The Riches of Gods Love, Part 2 · Treatise · Type of argument 2 · Section 3
DISCOURSE. SECT. III. This I divide into Five Subſections.
SUBSECT. I.
IT Fights with the juſtice of God, &c.
The Lord, ſaith David, is righteous in all his waies, Pſal. 145. The judgements of the Lord, ſaith Solomon, are weight and meaſure, Prov. 16. 11. That is, exact and without all exception. So juſt is God, that he offers the juſtice of his decrees and waies, to the triall of humane underſtanding. Iſai. 5. 3. Judge I pray you, between me and my vineyard: and Ezech. 18. 25. He is content to prove himſelfe juſt by plain arguments, through the whole chapter; Are not my waies equall, and your waies unequall? And he permitted Abraham, when he was in his greateſt humility, acknowledging himſelfe to be but Duſt and Aſhes, to reaſon with him about the equity of his doings; Wilt thou ſlay the righteous with the wicked. Shall not the judge of all the earth doe right? Gen. 18. 23, 25. And Moſes alſo, Num. 16. 22. is ſuffered to argue Gods juſtice in the ſame manner; Shall one man ſinne, and wilt thou …e …oth with all the Congregation▪ In a word; ſo evidently juſt is God in all his proceedings, that many both good and bad, who have felt his juſtice have cleared God, and deepely charged themſelves, witneſſe, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Daniell in their ninth Chapters, and Adonibezek, Judges 1. …. and the Emperour Mauricius, who having ſeen his children butchered, and waiting every Oſi…nd. Eccleſ, Hi… …ent. …. p. 200.minute for the bloudy ſtroake of death, brake out into theſe words; Juſtus es Domine, & juſtum eſt judicium tuum. Righteous art thou O Lord, and juſt is thy judgement. With this inviolable juſtice of God, abſolute reprobation (of ſuch eſpecially as are commanded to believe and called to Salvation) cannot be reconciled. My reaſons are theſe.
1. Becauſe it makes God to puniſh the righteous with the wicked, as it is taught the Supralapſarian way, directly, as it is defended the Sublapſarian way by good conſequence.
The Sublapſarians preſent man to God in his decrees of reprobation conſidered without ſinne and will have God to determine the infliction of unſpeakable miſery upon millions of men, without conſideration of any evill in them originall or actuall (as I have touched before) and ſo they make him plainly to be a deſtroyer of the righteous.
The Sublapſarians (for againſt their way have I tied my ſelfe to bend my reaſons) preſent man to God, conſidered indeed in originall ſinne, which is a ſinne (ſo farre as it concernes Adams poſterity) made ours only by Gods order and appointment, and ſo in effect they ſay, 1. That God did lay upon every man a neceſſity of being borne in originall ſinne. 2. That he hath determined for that ſinne, to caſt away the farre greater part of Mankind for ever; and ſo they make God to doe by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other ſay he did by one: and they will not ſtick, if they be put to it, to ſay as D. Twiſſe doth, Quod Deus poteſt intercedente libera ſua …ſtitutione, illud D. Tw…ſſe…. 2. di…r.1. p. 15.etiam abſolute poterit, vel ſine ali … conſtitutione intercedent…. That is God may decree men to hell (for that is the thing he ſpeaks of) for Adams ſinne, which is derived to them by the only conſtitution of God, he may as well doe it abſolutely, without any ſuch conſtitution. It is all one in ſubſtance, to decree the miſery of an innocent man, and to purpoſe, that he ſhall be involved in a ſinne, that ſo he may be brought to miſery: neither of theſe Decrees are juſt. Non iuſtitia iuſta dicetur (ſaith Fulgentius) ſi puniendum reum non inveniſſe ſed feciſſe dicatur: major vero e…it iniuſtitia, ſi lapſo Deus retribuat Fulgent. ad Menim. l. 1.poenam, quem ſtantem praedeſtinaſſe dicitur ad ruinam.
TWISSE Conſideration.
VVIth us Chriſtians there is no doubt or queſtion made of the truth of this, that God is righteous in all his waies: yea though he command Abraham to ſacrifice his ſonne; and though he cauſed not only Achan to be ſtoned for his treſpaſſing about the excommunicate thing, but his children alſo with him; and though he viſit the ſinne of Fathers upon the Children to the third and fourth generation of them that hate him. And though in the drowning of the World, he cauſed Infants to periſh with their parents, ſome in their Mothers wombe, ſome hanging on their Mothers breaſts: And ſo in the deſtruction of Sodome and Gomorrah with fire from heaven. And not ſo only, but the righteous God hath given us power over inferiour creatures, to weare them out in ſerving our turnes with them, yea and to knock them in the heads, to cut their throats, and ſtrangle them as we think good: and we are no whit the more unrighteous in executing this power, which God hath given us upon them: yea in giving his own and holy Sonne to be reviled, blaſpheamed, betrayed, condemned, crucified, ſo to make his ſoule an offering for our ſinnes. In all theſe waies the Lord is righteous, and holy in all his works, Solomon ſaith, Prov. 16. 11. That a juſt weight and ballance are the Lords, all the weights of the bagge are his worke. And the ſame Solomon in the ſame chapter ſaith, v. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himſelfe, yea even the w…ed againſt the day of evill. This revives in me the remembrance of a pretty ſtory; An odde fellow came to his Neighbour to borrow a buſhell of Malt, ſaying, the mercifull is righteous and lendeth; the other anſwered him in the ſame element ſaying, The ungodly borroweth and payeth not againe; Where is that ſaith the borrower? Where is yours ſaith the other? Why, ſaith he, the place I mentioned is in the 37 Pſahne. So is mine too, ſaith the other. But proceed we along with him: Whereas he ſaith Gods judgements are without exception, that is untrue, for we find the Apoſtle Saint Paul to take notice of exceptions made againſt the waies of God in ſome particular caſts; as when God hath mercy on Rom. 9. 18, 19, 20, 21.whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth: upon the propoſall of this Doctrine the Apoſtle takes notice of ſuch an exception as this. Thou wilt ſay then, why doth he yet complaine, for who hath reſiſted his will: and the juſtification hereof, the Apoſtle derives from no other conſideration then this, that God is our Creator, and we are his creatures: And that as the Potter hath power over the clay of the ſame lump, to make one veſſell to honour, and another to diſhonour; ſo hath God. O man (ſaith Paul) who art thou that diſputeſt with God, ſhall the thing formed, ſay to him that formed it, why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay? And as the Pſalmiſt ſaith, That Gods judgements are like a great deepe: So the Apoſtle profeſſeth, That his judgements are unſearcheable, and his waies paſt finding out. And in the common opinion this is Rom. 11. 33.delivered as touching the depth of Gods counſell in reprobation and predeſtination; and by the coherence of the words, with that which goes before it, appears to be ſpoken upon Gods diſpenſing and denying grace to whom he will, and when he will; As for example; like as there was a time when God had a Church in the World, without diſtinction of Jewes and Gentiles, ſo afterwards the providence of God was to diſplay it ſelfe after three ſeverall waies, the firſt was in gathering a Church unto himſelfe out of the World, from out of the poſterity of Abraham, theſe were called the Jewes, in diſtinction from the Gentiles, who for a long time had not obtained mercy, as the Apoſtle ſpeaks, Rom. 11. 30. In as much as they believed not: And this diſpenſation of grace peculiar unto the Jewes, with rejection of the Gentiles, continued for about 1600 years. Then God gathered a Church among the Gentiles, with rejection of the Jewes, as the Apoſtle ſignifies in the place before alleadged, ſaying, now you have obtained mercy through their unbeliefe. And this diſpenſation of Gods grace peculiar unto the Gentiles, hath continued now, for about 1600 years. And we believe a time ſhall come, for the calling of the Jewes, and then the Church of God ſhall conſiſt both of Jewes and Gentiles, and the generall calling of them, as the Apoſtle ſignifies, Rom. 11. 12. If the fall of them be the riches of the World, and the diminiſhing of them the riches of the Gentiles, how much more their fulneſſe: and v. 15. If the caſting away of them be the reconciling of the World, what ſhall the receiving of them be but life from the dead: and v. 31. Even ſo have theſe alſo now not believed, that through your (Gentiles) mercy, they alſo (the Jewes) might obtain mercy. For God hath concluded them all under unbeliefe, that he might have mercy on all. And hereupon it is, that the Apoſtle breaks forth into admiration of this various providence of God, and different diſpenſation of his grace, ſaying, O the depth of the riches both of the wiſdome and knowledge of God, how unſearcheable are his judgements, and his waies paſt finding out? So that albeit the juſtice of God, be apparent to the underſtanding of man in ſome of his waies, yet not in all. Neither doth it follow, that becauſe God offers the juſtice of his courſes, to the triall of humane underſtanding in ſome particulars, therefore he offers it to the ſame triall in all; or that the underſtanding of man is able to comprehend it in all. Not only carnall men cry out ſometimes, Where is the God of judgement? Mal. 2. 17. Again, it is in vain to ſerve God, and what profit is it that we have kept his commandements, that we have walked humbly before the Lord of hoſts? But even the children of wiſdome, which are apt to juſtify her, are yet ſometimes offended through weakneſſe of faith, or want of judgement to comprehend the depth of Gods providence, when they have conſidered the ſtrange proſperity of the wicked, as Job. 21. 6, 7, 8. and David, Pſal. 73. and Jeremy, Jer. 12.
But to conſider punctually the inſtances here particulated. Firſt not one of them treats of Gods decrees, though this Author boldly claps then in amongſt the waies of God: And theſe places throughout entreat not of the decrees themſelves, but of the executions of Gods decrees. As that Iſaiah 5. 3. Judge I pray you between me and my vineyard; yet this was meere grace and not juſtice; but the laying of it waſt, (as there he threatneth) for the unfruitfulneſſe thereof, was juſt even in the conſcience of man: So likewiſe the waies of God mentioned, Ezech. 18. 25. are moſt equall, as namely in rewarding the obedient, and puniſhing the diſobedient. In like ſort there is no queſtion to be made of Gods decrees, concerning the rewarding the one, and puniſhing the other. And it is as true, that all this is nothing to the purpoſe. The main queſtion being touching Gods decree, to give the grace of obedience to one, and deny it unto others; and of the execution hereof, in ſhewing mercy on whom he will, and Rom. 9. 18;hardning whom he will. No reaſon hereof can be deviſed by man without falling into manifeſt abſurdity, or manifeſt hereſy, or both. It is true God will not ſlay the righteous with the wicked: for the Infants of wicked Parents, untill God be pleaſed to regenerate them, are not to be accounted righteous, as being borne children of wrath. Epheſ. 2. 3. And therefore as in the conflagration of Sodome, God took a courſe to ſave righteous Lot, yet the Infant children of the Sodomites were conſumed Gen. 19.in the ſame fire with their Parents. And in like manner I anſwere to that of Moſes. Num. 16. 22. Shall one man ſinne, and wilt thou be angry with all the congregation? You know though Korah might be, and in likelihood he was the principall inſtigator yet Dathan and Abiram the ſonnes of Eliab, and On, the ſonne of Peleth, the ſonnes of Reuben joyned with him in the ſeparation, and with theſe were joyned no leſſe then 250 Captains of the aſſembly, and they famous in the congregation and men of renowne. Nor did thoſe alone periſh in this their ſeparation, but their families alſo. So that whereas when Moſes exhorted all the reſt to depart from the tents of thoſe wicked men, and thereupon Dathan and Abiram came out and ſtood in the doore of the Tent, with their Wives, and their Sonnes, and their little Children, all theſe were ſwallowed up, and went downe quick into the pit: and doe you think their little Children were partners with them in this conſpiracy? And is not this judgement ſtrange? What can juſtify this, but the power of God, is Lord over his creature, together with that originall corruption that is found in every one when they come into the world? Gueſſe, I pray, how happy this Author is in his obſervations. This makes me remember, how at my firſt coming into this place, having to deale with certain Browniſts, being willed thereunto by our Dioceſan: An old man among the reſt, was willing to conferre, ſo we would give him liberty to open his mind at full; we willingly condeſcended unto him, and thereupon he began to alleadge places of Scripture to juſtify his ſeparation; and whereſoever he found the word ſeperate, that he took up for an argument on his ſide (like him that did ſet downe every ſhip that arrived in the harbour at Athens, as one of his ſhipps) and amongſt the reſt, this 16 chapter of Numbers afforded him one authority v. 21. where the Lord ſpeaks unto Moſes and Aaron, ſaying, ſeparate your ſelves from among this congregation; whereunto I anſwered; here indeed is a ſeparation commanded, but from whom? Surely from thoſe who roſe up in rebellion againſt Moſes and Aaron: Now if you can prove us to be ſuch, as riſe up in rebellion againſt Moſes and Aaron, then, in the name of God ſeparate your ſelves from us: But if we are not the men that riſe up in rebellion againſt Moſes and Aaron, but you rather, then are not you commanded to ſeparate from us, but we rather are commanded to ſeparate from you; yet we deſire only, that you will not ſeparate from us, and all ſhall be well. But to returne, what doth this author think? Was God in a paſſion, or ſomething precipitate when he ſaid, ſeparate your ſelves from among this congregation, that I may conſume them all at once, and did Moſes moderate him as being more-ſtaid of the two? I hope, if God had done as much as he offered to doe, his action had been iuſtifiable, as well in the one as in the other. Certainly God ſhould be juſt, even in turning his holy Angells into nothing: and was juſt in expoſing his holy Sonne to tortures unexpreſſable upon the croſſe; other manner of proceedings, then were thoſe which were uſed towards Adonibezek and Mauricius: they juſtified God from conſideration of their former ſinnes: No ſuch courſe of juſtification could have place in annihilating Angells, or had courſe in breaking the Holy Sonne of God for our iniquities. Yet theſe inſtances are remarkable to obſerve therein, the felicity of this Authors diſcourſe. For firſt, was it God indeed that executed this judgement upon Adonibezek? Now the Text ſaith, the children of Judah were Judg. 1. 6, 7.they that dealt thus with him: did God then uſe their free wills, as his inſtruments for the execution of this judgement? And how was this? Was it by working them hereunto, or only by concurring with them to this act, as foreſeeing they would doe ſuch an act, and thereupon decreeing to concurre to the producing of that act? If God did work them hereunto, then can God work the will of any man to the doing of any free act freely: for who dares ſay that the children of Iſrael did not as freely doe this as ought elſe? But if God only concurred with them, to the doing of it modo vellent, and only, upon foreſight that they would doe it, decreed to concurre to the doing of it, calls he this Gods execution of judgement, depending meerely upon the pleaſure of man foreſeen by God?
As for the out-rage executed upon Mauricius by Phocas, this was no leſſe then abominable villany, as committed by him. Yet if God uſed him as an inſtrument herein, to execute his iudgement, then God by the ſinfull act of one, can and doth puniſh the ſame of another, and conſequently God muſt be the Author of that ſinfull act, whereby he puniſheth another, and that by Arminius his rule, which is this, Omnis paena non permittitur ſed infligitur a Deo, & habet Deum authorem. Now I come to conſider his accommodation of ſo impertinent a diſcourſe. He ſaith abſolute reprobation cannot be reconciled with this juſtice Divine: we ſay there is no need at all of reconcilement: for what an inſipid thing is it, to talke of a courſe of reconciling them, who were never at odds? But he takes upon him to prove the repugnancy between them by three reaſons.
1. The firſt whereof is this. It makes God to puniſh the righteous with the wicked, as it is taught the Supralapſarian way directly. I confeſſe here is a direct ſomewhat, but whether a direct truth, or a direct lye, let the indifferent judge. He adventureth the proofe of it thus: The Supralapſarians preſent man in his decree of Reprobation conſidered without ſinne: that is true I confeſſe, and it is as true that they preſent him conſidered without righteouſneſſe alſo; and for good reaſon, becauſe Gods decree was eternall, and the creature at that time had no being & to conſider a thing that hath no being, as having being, is not ſo much conſiderare, to conſider, as errare or fingere, to erre or feign, this I have delivered in my Vindiciae gratiae Dei, and that in the firſt part of the firſt book. And this Author pretends he hath read the ſecond, yet he takes no courſe to refute this or ought elſe. But let him goe on. God (he ſaith) is made by them to determine the infliction of miſery on men without conſideration of ſinne, either Originall or actuall. Firſt, let it be granted, yet herehence it followeth not, that he is made to be a deſtroyer of the righteous, or to puniſh the righteous with the wicked, which was that he affirmed. To determine puniſhment is one thing, to puniſh is another thing. Certainly in the opinion of thoſe he ſpeaks of, God puniſheth none but the wicked; the very conſcience of this Author cannot but convict him of falſhood in this crimination: For certainly by their opinion it doth not follow but that every one is found wicked, when God doth puniſh him. I may as well ſay in moſt abſolute congruity, that by their opinion, God doth puniſh men, before they have any being by creation: for ſuch they were indeed, and neither wicked nor righteous, when God paſſed the decree of reprobation upon them. But neither doe theſe Divines maintain, that God did decree to damne any man but for ſinne. Nay, I goe farther: let the object of reprobation be men not yet created, and ſo conſidered, as I have proved it to be ſo, herehence it no way followes, that the decree of reprobration, is in any moment of reaſon or nature, before the conſideration or citra conſiderationem peccati: and this alſo have I proved. This Author boldly ſuppoſeth the contrary to be true, without any proofe, yet pretends he hath read my Vindiciae Gratiae Dei farther off then where I have handled this. I ſay he pretends it, but I doe not know how he comes by this, it may be as Capons come by Chickens.
Hence he proceeds to the Sublapſarians alſo, the whole Synod of Dort (as 'tis ſuppoſed) our Brittain Divines, and all; for againſt their way he hath tyed himſelfe to bend his reaſons, but ſo, that as the Pope by his grants, doth never bind his own hands, for this Author hath power to untye himſelfe at pleaſure, and to fly out againſt the Supralapſarians alſo: as Scanderbeg did againſt the two Perſian challengers; but he was put thereunto, becauſe they contrary to the compact, ſet both at once on him. But this champion like a tall fellow, and of a brave ſpirit, as if he ſhould not have his hands full of a whole Synod, lets fly at all: They indeed, I mean the Sublapſarians, conſider mankind in originall ſinne; this he may well ſuppoſe: but he goes farther, and ſuppoſeth alſo, that this ſinne is made ours only by Gods order and appoyntment: For ſo, ſaith he, they in effect doe ſay.
1. That God did lay upon every man, a neceſſity of being borne in Originall ſinne. But in this alſo he ſpeaks at pleaſure, quoting no paſſage of any Author. God may be ſaid to lay upon man a neceſſity of eternall condemnation, dying in ſinne unrepented of: yet no ſober man will ſay, that God is the author of a mans condemnation, by Gods only order and pleaſure; For this implies, that there is no meritorious cauſe of condemnation in man. God (we ſay) of meer pleaſure, beſtowes the grace of repentance on whom he will; becauſe he finds all equall in naturall corruption, and no difference in any, whereby to move God to beſtow grace on him rather then on another. The caſe is not alike when God comes to beſtow ſalvation and inflict damnation; for ſome he finds dying in ſinnes, others dying in the Lord: yet we deny not but by power abſolute, and ſecluding the determination of his own will, he could annihilate the righteous as well as the wicked. In like ſort the whole courſe of nature depends meerely upon the pleaſure of God: yet we ſay it is naturall for a Leprous perſon, to beget a Leprous perſon: and ſo as naturall it is, for that which is borne of the fleſh to be fleſh, though each depends upon the conſtitution of God. For albeit Adam loſt the ſpirit of God by his tranſgreſſion, and all ſupernaturall graces wherewith he was endued; yet like as God by regeneration, of his meere pleaſure reſtored them afterwards to Adam, and in due time doth reſtore them to every one of his Elect: ſo in their very conception, if it pleaſed God, he could for Chriſts ſake infuſe them; notwithſtanding the ſinne of Adam; and conſequently it is the free act of God, in refuſing after this manner to deale with them. Yet this nothing hinders, but that the propagation of ſpirituall corruption unto all Adams poſterity, may be as naturall as the propagation of any hereditary diſeaſe from the Father to the child: and over and above, that it is not in the way of meer pleaſure, but in the way of juſtice; for the ſinne of Adam, which was the ſinne of our nature, bereaving him of that originall righteouſneſſe wherein he was …reated: and cauſing all mankind to be, 1. Derived from him, whereas he could have otherwiſe provided, 2. And that from Adam after his nature was corrupt with ſinne, whereas he could have derived poſterity from him before his fall, had it pleaſed him. And therefore I approve the ſecond Canon of the Synod of Dort, whereunto our Engliſh Divines with many others ſubſcribed: where they profeſſe, that the corruption derived from Adam to his poſterity was, per vitioſae naturae propagationem juſto Dei iudicio derivata. This I take to be much different from ſaying, Adams ſinne is made ours by meer pleaſure, or by imputation only. So the fifteenth Article in the confeſſion Eccleſiarum Belgicarum runs thus; Credimus Adami in obedientiâ, peccatum originis in totum genus humanum diffuſum eſſe: quod eſt totius naturae corruptio, & vitium haereditarium, quo & ipſi infantes in matris ſuae utero polluti ſunt, quodque veluti radix omne peccatorum genus in homine producit; ideo que ita foedum & execrabile eſt coram Deo, ut ad generis humani condemnationem ſufficiat. Our Brittain Divines, in their ſecond Theſis upon the third and fourth Articles, explicate themſelves concerning the condition of originall ſinne in this manner. Lapſae voluntati ineſt non tantum peccandi poſſibilitas, ſed etiam praeceps ad peccandum inclinatio; Nec aliter ſe poteſt res habere in homine corrupto, nondum per divinam juſtitiam reſtaurato: cùm ea ſit natura voluntatis, ut nuda manere nequeat, ſed ab uno, cui adhaeſerat, objecto excidens, aliud quaerat, quod cupidè amplectatur, ideo per ſpontaneam defectionem habitualiter adverſa a Deo creatore, in creaturam effraeni impetu fertur, ac cum ea libidinoſe ac turpiter fornicatur, ſemper avida fruendi utendis, ac vetita moliendi ac patrandi. Quid mirum ergo ſi talis voluntas ſit Diaboli maneipium? I find indeed in Corvinus ſuch a profeſſion of his, namely, that ex puro Dei arbitrio, qui Adami peccatum nobis imputare voluit, etiam in nos reatus derivatus eſt. And Walaeus in anſwer unto him writes thus; Nec quinto illo ad Rom. Capite, ad quod nos hic Corvinus remittit, quicquam tale dicitur aut innuitur, nempe quod ex mero Dei arbittio pendeat haec primi peccati imputatio.
2. The Second thing he puts upon our Divines is, That God hath determined for that ſinne, to caſt away the farre greater part of mankind for ever: and ſo they make God to doe that by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other ſay he did by one. To which I anſwer, Firſt, that if they ſay that God doth no more by two acts, then, the other ſay, God did by one, ſeeing I have proved that the other doe no way maintain that God doth puniſh the righteous with the wicked, which is his immodeſt and unſhamefac't crimination; no nor doe they maintain, that God determined to damne any but for ſinne, and which is more then that, ſuppoſing humanum genus nondum conditum, to be the object of reprobation, yet doth it not follow, that in any moment of nature, the decree of damnation is before the conſideration of ſinne; ſurely neither will it follow, by the Sublapſarian Doctrine, that God doth not decree to puniſh any man with damnation, but for thoſe ſinnes wherein he dyeth unrepented of; much leſſe that God doth puniſh the righteous with the wicked, which is the crimination of this Author, propoſed, I doubt, againſt his own conſcience. Tis true, ſome periſh only in originall ſinne, and that juſtly: for if they be borne children of wrath, is it ſtrange if they dye children of wrath? And is it not juſt with God to inflict eternall death on them, whom this Author profeſſeth to be guilty of eternall death? only he ſaith, that God of his meer pleaſure, makes them guilty of eternall death: That is his ſaying, not ours: For though we ſay originall ſinne makes a man guilty of eternall death, by the free conſtitution of God; yet we ſay not, that this free conſtitution of God was made of his meer pleaſure, but juſto Dei judicio▪ like as whoſoever believes not ſhall be damned, here damnation is by the free conſtitution of God, made the portion of unbelievers: but dares this Author inferre herehence, that it is not made ſo juſto Dei judicio? indeed God gives grace according to the meere pleaſure of his will: but no wiſe man will ſay, that he damnes men according to the meere pleaſure of his will; for this phraſe implies, that there is no cauſe thereof on mans part: And indeed there is no cauſe on mans part, why God ſhould give him grace, but there is cauſe enough on mans part, why God ſhould inflict damnation on him, and yet this work of God though juſt, is never a whit the leſſe free. So in damning for originall ſinne only, though Gods conſtitution hereof be juſt, yet is it never a whit the leſſe free; and though it be free, yet it is never a whit the leſſe juſt: And like as damnation is inflicted on finall impenitents, ſola Dei conſtitutione, only by vertue of this conſtitution Divine, whoſoever repents not of his ſinne ſhall be damned; (for it is apparent, God might have annihilated them, had it ſo pleaſed him) yet is it never a whit the leſſe juſt. In like ſort it is by the ſole conſtitution of God, that originall ſinne is propagated to all men, Chriſt excepted. for God could have derived mankind from another ſtock after Adams fall: and as he doth regenerate men uſually by his word, ſo he might if it pleaſed him, in their very conception give them his ſpirit, and thoſe ſupernaturall graces, whereof Adam was deprived by ſinne: yet the propagation of ſinne from Adam to poſterity. is never a whit the leſſe juſt; no nor any whit the leſſe naturall; like as the whole courſe of nature, depends upon the alone conſtitution of God. But when I ſay that God can without reſpect of ſinne, inflict any torment upon his creature, this is delivered of power abſolute. This power the Lord did execute upon his own ſonne: for what was his ſinne? Was he not the ſpotleſſe lamb of God? Yet what agonies did he ſuffer in the garden, what torments and terrours upon the croſſe, when hee cryed out My God, my God, Why haſt thou forſaken mee? But the like power he doth not execute on us, only he gives us authority to exerciſe the like power over other creatures: if the powder of an Hare burnt alive in an Oven, be found to be wholſome for us, he gives us leave thus to deale with him, and the like: yet have not theſe creatures ſinned either againſt God, or againſt us. Of this abſolute power of God, I have diſcourſed more ſparingly in the place cited by him, Lib. 1. p. 2. De Electione, digreſ. 3. If this Author hath any mind to except againſt it, either in whole or in part, he might have tried his ſtrength, and not contented himſelfe, with ſhewing his teeth only. Yet by his leave, whether thoſe he ſpeaks of, will concurre with me in this, it is more then I know, but to ſerve his turne at this preſent againſt thoſe whom he hath tyed himſelfe to oppoſe, as he profeſſeth, he cares little what he avoucheth to ſave himſelfe of farther pains. By the way let me take notice of one argument more then I dreamt of, for the maintenance of Gods abſolute power to inflict any pain upon a creature, and that of his meer pleaſure, which this Author ere he is aware ſuggeſts unto me; And accordingly thus I diſpute. If God can out of his meer pleaſure make a man guilty of eternall death, ſurely it ſeems that of his meer pleaſure he may inflict eternall death on any. But God can of his meer pleaſure make a man guilty of eternall death, as I prove out of this Author, who profeſſeth that God out of his meer pleaſure, made all mankind guilty of eternall death: Now we commonly ſay, that ab actu ad potentiam valet argumentum. And ſee farther how miſerably he overlaſheth. The higheſt degree whereunto he can improve the harſhneſſe of our Doctrine is this, that we ſhould teach, that God doth decree the miſery of an innocent man. Now I pray conſider, is it not as harſh, that God ſhould decree the death, the agonics, the ſorrowes, and tortures of an innocent man? And is it not apparent, that God decreed the death and thoſe unſpeakable ſorrowes of his innocent ſonne? Yet we ſay not that God decreed any other mans death or damnation, but only for ſinne. But it is all one in his opinion to ſay, God decrees the miſery of an innocent man, and to purpoſe that he ſhall be involved in a ſinne, that ſo he may be brought to miſery. Firſt, I ſay his opinion is no Oracle, if it were, the world would ſoon grow wild. Secondly, this ſufficeth not to prove his crimination, which was this, that by our Doctrine, we make God to puniſh the righteous with the wicked, not that we make God to doe that which is all one in ſubſtance. Thirdly, his beſt arguments are his phraſes, whereby he hopes to ſeaſon others affections as well as his own; as in ſaying God purpoſed man ſhall be involved in ſinne: For if he ſpeake of mankind, made guilty of the ſinne of Adam, he forgets his own Tenet; that God of his meer pleaſure makes Adams ſinne the ſinne of his poſterity, and thereby of his meer pleaſure makes them guilty of eternall death. And as touching our Tenet herein, is there any ſuch harſhneſſe in ſaying, that God cauſeth a leprous child to be borne of Leprous parents? But if he ſpeak it in generall of any ſinne, for which any man is damned, our Doctrine is, that the ſinnes which come to paſſe, muſt needs be permitted by God, and for God to permit any ſinne, is to will that ſuch a ſinne ſhall come to paſſe by Gods permiſſion. Arminius himſelfe profeſſing, that if God permit a man to will that which is evill, Neceſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum. And the Scripture is expreſſe as touching the fouleſt actions that ever were committed by man, to wit, in the moſt contumelious uſages of the ſonne of God, namely that both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Iſraell were gathered together, to doe what Gods hand, and Gods Counſell had predetermined to be done. And when Fulgentius ſaith, that God had been unjuſt, if he had predeſtinated ſtantem ad ruinam; ad ruinam here is ad peccatum, and Predeſtination in the Fathers ſenſe, is only eorum quae Deus ipſe facturus erat, which God himſelfe meant to effect, not what he meant to ſuffer. That they took predeſtination in this ſenſe, it appears by Auſtin. lib. 2. de bono perſever. c. 17. his words are theſe. In ſua quae falli mutari que non poteſt praeſcientia opera ſua futura diſponere, illud omnino, nec aliud quicquam eſt praedeſtinare. Marke it well, opera ſua, his works, now ſinne is no work of God, but a work of the creature only.
I come to his ſecond reaſon.
DISCOURSE. SUBSECT. II.
IT is againſt Gods Juſtice, becauſe it makes him to require faith in Chriſt, of thoſe to whom he hath in his abſolute purpoſe denied both ability to believe, and a Chriſt to believe in.
That Reprobates are bound to believe as well as others, it is the conſtant Doctrine of Divines; amongſt whom Zanchius delivers it for a Theſis: Quiſque (ſaith he) mandato Dei tenctur credere Zanch. lib. 5. c. 2. de nat. Dei, q. 1. de praedeſt. Sanct.ſe ad ſalutem aeternam in Chriſto fuiſſe electum, maxime is qui fidem in Chriſtum profitetur. And in his explication of this Theſis he ſaith, Cum dicimus unumquem que teneri hoc credtre, neminem, ne reproios quidem, qui neque unquam credent, nec credere in Chriſtum poſſunt, excipimus; & niſi credant, graviſſime ommum peccant. Every man, eſpecially he that profeſſeth Chriſt, is bound to believe that he is choſen in Chriſt to ſalvation; every man without exception, even the Reprobate himſelfe; and if he believe it not, he commits a moſt grievous ſinne above all others. This that he ſaith, he proves by Iohn 16. 9. The ſpirit ſhall convince the World of ſinne, becauſe they believe not in me: Reprobates therefore are bound to believe.
But now they cannot be juſtly bound to believe if they be abſolute and inevitable Reprobates, for three cauſes.
1. Becauſe it is Gods will that they ſhall not believe; and it appears to be ſo, becauſe it is his peremptory will that they ſhall have no power to believe; for its a Ma…ime in Logick, that Qui vult aliquid in cauſâ, vult effectum ex iſta cauſa neceſſario profluentem: No man will ſay that it is Gods ſerious will, that ſuch a man ſhall live, when it is his will, that he ſhall not have the concourſe of his providence, and the act of preſervation▪ now will any ſay (that forget not themſelves) that God doth unfainedly will that thoſe men ſhall believe, whom he will not furniſh with neceſſary power to believe. Now if it be Gods will, that abſolute reprobates ſhall in no wiſe believe, they cannot in juſtice be tied to believe. For no man is bound to an act againſt Gods peremptory will.
2. Becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould believe, they want power to believe, and muſt want it ſtill: God hath decreed they ſhall have none to their dving day: without power to believe, they can no more believe, then a man can ſee without an eye, and live without a Soule. Nemo obligatur ad impoſſibilia. To believe is abſolutely impoſſible unto them; and therefore in juſtice they can be tyed to believe no more then a man can be bound to fly like a Bird, or to reach heaven with the top of his finger.
3. Becauſe they have no object of ſaith. Credere …ubet, d… fidei nulium objectum …: This decree makes God to oblige men to believe, and to give them no Chriſt to believe in, and to puniſh them as tranſgreſſors of the covenant of grace, when yet they have no more right unto it, or part in it, then the very Devills. Can God juſtiy bind men to believe a lye? To believe that Chriſt died for them, when it is no ſuch matter? If a man ſhould command his Servant to eate, and puniſh him for not eating, and in the mean time fully reſolve that he ſhall have no meat to eate: Would any reaſonable man ſay that he were juſt in ſuch a command, ſuch a puniſhment? Change but the names, the caſe is the ſame.
TWISSE Conſideration.
IN this diſcourſe on the poynt of Gods juſtice, this Author ſeems to ſtorme, and ſhewes great confidence of bearing downe all before him: but the more ridiculous will it prove in the iſſue, when it ſhall appeare, that all this wind beats down no corne. He takes his riſe from a particular opinion of Zanchy, whoſe opinion is, that all, even Reprobates are bound to believe they are elected in Chriſt unto ſalvation, though never they ſhall believe nor can believe. But doth this Author himſelfe concurre with Zanchy in this opinion? If he did, I preſume it were upon ſome better ground then the authority of Zanchy; and in all likelihood we ſhould have heard of thoſe grounds: or doth himſelfe believe, that that paſſage Ioh. 16. 9. He ſhall convict the World of ſinne, becauſe they believed not in me, doth evince as much, or import as much as that is, whereunto Zanchy drives it? If he doth not concurre with Zanchy in either of theſe, why ſhould he tye us to the particular authority of Zanchy? Muſt we be bound to ſtand to every interpretation of our Divines, or every particular opinion of theirs, wherein perhaps they were ſingular? Secondly, ſuppoſe this opinion of Zanchy be a truth, and ſuppoſe we concurre with him herein, will it from this opinion follow, that therefore even Reprobates, have power to believe? Who ſeeth not that it is a flat contradiction to the antecedent? For the Doctrine of Zanchy as here it is related, is this, that even Reprobates, though they cannot believe, yet are they bound to believe. Now will it herehence follow that therefore they have power to believe? Whereas it is manifeſtly ſuppoſed in the antecedent that they cannot believe. And to my underſtanding, the diſtinction of Elect and Reprobate in this caſe is moſt unſeaſonable. For to what end doe we Preach unto our hearers, that all ſorts of men are bound to believe, but this, to wit, that every one that heareth us, being privy to his condition, may underſtand that he, of what condition ſoever he be, which is ſuppoſed to be better known to him, then to the Preacher, or at leaſt as well, is bound to believe. But as for theſe different conditions of elect and reprobate, no man can be privy to the one, untill he doth believe; nor to the other, untill finall perſeverance in unbeliefe. And if I liſt, I could alleadge the opinion of another Divine (who is very peremptory in his way) profeſſing that the Miniſters calling upon us to believe, is no commandement at all, but like a Kings gracious Proclamation unto certain malifactors, who are all accuſed of High Treaſon, giving them to underſtand, that in caſe they will voluntarily confeſſe their ſinne, and accept of his gracious pardon offered them, he will moſt graciouſly pardon them. But if they will not, but ſtand rather to their triall, preſuming to acquit themſelves right well, and prove themſelves to be true Subjects, let them ſtand to the adventure, and iſſue of their tryall. And that thus the covenant of grace is offered to be received by them only, who feare to come, and dare not come to the tryall of the Covenant of works. But I will not content my ſelfe, in putting off Zanchy in this manner; although by the way I cannot but profeſſe, that were I of their opinion, who teach that God gives unto all and every one, when they come into the World, a certain grace, for the enlivening of their wills, whereby they are enabled to will any ſpirituall good, whereto they ſhall be excited; I ſee no reaſon but that the way is open to everlaſting life, as well by the covenant of works, as by the covenant of grace: for let perfect obedience be the ſpirituall good whereto they are excited, let them but will it, as it is ſuppoſed they can; and then God will be ready to concurre to the doing of it, like as to the work in us foreign credere, and foreign reſipiſcere, modò velimus, ſo alſo I ſhould think, to work in us perfect obedience modò velimus. And in this caſe I pray conſider, what need were there of faith in Chriſt on their part, more then on the part of the Holy Angells; certainly there would be no need of repentance.
Thirdly therefore conſider we the conſtant Doctrine of Divines, not that Reprobates are bound to believe, but that all that heare the Goſpell are bound to believe: but in what ſenſe? Piſcator ſaith, as I remember, that the thing, which all ſuch are bound to believe, is the Goſpell; according to that Mar. 1. Repent ye and believe the Goſpell. Now to believe the Goſpell is one thing, the ſumme whereof is this, That Jeſus Chriſt came into the World to ſave ſinners; but to believe in Chriſt is another thing, which yet this Author diſtinguiſheth not, though it appears by the courſe of his argumentation, that he draws to this meaning, and that in a particular ſenſe, which is this, to believe that Chriſt died for them; as appears expreſſely in the latter end of this Section. And no marvaile if this Author carry himſelfe ſo confidently in this, being, as he is, armed with ſuch confidence. But I am glad that in one place or other, he ſprings his meaning, that we may have the fairer flight at him, to pull down his pride, and ſweep away his vain conſidence: though we deale upon the moſt plauſible argument of the Arminians, and which they think inſoluble. My anſwer is; firſt, Look in what ſenſe Arminius ſaith Chriſt died for us, in the ſame ſenſe we may be held to ſay (without prejudice to our Tenet) of abſolute reprobation, that all who heare the Goſpell are bound to believe that Chriſt died for them. For the meaning that Arminius makes of Chriſts dying for us, is this, Chriſt dyed, for this end, that ſatisfaction being made for ſinne, the Lord now may pardon ſinne, upon what condition he will; which indeed is to dye for obtaining a poſſibility of the redemption of all, but for the actuall redemption of none at all. Secondly, But I liſt not to content my ſelfe with this; therefore I farther anſwer, by diſtinction of the phraſe of dying for us, that we may not cheat our ſelves by the confounding of things that differ. To dye for us, or for all, is to dye for our benefit, or for the benefit of all: Now theſe benefits are of a different nature, whereof ſome are beſtowed upon man only conditionally (though for Chriſts ſake) and they are the pardon of ſinne and Salvation of the Soule, and theſe God doth conferre only upon the condition of faith and repentance. Now I am ready to profeſſe, and that, I ſuppoſe, as out of the mouth of all our Divines, that every one who hears the Goſpell (without diſtinction between Elect and Reprobate) is bound to believe that Chriſt died for him, ſo farre as to procure both the pardon of his ſinnes, and the ſalvation of his ſoule, in caſe he believe and repent. But there are other benefits, which Chriſt by his obedience hath merited for us, namely, the benefit of faith and repentance. For it pleaſed the Father, that in him ſhould all fulneſſe dwell, Col. 1. And He hath bleſſed us with all ſpirituall bleſſings in Chriſt, that is, for Chriſts ſake: and Eph. 1. 3. Heb. 13. 21.God works in us, that which is pleaſing in his ſight through Jeſus Chriſt, and therefore ſeeing nothing is more pleaſing in Gods ſight on our part, then faith and repentance, even theſe alſo, I ſhould think, God works in us through Jeſus Chriſt: and the Apoſtle praies in the behalfe of the Epheſians, for peace, and faith, and love from God Eph. 6. 23.the Father, and the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, that is, as I interpret it, from God the Father, Sonne, and Holy Ghoſt, as an efficient cauſe, and from the Lord Jeſus Chriſt, God and Man, as a meritorious cauſe thereof. Now I demand whether this Author can ſay truly, that tis the conſtant opinion of our Divines, that all who heare the Goſpell, whether Elect or Reprobate, are bound to believe, that Chriſt dyed to procure them faith and repentance. Nay doth any Arminian at this day believe this, or can he name any Arminian that doth avouch this? Nay doth himſelfe believe this? If he doth not, if he cannot ſhew any Arminian that doth, with what face can he charge this opinion upon us, as if we ſhould extend the obligation to believe, much farther then the Arminians doe, whereas uſually they criminate us, for not extending it ſo farre as we ſhould. And indeed there is a main difference between theſe benefits and the former: For as touching the former, namely pardon of ſinne and ſalvation, God doth not uſe to conferre them, but conditionally, to wit, upon the condition of faith and repentance. But as for faith and repentance, doth God conferre them conditionally alſo? If ſo, then let them make known to us, what that condition is on mans part, and whatſoever it be, let them look unto it, how they can avoid the making of grace, to wit, the grace of faith and repentance, to be given according unto works. But if theſe graces are conferred abſolutely, and Chriſt dyed for all to this end, that faith and repentance ſhould be conferred abſolutely upon all, then it followeth manifeſtly herehence, that all muſt believe and repent, and conſequently all muſt be ſaved. So that not only Election (as Huberus that renegate faigned) muſt be univerſall, but Salvation alſo. Thus have I given in my anſwer diſtinctly, to that which he delivered moſt confuſedly. Fourthly I come to the ſcanning of the particular opinion of Zanchy, namely, that every one that hears the Goſpell, whether elect or reprobate (for ſo I ſuppoſe it proceeds, to wit, only of them, who heare the Goſpell, though this Author, takes no conſideration of that neither, but hand-over-head, laies about him like a mad man) is bound to believe, that he is elect in Chriſt; and will trye whether I cannot reduce that opinion of his alſo, to a faire interpretation. And here firſt I obſerve, Zanchy is not charged to maintain, that every hearer of the Goſpell, is bound to believe, that he is elect in Chriſt unto faith and repentance, but only to ſalvation: that puts me in good heart, that Zanchy & I ſhall ſhake hands of fellowſhip in the end, and part good friends. Secondly, I diſtinguiſh between abſolute-Election unto Salvation, and election unto Salvation-abſolute. The firſt only removes all cauſe on mans part of election, the latter removes all cauſe on mans part of ſalvation. By cauſe of ſalvation I mean only a diſpoſing cauſe, ſuch as faith, repentance, and good works are, as whereby (to expreſſe it in the Apoſtles phraſe) we are made meet partakers of the Col. 1. 12.inheritance of the Saints of light. Now albeit Zanchy maintains as we doe, that all the elect are abſolutely elected unto ſalvation, there being no cauſe on mans part of his election, as we have learned: yet neither Zanchy nor we doe maintain that God doth elect any unto ſalvation abſolute, that is, to bring him to ſalvation, without any diſpoſing of him thereunto by faith and repentance. Now to accommodate that opinion of Zanchy, I ſay it may have a good ſenſe, to ſay that every hearer is bound to believe, both that Chriſt dyed to procure Salvation for him, in caſe he doe believe, and that God ordained that he ſhould be ſaved, in caſe he doe believe; where beliefe is made the condition only of ſalvation, not of the Divine ordination; and the confuſion of theſe by the Arminians, doth uſually make them confident and inſolent, and in a word, Magnas Tragoedias excitare. But take a way the confuſion of things that differ, their combes are cut, their locks are ſhorne, and they are but as another man. Now having ſhewed in what ſenſe every hearer, is bound to believe that Chriſt died for him, and in what ſenſe not, let us conſider of what worth this Authors arguments are, breathing nothing but ſmoak and fire, I will not ſay, like the great Potan, but like fell Dragon; but I nothing doubt we ſhall pare his nailes, and make him calme enough ere we have done with him, ſo that a little child ſhall be able enough to lead him. Now that they cannot be juſtly bound to believe, if they be abſolute reprobates he takes upon him to prove by three reaſons.
1. The firſt is, becauſe it is Gods will that they ſhall not believe, becauſe it is his peremptory will, that they ſhall have no power to believe. I anſwere, it is indeed the will of Gods decree, that is, he hath decreed not to give any Reprobate a juſtifying faith, but hence it followeth not, that therefore they cannot believe thus farre the contents of the Goſpell, namely, that both Chriſt hath merited, and God hath ordained, that as many as doe believe ſhall be ſaved. For this, as I take it, is not uſually accounted by our Divines a juſtifying faith, but rather it comes within the compaſſe of ſuch a faith, as is commonly counted faith hiſtoricall.
Secondly I anſwer, it followeth not, that becauſe God hath decreed to deny them the grace of faith, therefore they are not bound to believe; which I prove by Scripture: For was not Pharaoh bound to let Iſrael goe, when Moſes was ſent to him from Exod. 7. 2, 3.the Lord, to command him in the name of the Lord, to let Iſrael goe? Yet the Scripture plainly teacheth us, that the Lord told Moſes that he would harden Pharaohs heart, and that he ſhould not let Iſrael goe. What I pray is now become of his reaſon, compared with the light of Scripture? And what have we to doe to enquire into Gods counſells, as whether he hath decreed to give us grace or no? Is it not enough to bind us to obedience, for God to command this or that unto us? Did Abraham enquire in his thoughts, whether it were his purpoſe yea or no, that Iſaack ſhould be ſacrificed? Nothing leſſe; but upon the Lords command, he forthwith addreſſeth himſelfe to the worke, riſing early in the morning, and going forward in the Lords buſineſſe. Then again, we find by common experience, that naturall men are too to confident rather, and preſumptuous of their power, then diffident, and diſtruſtfull; dicere De Grat. & lib. arbit. c. 2.ſolet humana ſuperbia (ſaith Austin) ſi ſciſſem feciſſem: it were better for them if they did acknowledge their impotency, and by what means this corruption of theirs is brought upon them, that would bring them nearer to the Kingdome of God. But if I have a debtor, whom I know to be a Bankerupt, but he knowes it not, but having many bagges of Braſſe or Copper pieces, which he takes to be Gold, conceits himſelfe able enough to pay all his debts, and more too: ſhall I be ſaid to commit any indecent thing, by urging him to pay that he oweth? This argument is as old as Pelagius: but what was Auſtin his anſwer? In mandato cognoſce quid debeas habere, in corruptione cognoſce t uo te vitio non habere, in oratione cognoſce unde poſsis habere.
3. Laſtly, if God cannot juſtly command, and by command bind man to obey, in caſe he hath no power to obey; in like ſort God cannot juſtly complaine of their diſobedience, who being hardned by God, cannot obey him: And indeed as this Author argueth againſt the juſtice of Gods commands in this caſe, ſo the Apoſtle brings in one arguing the injuſtice of Gods complaints in the like caſe. For having delivered this Doctrine, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth: forthwith he brings in one tumultuating againſt it in this manner. Thou Rom. 9. 18.wilt ſay then why doth he yet complaine, for who hath reſiſted his will? And if any man be not aſhamed to argue as he did (ſaith Auſtin) let us not be aſhamed to anſwer as the Apoſtle did: and how was that? Surely only thus: O man who art thou that diſputeſt with God? ſhall the thing formed, ſay to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the ſame lump to make one veſſell unto honour, and another unto diſhonour? And albeit this, I trow, ſhould be ſufficient to ſatisfy a Chriſtian, yet we obſerve farther, how this Author confounds impotency Morall, which conſiſteth in the corruption of mans powers naturall, and impotency naturall, which conſiſteth in bereaving him of power naturall. The Lord tells us by his Prophet Jeremy, that Like as a Blackamore cannot change his skinne, nor a Leopard his ſpotts, no more can they doe good, that are Jer. 13. 23.accuſtomed unto evill. Now if a man taken in ſtealth ſhall plead thus before a Judge, My Lord, I beſeech you have compaſſion upon me, for I have ſo long time inured my hands to pilfering, that now I cannot forbeare it: will this be accepted as a good plea to ſave him from the Gallowes. Again, it is obſerved that men are naturally prone to runne upon the committing of things forbidden them; Gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas: & nitimur in vetitum: yet this is no juſt excuſe. Laſtly; as for faith, it is well known that Divines diſtinguiſh between fides acquiſita, and fides infuſa; that we may call a faith naturally acquired, which is found in carnall perſons, whether prophane or Hypocriticall: and this is a faith inſpired by Gods ſpirit. The object of each is all one, and a Man may ſuffer Martyrdome for the one as well as for the other, which manifeſteth the pertinacious adherence thereunto. And it appears that all profeſſions have had their Martyrs; Ucali Fartax a Calabrian borne, endured the Gallies fourteen years, rather then he would turne Turke; yet at length he became a Turke, and only in ſpleen to be revenged on a Turke, who had given him a boxe on the eare, and became a great man amongſt them: And at the famous battell of Lepanto, he alone maintained his Squadron entire, and beat the Chriſtians. But to returne, albeit it be not in the power of nature to believe fide infuſâ, yet is it in the power of nature to believe the Goſpell fide acquiſitâ, which depends partly upon a mans education, and partly upon reaſon, conſidering the credibility of the Chriſtian way, by light of naturall obſervations, above all other waies in the World. And when men refuſe to embrace the Goſpell, not ſo much becauſe of the credibility of it, but becauſe it is not congruous to their naturall affections, as our Saviour tells the Jewes, Light came into the World, and men loved darkneſſe rather then light, becauſe their deeds are evill: Is there Ioh. 3.any reaſon why their condemnation ſhould be any whit the eaſier for this? Neither have I ever read, or heard it taught by any, that men ſhall be damned for not believing fide infuſâ, which is as much as to ſay, becauſe God hath not regenerated them; but either becauſe they have refuſed to believe, or elſe if they have embraced the Goſpell, for not living anſwerable thereunto, which alſo is in their power, quoad exteriorem vitae emendationem, though it be not in their power to regenerate their wills, and change their hearts, any more then it is to illuminate their minds: yet I never read that any mans damnation, was any whit the more encreaſed for not performing theſe acts. Thus farre I have been content to expatiate in the way of reaſonable diſcourſe, to meet with this Diſputer in his own element; though every ſober Chriſtian (I ſhould think) ſhould reſt ſatisfied with the word of God, which both teacheth us that the naturall man perceiveth not the things of God, neither can he know them, becauſe they are ſpiritually diſcerned, & that all men are found dead in treſpaſſes and ſinnes, before the ſpirit of regeneration comes, that men cannot believe, that they cannot repent, that they that are in the fleſh cannot pleaſe God; and that a man hardned cannot obey; and yet withall, that God doth command faith, repentance, and obedience, and complaines of default in performance. And if any man charge ſuch courſes as unjuſt, what is the Apoſtles courſe in meeting with ſuch imputations, but either to ſhew, that the word attributes ſuch a courſe to God, and therefore it cannot be unjuſt, as Rom. 9. 14. What ſhall we ſay then, is there unrighteouſneſſe with God? God forbid, for he ſaith to Moſes, I will have compaſſion on him, on whom I will have compaſſion, and I will ſhew mercy on him, to whom I will ſhew mecy: or to fly to the conſideration of the Lords dominion over all, as Creator over his creatures. I come to his ſecond reaſon.
2. And that is, becauſe it is impoſſible that they ſhould believe, they want power to believe, and muſt want it ſtill. God hath decreed they ſhall have none to their dying day. I anſwer: This argument is the very ſame with the former, not ſo much as differently dr…ſt, or crambe bis cocta, and therefore my former anſwer will ſerve in every particular. Yet adde this alſo, this impoſſibility is only upon ſuppoſition of Gods Decree, which nothing hinders the liberty of the creature, in doing freely what he doth, and freely leaving undone what he doth not, as appears manifeſtly by divers inſtances. For upon ſuppoſition of Gods decree, that not a bone of Chriſt ſhould be broken, it was impoſſible they ſhould be broken: yet who doubts, but that the Souldiers did as freely abſtaine from the Iohn 19. 33, 36.breaking of Chriſts bones, as they did freely break the others bones? And the Text notes the reaſon why they brake not Chriſts bones, to wit, becauſe they ſaw he was dead already. In like ſort upon ſuppoſition of Gods decree, that Joſiah by name ſhould burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar: Cyrus by name ſhould build him a Citty, and let goe his captives; it was impoſſible that it ſhould be otherwiſe: yet I think no wiſe man doubts but that Joſiah did the one, and Cyrus the other, as freely as they did any thing in their lives. And therefore this Author doth miſerably overlaſh in the element of his Philoſophy, and rationall diſcourſe, in ſaying, a man in juſtice can be tyed to believe no more, then a man can be bound to fly like a Bird, or to reach heaven with the top of his finger. He might as well ſay, that becauſe God had determined that the Souldiers ſhould not breake Chriſts bones, therefore they had no more power to breake Chriſts bones, then they had power to fly like a Bird, or to reach Heaven with the top of their finger. Certainly there is no man but by grace may be enabled to believe: but never was any man known to affirme, that by grace a man may be enabled to fly like a Bird, or to reach Heaven with the top of his finger. If this be not miſerably to over-reach, I know not what is. As for his rule, Nemo obligatur ad impoſſibile, judge I pray of the truth of it by this; What if a man by a vitious converſation, hath made it as impoſſible for him to doe good, as it is impoſſible for a Blackemore to change his skinne, or Ier. 13. 27.a Leopard his ſpots; Shall he therefore be obliged no longer to doe good? And as by our own ſinnes committed by our perſons, ſo by the ſinne of Adam, which was the ſinne of our nature, upon the whole nature of man was this impotency brought, as the Scriptures teach, and none that I know were known in the dayes of Auſtin, to deny, but the Plagians.
I come to the Third.
3. Now this depends upon a notorious confuſion of things that differ. For I have ſhewed, how the Lord hath given them a ſufficient object of that faith, which he requires of them, as touching Chriſts dyeing for them; namily, to believe that Chriſt hath merited the pardon of ſinne, and ſalvation for as many as believe in him, in ſuch ſort, that if all, and every one throughout the World ſhould believe in him; they ſhould be ſaved by him. And this depends meerely upon the ſufficiency of Chriſts merits, and undoubtedly it was the will of God, that Chriſts merits ſhould be of ſuch a value, as was ſufficient for the ſalvation of all, and every one: otherwiſe it were not true, that if all and every one ſhould believe in Chriſt, they ſhould be ſaved by the vertue of Chriſt merits. But as for any obligation to believe that Chriſt died to procure faith and repentance for all and every one; I never yet heard or read of any Arminian, that he believed it. Nay in their Apologia Remonſtrantium, or Cenſura Cenſurae, they plainly profeſſe, that Chriſt died not at all to merit faith, and regeneration for any. In like ſort it is not credible to me, that any Arminian believes, that Chriſt dyed for any ſo, as to procure pardon of ſinne and ſalvation abſolutely for him, whether he believe or no, provided that he live to be capable of faith and repentance, and to enjoy the Goſpell, and the Preaching of Chriſt crucified. And like as it is no lye, but truth, that Chriſt dyed to procure ſalvation, to as many as believe in him, ſo in being obliged to believe this, or puniſhed for not believing it, is neither to be obliged to the believing of a lye, nor puniſhed for not believing it. Therefore it is falſe to ſay there is no ſuch matter. For look in what ſenſe they are bound to believe that Chriſt died for them, in the ſame ſenſe it is moſt true, that Chriſt died for them; they are bound to believe that Chriſt dyed to procure ſalvation for every one that believeth: and it is moſt true, that in like manner, Chriſt hath procured the ſalvation of every one that believes: ſo that here is a truth to feed upon, and they that oppoſe it, are ſtrengthned in their vaine confidence by a meere miſt of confuſion, which they raiſe unto themſelves and others, that ſo they may ſet the better face upon that lye, which they hold in their right hand, wherewith they are ſo enamoured that they had rather forſake their own mercies, then forgoe it. And ſo I come to the third and laſt reaſon in generall drawn from Gods juſtice.
DISCOURSE. SUBSECT. III.
THe third reaſon why abſolute Reprobation infringeth Gods juſtice is, becauſe it will have him to puniſh men for the omiſſion of an act, which is made impoſſible unto them by his own decree, not by that decree alone whereby he determined to give them no power to believe, having loſt it, but by that decree alſo, by which he purpoſeth that we ſhould partake with Adam in his ſinne, and be ſtripped of all that ſupernaturall power, which we had by Gods free grant, beſtowed upon us in Adam before the fall: Theſe are my reaſons which move me to think, that this abſolute decree is repugnant to Gods juſtice.
TWISSE Conſideration.
I Have already ſhewed how Gods decree and impoſſibility ariſing upon ſuppoſition thereof, doth no way prejudice the liberty of the creature, as by pregnant paſſages of the Scripture is made plaine unto us. And as for the other decree here ſpoken of; Firſt it is untrue which he ſuppoſeth, that, God by a ſpeciall decree decreed all mankind to be made partakers of Adams ſinne, and therein to be ſtripped of all ſupernaturall power, which before the had by Gods free grant. For if it were juſt with God to decree, that Adams nature, upon his ſinning, ſhould be bereaved of all ſupernaturall power, which formerly he enjoyed, this and this alone ſhould ſuffice to bereave all his poſterity of ſupernaturall power to doe that which is good. For ſeeing all his poſterity did receive their natures from Adam after his fall, they muſt therewithall neceſſarily receive their natures from him, bereaved of all ſupernaturall power unto that which is good, untill ſuch time, as God be pleaſed of his free grace to reſtore it by regeneration. 2. Is it not good reaſon that God, for Adams ſinne, ſhould bereave us of all ſupernaturall power in Adam, as of his meere grace he did adorne us all with ſupernaturall power in Adam? 3. Notwithſtanding this depravation of ſupernaturall power in Adam, yet we acknowledge that nevertheleſſe, whatſoever ſinne a man commits, he committeth freely: and the Schoole hath taught it before us, Aquin. p. 1. q. 23. art. 3. ad. 3. licet aliquis non poſſit gratiam adipiſci qui reprobatur a Deo, tamen quòd in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex ejus libero arbitrio contingit, undè & merito ſibi imputatur in culpam.
DISCOURSE. SUBSECT. IV.
TWo things are uſually anſwered. Firſt, that there are many things delivered for truths in Scripture, (among which this is one) which are above the reach of humane capacity, and therefore are we quietly to ſubmit, as to other revealed truths, ſo to this, and not to be ſo bold as to examine the juſtice of this decree, or any thing elſe in it, by our ſhallow and erring underſtandings. But this anſwer takes not away the arguments, for I have theſe things to reply.
1. That though there be diverſe things revealed in Gods word, which are above reaſon, viz. That there are three Perſons and one God; and that Chriſt was borne of a Virgin; that the world was made of nothing, that the dead ſhall be raiſed, &c. to all which we muſt captivate our underſtandings, and yeeld a firme aſſent propter authoritatem dicentis: yet there is nothing revealed therein, abhorring from, and odious to ſound and right reaſon; for it cannot be, that the moſt excellent gifts of God, Faith and Reaſon, Nature and Scripture ſhould overthrow one another: and that the wiſe God, who is the fountain of all right reaſon, ſhould diſcover any thing to us in his word, or enjoyne us any thing to be believed, which is vere foreign, truly and properly unreaſonable. Our faith is an act of our ſervice of God, and Gods ſervice is cultus foreign, a reaſonable ſervice. Rom. 12. 2. and Gods word is alſo foreign, milk reaſonable and without guile; they are ſo called, no doubt, to ſhew that there is a ſweet harmony between faith and reaſon, things revealed, and mens underſtandings: though there be a diſproportion, yet there is no contradiction between them.
2. That therefore all thoſe Doctrines which are adverſe and repugnant to underſtandings, purged from prejudice and falſe principles, are not to be taken for doctrines of Scripture, but devices of men corrupting Scripture by falſe gloſſes and interpretations, and conſequently, that this abſolute reprobation of ſo many millions of miſerable men, out of Gods only will and pleaſure, becauſe it is moſt irkeſome to the eares and underſtandings of all ſorts of men beſt and worſt, that ſtand indifferent to the entertainment of any truths, that may appeare to be ſo, is no doctrine of the Text, no part of the word of God.
3. That howbeit ſome things in Scripture, which are peculiar to the Goſpell, are above our underſtandings, and muſt without heſitation be believed, yet there are many things there, which have their foundation in nature, and may be apprehended by the light of nature, and demonſtrated by reaſon; and among theſe things the juſtice of Gods waies is one, as I have ſhewed before out of Iſaiah 5. 3. and Ezek. 18. and it is but a meer evaſion, when the abſolute decree is proved by ſound reaſons to be unjuſt, to ſay, reaſon is blind, and muſt not be judge, but the Scripture only: for God offers the juſtice of his waies to the tryall of reaſon.
TWISSE Conſideration.
THis Author ſeems to ſwell, in the conceit of his rationall performances, as if never any fly ſitting upon a cart-wheele in a Sommers day had made ſuch a duſt as he had made. And faſhioning to himſelfe a victorious conqueſt, as if all his adverſaries were but Pigmies to this Anakim, glad to runne into corners, or into Acorn-cups to hide themſelves there. For his reaſons like ſome hobgoblins, doe ſo fright them, more then all the ſpirits that ſtand by the naked man in the book of Moones: And therefore all the help they have, if we believe this Pyrgopolinices is to charme them, by ſaying, that many things are delivered in Scripture, which are above the reach of humane capacity, among which this is one, &c. And I take this to be ſound. For otherwiſe, 1 Tim. 3. 16;why ſhould the Doctrine of Godlineſſe, be called a myſtery of Godlineſſe. And the Schooles teach, that Fides eſt aſſenſus inevidens: and Cajetan who was no gras-hopper, as great an Anakim as this Author, or his familiar ſpirit takes himſelfe to be, ſpares not to profeſſe, that about the reconciling of Gods predeſtination with the liberty of mans will (a poynt that comes ſo neere to this in hand as a poynt can doe) there are many diſtinctions deviſed by the learned, but yet he ſaith of them, that they did not qutetare intellectum, and therefore that he did captivare ſuum in obſequium fidei: and Alvarez, no dwarfe neither in Scholaſticall, that is, rationall Divinity, addeth that herein Cajetan piiſſimè & doctiſſimè loquitur. But who they are, that have taken notice, of thoſe arguments here ſpecified, and at the ſight of them were ſo ſton'd, as at the ſight of ſome Meduſas head, and thereupon came to this courſe of incantation or pacification, he doth very wiſely conceale, and like a man of authority, puts it upon us to take it upon his word. Yet I doe not remember that I have reſted my ſelfe upon any ſuch courſe, though the holy Apoſtle thinks it ſufficient to cleare any courſe of God from injuſtice, by proving that Scripture doth attribute ſuch a courſe unto God, as I have ſhewed out of Rom. 9. 14. It is true, the ſpirit which this Author breaths, is the right Pelagian ſpirit, according to the Pelagians in Bradwardines daies: for their vaunt was, that they could not be refuted by any reaſon Philoſophicall, but only by certain naked authorities Theologicall, (as I have heard of a Schollar, ſometimes challenged by a friend and kinſman of his, for being given (as he heard) to the Arminian Tenet, made a ready anſwer with proteſtation, that that opinion was very plauſible, but that St Paul was againſt it.) And therefore Bradwardine undertakes to confute them by reaſon Philoſophicall; ſo farre off was he from being cowed with their vain boaſts and braggs. His words are theſe; Sicut antiqui Pelagiani ventoſo nomine ſecularium ſcientiarum inflati conſiſtorium Theologicum contemnentes Philoſophicum flagitabant; ita & moderni. Audivi nam que quoſdam advocatos Pelagii, licet multum provectos in ſacris apicibus; affirmantes Pelagium nuſquam potuiſſe convinci per naturalem & Philoſophicam rationem; ſed vix arguebatur utcun que , per quaſdam authoritates Theologicas, maxime autem per authoritatem Eccleſiae, quae Satrapis non placebat: Quapr opter per rationes & authoritates Philoſophicas ipſos diſpoſui reformare. And for my part, though I affect not in thoſe poynts, to goe beyond Scripture and Chriſtian reaſon, yet I am content to be led whetherſoever my adverſary thinks good to lead me: And as a Schollar of my acquaintance being left handed, and accordingly caſting his cloake over the right ſhoulder, was anſwered by a Cittizen obſerving it, when he enquired his way, ſaying, when you ſhall come to ſuch a place, you muſt turne on your right hand, meaning indeed, on the left; ſo likewiſe I am nothing afraid of this mans Philoſophy, nor his Abettors neither, nothing doubting, but as many as I find oppoſing this divine truth, which we maintain, their beſt dexterity, in Philoſophicall and rationall diſcourſe, will prove but a left handed Philoſophy: and in this very field of argumentation, I purpoſe to lay upon him ere we part. But let us firſt conſider the things that he replies.
1. He ſaith, There is nothing in Scripture abhorring from ſound and right reaſon, he addes, Odious too: as if his Philoſophy had taught him, that it is the part of reaſon to hate, and not rather of affections. This rule when we were initiates in the Univerſity, we were ſoon acquainted with: Yet this Author to vent his fulneſſe, caſts himſelfe upon an unneceſſary proofe thereof, and the miſchiefe is, that his proofe maketh his cauſe worſe then it was before. For having formerly made the compariſon between the word of God, and ſound and right reaſon; in his reaſon he ſtates the compariſon between faith and reaſon, nature and Scripture, not diſtinguiſhing between nature corrupt, and uncorrupt, reaſon corrupt and uncorrupt. Our ſervice of God is reaſonable, in as much as it is performed by reaſonable creatures, and the rule thereof is not Rom. 12. 1.naturall reaſon, but meerely the word of God. In whom was naturall reaſon more eminent, then in Philoſophers? Yet were they wont to be called Haereticorum Patriarchae: and the Apoſtle hath profeſſe of all ſuch, that the things of God ſeem fooliſhneſſe unto them, 1 Cor. 2. 14. Now I pray conſider ſoberly, how reaſonable ſuch courſes are judged to be, which are accounted fooliſhneſſe, and what a ſweet harmony there is between things revealed, and mens underſtandings; and whether reaſonable, and fooliſh, be not a plain contradiction; as well as wiſe, and fooliſh. If we enjoy a more pure and refined reaſon then they, let us give illumination Divine the glory of it: and ſay with him in Job, verily there is a ſpirit in man, but the illumination of the Almighty giveth underſtanding. And ſeeing the word of God, is the only means of Divine illumination, let Iob. 32. 8.us thank Gods word for all. I come to the ſecond Materiall of his reply.
2. And that is this, that all thoſe Doctrine which are ad…erſe and repugnant to underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles, are not to be taken for Doctrines of Scripture, but devices of men, corrupting Scripture by falſe gloſſes and interpretations. No marvaile that when men oppoſe the miſteries of Godlineſſe, they fall upon the myſteries of iniquity. Here we have a rule given to try whether a Doctrine propoſed, be to be taken for a Doctrine of Scripture yea or no? And mark it well, I beſeech you, and I deſire that every ſober man will mark it well, and judge whether it deſerve not to be numbred amongſt the foreign, the depths of Satan: And withall judge whether the pretended Author of this diſcourſe, can in any probability be the Author of this, and whether it becomes not rather ſome old beaten Souldier in Arminianiſme, that takes upon him to be the Maſter and Dictator of Sentences. About Regula fidei, the rule of Faith, there is much queſtion between us and Papiſts; the meaning whereof is, what that is whereinto muſt be made the laſt reſolution of our Faith? We ſay it is the word of God contained in the Books of the Old Teſtament and the New; Papiſts ſay, it is the voyce of the Church. This Author deviſeth a new way, which I think was never heard off before, except among the Socinians, namely, that it is the judgement of understandings purged from prejudice and falſe Principles. For albeit the Doctrine of Faith, we judge to be contained no where, but in Gods word, yet notwithſtanding as touching the meaning of it, nothing muſt be taken to be the true meaning of Scripture, how fairely ſoever grounded thereupon in ſhew, unleſſe withall it ſeem nothing repugnant to underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles. Into this therefore muſt be made the laſt reſolution of our faith.
Again, where ſhall we meet with theſe judges as they are here deſcribed, to wit, as having their underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles: undoubtedly, like as the Church of Rome, when they have once brought the matter hitherto, that the laſt reſolution of faith, muſt be made into the voyce of the Church, are confident enough, that when the queſtion is made of the voyce of the Church, where that is to be found, they ſhall undoubtedly be able to carry it for the Church of Rome: So theſe Arminians, or Socinians rather, when they have once brought the matter to this paſſe, that the laſt reſolution of our faith muſt be made into the judgement of mens underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles; and that the queſtion beginneth to be made of underſtandings thus purified, where they are to be found, they will be ſo favourable to themſelves, as to conceive, that ſuch underſtandings are to be found no where, but amongſt the nation of the Arminians; or at leaſt among ſuch, whoſe judgements are naturally inclined towards their Tenets. But is this a decent courſe to reſt in the judgement of any mans underſtanding, whereas the ſoundnes of his underſtanding is not, nor cannot be diſcerned, but by the ſtrength of his argument: and again, conſidering the judgement of man is miſerably corrupted in ſuch ſort, as that the things of God ſeem fooliſhneſſe unto them, Is it not much fitter that we ſhould judge of every mans underſtanding by Gods word, which cannot erre, rather then judge of the meaning of the word by the underſtanding of man? Let any man uſe his underſtanding in opening and interpreting the word of God unto us, and clearing the meaning thereof unto us as much as he can, by reaſon, by argument, by demonſtration, but ſtill let it be indifferent for any to judge, in what congruity his interpretation ſtands with the Text it ſelfe, and no mans judgement to be a rule of Faith unto others.
Before he goes off from this, he gives another deſcription of thoſe, whoſe judgements muſt be the rule of the right interpretation of Scripture; to wit, ſuch as ſtand indifferent to the entertainment of any truths. Now this ſeems to me to be as poore as the former, or rather much poorer. For this indifferency as I take it, is in reſpect of affections; now albeit a man may be thus diſpoſed, in reſpect of his affections, yet he may be of a very weak judgement; as for example, I have heard of a good man, that was ſometimes wavering about the poynt of Ceremonies, yet very willing to receive information; and therefore conferres with both ſides, as well ſuch as held them lawfull in the uſe, as with thoſe that held them unlawfull, and ſtill was carried every way with the force of their reaſons, who conferred with him for the preſent. Then again, ſuppoſe the indifferent were moſt fit to judge, where ſhall we find thoſe indifferent perſons, or who ſhall give rules, and what rules, according whereto to proceed in this our inquiſition? Again, who are to be preſuppoſed in likelihood, to be the more indifferent, then ſuch as have not hitherto been verſed in theſe controverſies, and is it fit, that they who have been many years verſed in them, ſhould ſtand to the judgement of thoſe who are little or nothing exerciſed therein? Laſtly is the creature fit to judge of the Soveraignty of his creator, or being conceived of the freedome of his own will, to judge how farre it is reaſonable, God ſhould have power over his will and no farther? When the Apoſtle calls upon the Corinthians, to judge whether that which he wrote unto them, were the commandements of God or no, whom doth he call unto this office? Doth he call any other but ſuch as are ſpirituall? If there be any amongſt you that is a Prophet, or ſpirituall, let him know that theſe things are the commandements of God. 1 Cor. 14. He doth not ſay, if there be any amongſt you, that hath his underſtanding purged from prejudice, and falſe principles, let him know that theſe things which I write unto you, are the commandements of God. And the ſame Apoſtle tells us, that the things of God are ſpiritually to be diſcerned. 1 Cor. 2. 14.
Yet it is remarkable, that he appeals to the judgement not of the beſt only, but the worſt alſo in this: but ſomething qualified I confeſſe, to wit, provided that they ſtand indifferent to the entertainment of any truths. Marke it well, of any truths: and who are theſe? Not poſſeſſed with the entertainment of any Truths, but indifferent to the entertainment of them, I ſay who are theſe? The regenerate or unregenerate? Here I am at a ſtand, not knowing which way to take. But it may be this is ſpoken only in reference to our Doctrine of abſolute Reprobation. But of whatſoever it be ſpoken, let him give inſtance in either or in both; it ſeems he is indifferent to have it take place either way, for he propoſed it of beſt and worſt. But why ſhould he preſuppoſe an unregenerate man to be indifferent, to the entertainment of any truth? Whereas the Apoſtle profeſſeth of a naturall man, that he cannot know the things of God, and he gives the reaſon of it, becauſe they are ſpiritually diſcerned; and formerly ſaid that they were fooliſhneſſe unto him. Yet I willingly confeſſe, the Doctrine of abſolute Reprobation, is very harſh to the judgement and affections of carnall men; and ſuch as we had never embraced, had it not been for the word of God, which plainly profeſſeth, that election is not of (good) works; and that by ſuch an argument, as whereby it is manifeſt, Rom. 9. 11.1. That election is as well proved not to be of faith, as not of works. 2. That reprobation is not of evill works; yet the harſhneſſe hereof, is nothing like ſo much appearing in its proper colours, as upon their deciphering and blazing of it, who are as zealous for making election to be upon foreſight of faith and works (though this latter member, they are loath to have the World take notice of) as they are oppoſite to the abſoluteneſſe of reprobation. Now whereas before I have ſhewed, that there is a great deale of difference between abſolute election unto ſalvation, and election unto ſalvation abſolute: And that not one of our Divines doth maintain, that God doth elect men unto ſalvation abſolute, but to obtain ſalvation upon their faith and repentance, and finall perſeverance therein: In like ſort there is as great difference between abſolute reprobation unto damnation, and reprobation unto damnation abſolute. And if none of our Divines doe maintain, that God ordains any man of ripe years to obtain ſalvation, otherwiſe then upon their faith and repentance, and finall perſeverance: how much leſſe doe they maintain, that God ordains any man unto damnation, otherwiſe then for his ſinne and finall perſeverance therein without repentance? Whereas theſe enemies of the grace of God, as Saint Auſtin ſometimes called the Pelagians, to make their cauſe more plauſible to the affections or carnall men carry the matter ſo, as if we maintained that God ordained them to be damned abſolutely, and for the meer pleaſure of God, concealing the only cauſe for which God ordained, that they ſhould be damned, namely, for the wilfull tranſgreſſion of Gods holy Commandements. Only the giving and denying of the grace of regeneration, the giving of faith and repentance, for the curing of that naturall infidelity and impenitency that is found in all; and the leaving it uncured by denying faith and repentance: this indeed we maintain to be abſolute, according to that of Saint Paul, he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. Rom. 9. 18. Now, dare any of them deny faith and repentance to be the gift of God? They doe not, they dare not; only of late they have come thus farre, as to deny that Chriſt merited faith and regeneration for any. Secondly, inquire whether God gives faith and repentance to ſome, and denyes it to others of his meere will and pleaſure, or becauſe he finds ſome good works in the one, which he finds not in the other. Here is the criticall poynt, we defend no other abſoluteneſſe of election and reprobation, but ſuch as depends wholly on this, namely, that God finding men equall in corruption, hath compaſſion on ſome, giving them faith and repentance, which he denies unto others: All other abſoluteneſſe of Election and Reprobation, beſides that which we undertake by cleare demonſtration to deduce herehence, we utterly renounce. Neither can our adverſaries be ſo groſſely ignorant, as not to perceive that this is the criticall poynt of theſe controverſies, the reſolution of the truths wherein, will ſet an end to all contention about Election and Reprobation. Why then doe they not deale plainly, and try their ſtrength in this, whereby they ſhould carry themſelves fairely and ingenuouſly, and deale above board. For here alone is that abſoluteneſſe of God in execution, which we maintaine; but here they are not ſo prone to ſhew their hornes: this argument is not ſo fit for the raiſing of clamours and Tragedies. And hating the truth of God as touching his ſoveraignty over his creatures, to have compaſſion on whom he will, and to harden whom he will; as alſo the prerogatives of his grace, to work us effectually to that which is pleaſing in his fight, and that in whom he will alſo: yet not daring plainly to deliver their mind in this, as wherein they are found moſt abſurd, and encumbred with ſhamefull contradictions; therefore by the back dore as it were, they hope to diſcredit it, and by oppoſing the abſoluteneſſe of Reprobation, to ſupplant and undermine the Doctrine of Gods free grace. And not content with this, they miſerably corrupt our doctrine alſo, in the poynt of abſolute Reprobation, drawing it to this; as if not reprobation only, but damnation alſo were made abſolute by us: and that God damned men not ſo much in the way of juſtice for their ſinne, as of his own meere pleaſure. At length to come to the third particular of his reply.
3. And that is this, that howbeit ſome things in Scripture, which are peculiar to the Goſpell, are above our underſtandings, and muſt without heſitation be believed: yet many things there, have their foundation in nature, and may be apprehended by the light of nature; and amongſt theſe, the juſtice of Gods waies is one, as hath been ſhewed. Iſai 5. 3. and Ezek. 18. To this I anſwer, That the waies of God mentioned Iſai. 5. 3. is only in his expecting fruits after ſo great pains that he had taken, in husbanding his vineyard. And Ezek. 18. conſiſts only in rendring unto men according to their waies. Neither doth it follow, that becauſe the juſtice of God doth plainly appeare in theſe particulars, therefore it doth appeare as cleerely, or comprehenſively in all others. Is there no difference between the waies of God there mentioned, and the waies of Gods juſtice mentioned in other place; as namely, in cauſing the Sonnes of Achan to be ſtoned to death with Achan himſelfe, for his Sacriledge: in drowning the old World, not ſparing the very Infants and ſucklings: and for their conſpiracy againſt Moſes and Aaron, cauſing the earth to ſwallow up not Dathan and Abiram only, but their Wives and Children, and all that they had? So in conſuming Sodom and Gomorrah with fire. And as for the puniſhing of of ſinne, this is no peculiar truth of the Goſpell. I had thought the Goſpell, in the proper nature thereof, had been above reaſon altogether, and no way capable of demonſtration. And as for the juſtice of God, muſt not this ſuppoſe him to be a free agent? Or was this known to Ariſtotle by all the light of nature whereunto he attained? We that believe him to be a free agent, and withall the creator of all, are ready to demonſtrate, that it is in his power to doe what he will with his creature, and that not only to annihilate him, though never ſo holy, but to inflict what paine ſoever upon him, yea even the torment of hell fire; which Medina acknowledgeth to have been Communem omnium Theologorum ſententiam, viz. that this he can doe, ut Dominus vitae & mortis; as I have ſhewed in my Vindiciae graciae Dei, and by variety of arguments proved it, more then once in two ſeverall digreſſions, which this Author pretends to have ſeen, yet anſwereth not one of them. And as for juſtice divine toward the creature (whereupon this Author doth with ſuch confidence diſcourſe,) both Vaſquez and Suarez Jeſuits, in other poynts concerning Gods juſtice, are miſerably at odds, yet joyntly concurre in this, that all iuſtice Divine, doth preſuppoſe the free determination of Gods will: Now, becauſe I find this Gentleman, ſo conceited of the purity of his rationall faculty, and the power thereof, as to require that all interpretation of Scripture, ſhould veyle bonnet to the ſoveraignty thereof; I purpoſe to try his ability this way, for the expediting of certain arguments about the abſoluteneſſe of Gods decrees in generall, and particularly of the decree of Reprobation. Therefore to combate with him on his own ground, and in his own element, I diſpute thus.
1. No temporall thing can be the cauſe of that which is eternall, but the ſinnes of men are all temporall, whereas Reprobation is eternall, therefore the ſinnes of men cannot be the cauſe of Reprobation.
If it be ſaid, that ſinne is not made the cauſe of reprobation, but as it exſiſts in Gods foreſight, and ſo not ſo much ſinne as the preſcience of ſinne is the cauſe of reprobation. I reply, that this device cannot ſtand, viz. that the preſcience of ſinne ſhould be the cauſe of reprobation, and that for this reaſon; The cauſe of reprobation whereof we enquire, is of the nature of a meritorious cauſe, But the preſcience of God can no way be ſaid to be a meritorious cauſe thereof. Science and preſcience are cauſes of Gods works in the kind of an efficient Phyſicall, not in the kind of an efficient morall, ſuch as are all cauſes meritorious.
If it be farther ſaid, that not ſo much the foreſight of ſin, as (to ſpeak more properly) ſinne foreſeen is the cauſe of reprobation: I reply againſt it in this manner; ſinne foreſeen doth ſuppoſe Gods decree to permit ſinne, and conſequently if ſinne foreſeene be before reprobation, then alſo the decree of permitting ſinne is before the decree of reprobation, that is, the decree of damning for ſinne. But this cannot be, as I endeavour to prove by two reaſons. The firſt is this; There is no order in intentions, but between the intention of the end and the intention of the means, and the order is this, that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means. Therefore if the decree of permitting ſinne be before the decree of damning for ſinne, the decree of permitting ſinne muſt be the intention of the end, and the decree of damning for ſinne muſt be the intention of the meanes. But this is notoriouſly untrue: For it is apparent that damnation tends not to the permiſſion of ſinne, as the end thereof; for if it did then men were damned to this end, that they might be permitted to ſinne. But far more likely it is, that ſinne ſhould be permitted to this end, that a man might be damned, which yet by no means doe I a vouch; other reaſons I have, to ſhew the vanity of this argumentation. I rather profeſſe, that permſſion of ſinne and damnation are not ſubordinate as end & means, but coordinate, both being means tending joyntly to a farther end, which, under correction from underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles, I take to be the manifeſtation of Gods glory in the way of juſtice vindicative.
2. My ſecond reaſon is, if permiſſion of ſinne be firſt in intention and then damnation, it followes that permiſſion of ſinne ſhould be laſt in execution; but this is moſt abſurd, namely, that a man ſhould be firſt damned, and then ſuffered to ſinne.
2. My ſecond principall argument is this; Reprobation, as it ſignifies Gods decree, is the act of Gods will; now the act of Gods will is the very will of God, and the will of God is Gods eſſence, and like as there can be no cauſe of Gods eſſence, ſo there can be no cauſe of Gods will, or of the act thereof. Upon ſome ſuch arguments as theſe, Aquinas diſputes, that the predeſtination of Chriſt, cannot be the cauſe of our Predeſtination; adding that they are one act in God. And when he comes to the reſolution of the queſtion, he grants all as touching actum volentis, that the one cannot be the cauſe of the other; But only quoad praedeſtinationis terminum, which is grace and glory, or the things predeſtinated. Chriſt is the cauſe of them, but not of our predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating. And I think I may be bold to preſume, that Chriſts merits are of as great force to be the cauſe, why God ſhould elect man unto ſalvation; as mans ſinnes are of force, to be the cauſe why God ſhould reprobate him unto damnation. The ſame Aquinas (a tall fellow as touching Scolaſticall argumentation) hath profeſſed that no man hath been ſo mad as to ſay that merits are the cauſe of predeſtination, quoad actum praedeſtinantis; and why, but becauſe there can be no cauſe on mans part of the will of God quoad actum volentis. Now reprobation is well knowne to be the will of God as well as election; and therefore no cauſe can there be on mans part thereof quoad actum reprobantis. And it is well knowne, there is a predeſtination unto death, as well as unto life, and conſequently tis as mad a thing in his judgement to maintaine, that merits are the cauſe there of quoad actum praedeſtinantis
God by efficacious grace could breake off any mans infidelity if it pleaſed him, that is, by affording him ſuch a motion unto faith, as he foreſaw would be yeelded unto: this is eaſily proved by the evident confeſſion of Arminius formerly ſpecified. Now, Why doth God ſo order it, as to move ſome in ſuch a manner, as he foreſees they will believe; others in ſuch a māner as he foreſees they will not believe? but becauſe his purpoſe is to manifeſt the glory of his grace in the ſalvation of the one, and the glory of his juſtice in the damnation of the other. Herein I appeale to the judgement and conſcience of every reaſonable creature that underſtands it, in ſpight of all prejudice and falſe principles to corrupt him.
4. In ſaying ſinne foreſeen is the cauſe of Gods decree of damnation, they preſuppoſe a preſcience of ſinne, as of a thing future, without all ground. For nothing can be foreknown as future, unleſſe it be future: now theſe diſputers preſuppoſe a futurition of ſinne, and that from eternity, without all ground. For conſider, no ſinne is future in its own nature, for in its own nature it is meerely poſſible and indifferent, as well not to be future, as to become future; and therefore it cannot paſſe out of the condition of a thing meerely poſſible, into the condition of a thing future without a cauſe. Now what cauſe doe theſe men deviſe of the futurition of ſinne? Extra Deum, nothing can be the cauſe thereof: For this paſſage of things out of the condition of things poſſible, into the condition of things future, was from everlaſting, for from everlaſting they were future; otherwiſe, God could not have known them from everlaſting, And conſequently the cauſe of this paſſage, muſt be acknowledged to have been from everlaſting, and conſequently nothing without God could be the cauſe of it, ſeeing nothing without God was from everlaſting. Therefore the cauſe hereof muſt be found intra Deum, within God; then either the will of God, which theſe men doe utterly diſclaime, or the knowledge of God; but that is confeſſed to preſuppoſe things future, rather then to make them ſo; or the eſſence of God; now that may be conſidered either as working neceſſarily, (and if in that manner it were the cauſe of things future, then all ſuch things ſhould become future by neceſſity of nature, which to ſay is Atheiſticall) or as working freely; and this is to grant, that the will of God is the cauſe why every thing meerely poſſible in its own nature doth paſſe from everlaſting into the condition of a thing future, if ſo be it were future at all. And indeed ſeeing no other cauſe can be pitched upon, this free will of God muſt be acknowledged to be the cauſe of it: And conſequently the reaſon why every thing becomes future is, becauſe God hath determined it ſhall come to paſſe; but with this difference, All good things God hath determined ſhall come to paſſe by his effection, All evill things God hath determined ſhall come to paſſe by his permiſſion. And the Scripture naturally affords plentifull teſtimony to confirme this, without forcing it to interpretations congruous hereunto, upon preſumptuous grounds that theſe arguments proceed from underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles.
5. My fifth argument is this. If ſinne be the cauſe of Reprobation, that is, of the decree of damnation, then either by neceſſity of nature, or by the conſtitution of God; not by neceſſity of nature, as all, that hitherto I have known confeſſe. But I ſay neither can it be by the free conſtitution of God; for mark what a notorious abſurdity followeth hence, and that unavoidably, namely, that God did ordaine, that upon foreſight of ſinne, he would ordaine them to damnation; marke it well, God did ordaine that he would ordaine, or God did decree that he would decree. In which words Gods eternall decree is made the object of Gods decree. Whereas it is well known that the objects of Gods decrees are meerely things temporall, and cannot be things eternall: we truly ſay God did decree to create the World, to preſerve the World, to redeeme us, call us, juſtify us, ſanctify and ſave us, but it cannot be truly ſaid, that God did decree to decree, or ordaine to ordaine: for to decree is the act of Gods will, and therefore it cannot be the object of the act of Gods will. Yet theſe arguments I am not ſo enamoured with, as to force the interpretations of Scripture to ſuch a ſenſe, as is ſutable hereunto, preſuming of the purity of my underſtanding, as purged from prejudice and falſe principles. I could willingly content my ſelfe with obſervation of the Apoſtles diſcourſe, in arguing to this effect; Before the Children were borne, or had done good or evill, it was ſaid the elder ſhall ſerve the younger: therefore the purpoſe of God according to election Rom. 9. 11.ſtands not of works. In like manner may I diſcourſe: Before the Children were borne or had done good or evill, it was ſaid the elder ſhall ſerve the younger: therefore the purpoſe of God concerning Reprobation stands not of works. And like as hence it is inferred, that therefore election ſtands not of good works; ſo therehence may I inferre, that therefore reprobation ſtands not of evill works.
6. If ſinne foreſeen be the cauſe meritorious of reprobation, then faith and repentance and good workes are the diſpoſing cauſes unto election. For therefore evill works foreſeen are made the meritorious cauſe of reprobation, becauſe evill works exſiſtent, are the meritorious cauſe of damnation. And if this be true, then alſo becauſe Faith and Repentance and good workes, are the diſpoſing cauſes unto ſalvation, then by the ſame force of reaſon, faith, repentance, and good workes foreſeen, muſt be the diſpoſing cauſe unto election; But faith, repentance, and good workes foreſeen, are not the diſpoſing cauſes unto election; as I prove thus.
1. If they were then the purpoſe of God according to election, ſhould be of faith, repentance, and good works, which is expreſſely denyed by the Apoſtle, as touching the laſt part; and may as evidently be proved to be denied by him in effect of the other parts alſo, by the ſame force of argumentation which he uſeth: as for example, from this anticedent of the Apoſtles, before the Children were borne, or had done good or evill, it no more evidently followeth that therefore the purpoſe of God according to election is not of workes, than it followeth that the ſame purpoſe of God according to election is not of faith, nor of repentance: For before they were borne they were no more capable of faith, or of repentance, than of any other good works. And undoubtedly faith and repentance are as good works, as any other.
2. If God doth abſolutely work faith in ſome, and not in others according to the meer pleaſure of his will, then it cannot be ſaid, that faith foreſeen, is the cauſe of any mans election. For in this caſe faith is rather the means of ſalvation, then ſalvation a means of faith; and conſequently, the intention of ſalvation rather precedes the intention of faith, than the intention of faith can be ſaid to precede the intention of ſalvation. And to this the Scripture accords, Acts 1348. As many believed as were ordained to everlaſting life, making ordination to everlaſting life the cauſe why men believed; anſwerable hereunto is that Acts 2. laſt. God added daily to the Church ſuch as ſhould be ſaved: and that of Paul to Titus, according to the faith of Gods elect: So that according to Pauls phraſe fides eſt electorum, but according to the Arminians Doctrine the inverſe hereof is a more proper and naturall predication, as to ſay, electio eſt fidelium.
But God doth abſolutely work faith in ſome men, according to the meer pleaſure of his will, denying the ſame grace to others: which I prove;
1. By Scripture. Rom. 9. 18. God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth, compared with Rom. 11. 30. Yee in times paſt have not believed, but now have obtained mercy; where it appears by the Antitheſis, that to find mercy is to believe, that is, to obtain the grace of faith at the hands of God, in Saint Pauls phraſe.
2. By cleare reaſon: for if it be not the meer pleaſure of Gods will, that is the cauſe hereof, then the cauſe hereof muſt be ſome good workes, which he finds in ſome, and not in others; whence it manifeſtly followeth, that God giveth grace according unto works, which in the phraſe of the ancients is according to merits: and for 1200 years together, this hath been reputed in the Church of God meere Pelagianiſme.
2. I further demand, what that good worke is, whereupon God workes it in one, when he refuſeth to worke it in another? Here the anſwer I find given is this, that God doth work in man foreign velle credere modo velit. Now of the abſurdity hereof, I appeale to the very light of nature, and let all the books that ever were written on this argument be ſearched, and let it be enquired, whether ever any did expreſſe themſelves in the manner of ſo palpable and groſſe abſurdity: as wherein the act of willing is made the condition of it ſelfe: whence it followeth evidently, that it muſt be both before it ſelfe, and after it ſelfe; for the condition muſt allwaies exſiſt before the thing conditionated. Yet they are driven upon theſe rocks of abſurdities in ſpight of their teeth: ſo ſhamefull is the iſſue of their diſcourſes, who, in hatred of Gods truth revealed in Gods word, and in a proud conceit of their own performances in the way of argumentation, dare preſcribe rules to all others, how to carry themſelves in the interpretation of Scriptures; as namely, to be ſo warie, as that they doe not deliver any thing, repugnant to underſtandings purged from prejudice and falſe principles: as if the word of God ſuppoſed them that are admitted to the ſtudying thereof, to have their underſtandings already purged from prejudice and falſe principles: not that it is given by God for this very end, namely, to purge our underſtandings: for what is the illumination or opening of the eyes of the mind, other than the purging of the underſtanding from prejudice and falſe principles: and how miſerable theſe aeriall diſputers doe betray themſelves, and manifeſt how they are tranſported with prejudice, and corrupted not with falſe only, but groſſe principles, by this it may appeare in part.
I come to the conſideration of his reply to the ſecond anſwer, which here he repreſents.
DISCOURSE. SUBSECT. V.
SEcondly it is anſwered, that God is not bound to reſtore men power to believe, becauſe they once had it, and have loſt it through their own fault; as a Maſter is not bound to renew his Servants ſtock, if he have waſted it by his bad husbandry.
But this anſwer doth yet ſatisfy me as little as the former: for I grant that God is ſimply and abſolutely bound to no man, he is agens liberrimum, a moſt free diſpenſer of his own favours, both what he will, and to whom he will; but yet he is conditionally; determinavit ſeipſum, he hath bound himſelfe to give ſupernaturall abilities to men by three things.
1. Firſt Decernendo, the Almighty is eternally ſubject to his own decree, or elſe he would be mutable; and therefore what gifts ſoever he hath decreed to men, he is bound to give them by vertue of his decree.
2. Secondly Promittendo. We uſe to ſay promiſe is debt, it is juſtice to performe what it was free to promiſe; and whoſoever he be that promiſeth, and payeth not, is guilty of a treſpaſſe (witneſſe Ananias and Saphira) and unworthy of the Kingdome of Heaven. Pſal. 15. 4. If therefore God hath made a promiſe of any gift or grace to men, this promiſe binds him to performance.
3. Thirdly Legem ferendo. By giving men a Law to keepe, which without ſupernaturall power, they cannot keep any more than they can eat a rock. By ſuch a Law the Almighty lawgiver binds himſelfe to his creatures, to give them ſuch power as may enable them to keep that law, or elſe he becomes the true and proper cauſe of the tranſgreſſion of it. We ſhall find God evermore giving ſtrength, when he giveth a command: when he commanded the creatures to encreaſe and multiply, he gave them a multiplying vertue. when Chriſt bid the lame man ariſe, take up his bed, and walke, he puts into his limbs an ability of walking: when Adam had a ſpirituall law given him to obey, which without ſpirituall ſtrength he could not, God gave him ſtrength anſwerable to the law, as all Divines agree, conſenting to that noted ſpeech of Auſtin, that Adam had poſſe non cadere, though he never had non poſſe cadere; a power and poſſibility, though not a neceſſity of continuing in obedience. That I may bring this home to my purpoſe. I ſay that God is bound to reſtore unto men, power to believe, ſuppoſing theſe waies that follow.
1. That he hath vouchſafed to enter into a New Covenant of Peace with men, when he needed not. 2. That in that Covenant he requireth obedience at mens hands, even at theirs that periſh. 3. That he promiſeth eternall life to every man, if he obey and keep the Covenant. 4. That he puniſheth the diſobedient with everlaſting death. Theſe particulars ſuppoſed, the moſt free God who is neceſſarily bound to none, is engaged to give ability of believing to men; nor can he juſtly without this gift, puniſh the diſobedient any more, then a Magiſtrate having put out a mans eyes for an offence, can command this man with juſtice to read a book, and becauſe he reads not, put him to death: Or then a Maſter (that I may returne the Simile in the anſwer) when he hath taken away from his Servant the ſtock, which he hath miſimployed, can afterward exact of him a juſt imployment of the ſame ſtock, and puniſh him becauſe he imployeth it not. I conclude therefore, that the abſolute and inevitable reprobation of ſuch men as are called to believe in Chriſt, and puniſhed if thev believe not, is utterly repugnant to the juſtice of God, and therefore cannot be a part of his word.
TWISSE Conſideration.
THis Second anſwer is in like manner, delivered at pleaſure, without quoting the Author of it: And no marvaile if this Author deſires to have the making of his own bed, that he may lye the more ſoftly. Yet touching the ſimilitude here mentioned let it be ſtated aright: a Maſter truſts his ſervant with a ſtock, not to receive it from him againe, though the ſtock be of a moveable nature, but to receive from him in lieu thereof, ſome yearely emolument. In this caſe let him ſay what he can againſt it: now here his diſcourſe is for the moſt part at large, ſhewing how God, though a moſt free agent, may oblige himſelfe to his creature.
1. Decremendo; whether hereby God doth bind himſelfe to his creature (which hath no being at all when Gods decrees are made) or to himſelfe rather, it is little or nothing materiall to the preſent: what ſoever it be that God decrees, we are ſure that muſt come to paſſe, provided that we doe not make his decrees of a revocable nature with ſome; but as touching any uſe of Gods obliging himſelfe this way unto his creature, this Author is content to ſay nothing at all, in the accomodation.
2. Promittendo. And we willingly grant, that what God promiſeth he never failes to performe, after that manner as he hath promiſed: as namely in caſe he hath promiſed that as many as believe in Chriſt ſhall be ſaved, we nothing doubt, but if all the world ſhould believe in Chriſt, all the world ſhould be ſaved. But whether any deviſe a promiſe concerning the giving of faith & repentance unto all, & every one; and that whether conditionately or abſolutely this Author is content to ſay juſt nothing. As likewiſe, neither doth he take upon him to plead any promiſe of God, to give to all and every one power to believe or power to repent.
3. Legem ferendo. This alone of all the three ſerves his turne, and therefore here he doth expatiate, much more than in the former. And herehence he inferres, that God binds himſelfe to give ſupernaturall power, to keep the Law he commands, provided the Law be ſuch, as without ſupernaturall power, he can no more keepe it, than eat a rock. Now this accommodated to Adam, had need of explication, ſeeing we read of no other Law given unto him, than of abſtaining from a certain fruit: which I doe not deliver as if I doubted, but that to the performance of obedience herein, a ſupernaturall power was requiſite; but only to ſignify, that it were worth the labour to give a congruous explication of it. Though of Adam I nothing doubt but he was indued with ſupernaturall power, to performe other manner of duties than this. And yet again, this denomination of power ſupernaturall, had need alſo of explication; for though that power which Adam had given him in creation, be ſupernaturall to us, yet our Divines uſually conceive it as naturall unto Adam, received together with his nature, and ſuch as ſhould have been naturall unto us all, had Adam continued in his originall integrity. But I am content to let that paſſe; only whereas he ſaith, that by ſuch a law the Allmighty law-giver binds himſelfe to his creatuees, to give them ſuch power as may enable them to keepe that law; I think rather if any obligation had place in this caſe, it were rather to maintaine the power already given them, than to give it. For every law-giver rather preſuppoſeth ability of obedience in them, to whom he gives a law; then firſt gives a law and then gives ability to performe obedience thereunto. And certainly God firſt created man after his owne image, before he gave him any law to be a rule of his obedience unto his creatour. So I take the multiplying vertue, was given to his creatures in their creation, before he ſaid encreaſe and multiply: In the curing of the lame man, his word indeed was a word of power, like as when he ſaid let there be light, and there was light. For though it goe under the forme of a command, yet it was not ſo properly a command (which is to command obedience) as the going forth of vertuous efficacy to create: like as that alſo Ezek. 37. O ye dry bones heare the voyce of the Lord. And undoubtedly the ſtrength of obedience given unto Adam preceded Gods command, for his abſtaining from the fruit of the tree, in the midſt of the Garden. He had in his creation given him, poſſe non cadere, not non poſſe cadere, the event manifeſted as much: and it is as true according to the ſame Auſtin, that God gave him poſſe ſtare ſi vellet, not velle quod potuit. But that God is bound to reſtore, any ſuch power unto mankind, which they have wilfully loſt, is boldly avouched, but let us conſider how Scholaſtically it is proved.
1. The firſt reaſon hereof is, becauſe God hath vouchſafed to enter into a new Covenant of Peace with men, when he needed not. To this I anſwer, that God hath entred into a new Covenant with men, is an indefinite propoſition, as touching the perſons included in this Covenant, and being not in a neceſſary matter but contingent, this Covenant proceeding meerely from the good pleaſure of God, it hath no more force than to ſignify, that God hath vouchſafed to enter into a new Covenant of peace with ſome men, which we wilingly grant but not with all, neither doth this propoſition, enforce any ſuch meaning. And that God hath not entred into a new Covenant with all, I prove by theſe reaſons.
1. As many as are under the Covenant of grace, ſinne ſhall have no dominion over them. Rom. 6. 14. Sinne ſhall not have the dominion over you, for you are not under the law but under grace. But ſinne hath the dominion over too many, even over the moſt part of the world, as we find by lamentable experience, therefore too many, even the moſt part of the World, are not compriſed under the Covenant of grace.
2. The covenant of Grace, doth covenant on Gods part, not only to give ſalvation upon condition of faith and repentance, but for Chriſts ſake to renew mens natures alſo, and to give them faith and repentance. As appears by diverſe paſſages of Scripture: Jer. 31. 31. Behold the dayes come ſaith the Lord, that I will make a new Covenant with the houſe of Iſrael, and with the houſe of Judah. v. 32. Not according to the Covenant, that I made with their Fathers, when I took them by the hand, to bring them out of the land of Egypt, the which my Covenant they brake, though I was a Father unto them. But this ſhall be the Covenant that I will make with the houſe of Iſrael, after thoſe daies ſaith the Lord, I will put my Law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and I will be their God, and they ſhall be my people.
Ezek. 36. 26. A new heart alſo will I give you, and a new ſpirit will I put within you, and I will take away the ſtony heart out of your bodies, and will give you an heart of fleſh, and I will put my ſpirit within you, and cauſe you to walk in my Statutes, and ye ſhall keep my judgements and doe them. Ezek. 20. 23. I will ſurely rule you with a mighty hand, &c. 37. And will cauſe you to paſſe under the rod, and bring you into the bond of the Covenant. Iſai. 57. 18. I have ſeen his waies, and will heale him. Hoſ. 14. 5. I will heale their rebellions, I will love them freely. And that faith it ſelfe and repentance, is the gift of God, who hath taken upon him by his covenant of grace, to be our Lord and our God to ſanctify us, is manifeſt by diverſe pregnant paſſages of holy Scriptures.
2. I come to his ſecond reaſon. And in that Covenant he requires obedience at mens hands, even at theirs that periſh. God in his covenant of Grace requires obedience unto ſalvation, but of his free grace undertakes to regenerate them, and work them to obedience; but how? Agreeable unto their rationall natures, that is by admonition, inſtruction, exhortation, that is to work faith and repentance, by exhorting and perſwading them unto repentance: And becauſe this he performes by his Miniſters, to whom he hath not revealed who they are, whom he hath choſen, therefore he commands them to Preach indifferently unto all, perſwade all, exhort all, unto faith and repentance, whereof alſo he makes this uſe even towards reprobates, that whereas they are naturally confident of their ability, to doe as much as any other, and as Auſtin ſaith dicere ſolet humana ſuperbia ſi ſciſſem, feciſſem. The Lord by his Miniſtry takes from them this excuſe, ſo that unto all that heare is this truth delivered, whoſoever believeth and repenteth ſhall be ſaved: and thereupon every one is exhorted in the name of the Lord to believe and repent. But God reſolveth to worke faith and repentance in none, but thoſe whom he hath choſen, according to that Acts 13. 48. As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life. And withall the Doctrine delivered in the Goſpell is ſuch, and ſo confirmed, as may juſtly make them inexcuſable that doe not believe: when it ſhall appeare, that many a vile legend they are apt to believe, and in the mean time deſpiſe Gods holy Oracles, by divine Authority, many waies confirmed unto them.
3. It is moſt true, eternall life is promiſed to every on that obeyeth and keeps Covenant with God; but God over and above worketh ſome unto obedience, unto faith and repentance, beſtowing theſe gratious giftes on them, even on whom he will, when he hardeneth others even whom he will. Rom. 9. 18.
4. He puniſheth the diſobedient with eternall death; true: but acording unto what Covenant? Not according unto the Covenant of grace, that is only a Covenant for Salvation, but according unto the Covenant of the law, the Covenant of works.
Whereas herehence this Author inferres, that the moſt free God is ingaged to give ability of believing unto men: he may as well inferre, that he is engaged to give ability unto men to the keeping of his law, and what need was there of Chriſts coming into the world? Seeing by his coming into the world, we have gained no better condition by the Arminian Tenet, than to be ſaved if we will; and if men have ability to to keepe the law even by the law, they may be ſaved if they will: and it will follow as well, that God, without giving this ability to keepe the law, cannot juſtly puniſh the tranſgreſſours of it; as that God without giving men ability to believe cannot puniſh men for not believing: no more than a Magiſtrate having put out a mans eyes for an offence, can command this man with juſtice to read a booke, and becauſe he reads not, put him to death. But this is a very vile ſimile, and ſtands in no tolerable proportion to that whereunto it is reſembled. For the man thus bereaved of his eyes hath a will to read, and conſequently it is no fault for not reading: for all ſinne is in the will. But it is not ſo, in not obeying either Law or Goſpell. If a man had a will to obey and believe but he could not, in ſuch a caſe it were unreaſonable he ſhould be puniſhed. But in the caſe of diſobedience unto God, we ſpeake of, all the fault is in the will voluntarily and wilfully, they neither will obey the one, nor the other: like as they that have accustomed themſelves to doe evill, can not doe good, as a blackemoore cannot change his skinne. Yet with this difference, that man is never a whit the more excuſable, or leſſe puniſhable for not doing that which is good; not ſo the blackemore, for not changing his skinne. But ſuch is the ſhamefull iſſue of them that confound impotency Morall with impotency naturall, as if there were no difference. As wild is the compariſon following, of the Maſters exacting from his Servant a juſt employment of that ſtock, which he hath taken from him. An evill ſervant may have a will to play the good husband in imploying his Maſters ſtock, where he pleaſed to intruſt him with it: But though he hath a will to be faithful and thrifty, yet without matter to worke upon, he cannot exerciſe this fidelity of his to his Maſters behoofe. Shew the like will in a carnall man to believe if he could, and if God bereave him of power, in ſuch a caſe, then conclude the unreaſonableneſſe of Gods courſes herein. But if the Maſter gave him a ſtock to employ, upon a reſonable rent to be payd him yearly for certaine yeares: if ſo be the ſervant waſt the ſtock, Shall it not be lawfull for the Maſter nevertheleſſe to require his debt? And bid him pay that he owes him? This is the caſe we ſpeake of. In Adam we all have ſinned, ſaith the Apoſtle, and thereby have waſted that ſtock of grace which God had given us, and ſo diſabled our ſelves to performe that duty we owe to God: What therefore? Shall not God call upon us to pay our debts, becauſe we are become bankrupts? Eſpecially conſidering the naturall man is proud enough of his abilities to performe any thing that is good. And as for ability to believe, is there not a kind of faith performed by prophane perſons, by Hypocrites, who concurre with the beſt in the profeſſion of the Goſpell? Nay, Is there not a ſecret kind of hypocriſie, as when a man thinks his heart is upright towards God, when indeed it is not? Otherwiſe what ſhould move Saint Paul to call upon the Corinthians to examine themſelves whether they were in the faith, ſaying, Know you not your ſelves how that Chriſt is in you, except ye be reprobates? 2 Car. 13. 5. It is true there is a faith infuſed by the ſpirit of God in regeneration; but who ever ſaid that any man was damned, becauſe he doth not believe with ſuch a faith? As much as to ſay, that non-regeneration is the meritorious cauſe of damnation. Now how well he hath proved that our Doctrine in the poynt of abſolute reprobation is repugnant to Gods juſtice, let the indifferent judge.