The Riches of Gods Love, Part 1 · Treatise · Discourse · Part 1 · Section 4
DISCOURSE. The Fourth Motive. Its affinity with the old exploded and condemned Errours of the Stoicks and Manichees.
THe Opinion of the Stoicks was, that all actions and events were inevitable, and determined, either by the revolutions of the Heavens, and the qualities of the Starres, which raigne at mens births, or by the Concatenation of naturall things, and the diſpoſition of the firſt matters of all things, being ſo put together from eternity, that one thing muſt needs follow another as it doth, and the Materia Prima being ſo diſpoſed, that all things cannot ſucceſſively come to paſſe otherwiſe then they doe, but muſt of neceſſity be as they are, even invito Deo, though God would have ſome things to be otherwiſe then they be.
The Manichees held, that all mens actions, good or evill, were determined too: Good actions by a good God, who was the author of all good things created, and of all good actions that fell out in the World: Evill actions by an Evill God, who was the primum principium malt, the firſt and principall author of all evill things that were extant in the world.
The Maintainers of the abſolute decree, doe ſay one of theſe two things; either that all actions naturall and morall, good and evill, and all events likewiſe are abſolutely neceſſary, or that all mens ends (at leaſt) are unalterable and undeterminable by the power of their wills, which is upon the matter all one. For in vain is our freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined, ſith, Omnis actio eſt propter finem, All actions are done for the ends ſake, that it might be obtained by them, which without them could not.
Now in theſe three Opinions, we may note two things.
1. The ſubſtance and formality of them, which is an unavoidableneſſe of mens actions and ends whatſoever they be; In this all of them agree and holding that in all things, undeclinable fates, and inſuperable neceſſity doe domineere. And therefore Melancthon doth not ſlack in many of his common Places, to call this abſolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Geneva (the great defender of it) with a labour to bring in the Stoicks errours, as we may ſee in a certain Epiſtle of Melancthons to Peucer, where he ſpeaks thus, Scribit ad me Laetius de Stoico Fato uſ que adeo litem Genevae moveri, ut quidam in carcerem conjectus ſit propterea quod à Zenone differret. O Miſera Tempora! Doctrina ſalutis peregrinis quibuſdam dubitationibus obſcuratur. And Beza too ſpeaking of Melancthon ſaies, Philippus de his rebus itaſcribere caeperat, ut Genevenſes quaſi Stoicorum Fatum invehentes notare quibuſdam videatur.
2. The Circumſtances or the grounds of their Opinions. The Stoicks derive this neceſſity from the Starres or firſt matter, the Manichees from duo prima principia aeterna & coeterna, and theſe laſt from the peremptory decree of Almighty God, ſo that in this they differ, but in this difference, the Stoicks and the Manichees in ſome reſpects have the better. For it is better to derive the neceſſity of evill actions, or unhappy events from an evill God, or from the courſe of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The ſubſtance of their Opinions is all one, the ground wherein they differ is but accidentall to their errour.
If it be ſo, for this very reaſon alone may this doctrine of abſolute reprobation be ſuſpected, becauſe theſe dreams of the Stoicks were exploded by the beſt Philoſophers of all ſorts: and this of the Manichees was generally cryed down by the Fathers, not only as fooliſh, but as impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Chriſtian heart, or Chriſtian Commonwealth, not ſo much for any thing circumſtantiall in it, but becauſe it made all things and events neceſſary, and ſo plucked up the roots of virtue, planted vice, and left no place for juſt rewards or puniſhments.
Theſe are my Reaſons of the firſt ſort.
TWISSE Conſideration.
OUR Doctrine I ſee is cryed downe, not only as infamous, but alſo as Stoicall, and Manichaicall. Now I had thought the infamy of it had conſiſted only in the Stoicality of it, and it is no way fit to coordinate the Genus with the Species, in multiplying criminations. But I remember what the Poet obſerves to fall out ſometimes, namely, that,
Accedit fervor capiti numeruſ que lucernis.
It calls to my remembrance a ſtory that Mr Baſtard ſometimes told my good friend D. Hoskins, it was of a neighbour that came to him complaining of a friend of his, that had loſt all his five Senſes; as for example, his ſight and his ſeeing, and ſo proceeded in his amplification: with whom Mr Baſtard as it were, condoling, anſwered, Though he had loſt his fight, yet if he had retained his ſeeing, there had been ſome comfort. True Sir quoth the plain fellow. In like ſort, I might ſay, that though our Doctrine in this poynt be Stoicall, yet if it were not infamous there were ſome comfort in it, but the heavy crimination laid to our charge is, that it is not only Stoicall, but infamous alſo. But let this be our comfort, that nothing herein is laid to our charg, which was not laid to the charg of Auſtin, many hundred years agoe. This Proſper teſtifies after Austins death, to have been the practice of the Pelagians. Prout ſibi obnoxias aliquorum aures opportunaſ que repererint, ſcripta ejus quibus error Pelagianorum impugnatur, Proſp. Epiſt. ad Ruffin.infamant, dicentes, eum liberum arbitrium peni…ùs ſubmovere & ſub gratiae nomine neceſſitatem praedicare fatalem. Neither was he free from this reproach while he lived, as appears by divers paſſages; as Contr. duas Epiſtol. Pelagiani. lib. 2. cap. 5. Sub nomine, inquiunt, gra…ae ita fatum aſtruunt, ut dicant, quia niſi Deus invito & reluctanti homini in…piraverit boni & ipſius imperfecti cupiditatem, nec à malo declinare, nec bonum poſſet arripere. This is the objection; His Anſwer followeth in theſe words. Nec ſub nomine gratiae Fatum aſſerimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibuſdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet Fati nomine nurcupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, ſed de verbis contendere non amamus. And cap. 6. Fatum qui affirmant de ſyderum poſitione ad tempus quo concipitur quiſ que vel naſcitur, quas Conſtellationes vocant, non ſolùm actus & eventa, veram etiam ipſas noſtras voluntates pendere contendunt. Dei verò gratia non ſolùm omnia ſydera & omnes caelos, utrum etiam omnes Angelos ſupergreditur. Deinde Fati aſſertores & bona & mala hominum Fato tribuunt. Deus autem in malis hominum meritis eorum debita retributione proſequitur; bona verò per indebitam gratiam miſericordi voluntate largitur: utrum que faciens non per ſtellarum temporale conſortium, ſed per ſuae ſeveritatis & bonitatis aeternum altum que conſilium. Neutrum ergò pertinere videmus ad Fatum. And cap. 8. Iam de Gratia & Fato quàm inani alloquuntur oſtendimus. Nunc illud est quod debemus advertere, utrum invito & reluctanti homini Deus inſpiret boni cupiditatem, ut jam non ſit reluctans, non ſit invitus, ſed conſentiens bono, & volens bonum. In like ſort, the Pelagians charged Auſtin with Manicheiſme, De Nupt. & Concupiſc. lib. 2. cap. 3. to whom he anſwereth thus, Quid obtendis ad fallendum communis dogmatis tegmen, ut operias proprium crimen, unde vobis inditum eſt nomen, at que ut nefario vocabulo terras imperites, dicis, ne igitur vocentur Haeretici, fiant Manichaei. And more at large, Contr. duas Epiſt. Pelag. ad Bonifacium, cap. 2. Manichaei dicunt Deum bonum non omnium natuarrum eſſe creatorem: Pelagiani dicunt, Deum non eſſe omnium aetatum in hominibus mundatorem, ſalvatorem, liberatorem. Catholica utroſ que redarguit, & contra Manichaeos defendens Dei creaturam ne ab illo inſtituta negetur ulla creatura; & contrà Pelagianos ut in omnibus aetatibus perdita requiratur humana natura.
2. Manichaei carnis concupiſcentiam non tanquam accidens vitium, ſed tanquam naturam ab aeternitate malam vituperant: Pelagiani eam tanquam nullum vitium ſed naturale ſit, bonum inſuper laudant. Catholica utroſ que redarguit, Manichaeis dicens non natura, ſed vitium eſt; Pelagianis dicens, Non à Patre, ſed ex mundo eſt, ut eam velut malam valetudinem ſanari utr… que permittant, deſinendo illi tanquam inſanabilem credere, iſti tanquam laudabilem praedicare.
3. Manichaei negant, homini bono ex libro arbitrio fuiſſe initium mali; Pelagiani dicunt etiam hominem malum ſufficienter habere liberum arbitrium ad faciendum praeceptum bonum. Catholica utroſ que redarguit, & illis dicens, Fecit Deus hominem rectum; & iſtis dicens, ſi vos Filius liberaverit, verè liberi eritis.
4. Manichaei dicunt, animam particulam Dei, naturae malae commixtione habere peccatum; Pelagiani dicunt, animam juſtam non quidem particulam, ſed creaturam Dei, etiam in iſtâ corruptibili vitâ non habere peccatum. Catholica utroſ que redarguit, Manichaeis dicens, Aut facile arborem bonam, & fructum ejus bonum, aut facile arborem malam & fructum ejus malum; Pelagianis dicens, ſi dixerimus quia non habemus peccatum, noſmetipſos ſeducimus. His morbis inter ſe contrariis Manichaei Pelagiani que confligunt diſſimili voluntate, ſimili vanitate, ſeperati opinione diverſâ, ſed propinqui mente perverſâ. Iam verò gratiam Chriſti ſimul oppugnant, Baptiſmum ejus ſimul evacuant, Carnem ejus ſimul inhonorant, ſed etiam hoc modis cauſiſ que diverſis. Nam Manichaei meritis naturae bonae, Pelagiani autem meritis voluntatis bonae perhibent divinitus ſubveniri. Illi dicunt, debet hoc Deus laboribus membrorum ſuorum: Iſti dicunt, debet hoc virtutibus ſuorum. Utriſ que ergò merces non imputatur ſecundum gratiam, ſed ſecundum debitum.
But come we to the conſideration of the particulars delivered by this Author.
1. As touching the opinion of the Stoicks and Manichees. 2. As touching the Parallell he makes, between their opinion and ours, in the poynt of Predeſtination.
1. The Chaldeans and Aſtrologers, did altogether place Fate, in the influencies of the ſtarres, and becauſe thoſe glorious bodies, did infatuate the World with a ſhew of Divinity (which the Lord Laboured to prevent in the Jewes. Deutr. 4.) no marvail if the vulgar ſort did acknowledge no other fate, but that. As Auſtin ſaith, De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 1. Id (Fatum) homines quando audiunt uſitatâ loquendi confuetudine non intelligunt, niſi vim poſitionis ſyderum, qualis eſt quando quis naſcitur ſive concipitur. But I doe not find that the Stoicks did thus diſtinguiſh, but by their Series Cauſarum, they comprehended all cauſes caeleſtiall or ſublunary. Ramus indeed conceived ſuch a difference between Poſſidonius and Chryſippus both Stoicks, but Turnebus makes bold to tell him, that herein he erred. Quod autem Poſsidonium dicis studio Aſtrologiae oblectatum, Fatum ſyderibus attribuiſſe in eo peccas, quod aliam ejus quam Chryſippi ſententiam putas, nec eam totam complecteris. Nam ſi in ſimul aegrotantibus fratribus cauſam eſſe dicebat in ſyderum & caeli conſtitutione & affectione, non tamen idcircò in aliis rebus Fatum non eſſe judicabat. Nay he profeſſeth that according to all the Stoicks, Fatum was God himſelfe and nature; and that by Fatum they underſtood, omnem naturae contagionem, which was Cicero's phraſe. As indeed the whole frame of nature is knit together per contactum, which Cicero called Naturae contagionem. And he proves as much of Poſſidonius out of Cicero De Divinatione. For Quintus therein profeſſing according to the opinion of Poſſidonius, that all force and courſe of Divination, was derived from God, from deſtiny, and from nature, he concludes therehence, that all kind of artificiall and naturall Divination, were in his opinion comprehended under the notion of Fate. And out of Cicero's ſecond Book of Divination ſhewes, that whereas Poſſidonius his opinion was, Vim quandam ſentientem & divinam quae tota confuſa ſit mundo, ad hoſtiam deligendam ducere. He concludes thus; Satis ut opinor, ſignificat Poſſidonium non in ſyderibus tantum Fatum poſuiſſe, ſed per omnem mundi continuationem & naturae conjunctionem, ordinem ſeriem que cauſarum permanare credidiſſe. Idem Poſſidonius (ſaith he) foreign ſcripſerat, quod non feciſſet, ſi in ſyderibus tantum Fatum eſſe ſenſiſſet. And like as Poſsidonius did not inſiſt only in the ſtarres, for the confirmation of Fate, ſo neither did Chryſippus in inferior cauſes. Neceſſitatem nature acutus interpres (he taxeth Ramus) ad Chryſippum pertinere aſtrorum ad Poſſidonium credidiſti; errorem errore cumulaſti. Nam nec Poſsidonius in ſolis aſtris Fatum ponebat ſed in totâ naturae contagione, ut ſuprà docui: & Chryſippus in eâdem naturae contagione, quâ etiam aſtra continentur, quod non intellexiſti. And that he proves out of Cicero anſwering Chryſippus in this manner. Ut igitur ad quaſdam res natura loci pertinet, ad quaſdam autem nihil: ſie affectio aſtrorum valeat, ſivis ad quaſdam res; ad omnes certè non valebit. Chryſippum enim alloquitur (ſaith Turnebus) ut vel puero notum eſt, ut me tui pudeat & pigeat, qui Poſſidonium intelligis. Thus he diſciplines Ramus, and proceed farther, ſaying, Chryſippum autem in aſtrorum conſtitutione, & affectione Fatum poſuiſſe, audi ex Cicerone; ſi quis, verbi cauſâ oriente Caniculâ natus eſt, is in mari non morietur. Vigila Chryſippe &c. Nihil iſtud argumentum (thus Turnebus concludes herehence) niſi etiam in astris Fatum poneret. So that the foure opinions concerning Fate, related by Ludovicus Vives in 4. lib. Auguſt. De Civit. Dei cap. 8. and that out of Picus Mirandula, lib. 2. Contra Aſtrologos; The firſt whereof is ſaid to be Nature; The ſecond, a Series of cauſes neceſſary knit together, the Third the Starres, the Fourth the Execution of Divine Decree. I ſay all theſe make but one Fatum with the Stoicks, yea with all the Stoicks in the judgement of Turnebus. And Auſtin De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 8. expreſly includes the will of God within that Series of cauſes, which was accounted Fatum in the Opinion of the Stoicks, and upon that ground approves of it. As for neceſſitation by reaſon of diſpoſition of the Matter Prime, whereby things were brought to paſſe in deſpite of God; I find no ſuch thing, neither in Auſtin, nor in thoſe that comment upon him, Ludovicus Vives and Coqueus, nor in Ramus or Turnebus; but rather to the contrary in Ludovicus Vives, who diſtinguiſheth out of the opinion of Plato, as touching one God whom he made Principem Parentem que caeterorum; the Caeteri belike were ſuch ſpirits as wee call Angells. And that Maximi Dei leges were inevitabiles, and this was called Neceſſity, and ſuch a Neceſſity, cui ne Deos quidem (that is inferior ſpirits) reſiſtere poſſe. Quae verò ab Aſtris geruntur, talia interdum eſſe ut evitari ſapientiâ, induſtriâ, labore queant, in quo ſua eſt Fortuna. Quae verò certis cauſis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa, id dici Fatum quod tamen neceſſitatem non afferat electioni.
That the Manichees maintained two ſupreme and coëternall cauſes of all things, we read; the one the cauſe of Good, the other of Evill: and that every creature was a ſubſtantiall part of one or both; and that man in his nature was compounded of both, and that his corruption was eſſentiall from the ſupream Author of evill, and not ſuch as acrewed to him of diſobedience, We read. But of their opinion that all things were determined by them, both good, and evill, I no where read, but in this Authors Legend. Danaeus hath commented upon Auſtin de Haereſibus, and to every Head of Hereſy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors. But I find no mention at all of this Article amongſt 21 ſhamefull errours of theirs which he reckons up. The 19th is this, Voluntatem malè agendi, quod vocant liberum arbitrium, nob is à naturâ ipſâ inſitam, non rebellione noſtrâ accerſitam, vel ex inobedientiâ natam; Quanquam homines propriâ voluntate peccant. And where Auſtin anſwereth the criminations againſt the Catholiques made by the Pelagians, I find no mention at all of this. He ſhould have ſhewed from whom he takes this, that underſtanding their Opinion aright, we might the better judge of the reproachfull compariſon which he makes.
2 To the conſideration of which compariſon of his, I now addreſſe my ſelfe. He propoſeth two things, one whereof he ſaith, muſt needs be maintained.
The Firſt whereof is this; That all actions naturall and Morall, good and evill, and all events likewiſe, are abſolutely neceſſary.
Concerning which, I ſay Firſt; I have cauſe to doubt that this Author underſtands not aright, the very notions of abſolute neceſſity, and neceſſity not abſolute. There is no greater neceſſity, then neceſſity of nature. And this neceſſity is twofold; either in Eſſendo, in being, or in Operando, in working. God alone is neceſſary in being, and his being is abſolutely neceſſary; it being impoſſible he ſhould not be, as not only we believe, but Schoole Divines demonſtrate, and that with great variety, of evident, and curious concluſions. As for the other neceſſity, which is in reſpect of operation: Firſt, this is no way incident unto God, ſpeaking of operation ad extrà, and ſecluding the myſterious emanations within the Divine Nature; ſuch as are the Generation of the Sonne by the Father, and the wonderfull Proceſſion of the Holy Ghoſt from the Father and the Sonne. But ad extra this neceſſity of operation is only found in the creature, and that only in ſuch creatures, as by neceſſity of nature are determined one way: as fire to burne; heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards; the Sunne, Moone, and ſtarres to give light; and the heavens to turne round; all naturall Agents in a word diſtinct from rationall are thus determined, to wit, to work that, whereunto they are inclined by neceſſity of nature; but yet ſo that being finite, they are ſubject to ſuperiour powers, and thereby obnoxious to impediment moſt of them, even to powers create; all of them to power increate. Whence it comes paſſe that no work of theirs is abſolutely neceſſary, eſpecially in reſpect of God, who can either ſet an end to all when he will, or reſtraine their operations at his pleaſure. We know the Three Noble Children, when they came forth of the fiery oven, had not ſo much as any ſmell of the fire upon them. And therefore Durand profeſſeth that theſe things which are commonly accounted to come to paſſe moſt neceſſarily, doe indeed come to paſſe meerely contingently, in reſpect of the will of God.
Nevertheleſſe we willingly profeſſe, that upon ſuppoſition of the will of God, that this or that ſhall come to paſſe, it followeth neceſſarily that ſuch a thing ſhall come to paſſe; like as upon ſuppoſition, that God knowes ſuch a thing ſhall come to paſſe, it followeth neceſſarily, that ſuch a thing ſhall come to paſſe; but how? not neceſſarily: but either neceſſarily according as ſome things are brought to paſſe by naturall agents, working neceſſarily after the manner aforeſaid; or contingently and freely according as ſome things are brought to paſſe, by rationall agents, working contingently and freely. And therefore as touching the Queſtion of the Schooles about the root of contingency, Aquinas and Scotus concurre in reſolving it into the Will of God, but with this difference; Scotus relates it into the will of God as a free agent. Aquinas reſolves it into the Will of God, as an efficacious agent. For the will of God is ſo efficacious, that he can effectually procure, both that things neceſſary ſhall be brought to paſſe neceſſarily, and things contingent, contingently; and according he hath provided congruous cauſes hereof, to wit, both agents naturall for the produceing of neceſſary things neceſſarily, and agents rationall for the producing of contingent things, contingently and freely. Thus God preordained that Joſias ſhould burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar, that Cyrus ſhould proclaim liberty to the Jewes, to returne into their Country; yet what ſober Divine hath made doubt, whether Joſias and Cyrus did not herein, that which they did freely. And as in doing, ſo in abſtaining from doing. For God ordained that Chriſts bones ſhould not be broken; as alſo that when the Jewes, all the Males, came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jeruſalem, None of their neighbours ſhould deſire their land. Exod. 34. 24. Yet what ſober man ſhould make queſtion, whether the Souldiers did non as freely abſtaine from breaking Chriſts bones, as from ought elſe, and ſo likewiſe the bordering Nations did as freely abſtaine, from invading the land of Iſrael. And how often is this phraſe uſed in Scripture, Neceſſe eſt, of ſome things coming to paſſe, which yet came to paſſe as contingently and freely, as ought elſe. And unleſſe this be granted, that Gods determination is nothing prejudiciall to the freedome of the creatures will, either we muſt deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and ſo every action pleaſing in the ſight of God. For the Scripture expreſſely profeſſeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleaſing in his ſight. And whatſoever God workes in us, or beſtows upon us in time, the ſame he determined, to work in us, and to beſtow upon us from everlaſting. For he worketh all things according to the counſell of his will Epheſ. 1. 11. and the counſell of his Will was everlaſting, it being the ſame with God himſelfe.
Now I come to the ſecond.
2. And that is this. That all mens ends are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their Wills; and this he ſaith is upon the matter all one.
1. Now this is moſt untrue, there being a vaſt difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monſter ſhall he be in the Church of God, that with Vorſtius ſhall dare to affirme, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlaſting; or being determined, they are alterable, and that in ſuch ſort, as to be otherwiſe determinable by the wills of men; eſpecially conſidering that the very acts of mens wills, being wrought by God, (as all ſides now a daies confeſſe) it conſequently followes that they were alſo determined from everlaſting, by the Will and Counſell of God. What ſhould I alleage the 11th Article of Ireland for this? God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counſell ordaine, whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe: yet ſo as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of ſecond cauſes is taken away, but eſtabliſhed rather. There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the ſame he did before all time decree, and that from everlaſting. I know there is a main, and a moſt Atheiſticall difference between us on one part, but I doe not find them willing to ſhew their hornes directly therein, but carry the matter ſo, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporall (not eternall) condition of decrees divine, or at leaſt of their alterable nature; whereas themſelves dare not plainly manifeſt themſelves, to be of any ſuch Atheiſticall beliefe. Let us inſtance in particular: Let the ſalvation of ſome, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with open face profeſſe, that the ſalvation of the elect, and damnation of the reprobate was not from everlaſting determined by God. Be the ſupream ends of God concerning man, the manifeſtation of his glory in the way of mercy on ſome, in the way of vindicative juſtice on others. Dare any of them profeſſe, that any of theſe ends are not from everlaſting determined by God; or being ſo determined, dare they profeſſe, that theſe divine decrees are alterable, or poſſible to be undetermined by the will of the creature? What a prodigious aſſertion were either of theſe? If they dare not ſay, Gods will is changeable, What an unſhamefac'd courſe is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of Gods decrees? But perhaps you may ſay, here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees, but of mans ends. And I willingly confeſſe there is not. And I am perſwaded, this Author dares not in plain termes profeſſe, that Gods decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifeſt document of the illuſions of Satan, and how mens carnall affections, which are more in love with errour then truth, doe make them to ſhut their eyes againſt the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harſh thing to ſay plainly, that Gods decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. Therefore the Devill finds a means to draw us, to entertain the ſame blaſphemous opinion, not barefac'd, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phraſe. For though it be uncouth to heare of an alterable condition of Gods decrees, yet it ſeems nothing harſh to diſcourſe of the alterable condition of mens ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appeare how the Devill gulls us in this.
Mens ends are either ſo called, as intended by man himſelfe, or as appoynted by God. If this Author ſpeak of mens ends, as intended by man himſelfe, wee willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleaſure; as for example, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to morrow, he intends one thing this houre, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleaſure reverſe his former intentions. And no marvail, conſidering that man partly is of a fickle diſpoſition in reſpect of his affections, ſtudious of change, and ſubject to innovation as the Moone; partly of an improvident diſpoſition, he knows not what a Yeare, what a Month, what a Day, what an houre may bring forth. And therefore though never ſo wiſe and conſtant in his courſes, yet may he have juſt cauſe to change his reſolutions and purpoſes. But of ſuch ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifeſt this Author ſpeaks not.
But of ends appointed by God, theſe be the ends he will have to be alterable and determinable anew by the wills of men, which cannot be without the alteration and change of Gods purpoſes and intentions, which is as much as to ſay, without the change and revocation of Gods decrees. And an end not yet actually exiſting, but only in intention, can admit of no other alteration then in intention, which this Author conſidering not, though perhaps he abhorres to ſay Gods decrees are changeable and alterable, and ſhuts out ſo uncouth an aſſertion at the fore-doore, yet as it were by a back-doore to receive it in, and in the dark and mufled, or veyled only with a different phraſe, a different expreſſion; Yet forthwith he takes a new courſe; For whereas by the word unalterable, he did imply that Gods decrees concerning mens ends, ſhould be of an alterable condition; in the words following he changeth his tone, and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all, but left unto man to be determined; as when he ſaith, In vaine is our freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined. Whereby it is manifeſt, he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined. And this end can be no other then ſalvation; for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive, and which they labour to attaine, every one naturally ſeeking after Summum bonum, after happineſſe. So that in the iſſue it comes to this, The ſalvation of this Author is not yet determined by God, but left to be determined by his will, and that I take to be in the way of a moving cauſe, and that moving cauſe I gueſſe to be, his finall perſeverance in faith and repentance, whereupon and not till then, ſhall this mans ſalvation be determined by God, as much as to ſay, that Gods decrees are as meerly temporall as are the executions of them. And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor Jackſon perhaps being ſo happy as to underſtand him, or perhaps being ſo happy as to light upon an interpreter of him ſome one that breaths the ſame ſpirit of oppoſition to Gods truth, and that after the ſame way. For ſometimes the Doctor pleads for a revocable condition of the divine decrees. For the Pope never bindes his hands by any Grant he makes; and why ſhould God bind his hands by any decree he makes? eſpecially conſidering that God hath more wiſdome and goodneſſe to manage ſuch authority then the Pope. But if it be diſhoneſty for a man to take liberty to break his promiſes, I pray what goodneſſe is required to the managing thereof? Yet that Doctor keeps his courſe in diſcourſing of an impotent immutability, and ſaith, it is indecent to attribute any ſuch immutability unto God; whereas immutability is a notion which connotates no power of doing at all, but only a power of ſuffering, and formally denotes the negation thereof. And what madneſſe is it to ſay, that the leſſe power God hath of receiving change, the leſſe power he hath of working? Yet this is not all; He hath another device anſwerable to the latter courſe of this Author, and that is, that Nothing, concerning any mans ſalvation or damnation, is determined by God before he is borne, or before his death: and to that purpoſe he ſaith that God is ſtill decreeing, as if hitherto he had not decreed ought. And would you know of whom he learned this? Rogers in his expoſition of the Articles of the Church of England, a Book dedicated to Arch-Biſhop Bancroft, & allowed by the lawfull authority of the Church of England, writing upon the 17th Article, and delivering his ſecond propoſition, collected therehence, in this forme, Predeſtination hath been from everlaſting; when he comes to ſet forth the Adverſaries of this truth, Thoſe wrangling Sophisters, ſaith he, are deceived, who becauſe God is not included within the compaſſe of any time, but hath all things to come as preſent before his eyes, doe ſay, that God he did not in the time long agoe paſt only, but ſtill in the time preſent likewiſe doth Predeſtinate.
2. Conſider we the reaſon he gives for ſo ſhamefull an aſſertion, as touching the alterable condition of Gods decrees, or as touching the ends of men, as yet undetermined by God, In vaine, ſaith he, is freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at, be determined. Here, Firſt, we have a wild phraſe Freedome in actions. For by freedome we underſtand an active power of working after a certain manner, which power is found in the will, not in the actions. Secondly, a bare avouching that unleſſe God as yet hath left the ends of men living undetermined, or in caſe he hath determined them, unleſſe theſe determinations of his be alterable, Freedome of Will is given in vaine; as much as to ſay, unleſſe we admit of ſuch monſtrous aſſertions, the freedome of mans Will is in vaine. But we ſay this conſequence is moſt untrue, and we give our reaſon for it. For whether ſalvation or damnation be the ends he meaneth, no creature is capable of either, but only creatures rationall; and the one being beſtowed by way of reward, and the other inflicted by way of puniſhment, each of theſe preſuppoſeth freedome of Will in the parties thus proceeded with: Or whether the ends are the manifeſtation of Gods vindicative and remunerative juſtice, for the ſame reaſon now ſpecified, each of theſe doth neceſſarily beſpeak freedome of Will in them, who after either way are made uſeleſſe on whom the glory of God is to be manifeſted. When he addes ſaying Omnis actio is propter ſinem. This altogether concernes the ends intended, and propoſed by the author of the action, nothing concernes the ends propoſed by another. And the ends of a man propoſed by himſelfe, are either ſupreame or intermediate, ſtill every action deliberate (for ſo alone it holds) tends to one end or other, which man himſelfe intends. The ſupream end of every one is his chief good; but as touching that wherein this conſiſts, all doe not agree. Some place it in wealth, ſome in pleaſure, ſome in honour, ſome in virtuous life. By the light of Grace we are taught, that as we are creatures, our end, which we ſhould propoſe unto our ſelves, is the glorifying of God our Creator, though there were neither reward nor puniſhment. But if there be a glorious reward to be gotten by it, and a dreadfull puniſhment to be ſuffered of them, that ſeek the ſatisfying of their own luſts, and not the glory of God, this is a double hedge unto us, to keep us in the good waies of the Lord, and to move us to make ſtrait ſtepps unto him; but ſurely the end of the creature, ſtill is the glorifying or God that made him. God makes it his care to provide for us, let our care be to glorify him; for ſeeing all things are from him, therefore all things muſt be for him; and ſeeing we are reaſonable creatures, and know this we muſt goe on, in conforming our ſelves hereunto, and ſeeking his glory. And albeit this Author may conceive, that ſalvation is the end he aimes at, yet can I not beleeve that he makes damnation the end that any man drives at. Nothing being fit to be a mans end, but that which hath rationem Boni, which ſurely damnation hath not.
3. His Annotations as touching the three Opinions propoſed by him, come to be conſidered in the next place; and theſe are two.
1. The Subſtance and Formality of them, which, as he ſaith is an unavoidableneſſe of mens actions and ends whatſoever they be. And in this, he ſaith, all of them agree, all holding that in all things, undeclinable Fates, and inſuperable neceſſity doe domincere. Whereunto I anſwer, that this is contradictory to his own premiſes, as touching the third Opinion. For againſt the Maintainers of Gods abſolute decree, he did formerly object only disjunctively, that either all mens actions were abſolutely neceſſary, that is unavoidable, or at leaſt, that mens ends were unavoidable; which is to inferre, that but one of them is avoidable; but here he profeſſeth (as upon that which he had formerly delivered) that by the Third Opinion, both mens actions and their ends were unavoidable. And as for the ſecond Opinion of the Manichees, I find no mention of the unavoidable condition, either of mans actions or ends at all, in the Relation thereof, by thoſe who have moſt ſtudied their Hiſtory. And as for the Stoicks, I no where find, that they denied the liberty of mens will, or that it was in mans power, either to forbeare the doing of that he doth, or to doe the things he forbears to doe; but rather the contrary, that they made choyce, ſome of them at leaſt, (though Auſtin delivers it without any ſuch diſtinction) to exempt the wills of men from ſubjection unto Fate: though I deny not, but that many vain diſcourſes might be differently entertained by them, having no better light to guide them, then the light of nature, and wanting that which God hath in great mercy vouchſafed unto us, the light of grace, and that in very plentifull manner. Much leſſe doe I find by them, that any thing came to paſſe, invito Deo. Though I willingly confeſſe, that ſuch a generation hath riſen up in theſe daies, affirming that God willeth and deſireth the ſalvation of all men, and yet the greater part of men are damned. And what is to come to paſſe, invito Deo, if this be not, I willingly profeſſe I know not.
But Melancthon, he ſaith, doth not ſpare to call this abſolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Ceneva, with labouring to bring in the Stoicks errours, as appears by Melancthons Epistle to Peucer, and Beza's confeſsion in the life of Calvin. To all which I anſwer.
1. That this Author either was better read in Melancthon then in Luther, or no ſo juſt matter could he find in Luther, to cry down the abſolute nature of Gods decrees.
2. Beza reports what Melancthon ſeems to ſome, and that Epiſtle of his to Peucer might be their ground. Now therein he delivers his mind meerly upon Laelius his relation, which was this, De Stoico Fato uſ que adeò litem Genevae moveri, ut Quidam in carcerem conjectus ſit propterea quod a …one differret. This I ſay is Laelius his relation made unto Melancthon, whereupon Melancthon ſaith no more then this, O Mijera tempora! doctrina ſalutis peregrinis quibuſdam diſputationibus obſcuratur.
3. Melancthon died foure years before Calvin, the one Anno 1560. the other 1564. And therefore if he did paſſe any cenſure on the Church of Geneva, it was in Calvins daies, many years before his death. Now Calvin and he were very great: Melancthon ſo well known and eſteemed by Calvin, that more then once he appeals to Melancthons judgement. Once in the point De Caenâ Domini, mentioned by Oſiander, Hiſt. Eccleſ. Cent. 16. Anno 1558. pag. 666. which was but two years before his death. Likewiſe in the poynt of Free-will and Predeſtination, as appears by Calvins Epiſtle unto him, prefixed to his Books, de Libero Arbitrio, which he ſent unto Melancthon: Was it ever known that Melancthon paſſeth any cenſure upon them?
4. When Grotius in like manner objected Melancthon, ſee I pray how Lubbertus anſwereth him, In Reſpon. ad Pietatem Grotii. Quod ad Melancthonem attinet, erras ſi ipſam ſtare pro Remonſtrantibus exiſtimas, &c. Idem Melancthon in 9. ad Romanos, Cur inquit nos ad Evangelium vocavit & non vocavit Alexandrum Macedonem, Auguſtum, Socratem, Pomponium Atticum, qui non minus civilitèr vivebant quàm nos. Hic neceſſe eſt cauſam rejicere in voluntatem Dei. Et Jacob electus eſt, Eſau reprobatus priuſquam quicquam boni vel mali feciſſent: Ergo opera non erant cauſa, ſed voluntas vocantis. Non addam hic, quomodo cavillentur ista nonnulli. Tantum hoc meminerit Lector, ſi opera ſecutura in vita erunt cauſa electionis, non licuit Apoſtolo dicere, Non ex operibus. Ex his conſtat (ſait Lubbertus) Melancthonem idem cum Calvino & Luthero de praedeſtinatione ſenſiſle. Fatetur hoc ipſe Melancthon ad Calvinum; ſuo (inquiens) haec cum tuis congruere, ſed mea ſunt foreign, & ad uſum accommodata. Idem in Epiſtolâ ad Eraſmum: Ego integrâ conſcientiâ non poſſum Lutheri dogmata damnare. He proceeds farther to ſhew, the different Method uſed by them in delivering the doctrine of Praedeſtination. Calvinus, ſaith he, à Priori docet, illos qui electi ſunt, immutabili Dei conſilio electos eſſe, at que inde infert illos perire non poſſe. Melancthon verò a Poſteriori docet, nos ex verâ fide & ſeriâ reſipiſcentiâ diſcere quòd ſumus electi, Ego credo in Jeſum Chriſtum & ſeriò reſipiſco, ergo ſum electus: at que ita in ipſâ re conſentiunt. Hanc enim Melancthonis argumentationem approbat Calvinus, & illam Calvini approbat Melancthon, tantum abeſt, ut alter alterius doctrinam rejiciat aut contemnat.
5. When I obſerved this relation made out of an Epiſtle of Melancthons unto Calvin, I could not reſt ſatisfied untill I had ſeen the Epiſtle it ſelfe: at length I found it amongſt Calvins, Epiſt. 49. Therein coming to the poynt, Ad Quaeſtionem (ſaith he) de praedeſtinatione habebam amicum Tubingae doctum hominem Franciſcum Stadianum, qui dicere ſolebat, ſe utrum que probare, Evenire omnia ut divina providentia decrevit, & tamen eſſe contingentia; ſed ſe haec conciliare non poſſe. Here we have gotten one friend more then we looked for, and that a friend of Melancthons alſo: And to what end doth he make mention hereof, but to give Calvin to underſtand, that with him at Tubing, there wanted not ſuch as concurred with him in opinion, and that as touching the eveniency of all things, by the decree of Gods providence, which yet might well conſiſt with Contingency, though we are not able to reconcile theſe, ſuch is the myſterious nature of Gods providence. And herein Stadianus agrees with Cajetan, and Alvarez. For Cajetan having profeſſed that the diſtinctions deviſed by the Learned, for the reconciling of Gods predeſtination with the liberty of mans will, did not, quietare intellectum, thereupon he ſaith, Ego captivo meum in obſequium fidei; In quo (ſaith Alvarez) doctiſſimè & pi…ſſimè loquitur. Melancthon goes on to repreſent his carriage in Teaching, Ego, ſaith he, cùm Hypotheſin hanc teneam, Deum non eſſe cauſam peccati nec velle peccatum, poſteà contingentiam in hâc nostrâ infirmitate judicii admitto, ut ſciant rudes, Davidem ſuâ voluntate ultrò ruere & eundem ſentio, cum haberet ſpiritum ſanctum, potuiſſe cum retinere; & in eâ lucta aliquam eſſe voluntatis actionem. All theſe things he grants afterwards, to agree with the Doctrine of Calvin. But may not a man proceed farther? and to diſpute hereof ſomething more accurately then this, He denyes it not: Haec etiamſi ſubtilius diſputari poſſunt, tamen ad regendas mentes hoc modo propoſita, accommodata videntur. In the ſame manner he goes on, Accuſemus ipſi noſtram voluntatem cùm labimur, non quaeramus in Dei conſilio cauſam & contra eum nos erigamus; ſciamus Deum & velle opitulari & adeſſe luctantibus foreign (inquit Baſilius) foreign Yet I preſume no Arminian will conceive that Melancthon did not acknowledge this very act of willing to be the work of God, conſidering the Apoſtle ſo expreſſely profeſſeth, that God worketh in us both the Will and the deed, according to his good pleaſure; and Leo Serm. 8. de Epiphan. Dubium non eſt hominem bona agentem ex Deo habere & effectum operis & initium volumatis: & Fulgentius Epiſt. 4. Ab ipſo (Deo) eſt initium bonae voluntatis. And if Melancthon had any conceit oppoſite hereunto, yet let the Opinion of the Affrican Biſhops prevaile in authority above Melancthon, who in their Synodicall Epiſtle write thus (as it is alleaged by our Divines Act. Synod. Dordrac. pag. 270) In vivificandis hominibus Deus nullum initium humanae voluntatis expectat ſed ipſam voluntatem, bonam faciendo, vivificat. And drawing to an end, I doe not write theſe things (ſaith Melancthon) to deliver dictates unto you, who are moſt learned and moſt expert in the exerciſes of Piety. And truly I know (ſaith he) that theſe things doe agree with yours, haec cum tuis congruere ſed ſunt foreign, woven with a thicker thred, & ad uſum accommodata Thus Melancthon unto Calvin, having received his Books ſent unto him, and written of Free-will and Predeſtination.
5. Within two years after I find a Letter written by Calvin unto Melancthon, wherein he profeſſeth his joy of their agreement, as touching the main poynt, in that whereabout their opinions were asked, albeit with ſome difference in certain particulars, it is Epiſt. 63. amongſt thoſe of Calvins, and the words are theſe. Deo autem maximas gratias agere non deſino, qui dedit ut in ejus quaeſtionis ſummâ de quâ rogati eramus, ſententiae nostrae congruerent. Tametſi enim paululum eſt diſcriminis in particulis quibuſdam, de re tamen ipſâ optime inter nos convenit.
The ſecond Annotation of this Author is, the circumſtance or the ground of the three opinions mentioned. The Stoicks deriving their neceſſity from the Starres or firſt matter; The Manichees from the two ſupream cauſes; And the Authors of the third, from the peremptory decree of Almighty God. And that in this difference, the Stoicks and the Manichees have the better, it being better (as he ſaith) to derive the neceſſity of evill actions, or unhappy events, from an evill God, or from the courſe of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The ſubſtance of the opinion is all one, the ground wherein they differ, is but accidentall to the errour.
To this I anſwer.
1. Is it ſo indeed, Better to derive the neceſſity of unhappy events, from an evill God, or from courſe of nature, then from the decree of God? Is not God then to be accounted the author of evill in the way of puniſhment? Is there any evill in the Citty, and the Lord hath not done it? Or doth it leſſe become him to be the author Amos 2. Ier. 9. 24.of affliction then of proſperity? Doth not the Lord in the ſame place, and in the ſame manner profeſſe, that he delights in the execution of judgement, as well as of mercy?
2. As touching the neceſſity he ſpeaks of, whether in good, or in evill actions; conſider I pray his carriage, He did not object unto us, that we made all the actions of men abſolutely neceſſary, but either ſo, or the ends of men unavoidable. Yet here he ſuppoſeth the former to ſerve his own turne in this preſent crimination, he holds it up, as it were contrary to his own conſcience. We acknowledge the actions of men to be free, not one being performed by any, but in ſuch ſort, that they had power to forbear it, and ſtill have to forbear the like: But upon ſuppoſition of Gods decree, either to work in us any thing, that is pleaſing in his ſight (which to be his gracious courſe, the Apoſtle expreſly profeſſeth, Heb. 13. 20.) or to permit any particular evill, we willingly profeſſe, that as well upon this, as upon Gods foreknowledge, it followeth conſequently that neceſſe eſt, that ſuch a thing come to paſſe; but how? not neceſſarily, but agreeable to the condition of our reaſonable natures, contingently and freely. And this Arminius in plain termes profeſſeth in the poynt of evill, to wit, ſuppoſing God permits a man to will this or that evill; Neceſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum, Exam. pag. 153. But I will farther diſplay the doctrine of theſe Arminians, and prove, Firſt, that no evill comes to paſſe, but that God did will it. Secondly, that never was there any greater neceſſity known to the World, then that which theſe men bring upon good and evill actions, a neceſſity that binds the Lord himſelfe.
1. As touching the firſt; Theſe words of Arminius are well known, Deus voluit Achabum menſuram ſcelerum ſucrum implere. But I will prove it by their Doctrine of ſcientia Media: For hereby they maintain, that God foreſeeth by what motives ſinne will be hindered, or not hindered, without any prejudice to the liberty of the creatures will; As alſo that God in the ſtorehouſe of his wiſdome, hath ſuch ſtore of morall impediments, as that he knows thereby, how to hinder any ſinne if it pleaſed him. His words are theſe, Praeter illa ſufficientia impedimenta, etiam efficacia habet in ſuo ſapientiae & potentiae promptuario, quibus productis certò & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur. And this is the difference with him, between a ſufficient impediment of ſinne, and impediment effectuall. Effectuall is that upon the uſe whereof, he knows full well, that ſinne will be hindered. Sufficient is that upon the uſe whereof, ſinne will not be hindered, and this is known to the Lord from everlaſting. Now let them tell me, why would not God make choyce to uſe ſuch an impediment, which he knew would prove effectuall, but ſuch rather, as he knew would prove ineffectuall. Doth it not manifeſtly appear hereby, that it is Gods will, that ſinne ſhall come to paſſe by his permiſſion? Like as the Scripture is expreſſe to this purpoſe, as where it is ſaid, that Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles, and people of Iſrael were gathered together againſt the holy Sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand, and his counſell, had foredetermined to be done. Now this is well known to have been no leſſe then the ignominious handling and crucifying of the Sonne of God. Acts 4. 28. And Revel. 17. 17. God put into the hearts of the Kings to doe his will, and to give their Kingdomes to the Beaſt, as much as to ſay, to uſe their Regall power, to the ſupporting of Antichriſt, which we know was in part by Maſſacring the Saints of God.
2. Now to diſcover the ſtrange neceſſity, that theſe men bring in upon all things: It cannot be denied, but that God knoweth all future things, before they come to paſſe. Therefore they are preſuppoſed to be future in order of reaſon before God, knows them to be future; therefore all things future, are either ſuch by neceſſity of nature, or by ſome cauſe; not by any cauſe, for if there were any cauſe hereof, to wit, to make them paſſe out of the condition of things meerly poſſible of their own nature, into the condition of things future, then this cauſe ſhould be found either within God or without God. Not without God can any cauſe hereof be found. For this paſſage of things, out of the condition of things meerly poſſible, into the condition of things future, was from everlaſting, therefore the cauſe hereof muſt have exiſtence from everlaſting. But nothing was everlaſting, Extra Deum, out of God; Therefore if any cauſe hereof be to be found, it muſt be within God; otherwiſe it muſt be confeſſed, that all things became future by abſolute neceſſity of nature. If to help this, they will deviſe ſomething within the nature of God, to be the cauſe hereof, let them tell us what that is. Not the Science of God, for all confeſſe, that ſecluding the divine will, Gods knowledge is the cauſe of nothing. If they ſay, the will of God, they concurre with us in embracing the ſame Opinion, which they ſo much abhorre. Nothing remaines to fly unto, but the Eſſence of God; If they plead, that I demand, whether the Eſſence of God working freely, be the cauſe of the futurition of all things, or as working neceſſarily? If as working freely, that is as much as to confeſſe in expreſſe termes, that Gods will is the cauſe thereof: But if they ſay the divine Eſſence is the cauſe hereof, as working neceſſarily, hence it followes, that all things good and evill come from God, as working by neceſſity of nature. See I pray and conſider the abominable, and Atheiſticall opinions, that theſe Arminians doe improvidently caſt themſelves upon, when they ſtretch their witts to overthrow Gods providence, as it is carryed in the 11th Article of Ireland, which is this, God from all Eternity, did by his unchangeable Counſell ordaine whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe; yet ſo as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of ſecond cauſes is taken away, but eſtabliſhed rather.
In the Concluſion, that which he vaunts of, as touching the Fathers, is meer wind; for he gives you nothing but his word for it; which of what credit it deſerves to be, I leave to the indifferent to judge. And as for the plucking up of the rootes of vertue which he fables of: Conſider I pray, what Sect of Philoſophers were ever known to be more vertuous then the Stoicks; and how was Zeno himſelfe honoured by the Athenians, for his grave and vertuous converſation? Hath not Eraſmus delivered it, as out of the mouth of Hierome, that Secta Stoicorum was Secta ſimillima Chriſtianae? Yet I no where find, that they brought in any neceſſity, that was not ſubordinate to the Will of the ſupream God: But theſe Arminians bring in a neceſſity of nature from without God, to make him to doe this, or that, if he doth any thing; or at leaſt, to make God himſelfe a neceſſary Agent, devoyd of all liberty and freedome, contrary to that of Ambroſe concerning the manner of Gods working, namely, that it is, Nullo neceſſitatis obſequio, but ſolo libertatis arbitrio. But according to theſe Divines it muſt be quite contrary, Nullo …ibertatis arbitrio, ſolo neceſſitatis obſequio.
And thus much as touching the firſt ſort of this Authors Reaſons, which he accounts only Inducing; I come to the other ſort, which he eſteemes convincing.
THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST BOOK, Wherein are Examined thoſe Arguments againſt the Abſoluteneſſe of DIVINE REPROBATION, WHICH Mr HORD Took to be of a CONVINCING NATURE.
OXFORD, Printed by Leonard Lichfield Printer to the Vniverſity. M. D. C. LIII.