The Riches of Gods Love, Part 2 · Section 3
Sect: 3.
Thus they teach, and therefore by juſt conſequence they make God the Authour of ſin; as it will plainly M. Maſon's Addit. p. 28. 29.appeare by theſe following conſiderations. 1. It is ordinary to impute ſin to thoſe who have not ſo great an hand in the production of it, as hath the Almighty, by the grounds of this opinion. For firſt, the Devill is called the Father of lies, and by the like reaſon of all other ſinnes. And therefore he that committeth ſinne, is ſaid to be of the Devill, and to be the child of the Devill. And ſin is called the the worke of the, Devill, which the Son of God appeared to looſe. And why is the Devill ſo called, but becauſe he doth egge and Jo: 8. 4. 4. 1 Io: 3. 8. 10. v. 8.allure men by inward ſuggeſtions and outward temptations to fall into ſin? This is all he doth or can doe. But God doth much more, if he neceſſitate, and by his decree firſt; and next by his powerfull and ſecret working in the ſoules of men, determine their wills irreſiſtibly to ſinen. For to determine is infinitely more then barely to perſwade; for as much as ſin muſt needs follow the determination, but not the perſwaſion of the will. God is therefore a truer cauſe of ſin, by this doctrine then the Devill. 2. Wicked men are eſteemed Authours of their own offences; becauſe they plot, purpoſe, chooſe, & commit them, and are immediate Agents in the acting of them. But God by this opinion doth more: for he overruleth the projects & purpoſes of wicked men, and by an uncontroulable motion proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, reſolutions, choices, and actions preciſely that very way; ſo as they cannot choſe but doe as they doe, whatſoever they may think to the contrary. They have indeed (potentiam in ſe liberam) a power in it ſelfe free to choſe what they refuſe, or to refuſe what they choſe, to determine themſelves this way or that way, as liketh them beſt; but they have not (Liberum uſum) a free uſe of this their power. God doth determine their will before it hath determined it ſelfe, and maketh them doe thoſe only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any abſolute dominion over their own actions, have preſcribed. More rightly therefore may God be called the Authour of thoſe offences. For deeds whether good or bad are owned more truly by him that overruleth them, then by the ſervile inſtruments that only execute and doe them.
3. Wicked counſellours and they who allure and adviſe men to ſin, are accounted by God and men to be the cauſes of thoſe ſins to which they are the perſwaders, and have been puniſhed for thoſe miſdeeds which others through their inſtigations have committed. Jezabell Ahab's wife was reputed and puniſhed as the murtherer of Naboth; becauſe ſhe counſelled and contrived the doing of it as we may ſee, 1 Kings 21. 23. 25. But what is counſelling to inforcing? Evill counſells may be refuſed, but an allmighty power cannot be reſiſted. God therefore that uſeth this (according to their doctrine) in the production of ſins, is much more an Authour of them, then he that only uſeth the other.
After two leaves ſpent, firſt in the charge; and ſecondly in proving that God is not the Authour of ſin in a fumbling manner, and thirdly in repreſenting the doctrine of our Divines Anſwer:at pleaſure, now at length he comes to make it plainly appeare, that by juſt conſequence they make God the Authour of ſin, as he ſaith, will plainly appeare by certaine conſiderations following: which in few words come but to this in generall, namely, that God doth more then the Devill, or wicked counſellours in alluring and advizing others to ſin, more then wicked perſons in acting of their own ſins. But by this diſcourſe of his, he is as farre off as ever from proving that we make God the Authour of ſin. For conſider, either by doing more he underſtands, that God doth the ſame which the Devill & wicked mē do; & more: or though he does not the ſame, yet he doth that which is more then that. If his meaning be that God doth the ſame which the Devill & wicked men doe, this is notoriouſly untrue, conſidering thē as tempters, & advizers, and perſwaders unto ſin. For God on the contrary forbids ſin, perſwades to repentance, to obedience both by his word and by his ſpirit; and indeed the ſpirit workes not, but by the word which is called the ſword of the ſpirit; All holines of life is compriſed within the compaſſe of ten commandements; theſe were given by the Lord frō mount Sinai, pronounced by the ſound of a trūpet; to theſe the Lord calls his people ſaying, ſtand in the waies and behold, and aske for the old way, which is the good way and walke therein & ye ſhall find reſt unto your ſoules. For the tranſgreſſion of theſe the Lord expoſtulates with thē, Heare ô heavens and hearken ô earth, I have nouriſhed and brought up a Ier: 6. 16.people, & they have rebelled againſt me. Whē they have gone aſtray he exhorts the, and that moſt pathetically to returne by repentance, by promiſe of ſalvation, and threatning judgment Eſa. 1.if they doe not repent. O Ieruſalem waſh thine heart from wickednes, that thou maiſt be Ier: 4. 14.ſaved, how long ſhall thy wicked thoughts remaine within thee? I have ſeene thy adulteries, and thy neighings, the filthineſſe of thy whoredome on the hills, in the feilds, and thine abominations. Woe unto thee ô Ieruſalem, wilt thou not be made cleane? When ſhall it once be? And to provoak Ier: 13. 27.them the rather unto repentance, he repreſents himſelfe unto them as eaſy to be intreated, as ſlow to wrath, and one that by his patience and long ſuffering leades them to repentance. And to this end he gives charge to his Miniſters, namely, by repreſenting the gracious nature of God to admoniſh them of their ſinnes, to call them to repentance, to obedience. And to this purpoſe to repreſent his promiſes which he hath annexed unto godlineſſe, both the promiſes of this life, and the promiſes of a better life that is to come. Yea and his threats alſo both of judgments in the world to come, to the caſting both of body and ſoule into hell fire; and thereupon to exhort us to feare him above all others. And judgments of this world, as, famine, peſtilence, and the ſword of the enemie, To deliver them over into the hands of beaſtly people, ſkilfull to deſtroy; To ſend Serpents, and Cockatrices among them that will not be charmed, and that ſhall ſting them; and that without all mercy. Surely theſe are not the courſes of Satan or wicked counſellours. Therefore they doe not as God doth, neither doth God doe that which they doe and more alſo. 2. If it be ſaid that albeit the Lord doth not as the Devill doth, and wicked men doe in perſwading them to ſinne; yet he doth that which is more then this. I anſwer, that nevertheleſſe he cannot be accounted the Authour of ſinne, in caſe the doing of this alone doth conſtitute an Agent the Authour of ſinne. Now as formerly I have ſhewed this was the opinion of Dominicus Soto, and of the Divines of Salamancha: yea and Vaſquez the Jeſuite profeſſeth, that he was ever of that opinion. Againe if to doe more then this, be to become the Authour of ſin; both this Authour and all that are of his Spirit doe maintain as well we, that God doth that which is farre more then this. For I preſume he will not deny, but that God is he, and he alone, who doth ſupport our natures in the committing of ſin; & who maintaines our ſenſes in their vigour and quickneſſe, without which we could take noe pleaſure in ſin, and that concurres to every act of ſin, in the way of cauſe efficient, not morally, which alone makes one to become the Authour of ſin, by the judgment of Divines formerly mentioned; but phyſically and naturally, which no creature can doe, namely become a naturall coefficient cauſe to the act of another man's will. Nay which is moſt conſiderable, I preſume this Authour hath ſo much accuratenes in School-learning, as not to deny that when the Devill tempts us, or wicked counſellours doe tempt us to ſin, God concurres with them in this act, and that in the kind of a cauſe efficient phyſicall. For in him we live and move and have our being; what is Act: 17. 28.it to have our being from him, but that he is the Authour of it in the kind of a cauſe efficient? In the ſame ſenſe doe we live in him, and in the ſame ſenſe doe we move in him. It ſtands us upon as much to maintaine this, as to maintaine that God is our Creatour. For unleſſe all things doe ſubſiſt in him neither were all things created by him. Now this is a great deale more then to perſwade. For a weake man is able to perſwade, but noe creature is able to performe theſe parts which God doth in the act of every thing created by by him. So that hereby the Reader may evidently perceive, that the diſcourſe is as farre off as ever, from proving God by this Doctrine of ours to be the Authour of ſin, any more then he is conſtituted the Authour of ſin by the doctrine of this Interpolator. But I am content to examine the things he propoſeth particularly and ſeverely.
1. The Devill, ſaith he, doth only allure men by inward ſuggeſtions, and outward temptations to fall into ſinne: But God doth much more if he doe neceſſitate, and by his decree firſt; and next by his powerfull and ſecret working in the ſoules of men, determine their wills irreſiſtibly to ſinne. For to determine is infinitely more then to perſwade. Now to this I have already anſwered by ſhewing. 1. That albeit God doth more then this, yet ſeeing he doth not this: if the doing of this alone conſtitutes one the Authour of ſin, as many great Divines have concurrently maintained; ſtill God is free from being the Authour of ſin. This Authour barely ſuppoſing, not once offering to prove the contrary. 2. Himſelfe confeſſeth that God concurres to the act of every ſinne, and that in the kind of a cauſe efficient naturall. And I may be as bold as to ſay of this, that it is infinitely more then to perſwade; like as he ſaith of God's determining the will and neceſſitating thereof. Now I proceed to a more particular examination of his diſcourſe. And here firſt I wonder not a little at this Authour's diſtinction of the Devill's inward ſuggeſtion from his outward temptations. For I confeſſe freely I know noe outward temptation of Satan, diſtinct from his inward ſuggeſtions. Outward occaſions and provocations to ſinne I know none wrought by Satan, any farther then as he in ſome caſes is duplicate page duplicate page God's inſtrument, as in afflicting Iob. For ſurely God hath not given over the world, or any part thereof to the goverment of Satan; this is in his own hand ſtill; and hereby occaſions and opportunities are offered from time to time for a man to advantage himſelfe in ſinfull courſes, either in the way of profit, or ſatisfying his unclean luſts. And Arminius confeſſeth that the adminiſtration of Arguments and occaſions, which provoke to ſuch an act, as cannot be committed by the creature without ſinne, if not by Gods intention, yet at Diſput. theol. pag. 108.leaſt according to the creatures affection, and often according to the events that ariſe therehence. This adminiſtration, I ſay Arminius confeſſeth, doth belong to the Divine providence. And theſe arguments, he ſaith, are objected & ther to the mind (of man,) or to his ſenſes outward or inward; and that either by the mediate worke of the creatures comming between, or by God's immediate action. And that the end of this Divine adminiſtration is to make tryall whether the creature will abſtaine from ſinne, even then, when it is provoked thereunto. As, for the triall of David, was Bathſheba going …o…th to waſh her ſelfe objected to David, whereupon he was inflamed with luſts Ioſeph was not, though farre more ſtrongly ſollicited by the temptations of his wanton Miſtris. Secondly, to neceſſitate the will or determine the will are noe phraſes of our Divines. The firſt is uſed only by Bradwardine (as at preſent I remember) ſometimes Arch-Biſhop elect of Canterbury; The other is that phraſe of the Dominicans. Now they are of age and able to anſwer for themſelves. Why doth not this Authour anſwer a chapter or two in Bradwardine, a chapter or two in Alvarez, where they diſpute this and reſolve the queſtion affirmatively. Surely hereby he ſhould performe a worke more worthy of a Scholaſticall Divine, then by ſo hungry a diſcourſe as this. Secondly, conſider neither Bradwardine maintaines that God neceſſitates; nor Alvarez that God determines the will to ſinne, but to every naturall act, in which kind of acts ſinne is to be found: Why then ſhould this Auhour carry himſelfe thus in his crimination? We know ſin is meerly privative in the formall notion thereof; an obliquitie ſuch as concerning which, Auſtine hath long agoe deliverd, that it hath noe efficient cauſe, but deficient only. And divers waies Divines have ſhewed how God may be the authour of the act, yet not the Authour o… the ſin, and illuſtrated it by various ſimilitudes. As of a man riding upon a lame horſe, he makes him goe, but doth not make him halt. The ſun ſhining upon a dung-mixton, makes it evaporate, but doth not make it ſtinke. The ſun makes flowers to evaporate and ſend forth their favours as well as a dung-mixton; but that the one evaporates a ſweet odour the other an unſavory, is frō the nature of things themſelves on which the ſun beates. In like ſort the Sun by the heat thereof provokes all things to engender according to their kinds, even frogs and toades & ſnakes, as well as other creatures profitable for the uſe of man in the way of food; yea of vipers fleſh good uſe is made in the way of phyſicke. And God knowes how to make good uſe even of the ſinnes of men. and of the rage and malice of Satan. If an underw-heele being out of his place, the upper wheele in a jacke or clocke will ſet him going in a wrong way, as well as all the reſt in a right way; his motion is from the upper whele, his irregular motion from himſelfe. A good Scribe meeting with moiſt paper will make but ſorry worke The writing is from himſelfe, the blurring from the moiſtneſſe of the paper on this very queſtion whether the act of ſinne be from God, Aquinas maintaining the affirmative, illuſtrates it by a diſtinction of the halting motion of a lame legge; the motion, ſaith he, is from the ſoule, the … is frō the imperfection of the Organ, the infirmitie of the legge. Yet this Authour carrieth it hand over head, as if to be the Authour of the action, were to be the ſinne; not conſidering that himſelfe maintaines, that God is the Authour of the action, and that in the kind of a cauſe efficient naturall. Thirdly, when Bradwardine maintaines that God neceſſitates the will to every good act thereof, he withall profeſſeth that he neceſſitates it ad liberum actum ſuum that is to worke every act thereof, freely. Soe when Alvarerz maintaines that God determinates the will to every act thereof, he withall maintaines that God determines the will to worke free ye and ſo Aquinas. For when he workes upon contingent cauſes, he moves thē to bring forth their effects contingently; like as when he workes upon neceſſary cauſes, he moves them to produce their effects neceſſarily. And like as to move contingent cauſes to produce their effects contingently, is to move them to produce their effects with a poſſibility to the contrary. Soe to move free cauſes, to produce their effects freely, is to move them to produce their effects with an active power to the contrary. But to proceed, whereas he ſaith, that ſinne muſt needs follow the determination; it is as true. 1. In this Authour's judgment, that it muſt needs follow upon God's cōcurrence to this act. If he ſay that this concurrēce is neceſſary to every act, I anſwer, it is neceſſary to the ſubſtance of every act, but not at all required to the ſinne; though this Authour carieth it blindfold after this manner. Secondly, ſo ſay we is determination required to the ſubſtance of every act. And Gods concourſe with the creature is not coordinate, like as one man concurres with another in moving a timber logge, which is the expreſſion of the Jeſuites, thereby manifeſting the vileneſſe of their opinion, as we can demonſtrate, and that more waies then one by evident demonſtration, as I have allready ſhewed in my Vindiciae. Let this Authour anſwer Lib. 2. digreſ. 7. & 9.thoſe digreſſions if he can, I am confident he will never anſwer them while his head is hot; nor all the Rabble of the Arminians. We know God is the firſt cauſe, and all other are but ſecond cauſes in compariſon to him. Yet we willingly confeſſe that the providence of God is wonderfull and of a myſterious nature in this; but ſuch as whereunto the Scripture gives pregnant teſtimonie, as ſcarce to any thing more. So jealous he is leaſt his providence ſhould be denied in evill, wherein indeed it is moſt wonderfull; and he takes unto himſelfe the hardning of men's hearts, and blinding of their mindes, and proſtituting them to abominable courſes, even to vile affections and thereby to puniſh ſinne with ſin, as Rom: 1. Therein ſaith the Apoſtle, they received the recompence of their errour. This hath Auſtine alſo by Scripture ſuggeſtion teſtified at large in his book. De gratiâ & Libero arbitrio in two large chap: & likewiſe in his fifth book againſt Iulian the Pelagian & third chap: this alſo the Adverſaries have been driven to confeſſe in a ſtrange manner, as to give inſtance firſt in Bellarmine whoſe words are theſe. God ſaith he, praeſidet ipſis voluntatibus eaſ que regit & gubernat, torquet & fl…ctit in iis inviſibiliter operando, ut licet vitio proprio malae ſint, tamen à divina providentia ad unum potius malum quàm ad aliud, non poſitivè, ſed permiſſive ordinentur. God is preſident over the Wills, and ſo rules and governes, wreſts & turns them, working inviſibly in them, that albeit through their own fault they are evill, yet by the divine providence they are ordered to one evill rather then to another, not poſitively but permiſſively What one of our Divines hath ſaid more then this comes to, or ſo much, profeſſing that God rules and governes the wills of men by his inviſible operation, ordering them to one evill rather then to another which St. Auſtine calles inclining them? And the Prophet David we know prayes, that God would encline his heart unto his teſtimonies and not to covetouſneſſe, arguing thereby that God hath power to incline a man's heart to covetouſneſſe. But Bellarmine ſaith more then this, in ſaying that, God wreſtes and bends them, torquet & flectit; thoſe are his words; although he ſeemes to blaſt all this in the end by ſaying that this is done permiſſivè, by permiſſion, in flat contradiction to himſelfe, whoſe expreſſe purpoſe is to ſhew that God doth not only ſuffer wicked men to performe evill acts, and to deſert the godly, but ſomewhat elſe alſo, namely, to rule and governe their w…lls, to wreſt and bend them by an inviſible working in them, to commit one ev… rather then another. Secondly conſider their generall doctrine of congruous grace, ſtanding in a neceſſary conformity and correſpondency to another vile doctrine of theirs concerning the foreknowledge of God, called by them Scientia media By this doctrine of theirs God foreſees in what eaſe and by what motives man being moved to abſtaine from this or that ſinne, he will abſtaine from it: And againe in what caſe and after what manner being moved to abſtaine from ſinne, he will not abſtaine from it And God makes choice at his pleaſure how to move him, whether after ſuch a manner in which caſe he foreſees he will abſtaine from ſinne; or after another manner in which caſe he foreſees he will not ab…aine. Now who is ſo blind as not to obſerve, that as often as a man ſinneth, it is the will of God, that is the decree of God he ſhall ſin, by the very groundes received by our Adverſaries. Thus much as touching my firſt anſwer concerning the neceſſary con…equence of ſinne upon God's operation to be acknowledged by our Adverſaries, according to the tenour of their own doctrine, as well as by us. 2. My ſecond anſwer is this. Albeit God determines the will to any vertuous act, morally good; whether in the way of doing ſome morall good, or in the way of abſtaining from ſome motall evill; yet unleſſe God give man ſome faith and love, as fountaines out of which every morall worke muſt proceed, that it may be acceptable with God; ſuch an one ſhall neceſſarily ſinne, though not as touching the act done, yet as touching the manner of doing; for as much as without true faith and love he can neither performe any morall good worke, nor abſtaine from any morall evill worke in a gracious manner. Now let every ſober man judge, whether God be bound to give every man faith and love, without which all is one as touching the preſerving a man from ſinne in generall, whether the will of man be determined by God, to an act morally good, or morally evill. In each of which God determines the will only to the ſubſtance of the act: So that whether God cooperates to the ſubſtance of the act or noe, and whether this cooperation be by way of determining the will or noe; ſtill there will be a neceſſary conſequence of ſinne to every act of man, if God doth not beſtow the ſpirit of regeneration upon him, which ſpirit of God we know was given to our firſt parents; though not under this notion of the Spirit of regeneration, and whereof they were juſtly bereaved upon the firſt ſinne committed by them; And becauſe all we have been derived from them ſince their fall, therefore we have received our natures from them deprived of the Spirit of God, and therein continue untill ſuch time as it pleaſeth God for Chriſt ſake, to reſtore it unto us, which he doth in regenerating us. Thirdly, and laſtly upon the very permiſſion of ſin, it followes neceſſarily that ſin ſhall be, by the doctrine not of Piſcator only, but of Vorſtius and Arminius alſo; yea and of the learned amongſt the Papiſts, as Navarettus and Penottus: And the very definition of Permiſſion of ſinne by Arminians juſtifies it; as alſo the Jeſuites doctrine concerning gratia congruâ. For if God will not afford that grace, upon the grant whereof men will abſtaine from ſin, as God well knowes; but ſuch a grace, upon the grant whereof man will abſtaine from ſin, which alſo is well known unto God; doth …t not manifeſtly follow that ſuch a one ſhall ſinne, though not ſinne neceſſarily, but contingently and freely. 2. In the next place he tells us that wicked men are eſteemed Authours of their offences: Now by the way this is not ſo; To be a ſinner is one thing to be an Authour of ſinne is another thing. And to be an Authour of ſinne is in reference rather to anothers ſinne, then to ones owne. And Martinius tells me that, Authour eſt cujus autoritate & ſententiâ aliquid fit, cujus teſtimonio ut aliquid credamus, adducimur. Qui hortatur ut fiat. Ita que authorem & diſſuaſorem Cicero opponit. He is the authour by whoſe authority and judgment a thing is done, by whoſe teſtimonie we are induced to beleive ought; who exhorts to the doing of ought. And therefore Cicero makes Authour and diſſwader oppoſite. But to proceed with this Authour who ſet the Printer on work for the edition of this peice. Men, he ſaith, doe plot purpoſe, chooſe and commit offences, and are immediate agents in the acting of them. But God by this opinion doth more; for he overuleth the projects and purpoſes of wicked men, and by an uncontroulable motion, proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, reſolutions, choices, and actions preciſely that very way, ſo as they cannot chooſe but do, as they doe, whatſoever they may thinke to the contrary. To which I anſwer, that it becomes every man to give the Divell his right, & and not make him worſe then he is, nor wicked men neither. Now noe wicked man doth will or chooſe ſinne as ſinne Nemo vult eſſe incontinens, ſaith Ariſtotle, although they doe ſuch things as doe ſufficiently evidence their incontinent diſpoſition. For the object of the will is only good; neither can any thing be willed by man, but, ſub ratione boni, under the ſhew of good: whether this good be in the kind of profit, or in the kind of pleaſure, or in the kind of honeſty. So Lucretia when ſhe killed her ſelfe, ſhe did it for the preſervation of the integrity of her mind in the opinion of the world, and that they might know that ſhe conſented not unto Tarquinius; but was forced by him. So then the act is it they doe or chooſe to doe for ſome motive or other, which whether it be pleaſure or profit, or credit they get thereby, that makes not the act ſinfull, but only that it is againſt ſome law or other, forbidding it And this act, (all ſides confeſſe) is the worke of God, as well as the worke of man; as in whom we move, like as in him we live, and have our being. And Bradwardine maintaines that of every act of the creature God is a more immediate cauſe then the Act: 17.creature it ſelfe, who…e act it is. This he proves of the creatures conſervation, of the creatures action, of the creatures motiō; & to this he proceeds by certaine degrees. And in all l. 1. c. 2. 3. 4.this God doth not tranſgreſſe any law, as man doth too often in the performing of many a naturall act, and only in performing acts naturall is ſinne committed, never in performing any act ſupernaturall; all ſuch acts are in a peculiar manner the work of grace 2. God overruleth no man's good projects or purpoſes, otherwiſe then as when accepting their intentions he will not have them put ſuch in execution becauſe perhaps he hath reſerved that for another time & perſon. As when David was purpoſed to build God an houſe, & was encouraged therein by Nathan: yet the Lord ſent Nathan ſhortly unto David to give him to underſtand, that he reſerved that work for Solomon his Son; yet ſo well accepting David's purpoſe that he promiſed to build his houſe. But if God at any time overruleth the wicked projects and purpoſes of men, whether good or evill, let us bleſſe him rather for this then curſe him; by curſing them that maintaine this good providence. Yet in overruling them, whether he doth it immediately, or by the miniſtry of his good Angells; not by working immediately upon the will, as this Authour dreameth. For that is not the way to worke agreably to the reaſonable nature of man (though ſo he worke alſo by generall influence affoarded cōmon to all agents) but by repreſenting to the underſtanding congruous motives to divert them from that they doe intend; whether in a gracious manner, as he diverted David from his purpoſe to maſſacre the whole houſe of Nabal; or only in a naturall way, whereby he diverts wicked men from their ungodly deſignes, by repreſenting the danger thereof, to make them feare, & ſo to reſtraine them. Will the Devill himſelfe be over prone to blaſpheme God for this? yet in this alone he doth more then either the Devill or man can doe; though this be not all that he doth. For he doth cooperate to every deſigne and execution of the creature, be it never ſo abominable; which neither man, nor Angells can doe. And he hath power to give over unto Satan, and to harden any man, and that more effectully then any Devill can doe. The Devill could not ſay with truth that He would harden Pharaoh's heart, that he ſhould not let Iſrael goe. Nor when he had let them goe, I will harden Pharaoh's heart that he ſhall follow after them, to bring them back. The Devill could not ſay in truth, as the Lord did to David, I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them to thy neighbour, and he ſhall lye with thy wives in the ſight of the ſunne. Nor as he ſaid to Ieroboam, Behold I will rent the kingdome out of the hands of Solomon, and will give ten tribes to thee. Nay the very permiſſiō of ſin ſo as whereby it ſhall infallibly come to paſſe, is not in the power of any creature, but in God alone. And ſhall it follow, that becauſe God doth more, both as touching the act it ſelfe, and touching the ſinfull condition of it, then any creature can doe, therefore God is the Authour of ſinne? whereas when God moves a man or carrieth him on to any good morall workes, whether in doing that which is vertuous, or abſtaining from that which is vitious, this man ſhall certainely ſinne, though not in ſo great a degree, unleſſe God be pleaſed over and above to regenerate him, and to beſtow faith, and love on him, for as much as in this caſe, though he doe an act vertuous, yet ſhall he not doe it in a gracious māner. & though he doe abſtaine frō an act vitious yet he ſhall not abſtaine frō it in a gracious manner. Let this man therefore proceed, & maintaine (if he thinks good) that except God doth beſtow the ſpirit of regeneration upon all and every one throughout the world, he is the Authour of ſinne, not only when he moves them to ſuch acts which are evill, but alſo when he moves them to the doing of ſuch as are vertuous, or to the abſtaining from thoſe that are vitious. As for his phraſes noe wiſe man will regard them, but only ſuch as are content to feed on huskes for want of better food. As, when he talkes of motion uncontroulable, which makes a noiſe, as if men's wills would controule his motion, but cannot: whereas God as the firſt mover moves the creature moſt congruouſly unto his nature; without which motion of his the creature could not move at all. The like noyſes makes the phraſe immutable decree; as empty things many times give the greateſt ſound: whereas by vertue of God's immutable decree it is, that it cannot otherwiſe be; then that as neceſſary things cannot but come to paſſe neceſſarily; ſo contingent things cannot but come to paſſe contingently, and the free actions of men freely. But by the way he manifeſt's how he licks his lips, at a Mutable decree of God, even of that God with whom, as St. Iames ſpeaketh, there is no variableneſſe, nor ſhadow of change. He doth acknowledge, we maintaine, potentiam in ſe liberam; but then he ſaith, we doe not maintaine, liberum uſum; a moſt abſurd diſtinction. For noe power deſerves to be ſtiled free, ſave that it is of free uſe and exerciſe. And what a prodigious thing is it to affirme, that it is not within the almighty power of God to cauſe that this or that ſhall be done by a reaſonable creature freely: this is it that Bradwardine propoſeth to the judgment of all to conſider, whether it be not an unreaſonable thing to deny this unto God. God doth determine their will before it hath determined it ſelfe, and maketh them doe thoſe only actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their wills out of any abſolute dominion over their own actions, have preſcribed. Thus he relates the opinion of our Divines; whereas neither determining, nor neceſſitating (as I ſaid before) are the expreſſions of our Divines, but of Papiſts; yet he laies not this to the charge of Papiſt's: Noe nor to the charge of Bellarmine, for ſaying that God doth not only rule, and governe, but wreſt and bend them, and that to one evill rather then to an other. If Scholars of our Univerſities uſe any ſuch phraſes, it is no other then they find in uſe among School-divines. It is true indeed Jeſuites oppoſe the Dominicans in this. This Authour ſides with the Jeſuites, but why doth he not take to taske any one chapter in Alvarez on this point to anſwer, to overthrow their grounds, which are no other then the very word of God, and cleare reaſon doth juſtifie. And the ground of the Jeſuites in oppoſing, is meerely an invention of their own, concerning a certaine knowledge of God called a middle knowledge; a vile invention, and a palpable untruth, and controulable of manifeſt contradiction. For they ſuppoſe a thing knowable by God, as future, before God's will hath paſſed upon it to make it future, being in it's own nature meerly poſſible; and conſequently cannot paſſe out of the condition of a thing meerly poſſible, into the condition of a thing future without a cauſe. Now noe cauſe can be deviſed hereof with any colour of reaſon, but the will of God. For firſt, the cauſe hereof muſt be eternall, ſeeing the thing it ſelfe, of the cauſe whereof we diſpute, is eternall to wit, the fruition of any thing. This I ſay was eternall, for it is known with God from all eternity. Now there is noe eternall cauſe to be found, but in God alone, therefore the cauſe why things meerly poſſible in their own nature, became future, and that from everlaſting, muſt be found in God alone. Therefore it muſt either be the will of God; or the knowledge of God that did make it future; and ſeing the knowledge of God rather ſuppoſeth them to be future, then makes them ſo; what remaines but that the will of God muſt neceſſarily be the cauſe hereof? Nay conſider whether the Jeſuites themſelves doe not manifeſt more ingenuity by farre, then this boiſterous Theologue, that thinks to carry all with the blaſt of his words, the reſolution of whoſe arguments generally, neither having the word of God for their ground; nor any confeſt principle of reaſon. Whereas not the greateſt, Angell of God will take upon him ſuch an authoritative manner of diſcourſe. For did we grant, that God by his Allmighty will did impoſe any neceſſity upon our wills. Yet Suarez confeſſeth that Suarez: de auxil. lib. 1. c. 2. num: 7.ſo to worke, doth neither involve any contradiction, nor exceed the Allmighty power of God: Whereas we are ready to prove and have already proved, that their doctrine of God's concourſe without ſubordination of the ſecond cauſes to the firſt, implies flat contradiction We ſay the wills determination of it ſelfe is the worke of God, otherwiſe faith and love and every gracious act ſhall not be the worke of God. Againe the wills determination of it ſelfe, is no other then the wills operation; and this Authour that oppoſeth us dares not deny the wills opperation to be the worke of God. But what School divine can he produce that delivers himſelfe in ſo abſurd a manner; as to ſay that God firſt determines the will, and that afterwards the will determines it ſelfe; eſpecially ſpeaking of ſuch actions of the will as are produced by the power of nature? The wills determination of it ſelfe, we ſay, is the worke of God moving the creature agreably to the nature thereof; that is to be carried neceſſarily to that which is it's end, and appeares to be good in genere convenientis: and freely to the meanes, which appeare to be good, in genere conducentis, as fit to pronounce the end intended. All confeſſing (Durand excepted) that God works the act; the queſtion whether he works the act abſolutely, the will a ſecond agent ſubordinate unto God, as to it's Creatour? Or conditionally, modo vellimus, provided that we will it, God the firſt agent ſubordinate to the will of the creature? This Authour will have it to be wrought by God, that is conditionally, in dependence upon, and expectation of the operation of the creature, which we ſay is moſt abſurd Firſt becauſe thus the firſt agent is made ſubordinate to the ſecond agent, which is moſt unaturall. Secondly, obſerve a manifeſt contradiction. For the queſtion is about, actus volendi, the act of willing, in man. Now if God produce this act upon ſuppoſition, that man produceth this act, then the ſame act is produced by God upon ſuppoſition, that it is produced by man. If it be produced by man, what need is there of God's producing it by way of ſupplement? Thirdly, by this meanes the thing is made the condition of it ſelfe. For hereby it is ſaid, this act is made upon condition that it doth exiſt; & ſo the ſelfe ſame thing ſhall be before & after it ſelfe. 4. Thus man's production of the act ſhall be noe worke of God, which holds off faith and repentance, as well as of any naturall act, in this Authours opinion. Fiftly, It is not poſſible the will can produce the act unleſſe God produceth it, If then God doth not produce it unleſſe the will doth produce it, in this caſe there ſhall be noe act produced. For if I goe not to London unleſſe you goe with me; nor you goe to London unleſſe I goe with you; here is no going at all till one ſaith I ſay I goe, and his reſolution carrieth the other with him if the others depend thereupon. 6 Whereas to helpe at a dead lift the Jeſuiticall doctrine of, Scientia media, middle knowledge, is called in after this manner; God foreſeing that at ſuch an inſtant the will of man will produce ſuch an act, if God be pleaſed to concurre; and upon this foreknowled…e God reſolves to concurre This doctrine I have already confounded by ſhewing the apparent falſity of this ſuppoſition. For ſeeing the wills producing ſuch an act at ſuch an inſtant, is a thing merly poſſible in it's own nature, & no more future then not future; It is impoſſible that this ſhould paſſe out of the condition of a thing meerly poſſible into the conditiō of a thing future without a cauſe: And noe cauſe hereof can be but the will of God, as I have often proved. It followes that the wills producing ſuch an act, depends rather upon the will of God to have it produced, then on the contrary, that Gods producing ſuch an act, dependes upon the creatur's will to produce it. As for that which followes of the abſolute dominion that the will of the creature ſhould have over it's action (I preſume he meanes independent) it ſounds more like the voice of the Devill, then of a ſober Chriſtian. Yet it is more then I know that Lucifer himſelfe challengeth any ſuch abſolute Dominion over his actions unto himſelfe; If he doth, I know noe greater ſinne that hee or the creature can be guilty of; unleſſe in caſe groſſe ignorance doth excuſe it. To deny God to be▪ the firſt Agent is to deny his God-head; and if hee be, primum agens, hee muſt be primum liberum too, the firſt free agent. And to make our ſelves to be prima libera, the firſt free agents, what is other then to advance our ſelves into the very Throne of God's Soveraigntie; and doe wee not feare leaſt his wrath ſmoake us thence. And if all this that hee contends for were granted him, that nothing but mere neceſſitie were found in the motion of men's wills; yet Suarez will juſtifie us from ſpeaking contradiction, or delivering ought that exceeds the compaſſe of God's omnipotencie. And what if all the world were innocent, yet God ſhould not be unjuſt in caſting the moſt innocent creature into hell fire; as Medina profeſſeth, and that by the unanimous conſent of Divines, and Vaſquez the Jeſuite acknowledgeth this to be in the power of God as he is Lord of life and death, and in the laſt chapter of the booke, de praedeſtinatione & gratiâ which goes under Auſtin's name, there is an expreſſe paſſage to juſtifie it. And albeit that worke be not Auſtin's, yet it is lately juſtified to be the worke of a great follower of Auſtin's, and as Orthodoxe as he; namely, the worke of Fulgentius as Raynaudus the Jeſuite hath lately proved, and juſtified that paſſage alſo; together with that which is uſually brought by School-Divines to prove it out of the twelfth Raynaud: in in Vindcationi.chapter of Wiſedome, and ſhewes the right reading, as followed by Auſtin and Gregory. And withall repreſents a pregnant paſſage taken out of the fifteenth Homily of Macarius to the ſame purpoſe. And out of Chryſoſtome in his 2. De compunctione cordis, about the end thereof. And out of Auſtin upon Pſalme the ſeventieth, about the beginning. And to theſe he addeth Ariminenſis, Cameracenſis, Serarius, and Lorinus, all maintaining the ſame. And this is evident by conſideration of the power, which it pleaſed the Lord to execute upon his holy Son, and our bleſſed Saviour, and by the power which he gives us over brute creatures. This I ſay, if all that he contends for were granted, ſhould rather be concluded therehence, namely, that in this caſe the creature ſhould be innocent, then that God ſhould be the Authour of ſinne; eſpecially conſidering that God performes in all this noe other thing then belongs unto him of neceſſitie; as without which his moving of the ſecond cauſes, it were impoſſible the creature ſhould worke at all, which we have made good, by ſhewing the manifeſt abſurdity of their contrary doctrine, who maintaine a bare concourſe Divine either in ſubordination unto the agency of the creature, or without ſubordinating the operation of the creature, to motion Divine. But we doe ſubordinate it, as without which the ſecond cauſe could not worke at all, and by vertue whereof it doth worke, and that freely, ſo farre forth as liberty of will is competent to a creature; but not ſo as to make the creature compeere with his Creatour. Let man be a ſecond free Agent, but ſet our God that made us evermore be the firſt free Agent; leaſt otherwiſe we ſhall deny him the ſame power over his creatures, that the Potter hath over the clay of the ſame lumpe to make one veſſell unto honour and another unto diſhonour. This power in my maker, the Lord hath given me eyes to diſcerne as taught us in his holy word, and an heart to ſubmit unto it; and to his providence in governing my will, even in the worſt actions that ever were committed by me, without any repining humour againſt his hand; though I thinke it lawfull for us in an holy manner to expoſtulate with God ſometimes in the Prophets language and ſay, Lord why haſt thou cauſed us to erre from thy waies and hardened our hearts againſt thy feare? Which yet I confeſſe he brings to paſſe at noe time, infundendo malitiam, by infuſing any malice into me, who naturally have more then enough of that leaven in me; but, non infundendo gratiam, not quickning in me that holy feare, which he hath planted in me, of which grace I confeſſe willingly, I have a great deale leſſe then I deſire, though the leaſt meaſure of it is a great deale more then I doe or can deſerve. Neither ſhall I ever learne of this Authour after his manner to blaſpheme God if at any time hee ſhall harden my heart againſt his feare. Though this Authour ſpeakes commonly with a full and foule mouth, yet his arguments are lanke and leane; and of noe ſubſtance but words. As when hee ſaith that, God over-rules men's wills by our opinion. Now to overrule… a man is to carry him in deſpight of his teeth. Wee ſay noe ſuch thing but that God moves every creature to worke agreably to it's nature, neceſſary things neceſſarily, contingent things contingently, free Agents freely; though nothing comes to paſſe by the free agency of any creature, but what God from all eternity, by his unchangable counſell hath determined to come to paſſe. As the eleventh Article of Ireland doth profeſſe by the unanimous conſent of the ArchBiſhop, Biſhops and Clergy of that Kingdome, when thoſe Articles were made. So I ſpeake warily and circumſpectly, the rather becauſe one Doctour Heylin doth in a booke intituled, The Hiſtory of the Sabbath, profeſſe, Chapter 8. page 259. That, that whole booke of Articles is now called in, and in the place thereof, the Articles of the Church of Ireland confirmed by Parliament in that Kingdome. Anno 1631. A thing I willingly confeſſe at firſt ſight ſeemed incredible unto mee; namely, that Articles of Religion agreed upon in the dayes, of King Iames, ſhould be revoked in the dayes of King Charles; but expect to heare the truth of that relation. For the Authour thereof hath never as yet deſerved ſo much credit at my hands, as to be believed in ſuch a particular as this. But to returne, this Authours text is nothing anſwerable to the margent. For firſt, imperare to command, is one thing, and to over-rule is another thing: though he that doth, imperare command ought, is commonly accounted the Authour thereof, as a cauſe Morall, from whom comes the beginning of ſuch a worke. But utterly deny that God commands evill, and the truth is wee acknowledge noe other notion of evill then ſuch as the Apoſtle expreſſeth in calling it foreign an incongruitie to the law of God, which law commands ſomethings and forbids other things. I come to his third reaſon. 3. I grant wicked counſellours and perſwaders are deſervedly accounted the Authors of ſinne: The common uſe and acception of the words as I ſhewed in anſwer to the firſt, is obſerved to denote ſuch. Therefore Cicero makes Authour and diſſwader oppoſite; and by law they are puniſhable in the ſame degree with the Actors. But God is noe counſellour or perſwader to any lewd courſe, but forbids it, and diſſwades it, and that with denuntiation of the greateſt judgments among trangreſſours. 2. I willingly confeſſe that councelling is farre inferiour to enforcing; yet in Scripture phraſe earneſt intreaty, or command is oftentimes expreſt by compelling as Mat, 14. 22. Mark: 6. 45. Luk: 14. 23. Gala: 6. 12, and 2. 14. 1 Sam: 28. 23. 2 Chron: 21. 11. And noe marvaile for hereby many times men are drawen full ſore againſt their wills to doe that which they would not. It is true God's power cannot be reſiſted, but neither hath any man any will to reſiſt that motion of God whereby he workes agreable to their natures, then indeed there were place for reſiſting. If the Lord carrieth on a covetous perſon, ſuch as Achan to covet a wedge of gold and a Babyloniſh garment, and coveting it move him accordingly to take it, and convey it away ſecretly, and hide it in his tent, what reſiſtance doth he make in all this? Or what is done in all this leſſe agreably to his covetous diſpoſition, then to the diſpoſition of Toades and Addars, when he moves them according to their nature to ſting and poyſon? So he moved the Babylonians compared to Serpents and Cockatrices to ſting a wicked people. Doe not the Scriptures Ier: 8. 17.plainly profeſſe that God did ſend them? Is not Aſſur in this reſpect called, the Rod of God's wrath and the ſtaffe in his hand? Was it not called the Lords indignation? Eſ: 10. 15.Is he not compared to an axe and a ſawe, ſhall the axe boaſt it ſelfe againſt him that heweth therewith? Or ſhall the ſaw extoll it ſelfe againſt him that moveth it? Still he confounds the act with the ſinfulneſſe thereof, ſpeaking of God's producing ſinnes; whereas ſinne is never produced, it being only an obliquity conſequent unto the act of ſuch a worker as is ſubject to a law. And our Adverſaries confeſſe that God is the cauſe of the act; as well as we. Yet will they not hereby be driven; to profeſſe that in producing the act he produceth the ſin. As for that which he ſpeaks of Inforcing, we may well pitty him, that when he wants ſtrength of reaſon, he ſupplies that by phraſes. We deny that God inforceth any man's will. Nay it is the generall rule of Schooles, that, voluntas non poteſt cogi, the will cannot be forced: We maintaine that every act of the will, eſpecially in naturall things (ſuch as a ſinfull act muſt needs be: for only gracious acts are ſupernaturall) is not only voluntary (which is ſufficient to preſerve it from being forced) but free alſo, by as much libertie as the creature is capable of, only we deny that the will of man is primum liberum, a firſt free agent, that is the prerogative of God alone, the firſt mover of all, and the ſupreme Agent thus: I have diſpatched my anſwer to his firſt reaſon conſiſting of three parts I come unto the ſecond.