The Riches of Gods Love, Part 50 – Part 55
IEANES.
FIrſt, you cannot deny but that in theſe words of Chriſt, Father if it be poſſible, or if it be thy will, let this cup paſſe from me, Chriſt prayed not as a Mediator for his elect, for ſo he was ingaged to drinke off this Cup; but as a man naturally declining, and abhorring death, and the ignominy of the Croſſe, as they are in themſelves evill: and yet all your arguments, mutatis mutandis, with due change may be applied unto this interpretation, as well as unto D. Twiſſe his notion (as you call it) upon Luke 23. 34.
Secondly, in anſwer unto your objections, we may make uſe of a diſtinction of prayer, brought by Suarez in tertiam partem Sum. Aquin. q. 21. Art. 4. Prayer is nothing elſe but an unfolding of the will unto God. Now in Chriſts manhood there was a twofold will, one abſolute and effectuall, another conditionall and uneffectuall, which may otherwiſe be termed, a velleity, a will of ſimple complacency, a will of a thing only ſecundum quid, in ſome particular reſpect, according to ſome particular conſideration: of ſuch a will of his we read. Mar. 7. 24. He entred into an houſe, and would have no man know it, but he could not be hid. Anſwerable unto theſe two acts of the will in Chriſt, there may be attributed unto Chriſt two ſorts or kinds of prayer; one proceeding from an abſolute and effectuall will, and this was alwaies heard: the other from a conditionall and uneffectuall will, and this was not alwaies heard; ſuch was his prayer in his agony, let this cup paſſe from me: and of this ſort or kind of prayer, is that paſſage, Pſal. 22. 2. In reference unto Chriſt, underſtood, O my God, I cry in the day time, but thou heareſt not, and in the night ſeaſon and am not ſilent.
Now to apply this diſtinction, Chriſt could not pray as a private man for thoſe of his perſecutors, for whom he did not pray as a Mediator, if we ſpeake of that kind of Prayer, which cometh from an abſolute and effectuall will, which is ſtyled by Gregory de Valentia, Voluntas rationis undequaque deliberatae, becauſe it proceedeth upon regard had to all circumſtances: And the reaſon is, becauſe with this kind of Prayer, he never prayed for any thing, but what he knew would be granted; for he never abſolutely and effectually willed any thing, but what was agreeable unto Gods abſolute will, the will of his decree or good pleaſure, and this is all that your arguments can prove. But yet notwithſtanding this, he might pray (taking prayer for a repreſentation of a conditionall or uneffectuall will) for the pardon of even thoſe of his perſecutors, who he knew ſhould be condemned, and for whom therefore he prayed not as Mediator: or more plainly, he might expreſſe a velleity, a gracious, mercifull, and charitable deſire, to have all his crucifyers pardoned, ſo as it were not contrary unto Gods decree, unto which he did ſubmit, and in which he did acquieſce, as he did in his prayer for the removall of his Paſſion, not my will but thy will be done.
An anſwer very like unto, if not coincident with this, may be eaſily gathered out of D. Twiſſe; and it is, that Chriſt, as a private man, prayed for the pardon of all his perſecutors, taking prayer for an expreſſion of Chriſts antecedent will, not as prayer is a repreſentation of his conſequent will.
An Antecedent will, as Alvarez explaines it, is the willing of a thing conſidered abſolutely, as it is in it ſelfe, abſtracting from all other conſiderations of it: A conſequent will, is the willing of a thing conſidered with all circumſtances wherewith it is clothed. Thus a Merchant willeth the preſervation of his wares with an antecedent will, as the preſervation of his wares is conſidered in it ſelfe; but he doth not will it with a conſequent will, as it is conſidered with this circumſtance, as 'tis accompanied with hazard, and danger of his life. Thus alſo a judge with an antecedent will, willes the life of a Priſoner, becauſe his life is in it ſelfe, a thing good and deſireable: but he doth not will it with a conſequent will, as he is guilty of Murther, inceſt, or any the like capitall crime.
Now D. Twiſſe, though he reject the application of this diſtinction to God, with whoſe ſimplicity and infinite knowledge ſeverall ſucceſſive conſiderations of one and the ſame thing are utterly incompetible, yet he denyeth not, but it may have place in the manhood of Chriſt. Ratione diverſarum conſiderationum non nego (ſaith he) diſtinctionem istam competere poſſe in hominem; quippe cui variae conſiderationes occurrere poſſunt invicem ſuccedentes: ſic Christus naturali ſui conſervandi deſiderio ferebatur, cum a patre peteret, ut calix tranſiret; at conſideratâ voluntate & decreto patris de Calice iſto ad bibendum ipſi propinato, eidem ſe ſubmittere conſultum duxit. This diſtinction in regard of diverſe conſiderations of one and the ſame thing, may be aſcribed unto man, in whom are found ſeverall conſiderations of the ſame thing ſucceeding one another: So Chriſt as man, out of a naturall deſire of ſelfe-preſervation, prayed that the cup of his paſſion might paſſe from him; but the will or decree, the command of his Father, his owne office, and mans ſalvation being conſidered, he ſubmitted himſelfe to the drinking up of this cup, even to the very dreggs; nevertheleſſe not my will but thy will be done. Luk. 22. 42. If this cup may not paſſe away from me except I drinke it, thy will be done. Mat. 26. 42. He did not will his paſſion with an Antecedent will, but he willed it (you ſee) with a Conſequent will. Joh. 4. 34. And ſo he prayed againſt it, as a prayer is a propoſall of an Antecedent, not conſequent will.
Now that Doctor Twiſſe reſembles this prayer of Chriſt, for the forgiveneſſe of all his crucifyers, unto Chriſts deprecation of his death and paſſion, and makes it to be as that, an expreſſion only of an antecedent will, a deſire of their pardon, conſidered abſolutely in it ſelfe, abſtracting from Gods decree unto the contrary, I ſhall evidence by giving you D. Twiſſe his own words. Vind. lib. 1. p. 2. pag. 188. Non dicit Molinaeus iſtam voluntatem Chriſti hominis, ſecundum quam oravit pro crucifigentibus ipſum, contrariam fuiſſe voluntati divinae; potuit enim fieri cum ſubmiſſione voluntati Dei tacite factâ, licet non expreſsà, ad formulam precationis illius: pater tranſeat a me calix iste; Sed non mea voluntas fiat, ſedtua. And againe afterwards in the ſame page. Annon homini ſanctiſſimo convenit, privatam offenſam remittere, & palam protestari, ſe (niſi Deus aliter statuiſſet) percupere ut ipſis ignoſceret; de quibus tamen Deus aliter forſitan constituerit, quod & ipſi forſitan innoteſcit? Annon petiit ſalvator, & ardenter obſecravit, ut ſi poſſibile eſſet, calix tranſiret, cum tamen Deum aliter conſtituiſſe, ne ſcilicet eum tranſiret calix, ipſi ſatis constaret? &c. Denique, Chriſtum illis bene voluiſſe, ut homo erat, quos antecedaneo decreto ab omnis boni ſpe ac poſſeſſione abſolute excluſit Deus; hoc enim addendum fuit (licet illud fraudulenter nimiùm diſſimulet Corvinus) etiam haec ſententia quid horrendi, quaeſo te inculcat? Praeſertim cum non ſic voluiſſe dicamus, conſideratâ istâ, de eorum a ſalute excluſione, voluntate divinâ; ſed duntaxat, ſi per voluntatem Dei aliter constitutum non fuiſſet, & ſi penes ipſum eſſet, ut eligeret, utrum in perſecutores ipſius vindictam exerceret, aut ſuſpenderet; pro eâ quam ut homo in omnes (etiam in injuriis remittendis) charitatem exercere debuit, vindictam ſuſpenſam mallet quam exercitam.
And this in generall unto all your Arguments, I ſhall ſay ſomething to each of them apart.
Mr GOODWIN.
FOr very unlikely it is, that Christ being now in a full investiture of his great office of Mediator, ſhould wave his intereſt in Heaven, by means hereof in his addreſſements unto God for men, and pray only in the capacity and according to the intereſt and duty of a private man.
IEANES.
VNleſſe variation of Phraſes be argumentative, here is nothing but a begging of the queſtion, only it is in ſtate and good language.
MR GOODWIN
This would argue that he prayed not for them with his whole heart.
IEANES.
IF we underſtand Prayer in the ſenſe but now mentioned, what abſurdity is it to ſay, that Chriſt, as a private man, prayed for the forgiveneſſe of all his perſecutors with his whole heart, that is, as intenſely, earneſtly, vehemently, and zealouſly as he could, in the utmoſt degree poſſible to an humane nature. In Luk. 22. 44. 'tis ſaid, that Chriſt prayed foreign more earneſtly, and his Sweat was as it were great drops of bloud falling downe to the ground. That this prayer was with the whole heart of Chriſt, you will not deny, and yet the former part of this prayer (if thou be willing remove this cup from me) was not the prayer of Chriſt as Mediator, but only an expreſſion of an antecedent or conditionall will and deſire, like unto this his prayer upon the Croſſe for the juſtification of all his perſecutors.
There is nothing conſiderable which can be objected againſt this, but that hereupon it would follow, that ſeeing prayer is a repreſentation of the will before God, that therefore in Chriſt there are two contrary wills, if he prayed for the pardon of all his perſecutors as a private man, and did not pray for it, but rather againſt it, as a Mediator.
But this receives a very eaſy ſolution. To will or not to will, or nill one and the ſame object, are not contrary, unleſſe it be in reſpect of the ſame circumſtances or conſiderations. For Chriſt as a private man, out of humane pitty to wiſh and deſire the juſtification of all his crucifiers, as a thing good and deſireable, if God had not decreed otherwiſe; and not to will, but rather nill the juſtification of ſome of them, upon conſideration that they are not given unto him by the Father, but excluded from ſalvation by the will of his decree or purpoſe; theſe indeed are diverſe, but not repugnant acts of the will, becauſe they proceed upon generall conſiderations, and therefore though the object be one materially, yet 'tis formally diverſified: Thus between Chriſts deſire of declining his death, and his willing acceptance thereof, there was a diverſity, but no contrariety, becauſe they were not in reſpect of the ſame circumſtances; he deſired to decline it, as it was in it ſelfe evill, and contrary to nature; but as the meanes of mans ſalvation, he joyfully embraced it.
To cleare this farther, I ſhall propound a diſtinction of contraries out of Rada. Part. 3. Controv. 10. Art. 2. Contraria ſunt in duplici differentiâ, alia abſoluta, quae a quibuſcun que causis cauſentur contraria ſunt; ut calor & frigns, quae non dicunt eſſentialem ordinem, & dependentiam ad aliquid extrinſecum, exceptâ dependentiâ ad cauſam: Alia ſunt contraria, quae & dicunt ordinem, & dependentiam eſſentialem, non ſolum ad ſuas cauſas, ſed ad alia extrinſeca, & objecta; cujuſmodi ſunt ſcientia & ignorantia, velle & nolle, gaudium & triſtitia; quocirca non erunt contraria niſi ad idem formale objectum comparentur.
MR GOODWIN.
THis would argue that he did not pray for them with an effectualneſſe of deſire to obtaine what he prayed for.