Mr Cottons Clearing Doubts Concerning Predestination, Interpretation 1 · Question 6
The Sixth Doubt.
Queſtion, 6.
HOw may it appeare, that the declaration of the equity and ſufficiency of Gods juſtice is reall, and not pretended; ſince all things are carryed and come to paſſe, by an abſolute and unconditionall decree, and providence: exempli gratia, that fact, Act. 4. 28. & 2. 23.
Anſwer. To ſay that God carryeth all things by an abſolute and unconditionall decree of providence, viz. oppoſing abſolute to all conditions preſuppoſed in the creature, in my judgment is neither agreeing to the Doctrine of Scripture, nor of our Divines; who doe both teach that as God in the fulneſſe of time doth adminiſter and diſpenſe the way of his providence, ſo hee decreed to diſpenſe them in the ſame manner from eternity. Now in diſpenſing the performance of the Covenant of works, the Lord puniſheth and rewardeth the creature according to the condition of obedience or diſobedience performed by it, as it is at large deſcribed, Levit. 26; Deut. 28. and therefore ſurely he decreed to carry ſuch works of his providence upon the ſame conditions.
The places that may bee alledged to the contrary, do ſpeak of Gods Decree in delivering Chriſt to death for us, which as it was a work of meere grace, you may ſafely conceive it was decreed by an abſolute and unconditionall decree of providence, as generally the works of free grace are. For either they depend on no condition in the creature, or at leaſt on none but ſuch as God is pleaſed to work in us, and for us. And yet I beleeve that in your own judgement you think not that God did decree the death of Chriſt, much leſſe deliver him to death, but upon condition of Adams fall. If you ſay, God did as well decree a ſinfull manner of the death of Chriſt by the hands of the wicked, as the death it ſelf, and that by an abſolute, an unconditionall decree.
I anſwer, if you mean an unconditionall decree, preſuppoſing no condition in thoſe creatures, which were the wicked inſtruments of his death, it is ſpoken without warrant either from thoſe places, or from any other. That God gave up Judas to betray him, it was the puniſhment of his covetouſneſſe and hypocriſie. That God gave up the high Prieſts and Phariſees to conſpire againſt him, to deliver him to Pilate, it was the puniſhment of their ambition and envy, and in ſome of them their ſin againſt the Holy Ghoſt. That Pilate againſt his conſcience gave iudgement againſt him, it was the judgement of his carnall popularity and his worldly feare of Caeſar. That the common people and Souldiers cryed out againſt him, and laid violent hands on him, it was the puniſhment of their ignorance and infidelity. Now it is out of all controverſie that God doth not puniſh ſin with ſin, nor decree to puniſh, but upon condition of ſin preſuppoſed. It is true indeed, God worketh all things after the counſell of his will; but that proveth not that God carryeth all things with an abſolute and unconditionall decree of providence. For it is the counſell of his will, as to work the ſalvation of his Elect according to the Covenant of Grace, freely and abſolutely: ſo to diſpenſe rewards and puniſhments to the men of this world according to the condition of their obedience or diſobedience.
There is therefore no place left for ſuch a queſtion, viz. How it may appeare, that the declaration of the equity of Gods Juſtice was not pretended, but reall, ſince all things are carryed and come to paſſe by an abſolute and unconditionall decree of providence. For neither are all things (as it is evident) ſo carryed, and if they were, I had rather ſuch a queſtion ſhould come out of the mouth of an Arminian, then of any godly and judicious Brother.
The Arminians you know upon a ſeeming faire pretence, are wont to object againſt our Divines, that God calleth the Reprobates rather ſimulate then ſorio, in ſemblance rather then in truth, if hee hath before determined of them, by an abſolute and unconditionall decree. But the ſame anſwer your ſelfe would return to their objection, the ſame I return to your queſtion, with more probability, (yea, I may truly ſay) with more ſafety.
That no will of God is conditionall, we have the concurrent Exam.conſent both of our, and Popiſh Divines. For both Piſcator maintaines it againſt Uorſtius, and Bradwardine demonſtrates it: And this condition which you ſpeake of, can be no leſſe then ſome motive cauſe: & Aquinos hath profeſſed that never any was ſo made, as to affirm that there was any cauſe of Predeſtination, quoad actum praedeſtinantis, as touching the act of God predeſtinating; and that for no other reaſon then becauſe there can be no cauſe of the will of God, quoad actum volentis, as touching the act of God willing. Whence it followeth manifeſtly, that in like ſort there can bee no cauſe of reprobation neither quoad actum reprobantis, as touching the act of God reprobating: and conſequently no condition. As for the contrary allegations out of Scripture, and out of Divines, I ſhall be content to conſider them, whenſoever you ſhall produce them; but I am perſwaded you will not bee forwards to trouble your ſelfe there-about, after I ſhall preſent unto you how incongruous a courſe you take to the juſtifying of that which here you affirme. And not incongruous onelyonly, but moſt dangerous, tending manifeſtly to the utter overthrow of the Freeneſſe of Gods grace in Predeſtination; which indeed very frequently you ſhake in this unhappy diſcourſe of yours. As God in fulneſſe of time doth adminiſter and diſpence the wayes of his providence, ſo (you ſay) bee decreed to diſpence them in the ſame manner from all eternity. Wee grant it willingly; but what of all this? you adde, that in diſpencing the performance of the Covenant of workes, the Lord puniſheth and rewardeth the creature according to the condition of obedience or diſobedience performed by it, or rather by the perſons under it: This alſo wee willingly grant. But what doe you inferre herehence? onelyonly this; Therefore ſurely hee decreed to carry ſuch workes of his providence upon the ſame conditions. Now this concluſion we embrace as readily as your ſelfe; but this is farre from juſtifying the decree of God to bee conditionall. Nay, your ſelfe doe plainly expreſſe, that the carriage of ſuch workes of his providence is upon ſuch conditions: Not that Gods decree is upon ſuch conditions: which is as much as to ſay in plaine termes, that the execution of his decree proceeds upon condition, not the decree it ſelfe. Yet I confeſſe, in the ſame manner Arminius himſelfe and his followers diſcourſe; as if they would explicate themſelves in this manner of argumentation. Sinne alwayes goes before damnation; therefore a reſpect to ſinne goes before Gods decree of damnation: As if wee ſhould argue thus. Faith in men of ripe yeares alwayes goeth before ſalvation: therefore a reſpect unto faith alwayes goeth before Gods decree of ſalvation. Doe you not perceive by this the dangerous iſſue of your argumentation? yet this is the very thing they aime at: this is the Helena they are enamoured with. But I am confident you are farre from this, and would not a little grieve to underſtand, that the Orthodox faith of ſome in the very point of predeſtination, is not a little ſhaken by ſuch argumentations as theſe. And the rather, becauſe they have found ſuch an eminent man as your ſelfe, not onelyonly to ſwallow them, but in a confidentiary manner to propoſe them as moſt ſound to give ſatisfaction unto others. Therefore Aquinas fairely diſtinguiſheth of the cauſe or condition of Gods will, either quoad actum volentis, as touching the act of God willing, or quoad res volitas, as touching the things willed; no cauſe or condition thereof, quoad actum volentis; there may be quoad res volitas. As for example, to give inſtance in predeſtination, no cauſe thereof at all, quod actum praedeſtinantis, as touching the act of God predeſtinating; there may be a cauſe thereof quoad res praedeſtinatione praeparatas, as touching the things prepared by predeſtination. As for example: Grace may bee, and is the cauſe of glory, and Chriſts merits may be, and are the cauſe of grace. So of Reprobation no cauſe thereof at all, quoad actum reprobantis, as touching the act of God reprobating, no more then of the will of God, quoad actum volentis, as touching the act of God willing: But there is a came thereof, quoad res reprobatione praeparatas, as touching the things prepared by Reprobation, as ſin is the cauſe of condemnation. And indeed many confound theſe, and thereupon profeſſe the will of God in ſome caſes to bee conditionall; the iſſue whereof is no more then this, That ſome things which God will have to come to paſſe, ſhall not come to paſſe but upon on condition. Thus Voſſius underſtands voluntas conditionata, a conditionate will, which hee attributeth unto God, not conſidering how handſomely he contradicts himſelf. And Doctor Jackson of Providence, diſcourſing of voluntas antecedens & conſequens, will antecedent and conſequent, premiſeth that the diſtinction is to be underſtood non quoad actum vokntis, not touching the act of God willing, but quoad ves volitas, as touching the things willed; though his diſcourſe hereupon bee nothing ſuitable. A manifeſt evidence that hee underſtood not the diſtinction any more then Uoſſius did.
You are willing to acknowledge that Gods decree of delivering Chriſt to death, was abſolute, as a work of meere grace. As for the condition of Adams fall to bee premiſed to this decree, ſure I am, that is not your Opinion: neither doth it become any to maintaine any decree of God to be both unconditionall and conditionall. And why that ſinne more then any other for which Chriſt ſatisfied ſhould be imagined to bee premiſed as a condition of this decree; I ſee no reaſon: and if every ſin muſt bee preſuppoſed, why not the ſin of crucifying Chriſt? This ſin ſtarted Arminius; and this is it, and this alone, which he thinkee good to except in this caſe. I doe nothing wonder that his learning and his honeſty were ſo well met both of a very temperate nature. But albeit the fall of Adam was not preconceived to this decree of delivering of Chriſt to death; yet I am not of your Opinion, who thinke hereupon, that the decree of ſending Chriſt into the world, was before the decree of permitting Adams fall: concerning which I have diſcourſed enough, while I examined how well you cleared the firſt doubt. But when you diſtinguiſh of Gods decree to deliver Chriſt to death, and to deliver him to a ſinfull death; you take a courſe to make mad work amongſt Gods decrees. As if God did firſt intend the generality of a thing, and not till after the foreſight of ſomewhat elſe intend the ſpecialty thereof. I will not tell you how undecent a courſe School-men conceive it to bee, to attribute decrees to God of things indefinite; I never found any Arminian take ſuch a courſe, Philoſophy hath taught us, duplicem ordinem naturae, a double order of nature; as namely, nature generantis, & naturae intendentis, in generation and intention. And albeit, ſecundùm naturam generantem, communia & generalia, are priora ſpecialibus, in generation, things common and generall are before their ſpecialls: According as a man in generation, prius vivit vitam plantae, firſt lives the life of a plant, then vitam animalis, the life of an Animal. Laſtly, vitam hominis, the life of a man; yet quoad naturam intendentem, as touching the intention the order is quite contrary, & that the more ſpecialls (as more perfect) are firſt in intention. And whereas intentio rerum gerendarum, the intention of things to be done, is for the production of things in exiſtence; and it is well known that generals can not exiſt but in ſpecials, nor ſpecials exiſt but in particulars; it is very ſtrange that God ſhould firſt intend to produce a Genius, and after intend the ſpecialty: ſeeing nothing can bee produced but in particular. You may as well ſay that God did firſt intend that Chriſt ſhould die, but whether a natural or violent death that was at firſt undetermined. Secondly, that God determined hee ſhould die a violent death, but whether by a judiciall proceeding, or extrajudiciall, that as yet was left undetermined. And ſee whether this might not bee extended further alſo. But let us examine it by your owne rules, the beſt courſe to preſent before your eyes the ſtrangeneſſe of theſe conceptions. Three things are to bee conſidered as ordered by you one after another. Firſt, Gods abſolute decree to deliver Chriſt to death. Secondly, the foreſight of mens corrupt diſpoſitions. Thirdly, Gods decree to deliver Chriſt to death by the ſins of men.
Now mens ſinfull diſpoſitions depending partly upon originall ſin derived unto all from the ſinne of Adam; partly upon mens former actuall converſations; as alſo upon Gods permiſſion of it to continue uncured and uncorrected; it followeth herehence, that the foreſight of theſe ſinfull diſpoſitions did preſupoſe both that God purpoſed to permit Adams fall, as alſo to bring theſe men forth into the world in originall ſinne, as alſo to permit their former actuall ſins, wherby they arrive to theſe vitious habits; together with his purpoſe to deny grace whereby theſe vitious habits ſhould bee corrected.
Before all theſe decrees, was the decree of delivering Chriſt to death by certain ſins of certain men, according to your Opinion in this place. Whence it followeth, that the delivering of Chriſt to death by the ſins of men, being laſt in intention, muſt bee firſt in execution, to wit, before Adam was ſuffered to fall, or they ſuffered by an evill converſation to ariſe to ſo corrupt diſpoſitions, or God denyed them grace to correct ſuch corrupt diſpoſitions. And though Chriſts ſuffering death in a ſpeciall manner, to wit, by the ſins of men, were to bee firſt in execution, yet Chriſts ſuffering death in generall and in an indefinite manner, was to bee laſt in execution. And this argumentation of mine throughout depends meerly upon your own rules delivered in clearing the firſt doubt. But paſſe wee over theſe ſcrupuloſities.
The courſe you take to explicate Gods providence in puniſhing ſin with ſin, is nothing congruous to the examples thereof ſet down in holy Scripture. For whereas Judas his betraying of Chriſt was a fruit of his covetouſneſſe, you make Gods giving him over to the committing of this ſin to bee the puniſhment of his covetouſneſſe. Likewiſe whereas the High Prieſts and Phariſees conſpiracy againſt Chriſt was a fruite of their envy; (for Pilate knew that for envy they had delivered him) and of their ambition, as appeareth Joh. 11. 48. you make Gods giving them over to the committing of this ſin, to bee the puniſhment of their ambition and envy. In like ſort that Pilate gave judgement againſt Chriſt being a fruit of his popularity and worldly feare of Caeſar, the giving of him over to the committing of this ſin, you make to bee the puniſhment of his popularity and worldly feare of Caeſar. So the Jews crying out againſt him being a fruite of their ignorance and infidelity, the giving them over unto this ſin, you make it to bee the puniſhment of their ignorance and infidelity.
Now ſhew mee any example throughout the book of God in puniſhing ſin with ſin, anſwerable unto this. As if God did puniſh mens ſinfull diſpoſitions by giving them over to bring forth the proper and congruous fruites of thoſe ſinfull diſpoſitions, Rom. 1. Wee read God gave the Gentiles over into a reprobate minde, to doe things inconvenient, to commit horrible uncleaneneſſe. But God hereby puniſhed not the unclean diſpoſition, the fruites whereof were brought forth by Gods giving them over into a reprobate minde, but hereby God puniſhed their Idolatry, 2 Theſſ. 2. 20. Wee read of Gods giving men over to illuſions to beleeve lies, hereby hee did not puniſh their infidelity, the fruite whereof was, the beleeving lies, but hereby hee puniſhed their want of love to Gods truth. So when God ſent an evill ſpirit between Abimelech and the men of Sechem, to ſet them together by the eares, hee did not hereby puniſh their mutuall hatred one againſt another, but rather their joynt conſpiracy againſt the ſons of Jerubbaal. I doe not deny but it may bee ſaid, as Auſtin ſaith, that God hath ordained, Ut omnis inordinatus animus paena ſit ſibi, That every inordinate minde ſhould bee a puniſhment to it ſelf; but in my judgement it is a ſtrange liberty of ſpeech, to ſay, that God doth puniſh a man for his covetouſneſſe, by not reſtraining it, but ſuffering it to have his courſe.
What you mean by giving Judas over to betray Chriſt, I know not. Gods providence operative in evill, is of an obſcure nature. You ſpeak of obduration and of giving over unto ſin, but wherein it conſiſts you explicate not. Yet by declining theſe phraſes, you forſake the point in queſtion: Which is not at this preſent, whether God gave Judas over to the betraying of Chriſt, but whether hee decreed hee ſhould betray him, and the Prieſts conſpire againſt him, and the people preferre Barabbas before him, and Pilate condemn him. Which becauſe you not directly deny, the Queſtion is tranſferred to the manner of this decree: as namely, whether it bee abſolute or conditionall. You will have it to bee conditionall, to wit, upon the preſuppoſall of Judas his covetouſneſſe. Yet this you doe not in plain terms expreſſe, as indeed you ſeldome ſet down your meaning plainly, giving your ſelf too much liberty in ſpeaking at large, which is no way conducing to the inveſtigation of truth, but a ſore impediment rather. Having ſaid that it is without warrant to ſay, that the ſinfull manner of Chriſts death was decreed by God by an unconditionall decree, preſuppoſing no condition in the creatures, which were the wicked inſtruments of his death. Whereas hereupon you ſhould ſhew upon preſuppoſall of what condition in Judas, in the Prieſts, in Pilate, God decreed that Judas ſhould betray him, the Prieſts deliver him to Pilate, and Pilate condemn him: you decline this, and in a new phraſe tell us, that it was the puniſhment of Judas his covetouſneſſe and hypocriſie, that God gave him up to betray Chriſt; and in like manner you ſpeak of the reſt. Leaving to your Reader to expiſcate your direct meaning, and to explicate that which you involve. It ſeems your meaning is, that upon the foreſight of Judas his covetouſneſſe and hypocriſie, God decreed hee ſhould betray him.
Now let us diſcuſſe this; If God did in this manner decree it, then certainly upon the covetouſneſſe of Judas hee brought this to paſſe. Now I demand by what courſe of providence God brought it to paſſe, that Judas betrayed him? you ſay it was by giving him over to betray him. Now what you mean by this I know not, neither doe you expreſſe: but I will indevour to explain it.
Firſt, I preſume your meaning is God did not reſtrain his covetouſneſſe, for this ſeems to bee the meaning of this phraſe, Pſal. 81. where it is ſaid, God gave them over to their own hearts luſts, and by way of explication it is added, And let them follow their own inventions. Now this courſe of providence was not ſufficient to bring it to paſſe, that Judas ſhould betray him. For this is onelyonly to let him doe what hee will in the courſe of his covetouſneſſe. Now though Judas was left to doe what hee would in the way of ſatisfying his covetous courſe, yet it doth not follow hereupon that Judas ſhould betray Chriſt. Therefore Arminius to this decree of God, preſuppoſeth not Judas his covetouſneſſe onelyonly, but his will to betray Chriſt, as much as to ſay, God foreſeeing hee would betray him, decreed hee ſhould betray him. To this conſtruction of Gods decree you come too neere, though you doe not deliver your ſelf thereof ſo plainly as hee doth, nor ſo plauſibly. But the miſchief is, it is now confeſſed on all hands; that the very act of willing is wrought by God, and conſequently was decreed by God. Now upon what condition preſuppoſed did God decree that Judas ſhould will the betraying of Chriſt? was it upon the foreſight of his will? If ſo, then alſo upon the preſuppoſition of Judas his will to doe this, God did work his will to do this; which is flat contradiction, in making Judas his will to doe this, to goe before his will to doe this. Beſides, what need was there for God to work his will to doe this, when his will to doe this is already preſuppoſed? Bellarmine goes another way to work, and confeſſing that God decreed that Chriſt ſhould bee betrayed and crucifyed, yet denies that hee decreed that any ſhould betray and crucifie him. Chriſts ſuffering was decreed and his patience therein, but not their ſin in putting him upon ſuffering. Your interpretation is leſſe plain then theirs, but equally with theirs removed from the truth. Puniſhment of ſin alway preſuppoſeth (I confeſſe) ſin; but I deny that the decree of puniſhing ſin preſuppoſeth ſin. If this argument were right; then it would follow, that becauſe to reward with everlaſting life, preſuppoſeth good works, Gods decree to reward with everlaſting life, preſuppoſeth good works; which is as much to ſay that election preſuppoſeth good works. For election is the decree of beſtowing everlaſting life by way of reward; yet here you bring in Gods puniſhing ſin with ſin, whereof there is no queſtion here, and forbeare to ſpeak of Gods decree, whereof alone is the preſent queſtion. I pray you what rewards doth God diſpenſe unto Reprobates in regard of their obedience? will you deny plain Text of Scripture expreſſely profeſſing, That wee muſt all appeare aſore the judgement ſeat of Chriſt, that every man may receive the things which are done in his body, according to that hee hath done, whether it bee good or evill? OnelyOnly here is the difference, Chriſt made ſatisfaction for Gods Elect, and not of Reprobates. And alſo merited that God ſhould inable his Elect, and not Reprobates to perform obedience acceptable to God, according to the Covenant of Grace, and that Salvation accordingly ſhall bee beſtowed upon them by way of reward.
Yet I confeſſe Gods equity and juſtice in diſpenſing rewards and puniſhments is no way prejudiced by the abſoluteneſſe of his decree. For hee hath abſolutely decreed to deale with men according to that, which they have done in their bodies whether it bee good or evill; though the good which is done is meerely of Gods grace, and his rewarding men accordingly, is no impediment to the courſe of his Covenant of Grace.
Gods calling of Reprobates wee conceive conſiſts in cauſing the Goſpel to bee Preached unto them, which in effect is this, Whoſoever beleeves ſhall bee ſaved, whoſoever beleeves not ſhall bee damned; judge you whether there bee not as much truth in Preaching this to Reprobates, as in Preaching it to the very Elect of God.