The Riches of Gods Love, Part 2 · Section 8
Section 8.
The will is determined to an Object two waies. 1. By compulſion againſt the bent and inclination of M. Maſon's Addit. p. 35. 36.it. 2. By neceſſity according to the naturall deſire and liking of it. God's predeſtination ſay they, de termineth the will to ſinne this laſt way, but not the firſt; It forceth no man to doe that which he would not, but carrieth him towards that which he would. When men ſin, tis true they cannot chooſe; And it is as true, they will not chooſe. It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine that God's decree is the cauſe of men's ſins, but their own wicked wills.
1. The Ancients made no diſtinction between theſe two words (Neceſſity) and (Compulſion) but uſed them in this argument promiſcuouſly; and did deny that God did neceſſitate men to ſinne, leaſt they ſhould grant him hereby to be the Authour of ſin, as I have touched before, and ſhall intimate againe afterward. Nor did the School men put any difference between them, as may appeare by the teſtimony of M. Calvin, who ſpeaking of the School-diſtinction of the will's threefold liberty; from neceſſity, from ſin, from Miſery, ſaith, This diſtinction I could willingly receive, but that it confoundeth neceſſitie with coaction.
2. That which neceſſitateth the will to ſinne is as truly the cauſe of ſinne, as that which forceth it, becauſe it maketh the ſinne to be inevitably committed, which otherwiſe might be avoided; and therefore if the Divine decree neceſſitate man's will to ſinne, it is as truly the cauſe of ſinne as if it did inforce it.
3. That which neceſſitates the will to ſinne, is more truly the cauſe of the ſinne, then the will is; becauſe it overruleth the will, and beareth all the ſtroke, taketh from it, 'its true liberty, by which it ſhould be Lord of it ſelfe, and diſporſer of 'its own acts, and in reſpect of which it hath been uſually called by Philoſophers and Fathers too, foreign, a power which is under the inſuperable check and controule of no Lord but it ſelfe. It overruleth, I ſay, & maketh it become but a ſervile inſtrument, irreſiſtably ſubject to ſuperiour command and determination; And therefore is a truer cauſe of all ſuch acts and ſins, as proceed from the will ſo determined, then the will is. For when two Cauſes concurre to the producing of an effect, the one a principle overruling cauſe, the other but inſtrumentall, and wholly at the Devotion of the principall; then is the effect in all reaſon to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of 'its influxe and impreſſion produceth it, rather then to the ſubordinate and inſtrumentall which is but a mere ſervant in the production of it We ſhall find it ordinary in Scripture to aſcribe the effect to the principall Agent. It is not ye that ſpeak, ſaith Chriſt, but the Spirit of my Father that ſpeaketh in you. I laboured more abundantly then Mat: 10. 20. 1 Co: 15. 10.they all, yet not I, but the grace of God which was in me. And I live: yet not I, but Chriſt liveth in me ſaith St. Paul. Gal: 2. 20. In theſe and many other places the effect or work ſpoken of, is taken from the inſtrument, and given to the principall agent; Which being ſo, though man's will worke with God's decree in the commiſſion of ſinne, and willeth the ſin which it doth, yet ſeing what the will doth, it doth by the commanding power of God's Allmighty decree, and ſo it doth that otherwiſe it cannot doe; the ſin committed cannot ſo rightly be aſcribed to man's will, the inferiour as to God's neceſſitating decree the ſuperiour cauſe.
4. That which makes a man ſinne by way of neceſſitie, that is with, and not againſt his will, is the cauſe of ſin in a worſe manner, then that which conſtraineth him to ſinne againſt his will; As he which by powerfull perſwaſions drawes a man to ſtab, to hang, to poiſon himſelfe is in a groſſer manner the cauſe of that evill, and unnaturall action then he that by force compells him; becauſe he maketh him to conſent to his own death; And ſo if Gods decree doe not only make men ſin; but ſin willingly too; not only cauſe that they ſhall (malè agere) doe evill; but (malè velle) will evill, it hath the deeper hand in the ſinne.
God determines the will to ſinne by neceſſitie, though not by compulſion: this he obtrudes upon our Devines as their opinion, but quotes none, is it likely that he who quotes Beza to Anſwer.ſhew that in his opinion, God doth not only permit ſinne, but will ſinne; And Calvin to ſhew, that a man's mind is blinded, volente & jubente Deo; would not quote ſome or other of our Divines to prove that which he obtrudes upon them? If his common place booke could afford him any ſuch quotation out of any one of them, to ſhew who they be, and where they ſay that, God determines the will to ſinne by neceſſity though not by compulſion. Was there ever the like crimination made againſt any without naming them that ſay ſo, and the place where, and their own words? Or hath this man or any of his ſpirit deſerved any credit to be truſted this way? The very phraſe of determining in Latine is no word of courſe with our Divines in this argument. It is the phraſe of the Dominicans. But doe they ſay that God determines the will to ſinne? I doe not thinke he can produce one of them that expreſſeth himſelfe ſo unſcholaſtically, ſo abſurdly. Alvarez ſaith that, God by his effectuall decree predetermineth ſecond cauſes to worke. He ſaith that God doth predetermine De aux: diſp▪ 22 Diſp. 24. Diſp. 26.the will to the act of ſinne, as it is an act. That the firſt root of contingency is the will of God. Then to what doth God determine the will in their opinion? Is it to the act only and not to the manner of its production? Namely, to produce it voluntarily and freely? Nothing leſſe though this Authour counts it his wiſdome to conceale this. God by his omnipotency doth cauſe, that man whoſe heart he moves to will and will freely. Againe, God's generall concourſe is a divine, immediate influence into ſecond cauſes whereby they are, foremoved, applyed ibid. Diſp: 118. pag. 485. ibid de aux: Diſp 1…1. pag. 490. …. 3.and determined to worke every one according to the condition of its nature; The naturall cauſe naturally; the free cauſe freely; as I have profeſſedly delivered. Diſput. 18. 23. And that in ſuch ſort freely, as they can chooſe to doe otherwiſe if they will, and that in the very inſtant wherin they doe what they doe. But come we to conſider his anſwer.
1. Touching that which he ſaith of the Ancients, he gives us his bare word for it, as touching the confounding of neceſſitie and compulſion; yet Bernard I confeſſe willingly, in talking of liberty from neceſſity, underſtands by neceſſity coaction. He ſaith farther, that thoſe Ancients did deny that God did neceſſitate men to ſinne, leaſt they ſhould grant thereby that God is the Authour of ſinne. But I doe not thinke he can ſhew this phraſe of neceſſitating the will any way to be found among the Ancients, what he hath touched before I have conſidered, what he ſhall intimate hereafter, I hope I ſhall not let it paſſe unſaluted. And the truth is to neceſſitate hath ſuch an Emphaſis with it as to perſwade that whatſoever a man is neceſſitated to do, that he doth by conſtraint againſt his will. And it is a rule commonly received that Voluntas non poteſt cogi, The will cannot be forced; which is moſt true, as touching Actus eliciti, the acts of the will inward and immediate, and not ſo of actus imperati, acts outward and commanded. But Bradwardine who alone uſeth this phraſe among'ſt School-Divines, takes it in no ſuch ſenſe, but only for an effectuall operation of God upon the will moving it to worke this or that, not neceſſarily, but freely; which this Authour moſt judiciouſly diſſembleth all along for deſparing to prevaile by true and ſubſtantiall information of the underſtanding; perturbundis affectibus ſuffuratur; by a corrupt propoſition of his Adverſaries tenet, hopes to worke diſtaſt upon the Readers affections. Bradwardines poſition is this, God can after a ſort neceſſitate every created will to 'its free act, and to a free ceſſation, & vacation from act: and hath a Corollary to this effect; That Bradw, de cauſa Dei l. 3. c. 1.ſome kind of neceſity, and liberty are not repugnant, but may conſiſt together. Againe, God doth after a ſortneceſſitate every created will, unto every free act therefore, and to every free ceſſation Id ibid, c. 2.and vacation from act that by neceſſity antecedent naturally. And he addes a Corollary, that ſome kind of antecedent neceſſity and liberty are not repugnant, and may conſiſt together.
This diſtinction of liberty from neceſſitie, liberty from ſinne, liberty from miſery, I find in Bernard, and Voſſius alleadgeth it only out of him, and the School-men might take it up after him. Bernard hath many obſcure paſſages in the proſecuting of it, eſpecially in reference to the two firſt members. Neither doth Voſſius take any paines to cleare them from a manifeſt contradiction in ſhew: And no marvaile if Doctor Potter doth not, in ſtating the opinion of the Church of England in the point of free will, which he undertakes very magnificently in his anſwer to charity miſtaken; he was content to be led by his blind guid: now the ſeeming contradiction is this. If there be in a naturallman no liberty from ſinne, then is he neceſſarily carried into ſinne; and how then is there any liberty in him from neceſſitie? unleſſe neceſſitie be taken as all one with conſtraint. And Bernard ſometimes in that very treatiſe doth clearly expreſſe himſelfe to underſtand thereby coaction. And ſo M. Fulkes in his anſwer to the Rhemiſh teſtament, denying unto man liberty from ſinne, yet grants unto him a liberty from coaction. And indeed ſinne to the profane perſon is like a ſweet morſell which he rolleth under his tongue, as the booke of Iob ſpeaks, he comes not conſtrained thereunto; but naturally takes delight therein; & I doubt too many there be, who though they are driven to confeſſe, that a naturall man hath no liberty from ſinne; yet they pleaſe themſelves with a certaine expreſſion of Lindan's, that a man hath free will unto ſinne; hoping therehence to conclude when time ſerves, that a man as he hath freedome to commit it, ſo he hath freedome to abſtaine from it, and ſo by a backe doore to draw in a Tenet quite contrary to the firſt, namely that even a naturall man hath liberty from ſinne. I am not ſure that Lindan did well underſtand his own expreſſion, ſo as to know how to make it good, much leſſe that they are able who licke their lips at it. But of this, and the clearing of Bernard, and of the difference between liberty naturall, and liberty morall I have elſe where diſcourſed at large. And Calvin obſerving this contradiction might well blame them that confound neceſſity, with coaction; whereby a way is opened to conclude, that becauſe a man is free from conſtraint of ſinning, therefore he is free from neceſſity of ſinning; whereas originall ſin doth neceſſarily incline him to ſinfull actions & courſes in generall; though to this kind of ſin in ſpeciall, or to this particular, in what kindſoever, it doth not: yet by the way it is to be conſidered, that Calvin in ſome particulars, as namely in gracious courſes, did attribute ſo much to the efficacy of God's operation upon a man's will, as that the actions performed thereby though voluntary, yet in his opinion were not to be accounted free; & indeed they are wrought in oppoſition & as it were in ſpight of a certain principall of corruption that in part remaines in the very beſt of God's children. But we ſee no reaſon to the contrary, but that, when once God hath planted in us a principle of new life, of the life of grace, by the ſpirit of regeneration, though all the powers thereof doe incline only to that which is good, like as the powers of naturall corruption incline only unto evill, yet the particular uſe and exerciſe of thoſe is alwaies free: Like as the particular uſe and exerciſe of the powers of our corruption is allwaies free to the committing of this or that ſinne according unto emergent occaſions ſtanding in congruity to every man's particular diſpoſitiō.
2. The Authour keepes himſelfe to the language of his own Court, but he ſhould not ſo imperiouſly put it upon his oppoſites to concurre with him in the language of Aſhdod. We know nothing that neceſſitates the will to ſinne, but that originall corruption, wherein every man is conceived, and which we brought with us into the world. For that makes us impatient of a yoake, like unruly Heyfers; And nothing is more burthenſome unto us in our corrupt nature, then the holy lawes of God; The ſtatutes of Omri are not ſo, nor all the manner of the houſe of Ahab; theſe are punctually obſerved, when God's holy ordinances are proudly deſpiſed. God moves every creature to worke agreeably to 'its nature. Neceſſary Agents neceſſarily, contingent Agents contingently, Free Agents freely. He doth not move to any ſuch act as is ſinfull, ſave only where the feare of God is not at all found, or not quickned, but the motions and ſuggeſtions of Satan entertained; nor then neither alwaies; and that not only in his own children, but even in the hearts of the wicked to reſtraine from ſinfull courſes in ſpight of Satans temptations, by injecting into their minds the conſideration either of danger, or of ſhame enſu…ng, ſo in a naturall way to reſtraine from the committing of ſuch an act as is ſinfull; eſpecially when he ſeeth it prejudiciall to the peace of his Church in generall, or any member thereof in particular; otherwiſe if he gives them over to Satan, and moves them agreably to his ſuggeſtions entertained by them, as being naturally well pleaſed with them, why ſhould this ſeem ſtrange to any? So that not any ſin is inevitably committed by the moſt wicked creature that lives upon the face of the earth, but he hath power enough (I doe not ſay to avoid it, an abſurd phraſe as if ſinne were a thing to be forced upon a man whether he would or no, but) to abſtaine from it, though not in a gracious manner, that being in the power of them only who have the ſpirit of regeneration dwelling in them.
3. In the ſame language he proſecutes his vile cauſe, giving manifeſt evidence to the world that it cannot be ſupported without lyes, nor embraced by any but thoſe whom God in his ſecret judgments hath given over to ſtrong illuſions to believe lyes, It is not incredible to me that ever any Papiſt or Proteſtant hath affirmed that God neceſſitates the will to ſinne; They generally acknowledge that evill hath no cauſe efficient, but deficient only: The terme of God's operation is no other then the ſubſtance of the act, which as an entity, and as an act muſt neceſſarily proceed from God, as Aquinas hath delivered. And albeit they maintaine that God's concurrence to the producing of the act doth worke upon the will of the creature which, from the firſt time that Divines came reſolutely unto the acknowledgment of this Divine concourſe to the act of ſin, hath alſo been received as I have ſhewed in my Vinaiciae. For Peter Lombard diſputing on either ſide about this concurrence, leaves it indifferent to the Reader to imbrace either part: Either the affirmative that God doth concurre to every act, though it be ſinfull or the negative. Yet I ſay as many as doe maintaine the affirmative, doe ſo maintaine God's motion upon the creatures will, as to move it only agreably unto it's nature, namely to work freely not neceſſarily. Like as he moves neceſſary Agents to work neceſſarily, and contingent Agents to worke contingently. And if this Authour be ignorant hereof, which may well give him boldnes. For who ſo bold as blind Bayard? What doth he other in all this but betray his own ſhame comming to diſcourſe on ſuch an argument, as an aſſe comes to play upon an harp, as the proverbe ſpeaks. But if he be not ignorant of this, what unſhamefaſtneſſe doth he manifeſt all along, making bold only upon the ſimplicity and ignorance of his Reader to gull him, and abuſe him, and draw him along to oppoſe the free grace of God in predeſtination and regeneration, under colour of making God the Authour of ſinne in the point of reprobation; which yet he deſpaires of making good againſt us without notorious untruths, and that undoubtedly delivered againſt his own knowledge. For what Authour hath he produced to juſtifie this that any of our Divines maintaines that God neceſſitates the will of man to ſin? Not any that I know uſing this phraſe Neceſſitate but Papiſts, and among'ſt them none that I know but Bradwardine a man renowned in his time both for eminent learning, and eminent piety, as appeares by Sir Henry Savill's preface unto that book of his; and he no where affirming that God neceſſitates any man unto ſinne; but only to the ſubſtance of the act; & that not ſo as to make the will work neceſſarily, as the phraſe imports in a vulgar eare, and unto a popular judgment (whereupon alone this Author takes his advantage moſt unconſcionably) but agreably to 'its nature, that is contingently and freely. For were he able to produce any one of our Divines that affirmeth this, why doth he not? Is there any…hing throughout this whole diſcourſe that more requires he ſhould name the man, and quote the places, where this is affirmed, then this? Yet here we find a blank; he carrieth it on magnificently upon his own bare word, which deſerves no credit at our hands; And is it poſſible to believe ſo foule a crimination without all evidence produced, unleſſe faction and partiallity hath blinded his eyes? Should he have laied to our charge that we maintaine that God neceſſitates the will to any good act, and to overrule the will therein, we ſhould utterly deny it without diſtinction. It is true he overrules the will of the fleſh, but not the will of the Spirit, the regenerate part, but moves it agreably to 'its nature, and to worke not only voluntarily but freely whatſoever it worketh. For albeit the regenerate part is like a morall vertue (though as much tranſcendent to it, as a thing ſupernaturall tranſcends a thing naturall) inclining only to that which is good; yet is it alwaies moved to this particular good rather then unto an other moſt freely. Like as a man's naturall corruption inclines a man only to evill; yet to this kind of evill or to this particular evill, rather then to that, Man is moved moſt freely. So that if we maintaine not that God workes a man to every good act, otherwiſe then freely; let the very conſcience of our enemies judge, whether we can maintaine that God neceſſitates the will either of men or of Devills unto ſinne. For it is apparent that God hath a Double influence unto a good act. One unto it as unto an act, and that is influence generall; Another unto it as unto a good and gracious act, and that we acknowledge to be an influence ſpeciall and ſupernaturall. But as touching an evill act, all ſides confeſſe that God hath but a ſingle influence thereunto and that generall, namely, as it is an act, not as it is evill. And albeit this influence which we call concurrence unto the act, be joyned with an influence into the will of the creature to move it to the producing of the ſame act; yet this motion is no other thē whereby the will is moved to worke agreably to 'its nature; that is freely. Like as all other Agents are moved by God, the firſt Agents to worke agreably to their natures, neceſſary things to worke neceſſarily, contingent things contingently. So that in all this there is no overruling of the will, no liberty taken from her; but rather ſhe is maintained and eſtabliſhed in her free condition, and moved agreably thereunto; like as in the eleaventh Article of Ireland it is expreſſed. For after it is laid downe that, God from all eternity did by his unchangable counſell ordaine whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe; It is forthwith added that, hereby no violence us offered to the wills of the reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the ſecond cauſes is taken away but eſtabliſhed rather. But becauſe of another claw that here is ſubjoyned by this Authour, it is to be conſidered that the liberty of the creature is not equall unto the liberty of the Creator God himſelfe: But like as all other cauſes are but ſecond cauſes, God alone the prime cauſe; All other Agents but ſecond Agents, God alone the firſt Agent. So likewiſe all other free Agents are but ſecond free Agents, God alone primum liberum, the firſt free Agent. So that no liberty of the creature doth or can exempt it from the Agency of God, In whom we live and move and have our being what a proud thing & preſumptuous were it for the creature to aſpire unto ſuch an exemption. Who oppoſe us in the point of free will more then Papiſts? Yet ſee how Alvarez diſputes againſt this viſe and preſumptuous conceit, ſo much maintained by the Jeſuites, and after taken up by the Arminians, who live by their ſcraps, as if they would be content to waſh their diſhes. The Jeſuites diſcourſe thus, That the will may be free, ſhe muſt have the Dominion of her act, true ſaith Alvarez, debet habere Dominium ſui actûs, Diſp. 22. num: 44.non tamen oportet quod habeat primum & abſolutum Dominium ſui actus, ſhe muſt have the dominion overher act, but not the firſt and abſolute deminion of her act. And Diſput. 117, he propoſeth this queſtion, Whether the will hath her dominion of her act, and what dominion this is. In the reſolution whereof he propoſeth three concluſions.
1. The free will of man hath the dominion of her act as the next cauſe thereof. In this concluſion the Divines on both ſides doe concurre. 2. Free will created in the actuall uſe of Dominion and power which ſhe hath over her acts, depends on God as of an abſolute Lord, predeliberating, and predetermining before the foreknowledge of the creatures future cooperation what the free will, will doe in particular. This concluſion is held of all thoſe Divines who maintaine that God by his motion or effectuall grace, not only morally, but efficiently and phyſically doth cauſe us to worke that which is good, & it is proved, ſaith he by all thoſe reaſons whereby it hath been formery ſhewed that God by his decree & effectuall motion doth predetermine all ſecond cauſes, even ſuch as are free, to worke, preſerving their liberty and nature 3. The dominion of her act is not firſt in the power of free will created, but in the power and dominion of God, eſpecially in reſpect of acts ſupernaturall Our meaning is that all dominion & actuall uſe of dominion which the created will hath as cauſa proxima the next cauſe, or doth exerciſe over her free acts which ſhe produceth, proceedeth from God, as from the cheifeſt & firſt cauſe efficient, & ought to be reſolved into him as into the firſt Authour & firſt abſolute Lord thereof And the truth is the queſtion of free will, is commonly confounded though there is place of momentous diſtincion. For as for free will unto good that is merely Morall, and the reſolution thereof, is according to the reſolution in the point of originall ſinne. But free will unto actions in generall under an appearance of good, this is naturall liberty; and the reſolution thereof depends upon a right underſtanding of God's naturall providence in governing the world, and working with all creatures in their ſeverall kinds, ſuch operations as are agreable to their ſeverall conditiōs. The firſt liberty conſiſts in diſpoſing man aright towards his end; like as morall vertues tend to this. But the ſecond liberty conſiſt's only in the right uſe of the meanes, unto what end ſoever is projected by us. The appearance of good moving herein is only, in genere boni conducentis, in the kind of good conducing to the end propounded; whether that end can be good or evill, right or wrong. But the appearence of good moving in the former is only, ſummiboni, of our cheifeſt good, the enjoying whereof will make us happy. But to returne, this Authour with whom I deale in preſent, ſtands for the will of man's abſolute dominion over her acts; as before he did expreſſe; whereas Alvarez profeſſeth utterly againſt this, Neither doe I blame him for contradicting Alvarez in this; but for carrying himſelfe like a poſitive Theologue, nor ſo only, but like a peremptory Theologue contenting himſelfe to dictate rules to others without all proofe, ſave this that otherwiſe we make God the Authour of ſinne. Yet this is not any expreſſe Argument of his neither; but he obtrudes premiſe, upon us, which I thinke was never affirmed by any Divines of theſe dayes, unleſſe it be by ſome Libertines, againſt whom none that I know have diſputed more effectually then ſome of thoſe very Divines which here are traduced by him. But obſerve the vile and abominable iſſue of this Authours doctrine in this particular, making man as he is a free creature to be the Lord of his own free act; yea and to have the abſolute dominion thereof, as formerly he did expeſſe Sect: 3. For ſeing the act of faith, of repentance, and the like are free acts; if liberty cannot be maintained unleſſe a man hath the abſolute dominion of his own act, hence it manifeſtly followeth, that God doth not determine the will to believe, to repent, or to any good work, yet the Scripture profeſſeth that God is he, who makes us perfect unto every good worke, working in us that which is pleaſing in his ſight through Ieſus Chriſt. That it is God who worketh in us both the Heb: 13. 21.will and the deed according to his good pleaſure. So that if a man ſhould live Methuſalch his age, and ſpend that whole time in a gracious converſation; yet that God doth worke in him either the will or the deed of one gracious act more, it is merely of his good pleaſure; ſo little cauſe have we to preſume of perſeverance in that which is good by out own ſtrength. And againe all this God workes in us for Chriſt his ſake. Chriſt hath deſerved even this at the hands of God his father. What then is the meaning of this, that God ſhould cooperate with us to the will and the deed, provided that we will? Conſider the abſurdity of this (upon the ſuppoſall of the poſſibility of ſuch a cooperation, which yet by evident reaſon may be demonſtrated to be utterly impoſſible.) Did Chriſt merit any thing for the Angells? yet doth he not cooperate with them to every act of theirs as well as to any of ours? Nay is it poſſible that any act ſhould exiſt without God's operation? And is it reaſonable to ſubject ſuch a courſe of Divine providence to the merits of Chriſt? Thus we ſee whereunto this Authour tends in this diſcourſe of his, namely ſo to maintaine God to be no Authour of ſinne, as withall to maintaine that he is no Authour of that which is good, no not of faith, repentance, or any gracious act that is freely performed by any creature man or Angell: we on the other ſide deſire & endeavour ſo to carry our ſelves that while we vindicate God from being the Authour of evill, we may not therewithall deny him to be the Authour of any thing, that is good and gracious; which is this Authours courſe, as appeares manifeſtly in the iſſue. And obſerve his crafty cariage foxe like; Had he dealt upon predeſtination, and the efficacy of grace, and therein profeſſed plainly that faith and repentance being free acts, every man's will hath an abſolute dominion over them; and therefore God doth not determine the will thereunto: For that were to make God the Authour of faith and repentance; how many thouſands would have been ready to have flowen in his face, and abhorre ſuch abominable doctrine. Therefore he baulks that, and deales only upon reprobation; and here he layeth to our charge that we make God the Authour of ſinne, by neceſſitating and determining the will to ſinne (though his premiſes herein I have ſhewen to be moſt falſe) therefore he maintains that God doth not determine the will ſo much as to the act whereunto the ſinfulneſſe accrewes; both becauſe man's will is free; and becauſe ſo he ſhould be the Authour of ſinne. And if once he can make his Reader to ſwallow this, he doubts not but to take him in the point of predeſtination and grace alſo; and make him wary to take heed of maintaining that God determines or neceſſitates the will of man to any good act whether it be of faith or of repentance, and that for feare of denying man to have the abſolute dominion over his will, to worke himſelfe to faith and repentance at his pleaſure: and ſecondly, for feare of makeing God the Authour of faith and repentance and every good act; Like as by ſaying that God doth determine or neceſſitate the will to ſinne, we make him the Authour of ſinne. Behold Reader the iſſue of this man's Divinity; and whether he be not leading thee into the very chambers of death, by working thee with him to oppoſe the free grace of God, both in predeſtination and in regeneration, and the power and efficacy therereof in working thee to faith, to repentance, and to every thing that is pleaſing and acceptable unto him, & that through Jeſus Chriſt. Yet we have ſhewed a manifeſt difference between God's moving the creature unto that which is good, and moving the creature unto ſuch acts as are evill. For in evill be moves only to the ſubſtance of the act, whereof our Adverſaries themſelves acknowledge God to be the Authour, that is the efficient cauſe, and this he performes by influence generall. But as touching every good act, the Lord moveth not only to the ſubſtance of the act by influence generall, but alſo to the goodnes thereof by influence ſpeciall. He proceeds to tell us what Philoſophers teach concerning the condition of the will. And becauſe it is very abſurd for a Chriſtian to goe to ſchoole to Philoſophers to learne the condition of Divine providence; he tels us of Fathers too that maintaine the ſame as he ſaith, but he quotes neither the one, nor the other. Now I would gladly know what Father hath ever taught that God hath no power over the will of man to convert it, and ex nolentibus volentes facere, of unwilling, to make men willing, to worke men to faith, to repentance, to all kind of pious obedience. And as for God's ſecret providence in evill, how plentifull is the Scripture concerning this? God is ſaid to have ſent Ioſeph into Egypt, though this was brought to paſſe by the parricidiall hands of his brethren; To tell David, that the ſword ſhould not depart from his houſe, though this could not be taken up or uſed, but by the free will of men; To ſend Senacherib againſt a diſſembling nation; and to profeſſe that this proud King in all his bloudy executions upon the people of God, was but as the axe, or the ſawe in the hand of God. The like is teſtified concerning Nabuchodonoſor after him. Nay the Prophet demands, Whether there be any evill in the Citty and the Lord hath not done it; ſpeaking of the evill of puniſhment, though wickedly executed by the hands of wicked men; that the Lord cauſed the King of Aſſur to fall by the ſword in his own land, though this was done by the hands of his own children. And as in violent courſes, ſo in impure courſes the Scripture as plainly teſtifies the ſecret providence of God to have place therein. And what doth Auſtin obſerve from the like places both in his fift book againſt Iulian the Pelag: c: 3, and in his book de gratia & libero arbitrio, profeſſing, occulto Dei judicio fieri perverſitatem cordis, that the perverſity of the heart, or will, comes to paſſe by the ſecret judgment of God; And the power that God hath over the wills of men to incline them even to evill; that is his phraſe as I have formerly ſhewed, abundantly repreſenting the places where he delivers this. He proceeds not ſo much in Scholaſticall diſcourſe, as in rhetoricall amplification, more like a Shrew vexing him ſelfe and fretting that he cannot have his will, then like a diſputer. That which neceſſitates the will makes it become but a ſervile inſtrument, irreſiſtably ſubject to ſuperiour command and determination; this action of command comes in moſt unſeaſonably, it denoting a morall action, commanding not only things agreable, but ſometimes contrary to the will of the perſon commanded. No ſuch thing hath place in God's moving of the will of man (did he move it unto ſinne which yet is moſt falſe; for he moves it only to the ſubſtance of the act.) But why ſhould it ſeeme ſtrange that the creature ſhould be a Servant to the Creator, and his inſtrument, and a ſervile inſtrument. Yet the notion of ſervility is very aliene from the matter in hand, that having place only in proper ſpeech as touching morall obedience; that which we treat of, is rather of motions naturall, and of the ſubordination of the ſecond cauſe to the firſt, the ſecond Agent to the firſt. And was ever any ſober man known to oppoſe this with ſuch froth of words as this Authour doth? Doth this Authour himſelfe thinke it poſſible that the Creature can move it ſelfe, or performe any operation without God's concourſe? I doe not think he doth. Doe we not live in God, have we not our being in God? And what is this other then to ſay that our life and being depend on God, in the kind of a cauſe efficient? And doth not the ſame Apoſtle, and in the ſame place teſtifie, and that in the words of an heathen man (to ſhew that all ſuch did not ſo maintaine the foreign, the foreign, the foreign condition of the will, as to maintaine the exemption of it from influence Divine) profeſſe that in God we move alſo? And the truth is all the queſtion is about the manner of this concourſe divine; whereabouts this Authour ſpends not a word, as if he kept his breath for ſome other purpoſe then to deale on that point, which alone is controverted. The irreſiſtable ſubjection he ſpeaks of is no more then the bereaving of the will of her liberty, which is moſt untrue For proof whereof I appeale to every man that will but look upon Alvarez, that maintaines this divine motion of will under the notion of determining; And upon Bradwardine, who alone, that I know maintaines the ſame divine motion under the notion of neceſſitating: Whereas he infers herehence that God is a truer cauſe of all ſuch acts and ſins that proceed from the will ſo determined, then the will is. Oftentimes he hath ſet before us ſuch Coleworts; but we have nothing but his bare word for it. And it depends merely upon this that the action of the creature is not free. Whereas both Bradwardin maintaines that God neceſſitates the creature to every free act of his; And Alvarez, that God determines the creature to worke freely. Now is it a ſober courſe hence to inferre, that the act is not free? As much as to ſay it cannot but be free, therfore it is not free. And yet we know that every one naturally is prone to ſinne, and in the beſt of God's children there is a principle that inclines to ſinne. God is confeſſed by our very oppoſites to be the true cauſe of the act; yet not at all the cauſe of the ſin by his concourſe. Only they differ from us as touching the nature of this concourſe; We ſay God concurres to the producing of the act as it becomes not an Agent only, but the firſt Agent; not a cauſe only, but the firſt cauſe; and man as a ſecond Agent, and ſecond cauſe that moveth in God as the Apoſtle teſtifies; like as he lives in God, and hath his being in God. But theſe men deviſe God, and man to move to the producing of the ſame act, as two men in lifting a timber logge, moſt indecently: And to free this concurrence from chance, they ſay ſometimes that God workes this or that act in us modo velimus, that is, upon condition that we will But when they conſider that God workes the act of willing, as well as ought elſe; & are demanded to anſwer upon what condition he workes this what condition will they deviſe of this? will he ſay; modo velimus, provided that we will? As much as to ſay, God will produce the act of willing, provided that it be produced already by us. Others ſay that God foreſeeing that the will of man, at ſuch a time will produce ſuch an act of willing in caſe God be pleaſed to concurre to the producing of it, hereupon he reſolves to concurre to the producing of it, whereby the finall reſolution is rather into the will of God, then into the will of the creature, I ſay the finall reſolution of every ſinfull act committed by the creature. Secondly here is deviſed a thing future without all ground. For whereas the act of willing (as for example in Iudas, the act of willing to betray his Maſter, is it in 'its own nature merely poſſible not future how then did it paſſe into the condition of a thing future and that from everlaſting (For from everlaſting God knew it as a thing future) this could not be done without a cauſe? And what cauſe could there be of an eternall effect, but an eternall cauſe which is God alone: And in God nothing can be deviſed to be the cauſe thereof, but his will or decree. Therefore to avoid this they muſt be driven to conclude that all future things became future by neceſſitie of nature; if not of their own nature; yet at leaſt by the neceſſitie of God's nature, he producing them all not freely, but by neceſſitie of nature This is that Atheiſticall neceſſitie whereupon our Adverſaries are caſt, while they oppoſe ſuch a neceſſitie as depends upon God's decree ordaining all things to come to paſſe agreably to their natures, neceſſary things neceſſarily, contingent things contingently and accordingly ordaining neceſſary cauſes working neceſſarily, for the producing of the one; and contingent cauſes working contingently, for the producing of the other; as Aquinas diſcourſeth. 1. pag q. 19, in the Article whoſe title is this, Utrum divina voluntas neceſſitatem rebus imponat, whether the will of God impoſeth a neceſſitie on things that come to paſſe in the world? The reaſon this Authour brings is a mere Socyſme, ſaying the ſame over and over againe; As when he ſaith, For when two cauſes concurre to the producing of an effect; the one principall overruling cauſe, the other but an inſtrumentall & wholly at the devotion of the principall, then is the effect in all reaſon to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of 'its influxe and impreſſion produceth it, rather then to the ſubordinate and inſtrumentall, which is but a mere ſervant in the production of it. To which I anſwer, that which he calls overruling, I have often ſhewed how abſurdly it is imputed unto us. For how can that be called overruling which workes not the will contrary to 'its nature, but moves it only agreably to the nature thereof. As for the cauſe principall, what Scholar of any braines ever denyed God to be the cauſe principall in any action to the producing whereof he concurres? For is he not the firſt cauſe and the firſt Agent? Are not all other ſecond cauſes and ſecond Agents? But this Authour hopes his Reader will underſtand this in reference only to the ſinne, not to the naturall act under it, whereas God as touching the ſinfullneſſe of it is no Agent at all, much leſſe a prime Agent; no cauſe at all, much leſſe a prime cauſe. Then ſecondly let God never ſo effectually work any creature to the producing of an act connaturall thereunto, yet if he works the creature therunto agreably to its nature, that is if it be an neceſſary Agent, moues it to worke neceſſarily, if it be a contingent agent, moves it to worke contingently; if it be a free agent, moves it to worke freely; then by Arminius his confeſion our cauſe is gained. For God ſhall be found free from blame, and the creature void of excuſe. Now this is clearly our doctrine, and in effect the doctrine of all them, who ſay that God determines the will, as the Dominicans; or that God neceſſitates the will, as Bradwardine. For they all acknowledge hereby that God moves the creature to worke freely, in ſuch ſort that in the very act of working they might doe otherwiſe if they would. They confeſſe this providence of God is a great myſtery and not ſufficiently comprehenſible by humane reaſon. Cajetan profeſſeth thus much as before alleadged, and Alvarez maintaines it in a ſet diſputation; And ſuppoſing God's concourſe as neceſſarily required to every act of the creature, they are able to prove by evident demonſtration, that no other concourſe can be admitted, then this whereby God moves every creature and that effectually to every act thereof, but agreably to 'its nature and condition. And this is farther demonſtrated by God's fore knowledge, of things future. Another Arminian with whom I have had to deale in this argument, being preſſed with this reaſon drawen from God's foreknowledge and urged to ſhew how things poſſible became future & that from everlaſting (for from everlaſting they were known to God as future) had no way to helpe ſelfe but by flying to the actuall exiſtence of all things in eternity. And I have good ground for ſtrong preſumption that this Authour with whom now I deale had his hand in that Pye, which was above foure yeares agoe. See the deſperate iſſue of theſe mens diſcourſes; who are drawen to take hold of ſuch a Tenet to helpe themſelves withall; which their beſt freinds the Jeſuites, the Authours of Scientia media, doe utterly diſclaime. And on the other ſide the Dominicans who embrace the actuall exiſtence of all things in eternity, are utterly repugnant to the doctrine of Scientia media. So that when the Jeſuites are reconciled to the Dominicans in the point of actuall exiſtence of all things in eternity; And the Dominicans to the Jeſuites in the point of Scientia media, then theſe men with whom I deale are like to prevaile, which I doubt will hardly be before Elias comes. Thirdly conſider, if when one cauſe is principall, overruling the other, the effect muſt be imputed rather to the principall then to the other. It followes evidently that when the cauſes doe equally concurre without any ſuch overruling of one the other, then the effect is equally imputable unto each, & conſequently the ſin (For ſuch is this Authour's language in this Argument) is equally imputable to both, to God as well as man; And he is to be accounted the Author of it, as well as man. I appeale to every man's ſober conſcience that is able to judge indifferently between us in this. But if to avoid this they deny that the concurrence is equall, but that God's concurrence is conditionall, to wit, in caſe the creature will, and ſo man is to be accounted the Authour of ſinne, and not God, hence it followeth, that ſeeing God's concurrence unto the act of faith and repentance is of the ſame nature in the opinion of theſe men; God is not the Authour of faith and repentance any more, then he is the Authour of ſinne, in the language of theſe diſputers. Or if they fly not to this, as I have found this Authour (as I gueſſe) to deny God's concourſe to ſtand in ſubordination to man's, then my former argument is not avoided; But a third reaſon ariſeth herehence againſt his former diſcourſe of God's concourſe, namely, that if God and man doe equally concurre unto the act of ſinne, then, as I have already ſhewed, that they are equally guilty of ſin. So in the working of faith and repentance man is as forward as God and as much the Authour of his own fatih and repentance as God is, in direct contradiction to the Apoſtle who ſaith that, Eph: 2. 8.Faithis the guift of God & not of our ſelves. We willingly grant that God is the principall agent in producing every act, whether it be naturall or ſupernaturall For in him we move as Act: 17. 26.well as in him we live & have our being But we deny ſin, as ſin, to be any act but a privation of obedience to the law of God, as the Apoſtle defines it to be foreign, Yet let us examine that which he delivers of the principall agent, & the texts produced by him, that we may not be carried away as he is with a ſuperficiary apprehenſion of things. And firſt conſider) we might plead as well for ſuch acts as this Authour calls ſins, as he doth for acts gracious by his ſuperficiary diſcourſe. For doth not Ioſeph comforting his brethren ſay unto Gen: 45. 8.them in like manner. Now then you ſent me not hither, but God. But conſider farther in that paſſage alleadged by him out of Mat: 10. 20. It is not ye that ſpeak but the ſpirit of my Father which ſpeaketh in you. Was not this ſpeech of the Apoſtles a free action? The labour of Paul more abundantly then of all the reſt of the Apoſtles, was it not a free action in Paul? …f God determined thē unto theſe actions, then freedome of will humane ſtands not in oppoſition to determination divine; and conſequently though the act be evill that is, done by man; yet may God determine the creature to the doing of that act, without any impeachment of the creatures liberty. If God did not determine the wills of his Servants but only afford a ſimultaneous concourſe to their actions, why is he called the cauſe principall, ſince it is confeſſed, God doth afford the like concourſe to every ſinfull act, as touching the ſubſtance thereof.
Againe he repeates the ſame, when in caſe of divine determination, he ſaith, the ſinne cannot be ſo rightly aſcribed to man's will the inferiour, as to God's neceſſitating decree, the ſuperiour cauſe. To which I anſwer againe, being drawen thereunto by his Tautologies; by the ſame reaſon it may be inferred, that when the fire burnes any combuſtible thing, the burning is rather to be aſcribed to God the more principall cauſe, then to the fire the leſſe principall, the firſt cauſe being more principall then the ſecond and if it pleaſe God ſo to order it, the fire ſhall not burne as it appeares in the three noble children caſt into the furnace of Babylon, when they came forth there was not ſo much as the ſmell of fire upon them. Secondly I anſwer as before, by the ſame reaſon, when the concourſe unto the ſinfull act is equall on man's part, & on God's, each ſhall equally be accounted the Authour of that ſinne, and not man more then God; Now ſuch a concourſe is maintained by this Authour. Thirdly in the working of faith and repentance; ſince by theſe mens opinions God affords only his concourſe he ſhall be no more the Authour of man's faith and repentance then man himſelfe is. Laſtly be it granted that God is a more principall cauſe then mā in producing the act; yet there is no colour of imputing unto God the cauſality of the ſin, who hath no Agency therein, by doing what he ought not to doe, or not in that manner he ſhould doe, this is found only in the creature, who being a free Agent, otherwiſe then as originall ſinne hath impaired liberty, which I hope this Authour will not deny, is juſtly anſwerable for his own tranſgreſſion. As for example, God determined that Cyrus ſhould give the Jewes liberty to returne into their own land; yet this action of Cyrus was as free an action, as any that was performed by him throughout his life. God determined that Joſiah ſhould burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar at Bethel, yet Ioſiah did this as freely as ought elſe: God determined that Chriſt's bones ſhould not be broken, yet the ſouldiours abſtained from the breaking of his bones with as much liberty as they had uſed, in caſe they had broken them. This divine providence we willingly confeſſe is very myſterious, and as Cajetan ſaith the diſtinctions uſed to accommodate it to our capacitie doe not quiet the underſtanding; therefore he thought it his duty to captivate his into the obedience of faith. And Alvarez in a ſolemne diſputation proves that it is incomprehenſible by the wit of man.
4. His laſt is delivered moſt perplexedly. I can make no ſenſe of it as the words lie, but I ſee his meaning. He ſuppoſeth that God by our Tenet makes a man to ſin willingly, & that he ſaith is worſe then to conſtraine a man to ſinne againſt his will. Where obſerve how this man's ſpirit is intoxicated when he delivered this. For firſt he calls that worſe which is merely impoſſible, and that by his own rules. For he holds that ſinne cannot be, except it be voluntary, ſpeaking of ſinne committed by any particular perſon. Secondly he ſuppoſeth that by our opinion God makes a man to ſinne, which is moſt untrue. For when he acknowledgeth that no ſin can be committed by man without God's concourſe; will he ſay that God by his concourſe helps a man to ſinne? He helps him to the producing of the act, not to the committing of the ſinne. And indeed be the act never ſo vertuous, if it proceed not out of the love and feare of God, it is no better then ſuch as the Heathens performed; of which Auſtin hath profeſſed that they were no better then ſplendida peccata glorious ſins: So that if God doth not give a man theſe graces of his holy Spirit in every act that is performed by him he ſhall ſinne, and not only in acts vitious; and God is not bound to beſtow theſe graces on any.