Eph. 1.11. which is always moſt holy and juſt: the ground of wicked mens actions is the motion of their own wicked wills, they ſeek to fulfil the will of the fleſh and of their mindes, Eph. 2.3. in their evil actions they do that which is contrary to the revealed will of God (and his ſecret will they know not) if they do the ſame things that God wills, yet not becauſe he wills them, but upon ſome other grounds. When Joſephs brethren ſold him into Egypt, they did it out of envy againſt him, but God did it out of love to him and his father Jacob, and his whole family.

2. The differ in the maner of their working; for in ſinful actions God works with wicked men not as a moral cauſe, but a natural cauſe onelyonly: he doth no where command, counſel or perſwade men to do evil, but altogether the contrary; and when they do evil, they are carried on by the dictate of their depraved judgements, and ſway of their own corrupt wills and diſordered affections. God being the Author of Nature, it belongs to him to uphold the creature in all its natural motions and actions; and he moves the creatures with a motion agreeable to their ſeveral natures, both irrational and rational creatures. When he moves good men that are guided by his Spirit, they work according to their natures, when he moves bad men, they alſo work according to their natures, and this without any iniquity or injuſtice in God; for of the natural motion he is the Author and proper Cauſe, of the obliquity of it, he is onelyonly an accidental cauſe, and therefore not the Author.

3. They differ in the end; for the end of all Gods actions p. 35is himſelf and his own glory, Prov. 16.4. but wicked men aim at themſelves, at their own glory, or ſome other baſe reſpect of their own. Is not this great Babel which I have built for the honor of my Majeſty? (ſaith that proud King, Dun. 4.27.) When the High Prieſts and Elders delivered up Chriſt to be crucified, they did it out of envy and hatred againſt him, to the end they might be rid of him; but God did it out of love, that by this means all his elect might come to be ſaved out of their loſt condition.

Object. 2. A ſecond principal Objection brought againſt Gods abſolute Decree, is, That it infers a neceſſity of ſinning, and ſo frees man from all blame in all his ſinful actions, becauſe what God hath decreed muſt neceſſarily come to paſs. This Mr. P. often urgeth, Cap. 1. pag. 13.touching at it almoſt in every other page, and making us to ſay that men ſhall ſin of neceſſity, do what they can to the contrary.

Anſw. 1. If Mr. P. had pleaſed to ſtoop ſo low as to take notice of that diſtinction uſually given by our Divines betwixt neceſſitas abſoluta & hypothetica, or (which is the ſame) neceſſitas conſequentis vel cauſae, & neceſsitas conſequentiae, he might have been convinced of the weakneſs of this Objection, and of the falſeneſs of that imputation which thereby he ſeeks to faſten on us.

2. It hath been already proved to him, that Gods Decree doth no whit infringe the liberty of mans will, or take away the contingency of the ſecond cauſes; to which he hath given no anſwer.

3. If he hath forgotten, or will take no notice of what was ſpoken of this ſubject, in the Obſervations which Mr. Barly prefixed before his Book, the ſame things ſhall be told him again with ſome addition.

That the Will and Decree of God doth not violate the liberty of mans will, may appear upon theſe following grounds:

Chriſts death was decreed, Argument 1 for he was delivered by the determinate counſel of God, Acts 2.23. yet he died moſt p. 36freely, for he ſaith that he laid down his life, when no man had power to take it from him, John 10.17, 18. Beſides, if Chriſts death had not been voluntary, it had not been meritorious; if it had not been an act of moſt free and perfect obedience, it could have merited no reward at the hands of God, either for himſelf or us.

The firm ſtanding of the good Angels is a free act, Argument 2 they are not enforced to it, yet this was decreed, for they are called Elect Angels, 1 Tim. 5.21. The obedience and ſervice which the Saints perform in heaven, they perform moſt freely and willingly without any conſtraint or neceſſity (hence we are taught to pray that the will of God may be done on earth as it is done in heaven) and when the Saints on earth repent, believe and obey, they do it freely, they are not carried to it by any natural or violent neceſſity, yet all theſe things are decreed; for it is ſaid, he hath choſen us before the foundation of the world, to be holy and without blame before him in love, Eph. 1.4. And that God hath from the beginning choſen us to ſalvation through the ſanctification of the Spirit, and the belief of the truth, 2 Theſ. 2.13.

In all our natural motions and actions, Argument 3 in our eating and drinking, ſitting, walking, diſcourſing, talking, we act freely: ſo alſo in our civil affairs, in our journeying, buying, ſelling, and all other buſineſſes belonging to our ſeveral Callings, we act freely without any compulſion or neceſſity: this I ſuppoſe Mr. P. will not deny, and will he deny that theſe things are appointed and determined by God? What a kinde of Governor of the world will he make him to be, when the greateſt part of things that are done in the world, all the actions of men and angels, and all contingent events what ever, are excluded from the compaſs of his Decree? How doth this agree with Scripture-Doctrine, which teacheth that mans goings are ordered of the Lord, Prov. 20.24. That the way of man is not in himſelf, Jer. 10.23. yea, that in him we live, move, and have our being, Acts 17. in all our natural motions and p. 37actions what we do, he doth, and what he doth in time, he hath determined before all time, otherwiſe he ſhould not work by counſel.

Gods Decree is actus ad intra, an act within himſelf; Argument 4 and of thoſe kinde of actions the rule holds true, that they do nihil ponere in objecto: Gods Decree alone never works any thing upon the creature, till it comes to execution, till he puts forth his inward purpoſe by ſome outward action: Unleſs therefore it can be ſhown how God by ſome outward action upon man, doth neceſſitate mans will, his inward purpoſe and decree alone will never do it. And we finde by dayly experience, that we ſin as freely as we eat or drink, or do any other thing in the world: Beſides, Gods inward purpoſe and decree is altogether unknown to a ſinner, and ignoti nulla cupido; therefore this can never move him to any ſinful act.

The Decree of God is ſo far from neceſſitating mans will, and infringing the liberty of the ſecond cauſes, Argument 5 as it is the ground and foundation of all freedom and liberty: for he doth not onelyonly decernere rem ipſam, ſed modum rei, he doth not onelyonly determine the thing it ſelf that ſhall be done, but the maner how it ſhall be done; for the modi rerum, are not really diſtinguiſhed from the things themſelves, but ſo nearly conjoyned, as they cannot be ſevered; as therefore ſome things come to paſs neceſſarily, becauſe God hath decreed they ſhall come to paſs neceſſarily, ſo other things come to paſs contingently, becauſe he hath decreed they ſhall come to paſs contingently; for he hath decreed that all things ſhall come to paſs, either neceſſarily or contingently, and the effect of his decree muſt be as certain in the one as the other.

Neceſſity and contingency ariſe from the intrinſecal nature of the things, and not from any thing extrinſecal. Argument 6 In things that come to paſs neceſſarily, there is ſuch a near and ſtrong connexion betwixt the cauſe and the effect, that if the cauſe go before, the effect muſt needs follow after; as if fire be fire, it muſt needs have the p. 38property of burning, if a ſtone be a ſtone, it muſt needs have the property of deſcending; but in contingent effects, though the thing ſhall certainly come to paſs, (upon ſuppoſal of Gods Decree) yet there is no ſuch neceſſary connexion betwixt the cauſe and effect; but in regard of the nature of the things, they might have been otherwiſe then they are. It is ſaid, The Lord holds the winds in his fiſt, Prov. 30.4. therefore the motion of them is according to his appointment; when he cauſed a ſtrong Eaſt winde to blow upon the head of Jonah, Jon. 4.8. this was according to his appointment and decree, yet this was not out of any natural neceſſity planted in the winde, for that was equally diſpoſed to have blown out of the Weſt or any other quarter, if it pleaſed God ſo to order it, for the winde bloweth where it liſteth, John 3.

Object. But if things may come to paſs otherwiſe then they do, then Gods Decrees may be fruſtrated.

Anſw. It follows not, becauſe (as before was ſhewed) he hath decreed that they ſhall come to paſs in the ſame maner that they do, namely, that neceſſary things ſhall come to paſs neceſſarily, and contingent things contingently; and his Decree can no more be fruſtrated in the one then in the other: For though it be neceſſary that what God hath decreed ſhould come to paſs, yet it is not neceſſary it ſhould come to paſs, neceſſario modo & neceſſariis mediis; God had decreed that Chriſts bones ſhould not be broken, therefore it was neceſſary this ſhould take effect, yet the Soldiers were not hindred by any neceſsity from doing it, but did as freely abſtain from breaking them, as they did freely break the Thieves bones. God had decreed the birthright and bleſsing to Jacob, yet this came to paſs by as contingent means as might be; for there was no neceſsity that Eſau ſhould come hungry from hunting, that Jacob ſhould have his pottage in a readineſs, that he ſhould propound them as a price for the birthright, that Eſau ſhould accept of the bargain, that Iſaac ſhould miſtake Jacob for Eſau, and p. 39his ſavory meat for Eſaus Veniſon; there was no neceſſity in any of theſe things, but all was done moſt freely, yet all was guided by a ſecret and certain providence, ſo as the event ſhould not fail to come to paſs as God had determined. Every neceſſary truth is an eternal truth, for it is a true rule, Quod neceſſarium eſt ſemper verum eſt, nec falſum eſſe poteſt, A neceſſary propoſition is that which is alway true, and can never be falſe: That Cain ſhould kill his brother, was no neceſſary truth before the thing was done; that man ſhould be a reaſonable creature, was a neceſſary truth before man was created: It was no neceſſary truth that Adam ſhould eat the forbidden fruit, before he had eaten it; and though then it was a truth, yet no neceſſary truth: for no circumſtance can change the nature of things, ſo as to make a neceſſary truth to become contingent, or a contingent truth to become neceſſary. True it is, that when a thing is done, it cannot be undone, (for a thing cannot be and not be both at one time) but it was not neceſſary it ſhould be done, if it be a thing of a contingent nature. What I now ſpeak or write, is neceſſary ſhould be thus ſpoken or written; but before it was not neceſſary I ſhould ſpeak or write any thing, theſe being acts of liberty and freedom; ſo it is in all actions of like nature, in all contingent actions. This for the ſecond Objection.

Object. 3. A third thing objected againſt the Abſolute Decree, is, That it is againſt Gods Juſtice; for if the Decree of Reprobation go before the foreſight of ſin, then the innocent creature is deſigned to deſtruction; which cannot agree with the Juſtice of God.

Anſw. For anſwer of this, Two things are needful to be proved; 1. That it is no injuſtice in God to puniſh the innocent creature. 2. That by the Decree of Reprobation, no innocent creature is deſigned to deſtruction. For the firſt, it may be proved theſe ways: Argument 1

Mr. P. aſſerts Infants to be innocent creatures, Cap. 4. Page 25.becauſe they never did hurt any man in thought, word or deed; p. 40and theſe are ſubject to death, and he cannot deny death to be a puniſhment, for it is the wages of ſin, Rom. 6.23. And though death differs in degree from damnation, yet it is a puniſhment, and God cannot be unjuſt in any degree. It may be Mr. P. may finde out ſome anſwer to this; therefore we add further,

Chriſt Jeſus was the moſt innocent perſon that ever was in the world, Argument 2 one that knew no ſin, neither was any guile found in his mouth, one that fulfilled all righteouſneſs; one in whom the Father was well pleaſed, for he had done all his pleaſure; yet he laid on him the iniquities of us all, he was wounded for our iniquities, and broken for our tranſgreſſions, Iſa. 53. The juſt ſuffered for the unjuſt, 1 Pet. 3.18. Yea he ſuffered ſuch a meaſure of his Fathers wrath, as was anſwerable to that, which all thoſe who are ſaved by him, ſhould have ſuffered in hell; for he being their ſurety, it was neceſſary that he ſhould fully diſcharge their debt, by making full ſatisfaction, in paying that which they ſhould have paid.

Mr. P. knows well that many innocent creatures dayly ſuffer for his ſake, Argument 3 and are put to divers kindes of deaths, ſome have their throats cut, ſome are ſtrangled, ſome are knockt on the head, according to the will and pleaſure of thoſe by whom they are killed; and theſe are ſuch as never offended or deſerved any ill at his hands: and may not God uſe the ſame liberty with creatures of his own making, as man doth with thoſe creatures which he never made? He would think it ridiculous if any ſhould clamor againſt him for cruelty and injuſtice, when he treads a worm under his foot, or cruſheth a fly ſitting on the wall; yet there is not ſo great a diſproportion betwixt him and the ſmalleſt worm, as there is betwixt him (or the greateſt King in the world) and the great Creator. Man compared with God, being but as a drop that hangs on a bucket, or as the duſt that cleaves to the ballance, which ſwayes it neither one way nor another, Argument 4 Iſa. 40.15.

May not the Potter do what he will with the veſſel p. 41which he hath made without any imputation of injuſtice, yea though he breaks it in pieces, or puts it to the baſeſt uſes? the Apoſtle makes Gods power over his Creature, to be full as large as the Potter hath over the Veſſel that he hath made, and gives this anſwer to the like Objection, Rom. 9.21. God was not bound to preſerve man in his being after he was made, for he might have annihilated him as he made us of nothing, ſo he might bring us to nothing: and ſome deaths are leſs then annihilation. Neither was he bound to preſerve man from a ſinful being, as he did ſome of the Angels, but he might ſuffer him to fall, as he did ſome of them, and then deal with him accordingly. Thus we ſee it is no injuſtice in God to inflict ſufferings upon innocent creatures.

2. That by the Decree of Reprobation, innocent creatures are not deſigned to deſtruction, appears,

Becauſe Reprobation is that everlaſting purpoſe of God, Argument 1 whereby he hath decreed to glorifie his juſtice in the juſt condemnation of ſinful men: here ſin goes before condemnation, though it goes not before Gods Decree: for condemnation is the execution, and is in time, whereas the Decree is before all time. It is a true rule, that Deus vult hoc eſſe propter hoc, ſed non vult hoc propter hoc, the one hath reference to the execution, the other to the decree: though there be a cauſe of the being of a thing, yet there is none of Gods will. It is the Tenet of the Schoolmen, Nullamdari poſſe cauſam decreti divini ex parte volentis, ſed tantùm ex parte volitorum. There can be no cauſe given of the Will and Decree of God, as it is his act, but onelyonly of the things willed by him, none of the Decree, but onelyonly of the Execution. Mr. P. ſeems ſometimes to grant this, and if he would ſtand to it, the controverſie might ſoon be at an end, for nothing is needful to go before the effect, but the cauſe, that which hath efficiency in ſome kinde or other in producing it; and if there can be no kinde of cauſe going before Gods Decree, his Decree may be without it.

p. 42God doth condemn no man in time but for ſin; Argument 2 therefore he determined to condemn no man but for ſin, for he doth things in time, in that maner and order that he determined to do them before all time. He actually condemns no man but for ſin actually exiſting, till after men have ſinned, but ſin exiſts in time; therefore if he ſhould determine nothing touching mans everlaſting eſtate, till after he hath ſinned, his Decrees ſhould not be eternal but temporary: and ſo it is in effect according to this Doctrine which teacheth, That there is no abſolute nor peremptory Decree paſſed upon men, but upon foreſight of what they will do. And as for the Conditional Decree it is as good as none; becauſe (as hath been ſhewed) it is equally diſpoſed to mens damnation, as well as their ſalvation.

Though ſin doth not go before Gods Decree, Argument 3 yet neither is his Decree without the conſideration of ſin, becauſe he decrees all things ſimul & ſemel, uno actu ſimpliciſsimo, (as hath been ſhewed) there is no prius & poſterius in him or in his Decrees; but becauſe we are not able with one ſimple act to apprehend the ſeveral things which God hath decreed touching mans everlaſting eſtate, therefore Divines uſually place an order in his Decrees, wherein one thing goes before another (though not in him, yet in our conſideration) yet this is ſuch an order as agrees with the order of nature, wherein the cauſe always goes before the effect, and the end before the means: and upon this ground the foreſight of ſin cannot go before Gods Decree, becauſe when he decrees to permit ſin (without which there can be no foreſight of it) the end of this permiſſion muſt needs be the manifeſtation of his glory in the merciful Salvation of ſome, and juſt Condemnation of others; therefore this muſt be firſt decreed according to the order of nature, though for time all be done at one inſtant. Beſides, when God decreed to create man, the end which he propounded to himſelf in this work, was his own glory, and that not onelyonly in general, but in that particular p. 43way, in that particular ſtate and condition of man whence in the end he receives his glory: but at laſt he receives greateſt glory in the Salvation of ſome, and Damnation of others; therefore this was the end which he intended, when he intended mans creation: for to ſay that he intended no certain end in this great work, or was fruſtrate of his intentions, is altogether unbeſeeming the excellent nature of God. But Mr. P. thus undertakes to prove that reprobation follows the foreſight of ſin.

Object. Cap. 4. page 5.We grant (ſaith he) that Damnation follows the foreſight of ſin, but Damnation alway follows Reprobation; ergo, Reprobation follows the foreſight of ſin.

He much triumphs in this Objection, telling us we put a bitter jeer upon the greateſt part of mankinde, to ſay they are rejected without reſpect of ſin, and yet not damned without reſpect of ſin, this following the other.

Anſw. Here we may tell Mr. P. that he puts his pitiful Sophiſtry upon his Readers, this Argument being a meer Fallacy; for here the concluſion is general, whereas in the third figure (as this Argument is) it alway ought to be particular, the deceitfulneſs of it will appear in the like inſtance: Suppoſe a man intends to build a houſe fit for his habitation; by this kinde of Logick we may thus argue:

The building of the houſe follows after the providing Wood, Stone, and other materials:

But the building of the houſe follows after his intention to build it;

Therefore his intention to build his houſe, follows after the providing of Wood, and Stone, and other fit materials.

This is Mr. P. his acumen

Object. But Mr. P. objects, Cap. 3. Page 66.That it is impoſsible (as implying a contradiction) that God ſhould decree to reprobate any without intuition of ſin, and yet at the ſame time to decree not to damn without reſpect of ſin.

Anſw. 1. It is very poſsible that Reprobation ſhould p. 44be without foreſight of ſin, and yet Damnation not to be ſo, becauſe theſe differ both in nature and time; reprobation being an immanent act terminated in himſelf, damnation being a tranſient act, terminated in man; reprobation being from all eternity, damnation being in time; the one is the Decree, the other the Execution. To decree to damn, is to decree to do a thing in time. We may as well ſay that a man is ſaved as ſoon as he is elected, as damned ſo ſoon as he is reprobated.

2. It is very improper to ſay that God doth decree to reprobate, as if he ſhould decree to decree; whereas reprobation it ſelf is the decree: but it is uſual with Mr. P. to confound the Decree with the Execution, and ſo to jumble theſe together as thereby a miſt is caſt upon the eyes of the Reader, that he ſhall not diſcern the truth.

Object. 4. A fourth Objection againſt the Abſolute Decree, is, That it cannot ſtand with Gods Philanthropy, with his love to mankinde; for Mr. P. tells us, That he hates nothing which he hath made: and the Scripture tells us, That he is gracious, merciful, abundant in goodneſs and truth, that his mercy is over all his works, and therefore deſigns none to be deſtroyed.

Anſw. 1. Mr. P. tells us indeed that God hates nothing that he hath made, but the Scripture tells us no ſuch thing, but rather the quite contrary; for it ſaith, That the Lord loved Jacob, and hated Eſau, and that before they were born.

Object. To this Mr. P. replies, That this hatred is to be underſtood onelyonly in regard of temporal bleſsings, of the inheritance of the land of Canaan.

Anſw. This evaſion hath been ſufficiently confuted before, in confirmation of the ſeventh Argument againſt the Conditional Decree, where was ſhewed 1. that the hatred here ſpoken of ſtands directly in oppoſition to the love wherewith Jacob was loved; but that was the love of Election, Rom. 9.11. compared with verſe 13.

2. The earthly Canaan was a type of the heavenly, why p. 45elſe had Eſau the black Character of Profaneneſs ſtampt on him, for paſſing away his right to it, by ſo ſlightly ſelling his birth-right? Heb. 1.16.

3. In regard of outward bleſſings Eſau was no whit inferior to Jacob, but rather above him; for he had the fatneſs of the earth, the pleaſant mount Seir for his poſſeſſion, whereas Jacob was a ſtranger in the land of Canaan, Pſal. 105.12. having no poſſeſſion there, but onelyonly the burying-place which Abraham had bought, Gen. 25.15. therefore it is ſaid, That God gave Abraham no inheritance in the land, no not ſo much as whereon to ſet his foot, Acts 7.5.

4. Eſau had abundance of all things, and therefore refuſed his brothers preſents, telling him he had enough. Alſo he was a man of great place, for he came to meet his brother attended with four hundred men, ſo that Jacob bowed down to the ground before him, and called him his lord, Gen. 32.18. and 33.3. ſo that he was no whit inferior to his brother in regard of outward bleſſings.

Anſw. 2. Secondly, for thoſe Scriptures which hold forth God to be ſo merciful, gracious, good to all, &c. It is granted that there is a common bounty and goodneſs which God extendeth to all mankinde, making the Sun to ſhine, and rain to fall upon the juſt and unjuſt, Matth. 5.45. but his ſpecial Grace and Mercy he extends onelyonly to thoſe who are the proper objects of it, namely, thoſe whom he hath choſen to be veſſels of Mercy. Why may not God have his Favorites as well as Kings have theirs? Hence it is ſaid, that he will be gracious to whom he will be gracious, Exod. 33.19. which argues that he will not be gracious alike, and there are ſome ſpoken of in Scripture who were made to be taken and deſtroyed, 2 Pet. 2.12. who before of old were ordained to condemnation, Jude 4. therefore all are not alike objects of mercy. And herein appears the excellency of free Grace and ſpecial Mercy, namely, in regard of the peculiarity of it; it is as rare as precious: it were no great priviledge to be Favorite of a Prince, if p. 46all Subjects were favored alike, or none were favored, but according to their deſerts; therefore ſpecial Grace is not confuſedly ſcattered amongſt all by a general offer, take it who will, but confined to a few: hence Chriſts people are called a peculiar people, Titus 2.14. and his flock is ſaid to be a little flock, Luke 12.32. and though the number of Iſrael be as the ſand of the ſea, yet a remnant onelyonly ſhall be ſaved, for the Lord will finiſh his work, and cut it ſhort in righteouſneſs, Rom. 9.27, 28.

Object. Cap. 3. page 83.But for ſpecial Grace Mr. P. tells us, It is ſo called becauſe it ſerves ad ſpeciales habitus & actus, to every habit, or act, or thought of good that is done by man.

Anſw. This is ſuch a notion of ſpecial Grace as I think but few have been acquainted with: but let him tells us whether theſe ſpecial acts and habits be effects of that ſpecial Grace which is given to ſome onelyonly, to ſuch whom God loves with a ſpecial and peculiar love, or imparted to all men indifferently: If the former, then it is called ſpecial, in reference to ſome ſpecial perſons to whom it is communicated, and thoſe ſpecial effects which it produceth in theſe more then in others. If the latter (which Mr. P. ſeems to intend) what a choice and ſpecial Grace hath he found out for us, which is beſtowed as largely upon Judas as upon Peter, upon the damned in hell, as thoſe who are ſaved in heaven? When Judas preached and caſt out devils, he did it by a Grace that ſerved for thoſe ſpecial acts and habits whereby he was enabled to do theſe things. When others called Chriſt Lord, Lord, yea not onelyonly made an outward profeſſion of him, but propheſied and caſt out devils in his name, they did it by vertue of a Grace that ſerved for theſe ſpecial acts and habits, yet Chriſt will ſay to them at the great Day, I know you not, depart from me ye workers of iniquity, Matth 7.22. What comfort can a man take in ſuch a ſpecial Grace, as he may carry with him to hell? Doth not Scripture-language found in another kinde of ſtrain then this? as when our Savior gives thanks to his Father, that he had hid the myſteries p. 47of his kingdom from the wiſe and prudent, and revealed them to babes, Matth. 11.25. and tells his Diſciples, that it was given to them to know the myſteries of the kingdom of heaven, and not to others, cap. 13.11. and the Apoſtle, Not many Wiſe, not many mighty, not many noble whom God hath called, 1 Cor. 1.26. and ſaith of himſelf, that when he was a blaſphemer and a perſecuter, yet he found mercy, and the grace of the Lord was exceedingly abundant towards him, 1 Tim. 1.13, 14.

Object. 5. A fifth Objection (which makes a great noiſe) is, That this Doctrine cannot ſtand with the truth of God; for he hath ſaid, He hath no pleaſure in the death of wicked men, and confirms this with an oath, Ezek. 33.11. and ſaith expreſly, That he would not that any ſhould periſh, 2 Pet. 3.9.

Anſw. 1. For that place of Ezekiel, the anſwer is by diſtinguiſhing of that which is called in Scripture by the name of the will of God. It ſignifies either his ſecret will, or his revealed will; the will of his purpoſe, or the will of his precept and command; this place is not to be underſtood of the will of his purpoſe (which onelyonly is properly his will) but of the will of his precept or command, whereby he enjoyns men to do thoſe things that tend to life, and to decline all thoſe things that tend to death, and therefore may be ſaid not to will their death: eſpecially all his outward diſpenſations towards men, tending to the ſame end with his command, namely, to procure life, not death.

Object. Againſt this Mr. P. replies, That the revealed will of God, or the will of his command, is propriè voluntas, properly the will of God; for the whole word of God revealed in Scripture, is properly his will.

Anſw. For anſwer of this, two things are needful to be proved; Firſt, That the revealed will of God or his command, is not properly his will. Secondly, That all thoſe whom God wills to be ſaved, voluntate propriè dicta… with the will of his purpoſe, with his internal will, are, or ſhall be certainly ſaved.

p. 481. For the firſt, when two things are attributed to God that are contrary one to the other, both of them cannot poſſibly be taken properly; as when it is ſaid, that it repented the Lord that he made Saul king, 1 Sam. 15.11. and, that the Strength of Iſrael cannot lie nor repent, verſe 29. Both theſe cannot be taken properly (for then there would be a contradiction) that onelyonly therefore is to be taken properly which agrees to the nature of God; he is unchangeable, and therefore cannot repent; the other is to be taken figuratively, he is ſaid to repent, becauſe he doth the ſame thing that a repenting man, he changeth his action as a repenting man doth: he never changeth his minde. So when it is ſaid, that God wills not the death of a ſinner, and that he hardens whom he will, and makes ſome veſſels to diſhonor, Rom. 9.18.21. Both theſe cannot be taken properly, therefore that muſt be taken properly which agrees with the nature of God, and the other to be taken figuratively: now it properly agrees to the nature of God that his will ſhould be accompliſhed (becauſe he is Omnipotent) therefore when he is ſaid not to will the death of a ſinner, and yet many ſinners die everlaſtingly; this cannot be underſtood of his will properly taken, namely, the will of his Purpoſe and Decree, but of the will of his precept and command, and of his outward diſpenſations towards men, all which in themſelves tend to the preſerving from death.

2. The ſame name cannot be properly given to two things whoſe nature doth really differ: as for inſtance, when Chriſt ſaith, Let the dead bury the dead; this cannot be properly taken in both places, becauſe in the firſt it is ſpoken of thoſe who are ſpiritually dead, in the other of thoſe who are naturally dead.

Now that the will of Gods purpoſe, or his internal will, and the will of his precept and command do really differ in their own nature, is thus proved:

1. The will of Gods purpoſe, or his internal will, is eternal, all his Decrees are from everlaſting, but his commands p. 49are given forth in time; the commands belonging both to the moral and ceremonial Law, were not given out till the world was above two thouſand years old; and the word of the Lord came to the Prophets at ſeveral times; yea, there was a time when there was no Scriptures or written word of God.

2. The Will of Gods purpoſe is immutable and unchangeable, The counſels of the Lord ſtand for ever, and his thoughts to all generations, Pſal. 33.11. but his commands are mutable, as we ſee in the example of Abraham, who received a command to kill his ſon, which afterwards was reverſed, and in all the precepts of the ceremonial Law.

3. The will of his purpoſe cannot be reſiſted: Who hath reſiſted his will? Rom. 9. The will of his precept is dayly reſiſted by wicked men, and too often by his beſt ſervants.

4. The will of his purpoſe is alway fulfilled, he doth whatſoever he will: but the will of his command is not ſo; This is the will of God, even your ſanctification, 1 Theſ. 4.3. yet all men are not ſanctified.

5. The will of his purpoſe is an act within himſelf, and therefore not really differing from himſelf, the will of his command is ſomething proceeding from himſelf; ſo that theſe do as really differ as the Creator and the Creature, the one being eternal, immutable and irreſiſtible, the other temporary, mutable, reſiſtible. The command indeed by a Metonymy, is called the will of God (becauſe ſometimes, not always, it ſhews what the will of his purpoſe is) yet it is not, nor cannot be properly his will, upon the grounds before named; neither doth it follow hence, that there are two wills in God, but onelyonly that there are two things that are ſet forth by one and the ſame name, which is very uſual in Scripture. Neither doth it follow, that one Will of God is contrary to another, for contraria muſt be ad idem; but theſe are not the ſame, but do really differ, as hath been already proved. p. 50True it is, that God doth properly will to give forth ſuch and ſuch commands, but his will and purpoſe is one thing, and his command another, really differing from it. Thus much to ſhew that Gods revealed will, his precepts and commands are not properly his will.

2. For the ſecond thing, namely, That all thoſe to whom God wills ſalvation, voluntate propriè dicta, with the will of his purpoſe and decree, ſhall moſt certainly be ſaved, needs no great proof; for this will of his being an immutable, irreſiſtible, omnipotent will, it muſt needs take effect. Our God is in heaven, and doth whatſoever he will, Pſal. 115.3. Whatſoever pleaſed the Lord, that did he, both in heaven and in earth, Pſal. 135.6. There are two principles onelyonly needful for producing any effect, potentia & voluntas, and where theſe concur, the effect muſt needs follow: If God doth really and internally will and deſire the ſalvation of men, what ſhould hinder the effecting it, ſince his power is anſwerable to his will? If mens power were anſwerable to their will, they would do any thing that they have a minde to.

If it be ſaid that he wills it conditionally, 1. This conditional will hath been already refuted, and it hath been ſhewed, that conditions belong not to Gods will, but onelyonly to the execution of it. 2. If he really wills the thing, he is able to work the conditions, to work effectual faith, true repentance and other graces in all, as well as he doth in ſome.

But that that place in Ezekiel, and other like places cannot be underſtood of Gods will, properly taken (as Mr. P. confidently aſſerts) may be proved, 1. Becauſe then this Scripture would croſs other Scriptures; for here it is ſaid, that the Lord hath no delight in the death of a ſinner, and elſewhere it is ſaid, that he would rejoyce over wicked men to deſtroy them and root them out, Deut. 28.63. and he would laugh at their calamity, and mock when their fear cometh, Prov. 1.25. which expreſſions ſhew, that theſe things are not againſt his will.

p. 512. Theſe things are works of his Juſtice, and his Juſtice being an attribute as eſſential to him as his mercy, he muſt needs be well pleaſed, not onelyonly with the works of his Mercy, but of his Juſtice, for all his works are well pleaſing to him.

3. He is well pleaſed with all things which make for his own glory, but at laſt he ſhall have much glory from the juſt deſtruction of wicked men.

4. If a deſire of all mens ſalvation be properly in God, then it is perpetually in him; then when wicked men are damned in hell, he ſtill continues to deſire their ſalvation, and for want of enjoying his deſire, he is hindred from enjoying full felicity (for what is full and perfect felicity, but a full and perfect fruition of all our deſires?) ſo that ſo long as wicked men ſuffer pains in hell, God cannot enjoy full felicity in heaven, but rather ſuffers ſome kinde of trouble and diſquiet, for it is a troubleſome thing for one, to have that perpetually withheld from him, which he earneſtly deſires. Theſe are monſtrous conſequences, yet ſuch as directly follow from that doctrine which teacheth, That when God ſaith, he hath no pleaſure in the death of a ſinner, this muſt be taken properly without any figure. To conclude, there is this difference betwixt theſe two wills, that God by his ſecret will and purpoſe, determines what himſelf will do, by his revealed will declares to us what is our duty to do.

Queſt. But may God command a man to do that which he doth not intend he ſhall do?

Anſw. He may: for commands are not onelyonly for performance, but for tryal: thus he commanded Abraham to kill his ſon, when he did not intend it ſhould be done. Gods commands are not alway given to declare his ſecret intentions, but to be the rule of our actions: yea he may by his outward diſpenſations carry himſelf in a differing, yea in a contrary way to his inward intentions: He by his Prophet bade Hezekiah ſet his houſe in order, for he p. 52ſhould die, Iſa. 38.1. when he did not intend he ſhould die, till divers years after. He ſent Moſes to Pharaoh to command him to let the people go, when at the ſame time he tells him, that he would harden Pharaohs heart, that he ſhould not hearken to him, Exod. 7.2, 3, 4. It is not neceſſary that finis operis & operantis, ſhould be alway the ſame in God. The Preaching of the Goſpel in its own nature tends to life and ſalvation; but it is not neceſſary that God ſhould intend the ſalvation of all thoſe to whom the Goſpel is preached, for then it could not be a ſweet ſavor to him, not onelyonly in thoſe that are ſaved, but in thoſe that are loſt, 2 Cor. 2.21. Mr. P. boldly aſſerts, That there is an intention in God, to ſave all men without exception, if by the wickedneſs of their wills they did not fruſtrate his intention. But doth not this exceedingly derogate from Gods omnipotency and infinite wiſdom? Cap. 3. Pag. 81.From his Omnipotency, in that he ſeriouſly deſires that which he is not able to effect; from his Wiſdom, in that he ſeriouſly intends that which he knows ſhall never be effected.