The Sum of Christian Religion, Catechism · Part 2 · creation of the world · Subsection 1
1. Whether the world was created of God.
Five ſignifications of the word world.FIrſt the words and terms are to be underſtood: The name of the world is diverſly uſed in the Scripture: 1. It ſignifieth the univerſall frame of all things, namely, heaven and earth, and all things which are in them, viſible and inviſible, beſides God himſelf: The world was made by him. John 1.10.2. Worldly concupiſcence. 3. All mankind. 4. The wicked, or thoſe that are not regenerate in the world. 5. The elect: That the world might beleeve. John 17.9, 21. John 3.16.So God loved the world. Here we conſider it in the firſt ſenſe.
To create ſignifieth three things.To create ſignifieth, 1. To ordain or conſtitute, as the Latines uſed it; Creare Conſulem, to create a Conſull. 2. To make ſomething of nothing, without any motion, with a beck or word only; ſo it is taken in this place. 3. The continuating of creation, or creation continued; which is the providence of God.
The creation of the world proved:That the world hath not been from everlaſting, but had, when it ſeemed beſt to the Creatour, according to his eternall counſell and will, a beginning once, and was created of that only true God, who hath manifeſted himſelf in the Church, that he is the eternall Father, and Son, and holy Ghoſt, wee know, By teſtimonies of Scripture.By teſtimonies of holy Scripture, as by the whole hiſtory of the creation ſet down by Moſes. Likewiſe,Pſal. 33.6, 9. Pſal. 104. & 113. & 124. & 136. & 146. Iſa. 44. Acts 4.17. out of other teſtimonies of Scripture very many: By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the hoſte of them by the breath of his mouth. Hee ſpake, and it was done; hee commanded, and it ſtood, or, was created. There are other places alſo in the Pſalmes, where more largely and amply the wonderfull works of God, and the principall parts of the world created by God, are propoſed to be conſidered of us; that through the conſideration thereof, wee may learn to put our truſt and confidence in God. For this purpoſe did the Lord himſelf propoſe unto Job his marvellous and incomprehenſible works, conſpicuous in heaven and earth,Job 38. & 39. and other things alſo created by him, to declare his juſtice, power, and providence.
2. By reaſons.Furthermore, beſides teſtimonies of Scripture, almoſt innumerable, it is confirmed alſo by firm and true reaſons, that the world was created of God; ſuch as theſe following; 1. The originals and beginnings of nations and people ſhew it, which could not be fained of Moſes, when as ſome remembrance and memoriall of them was then extant amongſt many; which yet in proceſſe of time periſhed. 2. The novelty and lateneſſe of all other hiſtories, compared with the antiquity and ancientneſſe of the ſacred ſtory. 3. The age of man decreaſing: which ſheweth that there mas greater ſtrength in nature at the firſt, and that not without ſome firſt cauſe it hath decreaſed hitherto. 4. The certain courſe and race of times, even from the beginning of the world unto the exhibiting of the Meſſias. 5. The conſtitution and founding of common-weals. 6. The order of things inſtituted in nature: which muſt needs have been produced and framed by ſome intelligent mind, far ſuperiour to all things. 7. The excellency of the minde of men and Angels. Theſe intelligent mindes have a beginning: Therefore they have it from ſome intelligent cauſe. 8. The principles or generall rules and naturall notions ingenerated in our minds. 9. The trembling of conſcience in the wicked. 10. The ends of all things profitably and wiſely ordained: therefore by ſome cauſe underſtanding and ordaining them. 11. Laſtly, Thoſe other arguments and reaſons alſo, which prove that there is a God, prove in like manner, that the world was created of God.
3 Naturall reaſons.Thirdly, beſides theſe reaſons, it may be enforced by philoſophicall arguments drawn out of the boſome of nature, That the world was created; and, that it was created of God, although by them we are not able to demonſtrate the time when it was created: For, 1. There is no infinite proceſſe in nature of cauſes and effects; for if ſo, nature ſhould never attain unto her end, even the producing of effects: Therefore this world had a beginning. 2. The nobleſt and excellenteſt of all effects is the world: Therefore it proceedeth from the nobleſt and excellenteſt cauſe, which is God.
How the creation is unknown to Philoſophers.Other queſtions; as, Whether the world was created from everlaſting, or in time: that is, Whether it be an effect of equall perpetuity with his cauſe, and ſo co-eternall; or, Whether it once ſo began to be, that before it had no being. Again, Whether, if ſometimes it were not, yet it was neceſſary that it ſhould be created: And, Whether it ſhall endure for ever: And if it endure, Whether it ſhall remain the ſame, or it is to be changed. Theſe and ſuch like queſtions cannot be decided by Philoſophy: The reaſon is, becauſe all theſe things depend upon the meer will of God, the firſt mover of all things, who doth nothing of neceſſity, but with moſt abſolute freedome. Now this his will is not known to any creature, but to whomſoever God himſelfe revealeth it: Therefore it is not manifeſted to heatheniſh Philoſophers, but declared to the Church alone: for they cannot poſſibly collect any thing hereof by proceeding from a continuing effect unto his cauſe. It followeth indeed, that there is ſome cauſe of thoſe effects: but it followeth not, that thoſe effects were produced of that cauſe either at this, or that time, or from all eternity; becauſe a free agent may either act, or ſuſpend his action at his pleaſure. The whole demonſtration hereof is thus brought in form: No effect depending onelyonly of ſuch a cauſe as worketh freely or contingently, can be demonſtrated by that cauſe: But the creation of the world is ſuch an effect: Therefore the creation of the world cannot be demonſtrated by the will of God, the first mover of all things, that it either was made from everlaſting, or in ſome beginning of time. Arguments of Philoſophers againſt the creation of the world.Now, whatſoever arguments are brought of Philoſophers againſt the creation of the world, it is eaſie to perceive that theſe were not framed out of true Philoſophy, but by the imaginations of men; if the order of the generation and mutation of things inſtituted in nature, which was created of God, be diſcerned from creation.
Object. 1. It is abſurd (ſay the Philoſophers) to imagine that God is idle. Anſ. Nay rather, it is abſurd to term him idle who adminiſtreth and ruleth the world. Repl. This I grant; but he could not govern the world, when as yet the world was not: Therefore the world not being created, God not idle, before the creating of the world, but contemplating his owne wiſdome. Epheſ. 1.4.he was idle. Anſ. The conſequence of this argument is denied: For God, before the creation of the world, did contemplate and behold from everlaſting, his owne wiſdome; hee begot the Son; from him flowed the holy Ghoſt; Hee choſe us in Chriſt before the foundation of the world to everlaſting life; hee decreed to produce and create the world in time; and provided and prepared hell for curious ſeekers and ſearchers into the hidden and ſecret counſels of God; as Auguſtine prettily anſwered a certain African, demanding of him, what God did before the creating of the world. He made hell (ſaith he) for curious men, which ruſh and break into his ſecrets.
Object. 2. They collect arguments alſo whereby to prove, That the motion or mutation of things which now is, hath been from everlasting. Whatſoever can any way be moved or changed (ſay they) that either having been ſuch from everlasting, hath admitted no change or motion, (which were abſurd, and is alſo denyed of us;) or hath been made ſuch by ſome generation and motion: But there is no motion or change, except there be ſomething before which can be moved and changed: Wherefore no motion of any thing can be brought which ſome other motion hath not gone before: and ſo there ſhall be no beginning of changes and mutations. Anſ. There is an untruth, and an unſufficient enumeration in the Major; for that they, imagining that things could never be produced out of other but by generation, take away from God the power of creating what he will, even out of no matter pre-exiſtent or being before. Wherefore our anſwer is, That motion goeth before a moveable thing which is generated,Motion goeth before any movable thing which is generated, but not before that which is created. but not which is created.
Object. 3. All motion before which was quietneſſe or a ceaſing of mutation, hath another motion going before it, whereby is removed the cauſe of that quietneſſe or let of mutation: But they ſay, that according to our aſſertion, there is put a quietneſſe before the firſt motion that ever was in the nature of things: Therefore there must be ſome motion or mutation whereby the cauſe of that quietneſſe was taken away; and ſo there ſhall be no mutation which may be ſaid to be the first. There went not any motion before the beginning of motion in nature, but only the creting will of God.Anſw. The Major is true of the mutation and entercourſe of things now begun after the creation, but not of the originall of thoſe mutations and changes which wee now ſee in the world: for the let and ſtay of them was in the will of God onelyonly; which is not taken away; but being the ſame, and ſtanding immovable from everlaſting to everlaſting, beginneth and effecteth the beginnings, and ends, and mutations, or motions of things, and alſo quietneſſe or ceſſation, and a continuance in the ſame ſtate, moſt freely, and without any mutation or change of himſelfe. Seeing then this his divine will alone beginneth the motion and mutation of things without ſecond cauſes, as he did in the creation of the world; it was not onelyonly not neceſſary, but not ſo much as poſſible, by reaſon of the eternity and immutability of the divine will, that there ſhould be any other motion before the originall and beginning of the motions and mutations of nature. For God will from everlaſting to everlaſting, that all ſhould then begin to have their moving, mutation, and being when this beginning was made. There is therefore an ambiguity in the word quietneſſe: Two ſignifications of the word quietneſſe in Philoſophy.for wee grant the Major, as concerning that quietneſſe which ſignifieth a privation in the ſubject: that is taken away by re-entry of motion: but the Major is falſe, if it mean ſuch a quietneſſe as is an abſolute deniall of the being of motion: this is taken away not by motion, but by the will of God, which alone, without ſecond cauſes and any motion, beginneth motion.
Object. 4. If time be eternall, then motion is alſo eternall; for time is the meaſure of motion, whereby wee judge how long or ſhort all motion is: But time is eternall; becauſe every inſtant or point of time is the end of that time which went before, and the beginning of that which followeth: Therefore alſo motion is from everlasting. Time, as it is taken for the meaſure of motion, is not eternall.Anſw. The appellation of time here is ambiguous or doubtfull, and therefore cauſeth a double anſwer: For if time be taken onelyonly for the meaſure of ſome motion, the Major is true; but if it be taken for the during of any thing, the Major is falſe, as it is manifeſt in the during of quietneſſe, which during alſo is time: So alſo eternity is time, without any mutation of the thing which is eternall. So the Minor alſo is true, as concerning duration; but as concerning the meaſuring of motion, it is falſe. Neither is it furthered by the argument which is adjoyned concerning an inſtant: For the firſt inſtant or moment wherein any motion beginneth may be alſo without any precedent motion, (for otherwiſe we ſhould be fain to ſay, that all, even the ſhorteſt motions of all things, were from everlaſting.) And that inſtant is only the beginning, or firſt point, or indiviſible moment wherein time, by the will of God, began to flow or multiply: but it is not the end of any time fore-paſt. So the firſt point in a line hath only line after it, not alſo before it: that is, it is the beginning of the line, not alſo the end.
Object. 5. Whatſoever hath a beginning hath alſo an ending: The celeſtiall bodies have no ending: Therefore they had no beginning. Anſw. The Major is to be diſtinguiſhed. Whatſoever hath a beginning naturally, by motion or alteration of a pre-exiſten ſubject, hath an ending alſo, and is corrupted, to wit, naturally, by motion:Heaven is not corrupted naturally, but by the power of God. The celeſtiall bodies are not corrupted, that is naturally; for they have not a matter which is capable of another form: Therefore they had no beginning, that is, by naturall motion: For by order of nature, corruption followeth the generation of one thing out of another. Now although heaven is not corrupted naturally, yet it is corruptible by the abſolute power of God, working without any motion: for the omnipotency of the Creatour is able moſt freely either to preſerve the ſame ſtate, or to change, or to bring to nothing as well thoſe things which he formeth out of other things, as which he produceth out of nothing.
Object. 6. God is eternall. Lib. 1. de Coelo cap. 9.Heaven is the palace and ſeat of God: Therefore heaven is eternall. Anſ. It doth not follow: for firſt, there are four terms in this Syllogiſme. For God is one thing, Two cauſes why God is chiefly ſaid to be in heaven.and the palace and ſeat of God another thing, which is not God. In like manner the body is the ſeat of the ſoule: but it followeth not hereof, that the body is a ſpirituall, intelligent, immortall eſſence, becauſe the ſoul is. Secondly, Heaven is the ſeat of God, not properly nor neceſſarily; becauſe God, as being an infinite eſſence, is in all things, and without all things. And Ariſtotle himſelfe witneſſeth, that he is without heaven: therefore he can be, though heaven be not; neither needeth he this tabernacle: But he is ſaid to dwell in heaven, though he fill all things with his eſſence and power: 1. Becauſe he is above all things, and the Lord and ruler of all. 2. Becauſe he exhibiteth there his glory, majeſty, and grace more cleerly and fully to be beheld and injoyed of the bleſſed Angels and men, then here on earth. Againſt the firſt anſwer, Ubiquitaries reply in Ariſtotles behalfe, on this manner; The bleſſedneſſe of God is not without God, but is God himſelfe. Heaven is the bleſſedneſſe of God, not any place: Heaven is the place of the bleſſedneſſe of the elect: but not God himſelf, or bleſſedneſſe.Therefore heaven is God himſelf. Anſ. 1. Not onelyonly Ariſtotle, but the ſacred Scripture alſo doth every where diſtinguiſh heaven from God, as the thing made, from the maker thereof: and alſo oppoſeth heaven to earth, ſo that it affirmeth earth to be below, and heaven above us, where God communicateth himſelfe and his bleſſedneſſe unto the elect more cleerly and fully then on earth. Heaven, ſaith God himſelfe, is my ſeat, Iſa. 66.1.and earth my foot-ſtoole. Wherefore, although heaven were ſomewhere taken for heavenly bleſſedneſſe, yet might it not be hereof inferred, that heaven properly is not a place wherein the elect enjoy, and ſhall for ever enjoy that bleſſedneſſe: for alſo hell ſometimes ſignifieth helliſh pains: yet ſo, that it excludeth not the place where the wicked, being truly ſevered from the godly, ſhall ſuffer thoſe pains and torments. 2. The Minor is falſe, if heaven be taken for that bleſſedneſſe which is God himſelfe, being ſufficient unto himſelfe in all things: for heaven is a thing created and finite; that bleſſedneſſe is uncreate and immenſe. And if it be underſtood of a created bleſſedneſſe, which is in us communicated from God, there are four terms in the Syllogiſme: for the Major propoſition ſpeaketh of an uncreated bleſſedneſſe, which is the very eſſence of God, neither is communicated at any time to any creature.
The externall reſpects and relations of God are not the mutation o… perfection of God, but of the creature.Object. 7. Hee that is Lord in poſſeſſion is happier then hee which is Lord only in poſſibility: But God before the creation was onelyonly in poſſibility Lord: Therefore hee is made happier by the creation. But this is abſurd: Therefore the world was from everlasting. Anſw. He is happier that is Lord in poſſeſſion; true, if by the actuall dominion and government there ariſe any more good unto him then hee had before: But unto God, by reaſon of his exceeding great perfection, ſimpleneſſe, and immutability, there could, or can nothing at all come by his creation and dominion over his creatures: For, The reſpects and appellations of Creatour, Lord, Saviour, Redeemer, Father of mankind, and the like, which God in time aſſumeth unto him, doe not appertain to Gods eſſence, but ſignifie the beginnings and mutations of creatures; that is, God is termed Creatour, not of any new action or form that is in him, but of the creatures, which once began to be from him, when they were not at all before. Wherefore, Theſe reſpects, creation, dominion, and the rest, are in the creatures reall relations, but in God reſpects only of our conſideration: and therefore the Creatour and creatures are relatives, not mutually, as the Schoolmen well ſpeak and judge; becauſe not both of them, but one only dependeth of the other, and is referred thereto really and formally, that is, the creature: for in the Creatour is nothing at all depending of the creature. For if the Creator and the creature were relatives mutuall, then theſe abſurdities neceſſarily follow: 1. That God is not most perfect in himſelf. 2. That from everlaſting both the Creatour was, as hee is, Creatour, and the creature. 3. Or ſome reall thing to have come in time to the divine eſſence. 4. And therefore the divine eſſence to be mutable and compound. Wherefore relations in God do not make mutation, but are attributed to God in reſpect of the creatures.