The Riches of Gods Love, Part 2 · Treatise · Type of argument 2 · Section 1
SECT. I. As touching the Generall.
SEcondly it fights with ſome principall Attributes of God, therefore it cannot be true. For God uſeth not to make decrees contrary to his own glorious nature, and incompatible with thoſe excellent Attributes, by which he hath diſcovered part of himſelfe to men.
Two things are here to be premiſed.
1. That Gods chief Attributes are thoſe perfections, in the manifeſtation of which by acts conformable to them, God is moſt glorified, which are Mercy, Juſtice, Truth, &c. For God is more honoured by the exerciſe of theſe amongſt men, then by the putting forth of his unlimited power and Soveraignty; as a King is more renowned among his Subjects, for his clemency, equity, candid and faire dealing, then for his Dominion and Authority, or any thing that is done only for the manifeſtation thereof. And there is good reaſon for it. For,
1. Power is no vertue, but mercy, juſtice, and truth are; acts of power are not Morally good of themſelves, but are made good or evill by their concomitants: if they be accompanied with juſtice, mercy, &c. they are good, if otherwiſe, they are naught. For juſtum oportet eſſe quod laudem meretur.
2. Power and Soveraignty may as well be ſhewed in barbarous and unjuſt actions, as in their contraries. Saul ſhewed his authority and power to the full, in ſlaying the Lords Prieſts, and Nebuchadnezzar in caſting the three Children into the fiery furnace, and Daniell into the Lyons Denne; but no mercy, nor juſtice, nor any thing elſe that was good.
2. The ſecond thing that is to be preconſidered is, that juſtice, mercy, and truth in God, are the ſame in nature with thoſe vertues in men, though infinitely different in degree (as light in the aire, is the ſame with light in the Sunne in nature, not in degrees) and that which is juſt, mercifull, and upright in men, is ſo in God too. And by theſe vertues in our ſelves, and ſuch acts as are conformable to them, tanquam ex pede Herculem, we may ſafely meaſure the ſame in God: For otherwiſe theſe things would follow.
1. The common and received diſtinction of Divine Attributes, into communicable and incommunicable, would fall to the ground: for againſt it this night be ſaid, that the mercy, juſtice, truth, and other vertues that are in us, are not Gods perfections in a lower degree communicated to us, but things of a different nature.
2. Men cannot be truly ſaid, to be made after Gods image, Gen. 1. 27. Nor when they are regenerated, to be renewed after the ſame image, Col. 3. 10. And to be made partakers of the Divine nature, 2 Pet. 1. 4. That Picture cannot be the picture of ſuch a man, which doth not in its parts and lineaments clearly reſemble him; nor can we be truly the image of God, in reſpect of our graces, if in theſe graces there be not a reſemblance of Gods Attributes.
3. We may not ſafely imitate God, as we are commanded; Be you perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect, Math. 5. 48. and be ye holy as I am holy. Nor when we ſhew forth mercy, juſtice, and truth in our actions, can we be properly ſaid to imitate God, if theſe be one thing in God, and in men another.
Theſe two things being thus premiſed, viz. that Gods mercy, juſtice, and truth, are three of his chief Attributes, in the exerciſe of which he takes himſelfe to be much glorified, and that we are to meaſure theſe Attributes by the ſame vertues in ourſelves. I come to the proofe of my ſecond reaſon againſt abſolute reprobation, which is, that it oppoſeth ſome of Gods principall Attributes, particularly his juſtice, mercy, and truth.
TWISSE. Conſideration.
I Cannot but wonder at the performances of the true Author of this Diſcourſe, in comparing that which goes before, with that which comes after; His poverty of argumentation out of Scripture, and the exuberancy of his diſcourſe following. Before he was in ſome ſtraits, but now he ſeems to have gotten Sea roome enough: yet this is my comfort, I ſeem to perceive out of what chimney all this ſmoak proceeds, and to be as well acquainted with the ſpirit that breatheth here, as if I were at his elbow while he penned it. Agnoſco veteris veſtigia flammae: ſuch like are Doctor Jackſons diſcourſes; and him I have known of old, and his Epheſtion alſo; I profeſſe willingly of Scholar acquaintance, they were my greateſt and deareſt; But ſeeing it hath pleaſed God to put ſuch a difference between us; I would have both them and the World know, I doe as little regard them as feare them.
Arminius himſelfe is never more plauſible, then in ſuch like extravagant diſcourſes as a poſitive Theologue: But theſe inſpirations were never derived from him; they are flowers of another garden. Theſe have been ſhapen in a more Philoſophicall brain whereof ſome having gotten the reputation, give Oracles therehence, firſt to forme interpretations of Scriptures, in congruity to theſe Theorems, as the true Author bluſheth not to profeſſe; which when he hath perſwaded the World of, I ſee no cauſe to the contrary, but he may adventure a degree farther, and perſwade the burning of the Bible, ſo farre as it concerneth the Doctrine of Predeſtination and Reprobation, Grace and Free-will, and content themſelves with theſe magiſteriall precepts, as moſt ſufficient and ſoveraigne for the endoctrinations of the Chriſtian World in theſe poynts. But he might have ſpared his pains in proving this conſequence, that if our Doctrine of Reprobation be contradictory to Gods principall attributes it cannot be true. I ſay he might have ſpared the proofe hereof, for all that he brings in proofe of this is but darkneſſe in compariſon of the domeſticall light, and ſelfe-evidence, which this conſequence carryeth with it. His premiſes here, and diſcourſe thereof is like unto the Turkes parly before the encounter, when he challenged any one of Scanderbegs army to a ſingle combate. For as that parley was meerely complementall, and to no purpoſe, ſave only, as he might conceit, to abate the fervor of his oppoſite, who longed to be dealing with him; ſo this introduction, I find to be of no Scholaſticall uſe in the world, but meerely Politick, to work ſome impreſſion upon the readers affections, where by it may come to paſſe, that when he reads of Gods mercy and juſtice, as here it is ſet forth, he may be the more enclined to judge thereof, according to the genius of human mercy and juſtice. Yet I am content to give my ſelfe to be wrought upon by theſe pretty contemplations, as farre as I ſhall be convicted of any truth and ſobriety in them: though I willingly profeſſe I am very ſuſpicious (for I love to betray my infirmities) that there is little or no truth and ſobriety at all in them.
1. Now becauſe he hopes to hatch much advantage unto his cauſe out of theſe attributes, and to that purpoſe he ſitts very long upon them, though his market may be never the better for all that. He tells us theſe are Gods chief attributes, and as it appeareth by that which followeth, his practice is to diſparage his power (which I call the Lords Soveraignty) in compariſon to theſe; Now it ſeems they are chiefe indeed in his opinion, for the furthering of his cauſe; but as for any abſolute chiefty they have in God, I am not as yet acquainted therewith, what I may be by this Authors performances I know not; yet in the next page ſave one, he profeſſeth expreſſely, That all Gods excellencies are infinitely good, and one is not greater then another; wherein I doe much approve his judgement, as ſavouring of more depth then this, which yet I think not that he, who pretends to be the Author of this diſcourſe, in reſpect of his minority, ſhould be likely to broach; as for other reſpects of principality, I ſhall be ready to take notice of them in due place. But when he ſaith, God is moſt glorified in the manifeſtation of mercy, juſtice, and truth, it is a very odde phraſe: For it is one thing to be glorious, another thing to be glorified; dare he deny that God is as glorious in his power and ſoveraignty, as in his mercy, juſtice, and truth? As for the glorifying of him, that depends upon the will of the creature. It may be ſome are more thankfull unto God, for bleſſing them with health, and riches, and honour, and preferment; then for beſtowing his Goſpell upon them; but will it follow herehence, that his goodneſſe in giving riches, &c. is more glorious then his goodneſſe is ſeen in giving us his Word and Goſpell? We read that when God laid the foundations of the earth, the Starres of the morning praiſed God together, and all the children of God rejoyced, Job. 38. 7. did theſe Angells glorify God for his mercy, juſtice, and truth, in the creating of them? We read ſometimes of Gods power, ſometimes of his wiſdome manifeſted in the Creation, as Jer. 10. 11. and 51. 11. and Pſal: 136. 5. Jer. 10. 12. &c. But no where have I read (that I can remember) he made the World by his mercy, juſtice, or truth; and Revel. 4. 11. I find the glory of power given unto God in the creation, by the 24 Elders, but neither there, nor any where elſe (that I know) is the glory of his mercy, juſtice, and truth, given unto God therein. Thou art worthy O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power; for thou haſt created all things, and for thy will ſake, they have bee and are created. And albeit men faile in giving God the glory of his power and wiſdome as they ſhould, will it follow herehence, that God is not ſo much to be glorified for his power and wiſdome, as for mercy, juſtice, and truth? yet who falles in this, that failes not in the uſe of the Lords Prayer; the concluſion whereof is this, For thine is the Kingdome, and power, and glory? And indeed albeit Power and Wiſdome may be ſhewed other waies, then in the way of mercy, juſtice, and truth; yet Gods mercy, juſtice, and truth, cannot be ſhewed without the ſimultaneous demonſtration of his power and wiſdome: And therefore when God comes to make good his gracious promiſe, for the delivering of Iſrael out of Egypt: which cannot be denied to have been a ſingular work of mercy, juſtice, and truth; the Lord profeſſeth that then he would make himſelfe known unto them by the name, Jehovah, by which name he was not known before. The Incarnation of the Sonne of God, was it not an admirable work, as well in the way of power, and wiſdome, as in the way of mercy, juſtice, and truth? I am apt to confound Gods juſtice with his truth, ere I am aware, without having that awfull regard to the authority of this writer, as perhaps may ſeem fit: But I hope it is a pardonable fault, conſidering my education hitherto in divinity; whereby I have attained only thus farre, to the acknowledgement of juſtice Divine; for juſtice conſiſteth, in giving every one his due; now this due being either in reſpect of God, or the creature: Juſtice Divine in giving God his due, Aquinas hath taught me, that it is all one with Gods wiſdome, promoting his ends by congruous means; juſtice Divine in giving the creature his due, I have learnt to depend wholy on Gods determination, manifeſted by his promiſes and threatnings, and this is commonly called juſtitia fidelitatis, which I take to be all one with truth. But I am very willing to be better informed by this Author, and I give my ſelfe to his contemplations, to have my thoughts faſhioned by them as they can; and if hitherto they have not transformed me into a new Creed, I cannot help that. Now if it be ſo that Gods power and wiſdome accompany the demonſtration of his mercy, juſtice, and truth, I cannot ſee how God is honoured more by the exerciſe of the one ſort, then of the other, but rather on the contrary. So that albeit a King is more renowned among his Subjects, for his clemency, equity, candid and faire dealing, then for his dominion and authority; yet I doe not eaſily perceive, how God is renowned more for his clemency, equity, &c. then for his power, &c. yet again this ſeems to me a very poore argument; to conclude Clemency to be a chiefe attribute of God, becauſe men doe more magnify him for that, then for his Power. For conſider, a Malefactor going to execution, is called back and ſaved by the Kings pardon, this man (be ſure) will magnify the King more for his clemency in ſaving him, then he would for his juſtice in putting him to death: but will it follow herehence, that Clemency is a more chiefe attribute of a King then juſtice? Solomon the greateſt of Kings hath ſaid, the Throne is eſtabliſhed by Juſtice: and it was wont to be ſaid, fiat juſtitia, ruat orbis. No ſuch thing is ſaid of Mercy. Then again the King could not doe this but by vertue of his prerogative, yet the Malefactor magnifies him not for his prerogative, but for the favourable uſe of it for his good, for that is all he reſpects: yet aske I pray any man of judgement, which is the chiefer attribute of a King, and more glorious of the two; his prerogative or his clemency? Clemency is a very vulgar vertue, but the royall prerogative is peculiar to one; A Thiefe after a robbery committed on the high-way, meeting with a begger that beggeth a penny, if he aſtoniſh him with the gift of twelve pence, the begger is very likely more highly to magnify him, then any honeſt man going on the way, that beſtowes but an halfe penny upon him; yet, Whoſe liberality is the greater of the two? Carnall men renowne others for the benefit they receive by them; not according to their true worth: yet there is a farther difference; humane authority may be abuſed, and Soveraignty on earth is not alwaies joyned with good Morality, much leſſe with Piety; but in caſe a man could not ſinne, the more honour and authority is laid upon him, the more glorious ſhould he be; as being backt with the greater power to execute his goodneſſe. Thus it is with God, it is impoſſible he ſhould abuſe his ſoveraignty; yea his mercy and juſtice are one and the ſame reality with his power: what a vanity then is it to diſcourſe as this Author doth, in preferring one attribute of God before another, as if God were more glorious in the one then in the other. But he hath farther reaſons for this, let us conſider them: 1. Power (ſaith he) is no vertue, nor morally good, but mercy juſtice and truth are. I anſwer: Though it be ſo, yet who will ſay, the glory of vertue is greater then the glory of power?
2. Eſpecially conſidering, that vertue is common to the meaneſt.
3. A little vertue joyned with power, ſhall bring forth farre better fruits, then a great deale of vertue without power.
4. Though it be ſo in man, whoſe power may be abuſed, ſhall we transferre it to God, whoſe power cannot be abuſed, his power and his goodneſſe being all one?
5. Morall vertues denote a goodneſſe removeable where it is, obtainable where it is not; but no ſuch goodneſſe can be found in God, and conſequently no Morall vertue in proper ſpeech, whatſoever is in him, that being naturall and eſſentiall unto him.
6. Laſtly, to power only and ſoveraignty we owe obedience, and not to goodneſſe, and juriſdiction is farre more glorious then ſubjection. Yet by the way it is untrue (in my judgement) that acts of Power are made good by being accompanied with juſtice, ſpeaking of Morall goodneſſe; as acts of vertue alone they are morally good, not as acts of power. If justum oportet eſſe quod laudem meretur; then juſtice if not alone, yet chiefly, ſhall be that whereby one is renowned: yet herehence it followes, that every act of Gods power ſhall laudem mereri; becauſe it is impoſſible that any thing he doth ſhould be otherwiſe then juſt, ſuch a juſtitia condecentiae followeth all his actions; otherwiſe we muſt grant, that God hath power to doe that which is unjuſt.
2. And accordingly, though power humane and Angelicall, may be ſhewed in barbarous actions: yet power Divine cannot; let him doe whatſoever he is able, it ſhall not be unjuſt; let God turne all the World into nothing, another manner of deſtruction then that of Sauls ſlaying the Lords Prieſts, or Netuchadnezzars caſting the three Children into the fiery Furnace, yet dares this Author ſay, that God herein ſhould be unjuſt.
I come to the ſecond of his premiſes.
2. We have had a taſt of this Authors faculty in roaving at large, and within the Horizon of his own braine, we ſhall drink a deeper draught of it ere we part. And once again I willingly profeſſe, it cannot enter into my beliefe, that theſe conceits have dropt from the fancy of a young Divine; ſome old beaten Naturaliſt rather doth imploy his braine to doe the Arminians this ſervice. I never found hitherto that Arminius, or any of his Batavian followers have thus diſcourſed, that juſtice, mercy, and truth in God, are the ſame in nature, with thoſe vertues in men, though infinitely differing in degree. I conceive Arminius (though wild enough in his 20 reaſons, and eſpecially in his reaſons drawn from the conſideration of Gods juſtice) to be more Orthodoxe, and farre more Scholaſticall then ſo; though I nothing doubt, we have a generation amongſt us that affect to have all learning in Divinity, to goe by their rules of Philoſophy, and yet the baſeſt Philoſophy I think that ever was deviſed. And this Author whoſoever he be, ſeems herein to diſcourſe after ſuch a manner, as if he were of the number of thoſe that heard the Devill read Lectures through a grate in the Univerſity of Toledo. If juſtice mercy and truth in God, are the ſame in nature, with thoſe vertues that are in men, then there is ſomething in man, that is the very eſſence of God; For undoubtedly whatſoever is in God, is of his eſſence; yet thoſe are they that attribute Manicheiſme unto us. And ſeeing the vertues of man are accidents, it followes that that, which under the ſame name is attributed to God, is either an accident in God; or if it be his eſſence, then the eſſence of God, is of the ſame nature with accidents in man.
Thirdly; hence it followes, that the Divine perfections conſiſt of degrees, and conſequently muſt needs be accidentall unto him, not ſubſtantiall; for ſubſtance admits no degrees.
Fourthly; if juſtice humane be of the ſame nature with juſtice Divine, it followeth, not only that, that which is juſt in man is juſt with God, but that it muſt be after the ſame manner juſt; that like as mens juſtice conſiſteth in obedience to Gods law, implying ſubjection thereunto: So juſtice Divine muſt conſiſt in obedience to Gods law implying ſubjection. And like as man is obliged to be juſt, in the ſame manner God is obliged to be juſt. And conſequently like as Soul ſinned and became unjuſt in ſlaying the Lords Prieſts, ſo had God been unjuſt in doing the like.
Fiftly; man ſinneth in ſuffering his brother to ſinne, when it lies in his power to keepe him from ſinne; and conſequently, if that which is unjuſt with man is unjuſt with God, God ſinneth as often as he ſuffereth any ſinne to be committed in the world, for undoubtedly he could prevent it. Auguſt. contra Julian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4. Nos certe, ſi eos, in quos nobis poteſtas eſt ante oculos nostros, perpetrare ſcelera permittamus, rei cum ipſis erimus: Quam vero innumerabilia illa permitit fieri ante oculos ſuos; quae uti que ſi voluiſſet, nullâ ratione permitteret, But let us ſee how he proves this, for he adventures upon it like a tall fellow, and that with variety of demonſtration.
1. The firſt is drawn from the received diſtinction of divine Attributes, namely into ſuch as are communicable unto the creature, and ſuch as are incommunicable; but here he conceales his Authority. But let him bring forth the teſtimony of any Divine, that maintains any Attribute Divine to be the ſame quoad nomen & nominis rationem, with any Attribute humane. Yet we may talke of Gods Attributes ſo, as for diſtinction ſake to ſay, ſome are ſuch as are alſo Attributed to man, others are not; without maintaining, that humane vertues are of the ſame nature with Attribute Divine. Life is a Divine Attribute, it is alſo attributed to man, to a beaſt, to a plant; But will any wiſe man ſay that the life of God is of the ſame nature with the life of a Man, of a Beaſt, of a Plant? What more equivocall then the word Canis? Attributed to a Starre, to a Fiſh, to a Foure-footed creature on the Earth; I anſwer much more equivocall is every thing in common attributed to God and Man; For whatſoever is in God, is his Eſſence, but between the Eſſence of God, and the eſſence of Man, there is a vaſter difference, then between the eſſence of a Starre, of a Fiſh, of a Dogge; how much more difference is there between the Eſſence of God, and an accident in man, ſuch as his vertues are. In a word, the vertue of Man is of an annihilable condition, and if it be of the ſame nature with ſomething in the nature of God, why ſhould not ſomething in the nature of God be of an annihilable condition? I marvaile not if men of this generation are apt to profeſſe that they will turne Atheiſts rather then concurre in ſome poynts with the Contra-Remonſtrants; for their diſcourſes breath Atheiſme in a very high degree. It is a queſtion among Schoolemen, whether Ens (the moſt abſtract notion of all other) be predicated univocally of God and the creature; the Dominicans utterly deny it; Scotus maintains the contrary with ſome curioſity of argumentation: but his Arguments are anſwered by the Dominicans and particularly by Verſor on the Metaphyſicks; but never, I think, was it heard of Scotus or any other (till now) that the vertues of man are of the ſame nature with the Divine Attributes, differing only in degree.
I come to his ſecond Argument.
2. It was wont to be accounted that man was the image of God, not in reſpect of the qualities of his mind and will only, but even in reſpect of his Eſſence alſo; And ſome have been anciently condemned for denying this: why then doe we not ſay that the Eſſence of man is of the ſame nature with the Eſſence of God differing only in degree. In the next place the power of underſtanding and liberty of will in man a bodily creature, brings him neareſt to God, of all bodily creatures: it was wont to be ſaid that all other creatures had veſtigia Dei, but man was imago Dei; as in whom is repreſented the Divine Nature as intelligent and free; ſo farre forth, as a compound creature of body and ſoule can repreſent him; but who hath ever ſaid that the underſtanding of God was of the ſame nature with the underſtanding of man: and the will of God of the ſame nature with the will of man? It is well known that the underſtanding, and will humane, are but naturall faculties in man; but the underſtanding and will Divine, is the very eſſence of God; and if mans eſſence be not of the ſame nature with his faculties, doth it become us to profeſſe that the eſſence of God is of the ſame nature with the naturall faculties of man? As for the graces of Gods ſpirit, what are theſe but the three Theologicall vertues; all other are but Morall vertues ſanctified by theſe; Now ſhew me what Faith there is in God of the ſame nature with our Faith differing only in degree? What hope there is in God of the ſame nature with our hope, differing only in degree, what charity there is in God of the ſame nature with our Charity, differing only in degree. Theſe indeed being of all other the moſt peculiar fruits of regeneration, whereby we are renewed after the image of God, as touching the adventitious qualification of our natures, ſhould have Attributes divine anſwerable unto them (if any) of the ſame nature with them, differing only in degree. Yet herein (as I conceive) conſiſts not ſo much our participation of the Divine Nature, as in that, the Spirit of God the Father, and God the Sonne is communicated unto us, given unto us to be the immediate fountain of all actions and motions ſpirituall in us.
3. And albeit theſe Attributes, which in common doe denominate God and man, are one thing in God, and in man another: yet this nothing derogates from our imitation of God; and ſtriving to be perfect and holy in our kind as creatures; like as God is perfect and holy in his kind as Creator. And that I may repreſent ſome authority for my diſcourſe, whereas this Author repreſents none for his, it is a poynt generally received in the Schooles, that in this weakneſſe of our underſtanding, we come to know what God is by negation rather then by affirmation. Capreolus upon the firſt of the Sentences Diſt. 2. Queſt. 1. rehearſeth diverſe paſſages out of Aquinas to this purpoſe, as out of 1. Contra Gentes cap. 14.
In conſideratione Divinae ſubſtantiae praecipue utendum eſt via remotionis. Nam Divina ſubſtantia omnem formam quam intellectus noſter attingit, ſuâ excedit immenſitate. Et ſic ipſam apprehendere non peſſumus, cognoſcendo quid eſt, ſed aliqualiter ejus notitiam habemus, cognoſcendo quid non eſt; tantóque ejus notitiae magis appropinquamus, quanto plura per intellectum noſtrum poterimus ab eo removere. Tanto enim unumquodque perfectiùs cognoſcitur, quanto differentias ejus ab alio pleniùs intuemur. Quià in conſideratione Divinae ſubſtantiae non poſſumus accipere quid, quaſi genus, nec diſtinctionem ab aliis rebus per differentias affirmativas accipere poſſumus; eam oportet accipere per differentias Negativas. Id. 3. Contra gentes cap. 47. Per effectus Dei pertingere poſſumus ut cognoſcamus de Deo, quia eſt, & quod cauſa aliorum est, aliis ſupereminens & ab omnibus remotus: & hoc eſt ultimum & perfectiſſimum noſtrae cognitionis in hac vitâ, ut Dionyſius dixit. lib. de Myſticâ Theologiâ. Cum Deo quaſi ignoto conjungimur, quod quidem contingit, cùm de Deo, quid non ſit, cognoſcimus, quid vero ſit penitùs manet ignotum: unde & ad hujuſmodi ſublimiſſimae cognitionis ignorantiam demonſtrandam, dicitur de Moſe Exod, 20. quod acceſsit ad caliginem in qua Deus er at.
In the conſideration of the Divine Eſſence, we muſt chiefly uſe the way of negation: for the Divine Eſſence, through its immenſity, doth exceed every forme that our underſtanding can conceive: So that we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is; but after a ſort we have the knowledge thereof, by knowing what it is not. And ſo much nearer doe we approach to the knowledge thereof, the more we are able to remove from the nature of God. For every thing is known ſo much the more perfectly by how much the more at full we doe behold how it differeth from other things. Now in the conſideration of the Divine eſſence, we cannot take any thing as the Genus thereof; neither can we apprehend its diſtinction from other things, by differences affirmative; and therefore we muſt apprehend it by differences negative. The ſame Thomas in his Third Book Contra Gent. cap. 47. By the effects of God (ſaith he) we may attain to know that God is, and that he is the cauſe of other things eminent above them, and removed from them all: and this is the laſt and moſt perfect degree of our knowledge in this life, as ſaith Dionyſius in his Book of Myſticall Divinity: We are conjoyned with God as unknown which verily comes to paſſe, when we know of God what he is not, but what he is it remains utterly unknown unto us; and therefore to demonſtrate our ignorance of this moſt ſublime knowledge, it is ſaid of Moſes Exod. 20. that he came unto the darkneſſe where God was.
The ſame Capreolus proceeds to ſhew out of Aquinas in 1 Sent. Diſt. 8. q. 1. art. 1. ad 4. How we muſt make progreſſe in our knowledge of God, by way of remotion or negation.
Quando, inquit, in divinis procedimus per viam remotionis, primò negamus corporalia, & Secundò intellectualia, ſecundum quod inveniuntur in creaturis, ut bonitas & ſapientia, & tunc remanet in intellectu Quod eſt, & nihil amplius, unde eſt, ſicut in quadam confuſione.
When (ſaith he) we proceed by way of remotion, or negation, in ſearching out the Divine nature, firſt we deny of him all corporall things, and ſecondly we deny of him all intellectuall things, after ſuch a ſort as they are found in the creatures, as godneſſe and wiſdome, (mark this well for theſe and ſuch like are the vertues which this Author ſaith are of the ſame nature in God and man differing only in degree) and then there remains in the underſtanding, id quod est (as much as to ſay foreign Ens) and nothing more; and hence the underſtanding remains as in a certain confuſion.
And indeed the notion of entity is moſt generall, moſt abſtract, and if any notion ſignifies one and the ſame nature, ſuch as may be affirmed of God and the creature, ſurely this is it. Now obſerve Aquinas his judgement concerning this, out of the ſame Capreolus in theſe words.
Ad ultimum autem, Eſſentiam ipſam, ſecundum quod eſt in creatur is, ab ipſo removemus, & tunc remanet (intellectus noſter) in quadam tenegrâ ignorantiae; ſecundum quam ignorantiam, quantum ad ſtatum viae pertinet, optime Deo conjungimur, ut Dionyſius dicit, & haec eſt caligo in qua Deus habitare dicitur.
To the laſt (I anſwer) the very entity or exiſtence in the creatures we remove from God, and then our underſtanding remains in the darkneſſe of ignorance; according to which ignorance, ſo farre forth as it pertains to our condition (as Viatores) and in the way, we are conjoyned with God in the beſt manner; as Denis ſaith: and this is the darknes, wherein God is ſaid to dwell.
By this let any man judge, whether this Authors diſcourſe be not as oppoſite to the diſcourſe of Aquinas, as touching the nature of God in reſemblance to ours, as the Antipodes are to us. And withall I doe not find throughout his diſcourſe following, that he makes any uſe of theſe premiſes. And indeed there is no need of them at all: For if he cannot prove this Doctrine of ours repugnant either to Gods Mercy, or to his Truth, or to his Juſtice, theſe premiſes will ſtand him in no ſtead: and if he can prove it to be repugnant to thoſe Attributes of his, his argument ſhall ſtand in the ſame force, as well without theſe premiſes as with them.
Now, how well he makes good the repugnancy of our Doctrine to Gods mercy, we are in the next place to conſider.