The Riches of Gods Love, Part 1 · Treatise · Discourse · Part 1 · Section 2
DISCOURSE. The Second Motive.
ITS unwillingneſſe to abide the Tryall. I find that the Authors and Abettors of it, have been 2dò.very backward to bring it to the Standard, not only when they have been called upon by their Adverſaries to have been weighed, but alſo when they have been intreated thereto by their chief Magiſtrates who might have commanded them. A ſhrewd argument (mee thinks) that it is too light.
In the Diſputation at Mompelgard Anno 1586 held between Beza and Jacobus Andreas with ſome Seconds on both ſides, Beza and his company having diſputed with the Lutherans about the perſon of Chriſt, the Lords Supper &c. When they came to this Point, did decline the ſifting of it, and Beza in Col. Mompelg. pag. 375. Vide etiam Oſiander. Brand. Collog. Hagh. pag. 57.gave this reaſon among others, that it could not then poſſibly be diſputed of, ſine gravi eorum offendiculo, qui tanti myſterii capaces non ſunt, without the great ſcandall and hurt of the ignorant, and unacquainted with theſe high myſteries.
The Contra-Remonſtrants alſo in their Conference with their Adverſaries at the Hague in the year 1611 could not be drawn to diſpute with them about this point, but delivered a Petition to the States of Holland and Weſtfrizland that they might not be urged to it, reſolving rather to break off the Conference, then to meddle with it.
In the Synod likewiſe of Dort, in the year 1618, and 1619. the Remonſtrants were warned by the Preſident of the Synod ut de Electione potius quàm de odiosâ Reprobations materiâ agerent, that they Act. Syn. p. 1. pag. 133.ſhould rather diſpute of the point of Election, then the odious point of Reprobation.
Can this Doctrine be a truth, and yet bluſh at the light, which makes all thing manifeſt? eſpecially conſidering theſe things.
1. That Reprobation is a principall Head of Practicall divinity by the ill, or well ſtating of which, the glory of God, and good of Religion is much promoted, or hindered.
2. That there is ſuch a neceſſary connexion between the points of Election and Reprobation (both being parts of predeſtination) that the one cannot well be handled without the other.
3. That Reprobation was the chief cauſe of all the uproares in the Church at that time.
4. That it was accuſed with open mouth, and challenged of falſhood, and therefore bound in juſtice to purge it ſelfe of the crimination.
5. That it may eaſily be defended, if (as ſome ſay) it be ſuch an apparent truth, for Nihil eſt ad defendendum puritate tutius, nihil ad dicendum veritate facilius, ſaith S. Hierom.
The ſtriving to lye cloſe and hide it ſelfe, though perhaps it be not ſo infallible, yet it is a very probable argument of a bad cauſe. Truth covets no corners, but is willing to abide the tryall, whether in men or in doctrines. David knowing his heart to be without guile, offers himſelfe ready to the Pſalm. 139. 23, 24, Ioh. 3. 20, 21.Lords tryall, Search me, o God, and know my heart, try me and know my thoughts, and ſee if there be any wicked way in me. And our Saviour tells us that, Every one that doth evill, hates the light and comes not to the light, leaſt his deeds ſhould be reproved; but he that doth truth, comes to the light, that his deeds may be made manifeſt, that they are wrought in God. As S. Paul ſaith of an Heretick, he is foreign ſelfe condemned, and ſo may we ſay of Hereſy and untruth, it condemnes it ſelfe, and by nothing more then by refuſing the Touch-ſtone. He is to be thought an empty Scholler, who is loath to be oppoſed, and his gold to be light and counterfeit, that will not have it touched and weighed, and theſe Opinions to be but errours, which would ſo willingly walk in a miſt, and dwell in ſilence, when it concernes the peace of the Church ſo much to have them examined.
TWISSE Conſideration.
VVHo are theſe Authors of this Doctrine, who here are ſaid to have been backward to bring it to the ſtandard? Is Beza thoſe Authors? whereof was he the Author? Was it the doctrine of predeſtination as proceeding of the meer pleaſure of God, and not upon foreſight of mans faith and works? Is it not apparent that this was the doctrine of Auſtin 1200 years agoe, and that in oppoſition to the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians? Or was it the doctrine of reprobation, as not proceeding upon the foreſight of ſinne, but of the meer pleaſure of God? Is this Author ſo ignorant, as not to know what are the concluſions of Alvarez in the queſtion, Whether there be any cauſe of reprobation on mans part. Lib. 10. de Auxil. diſc. 110. pag. 866.
1. His firſt Concluſion is this, Reprobation whereby God decreed not to give unto ſome everlaſting life, and to permit their ſinne, is not conditionate, but abſolute: neither doth it preſuppoſe in God, foreſight of the deſerts of reprobates, or of their perſeverance in ſinne unto the laſt period of their life.
2. His next Concluſion is, In the Angells that fell, there is no cauſe of their reprobation on their part, as touching the whole effect thereof, but before any foreſight of their future ſinne, God, pro ſua Voluntate, of his meer will, did reprobate ſome of them, and ſuffered them to fall into ſinne.
3. The third, Infants departing in Originall ſinne alone, there is no cauſe on their part of reprobation, if they be conſidered in compariſon with others which are not reprobated, and the like is to be ſaid proportionably of men of ripe years.
4. The fourth, Not only comparatively, but abſolutely there is no cauſe of reprobation. Therefore neither ſinne actuall, nor originall, nor both of them foreſeen by God, was indeed the meritorious and motive cauſe of the reprobation of any, as touching all the effects thereof, and the proofe hereof he proſecutes at large.
5. Reprobation as touching the laſt effect thereof, preſuppoſeth in ſigno rationis the foreſight of ſinne originall, or actuall, for which a reprobate is damned. Marke it well, He does not ſay as the cauſe for which God decrees his damnation, but as the cauſe for which a reprobate is damned. And Aquinas (whoſe followers the Dominicans are) expreſſeth this doctrine in this manner, and that more Scholaſtically and accurately then Alvarez. Praeſcientia peccatorum poteſt eſſe aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte paenae quae praeparatur reprobatis, in quantum ſcilicet Deus proponit ſe puniturum malos propter peccata, &c. in Ad Rom. 9. Sect. 2. in fine, that is, Preſcience of ſinnes may be ſome reaſon of reprobation on the part of puniſhment, to wit, in as much as God purpoſeth to puniſh wicked men for their ſinnes. Where ſinne is evidently made the cauſe of damnation, and that by vertue of Gods purpoſe, but by no means the cauſe of the decree it ſelfe. And the ſame Aquinas elſewhere profeſſeth that, No man was ſo mad as to affirme that merits are the cauſe of Predeſtination, as touching the act of God Predestinating: and that it cannot be the cauſe thereof, he proves, becauſe nothing can be the cauſe of Gods will, as touching the act of God willing, but as touching the things willed by God, as formerly he had proved. The ſame doctrine in effect is taught by Durand in 1. diſt. 41. q. 2. Bonaventure applies the ſame diſtinction to reprobation it ſelfe. Odium aeternum, ſaith he, implies two things, Principale ſignificatum & connotatum &c. & primum non eſt ex meritis, ſed ſecundum. This he explicates in the words following, Quod patet ſi reſolvatur, quia Odium eſt propoſitum puniendi: Propoſitum autem nullus meretur ſed paenam, that is, Hatred (or reprobation) is Gods purpoſe to puniſh: Of this divine purpoſe there is no meritorious cauſe, but only of the puniſhment. The ſame was the Opinion of Gandavenſis, Scotus, Halenſis, as I have ſhewed in my Vindiciae.
Now judge I pray with how little judgement, or modeſty this Author intimates Beza to be the author of the doctrine of abſolute reprobation. Perhaps he will ſay his meaning is, that he was the author of the Upper-way, as touching the making of the object of Predeſtination mankind not yet created. But to this I anſwer, that Beza doth ſo indeed, but he was never called to a conference hereabouts, and conſequently he never declined it. And that which was declined, he makes to be declined by the abettors, as well as the authors; which cannot be underſtood of this nice and Logicall poynt, as touching the object of reprobation. The main queſtion is, whether there be any cauſe of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating: the Negative whereof, was maintained very generally amongſt Schoole-Divines before Beza was borne. And was it ever known, that thoſe I have named did ſhrink in their heads or decline the triall thereof? What a ſilly thing is it then to inferre, that becauſe Beza at ſuch a time, did decline the diſputation hereof, and the Contra-Remonſtrants at another time, therefore it is ſuſpectable to be an untruth? Yet let us examine his inſtances.
Beza he ſaith did decline the ſifting of this doctrine (to wit, of predeſtination) (for on that they were moved to diſpute.) I doubt this Author ſpeaks by rote, and that he is nothing at all acquainted with the ſtory hereof, either in Oſiander or in Beza, but tranſcribes only what another hath prompted unto him. For it is apparent by Oſianders Hiſtory, that they did conferre thereof. It is true he ſtood off at the firſt, and gave reaſons for it, but at length he and his fellowes, condeſcended to the inſtance and importunity of their Adverſaries, and ſo came on to the Conference hereabout, His words are theſe. Praefat. in 2. part. Reſponſ. ad Acta Colloq. Mompelg. Quamvis quò evaſura eſſent reliqua ſatis proſpiceremus, mane nihilominus mutata ſententia Illuſtriſſ. Principe ſalutato, in reliquam ſequentem Collationem conſenſimus; eâ tantùm conditione additâ, ne propter proximum Paſchae Feſtum, ea diſceptatio longius protraheretur. Et ita demùm ad audiendas D. Andreae declamationes rurſum proceſſimus.
Was it this point alone the ſifting whereof, as this Author phraſeth it, Beza declined? It is apparent they were no leſſe then three Points. This appears by the ſecond part of Beza's anſwer Ad act. Colloq. Mompelg. as alſo by the anſwer of Jacobus Andreae, as if he were the mouth of the Prince, namely, that if they liſt not De Tribus illis conferre, yet he thought it fit that Theſes written by them on thoſe three Articles ſhould be rehearſed in the hearing of all, which afterwards Beza and his fellowes might take home with them to addreſſe an anſwer to them afterwards, as they thought good. And theſe three Articles were concerning, Predeſtination, Baptiſme, and the putting down of Images in Churches. Concerning all which Jacobus Andreae gives his reaſons, why he thought it fit they ſhould entertaine farther Conference; Whereunto Beza makes anſwer in his Praeface to that ſecond part of his Anſwer Ad Act. Colloq. Mompelg. It is true, this reaſon Beza gave why he thought it not fit in that place publiquely to diſpute thereof, to wit, of predeſtination, Quod haec graviſſima quaestio publicè in illo caetu allatis utrin que contrariis ſententiis diſceptari abſ que nonnullorum offendiculo non poſſe videretur. For both the myſterious nature of it is ſuch, as few are capable of it; the Maſſilienſes profeſſed as much, as appears in Proſpers Epiſtle unto Auſtin, De his taceri exigunt (ſaith Proſper) quorum altitudinem nullus attigerit. And to the ſame purpoſe, even they who durſt not diſlike Auſtins doctrine thereof profeſſed as much, as appears by the Letter of Hilarius unto Auſtin. Conſentientibus etiam his qui hanc definitionem improbare non audent, ut dicant, Quid opus fuit hujuſmodi diſputationis incerto tot minus intelligentium corda turbari? Then again it was in a Lutheran Aſſembly, and amongſt many brought up in the hatred of the doctrine which Beza maintained, who in all likelihood would be the more exaſperated. Cauſas verum tacendi Aug. de Den. Perſev. c. 16.tongum eſt omnes quaerere (ſaith Auſtin) quarum tamen eſt & haec una ne priores faciamus eos qui non intelligunt. No wiſe man, ſaith our Saviour, putteth new wine into old bottells. Quanto minus ſapit, ſaith Beza in that Preface of his, qui de praeſt antiſſimo vino prius in utres faecibus adhuc, & vappa obſitos immittendo quàm de repurgandis illis & apparandis cogitet. Laſtly, Beza perceiveth the practice of Jacobus Andreas ſtanding upon a place of advantage, to urge them to conferre upon ſuch a poynt, the truth whereof is moſt harſh to carnall affections, that ſo he might have the better opportunity to make them odious. And truly what Jacobus Andreas was, I know not, but Beza ſets him forth as a man of a moſt malevolent diſpoſition to the French Proteſtants: and our Saviour hath admoniſhed us, Not to give that which is holy unto doggs, or to caſt pearle before ſwine. Yet Andreas to ſerve his turne, and to draw them into a ſnare, pleads that the doctrine of Predeſtination, is not ſo to be put over in the Schooles, ut non opus ſit eam rudi & imperito populo ponere; yet Hunnius a man of the ſame profeſſion, is ſo farre different from Iacobus Andreas, that he thinks it not fit to preach before the rude people of preſcience divine, but very ſparingly; how much leſſe would he think it fit to Preach before them of Predeſtination divine? De Praedeſt. queſt. & reſponſ. pag. 394. his words are theſe, Interim hoc repeto quod ſupra monui rudioribus (quibus Apoſtolus vult lac propinari, non cibum ſolidum apponi) non eſſe multum de praeſcientiâ Dei diſputandum, hâc ſolummodo de cauſa quia haud perinde capiunt ea quae alias in Scholis in Diſputationibus contra adverſarios, &, ut Paulus ait, inter perfectos utiliter & ex fundamentis eloquiorum Dei aſtrui ſolent. Coram rudioribus ergo ſimplicior loquendi ratio & ipſorum captui accommodatior eſt ſi dicamus, Deum ad haereditatem regni caeleſtis elegiſſe & certo ſalvare decreviſſe eos omnes qui reſipiunt, & in vera fide filii Dei ex hâc vitâ decedunt. Its well known what order King Iames took in his time, in the reſtraint of preaching this doctrine in the Pulpits, by any under the degree of a Deane, and counſelled the States likewiſe to forbid the preaching of thoſe controverſall points amongſt them. And if it were wiſdome in them to take this courſe, without any prejudice to the truth of the doctrine, why ſhould Beza's with-holding from conference hereupon, be any thing prejudiciall thereto.
But were there not other cauſes of moment, to move him hereunto, which this Author conceales, and which Beza propoſeth in the firſt place? as namely, that the Prince who invited them hereunto, in his Letters Miſſive, alleaged no other cauſe of that meeting, but Infaelicem de Coenâ Domini controverſiam, that unhappy Controverſy about the Supper of the Lord. Secondly, that their Citties ſent them over accordingly to this Conference for no other cauſe, but to conferre thereabours. This Iacobus Andreas acknowledgeth, and giveth a reaſon why in thoſe Letters of the Prince, there was no mention made of thoſe three Articles, whereabout they were afterwards urged to conferre, to wit, quod illos in iſtis quo que diſſidere non intellexerat Princeps Illuſtriſſimus. And thirdly, becauſe the Feaſt of Eaſter approched, and they deſired to be at home in their own Citties by that time.
Laſtly, doth if follow, that becauſe they declined the ſifting the truth of theſe poynts (as this Author phraiſeth it) after ſuch a manner, to wit, by publique diſputation; doth it herehence follow, that they declined the ſifting of it? They made this offer to propoſe their opinion herein, and the confirmation of it out of the Word of God, in private before the Prince: and if Jacobus Andreas were pleaſed to propoſe any Theſes againſt it, they would take them along with them and upon conſideration to addreſſe a convenient Anſwer thereunto; This Beza ſets down in that Preface: Let D. Andrews ſhew if he can, ſaith Beza, hanc Chriſtianae doctrinae partem aut à noſtris ſive ſcribendo ſive concionando praetermiſſam, aut a ſuis rectius & acuratius quàm a noſtris pertractatam. And truly for my part, I no way like ſuch conferences, being privy to mine own imperfections, as having neither ſuch ſtrength of memory as to command a preſent uſe of my knowledge in theſe poynts upon all occaſions, nor ſuch command of my paſſions, as to keep them from breaking forth in ſuch ſort as might be obnoxious to cenſures, not knowing how I might be provoked; but certainly I feare not to come to the examination of any of their Writings, or to offer mine own to be examined by any of them. One thing I had almoſt omitted out of Beza, in his Preface to the Firſt Part of his Anſwer to theſe Acts. It was Beza's motion that all things paſſing between them on both ſides, might be ſet down in writing, under the hands of Collators; and this courſe I confeſſe I could willingly approve of, and after this manner to conferre with any. But this ſo faire a motion was rejected by Andreas; He would conferre rather by word of mouth then by writing. A ſecond motion propoſed by Beza was this, that what was ſpoken on both ſides, might be ſet down in writing by Notaries choſen and appoynted thereunto by common conſent. But neither would Andreas admit of this. Petivimus, ſaith Beza, initio ut utrin que omnia ſcriptis propria Collocutorum manu ſubſignatis agerentur. Quod cum D. Andreae non placuiſſet qui verbis agi malebat (for the Auditory was very propitious to him for the moſt part) poſtulavi ut utrin que dicta à probatis & utriuſ que partis conſenſu delectis Notariis exciperentur, quae deinde cui que parti recognoſcere & addita ſubſcriptione confirmare liceret. Haec enim erat profectò juſta & ſincera colloquendi ratio ut ſic falſationi occurreretur. Quum autem ne hoc quidem admitteret D. Andreas, &c. Now let any indifferent perſon that is not ſowred with partiall affections, judge whoſe carriage is to be thought in equity more prejudiciall to their cauſe, the carriage of Andreas, or the carriage of Beza.
I come to the Contra-Remonſtrants unwillingneſſe to conferre upon the poynt of reprobation. What their reaſons were I know not. But this I am ſure of, the Scripture is free in ſpeaking of election, and expreſſe; not ſo of reprobation, leaving us to take notice of the condition of reprobation by its oppoſition to election. And in conformity hereunto, both Auſtin in his time, and Remigius in his time, and Bradwardine in his time, ſpeaks liberally of predeſtination, but very ſparingly of reprobation. And the doctrine of reprobation as it is nothing leſſe myſterious then that of election; ſo it is farre more harſh to carnall affections. And it is well known that at the time of the Hague Conference, Barnavelt that ruled the roſt amongſt the States, was too great a friend to the Arminian Party.
But, what boldneſſe doth this Author take in paſſing his ſuſpicious cenſures upon a doctrine, becauſe ſome defenders of it, at ſome time have been loath to come to entertaine a publique Conference thereupon? For what argument call you this, The Contra-Remonſtrants would not be brought to give their reaſons on this point; therefore the doctrine of Auſtin delivered 1200 years (or thereabouts) before, concerning the abſoluteneſſe both of Predeſtination on the one ſide, and of preterition on the other (as Voſſius acknowledgeth) is to be ſuſpended of untruth? And if my readineſſe to come to the triall hereon doth nothing credit the cauſe as maintained by others; why ſhould others unwillingneſſe to come to the ſame triall, be any diſparagement to the ſame cauſe, as it is maintained by me or any other? It is well known that Peter Moulin, concurring with us in the poynt of abſolute predeſtination, maintaines reprobation to proceed upon the divine foreſight of finall perſeverance in impenitency. If this Author differed from us no more the Mr Moulin doth, and acknowledged the meer pleaſure of God, in giving grace to whom he will, and denying it to whom he will, I doe not think any friend of his would think any whit the worſe of him, or charge him with defection from the truth of God in this. Neither can I think, that he ever was of any other opinion, conſidering how many worthy Divines oppoſite to the Arminians, doe either conceive, or at leaſt ſeem to conceive that the purpoſe of God to damne, doth preſuppoſe in ſigno rationis the foreſight of finall impenitency, yet concurring with us in this, that all are fallen in Adam and ſo brought forth into the world in damnatâ Maſſà, as Auſtin calleth it. God of his meer pleaſure cures this naturall corruption (the fruits whereof are infidelity and impenitency) in ſome, by regenerating them and beſtowing the grace of faith and repentance upon them, and leaves it uncured in others by refuſing to regegenerate them, to beſtow faith and repentance upon them; We give the hands of Chriſtian fellowſhip, and brotherly amity one unto another, without all exception notwithſtanding ſome nice differences, which in the iſſue I hope, will prove to be meerly Logicall, and nothing Theologicall.
Laſtly, however this poynt of unwillingneſſe in ſome, to come to conferre in the poynt of reprobation, might caſt ſome colour of ſuſpicion to the prejudicing of their cauſe; yet leaſt of all did it become this Author to take advantage hereof, conſidering that it is his own caſe, as who declineth not one poynt only, but all the reſt in this his diſcourſe, and cleaves only to that of reprobation, nothing anſwerably (I preſume) to *The Doctor directs his ſpeech unto S. Nathaniel Rich.your expectation, who put this task upon him: and whether it be any thing anſwerable to the promiſe he made unto you, your ſelf are beſt acquainted therewith. Yet becauſe the Remonſtrants hereupon (to wit, upon the Contra-Remonſtrants declining this Controverſy) have taken liberty to oppoſe the doctrine of the Contra-Remonſtrants in this poynt, ſo farre forth, as they made conſtruction of their opinion hereupon, by their doctrine concerning election; therefore I will not ſpare even here, to digreſſe ſo farre, as to take notice what they delivered, and to addreſſe an anſwer hereunto, the rather becauſe I find this diſcourſe of theirs inſerted in their Relation of that Conference at Hague.
Now, whereas firſt, by a long deduction upon conſideration of the Contra-Remonſtrants doctrine in the poynt of election, they doe inferre Colloq. Hagh. Bertii p. 120. that like as faith is made by them a fruit of election, ſo infidelity is by them to be made a fruit of reprobation: this conſequence we utterly deny. It only followes herehence, that like as faith, whereby mans naturall infidelity is cured, is by them made the fruit of election, ſo the denyall of faith, that is, the not curing of mans infidelity, or the leaving of it uncured is the fruit of reprobation. And indeed conſidering the means muſt be his work who intends the end, wherehence it followeth, that look what end God doth intend in mans election, the means tending thereunto muſt be Gods work, as namely, faith; in like ſort, whatſoever be the end which God intends in reprobation, the means tending thereunto, muſt be his work, which cannot be infidelity or ſinne, but the permiſſion of ſinne rather and infidelity, or the not curing of that corruption and infidelity which is naturall unto us all. Hereupon they proceed to propoſe two things to be queſtioned, in congruity to the doctrine of the Contra-Remonſtrants. 1. Utrumne Fides in conſilio & decreto Dei de electione ad ſalutem, eam ipſam electionem ordine praecedat an verò conſequatur? 2, Ex alterâ parte; An Infidelitas in eodem Conſilio & Decreto Dei de reprobatione ad exitium, eam ipſam reprobationem ordine praecedat an ſequatur? The latter of theſe is only pertinent to our preſent purpoſe; yet ſeeing they handle them both, ſo farre as to diſpute againſt the opinion of their oppoſites in both, and carry themſelves herein Magnificentiſſimè, I am content to weigh their arguments, in the ballance of Scholaſticall conſideration, leaſt ſome ſuch as this Author, ſhould affect to ſeem judicious in ſuſpecting my declining of them to ſavour of ſome inability to encounter them.
Thus therefore they beginne.
If faith followes election unto ſalvation, then alſo the decree of ſending Chriſt as a Saviour into the World, muſt neceſſarily follow that election; But this conſequent is abſurd, and pertains notably to the ignominy of Chriſt.
To this I anſwer. Firſt out of mine own opinion, Thus.
Faith is ſuppoſed to follow Election unto ſalvation, upon no other ground then becauſe the intention of giving faith, is ſuppoſed to follow the intention of giving ſalvation. But this I ſhould deny, and that for this reaſon, becauſe this ſubordination is grounded only upon ſuppoſition, that ſalvation is the end which God intends, and faith the means tending unto that end: but this I deny. Firſt, becauſe the end of Gods actions, is not the ſalvation of man, but the manifeſtation of his own glory. For he made all things for himſelfe, Pov. 16. 4. and reaſon juſtifies it. For God being the ſupream efficient, muſt be the ſupream end; and being Optimus as well as Maximus, he muſt needs be both moſt lovely and moſt loving, of that which is moſt lovely, that is, of himſelfe. But becauſe ſome may conceive that though Gods glory be the ſupream end, yet mans ſalvation may be the intermediate end: therefore to this I anſwer; Firſt, let ſuch ſhew then what is the glory of God, which ſalvation of the creature ſetteth forth, and I doubt not, but if that glory be ſtated right, it will appeare, that not ſalvation alone, but ſomething elſe is required to be joyned with it; as namely, the miſſion of Chriſt, yea and faith in Chriſt, to compleat that means, which tend to the procurement of ſuch an end, that is, to the ſetting forth of ſuch a glory. Secondly, the end whether ſupream or intermediate is alwaies ſuch as being rightly underſtood, doth break ſuch a means; but ſalvation is not ſo in reſpect of faith; for it doth not beſpeak it, as is apparent in the ſalvation of Angels, of Infants; as alſo in this, that it was abſolutely poſſible for God to ſave even ſinners without Chriſt, as may be demonſtrated and I have demonſtrated in my Vind. Grat. Dei. by variety of evident reaſons.
In a word, if Gods ſupream end, were the manifeſtation of his glory on ſome conſidered, as meerely poſſible in doing them good in the higheſt degree, and that in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice, and that ex Condigno & ex Congruo; it is apparent, that the means required hereunto, and beſpoken hereby, is a body conſiſting of divers particulars, all together compleating the integrall means required hereunto. For herehence it followeth, that they muſt be both created, without which no glory of God at all can be manifeſted upon them and permitted to ſinne, otherwiſe God could not doe them good in the way of mercy, which ſuppoſeth miſery, but alſo that a Saviour muſt be ſent, and he no leſſe then the Sonne of God, to deſerve the pardon of their ſinne and ſalvation, otherwiſe it could not be in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice de Condigno: and faith and repentance muſt be beſtowed on them, otherwiſe the good done them, could not be by way of reward: and laſtly, ſalvation, otherwiſe good could not be done them in the higheſt degree. And thus in no moment of nature is the Predeſtination of Chriſt either before or after the Predeſtination of man; as our Brittiſh Divines maintained at the Synod of Dort; but at once God predeſtinated both him to be our Head and us his Members; like as Aquinas maintained Chriſts predeſtination, and our predeſtination to be one act in God, and conſequently neither could be the cauſe of another.
Thus have I diſpatched mine anſwer unto them, as touching mine own opinion. But ſuppoſing the method of the Contra-Remonſtrants ſound, in making ſalvation of man, to be intended by God as an end, and both mans faith in Chriſt, and Chriſts Miſſion to be intended as means. We deny this to be abſurd or ignominious unto Chriſt. Lets heare how they prove it, thus; If the decree of ſending Chriſt be poſterior to the electing of ſingular perſons unto ſalvation, then the intention of mans ſalvation was poſterior to Gods intention of ſatisfaction to his juſtice, which ſay they is abſurd and fooliſh, to wit, to decree the ſalvation of ſinners, unleſſe firſt he decree ſatisfaction to his juſtice. But I anſwer according to the forme of the Contra-Remonſtrants doctrine: Firſt, by proving their order to be ſound: Secondly, by ſhewing the invalidity of the Remonſtrants diſcourſe.
Firſt therefore: There was never any other order of intentions acknowledged by the learned, then ſuch as is found between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means tending thereunto. And the Order moſt received is this; That the intention of the end, is before the intention of the means. Now let every man that is is his right Witts conſider, which is more likely to be the end, and which the means of theſe two, Mans ſalvation, and Chriſts Miſſion to ſatisfy for the ſinne of man. Was ever any man known to be ſo brainſick as to affirme, that the ſalvation of man is a means tending to this end, namely, the ſending of Chriſt into the World to ſatisfy for the ſinne of man? On the other ſide, how fair and plauſible is it to affirme, that Chriſt was ſent into the world, to ſatisfy for mans ſinne, to this end, that man might be ſaved? whence it followeth evidently by the moſt approved rules of Schooles, that the intention of mans ſalvation is in ſigno rationis, before the intention of ſending Chriſt into the world, to make ſatisfaction for ſinne. Againe, if Chriſts ſending into the world to make ſatisfaction for ſinne, be firſt in intention, then it ſhould be laſt in execution, by rules undeniable, and ſuch as are manifeſt by the very light of nature; Whence it followeth, that man ſhould be firſt ſaved and after that Chriſt ſent into the World, that, by his ſufferings, Gods juſtice might be ſatisfied.
Now I come to the conſideration of the Remonſtrants argument. The Conſequence of the Major we grant, but the Minor we deny. And it is a vaine thing for them to cry out, that it is abſurd and fooliſh to ſay, that the intention of ſalvation, precedes the intention of ſatisfying Gods juſtice; for words muſt not carry it: and it is well known that the moſt empty veſſells give the greateſt ſound. I have ſhewed how abſurd it is to conceive, that man was ſaved to this end, that Gods juſtice may be ſatisfied, and that 'tis farre more probable to ſay, That by Chriſts ſufferings, Gods juſtice was ſatisfied to this end, that man might be ſaved. For the ſalvation of man we ſay, was not intended by God ſimply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with juſtice; which end doth not preſuppoſe the permiſſion of ſinne, as theſe Remonſtrants ſhape the matter to varniſh over their conſequence, with ſome colour of probability: but rather it beſpeaks, both the permiſſion of ſinne, and ſatisfaction to be made for ſinne, to the end that ſo man might be ſaved, not ſimply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with juſtice. But ſuppoſe they were conſidered as ſinners, Why ſhould the Remonſtrants look ſtrangely upon this doctrine, namely, that God ſhould intend the ſalvation of ſinners in ſigno rationis, before he intended that his juſtice ſhould be ſatisfied? For doe not they maintaine, that God by power abſolute, can pardon ſinne without all ſatisfaction? But ſuppoſing that God will not pardon ſinne without ſatisfaction, in this caſe they may contend, that God muſt firſt intend to take a courſe, that ſuch ſatisfaction may be made, and then intend to ſave. And let them contend but in the name of reaſon, and not of clamours, and content themſelves, with the infatuation of themſelves, with ſuch ſenſeleſſe conceits, and not ſpread this ſcab unto others alſo. My reaſon to the contrary is ſtill the ſame, namely, that if God be pleaſed to ſave ſinners in deſpight of ſinne, in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice, the caſe is cleare, that ſatisfaction for ſinne, is rather a means of mans ſalvation, then mans ſalvation is a means tending to the procurement of ſatisfaction for ſinne, and conſequently the intention of ſalvation of ſinners, is in reaſon to precede the intention of procuring ſatisfaction, rather then to follow after it; as the intention of the end, is rather to be accounted before, then after the intention of the means. Yet ſay theſe Remonſtrants, if a man will be ſo obſtinate, as (notwithſtanding the felicity of theſe Remonſtranticall witts in fruitfull inventions and ſubtile argumentations) ſtill to deny that there is any abſurdity herein, thus over and above we prove it. For as yet they have runne themſelves out of breath. If, ſay they, the decree of Chriſt a Saviour, be after the election of particular perſons unto ſalvation, it followeth that God did decree ſome particular mens ſalvation, before he ordained Chriſts merits to procure their ſalvation; but this is fooliſh and abſurd.
I anſwer, No more fooliſh and abſurd then the former: and indeed every one of theſe conſequences for the expreſſing whereof, they affect to ſeem very inventious, doe ſavour of no invention at all; the Conſequents doe ſo evidently, even every one of them appeare as clearely in the Antecedent, as a mans face in a glaſſe, and are to be accounted rather Tautologies, then deductions, much leſſe doe they relliſh of any ſubtilty of wit. So that all this while, they ſeem to be in travell with nothing but wind, or ſick of the diſeaſe called Tenaſmus, ſtriving mightily to doe ſomewhat, when indeed they doe nothing at all. And our former argument ſtill hath place, and here alſo applied, doth manifeſt, that ſeeing the merits of the ſonne of God are the means of mans ſalvation, then mans ſalvation is the end of Chriſts merits; therefore in all probability, the intention of mans ſalvation, as the intention of the end, ſhould precede the intention of ſending Chriſt to merit as the means, rather then to be ſubordinate unto it. And indeed if the ſending of Chriſt into the World to merit, ſhould be firſt in intention, then ſhould it be laſt in execution; that is, All the elect ſhould firſt be ſaved, and then Chriſt ſhould be ſent into the world to merit their ſalvation. Therefore to mend the matter (for who is ſo ſilly as not to perceive, that if the conſideration of Chriſts obedience, as ſatisfactory, will not ſerve their turne, ſurely neither will the conſideration of his obedience as meritorious, ſtand them in any ſtead) they put into this Conſequence another clauſe, without all art, and without all honeſty, pretending, that hereby we make ſalvation deſtinated to man, before it is decreed to man: as if we put any difference in this caſe between deſtination and decree, or as if we make ſalvation deſtinated to a man hereby, before it is deſtinated unto him; whereas we only make the end (that is ſalvation) intended before the merits of Chriſt (which are the means of ſalvation) are intended. And would any man that is in his right witts, ſay this is to make ſalvation deſtinated to a man before it is deſtinated to him? Farther, it is to be obſerved, that we may omit nothing, but take notice of the uttermoſt of their ſtrength, and the rather, becauſe it will notably diſcover either their ignorance, or which is moſt likely, (for as much as they doe not directly inſiſt, as they might upon a new argument farre more plauſible with the ignorant) their unconſcionableneſſe. For they ſignify that hence it will come to paſſe, that the intention of ſalvation, being before the intention of finding of Chriſt to merit, ſalvation ſhall exiſt, being decreed as preſent to God, before Chriſt is conſidered as he that by his Croſſe hath deſerved it. Now had they ſaid before Chriſt hath deſerved it, I ſhould readily have granted it. For I hope none of thē would deny, that the ſalvation of many a Prophet and Patriarch, exiſted not only before God, but actually and really before Chriſt was crucified. To prevent this eluſion of their argument, they expreſſe it thus, Before Chriſt was conſidered as he that hath deſerved it. Yet here they fall foule upon an indecent expreſſion. For I will be bold to deny, that Chriſt was conſidered by God, as one that had deſerved mans ſalvation, before he had deſerved it. For before he had deſerved it by his Croſſe, to ſay, that God conſidered him as one that had deſerved it, is either to erre or to feigne, neither of which is incident unto God. God conſidered him from everlaſting, as one that in the fulneſſe of time ſhould deſerve it, by ſuffering upon the Croſſe, not as one that had deſerved it. For to conceive him after the former manner, is to conceive aright, but to conceive him after the latter manner, is to conceive amiſſe. But I will take the pains to mend this argument for them thus. If their ſalvation were decreed before Chriſts merits, then their ſalvation did exiſt as preſent with God before Chriſts merits did exiſt, as preſent with God. But this is not to be admitted: Now I come to diſcover their ignorance, which they betray in this. Firſt, neither Gods preſcience, nor Gods decree doth make things to exiſt, otherwiſe then in Eſſe cognito & in eſſe velito; but this is not to exiſt. Therefore they qualify it by the addition of the manner, ut praeſens Deo; which indeed is Terminus diminuens in this caſe. For it is preſent to God by vertue of his decree intentionally only, and not really, which alo…e is to exiſt. But let this Peccadillio paſſe. Secondly, Who ſeeth not that this argument tends to the utter deſtruction of all diſtinct intentions of end, and means in God? For if there be any ſuch diſtinct intentions in God, the one muſt be acknowledged to be before the other. As for example, What was the end of creation? Lets goe no farther then the manifeſtation of Gods power and wiſdome as the end thereof. Now hence it will follow by the quaintneſſe of this argumentation, that the manifeſtation of Gods wiſdome and power in creating the world did exiſt, as preſent with God, before the creation. Is not here a proper argumentation. Spectatum admiſſi riſum teneatis amici.
Thirdly, to draw neerer to the diſcovery of their ignorance. I grant it ſhall firſt exiſt; but how? Not in duration; We acknowledge no ſuch priority in God, between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means; though ſuch a priority in this caſe is found in man. What then? Ile tell you: They commonly call it a priority of nature. But take heed you doe not apply it to any of the two kindes of priority of nature mentioned by Ariſtotle. For try if you pleaſe, and you ſhall find that none of them can poſſibly ſerve the turne; What then is this priority of nature ſo called? I anſwer, it is only Prioritas rationis: And ſo I formerly ſaid, that the intention of the end is in ſigno rationis, before the intention of the means. You may farther demand, Wherein doth this Prioritas rationis conſiſt? I anſwer out of Durand, it conſiſts in this, that, Ratio unius petitur a ratione alterius, and ſo indeed, Ratio mediorum petitur a ratione finis. This generally holds of the intention of end, and means, as well in God, as in the creature. For alwaies the nature of the end duely conſidered, doth beſpeak what ſhall be the condition of the means. So that this makes no priority of exiſtence at all, neither in duration nor in nature properly ſo called, but only ſuch a ſubordination between them, that the reaſon of the one, that is, the nature or condition of the one, depends upon the nature and condition of the other. Now let any ſober man judge, Whether the ſalvation of man be required to the procuring of Chriſts merits, and not rather, Chriſts merits are required to the procuring of mans ſalvation; which yet is not true of ſalvation conſidered ſimply, but only as to be beſtowed after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of juſtice, and by way of ſatisfaction made for ſinne, that ſo a man may be ſaved by grace in deſpight of ſinne. In the cloſe of all they ſignify that this of theirs in the laſt place ſeriouſly conſidered will make it appeare, that this doctrine of their Adverſaries, tends notably to the diminution of Chriſts honour, and to the annihilation of Chriſts merits, to wit, unleſſe Chriſts merits be acknowledged the end of mans ſalvation, and not mans ſalvation the end of Chriſts merits, Chriſt ſhall be diſhonoured, and his merits annihilated. Here they are quite out of breath, and that which is wanting, they leave to be ſupplied by the ſerious (they ſhould ſay ignorant) conſideration of their Proſelites. They preſume this colour of diſhonour redounding hereby to Chriſt, will be ſufficient to blow up their Adverſaries, though it prove of no more force then a ſquibbe. This carriage of theirs calls to my remembrance, a mad prank plaid by the Engliſh at Delfe, while they were billeted there, which was told me merrily, by one of the number. One of the Souldiers was billeted in an old Widdowes houſe, and another being a Goldſmith, told him and another conſort of theirs, he had a deviſe to put mony in all their purſes, for he knew how to make a Rex-dolar of three-pence ſylver, and in that Widdowes houſe they would ply their buſineſſe very ſecurely. To work they went, and caſting plates of Tinne to the quantity of one of thoſe Dolars, and ſtamping them full and faire, this Gold-ſmith, with the quantity of three pence ſilver, ſylvered them over very fairely, and, leaſt they ſhould ſeem too light, hangs them up in the chimny in a bagge, that the ſmoak might bring them to the ſadder hew. Thus having met with a mine of Sylver in their lodging, one is imployed as a Merchant-man to goe to the Staple of Cloth, and he laies out their coyne in cloth, whereof afterwards they made good ſilver indeed: at length one of them paying a debt of his to a Dutchman in Delfe, in one of theſe Rex-dolars, he found the Dutch to betray ſome ſuſpicious geſtures and interpretations upon the coyne. That was a faire warning to an intelligent man of armes; and hereupon they get them packing ing away with all ſpeed; and home they come, and make themſelves merry with the relation. In like ſort theſe Remonſtrants ſhew a great deale of Tinne and traſh in theſe argumentations, and they have not ſo much as three pence ſilver to colour it therewithall to cheat the World, if they will be cheated. But they hope the colour of ſome diſhonour by their adverſaries doctrine redounding unto Chriſt, will be taken for a peece at leaſt of good ſilver. I confeſſe, I am ſomewhat the more merrily diſpoſed at this time, For being taken off from the midſt of a ſentence, by the courteous invitation of a Gentleman, to come unto him to his Inne: He was pleaſed to entertaine me with ſuch good diſcourſe, that it did not a little refreſh my ſpirits. His reaches were after new diſcoveries for the advancement of learning; and endoctrinated me more in one halfe hower, then ſeventeen years ſtudy in the Univerſity. For whereas I never learned there, more cauſes then foure, he was pleaſed to acquaint me with nine; which I took ſome pains to learn without book, and they were theſe, Matter, Forme, Workman, Will, Power, Time, Finding out, Accident, End. And moſt courteouſly offered himſelfe to enlarge on every one of them; but having left off at a broken ſentence, I was deſirous to return to my ſtudies Theologicall, and to let thoſe Philoſophicall progreſſes alone. But I proteſted unto him ſeriouſly, that he had informed me more in the number of cauſes in a ſhort ſpace, then Oxford had done in many years; he entreated I would conſider of them, and I promiſed I would, and conferre of them too, with all the Schollers I companied with; which he took in very goo part; and ſo I took my leave. And finding my ſpirit not a little elevated with this recreation, I reſolved, forbearing my uſuall time of ſupper, to follow theſe ſtudies cloſe that night, which truly fell out very happily. For one of thoſe cauſes being found out, otherwiſe called, Invention (as for Judgement, I doe not remember that it was admitted into the number) I made uſe of it very happily in finding out, or diſcovery of the foppery of theſe Remonſtranticall argumentations.
Now I proceed to the ſecond Queſtion, as more ſeaſonable to the preſent occaſion. And here firſt they begin with their former artifice, making infidelity on the part of reprobation, anſwerable to faith on the part of election, which is moſt untrue, as formerly I ſhewed: Only the not curing of infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by us ſubordinate to reprobation; as the curing of naturall infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by us ſubordinate to election. But they goe on, as in ſhaping our Tenent at pleaſure, ſo in baſting it with their very liberall cenſures, as abſurd and execrable, in ſuch ſort, as the bare commemoration of it, they take to be ſufficient to repreſent the horrour of it, and to confute it, and this they commit to the judgement of all the faithfull of Chriſt. And indeed their beſt ſtrength lyeth in ſetting forth their Adverſaries doctrine in ſuch colours, as the Devill is painted with. And in this particular, they conceive good hope (no doubt) that propitious Readers will conceive hereby, that the infidelity of man is made by their Adverſaries the work of God, as well as Faith; Whereas it is well known, that there is ſo little need of working men to infidelity, that all being borne in ſinne, and corrupted and eſtranged from the life of God, through the fall of Adam, infidelity is as naturall and hereditary to a man, as any other corruption. And it is as well known and undeniable, that none can cure it but God, by faith; but this he cures in whom he will, by giving Faith to whom he will, and if he refuſe to cure it in any, that, and that alone is enough to make him a veſſell of wrath, that ſo Gods glory may be manifeſted upon him, in the way of juſtice vindicative. But come we to their Arguments.
1. The firſt is this. If Infidelity followeth Reprobation unto deſtruction, then God cannot in justice deſtroy Reprobates for their infidelity. For there is no greater injustice, then to deſtroy a man for that, that followeth neceſſarily upon reprobation which is the work of God. To this I anſwer.
1. According to mine ordering the decrees divine. Secondly, according to the Contra-Remonſtrants Tenent in ordering them.
1. According to my ordering of the decrees divine; In no moment of nature or reaſon is the decree of damnation precedent to the decree of permitting infidelity, or leaving the infidelity of ſome men uncured, to wit, by denying them faith, by denying the grace of regeneration. But the decrees of creating all in Adam, of permitting all to fall in Adam, in bringing all men forth into the World in the ſtate of Originall ſinne, of leaving this originall ſinne uncured in them, and laſt of all, of damning them for their ſinnes; are decrees not ſubordinate, but coördinate, as decrees de Mediis, tending joyntly to one ſupream end, which is the manifeſtation of Gods glory upon them in the way of juſtice vindicative; as alſo to ſhew the riches of his glory upon the veſſels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, to wit, by beholding Rom. 9. 22.in others that miſerable condition, which through Gods meer grace and goodneſſe they have eſcaped.
2. According to the Contra-Remonſtrants Tenent, I anſwer,
1. Many of them doe not maintaine that infidelity is conſequent to the decree of damnation, but in the foreſight of God, precedent rather: as appears by the Brittiſh Divines their Theſes De Reprobatione; and Alvarez profeſſeth the ſame. The denyall of grace, and ſo the permitting of naturall infidelity to remain uncured, they make conſequent (as it ſeems) to a negative decree of denying glory. And to the decree of permitting infidelity, they make the foreſight of infidelity ſubſequent; and this foreſight of infidelity they make precedent to reprobation, as it ſignifies the decree of damnation. And thus farre I agree with them, That in no moment of nature, or ſigne of reaſon did God ordain any man to damnation, but for ſinne; and conſequently in no moment of nature, or ſigne of reaſon, did the decree of damnation goe before the foreſight of ſinne or infidelity.
2. But ſuppoſe, as theſe Remonſtrants collect and pick out their meaning, They make the decree of reprobation, in all poynts proportionable to the decree of ſalvation, that like as the decree of giving faith, they conceive to be ſubordinate to the decree of ſalvation; ſo the decree of permitting infidelity, or denying faith (for herein conſiſts the juſt proportion, and not as they feigne it, between faith on the one ſide, and infidelity on the other) is with them made ſubordinate to the decree of damnation. Then I anſwer,
1. Their Conſequence ſhould be this, If the permiſſion of Infidelity followeth the decree of damnation, then God cannot in juſtice damne them for Infidelity. Now here is no colour of good Conſequence.
2. If they reply, That in caſe infidelity followeth neceſſarily upon Gods permiting of it, the Conſequence is as good as in caſe infidelity followed upon reprobation. For even hereby it appears, that infidelity followeth upon reprobation though not immediately, but by the mediation of the divine permiſſion thereof; but whether it followeth mediately or immediately all is one, as touching the force of the Conſequence.
Reſp. Now to this I Reply, Granting that all is one, as touching the force of the Conſequence: but then conſider.
1. All the force of the argument depends not upon the conſequution of infidelity, ſimply unto the decree of damnation, but only upon the neceſſary conſequution thereof. And yet no mention at all was made hereof, in the Conſequence of the Major, but it is brought afterwards over and above moſt illogically.
2. In this caſe all the force of the Conſequence depends upon the neceſſary conſequution of ſinne in generall, or infidelity in ſpeciall, upon Gods permitting of it.
So that whether Gods decree to permit the ſinne of infidelity, be antecedent or conſequent to the decree of damnation all is one. Yet theſe Remonſtrants make the force of their argument, to conſiſt only in the ſubordinating of the decree divine, as touching the permiſſion of infidelity to the decree of damnation, which yet appears by this to be of no force.
3. But if they hereupon take a new courſe of argumentation, and diſpute thus; If Infidelity followeth neceſſarily upon Gods permitting of it, then God cannot in juſtice damne a man for Infidelity; pretending no injuſtice to be greater, then to damne a man for that which followeth neceſſarily upon permiſſion, which is Gods work.
Reſp. I anſwer.
1. That thus their former argumentation is caſhierd as unprofitable.
2. We deny this Conſequence; and call in no meaner name then Arminius himſelfe to beare us out in this our deniall. Who expreſſely profeſſeth, That in caſe God permits a man, Velle peccatum, neceſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum. Exam. pag. 153. I could adde Vorſtius alſo, herein concurring with Piſcator, Perkins, and Navarrettus the Dominican is as expreſſely in this as any other; as alſo in ſubordinating it to the decree of reprobation. Arminius likewiſe profeſſeth faith and repentance, Niſi Deo dante haberi non poſſe. Exam. 57. and that both of them are denied to the reprobates by the decree of reprobation. See his own words, At Deus ſtatuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare. Concedo lubens, illam aſſumptionem, ſed rectè intellectam: He laboureth to charme this inconvenient grant of his, but no charme will ſerve to keep this adder, from ſtinging and wounding their doctrine of reprobation unto death. He ſaith, Faith is given by way of ſuaſion. We ſay, that matters nothing; for ſo it be given by God whereſoever it be found, and ſo it be denied to reprobates by the decree of reprobation, we deſire no more. We our ſelves acknowledge, that faith is not given to the elect, but by way of ſwaſion, the Word working faith, running in this manner; Repent and believe the Goſpel; and whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved. For God hath ſet forth his Sonne to be a Propitiation for our ſinnes, through faith in his bloud.
3. At length he proceeds in his charming courſe, but moſt unſucceſſefully, as whereby his former ſaying is nothing charmed. His care rather ſeems to be to eat his own words, as Satan devoured his own children. For diſtinguiſhing ſuaſion into that which is ſufficient, and that which is effectuall: this effectuall ſuaſion, he confeſſeth to be adminiſtred by the decree of election; but as for that ſufficient ſuaſion, though withall he accounts it allwaies ineffectuall, yet he ſaith it is adminiſtred by the decree of providence, not by the decree of reprobation. At length he confeſſeth, that by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectuall, that is ſuch a grace as whereupon he foreſaw they would believe. Now herein I appeale to the judgement of every ſober man. Take we two men into conſideration, the one elect as Paul, the other reprobate as Eſau. Of two ſufficient graces, the Lord foreſeeth which of them will prove effectuall with Paul, and which ineffectuall; and he makes choice to give him ſuch a grace, as he foreſeeth will prove effectuall. Again he foreſeeth of two ſufficient graces, which of them will prove effectuall with Eſau and which ineffectuall, and makes choice to afford him only that which he knowes will prove ineffectuall. Now what can be the reaſon hereof, but becauſe he purpoſeth to ſhew his mercy in the ſalvation of the one, and his juſtice in the damnation of another. Before Arminius came to this reſolution, as expreſſely to profeſſe, That by the decree of reprobation is denyed grace effectuall, he found himſelfe in a ſtreit upon his diſtinction of grace ſufficient and effectuall, and the deſcription of each; he drew his breath very ſhort; and therefore to get, as it were, more liberty of ayre, he concluded that diſcourſe with, Haec ex Auguſtini ſententiâ dicuntur. pag. 58. and in the next page. Hiſce autem ita explicatis ex mente Auguſtini & fortè Scripturae ſenſu. But, What, a miſchiefe, doth this great Doctor mean to tell us? Firſt, that he willingly grants that, Deus ſtatuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare (provided it be well underſtood) and after all this explication, tells us, that all this explication of his is delivered ex ſententiâ & mente Auguſtini, and but perchance, ex Scripturae ſenſu, concealing all the while what is his own Opinion. Is this to give us the right underſtanding of that Aſſertion (Deus ſtatuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare) moſt prejudiciall to his own Tenent at firſt fight, and much more by the diſtinction following of Gratia ſufficiens & efficax; which he ſo well perceived, that he is content to clap it upon Auſtins back to beare the burthen of it; and puts it but upon adventure, that it may prove to be the Scripture meaning. And in like ſort, when, pag. 98. having propoſed two things to be neceſſarily unfolded by him. Primò, de Gratiâ ſufficiente & efficaci. Secundo, de utriuſ que diſpenſatione, diſpenſationiſ que Cauſis: He leaves off there, giving it over in plain ground. What doth this argue? but that he manifeſtly perceived, he was not able in any tollerable manner, to ſhape this diſtinction in congruity to his own Tenent. Let this Author well conſider this, that talkes ſo much of our Divines unwillingneſſe to come to tryall in the poynt of reprobation; When Arminius durſt not adventure upon the explicating of his own opinion, touching the diſtinction of grace ſufficient and effectuall, and in giving us the definition of each. The like to have been the courſe of other Arminians, I have known, declining the point of effectuall grace, as a precipice and breakneck unto them: And when others have been put upon it, they have placed it in the grace ſubſequent, and have not been aſhamed to make it conſiſt in this, that God by effectuall grace, doth work in man, foreign Velle credere, modo velit, and why not as well, that he workes in man, foreign Credere, modo Credat, foreign Reſipiſcere modo Reſipiſcat. This that I ſpeake, I can ſhew under the hand of one of them, a great ſtickler for the Arminian Cauſe; great I ſay in reſpect of affection, not of judgement. And I have cauſe to conceive, that both this Authors Diſcourſe, and that others I have had to deale withall, is but as a ſmoake, that for a great part, if not for the moſt of it, comes out of the ſame Chimney.
4. Let the argument ſtand as it doth, let infidelity by Gods permiſſion follow upon the decree of damnation, and that neceſſarily. Yet conſider.
1. Gods permitting of it, is no other then the leaving of it uncured: not that hereby infidelity followeth, which was not before; but being in all before, as the fruit of that naturall corruption wherein all were borne, as all confeſſe, as many as concurre againſt the Pelagians, in acknowledging Originall ſinne. By Gods permiſſion of it, it continueth to be uncured; What actuall ſinne is there in the World, or habituall ſinne ariſing thereupon, which God cannot cure if it pleaſe him? If then he will not cure it in ſome, ſhall it not be lawfull for him to puniſh it, where he findes the continuance of it unto the end, without breaking off by repentance?
2. Suppoſe all men had power to doe any good thing; if God will not give them Velle quod poſſunt (as Auſtin ſaith he dealt with Adam in his innocency, and gave the Angels that ſtood, amplius Adjutorium, then he gave the others; whereby it came to paſſe, that they ſtood in obedience when the other fell) what ſhall wee ſay in this caſe, is it poſſible that they ſhould Velle bonum, if God will not work it in them, of whom the Apoſtle profeſſeth, that he works in us both the Will and the Deed? Or ſhall wee hereupon ſay, they doe not ſinne freely? What ſhift have they to avoyd this, but either by contradicting the Apoſtle, and ſaying God doth not work in us foreign Velle, or by ſaying that God doth work in us foreign Velle, modò Velimus, as plain a contradiction as ever proceeded from the mouth of any, The ſelfe ſame act, being made before and after it ſelf; for the condition is allwaies before the thing conditioned. And is this to work in us the Will according to Gods pleaſure, or according to mans good pleaſure? What is it to ſay, that grace is given according unto works, if this be not?
3. We deny, that any evill act therefore comes not to paſſe freely, becauſe it comes to paſſe neceſſarily, upon ſuppoſition of Gods denyall of grace, to refraine from it. For like as good works, are not therefore not wrought freely by us, becauſe God by his grace workes us to the performance of them; (For who dares deny that it is in Gods power to make us work this or that freely) in like ſort, and much more, evill works are not done the leſſe freely, becauſe God denies ſpeciall and effectuall grace to abſtain from them. For, want of grace doth not take away willingneſſe unto that which is evill, but leaves too much rather in man of that kind. As Auſtin ſaith, that Libertas ſine gratiâ non eſt libertas ſed contumacia. Now where there is contumacy, there is rather too much will then too little. For Contumacy is Wilfulneſſe.
4. The Schooles teach, that liberty of will conſiſts only, in electione mediorum, in the election of means to certain ends. Now when the Goſpel is preached to a carnall man, whoſe ends are only carnall, as the Apoſtle ſaith, Philip. 3. 20. They mind earthly things; ſo farre forth as he ſhall find it ſerviceable to his carnall ends, he may believe it and make profeſſion of it, as many times Hypocrites doe, and ſometimes in ſuch ſort, as it is hard to diſtinguiſh, between a true and an Hypocriticall profeſſour. This moved the Apoſtle to exhort the Corinthians, famous for their faith, to examine themſelves, and prove themſelves, Whether they were in the faith, that is, in faith unfaigned. For there is not only a groſſe Hypocriſy, whereunto a mans own heart is privy, but a ſecret Hypocriſy whereof the man himſelfe is nothing conſcious; yet ſuch a faith undoubtedly is performable by a naturall man. Now when a man rejects the Goſpell, the faith and profeſſion whereof he finds nothing ſerviceable to his carnall ends, doth he not judiciouſly and deliberately, yea and wiſely too (according to the wiſdome of fleſh and bloud) reject it?
5. Auſtin profeſſeth Lib. 1. De Gen. contr. Manich. cap. 3. That all men may believe if they will, and juſtifies it in his Retractations. But if the will of man be corrupt, and averſe from believing, We juſtly ſay, ſuch a man cannot believe; as our Saviour ſaith, How can you believe that receive honour one of another, and ſeeke not the honour that cometh of God alone. Joh. 5. 44. yet this is an impotency Morall only, which is to be diſtinguiſhed from impotency Naturall. For notwithſtanding this, it may be truely ſaid, that, All men may believe if they will, and herein conſiſts the naturall liberty of the will. The Morall liberty conſiſts, rather in a ſanctified inclination unto that which is good, whereby it is freed from the power of ſinne and Sathan; then in a power to doe good if they will, and not otherwiſe. But I never find that Arminians doe diſtinguiſh theſe.
6. It is not ſufficient for Arminians to conclude, that ſuch a thing upon ſuppoſition comes to paſſe neceſſarily, therefore it comes not to paſſe freely.
1. For upon ſuppoſition that God decreed to create the World, the creation of the World came to paſſe neceſſarily; yet ſimply the World was made by God freely.
2. In like ſort, upon Gods foreknowledge that ſuch a man will not believe it followeth neceſſarily, that ſuch a one will not believe; and ſo the like may be ſaid of the moſt free act that is performed. But will it follow herehence, that it is not done freely?
3. In like ſort upon the denyall of an effectuall impediment of ſinne, unto a man it followeth neceſſarily, that ſuch a man will ſinne, according to Arminius his doctrine, and this holds applied to any particular ſinne whatſoever. But will it herehence follow according to Arminius, that ſuch a ſinne is not committed freely? nonothing leſſe.
2. The Remonſtrants ſecond argument is this.
What God cannot performe that God cannot will. But God cannot damne a man for infidelity flowing from ſuch a decree of Reprobation.
Reſp. 1. But who ſaith that infidelity floweth from the decree of reprobation? Not one that I know, but Piſcator upon theſe words, Yee therefore heare not my words, becauſe yee are not of God. But underſtand him aright, it is as if he John 8. 47.ſhould ſay, Therefore ſuch a man goeth lame, becauſe the Phyſitian will not cure him: yet it is well known the cauſe of his lameneſſe is from within, and perhaps procured by ſome diſtemper of his own: yet in caſe a Surgeon could cure him and will not, he may be ſaid to be the cauſe of lameneſſe; but how? per modum non removentis. This is well known by the learned to be a kind of cauſe whereof notice is taken in Naturall Philoſophy. And in this ſenſe and no other, it is well known that Piſcator makes God the cauſe of infidelity, and that according to the expreſſe Word of God. But in my judgement Piſcator miſtakes the phraſe, To be of God, which he conceives to denote election. I rather take it to denote regeneration, as much as to ſay, yee therefore he are not my words, becauſe God hath not hitherto by regeneration cured that naturall infidelity which is in you.
2. But take the argument according to the former expreſſion, God cannot damne a man for that infidelity which is conſequent to reprobation; And then my Anſwer to the former argument in every particular thereof, may be accommodated unto this.
3. The Third followeth. If Infidelity flowes from reprobation, then God can neither require Faith of reprobates, nor ſeriouſly offer ſalvation unto them, but neceſſarily counterfeit. For it is manifeſt Hypocriſy, to invite thoſe unto faith and ſalvation, who are excluded from both by the decree of God.
Reſp. 1. Here again Infidelity is made to flow from reprobation; whereas nothing flowes from reprobation by the doctrine of the Contra-Remonſtranes, but the not curing of mans naturall infidelity, like as the curing of it by faith, is that which flows from election.
2. I ſay, There is no ſimulation at all of God in this. For that wich he propoſeth is but this, that, Whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved, and Whoſoever believeth not ſhall be damned. He ſends his Miniſters to Preach this, and to Beſeech them to believe, and to be reconciled unto God, yea, all they meet with. But for whoſe ſake? Not for the reprobates ſake, but for the elects ſake, Who becauſe they are mixed among reprobates, and God hath not revealed to his Miniſters, Who are elect and who are not (as neither was it fit he ſhould, many of the Miniſters themſelves, even of thoſe that not only prophecyed in his name, but caſt out Devills, being reprobates) therefore it was fit their Commiſſion ſhould be generall to Preach to all. Yea, did not the Apoſtles themſelves take notice of this? Doth not Paul profeſſe that, He became 2 Corinth. 6.all things to all that he may ſave ſome? And who were thoſe ſome, but the very elect of God, as the ſame Apoſtle elſewhere profeſſeth, ſaying, I ſuffer all things for the elects ſake. And doth not Auſtin profeſſe that if we knew who were reprobate, 2. Tim. 2. 10.we would no more pray for them, then for the Devills? De Civit. Dei lib. 21. cap. 24.
4. The Fourth and laſt. If Incredulity followes the decree of reprobation, then God conſidered the reprobates in his counſell of reprobation, either as creatable, or as created in the state of innocency, or as falne into Originall ſinne. Sed falſa ſunt haec omnia. All theſe things are falſe. And theſe things, he ſaith, are delivered, contra abſurdam, deteſtabilem, at que abominabilem ſententiam.
Reſp. Here is froth enough of words, but a very hungry diſcourſe for ſubſtance of argumentation throughout.
1. Yet as I ſaid, All this nothing toucheth them, Who albeit they maintaine that God of his meer pleaſure, hath mercy on ſome, giving them faith and repentance (conſidering all in the corrupt Maſſe) and of his meer pleaſure hardens others (no worſe in nature then the former) by denying them faith and repentance, yet as reprobation ſignifies the decree of damnation, doe permit thereunto the foreſight of finall perſeverance in ſinne.
2. According to my Ordering of Gods decrees, Who conceive mankind not yet created to be the object of all Gods decrees, they being eternall, and but one act in God, and that act his very Eſſence, and all other things being temporall. I doe not maintain that the decree of damnation, is in any moment of nature or reaſon, before the conſideration of mans finall impenitency. As neither doe I conceive it to be after this, but both ſimultaneous; for as much as the decree of permitting all to fall in Adam, together with the decree of finall leaving ſome therein, and the decree of damning them for ſinne, I take not to be ſubordinate, but coordinate and ſimultaneous.
3. Whether we take the Firſt-way for ſhaping the object of predeſtination, or the Second, or the Third, I Anſwer.
1. The difference hereabout is in my judgement meerly Logicall, nothing Theologicall; the reſolution whereof according to generall rules, is eaſily made by light of nature, if once it be agreed upon in Divinity, What is Gods end both on the part of election, and on the part of reprobation, and what are the means that tend unto thoſe ends.
2. Which way ſoever we take of the Three, I never found any reaſon given by Arminians of any force to take us from it, as I have juſtified in my Vindiciae, as touching the Firſt-way; And in my Examination of the Conference between Arminius and Junius, as touching the Second-way; And in my Anſwer to Corvinus againſt Tilenus, as touching the Third-way, and therein, I truſt, routed and profligated the 20 Reaſons of Arminius, propoſed againſt the Firſt and Laſt-way, but chiefly againſt the Firſt, in the Declaration of his Opinion before the States.
Now I returne to the Author of this diſcourſe, and to the remainder of his ſecond Motive, from whence I have digreſſed.
I was here paſſing over unto the third inſtance, to wit, of the proceedings in the Synod of Dort; but upon my looking into the Hiſtory thereof, to prepare my ſelfe for an anſwer thereunto, ere I was a ware, I lighted upon the reaſons of that the Contra-Remonſtrants motion to be ſpared, preferred unto the State. And they utterly deny what is here caſt upon them, namely, that they deprecated at all, that they might be ſpared from conferring upon the poynt of reprobation. But whereas the Remonſtrants had incumbred the point of election and reprobation with ſeaven Queſtions, which pertained not to the ſtate of the Controverſy concerning the firſt Article, and being alſo imperfect and intricate for the moſt part, and propoſed to this end, to draw their Adverſaries away from the true ſtate of the Queſtion; They deſired to be ſpared from anſwering unto them. And upon this Petition of theirs it pleaſed the States, that leaving thoſe thorny queſtions, they ſhould come to the handling of the Articles. This is ſet down in the Preface to thoſe Acta Synodalia, ſet forth by the Authority of the States. Fol. 10. pag. 1. For after the propoſing of theſe two queſtions to the Remonſtrants, as touching the decree of Predeſtination. 1. Whether the intire decree of Predeſtination were contained in this Article, namely, That God did from everlaſting decree to ſave believers, which no man denies. 2. Whether they thought faith & perſeverance therein, did precede election, as the Cauſes or Conditions thereof. After the Remonſtrants had anſwered affirmatively unto them both; hereupon they bring in their ſeaven, for the moſt part, intricate queſtions. Reponebant deinde ſeptem alias tum de electione tum de reprobatione, queſtiones, ad quas a Paſtoribus à Claſſibus deputatis reſponderi volebant. Quae cum ad controverſiae de primo articulo ſtatum non ſpectarent, etiam mutilae at que intricatae plerae que eſſent; eum que in finem ab illis proponerentur, ut hoc modo a praecipuo controverſiae statu recta que agendi ratione, in ambages ad ducerent. Paſtores expoſitâ per Libellum ſupplicem Illuſt. Ordd. iniquâ hâc agendi ratione, non quidem deprecati ſunt, ne de reprobatione ſententiam ſuam manifestarent (uti Remonſtrantes improbè ſaepius ipſis objectarunt) ſed diſertè ſententiam ſuam quantum ad Eccleſiarum pacem at que aedificationem ſufficere exiſtimarent, non tantum vivâ voce ſed & ſcripto declararunt. Se nimirum cum aeternum electionis ſingularium perſonarum decretum ponunt, ſimul quo que ponere aeternum de reprobatione & rejectione quarundam ſingularium perſonarum decretum, quum fieri nequeat ut ſit electio, quin ſimul quò que ſit aliqua reprobatio aut derelictio. Difficiles omnes circa hunc articulum quaeſtiones temere excutere, nihil aliud eſſe quam inutilibus diſputationibus & nihil profuturis litibus, Eccleſiam replere, ejus que pacem perturbare. Declarationem ſuam hanc Libello ſupplice expreſſam, moderatis omnibus, pace… que amantibus ingeniis, ſufficere debere: Credi videlicet ac doceri ab ipſis, Deum neminem condemnare, imò verò ne ſtatuiſſe quidem condemnare quenquam niſi juſtè propter propria ipſius peccata: Placuit ita que Illuſt. Ordd. ut miſſis illis ſpinoſis quaeſtionibus, ad articulorum pertractationem deveniretur. And Pag. 136. & 156. I find this objection propoſed by the Remonſtrants in theſe words. Pag. 156. In Collatione Haghienſi Libello ſupplice Illuſt. Hollandiae & Weſtfriziae Ordinibus exhibito, deprecati ſunt Contra-Remonſtrantes ne de reprobatione ageretur: & more at large Pag. 195. Thus, Ipſi Contra-Remonſtrantes cum in Colloquio Haghienſi juſſi eſſent, ad interrogata quaedam noſtra de reprobatione reſpondere Magiſtratui morem gerere gravati fuerint, uſ que adeò ut Collationem caeptam abrumpere ſe malle profiterentur quàm ut ſummarum Poteſtatum imperio ſe conſtringi paterentur, nihil aliud conſcientiae ſuae praetexentes quam quod Eccleſiae aedificationi obfuturam eam agendi rationem judicarent. Now to this Pag. 157. Feſtus Hominus, one preſent in that Conference, ſtands up and anſwers, Expoſuit que paucis quàm non bonâ fide haec de illis dicerentur. Se Libello ſupplice non fuiſſe deprecatos, ne de reprobatione ageretur: caeterùm quia Remonſtrantes ſubdolè in ipſo Collationis initio, ſeptem queſtionibus ſpinoſis ac minime neceſſariis non tantum ad reprobationis, ſed electionis quoque doctrinam ſpectantibus, à recto agendi ordine Contra-Remonſtrantes in ambages adducere conarentur. Contra-Remonſtrantes Libello ſupplice apud Illuſt-Ordd. de tam iniquâ agendi ratione conqueſtos fuiſſe at que ut Remonſtrantibus mandaretur, ne extra juſtam agendi rationem jam inchoatam evagarentur petiiſſe. De reprobatione autem Contra-Remonſtrantes quantum ad aedificationem ſatis erat, ſententiam ſuam clarè ibidem explicaſſe uti ſcriptorum editorum fide probari poteſt. Idem etiam Reverendus & Doctiſſimus vir, D. Joannes Becius qui & ipſe huic interfuerat Collationi, ſuo praeſens comprobabat teſtimonio.
Now I come to the Synod of Dort.
4. This Author ſaith the Remonſtronts were there warned by the Preſident of the Synod, Ut de electione potius quàm de odioſâ reprobationis materiâtagerent. And truly at firſt I wondered not a little, that the Preſident of that Synod ſhould account, the matter of reprobation (which is as much as to ſay, the doctrine of reprobation) an odious matter, an odious doctrine. For we commonly ſignify hereby, ſuch a doctrine as deſerves to be hated; but I thought withall, that they might expreſſe rather, what is the condition of it in the event, namely, that it is entertained with hatred, not of all neither, nor of any of thoſe, that ſubmit their judgements to the word of God; but rather of thoſe, and of thoſe only, who follow the judgement of fleſh and bloud. Yet I thought good to enquire into the truth of the fact here mentioned; and I find it in the page mentioned, and how the Remonſtrants themſelves doe expreſſe this, even as here it is expreſſed, thus, A Reverendo Praeſide moniti ſumus ut à negativis enunciationibus abſtineremus & de electione potius quàm odioſâ reprobationis materiâ ageremus. Yet I confeſſe this did not ſatisfy me; For why ſhould this Author make choyce to expreſſe it in the Remonſtrants termes, rather then in the words of the Preſident himſelfe. Therefore I turne to the beginning of that Seſſion, being Seſſ. 32. There I find this particular, Submonuit & Praeſes ut potius quaeſtionibus illis inhaererent, quae circa ſuavem de electione doctrinam verſarentur, quàm ut d… odiosè doctrinam de reprobatione exagitarent. Now I find a great deale of difference between profeſſing the matter of reprobation, or the doctrine hereof to be odious, and admoniſhing to ſpare the exagitation thereof after an odious manner. This indeed being their uſuall courſe, to make it as odious as they can, like as Arminius, Doctrinam de praedeſtinatione odioſam reddere conabatur, as it is profeſſed in the Preface to thoſe Act. Synod. fol. 7. pag. 2. and fol. 8. pag. 2. They profeſſe in like manner of the Remonſtrants, namely, that in their Remonſtrance they endeavoured, Illuſt. Ordd. odioſam reddere doctrinam Eccleſiarum Reformatarum, and that not only, de divinâ predeſtinatione, but alſo de Gratiâ Dei & Sanctorum Perſeverantiâ, but all this malâ fide, nec ſine apertis, atrocibuſ que calumniis. Moreover I find, Seſſ. 39. pag. 151. this decree of the Synode gratifying the Remonſtrants, and yeelding to their motion made, which was, that they might have liberty to treat as well of reprobation as of election, thus, Quoniam Remonſtrantes aliquoties profeſſi ſunt, ſe per conſcientiam in Synodo ſubſiſtere ulterius non poſſe, niſi prius caveatur ipſis fore, ut de electione & reprobatione, eâ ratione quam in Theſibus & Scriptis ſuis hactenus exhibitis propoſuerunt, in poſterùm agatur. Synodus quò magis ipſis fiat ſatis, publice ac coràm omnibus declarat, ſtatuiſſe ſeſe ac ſtatuere ſententiam ipſorum, non de electione modò, verum etiam de reprobatione expendere at que examinare. Quantum nempe in conſcientiâ ad Dei gloriam, aedificationem & tranquillitatem Eccleſiae, omnium que conſcientiarum poſſe ac debere ſatis eſſe, ipſa judicaret. Ad agendi verò modum, qui hic eſt ſervandus & ordinem quod attinet, ſuum eſſe de eo diſpicere, non autem fratrum Remonſtrantium qui huc ſunt citati, quicquam praeſcribere, exiſtimat. This decree being read to the Remonſtrants, they refuſed to give way unto it. The 40 Seſſion contains the altercation thereabout, between the Synod and them. They forſooth would preſcribe to the Synod de modo Agendi, the Synod muſt not preſcribe to them. And they profeſſe againſt it Seſſ. 41. pag. 155. in this manner, Nec ſatisfit nobis ſi dicatur Synodum permiſſuram, ut nostram de reprobatione ſententiam tractemus quoad illa ipſa ad gloriam Dei, aedificationem Eccleſiarum, conſcientiarum tranquillitatem fore judicabit. Nam hâc ipſâ reſtrictione, nobis praeciditur libertas & plenaria ſententiae noſtrae defenſio, & contrariae Impugnatio. Praeterquam quòd non levis ſuſpicandi nobis data ſit occaſio, Synodum, ubi nos de electione diſſerentes audiverit, nequaquam permiſſuram ut Contra-Remonſtrantium & eorum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, de reprobatione ſententiam prout neceſſarium judicabimus, ad incudem revocari. Hereupon the Synod entreats the judgement of Forraine Divines; and they all with one conſent profeſſe, Tantam Remonſtrantibus libertatem ad defenſionem cauſae ſuae conceſſam eſſe, quantâ ex ratione & dignitate Synodi Citatis concedi poſſet. Ac proinde nullam eſſe cauſam cur Synodicum decretum mutandum videretur, aut cur Remonſtrantes querelam inſtituerent, vel authoritatem hujus Synodi ſubterfugerent. Nihil illis eſſe imperatum quod ullo modo conſcientias ipſorum gravare poſſet. Ac proinde conſcientiae velum fruſtra pervicaciae obtendi. Abundè iis omnibus que modis ſatisfactum jam eſſe. Abſolutam illam, nulliſ que circumſcriptam limitibus libertatem quam petunt, à Synodo concedi ipſis non poſſe. Aequum eſſe ut certis ſeſe legibus ſubmittant, quibus, ſi exorbitent, coërceantur. Nay in the next Seſſion, which is Seſſ. 42. there is a repreſentation made of their unreaſonable demand in theſe words. Profeſſi ſunt ſibi agendi modum a Synodo praeſcriptum, iniquum videri. Sibi permitti velle non tantum primo loco, ſed & circa omnes articulos & Theſes, ſingula que argumenta de ſententiâ Contra-Remonſtrantium, & corum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, quoad reprobationem agere, quia in hoc argumento calceus illos maximè urgeat. Hereupon the Opinions of the forraigne Divines were required, to wit, Whether it were fit to yeeld unto them, as to treat of Reprobation, before they treated of Election, Qui conſentientibus declarabant ſuffragiis, ab omni ratione & methodo eſſe alienum id quod Remonſtrantes peterent, ut prius de reprobatione quàm de electione agere ſibi liceret. Their judgements hereupon are here repreſented ſeverally and at large; Firſt of our Brittiſh Divines, then of the Palatine Divines, then of the Divines of the Land of Heſſe, then of the Helvetians, then of thoſe who were of the correſpondency of Weteraw, then of thoſe of Geneva, then of thoſe of Breme, and laſtly of thoſe of Emden.
5. Upon the former bald and baſe pretences, as if, Concluſum eſſet contrà Manichaeos, the Author proceeds crowing magnificentiſsimè, and demanding in this manner.
Can this doctrine be a truth, and yet bluſh at the light which makes all things manifeſt, eſpecially conſidering theſe things?
1. That Reprobation is a principall Head of practicall Divinity by the well, or ill ſtating, or ordering of which, the glory of God, and good of Religion, is much promoted or hindered.
2. That there is ſuch a neceſſary connexion between the points of election and reprobation (both being parts of predeſtination) that the one cannot be well handled without the other.
3. That Reprobation was the chiefe cauſe of all the uproares in the Churches of that time.
4. That it was accuſed with open mouth and challenged of falſhood, and therefore bound in juſtice to purge it ſelfe of the crimination.
5. That it may eaſily be defended, if (as ſome ſay) it be ſuch an apparent truth. For, Nihil eſt ad defendendum puritate facilius, ſaith St Hierome.
Now albeit for the diſcovery of the vile vanity of this concluſion, I need take no other pains, then to appeal to your, or any ſober mans due conſideration of the premiſes duely examined according to my former anſwer; yet I think good not to paſſe it over without ſuch particular conſideration as it deſerves. Firſt, I pray conſider, what is that light that makes all things manifeſt? Is it the light of Conference? In the Conference of Mompelgard there were diverſe other things diſputed of, beſides this of predeſtination. Now is the truth manifeſted hereby in all thoſe particulars? If it be, I pray, let him ſignify on whoſe ſide, whether on the part of Jacobus Andreas, or on the part of Beza? To whom is it made manifeſt? To either ſide, or only to that ſide, on whoſe ſide this Author conceives the truth to ſtand? Doe you not manifeſtly perceive the crudity of this conceit? Nay, who ſeeth not, that it is not the condition of conference, but the quality rather and ability of the conferrers, that is apt to manifeſt the truth. And ſuch men are able to manifeſt, as well out of conference in their diſcourſes, either Poſitive, or Controverſiall, as in conference; yea, and farre better; Thoſe diſcourſes being more quietly carried, and more free from altercation, then conferences; eſpecially in caſe they meet with malignant oppoſites. And indeed it is the Word of God alone, which is that ſpirituall light, which giveth manifeſtation to all ſpirituall truth. And conſequently neither are they to be cenſured as bluſhing at the light, that prefer to write quietly of theſe controverſies, then to conferre about them in ſome caſes; or that preferre conference by the penne as Beza did, before conference by word of mouth, though this better pleaſed the lipps of Jacobus Andreas. Yet neither Beza did refuſe to yeeld to Andreas his own way, neither did either the Contra-Remonſtrants at the Haghe Conference, or the Divines of Dort, refuſe to treat of reprobation, as well as election, as formerly I have ſhewed by authenticall evidences. But ſuppoſe Beza and his fellowes, whether two or three had altogether declined to conferre at all, as in my judgement they had good reaſon to refuſe, muſt this be cenſured their bluſhing at the light? Auſtin profeſſeth as I have formerly vouched him, that there may be many cauſes of forbearing to deliver the truth at ſome times. He little dreamed of expoſing the truth thereby to ſuch a cenſure, as if it bluſhed at the light. And if ſome few might be juſtly cenſured as bluſhing at the light, muſt all for their ſakes, by the rules of juſtice, be made obnoxious to the ſame cenſure, and not the Doctors only, but the Doctrine it ſelfe? Is it not apparent that a true and ſound doctrine, may be weakly apprehended by many, though learned, and Veritas eſt temporis filia, and the accurate handling and maintaining of the truth in plainer points then this of reprobation, comes not to perfection, but by degrees, and after much ventilating of it in a ruder manner. Thus I think I have crackt the crowne of this concluſion; I may proceed with the greater facility to the reſt.
1. That Reprobation is an Head to any part of practicall Divinity, I never read, nor heard till now. But yet in every theoreticall poynt, as touching the nature of God and his attributes, by the true doctrine thereof, the glory of God, and good of Religion is promoted, & by the erronious doctrine thereabouts it is as much impaired. For like as it is blaſphemy, to attribute that unto God, which doth not become him; ſo is it blaſphemy alſo, to deny unto him that which doth become him. As for the entertaining or refuſing conference thereabouts, I have already ſpoken ſufficiently; yet two particulars more I have to deliver, which I purpoſe to ſubjoyne to the end of thoſe five conſiderations here diſtinguiſhed, as remarkable ones, if my memory failes me not.
2. A Connexion I grant there is, between election and reprobation, and the clearing of the truth in the one, doth give light unto the other. But which of theſe is to be handled firſt, that the clearing of the truth therein, may give light to the ſtating of the other, I ſhould think no ſober man would make queſtion. Yet the Remonſtrants at the Synod of Dort, were eager to begin with Reprobation, but were therein generally cenſured by the conſent of forraine Divines that aſſiſted there. But that one of them cannot be handled without the other, is a palpable untruth, as appears by the very practice of this Author himſelfe, and his own carriage in this buſineſſe. For he undertakes only the poynt of reprobation.
3. As touching the third particular, in charging the doctrine of reprobation, with being the chiefe cauſe of all the uproares in the Church at that time; this author takes to himſelfe a ſtrange liberty of diſcourſe. We read and heare of no ſmall ſtirres in the Church of Rome, between the Dominicans and the Jeſuits; but I never read that the Jeſuits laid to the Dominicans charge, that their Doctrine as touching the predetermination of the creatures will to every act thereof, was the cauſe of any uproare in the Church of Rome: But to the contrary rather. I read that in the contention between the Dominicans and Jeſuits in Rome it ſelfe, wherein Valentianus through ſome heat in diſputation, caught a feaver whereof he dyed within three daies after; of the relation whereof, made by one Pet (that had been a Prieſt) in Oxford I was ſometimes an eare witneſſe. The Jeſuits were rather taxed for their heterodoxy in the poynt de auxiliis, as Petrus Mattheus in his Hiſtory reports it. And from D. Jacksons mouth, I have heard what a Spaniard ſhould deliver upon the mention of Molina the Jeſuit, namely, that he was the man, qui tantos tumultus excitavit, to wit, in Spain. But as for Churches Proteſtant, he doth well to limit his crimination to a certain time. For the ſtirre that was raiſed by Huberus in the Lutheran Churches, was neither cauſed nor occaſioned by our doctrine concerning reprobation. Huberus his cauſe was, a pertinacious ſtanding for an univerſall Election. It ſeems he hath relation only to the Haghe conference, and the uproares, as he calls them, amongſt the States only, and their particular, or provinciall congregations alone (as it ſeems) he denominates the Churches. Now let us conſider, Who made thoſe uproares, were they the Contra-Remonſtrants, or the Remonſtrants only? If he chargeth this upon the Contra-Remonſtrants, let him prove it, leaſt he be juſtly cenſured for one of thoſe wild beaſts, an Emperour was ſometimes warned to beware of, they were the ſlanderers. If the Remonſtrants were the authors of theſe uproares, how doth he prove that the doctrine of reprobation, was the chiefe cauſe of them, Were not thoſe Arminians voluntary agents in thoſe uproares? If they conceived their oppoſites doctrine to be unſound, could they not oppoſe it without uproares, without violent proceedings? Againe, their oppoſites doctrine, was it never received or preached 'till thoſe daies? Or was there any uproare made thereupon, 'till Arminius his innovating? And is that the chief cauſe of an uproare, which hath no ſuch conſequent enſuing untill it meets with ſome turbulent ſpirits, which begin to ſtirre as innovators in a Church or State. And yet was reprobation that alone, whereupon they ſtirred? Is it not apparent, that about the five Articles commonly ſo called, they conferred alike? But he ſaith it was the chiefe cauſe, and only ſaith it, yet Molinaeus profeſſing reprobation to proceed, upon foreſight of finall impenitency, as in truth it cannot be denied, but that as the Contra-Remonſtrants profeſſed, as well in that Conference at the Hague, as in the Synod of Dort, that God did never intend to damne any man of ripe years, but for finall perſeverance in infidelity and impenitency. Did their contentions hereupon, either totally ceaſe or in part? But ſuch criminations are nothing ſtrange. We know after what manner of greeting wicked Ahab ſaluted the holy Prophet Elijah. Art thou he that troubleth Iſrael? but he ſpared not to anſwer him, I am not he that troubleth Iſrael, but Thou and thy Fathers houſe. In the like manner were Paul and Silas entertained Act. 16. 20. when being caught and brought before the Magiſtrates, heard ſuch an accuſation made againſt them, Theſe men which are Jewes trouble our citty: and preach Ordinances which are not lawfull for us to receive, neither to obſerve, ſeeing we are Romans. And no marvaile if the Devill roares, when he falls from heaven, like lightning, and his kingdome is ſhaken. But becauſe he putts us to it in this crimination, I think it fit to give a taſt of the violent proceedings in thoſe parts, as I find them ordered in the Preface to the Synod. Dordrac. ſet forth by the authority of the States. And becauſe uproares concern inſurrections againſt government in Church or State; The firſt particular I obſerve of this nature is, Fol. 3. pag. 1. where after Arminius had been much ſuſpected, and divers times urged to declare his opinion, upon certain poynts which hitherto he had declined, ſaving in a falſe manner, his proteſtation in the iſſue, proving directly contrary to his practice. The Rectors of particular Churches, ſowred with the leaven of his doctrine, openly refuſe to ſubſcribe the Confeſſion of the Catechiſme, though the Synod of South-Holland commanded them. Paſtores Arminii ſententiam amplexi paſſim in Claſſibus recuſabant mandato Synodi de ſubſcriptione Confeſſion is, ac Catecheſeos morem gerere. Here we have the begining of a manifeſt ſchiſme. Now conſider we the progreſſe hereof. Hereupon a reſolution was made (it being high time) by the States, for the calling of a Nationall Synode, in the yeare 1605. about November 26. the execution whereof, was by divers practiſes of the Arminian Faction, delayed, and put off from time to time, for the ſpace of 13 years. Fol. 5. pag. 2. Arminius himſelfe acknowledgeth, de Heterodoxiâ ſuâ varios rumores omnes jam eccleſias pervaſiſſe, incendium que à ſe ſuſcitatum ipſa Eccleſiae tecta ſuper are dici. Fol. 8. pag. 1. In the mean time, Anno 1608. the States declared their purpoſe was, to call a Provinciall Synode in October following, and ſignification hereof being made, the Rectors of particular Congregations, as many as were addicted to Arminius, being admoniſhed to manifeſt their conſiderations in their ſeverall Deanaries, that ſo they might be fairely ſent to the Synod that approached. They put this off alſo. Illi vero ut antea, ita nunc quo que ſinguli conſuetis tergiverſationibus pariter hoc detrectarunt. The like refuſall was afterwards made in the Synod of South-Holland, though they were urged by the Synod to declare themſelves (for as for the Provinciall Synod, that was deferred two months longer.) Whereupon the Synod decreed, that they ſhould give up their conſiderations within a Months ſpace, or be obnoxious to Cenſure Eccleſiaſticall. Hereupon was means made by Utenbogard, for letters from the States unto thoſe Paſtors, to ſend up unto them their conſiderations ſealed, that ſo they might reſerve them to the Provinciall Synod ſhortly to be held. In theſe proceedings a man may eaſily ſmell Barnavells hand all along. Hereupon came forth at length Arminius his Declaration before the States. In anſwer whereunto Gomarus riſeth up, as there we may read, Fol. 6. pag. 2. And amongſt other courſes of Arminius, makes relation of this, as how Spretis Synodorum Claſſium & Prebyteriorum judiciis ac decretis ad ſupremi Magiſtratus tribunal prima inſtantia proſiluiſſe, ibi que querelas at que accuſationes ſuas adverſus Eccleſiarum doctrinam propoſuiſſe, artibuſ que aulicis favorem ſibi Eccleſiis verò odium conſiliare diligenter studiiſſe. And hereupon beſought the States, that ſeeing Contentiones gliſcerent, Eccleſiae turbarentur, Civeſ que in partes diſtraherentur, the Nationall Synod which they had promiſed might be gathered together with the firſt; which yet by the practice of Utenbogard and others was ſtill delayed. Hereupon Arminius his Faction grew ſo bold, as publiquely to Preach againſt the received Doctrine, as Bertius ſpared not to declare himſelfe; but wherein? Mark I pray the Article well, becauſe this Author drawes all to reprobation. Now the Articles whereupon Bertius declared himſelfe, to differ from the Doctrine received, were, De juſtificatione hominis coram Deo, De Praedeſtinatione, De Gratiâ Dei, & libero arbitrio, De Perſeverantiâ fidelium; and upon theſe very points afterwards, proceeded the Conference between Arminus and Gomarus before the States. And one Venator ſpared not publiquely to broach Pelagian and Socinian errours. Whereupon he was ſuſpended by the Churches of North-Holland. In ſpite of whom notwithſtanding, he continued his courſes of Preaching. Now whereas the Orthodox Paſtors in the Deanary of Alomar conſidering he was lawfully ſuſpended, and withall a man of impure life, refuſed to admit him into their company. Hereof complaint was made to the States, and by Utenbogards practice a Mandate obtained from them, that they ſhould admit him. Now when the States conſidering the preſent exigent, were eaſily like to condeſcend to a Provinciall Synode, the Arminians moved, that the Deputies to be ſent thither, ſhould not be appointed thereunto by the Churches, according to the uſuall courſe, but only by the States, preſuming hereby, that either none, but ſuch as favoured their cauſe ſhould be ſent, or at leaſt ſuch as were leſſe alienated from their Opinion. fol. 8. p. But though they could not effect this, yet by their practice it came to paſſe, that the calling, not only of a Provinciall Synode, but of the yearely Synods were hindered. Shortly after this, finding what liberty they had, they met together of their own accord privily, Sine Magiſtratus Supremi authoritate magno numero. At que ibi inter ſe initâ per ſubſcriptionem nominum confaederatione ſeu conſpiratione, manifeſtum in Eccleſiis Reformatis Schiſma inſtituunt. That year came forth the Remonſtrance. Upon this by the practice of the Remonſtrants, Vorſtius is brought in to be a Profeſſor in the place of Arminius. For as touching the exceptions taken againſt him, the Remonſtrants profeſſed before the States, he had given them good ſatisfaction, Fol. 10. pag. 2. Then follow their practiſes for the removing of ſuch Rectors from their Churches, as were their oppoſites, and obtruding upon the people ſuch as were of their own Party. At Alcmar, Adolphus Venator, a man of impure life and faith, moved the people to Armes againſt the Magiſtrate, whereby he was driven to relinquiſh his place, and others brought in of Venator his Faction. Fol. 12. pag. 1. Hereupon the Elders and Deacons of that place were removed, and two Paſtors, the one having formerly executed his Miniſtry amongſt them for fifty years continuance. Grevincovius in like ſort, with the Magiſtracy of Rotterdam, to deprive his Colleague there Cornelius Geſelius of his Miniſtry firſt, and then by their Sergeants to caſt him out of the Citty. Utenbogard ſends Remonſtrants into Utrecht, and amongſt others, Jacobum quendam Taurinum hominem turbulentum & ſaevum. Fol. 12. pag. 2. In Gelderland alſo the ordinary and annuall Synodicall Aſſemblies were hindred by the practice of Utenbogard, like as ſtill they continued withall their art to hinder the calling of a Nationall Synod, ſo often promiſed by the States, and ſo many years deferred. William of Naſſau moved both Utenbogard on the one ſide, and Feſtus Hommius on the other ſide, to conſider of a courſe how theſe ſtirres might be pacified. To which motion Feſtus Hommius makes anſwer, that in caſe the Remonſtrants differed from the Churches only in five Articles, he could think of a courſe whereby ſome peace might be made in the interim, untill a Nationall Synod were gathered. This is the more obſerveable, becauſe this Author layeth all the cauſe of thoſe uproares (as he calls them) upon Reprobation. But he profeſſeth they had great cauſe to ſuſpect the Remonſtrants differed from them in greater points of moment. And theſe are afterwards declared to be theſe, Fol. 14. pag. 1. De perfectâ Chriſti pro peccatis Satisfactione, de Juſtificatione hominis coràm Deo, de Fide Salvificâ, de Peccato Originali, de Certitudine ſalutis, & de Perfectione hominis in hâc vitâ. And whereas, they deſired the Remonſtrants would deale clearly and make known what their opinion was in thoſe poynts: Utenbogard having laboured to have a hearing before the States alone, There traduceth the actions of his Brethren in demanding the Declaration of their minds hereupon, as if this were to bring in a new kind of Inquiſition amongſt them, not to be endured. And hereupon obtaines of the States, that no ſuch Declaration ſhould be required at their hands. And more then that, finding the Deputies of the Synode by their continuall ſollicitations with the States (as it well became them in their places) to be moſt prejudiciall to their proceedings, they brought it ſo to paſſe, that like as formerly their Annuall Synods were hindered, ſo now it was forbidden to the Deputies themſelves, thenceforth to take any ſuch ſtile unto them, or performe any ſuch office as whereabout they were then imployed. And ſo the Relator proceeds in ſetting downe their inſolent courſes untill at length perceiving, that by the mediation of the King of Great Brittaine, all for the moſt part, inclined to the convocation of a Nationall Synod, they fell plainly on, upon theſe deſperate Counſells openly profeſſing that the calling of a Nationall Councell, would prove prejudiciall to the Majeſty and Liberty of the Provinces, manifeſting themſelves hereby utterly averſe from ſuch a courſe; which yet hath been moſt in uſe in the Church of God, and that of ancient times, for the pacifying of contentions ariſing in matter of Religion. I profeſſe, I nothing affect to ſpend time in ſuch ſearches and relations, I had rather imploy it another way, but you ſee I am driven unto it, to repreſent the unſhamefaſed condition of this Narration.
4. And whereas he ſaith, It was accuſed with open mouth, and challenged of falſhood, it is apparent that the Remonſtrants would very well have reſted contented with a mutuall toleration of one another in their ſeverall waies. For when Utenbogard and Feſtus Hommius were to meet together, and treat upon ſome faire courſe of compoſition, Utenbogard, together with thoſe of his ſide, profeſſed they knew no other courſe for ſetling peace, but my mutually tolerating one the other; Feſtus Hommius and others with him on the other ſide, profeſſed they knew no better courſe then convocation of a Nationall Synode, and in the interim to tolerate one another, provided they would declare themſelves to differ from the received doctrine in the Church, in no other points then in the five Articles. But how they carried themſelves herein refuſing to declare themſelves, I have formerly ſhewed. And farther, in the purſuit of this their practice to enjoy toleration, it is farther ſtoried, by what means they procured a Letter from King James to farther them therein, and after that an Edict to that purpoſe from ſome of the States. And conſider farther, If any amongſt us ſhould riſe up, and confederate themſelves and impugne any five Articles of the Church of England, and accuſe us for maintaining erronious doctrine therein, and challenge us for falſhood, if they doe it with never ſo open mouth, ſhall this be ſufficient to juſtify them and condemne us, if wee doe not come to a tryall with them to diſpute the caſe, though Wee are the Poſſeſſours, They the Intruders and Innovators? Wee maintaining no other Doctrine then that which is by Authority eſtabliſhed amongſt us, and They which impugne the doctrine received, are they not uſually judged amongſt us, as ſuch who are rather to be cenſured then diſputed with? And withall conſider, that this mutua tolerantia, which the Remonſtrants ſo much preſſed and were ſo glad to enjoy, was with greateſt inſtance ſtood for long after the Conference at the Hague. Laſtly, how often was Arminius himſelfe queſtioned and called upon to give ſatisfaction for his Heterodoxies, and how often did he decline it? When at the firſt, Motion was made for his ſurrogation into the place of Iunius beind deceaſed, then the ſuſpicions of his Heterodox breaking forth, and they of Amſterdam not well likeing to let him goe from them, amongſt whom at that time, he exerciſed his Miniſtry; and that becauſe they obſerved his luxuriant and novelizing Wit, which was like to breed dangerous effects in an Univerſity: at length upon the great inſtance both of Utenbogard and Arminius himſelfe, way was made for him unto the Chayre, upon condition he ſhould conferre with Gomarus upon ſome chief heads of Doctrine, and by a round declaration of his mind thereon, remove all ſuſpicion of Heterodoxy, having formerly by a ſolemne Proteſtation given his word, that in caſe he had any ſingular opinion of his own, he would not ſpread it. Hereupon he made open profeſſion, that he condemned the chiefe Pelagian opinions concerning grace naturall, the ſtrength of Free-will, Originall ſinne, the perfection of man in this life, and Predeſtination, and that he approved all thoſe diſputes, which Austin and other Fathers had written againſt them; and that in his judgement the Pelagian errours were rightly refuted by thoſe Fathers, and withall promiſed, that he would teach nothing that differed from the received Doctrine of the Churches; and hereupon he was admitted to a Profeſſors place in the Univerſity. In the beginning whereof he laboured by all means to quench all ſuſpicion of Heterodoxy in himſelfe, and maintained the doctrine of the Reformed Churches, De ſatisfactione Chriſti, de Fide juſtificante, de juſtificatione per fidem, de Perſeverantiâ verè fidelium, de Certitudine ſalutis, de Perfectione hominis in hac vitâ &c. all which he afterwards contradicted, as alſo did his Followers. This I ſay, he then at the firſt maintained publiquely, contrà ſententiam ſuam (which let every man judge, whether it be not as much as to ſay, againſt his own Conſcience) and Corvinus is alleaged as in a certain Writing of his ſet forth in Low-Dutch ingeniouſly profeſſing as much, Praefat, in Synod. Dordracen, Authoritate Ordinum Fol. 2. p. 1. But after he had been a yeare or two in the place, he begins to unmaske himſelfe, and by his Publique Lectures, and chiefly by his dealing with his Schollers in private, his heterodoxy diſcovered it ſelfe. Here upon the deputies from the Churches of South and North Holland are ſent unto him, who acquaint him with the rumours that went of him, praying him that if he diſliked ought in the doctrine received, he would ſincerely declare it unto his Brethren, to the end, either by a friendly Conference, he might receive ſatisfaction, or the whole buſineſſe might lawfully be put over to the conſideration of a Synod. Arminius his anſwer was, that he never gave any juſt cauſe, why ſuch rumour ſhould be ſpread of him, neither was it wiſdome for him to treat with them as with Deputies, that ſhould make relation of the whole matter to a Synod, though as private perſons, he refuſed not to conferre with them, provided that in caſe they differed, no relation hereof ſhould be made unto a Synod. The Church of Leyden alſo admoniſhed him, that there might be a Conference between him and his Colleagues, before the Presbytery of that Church. To them he anſwered he could not yeeld thereto, without leave from the Gurators of the Univerſity, and that he perceived not, that any benefit was like to redound unto the Church by ſuch a Conference. At another time Fol. 4. p. 2. being entreated by the Profeſſors and Paſtors with great earneſtneſſe, that if he had ought to ſay againſt the doctrine received in their Confeſſion and Catechiſme, he would freely and brotherly communicate it unto them, promiſing their endeavours to give him full ſatisfaction, or if not ſo, yet that he and his Colleagues under certain conditions might come to a faire agreement, to live together in peace, and that the reconciliation being made, nothing which paſſed between them ſhould be divulged. The anſwer he made, was this, It was no wiſe part for him to yeeld to their motion, neither was he bound thereto, the preſent meeting being not ordained unto any ſuch purpoſe, fol. 5. p. 2. Gomarus openly tells him, how it became him to declare his opinion, ne que ejuſmodi ſubterfugiis diutius hâc in re uti, & fol. 6. p. 2. before the States he repreſents his continuall practice thereunto, in concealing his Opinion, His words are theſe, Quibus inſuper artibus opiniones ſuas diſſeminare; Publicè ſcilicet ab Eccleſiis rogatum obteſtatum que , ſententiam ſuam occultare, privatim vero Paſtoribus quos in eam pertrahi poſſe ſperaret, ac diſcipulis ſuis diligentèr eam inculcare; argumenta Noſtrorum praecipua quibus astrui doctrina Orthodoxa ſoleret enervare, Jeſuitarum verò aliorum que Adverſariorum, quibus doctrinam Eccleſiarum Reformatarum oppugnant confirmare, Varias de doctrinae receptae Veritate dubitationes diſcipulorum animis ingerere, eandem que cum doctrinâ heterodoxâ prius, quaſi in aequilibrio ſuſpendere, ac deinde prorſus rejicere, nullam hactenus ſinceritatis ac conſenſus in doctrinâ, licet ſaepius ab Eccleſiis amanter fraterne que rogatum Declarationem edere voluiſſe. Now let any indifferent perſon compare the carriage of Arminius the Innovator, with the carriage of the Contra-Remonſtrants, ſtanding for the doctrine heretofore received, and judge impartially which of them betrayes the greater diſtruſt of the integrity of their Cauſe.
5. As for the eaſineſſe of defending it, if it be not, or were not ſo in their opinion, who are here pretended to have declined the ſifting of it, What is that to the purpoſe? Then who are they, who ſay it may ſo eaſily be defended? I never read any hitherto, who doe not acknowledge a great myſtery in the divine providence. And from the daies of Anſelme unto this preſent day, it hath ever been accounted (in my obſervation) a very difficult poynt to accord predeſtination divine, with the liberty of mens wills. But put the caſe it may eaſily be defended, as of evident truth by the word of God, yet notwithſtanding, if it be found harſh to mens affections, are they likely to admit it with ſuch eaſe? I ſhould think it ought to be put out of queſtion, that God hath mercy on whom he will, in beſtowing faith and repentance upon them, and thereby curing their naturall infidelity and hardneſſe of heart, as alſo that God hardneth whom he will, leaving their infidelity and hardneſſe of heart uncured; yet when fleſh and bloud riſeth up againſt this doctrine thus, Why then doth God complaine; (to wit, of mans diſobedience) for who hath reſiſted his will? And the Apoſtle addreſſeth hereunto no other anſwer but this, O man who art thou who diſputeſt with God? ſhall the thing formed ſay to him that formed it, why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the ſame lump, to make one veſſell unto honour, another unto diſhonour? Is fleſh and bloud, I pray, apt to reſt ſatisfied with this?
Now as touching the two things I promiſed to adde, they are theſe.
1. I pray conſider whether in all this, this Author doth not very judiciouſly pronounce ſentence againſt himſelfe. For you know, your own motion you made unto him, and the promiſe he made unto you; and I pray conſider how anſwerable hereunto hath been his performance. The certain Controverſies, as touching which he profeſſeth change of Opinion, what are they, but the five Articles ſo much agitated between the Remonſtrants, and the Contra-Remonſtrants? Doe you not perceive how he makes choyce only of reprobation to grate upon? Is he not content to lye cloſe as touching foure of them? What is this, but according to his language, the coveting of corners? And what willingneſſe of abideing the tryall doth this manifeſt? Yet he pleaſeth himſelfe in a conceit, of being as free from guile, as David was when he offered himſelfe to the Lords tryall, and thereupon advanceth himſelfe to the greater liberty of cenſuring others, ſuch as Beza, and Muſculus, and their Fellowes, together with the Contra-Remonſtrants, as too full of that guile, whereof himſelfe, by virtue not of his Free-will, but of a grace of God of his ſhapeing, is voyd. This is an uſuall courſe with thoſe of his ſpirit, whereof I have had plentifull experience in this very kind. For if you believe them, all the Arminians Geeſe are Swannes, and all our Swannes are Geeſe in compariſon to them. He hopes you will not think he hates the light, or refuſeth to come to the light, (in his phraſe) this is the cenſure he liberally beſtowes upon his oppoſites. For though ſome of our Divines are willing enough to treat of the five Articles, yet to treat of reprobation, which is a part of one of thoſe, they are not ſo willing, but this young Maſter in Iſrael, out of the plerophorious conceit of his own integrity and ſufficiency, is very willing to treat of this of reprobation, though he leaves all the reſt alone. Yet I pray make the ſcales even, What inſtance can be given, I doe not ſay of Beza, Muſculus, or any one of the Contra-Remonſtrants, but of any one of the like condition to himſelfe, that being entreated by a friend (as this Author was by you) to ſhew the reaſons, why he hath changed his mind from Arminianiſme, to the oppoſite opinions, hath carried himſelfe, as this Author hath done, to give his reaſons only on the part of one of them, and yet paſſeth his cenſure ſo prodigally on others for refuſing triall, by the way implying, a glorious oſtentation of his own performances to the contrary, as if he had done a notable piece of ſervice, whereas all that he hath performed hereon, by proofe from teſtimonies of Scripture, are little more then two Leaves, and therein alſo as it were purpoſely, declines all thoſe places, wherein the Scripture ſpeaketh directly of election, predeſtination, and of that, which in effect, is all one with reprobation. Such places pregnantly ſpeaking hereof, he purpoſely declines, and yet he calls the places he inſiſts upon, pregnant teſtimonies; and indeed ſo they are, but nothing at all to the purpoſe of predeſtination, election, or reprobation. Yet I marvaile not he is ſo well conceited of his atchievements. I remember the Fable of the fly, ſitting on a Cart-wheele, in a dry ſummers day, and ſaying, See what a duſt I make. For, becauſe he hath diſcharged himſelf ſo unworthily with you, he may be bold to conceit, that if he had to deale with Beza, or with any of the Contra-Remonſtrants, or of the Synod of Dort, he would make it ſoon appeare, that Hereſy and untruth condemnes it ſelfe (this is the ſweet accommodation he makes of that the Apoſtles foreign) to wit, by their refuſing the touch-ſtone, and his readineſſe backed with all ſufficiency to come thereto, whereof he hath given ſo plentifull demonſtration in this he hath written unto you; as if he had been with ſome Oracle of late, who had not only revealed unto him, ſome reaſonable motives, and wiſe carriages of the matter, but inſpired him alſo with ſome martiall ſpirit, fit for any encounter, deſpiſing his Adverſaries, as empty Schollers, and as if their parts were but copper, to his gold. Therefore he may take heart to ſpeak boldly, and ſhew himſelfe in the clear day, when ſuch as Beza make choyce to walk in miſtrs, and dwell in ſilence. Beſides his care is very Apoſtolicall for the peace of the Church, whereas Beza's was not at Mompelgard, nor the Contra-Remonſtrants, neither at the Hague Conference, or at the Synod of Dort. For none of theſe belike, have been ſo forward to ſhew themſelves unto the World, and upon the ſtage, for the maintenance of their doctrine (at leaſt in the poynt of reprobation) no not Beza in his Lectures upon the ninth to the Romans. Yet neither this man nor his Oracle hath done ought that I know, but in corners. And in corners I find theſe ſpirits exceeding buſy; and I have been ſo happy (for ſo I account it, although I confeſſe my time might be farre more profitably beſtowed) as to meet with ſome of their Myſteries, ere I was aware. And I find their Lyons skinnes, doe ſmell farre more of the Fox then of ehe Lyon.
2. The ſecond is this, Why ſhould their carriage be any prejudice to others, who are as willing to give an account of their faith in theſe particulars, as any Arminian whatſoever. For my part, I never met with any of them, that I declined, nor I hope never ſhall. I heartily wiſh, time might ſerve me for them all. I have dealt with Arminius his Examen, his Conference with Junius, Corvinus his anſwer unto Tilenus, I have entred upon Voſſius his Pelagian Hiſtory. I deſire I might have time and opportunity, for their Synodalia Dordracena, but moſt of all with the Jeſuits; while I deale with them I learne ſomewhat, but nothing at all while I am occupied with the Arminians.
3. Let mee adde one thing more: In the Articles of our Church, the ſeaventeenth is concerning Predeſtination and Election, not one concerning Reprobation. If any of us, ſhould forbeare to meddle with the doctrine of reprobation in diſpute, may we not juſtly plead, a faire conformity to the wiſdome of the Church whereof we are members? And by the way to touch one thing, Might not this be the reaſon, why this author utterly pretermits the proſecuting his opinion concerning Predeſtination and election, to wit, leaſt thereby he ſhould fall foule upon the doctrine of our Church, ſo evidently ſet downe in that Article concerning the poynt of Predeſtination? The Church of Ireland content themſelves, with the very forme of that 17th Article of ours concerning Predeſtination: Only they premiſe two Theſes; the one whereof is this, God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable Councell ordaine, whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe, yet ſo, as thereby no violence is offered to the Wills of the reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty, nor the contingency of the ſecond cauſe is taken away, but eſtabliſhed rather; The other this, By the ſame eternall Counſell, God hath Predeſtinated ſome unto life, and Reprobated ſome unto death, of both which there is a certain number, known only unto God, which neither can be increaſed nor diminiſhed.