The Riches of Gods Love, Part 1 · Section 5
Sect. 5.
M. Maſon's Aditions p. 19. 20.To the firſt part of this reply, namely, that it is more deſirable to be in hell, then to be nothing. I oppoſe three things. 1. The ſpeech of our Saviour concerning Judas: Woe be to that man by whom the Sonne of man is betraied, it had been good for that man if he had never been born Two things eſpecially are ſet forth in theſe words of our Saviour. Firſt the miſery of Judas the betraier of the Lord. Woe be &c. Secondly, the greatnes of his miſery, It had been good &c. It is as much as if the Lord had ſaid, Judas the traitour ſhall be damned, and therefore ſo woefull will his condition be, that it had been good and happy for him, if he had never received a being: good in earneſt, as the Interpreters doe generally expound it, not in the opinion and eſteem of weak minded, faint-hearted-men only as ſome few underſtand it. For firſt let it be granted that Scripture ſpeaketh of things ſometimes according to men's opinions, yet without reaſon to faſten ſuch an expoſtiō upon any Scripture, is to doe, as dunces doe in the Schooles, who being not able to anſwer a place in Ariſtotle wherewith they are charged, ſhift it off, and ſay, (loquitur ex aliorum ſententiâ, he ſpeaks according to the opinion of others.) 2. This ſcripture cannot in reaſon be thus expounded. Firſt becauſe it is an argument and ground by which Chriſt declareth the truth and greatneſſe of the miſery of Judas, Woe to the man &c And why woe? Becauſe it had been good &c. But it were no argument to ſhew his woefull eſtate by, to ſay that it had been good for him, that he had never been born in the opinion of men, who miſtake the caſe but not in truth. 2. becauſe this expoſition would teach and encourage men to be Atheiſts and Epicures. In the ſecond of Wiſdome, we read how voluptuous men doe ſtirre up one another to enjoy the good things, that are preſent, to fill them ſelves with wine and ointments, to leave ſome token of their jollity in every place and to practiſe all manner of wickedneſſe. And what is their motive? a falſe perſwaſion that their ſoules ſhall dye with their bodies; and that they ſhould have noe being after death. If this conceit would fleſh them thus in their opinions and voluptuous courſes, how freely and eagerly (may we thinke) would they purſue their carnall and ſinfull delights, if they could be but once perſwaded, that, after all their pleaſure they ſhould be in better caſe then if they had noe being? Secondly, I oppoſe common conſent. Where ſhall wee pick out a man, but will ſay (if he ſpeak from his heart) that he were better to vaniſh into a thouſand nothings, then to be Aug. Epiſt. ad Bon. 160.caſt into hell. What is the reaſon why men are ſo afraid of hell, when they are touched to the quick with the conſcience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternall vengeance, that with Job they curſe their birth day, and wiſh an hundred times over that they had never been, or might ceaſe to be, that ſo they might not come into the place of torments, but becauſe they judge a being there to be incomparably worſe, then no being any where? And why are men who are ſenſible of hell fire ſo ſtrongly curbed in the feare of feeling it, even from darling and beloved ſinnes, but becauſe they apprehend it to be the moſt terrible of terribles? Feare of being annihilated can never doe that, which the feare of hell doth.
M. Maſon went great bellied with theſe choiſe conceits, and therefore he will bring Anſwer.them in though it be by the cares, in ſpite of his own friends: like as Arminius did before him, to vent a certaine argument of his, which yet had a very unhappy iſſue to the betraying of the Authours nakedneſſe moſt ſhamefully; and his argument was this, To be happy is better thē ſimply to be; therefore to be miſerable, is worſe then ſimply not to be; now the conſequence is moſt inconſequent. For therefore to be happy is better then ſimply to be; becauſe, to be happy, includes being, & addes hapines thereunto. And one good added to another good muſt needs make the whole compound better. In like manner, If to be miſerable doth include the evill of not being and adde another evill thereunto, the whole compound muſt needs be worſe. But to the contrary it is apparent, that, to be miſerable doth not include the evill of not being, but the good of being rather; and conſequently there is no juſt proportion between miſery and happineſſe, And therefore though to be happy is better then ſimply to be (as including being, and ſome good thing more) yet thence it followes not, that to be miſerable, is worſe then not to be; for as much as, To be miſerable, doth not include the evill of not being and adde ſome evill more to it. Now the firſt that affirmed this harſh poſition, namely, that to be miſerable is not worſe then not to be at all, was Auſtin, and he not only affirmes it, but diſputes it, and proves it by variety of arguments, not one whereof is anſwered by this Authour or by any friend that I know. And from Auſtin the School-men have taken it, and added this one argument to confirme it over and above thoſe of Auſtine's, To turne a man into nothing is to deſtroy a man's univerſall being; but to inflict torment upon him doth deſtroy only particular being, to wit, his being in eaſe and pleaſure. Now to have a man's particular being deſtroyed is not ſo bad, as to have a man's univerſall being deſtroyed. Now I come to conſider how this Authour carrieth himſelfe in overthrowing his own fiction. For albeit the poſition impugned by bim, be no fiction (for it was the opinion of Auſtin and of divers School-men) yet the bringing it in here, as if it were an anſwer made by us to any of our Adverſaries objections (as this Authour doth) as if we ſtood in need o… any ſuch aide is a mere fiction. And firſt he ſtates it at pleaſure to ſerve his own turne, of being in hell to be more deſirable, whereas the Authour whom he oppoſeth delivers it of, eſſe mi erum to be miſerable and miſery is as well in reſpect of ſinne, as in reſpect of bodily torment Nay it is confeſſed by Arminius himſelfe, That the miſery of ſinne is greater, then the miſery of torment. So, that if it be uncouth to ſay, that to be under the torment of hell is better then not to be at all; it ought to ſeem more uncouth to ſay, that it is better for a man to be guilty of ſin, then to have no being at all. Now I doe not find that this Authour in all his Mountebank-like amplifications, did take this into conſideration. Againe when it is ſaid. That to be miſerable is better thē not to be, this is to be underſtood aright, not as if miſery it ſelfe were deſirable, but being only, though with the adjunct of miſery thus, to have a being though in miſery is more deſirable, then to have no being at all And ſo if it beapplyed to the miſery of torment, and that in hell, it ought to be taken thus, To have a being though in hell is more deſirable then to have no being at all. And it is apparent, that in not being at all, there is nothing at all deſirable, but in being; though under the greateſt pain there is ſomething deſirable, to wit, being. Now I conſider his reaſons.
He objecteth the ſaying of our Saviour to Iudas. Woe be to that man by whom the ſonne of man is betrayed, it had been good for that man if he had never been born: and indeed the betraying of the Sonne of God his Lord and maſter, was a moſt facinorous act, eſpecially being committed by the way of a kiſſe, & with ſweet words ſaying Hayle Maſter. And Schoolmen doe diſtinguiſh between, the miſery of ſinne, and the miſery of pain, in ſuch ſort that albeit they deny the latter to be worſe then not being, yet they doe not reaſon ſo of the former. But becauſe Iudas was not ſo ſenſible of the miſerable condition of the one, as of the other; therefore our Saviour ſets forth the woefull condition of that ſtate whereof he, and generally all are moſt ſenſible. Whence we may well argue, that our Saviour ſpeakes in conformly to man's ſenſe and judgment, and it was not long ere the terrours of a guilty conſcience took hold of him, and he went forth and hang'd himſelfe. Yet our Saviour ſaith not, It had been good for Iudas if he had never received any being, but only this, If he had never been borne▪ now being is not received in a man's birth but in the conception rather. And undoubtedly, if Iudas had periſhed in his mothers womb it had been much better for him. As Arch-byſhop Whitgift ſometimes in the Court of high commiſſion ſaid, of one that was accuſed and convicied o… ſome foule crime committed by him in the very houſe of God That better it had been, that his neck had been broken at the firſt, then that he ſhould live to be o…ſcandalous to the Church of God And yet as if our Saviours wordes were not enough for this Authour in ſaying, It had been good for that man; therefore he patcheth it out with a ſupplement of his own, thus, It had been good and happy for that man, if he had never received being. So that whereas Ariſtotle made happineſſe to conſiſt in an aggregation of all good things this Authour with his divinitie thinks good to mend Ariſttotl's Philoſophy, by placing happineſſe in the want of every good thing very learnedly and judiciouſly. Vulcan who made thunder-bolts for Iupiter, when he was caſt out of heaven had a ſhrewd fall, and contracted ſuch lameneſſe as ſtuck by him ever after. So this Authour who forgeth thunder-bolts and arguments for others, being fallen upon oppoſition to the prerogative of God's grace and his Soveraignty over all creatures; no marvaile if his logick and philoſophy halteth; and his infirmity ſo contracted may increaſe ſo farre, as in the end to bereave him of commō ſenſe. He contents himſele as his manner is with ſaying, that Interpreters doe generally expound it as he doth; ſome few he confeſſeth underſtand it other wiſe, but moſt concurre with him, to wit, that, it is delivered in earneſt; what a jeſt is this as if any Interpreter was ever known to ſay, that our Savour ſpake not in earneſt. Neither doe I know any that interpreteth the place as he ſhapes it, as if our Saviour ſpake according to the opinion of weak-minded faint-hearted men only. Not one that I know putteth any ſuch difference of men under the torments of hell. Like as the Prophet ſpeakes of the ſtouteſt, as well as the weakeſt, Can thy heart endure, or thine hands be ſtrong in the day that I have to deale with thee, or the Lord rather by Ezech: 22. 14.the Prophet. The School-men ſuppoſe without difference, that the damned wiſh they had never been borne, or rather that they had never been. So the Saints of God in this life have broken forth into paſſionate expreſſions in the time of their extremity; Maldonate on this place gives inſtance in many; but the queſtion is whether theſe proceed from the judgment of right reaſon; or erroneous rather, through the vehemēcy of paſſion, whoſe courſe is as Aquinas obſerves, extinguere rationem, to extinguiſh reaſon. And it is one of the three things as Ariſtotle obſerves in his bookes De Animâ, that hinders the mind in her judgment. The other two are, foreign a Diſeaſe, foreign ſleep; the third is paſſion; how much more when paſſion is ſtirred up by the ſoreſt diſeaſe of all other the torments of hell fire?
1. But if I am glad to ſee the iſſue whereto he drives his diſcourſe. For he grants that the ſcripture ſpeakes ſometimes according to men's opinions: but without reaſon to faſten ſuch an expreſſion upon any Scripture, is to doe as Dunſes doe &c. he gives no inſtance; I will ſupply the want thereof, and that out of one of thoſe dunſes a follower of Iohn Duns an eminet ſchool-man, from whoſe name ſchool-men are called dunſes, whom this Authour was woont to magnifie; Lychetus a Minorite is the man, who is the firſt that I have found hitherto maintaining that God's purpoſe of election of any particular man may ceaſe; and the purpoſe of reprobating the ſame may come in the place thereof. So the purpoſe of reprobating Iudas may come in the place thereof, and that without all change in God. This is a doctrine that now a dayes growes in requeſt Penotus hath taken it up without betraying from whom he had it: And Franciſcus à ſanctâ Clarâ after him, and ſome of our Arminians I find inamoured with it. Now this Lychetus, when he is charged with the doctrine of Scotus as directly oppoſite hereunto, his anſwer is in part that he ſpeakes according to the opinion of others. Now I deſire not upon better termes to contend with M. Maſon. For Auſtine hath given many reaſons to prove that ſimply and abſolutely not to be, is not a thing deſirable, above being, though joyned with never ſo great miſery of pain. And the School-men acknowledge that Auſtine herein delivers his judgment, and withall they concurre with him as Scot, Biel, Durandus, Maldonat. And it is evident that to be turned into nothing, is an univerſall deſtruction of being; ſo is not inflicting of puniſhment, as both Durandus and Maldonat argue the caſe. And ſaying that not to have any being at all is better for Iudas then to be in torment, here is ſomething affirmed of a ſubject that makes him of a better condition then otherwiſe, which hath no place, but upon ſuppoſition of a ſubjects exiſtence, & that in diſtinction from an attribute affirmed of him, which conſtitutes him in a condition of betternes, now that that which is nothing, by reaſon of being nothing, ſhould be better the ſomething, is one of the wildeſt expreſſions, I think that hath been heard of ſince the world began; And therewithall creatures began to have a being. Againe conſider, take Gabriel the Arch-Angell moſt holy as a creature, and let every ſober man judge, whether it were better for him not to be, then being holy as he is to be tormented in hell fire. I ſhould think that albeit God ſhould torment me with hell fiire yet if he ſhould preſerve my ſoule from ſinne & in the love of him out of the ſenſe of his love towards me, I ſhould have infinitly more cauſe to rejoyce then to complain, how weak ſoever I am at this preſent. Thirdly, if it be better and more deſirable to have no being at all, then to be in hell fire; then this is to be uderſtood of hell fire, either without limitation of time only: or with limitation. If only it hold in reſpect of everlaſtingneſſe, then it followes it is better to be in hell fire, provided a man ſhall not everlaſtingly continue there, then to have no being at all, though it be for a thouſand yeares, not only twiſe told; but a thouſand times over and over, and that multiplied Cubically, and yet no end of multiplication of the time of tormenting. If it be better to have no being at all then to ſuffer hell torments ſo long, then it is better to have no being at all, then to ſuffer hell torments halfe ſo long: For no reaſon can be given to the contrary; In a word it will follow, that it were better to have no being, then to ſuffer hell torments one houre, or halfe an howre, or a quarter, or a minute, or halfe a minute. For no reaſon can define the bounds within which it will be better to ſuffer the paines of hell fire, then to be turned into nothing, and beyond which it will be worſe. But M. Maſon ſaith ſecondly. This Scripture cannot in reaſon be thus expounded: And he gives his reaſon for it: Becauſe it is an argument and ground by which Chriſt declareth the greatneſſe or truth of the miſery of Iudas: and I pray let every ſober man judge, whether this be not a ſufficient amplification of that miſery, that they ſhall wiſh they had never been, or that they might be turned into nothing, rather then ſuffer ſuch torments. How many preferre death before this worlds miſery, and ſo goe on to deſtroy themſelves; will it therefore follow that death indeed, though it ſhould be an utter abolition of man, is not ſo bad as to ſuffer the miſeries of this world. The miſtake of a damned perſon wiſhing not to be, conſiſts not in conceiving his torments to be unſufferable with any content or patience, but in conceiving that by not being, he ſhould have eaſe, which is a moſt abſurd conceit, ariſing merely from diſtraction of mind throug extremity of anguiſh. So that all things rightly conſidered, here is no encouragement for men to become Atheiſts & Epicures, unleſſe this be an encouragement thereunto, that their pain ſhall be ſo extreme and unſufferable, as to make them deſire, and utter they know not what, ſuch diſtraction of mind and and perturbation of judgment ſhall ſurprize them. A falſe perſwaſion that mens ſoules ſhall die with their bodies, and that they ſhall have no being after death, urgeth every man indifferently to take his delights and pleaſures while he may; whether this delight and pleaſure be taken in courſes vicious, or in courſes vertuous, becauſe death ſets an end, as to them; ſo to their pleaſures and delights. But if their greateſt happineſſe, or miſery doth begin in joy, or ſorrow after death; and this is well known unto them: ſober reaſon doth ſuggeſt unto them to provide for the obtaining of that happineſſe, and declining that unhappineſſe, above all other, according to that Ladies reſolution in Sophocles, and that upon this ground foreign, there I ſhall continue for ever. But when he ſaith the wicked will the more eagerly purſue their carnall and ſinfull delights, becauſe after all their pleaſures they ſhall be in a better caſe, then if they had no being. I long to have the judgment of any lewd perſon throughout the world concerning this; as namely whether he takes any comfort or encouragement to ſinfull courſes from this; that albeit he ſhall be caſt with the devill and his Angells into hell fire that never goeth out. Yet this condition is a better condition, then not to have any being at all; whereas this better condition conſiſts only in this, that being is better then not being; not in this, that he hath any eaſe, or is leſſe obnoxious to torment and ſorrow, which ſhall be ſo unſufferable, as to provoke him to wiſh, that he never had any being at all. Or that forthwith he might be turned into nothing.
Secondly, I oppoſe common conſent. Where ſhall we pick out a man but will ſay (if he ſpeak from his heart) that he were better to vaniſh into a thou and nothings, then to be caſt into hell? What is the reaſon why M. Maſon's Addit. p. 20.men are ſo afraid of hell, when they are touched to the quick with the conſcience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternall vengeance, that with Job they curſe their birthday, and wiſh an hundred times over, that they had never been, or might ceaſe to be, that ſo they might not come into that place of torments; becauſe they judge a being there to be incomparably worſe, then no being any where? And why are men, who are ſenſible of hell fire, ſo ſtrongly curbd and held in with feare of feeling it, even from dailing and beloved ſinnes, but becauſe they apprehend it to be the moſt terrible of all terribles? feare of being annihilated can never doe that which feare of hell doth.
And is he well in his wits that talkes of a thouſand nothings? I looked whereto it would come with ſuch like wild diſcourſes, even to runne out of common ſenſe at laſt. Anſwer.Yet all this that he diſcourſeth of, for the ſubſtance of it is no other, then Auſtine hath taken notice of in his very argument; and ſhewes the vanity of it, and the errour of man's imagination, conceiving the condition of being nothing, to be a condition of eaſe and reſt from ſorrow & pain; againe aske the ſame men whether they would not be content to be turned into dogges, wolves, ſnakes, toades, rather then to be under the torments of hell fire; aſke againe whether they would not be contēt, to be turned into devills, ſo they might be free from the torments of hell fire. Aske the Adulterour whether he would not be content to lye with an other mans wife all his daies, rather then to ſuffer (ſhall I ſay) the torments of hell fire? Nay rather then dye poſſeſt of the joyes of heaven. Aske this Authour whether he would not be content to maintaine ſtiffly, that grace is given according to workes, and that a man is juſtified by his workes, rather then ſuffer the paines of hell fire, yea though it were againſt his own conſcience. As for me were I a damned creature, yet according to this judgment which God hath given me cōſidering that the glory of God's juſtice is manifeſted in my condemnation, though extreamity of pain would tranſport me into as wild wiſhes, as this Authour juſtifies; yet according to right reaſon I ſhould rather be content to ſuffer, then wiſh that I were turned into a bruit beaſt, or into a devill, or into nothing. I think the whole nation of ſober divines would juſtifie me in this undoubtedly God is able to worke me or any man to this reſolution without ſin.
2. If, becauſe men through feare of hell and expectation of eternall vengeance doe with Job curſe their birth day once, and wiſh they had never been; therefore it is better to be nothing then to be in hell: By the ſame reaſon, becauſe they doe no other then Job did, it muſt follow, that it was better for Iob to be nothing, then to be under ſuch torments. But if Iob's deſire was an unſober and unreaſonable deſire in this, why might not their deſire be as unſober and unreaſonable alſo, proceeding not ſo much from calme reaſon, as from the ſtrength of paſſion inflamed and diſordered through extremity of torment. We know that men upon the rack doe ſometimes make confeſſions, even againſt the light of their own conſciences. And feare of evill ſometimes diſtracts as much as the ſenſe thereof; as in him who hearing the ſentence of death paſſed againſt him at Paris, fell into a ſweat of blood. And it was wont to be ſaid, that pejor eſt malo, timor ipſe mali. Francis Spira in the time of his diſtraction confeſt as much of hell it ſelfe. And if one deſire, once having courſe, prove unreaſonable, why ſhould the renewing of it a thouſand times over prove leſſe unreaſonable. And let the judicious obſerve the hand of God, in ſtriking this Authour with ſuch giddineſſe even in this argument, (which he conceives of all other to be advantagious to his cauſe) ſo as at every turne to ſupplant himſelfe, and to betray the ſhamefull nakedneſſe of his diſcourſe. As firſt, in talking of a thouſand nothings. Secondly, In putting the caſe of ſome curſing their birth day, but how? as Iob did. Now will any ſober man make the like collection of Iob's curſing his birth day, as this Author doth from others curſing theirs. Thirdly, and laſtly in calling hell fire the terrible of all terribles. Who ſeeth not that this proceeds in reference to ſuch things, which as they are feared, ſoe they may be felt; and ſuppoſing a ſubject exiſting, as to feare it before it comes, ſo to feele it when it is come but ſuch is not the condition of being nothing. And when he feignes us to conforme to his crude conceptions, namely to conceive annihilation to be a thinge feared, he pleaſeth himſelfe in his owne fictions. He no where finds me to ſpeake of annihilation as a thing to be feared, no more then I ſpeake of it as of a thing that is to be felt. OnelyOnly I ſay that it is a condition no way deſirable by a reaſonable creature, no more then the ſuffering of hell fire. But whereas hell fire cannot be ſuffered of any unleſſe he hath a being, here is ſomething found deſirable, to wit the continuance of being. But in the condition of being nothing, there is not found any thing to be a fit Object of mans deſire.
The third thing which I oppoſe is common ſenſe; which judgeth paines, when they are extreame to be worſe then death. Hence it is that Job being tormented in his body by the Devill curſed his birth day, magnified M. Maſon's Addit. 3. p. 20. 21.the condition of the dead, and wiſhed himſelfe in the grave, plainely preferring the loſſe of his being, before that miſerable being which he then had. And hence it is that men even of ſtouteſt and hardeſt ſpirits (as we ſee by dayly experience) would (if they might enjoy their option) chooſe rather to have no bodyes at all, then bodyes tormented with the ſtone or gout, or any other ſharpe and ſenſible diſeaſe It is a knowen ſaying grounded on this judgement of ſenſe. Praeſtat ſemel quàm ſemper mori, better it is to dye once then to be allwayes dying. This the tyrant Tiberius knew very well, and therefore he would not ſuffer thoſe, towards whom he purpoſed to exerciſe his cruelty, to be put to a ſpeedy death, but by lingring torments. And Suetonius repo…t…th of him in that chapter, wherein he reckoneth up his barbarous and cruell practiſes; Theſe, ſayth he, who would have dyed through the extremity of their torment, he uſed meanes to keepe alive (nam mortem adeo leve ſupplicium putabat) For he accounted death ſo light a puniſhment; that when he heard that one Carnulius, a man appoynted to torments, had prevented him, he cryed out, Carnulius me evaſit Carnulius hath eſcaped mine hands. To a priſoner entreating him to put him quickly to death he gave him this anſwer, Nondum tecum redii in gratiam, I am not yet friends with thee; accounting it a great kindneſſe to put him quickly to death, whom he might have tortured. Many that were called into queſtion did partly wound themſelves in their owne houſes, Ad vexationem ignominioſam vitandam, to prevent that paine and ignominy, which they knew they ſhould endure; And partly poyſoned themſelves in the mid'ſt of the Court, as they were going to their a…aingment for the ſame cauſe Seneca ſpeaking of one Mecaenas, who was ſo a frayd of being dead, that he ſayd he would not refuſe weakeneſſe, deformity, nec acutam crucem, no nor the ſharpeſt crucifying, ſo that he might live ſtill in theſe extreamityes, he calleth his deſire. Turpiſſimum votum, a baſe, and moſt ignoble, and unnaturall with, and cenſureth him for a moſt effeminate and contemptible man; becauſe in all his evills he was afrayd of that which was the end of all evills, the privation of his being And certainly we muſt needs conceive and cenſure them to be ſtocks and ſtones, rather then fleſh and blood, who can ſo put of all feeling, and ſenſe, as to thinke a tormented being in hell, to be a lighter and leſſer evill, then no being at all.
We know that death to ſuch as Iob was, is not only better then extreame paines, but better then all the joyes of this world; by how much to be preſent with the Lord Anſwer.Chriſt, is better then to be abſent from him; and we know, ſayth Paul, to the unſpeakable comfort of all true Chriſtians, that when the earthly houſe of this our tabernacle is diſſolved we have a building of God not made with hands, but eternall in the heavens. So that I wonder not a little at theſe wilde diſcourſes of this Authour. When he ſaith that even the ſtouteſt and hardeſt ſpirits would chooſe rather to have no bodyes at all, then bodyes tormented with the ſtone or gout, what other is this then to deſire that they were impaſſible; would they not deſire to have no ſoules too? and to be without ſenſe like ſtocks and ſtones? But let every ſober man judge whether this be a reaſonable deſire; what Chriſtian juſtifies Iob in curſing the day of his birth? What Martyr hath not rejoyced in ſuffering, not naturall diſeaſes, but the cruelleſt torments that moſt cruell, and ſpightfull Tyrants could deviſe to be inflicted upon them? And even to ſuffer other evills by courſe of nature brought upon us with patience, acknowledging the hand of God therein, and ſubmitting unto his will, juſtifying him as righteous in all his wayes, and holy in all his works, and condemning our ſelves: even this long a goe hath beene accounted for Martirdome in the judgement of Chryſoſtome. It is true ſuch proverbs have had their courſe in moſt nations. foreign, praeſtat ſemel quam ſemper mori. And amongſt us. Better eye out then allwaies aking, better one dead then allwaies dying. But ſhall we take this hand over head without a difference between a Chriſtian & unchriſtian, and heatheniſh interpretation? As many as had an opinion of the immortall condition of the ſoule, and withall of different conditions of men in joy, or ſorrow, according to the condition of their life ſpent in their courſes vertuous, or vicious, if they were well perſwaded of their life paſt, they might accordingly think it better for them to dye then live; And it is noe leſſe deſirable to them, who had no comfort in their life paſt. Bradwardine hath ſuch a meditation. Mallem non eſſe quàm te offendere, I had rather have no being at all then to offend thee, ſpeaking unto God. Yet in ſinning againſt Bradward. lib. 2. c. ult.him we are matter of his glory, which we are not, when we have no being at all. Matter of his glory I ſay, either in pardoning ſinne, or in puniſhing it, or both. But what ſober man will juſtifie ſuch a ſaying, I had rather have no being at all then be troubled with the ſtone, or gout? Is not this the proper place for patience to have its perfect worke. And if it be urged that this holds true only in evills tolerable, not in caſe they prove intolerable. I anſwer that ſurely the pain of ſtone or gout is not intolerable, not any in the judgment of Paul, whoſe profeſſion was this I am able to doe all things (his meaning is to ſuffer all things) by the power of Chriſt that inableth me: and when upon his prayer Iav, 1. 4.that the meſſenger of Satan might be removed from him, he received this anſwer from the Lord, My grace is ſufficient for thee, and my power is made perfect in thy weakneſſe, What is Paul's reſolution hereupon, though in himſelfe a very weak creature? I will gladly therefore rejoyce in my infirmities, that the power of Chriſt may dwell in me. Therefore I take pleaſure in infirmities, in reproaches, in neceſſities, in perſecution, in anguiſh, for Chriſt's ſake. For when I am weak then I am ſtrong. Doth not this extend to the very torments of hell ſuffered by our Saviour for our ſakes. Undoubtedly, if the glory of heaven poſſeſſe the ſoule, though the paines of hell ſeize upon the body, ſuch a one ſhall have more cauſe to rejoyce then to complain. Theſe courſes of Tiberius I had cauſe to take notice of in mine anſwer to M. Hord. For, whereas he ſlaundered our doctrine concerning the abſoluteneſſe of God's decrees, and conforming them to the cruell courſes of Tiberius: whereupon I ſhewed, that if ſuch compariſons were not odious, but allowable, we might in like manner compare God's courſes in puniſhing ſinne temporall with torment eternall, with courſes of Tiberius here ſpecified. And becauſe nothing hath a greater ſhew of cruelty in Tiberius then ſuch courſes of his as theſe. Hence they may with the ſame liberty conclude, that the divine Majeſty is cruell (which is a horrible thing to utter) and unjuſt in puniſhing men everlaſting in hell fire, for ſinnes committed by them for a very ſhort ſpace in the courſe of their lives. But let this Authour conſider, were heathen Princes more exaſperate againſt any then againſt Chriſtians, or were more cruell courſes taken againſt any then the ſervants of God. Yet did theſe Chriſtians prevent their bloody and barbarous deſires by murdering their ſelves? Did they not rejoyce in tribulation? Yet death they might well preferre before the ſweeteſt life. That they might enjoy the Lord Chriſt And Auſtine hath long agoe in this very argument ſhewed, that even in deſtroying themſelves they aimed at being at a ſtate of freedome from ſorrowes. So farre were they from affecting to have no being at all. And firſt, he diſtinguiſhes of the will as it ſignifies an appetite naturall; or as it ſignifies an abſolute deſire. As it ſignifies nature or appetite naturall; ſo by no meanes can it deſire to have no being. All naturall deſire being for reſt, but nature findes no reſt in its deſtruction: Reſt of nature ſuppoſeth its being, and adds ſomewhat over and above thereunto, namely freedome from trouble, unde ſiquis dicat vellem non eſſe, magis quàm miſerum eſſe; reſpondebo, mentiris, quia cum miſerum nolis eſſe tamen vis. Thus Durand analizeth Auſtin's diſcourſe hereupon. Then he proceeds to ſhew that the deliberative appetite cannot affect not being, for the avoiding of evill, ſave only according to erroneous reaſon. All which this Authour takes no notice of, but pleaſeth himſelfe in his own confuſion. All creatures have in them, veſtigia Dei, ſaith Luther, to wit, in reſpect of their being; But man is, Imago Dei. Shall right reaſon ſuggeſt the deſtroying of this for pain's ſake? Durandus proceeds & ſhewes how according to erroneous reaſon a man may deſtroy himſelfe, by reaſon of ſome preſent miſerable condition urging him; conceiving that thereby he ſhall arrive to ſome ſecret exiſtence wherein he ſhall be free, as from the good things, ſo from the evill things of this world. Unde Aguſtinus ubi ſupra dicit, quòd aliqui urgente miſeriâ ſeſe interimūt, eo quòd confugiunt ubi melius fore putaverint. A ſecond manner is this, the vehemency of evill ſuffered may ſo over-cloud and trouble reaſon, as to make them conceive, that to have no being at all is better then to be in miſery, which is abſurd, ſaith he; for as much as the privation of evill is not good, but by reaſon of obtaining of the contrary good; but no ſuch good can be obtained in being nothing, howſoever men through errour of judgment may faigne it otherwiſe. In which caſe he makes choice of nothing (thinking to make choice of ſomething) and conſequently his election is erroneous, as Auſtine concludeth. But Seneca is the beſt flower in this Authours preſent diſcourſe; and the cenſure which he paſſeth upon one Mecaenas, who, ſo he might live, would not care what torments he ſuffered. Where by the way I obſerved; that albeit this Authour repreſents the common ſenſe of heathens only in this. Yet all heathens were not of the ſame mind. Secondly, I obſerve that Seneca who cenſureth him did look for an immortall condition after death, which it ſeemes was no part of Mecaenas his Creed. And upon this ground his cenſure might proceed. And indeed otherwiſe it is very ſtrange that he ſhould cenſure him for effeminatenes, in reſpect of a reſolute mind to endure tortures, which we know full well is uſually accounted virile aliquid, rather then muliebre, the part of a man, more then the part of a woman. Thirdly, I find in Auſtine, that this was the opinion of Varro and the Stoicks, that it became a man to deſtroy himſelfe, rather then to endure ſome evills, and in this doctrine of theirs, he findes ſome contradiction to another doctrine of their own, which was this, Hanc eſſe naturae primam quodammodo & maximam vocem, ut homo concilietur ſibi, & propterea mortem naturaliter fugiat, This is the firſt and greateſt voice of nature, that man ſhould be at one with himſelfe, and therefore naturally flieth death. And herein Auſtine himſelfe acknowledgeth them to deliver a truth. Now conſider, is a man at one with himſelfe when he deſtroyes himſelfe? Is he not rather at odds with himſelfe in making a man's fortitude to be a ſelfe deſtroyer? If ſo be that deſerves to be called fortitude, as there Auſtine ſpeakes: Or how can the duty of preſerving a man's ſelfe, be the greateſt voice of nature, if there be found a voice of nature countermanding it, and commaunding a man to kill himſelfe? In ſuffering evills there is place for the exerciſe of patience, of true fortitude and magnanimity of mind: But in the utter deſtruction of nature there is no place for the exerciſe of any vertue: which vertue was ſo farre advanced by the Stoicks, as touching the power of it, as to be able to deſcend into Phalaris his Bull, as Cicero diſcourſeth in the laſt of his Tuſculane queſtions Yet not only great evills, for the inſufferable nature of them did urge them to deſtroy themſelves, but meaner evills moſt unreaſonably. What moved Cato to deſtroy himſelfe, but becauſe he would not come under Caeſar? His ſtout ſpirit could not endure ſubjection. Yet he read over Plato's diſcourſe of immortality the night before, and felt the edge of his ſword, which ſome cenſure as an argument of ſome puſillanimity. The Spaniard, who was whipt through Paris never changed his pace, affecting to maintaine the reputation of ſpaniſh gravity and reſoluteneſſe, though he ſmarted the more for it. And ſhall not our being in the likeneſſe and Image of God, be preferred before not being, though conjunct with any dolorous ſuffering: when this Authour will have no being, to be a lighter and leſſer evill then hell paines; doth he not moſt manifeſtly ſignifie that it is a burden more eaſie to be borne? Thus ere he is aware moſt contradictiouſly he ſuppoſeth that, even in not being, there is a being. For how is it poſſible that an evill can be borne, and that with more eaſe then ſome other evill, by him who hath no being at all. But let him ſtraine his wits to deviſe where firſt pain begins to be ſo great, that a man's utter deſtruction is to be preferred before it, ſeeing it is apparent that all pain is not ſuch.