The Riches of Gods Love, Answer 1

The Riches of Gods Love · Answer 1

p. 175An Anſwer to a Letter of D. H. concerning Gods Decrees definite or indefinite; By Dr. TWISSE.

SIR,

YOur Letter hath two parts, the one concerning the decree of God, eſpecially in compariſon between a decree indefinite and definite; the other concerning the election of Angels: Of both in order.

I.

Concerning the firſt, I will endeavour to ſatisfie you my way; and if that ſucceeds not, to gratifie you your own way.

My conceit of a decree indefinite, propoſed digreſſ. 3. cap. 6. you preferre as more 1,ſuitable to my manner of ordering Gods decrees. Three reaſons there I propoſed why I durſt not imbrace that conceit.

1. The firſt was, becauſe it ſeems to be of a more imperfect nature then is fit to be attributed to God.

To this is anſwered, that we need not to attribute any ſuch decree to God, but onelyonly to reſolve a definite decree of God into two conceits, according to our apprehenſion, whereof the one is indefinite, the other definite; As in Gods purpoſe to make Peter and Paul veſſels of mercy, there are included two conceits in our apprehenſion; the one indefinite, to wit, to make ſome veſſels of mercy; the other definite, to wit, that Peter and Paul ſhall be two of them. You ſeem to approve of this.

Now I have cauſe to doubt of the ſoundneſſe of this, for theſe reaſons, 1. If no ſuch decree can be attributed to God, then in vain doe we diſcourſe of the priority thereof before other decrees of God, which indeed are attributed to him, and that decently. And indeed all the decrees whereof we diſpute are truely attributed unto God, though they have not that diſtinction one from another in God as the like decrees are diſtinguiſhed in man. And an indefinite decree, reliſhing of imperfection, both in that reſpect cannot be decently attributed unto God, as alſo becauſe it doth imply an indefinite and confuſe knowledge in God. 2. The priority of decrees in God, is onelyonly ſecundum rationem, and this Durand expounds moſt clearly in this manner, quando ratio unius ſumitur ab altero, in 1. diſt. 41. q. 2. ſo ratio mediorum ſumitur à ratione finis. But ratio decreti definiti non ſumitur a ratione deoreti indefiniti. Becauſe God intends ſuch an end, therefore God doth appoint ſuch and ſuch means: but it cannot be ſaid, that, becauſe God doth intend to make ſome indefinitely to be veſſels of mercy, therefore he doth intend that Peter and Paul ſhall be two of them.

2. My two other objections are theſe, Indefinites are before definites onelyonly in ſuch ſort as communia are priora ſpecialibus, and this is onelyonly prioritate naturae generantis, non intendentis; and we ſpeak of priority in intention, not in the way of generation. And again, that which is firſt in the way of generation, is laſt in intention; and therefore this makes rather againſt it, than for it.

To this you anſwer, that rather on the contrary Univerſalia are priora ſingularibus, non tam natura generante, quam intendente. For Homo prius intenditur quam Socrates: Non enim ſpecies eſt propter Individuum, ſed Individuum propter ſpeciem. Or, if this be not true in univerſalibus phyſicis, yet is it in politicis ſive aggregatis, which have a more reſemblance to our preſent matter.

To this I anſwer, 1. The compariſon we ſpeak of between a decree indefinite and definite, is not the ſame with a compariſon between the ſpecies and the ſingular; but only as between ſingulars and ſingulars; ſingulars indefinitely propoſed as aliqui, and ſingulars propoſed definitely, as Hic & ille, Peter and Paul. Now though individuum be propter ſpeciem, as that which nature intends principally; and individua for the maintenance of the ſpecies: yet is it not ſo congruous to ſay, that particulars definite are for particulars indefinite, &c. The inſtance I gave in reducing it to a compariſon between generalia and ſpecialia, was to bring it, as neere as I could, to ſuch a State wherein the evidence of truth might plead for it ſelfe. As indeed it is manifeſt, that generalia are onelyonly priora ſpecialibus quoad naturam generantem, ſpecialia priora generalibus quoad naturam intendentem; which I delivered out of the remembrance of my old Philoſophy, as a thing which I conceived to be without queſtion. Zabarell de methodis lib. 1. cap. 6. Ordo naturae non unus eſt, ſed multiplex, vel ſaltem duplex: Non ſolum p. 176enim ſimplicia ſunt naturae priora compoſitis, ſed etiam compoſita ſimplicibus, ut ex Ariſtotele colligimus, in cap. 1. lib. 2. de partibus animalium: ſi namque ordinem naturae intelligamus habita ratione generationis naturae, elementa ſunt priora miſto, miſtum animali, animal homine; quod ſi per ordinem naturae intelligamus ordinem perfectionis ſeu ordinem ſcopi & intentionis naturae, homo eſt natura prior animali, animal miſto, & miſtum elementis. But I confeſſe the caſe is different between a ſpecies and the particulars thereof, whether we conſider nature particular, or nature univerſall: For, as for nature particular, though it intends and works onelyonly for a particular like it ſelfe; yet, whereas particulars may be infinite, and it is found to have no power to produce one particular rather then another; this conſideration hath puzled many in enquiring how it comes to paſſe that this particular agent brings forth this particular effect at ſuch a time; whereas he was indifferent to have brought forth any one particular of many thouſands in that kind. And, after Suarez in his Metaphyſicks hath tryed many waies hereabouts, at length reſolves upon Ariminenſis his invention, who reduceth it to the determination of Gods will: and this conceit, after Suarez, is embraced with great approbation by Hurtado de Mendoza. Which becauſe it concerneth a manner of Gods concourſe, and that a very ſtrange one, as they expound it; I have taken occaſion to conſider it in a peculiar digreſſion. So that in that caſe the particular produced is not intended by nature at all (as being indifferent to any) but left to be determined by the will of God. And as for nature univerſall, whoſe end is the maintenance of the univerſe in the ſeverall kinds of the parts thereof; it likewiſe, ſo there be particulars ſucceeding whereby the ſpecies rerum are maintained, regards not at all, whether theſe particulars be produced or others. But theſe intentions are not anſwerable to the intentions of God, which are altogether of particulars, whereupon mans underſtanding works in drawing therehence unities ſpecificall and genericall, according to that of Ariſtotle, Animal aut nibil eſt aut poſterius eſt. And Navarrettus, writing of divine concourſe; ſuppo…endum eſt id quod ſolent Logici & Metaphyſici dicere de unitate univerſa… quae non eſt unitas poſitiva ſed negativa: Non enim univerſale eſt poſitive unum in multis ſed cum reperiatur plurificatum in multis, & non magis determinatum ad unum quam ad alterum, habet in ſe quandam indifferentiam, non quidem poſitivam reſpectu multorum, atque adeo non habet unit atem poſitivam; ſed negative ſe habet ad illa multa, & conſequenter, eſt unum negative in multis, hoc est, habet unitatem quae non magis reperitur in uno inferiorum quam in altero. But yet the caſe I ſay in preſent conſiſts not in compariſon between a ſpecies and the ſingulars thereof, but between particulars and particulars; either as indefinitely conſidered under the notion of aliqui, or definitely under the notions of Hic & ille.

But you think in univerſalibus Politicis, as in the gathering of an Army, or erecting of a Colledge, the truth you ſpeak of is more apparent, and the reſemblance more congruous to the matter in hand. Let us conſider them. A certain number of Souldiers for compleating of an army I confeſſe is intended firſt, afterwards a choyce of perſons: ſo the maintenance of a certain number of Schollars is intended firſt, and afterwards they proceed to the election of Schollers. Here is totum per aggregationem, but it is by aggregation of parts in a certain kind, which is of greateſt conſideration, to wit, of parts ſucceeding one another, as a river is ſaid to be one by ſucceſſion of parts which never return. All which parts are impoſſible to be ſubject to the conſideration of the Founder or Generall, becauſe the Colledge continueth long after the Founder is dead, and ſo may the Army alſo, one Generall ſucceeding another by the appointment of the State. A more proper reſemblance is found in a man purpoſing to diſtribute a ſumme of money to a certain numbr of perſons: as, put the caſe, twenty pound to forty perſons, as a Gentleman hath dealt with our town. The choyce of ſuch perſons as are moſt neceſſitous he leaveth to ſome perſons of truſt. Now, if the Gentleman himſelfe knew of himſelfe every perſon in the Town, and their neceſſitous condition; from the firſt undoubtedly he would appoint, not a certain number indefinitely to receive it, but aſſigne rather ſuch perſons particularly on whom it ſhould be beſtowed. And in like ſort a Generall were it in his power to leavy whom he liſt, and withall knew for certain every mans ſufficiency, he would from the firſt reſolve upon and deſigne, not onelyonly ſuch a number, but ſuch particular perſons alſo for that ſervice: And, that in the ordinary courſe it is otherwiſe, this proceeds from ſuch an imperfection as is not incident unto God. And laſt of all, both the Generall and the Founder have reſpect to fitneſſe in them whom they chooſe, which it is not in their p. 177power to procure. But God hath power to provide himſelfe both of fitneſſe and of perſons alſo to that ſervice whereto he is pleaſed to deſigne them. Yet Didacus Alvarez ſeems to acknowledge ſuch an indefinite decree, and he is gravis author I confeſſe: And he plainly profeſſeth, that permiſſio peccati prop…r quod quis damnatur eſt effectus reprobationis. Whence it manifeſtly followeth, Firſt, that the reprobation of Infants as many as die in originall ſinne in their infancy, cannot premiſe the foreſight of originall ſinne, becauſe they undergoe condemnation onelyonly for originall ſinne. Secondly, that no mans Reprobation can premiſe originall ſinne, becauſe every man that undergoes condemnation, undergoes it not for actuall ſinnes onelyonly, but originall alſo: yet this tenet of his he delivereth not obiter, but maintaines it eagerly by argument. As for this of an indefinite degree, he toucheth onelyonly by the way, without ſo much as explication of his meaning therein. And again in that diſcourſe of his he hath ſome other ſtrange conceits, as I have ſhewed in my firſt digreſſion upon election: in the peruſing whereof at this time it ſeems, you are. As for Beza, that which I there delivered is meerly by collection: but what his opinion was, may appeare by his own expreſſion, De praedeſtinatione, in 9. ad Rom. in theſe words, Denique verbum iſtud [Faciendi] & nomen [Luti] ac [Maſſae] adhue informis, manifeſte mihi quidem videtur declarare, Deum in hac ſimilitudine nobis preponi, de humanototo genere in primo illo homine, protoplaſto propterea vocato, condendo ſtatuentem; unde Singuli homines ad finem uſque ſeculorum propagarentur, eo jam tum conſilio, ut in unis quidem, quos jam tum in libro vitae ſuis temporibus naſcituros, eligendos, vocandos, credituros, juſtificandos, glorificandos deſcribebat, ad ſalutis decus per gratiam in Chriſto evebendis: in aliis vero per contrarios gradus in aeterni exitii dedecus juſte praecipitandis, gloriam ſuam patefaceret. In like ſort Piſcator in his diſputation de objecto praedeſtinationis, defines predeſtination this, Praedeſtinatio eſt aeternum Dei decretum quo conſtituit condere homines ad diverſos fines ſpeciales, nempe alios ad fruendum ſalute aeterna, alios vero ad ſentiendum cruciatus aeternos, ſeu ad aeternum exitium: itemque conſtituit permittere, ut iſti omnes, integri conditi, in peccatum laberentur; idque propterea, ut quos conditurus erat ad ſalutem ſervaret ex miſericordia; quos vero ad exitium, puniret ex juſtitia: & denique conſtituit ex lapſis illos quos conditurus erat ad ſalutem, ſervaret ex miſericordia, quos vero ad exitium, puniret ex justitia: (all which cannot be underſtood but of perſons definite) & denique conſtituit exlapſis illos quos ad ſalutem conditurus erat, eligere ad hoe, ut eos ex miſericordia ſervaret; quos vero ad exitium, reprobare ad hoc, ut eos ex juſtitia puniret: (this likewiſe cannot be underſtood but of perſons definite) atque ita omnibus iſtis modis gloriam tum miſericordiae ſuae parcentis, tum juſtitiae punientis, tum vero imprimis poteſtatis ſuae ſummae patefacere. And by theſe paſſages appeares the errour of my conſtruction both of Beza and Piſcators meaning; for it was grounded upon ſuppoſall that election in them both ſignified an internall act in God, the very decree of God, which is eternall: But here it appeares they took Election for an externall and temporall act, and yet diſtinct from vocation: of which opinion of Piſcator I have conſidered. digreſſ. 2. de praedeſtinatione. And here it appeares that Beza had entertained ſome ſuch conceit, as when he ſaith naſoituros, eligendos, vocandos, credituros, juſtificandos, &c. And indeed I well remember him to diſtinguiſh between electio & decretum eligendi.

Yet now, to gratifie you your own way: I am content to leave that which I have ſaid in that Digreſſ. 3. of an indefinite decree as it lieth; and to propoſe the reaſons II.alledged againſt it onelyonly by way of diſputation, not by way of aſſertion, and leave it indifferent unto the Reader to judge as he ſhall think moſt agreeably. And to confeſſe a truth unto you, it is but lately I came to this order; following the rigorous Tenet before as ſeemeth moſt conſonant to reaſon, though harſh to mens affections; and being but lately fallen upon it, I am apt to conceive, that ſomething may be wanting to the full clearing of the truth in this point; a way whereunto I hope I have opened: yet if you ſhall think it inconvenient, I ſhall be content to pretermit it wholly, and leave out all my digreſſions of this argument, or any other.

II.

Now touching Angels, I pray let not ought that I have written make you ſorry for ought that you have delivered touching the election of Angels: And doe not you conceive of me amiſſe, as if I did conceive you to harbour any ill opinion thereabouts: For I profeſſe I doe not, neither have you given me any cauſe; yet from nine yeeres of p. 178age I have known you. The firſt time I wrote of that, I onelyonly ſaid, it ſeemed ſtrange unto me; my reaſon was, becauſe I never knew any, either by writing or otherwiſe, Proteſtant, or Papiſt, ſound in maintaining mans election by grace, but that in like ſort he maintained the election of Angels to be of grace. And whereas you profeſſed otherwiſe onelyonly as an opponent: I conceived you did it but as my ſelfe or any other Schollar will doe, to try the uttermoſt of anothers ſtrength with whom we diſpute.

But when the ſecond time you wrote hereon, you profeſſed to doubt whether Arminius acknowledged any election at all of Angels; that ſeemed to me as ſtrange, becauſe I am perſwaded that no Arminian or Lutheran denieth the election of Angels: though like enough they are apt to faſhion it according to their opinion of the election of men. As for the conſtruction of that place in Timothy touching the elect Angels, I could not aſcertain my ſelfe in what ſenſe it might be conceived to proceed without acknowledging their election, and I was loath to divine at random. Now as you expreſſe your ſelfe herein more particularly; ſo will I particularly make anſwer.

Firſt, I grant that a conditionall decree is no election. But ſeeing it is impoſſible but God ſhould foreſee, on whoſe part the condition would be performed, and on whoſe part not; herehence it followeth, that God muſt accordingly Elect the one, and Reprobate the other: and ſo there muſt be acknowledged even an election of Angels after their manner. Like as the Arminians, beſide that conditionall predeſtination of men you ſpeake of, doe acknowledge a preciſe election of ſome upon foreſight of their obedience, and reprobation of the other upon foreſight of their diſobedience.

Touching the expoſition of that, 1 Tim. 5. 21. I have conſulted Hemingius, a man as erroneous in the point of election as any Lutheran; yet he interpreteth the place thus, Hos Electos ad diſcrimen Reproborum vocat. I grant it denotes the dignity of their perſons, but ſtill in reſpect of choice: as when we ſay a choice Book, a choice Jewell, as much as to ſay, which a man would make choice of, and preferre before many: ſo the Elect Angels are ſo called in reſpect of choice, which choice to my underſtanding can have no congruous reference, but to the choice of God.

It is true we have, nothing like, ſuch Scripture evidence touching the election and reprobation of Angels, as of Men. But whereas in theſe points both Scripture evidence and light of Chriſtian reaſon doe concurre; ſo the light of Chriſtian reaſon doth make it as evident on the part of Angels, as on the part of man; namely, that nothing can poſſibly be the cauſe of Gods will or predeſtination quoad actum volentis, or praedeſtinantis. And Aquinas, as you have heard, profeſſeth, That never any man was ſo mad as to profeſſe, that any thing without God could be the cauſe of predeſtination, quoad actum praedeſtinantis; and herein you your ſelfe agree.

Now touching Auſtin; I am glad you have lighted upon him. I do …b… not but he ſhall perſwade you in this point, though I could not. And firſt I will accommodate an anſwer to your allegations; Secondly, I will endeavour to ſhew clearly his opinion in this point.

Your firſt allegation is, Caeteri autem per ipſum liberum arbitrium in veritate ſteterunt; De corrept. & gratia. cap. 10.but your ſelfe perceive it might be anſwered, that this might be delivered incluſa gratia ſpeciali. And it may be proved that this phraſe of ſpeech doth not exclude ſpeciall grace: for in the ſame Chapter it is afterwards ſaid of man thus, In quo ſtatu recto ac ſine vitio, ſi per ipſum liberum arbitrium manere voluiſset. Here you muſt not exclude ſpeciall grace in this caſe; For ſi manere voluiſſet, undoubtedly this will of his had been wrought by ſpeciall grace, as Auſtin manifeſteth in the chapter following: For Cap. 11.he diſtinguiſheth of two graces or two adjutories, the one was, ut poſset pernianere ſi vellet, the other was, ut vellet quod potuit; his words are theſe, eſt in nobis per hane Dei gratiam, in bono recipiendo & perſeveranter tenendo, non ſolum poſse quod volumus, veruns etiam velle quod poſſumus: Quod non fuit in homine primo, unum enim horum in illo fuit, alterum non fuit. Namque ut reciperet bonum, gratiâ non egedat, quia nondum perdider at: ut autem in eo permaneret, egebat adjutorio gratiae, ſine quo iâ emnino non poſſet: & acceperat poſse ſi vellet, ſed non habuit velle quod poſſet: nam ſi babuiſſet perſeveraſſet. But you bring a ſecond place to prove that Angels could have ſtood by their free-will, ſecluding ſpeciall grace, and that is this, Credimus Dominum Deum—ſie ordinaſſe p. 179Angelorum & hominum vitam ut in ea prius oſtenderet quid poſset eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid poſset ſuae gratiae beneficium, juſtitiaeque judicium. I grant the Angels had power to ſtand if they would, and power to fall if they would; and this power was manifeſted in the ſtanding of the one, and in the fall of the other. But herehence it followeth not, that therefore the act of ſtanding was not of Gods grace. But you will ſay the benefit of grace was afterwards manifeſted: And I anſwer, that grace was the grace of confirmation, oppoſite to the Obduration of the evill Angels; which grace of confirmation, though it were manifeſted after the obedience of the good Angels, conſiſting in aſſurance that they ſhall never fall; yet herehence it followeth not, that their ſtanding was not by grace, though that grace whereby they ſtood was different from that grace whereby they were confirmed: for before their obedience, ſo they ſtood, as that withall they might fall; but ſince their obedience they now ſo ſtand, that they cannot fall.

Now for Auſtins opinion hereabouts, it is plaine enough from other places. De civ. dei, lib. 12. cap 9. aut minorem acceperunt amoris divini gratiam, quam illi qui in eadem perſtiterunt, aut ſi utrique boni aequaliter creati ſunt, iſtis mala voluntate cadentibus, illi amplius adjuti ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem pervenerunt. So that he doth manifeſtly acknowledge, that the good Angells had ſuch an adjutorium which the wicked had not: whereupon Leonardus Coquaeus, neither Jeſuit nor Dominican, but an Auguſtinian, commenting, writes in this manner: ea ratione intelligitur majus beneficium collatum Angelis honis quam malis, etſi enim gratiam aequalem habitualem ab initio ſint conſecuti, it a tamen efficax fuit motio divina et auxilium dei ſpeciale in Angelis ſanctis, ut in Deunt toti converterentur, perſiſterent in bono, et beatitudinem eandem aſſequerentur; non ex vi libertatis arbitrii certe factum eſt, ut it a differenter afficerentur, et quod gratia fuerit efficax in his et non in iſtis, Deo maxime tribuendum; et ex duobus bominibus aequaliter affectis, ſi unus ſalvetur, alius vero damnetur, intelligo ſemper majus auxilium gratiae collatum ei qui fit ſalvets, idque cum Auguſtino hoc loco, & paſſim, ubi de hac materia diſputat, neque totum id refero in libertatem arbitrii, quod unus velit conſentire et reſpondere gratiae, alius non; facit enim etiam ut velimus, et conſentiamus: neque infallibilem illam noſtram conſenſionem puto tantum ex infallibili praeſcientia Dei; imo ſi per impoſſibile ſecludamus omnem praeſcientiam dei, ipſa gratia ex ſe infallibiliter movet hominem vel etiam Angelum, ut, licet non neceſſitate coactionis, neceſſitate tamen immutabilitatis efficax ex ſe ſit, et gratia dei magis in uno quam in altero; et quod unus convertatur, alius non, quod uni detur auxilium efficax, in alio ſit quidem ſufficiens, minime tamen conſequatur ſuum effectum, mysterium eſse ubique docet Auguſtinus, at ſi poſita aequali gratia qua unus converteretur, alius non, id ex ſolo conſenſu vel d…ſſenſu liberi arbitrii penderet, nullum certe myſterium in…ſſe mihi videretur. Neque hic reddit Auguſtinus cauſam eur ex Angelis alij ſalvati fuerint, alij minime, quod hos deus praeſcierit ſalvandos vel cooperaturos ſuae gratiae, alios minime cooperaturos; ſed quia qui ſalvati ſunt, vel majorem acceperunt divini amoris gratiam, vel certe ſi aequaliter boni creati ſunt, id eſt, in aequali gratia, illi amplius adjuti fuerint: adeo ut negotium ſalutis Angelorum benorum in majus auxilium gratiae referat; ut, quod alij cadant et non reſpondeant gratiae divinae, eique non cooperentur; id quidem aſcribendum ſit libero horum arbitrio: quod vero in aliis gratia ſit efficax, ade…que illi cooperentur, ipſi deo potiſſimum tribuendum ſit. Than which I never found a more illuſtrious teſtimony for the prerogative of Gods grace in, and ſoveraignty over his creatures in any Thomiſt or Dominican, that at this day hath maintained the cauſe of God, (as Bradwardine calls it) againſt the Jeſuits. Neither did I ever take notice of the place before, but by occaſion of this preſent ſearch to give you ſatisfaction concerning the opinion of Auſtin; onelyonly reſted contented with that which I ſuppoſed to be the common opinion of all, that the caſe is the ſame as touching the operation of Gods grace both in Angells and men, and Chriſt in Scripture is accounted the head of Angells as well as of men. But that whole Chapter in Auſtin, lib. 12. de civit. dei. cap. 9, is worth any mans reading, where he diſputes the caſe at large, where he hath another ſentence more illuſtrious then the former, this; et cumid egit eorum voluntas bona ut non ad ſeipſos, qui minus erant, ſed ad illum qui ſumme eſt, converteretur (hence is taken I gueſſe that conceit of Maſter Hookers, that the fall of Angells was the converting the contemplation of their minde from God upon themſelves) eique adbaerentes magis eſſent, ejuſque participatione ſapienter beate que viverent, quid aliud eſtenditur niſi volunt atem quamlibet bonam, inopem fuiſſe in ſolo deſiderio remanſuram (inopem remanſuram, a pretty phraſe unable to remaine) niſi ille p. 180qui bonam naturam ex nihilo ſui capacem fecerat, ex ſeipſo feceret implendo meliorem, prius faciens excitando avidiorem. If you get any thing by my conference I am glad, I aſſure you I get by yours, both touching the clearing of Auſtins opinion hereabouts, and others concurrence alſo, wherein I doe much rejoyce; and the rather, becauſe, as you may obſerve, I have hitherto proceeded thereupon, rather by ſuppoſition than of confirmation. Another place to this purpoſe I finde alleadged out of his Enchirid. cap. 100. Hac ſunt magna opera domini exquiſita in omnes voluntates ejus; et tam ſapienter exquiſita, ut cum Angelica et humana natura peccaſſet, id eſt, non quod ille, ſed quod veluit ipſa, feciſſet, etiam per eandem creature voluntatem (qua factum eſt quod creator noluit) impleret ipſe quod voluit, ben… utens et malis tanquam ſumme bonus, ad eorum damnationem quos juſte praedectinavit ad poenam, et ad eorum ſalutem quas benigne praedeſtinavit ad gratiam. But this hath but a touch, and that ſubject to ambiguous interpretation, the other is more full and cleare. I come unto the Theſes.

You deſire I would ſhew you in a word where your errour is in theſe, but you may remember what one profeſſed ſometimes, namely that ad quaeſtionem longam od…rat reſponſionem brevem, yet I will endeavour to ſatisfie you in this alſo firſt, and afterwards ſo to ſatisfie as I may ſatisfie my ſelfe alſo.

Firſt therefore, my briefe ſatisfaction as it were in a word ſhall conſiſt in two points.

1. You have but nine Theſes, and the eighth is as a ſuccinct recapitulation of all that went before, and the concluſion there mentioned is no more than that which every one grants, namely this; that God did decree firſt to produce that ſubject, and afterward to worke ſuch an effect thereupon: And indeed it is an ordinary courſe to confound the order of execution with the order of intention. Zanchius his definition of praedeſtination I doe exceedingly approve of, anſwerable to this of yours, for thus it lyeth, Generalis, boceſt, omnium hominum praedeſtinatio eſt aeternum &c. Dei decretum, quo apud ſe ab aterno decrevit, primum quidem omnes homines tum creare ad ſui imaginem juſtos, tum ut in peccatum a Satana tentati ſuo libero arbitrio labe entur, permittere: deinde b… rum alios liberare, et liberatos ſpiritu ſuo comitari, et tandem aeterna vita donari; alios tum indurare, tum aeterno exitio perdere; idque ut in illis divina bonitas et miſericordia, in iſtis autem divina potentia et juſtitia declaretur, atque ita in omnibus deus glorificetur. Where, if you marke it well, you ſhall find he makes no order between the decrees of creation, permiſſion of ſin, liberation and ſalvation on the one ſide, of induration and damnation on the other ſide, but onelyonly between creation it ſelfe and permiſſion of ſin, and liberation it ſelfe and ſalvation on the one ſide, and dereliction and damnation on the other ſide, all which he conſiders as meanes, and in the laſt place notes the end of all to be the patefaction of Gods glory in goodneſſe and mercy on the one ſide, and of his power and juſtice on the other.

2. Againe, in your firſt Theſis containing the maine body of your tenet, you will have the foreſight of the ſubject, or occaſion, whereupon any thing is decreed abſolutely to be wrought, alwayes to goe before the decree it ſelfe, as well as the decree of the end goeth before the decree of the meanes. The irregularity whereof as touching God (though as touching mans decrees I confeſſe it is right that you ſpeake) I will ſhew as briefly as I can before I anſwer your reaſon brought for confirmation of it.

1. If the foreſight of the ſubject and occaſion goes before the decree of working upon the ſubject; then much more muſt the decree of making the ſubject, as alſo of making or permitting the occaſion, goe before the decree of working upon the ſubject, and upon ſuch an occaſion, (for no ſubject whereupon God workes can be without Gods making, but it is nothing ſo with man, who findes ſubjects whereupon to worke rather than makes them) Now this is a thing impoſſible. For,

1. Firſt, nothing is firſt in intention but the end, and 'tis not poſſible that the ſubject or occaſion ſhould be the end whereunto God workes upon the ſubject thus or thus:

2. Secondly, that which is firſt in intention is laſt in execution. And therefore if the making of the ſubject, and permitting of the occaſion whereupon God meanes to worke, were firſt in intention, it ſhould be laſt in execution, that is, God ſhould firſt worke upon the ſubject before he had made the ſubject, or permitted the occaſion whereupon he workes.

p. 181But yet I confeſſe if you have a reaſon for what you ſay, unleſſe you may receive ſome ſatisfactory anſwer unto that reaſon of yours, it will be a very hard matter to ſatisfie you; Therefore I come to the conſideration of your reaſon, which is this.

The foreſight of a thing is nothing but the conſideration of it tanquam reipſa & certo futurum.

But whoſo will reſolve abſolutely to work ſuch an effect upon ſuch a definite ſubject, or to make ſuch an uſe of ſuch a particular event, muſt conſider that ſubject and that event tanquam reipſa futurum: for elſe his decree will be but conditionall. To this, I anſwer,

1. Firſt, according to their opinion, that are accounted the moſt rigid interpreters of predeſtination.

1. Your propoſition is moſt ſound.

2. As for your aſſumption, which you ſuppoſe to be true, they ſuppoſe to be utterly untrue; as directly contrary to the moſt generall rules touching the order of things in intention, and execution: And Alphonſus Mendoza takes upon him to prove at large, that the ſupernaturals of Peter and Paul were intended before their naturals.

2. The onelyonly reaſon (ſaving the plauſibility of the propoſition it ſelfe) to juſtifie it, ſeems to be this, God cannot worke upon a ſubject, unleſſe the ſubject firſt be, and that occaſion alſo whereupon he works; therefore God cannot intend to work upon a ſubject unleſſe firſt he intend to produce that ſubject, and permit (at leaſt) the occaſion whereupon he intends to work. As much as to ſay, becauſe I cannot ride to London without a horſe, therefore I cannot intend to ride to London, unleſſe firſt I intend to get me a horſe. Whence it manifeſtly followeth, that in execution I muſt firſt ride to London, and afterward get me an horſe to that purpoſe. And the confounding of the order of execution with the order of intention, ſeems to be the cauſe why this propoſition of yours ſeems to be ſo plauſible.

2. Now I will anſwer your propoſition, according to my own Tenet in ordering Gods decrees, which is likely to give you better ſatisfaction in the way of your own apprehenſion. Now I grant your propoſition; acknowledging that in this caſe ſo it falls out, that he muſt needs conſider the ſubject as reipſa & certo futurum. But how, non tanquam praecedaneum (whereto your diſcourſe tends) but tanquam conjunctum; the reaſon is, becauſe I make the decrees of creation, permiſſion of ſin, and rayſing out of ſin, not ſubordinata, but coordinata & conjuncta. So I ſay in like manner, God doth joyntly decree to give both grace and glory; I do not ſay God doth decree joyntly to give them, but he joyntly decreeth to give both grace and glory. And ſo Auſtin defines predeſtination to be praeparationem gratiae & gloriae. So that in the ſame moment that he decreeth glory, he conſiders grace not as praecedaneum in intentione, but conjunctum. So on the other ſide God doth joyntly decree finall dereliction of ſome in ſin and damnation for ſin, as Aquinas profeſſeth of reprobation, that it includes voluntatem permittendi culpam, & damnationem inferendi pro culpa: ſo that in the ſame moment that he decreeth damnation, he conſidereth their finall impenitency non tanquam quiddam antecedaneum, but tanquam conjunctum. And judge you what force this hath to qualifie the harſhneſſe of Tenets hereabouts, and what diſadvantage to our oppoſites the Arminians, who upon the ſubordination of theſe decrees cry out upon our Tenets and expoſe them to obloquie, ſaying that we maintaine that God doth firſt decree to damne men, and then to this purpoſe he expoſeth them to ſinne thoſe ſinnes for which they are damned. And herewith they charge the Authors of Maſſa corrupta for the object of election and reprobation, aſwell as the Authors of Maſſa nondum condita, or condita, but nondum corrupta. And the twenty reaſons which Arminius hath given againſt the Authors of Maſſa nondum condita; he profeſſeth that with little difference they may be accommodated againſt the Fautors of Maſsa corrupta. All which notwithſtanding, I have conſidered, and I hope refuted alſo, both the one way againſt Arminius, and the other way againſt Corvinus, in a Digreſſion by it ſelfe, which containes a whole quire of paper, one of them; but that is in my anſwer to Corvinus, which is not yet perfected. Doctor Jackſon my ancient friend, partly by his traditionary writings that paſſe in hugger-mugger from hand to hand, four pieces whereof as many as I could come by, I have anſwered; and partly by his treatiſe of divine eſſence, withdrawing my ſtudies another away: yet an anſwer to that I hope to ſmith by Whitſontide; and then to return: For in the ſecond part which is newly come forth I finde little conſiderable ſave ſome few chapters touching contingency: p. 182My greateſt buſineſſe about him is to underſtand his language. Now to draw to an end; as your firſt Theſis is an acknowledgement of the eternity of Gods decrees; ſo the ſecond, of their unity both in time and nature, God willing all things uno & eodem actu. Now judge I pray whether of the two opinions is moſt ſuitable hereunto; that which makes the decrees of God before ſpoken of, coordinata & conjuncta, or that which makes ſuch a concatenation of them by conſequents after conſequents: as for example, Gods decree of raiſing men out of ſin preſuppoſeth the foreſight of ſin; the foreſight of ſinne preſuppoſeth the decree to permit ſin; the decree to permit ſinne ſuppoſeth the foreſight of the futurition of the creature; and the foreſight thereof ſuppoſeth the decree of creation: eſpecially conſidering Aquinas his argument, whereby he proves that praedeſtinatio Chriſti cannot be the cauſe praedeſtinationis noſtrae, to wit, becauſe God by one and the ſame act predeſtinates both Chriſt and us. And withall conſidering that praerequiſitum will as much hinder the unity of Gods decrees as Cauſa. I had thought to have gone over your Theſes more exactly, but ſeeing the length already ſpun out, I reſolve to be the briefer.

3. Whereas in your third, you conceive the order of Gods decrees is to be underſtood foreign: I judge rather Durands inſtruction to be more ſound, before mentiotioned; to wit, that there is onelyonly prioritas amongſt them ſecundum rationem; and that he expounds thus, quando ratio unius ſumitur a ratione alterius, as ratio mediorum ſumitur a ratione finis. And priority in intention is onelyonly of the end in reſpect of means tending thereto, as you rightly conceive it in your fourth Theſis.

5. Of the fifth I have already ſpoken enough, wherein I have laboured partly to diſcover the errour of your argumentation, and yet withall ſo as to give you ſatiſfaction in your own way.

6. The ſixth containes onelyonly an inference upon the former, and the inference is not ſuitable; for your aſſumption in the former Theſes did but contend, that God muſt conſider it; here you inferre, that he muſt preſuppoſe it; But it followeth not: For to conſider it, 'tis ſufficient that it is conjunctum; But to preſuppoſe it is to maintain that it is antecedaneum.

Beſides it is as much peccant againſt the order, between the end and the means, as the former, whereof I have ſpoken ſufficiently.

7. Of the ſeventh, your reaſon (you confeſſe) is the ſame as before, to wit, in the fifth, which I have already conſidered. Neither is there any neceſſity why one ſhould be before the other: they may, nay muſt be both together intended; For conſider, if the pardoning or curing of ſinne be in intention after the permitting of ſinne, then it ſhould be before it in execution, which were as much as to ſay, that God muſt firſt pardon and cure ſinne, before he can permit ſinne. This is plainly irregular; that irregularity which you conceive on the contrary is onelyonly in ſhew, and riſing meerly from confounding intention with execution. Better to ſay, God doth firſt intend to cure ſinne, and then intends to permit it; (for herehence followeth a due order in execution, to wit, firſt ſinne is permitted, and after cured) then to ſay, God firſt intends to permit ſinne, and after to cure it; for herehence proceeds a moſt prepoſterous order in execution, namely, that firſt ſinne ſhall be cured, and then the being of ſinne permitted. And indeed when men ſay, God doth firſt intend to permit ſinne, and then to cure it, it ſeems their meaning is onelyonly this, not that God doth firſt intend, &c. but that God doth intend firſt to permit ſinne, and then to cure it, which is moſt true.

8. Like as in your eighth Theſis you doe expreſſe it ere you are aware, and no otherwiſe.

9. And as in your eighth, ſo in your ninth, you do expreſſe it moſt congruouſly thus, we may conceive God decreeth to permit the occaſion firſt, and afterwards to make that uſe of it which he intends: which I ſay is moſt congruous, conſtituting this priority onelyonly in execution, not in intention.

I come to your concluſions drawn from the premiſes.

1. Gods decree to manifeſt the glory of his power and goodneſſe ad extra, is before his decree to create mankind, becauſe that is a decree de fine, this de medio.

Reſp. 1. Though this be a truth, yet it is not the whole truth; for it ſeems by power and goodneſſe you underſtand onelyonly that power and goodneſſe which was ſhewed in his creation; but this was not the laſt end: For this end was obtained the very firſt moment of Adams creation, after which Adam lived above 900 yeeres, and all mankind p. 183ſince, many thouſands, and every one knowes, the laſt end of a mans worke is of chiefeſt conſideration, when he ſets himſelfe to make his worke, neither doth it become the wiſdome of man to carry himſelfe otherwiſe: as Beza profeſſeth, ſaying, Statuere deum prius ordine cauſarum decreviſſe hominem condere, quam quid eo condito faceret deliberaret: (here is the point, marke it well) is ſuch a thing as quo nihil abſurdius dici poteſt, quum finis in omnis ſapientis artificis mente praecedat ipſius operis aggreſſionem, ut certiſſimum ſit dei de humano genere decretum, creationem et ipſius creationis fines omnes anteceſſiſſe; wherein he diſtinguiſheth betweene finis creationis and finis hominis creati. And as the creation manifeſted his power and goodneſſe in making man out of nothing, ſo man by this almighty power thus made, was made, and intended to be made, to a certaine end; which cannot be imagined to have been in any other kind than to be either a veſſell of mercy, or of wrath.

And when Solomon ſaith, God made the wicked againſt the day of evill, and withall ſignifieth that even this alſo was for himſelfe, that is, for the manifeſtation of his glory, this cannot be in the way of that power and goodneſſe you ſpeake of, but ſomething elſe; even the making of him a veſſell wherein one day ſhall ſhine the glory of God in the way of juſtice and ſoveraigne power over his creatures.

2. And therefore it cannot be as you conclude in the ſecond place, that Gods decree to create mankind is before his decree to manifeſt his mercy or juſtice in mankind. For though that be a decree to produce a ſubject, yet conſidering that this is the decree touching the end whereto he makes him: in all reaſon the decree of the end whereto a ſubject is made is before the decree of making the ſubject to that end. And we have an expreſſe teſtimony of the Holy Ghoſt for this, namely, that as God created all things for himſelfe, ſo he created the wicked againſt the day of evill for himſelfe.

But by the way, I obſerve how you miſtake the opinion of your oppoſites; as when you ſay, that this decree of manifeſting Gods mercy or juſtice, is a decree of working an effect in that ſubject, for this is utterly untrue; This were to make the decree of ſalvation of the one, and of damnation of the other to be before the decree of creation. And although ſome ſuch thing may be conceived out of a ſuperficiall apprehenſion of it, as propoſed by Beza and Piſcator; yet both in true account of that opinion in generall, and miſtaking of it in ſpeciall, no ſuch thing is avouched. Nay, whereas your ſelfe maintaine, that the decree of damnation is before the decree of permiſſion of finall impenitency (a point no way congruous to your Tenet about maſſa corrupta) you have often read in my writings, that I account the decree of damnation in no moment of time to precede the decree of permiſſion of finall impenitency.

Then the caſe of Angells is utterly againſt this; unleſſe you maintaine the one to be elected upon the foreſight of their obedience, the other reprobated upon the foreſight of their diſobedience: which I am perſwaded you ſhall not find any Orthodox Divine in the point of mans election, to maintaine.

3. Concluſio tertia. Gods decree to permit ſinne is before his decree to manifeſt either his mercy in pardoning ſinne, or his juſtice in puniſhing ſinne, becauſe that is a decree, de eventu; this a doing of ſomething by occaſion of that event.

Reſp. 1. To your reaſon here mentioned I have anſwered before.

2. There is no priority or poſteriority in intention, but onelyonly in reſpect of finis and media ad finem.

3. It is untrue, that the former decree is a decree of an event, and the latter of doing ſomething by occaſion of this event. For what? is Gods permiſſion, the event you meane? If ſo; then Gods working grace may be accounted an event alſo, and ſo Gods decree of ſalvation upon his working grace ſhall follow upon his decree of working grace, which is manifeſtly Arminianiſme. Is the ſinne permitted the event? Firſt, why ſhould you call it an event? is it becauſe you conceive it to fall out beſides Gods intention? Arminius himſelfe profeſſeth the contrary. The articles of Ireland profeſſe, that God from eternity did by his unchangeable counſell ordaine whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe, your ſelfe acknowledge, that Gods decree of permitting ſinne, is a decree de eventu: your ſelfe acknowledge, that God did foreſee that man would ſinne in caſe he did permit him to ſinne; which is as much as to ſay ſtice: food did intend that ſinne ſhould come to paſſe by his permiſſion: which is … and expreſſe profeſſion of Austin where he ſaith, Non ergo aliquid fit niſi omnipotens fieri velit, vel ſinendo ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo: ſo that whether things come to paſſe Deo faciente p. 184as good things, or Deo ſinente, as evill things; ſtill they came to paſſe Deo volente as Auſtin profeſſeth. Now this ſinne is apparently the cauſe of the damnation of many thouſands; for as much as many thouſand infants are damned onelyonly for ſinne originall; And therefore like as upon this ſin exiſtent, God doth not take an occaſion onelyonly, but a cauſe of damning many thouſands; ſo if the decree of permitting this, be preſuppoſed before the decree of damnation, you may ſay as well, that God upon the foreſight of this ſinne, doth not onelyonly take occaſion, but a cauſe alſo, of decreeing their damnation. And this may be applyed to the reprobation, not onelyonly of infants, but of all that are damned, foraſmuch as all that are damned, are damned for originall ſinne, onelyonly here is the difference, ſuch reprobates as dye in their infancy, are damned onelyonly for originall ſinne, but others are damned not only for originall ſinne, but for their actuall ſinnes alſo.

Againe it is manifeſt, that the decree of permitting ſinne originall, is no more a decree de eventu, and Gods decree to manifeſt his mercy in pardoning it, is a decree of doing ſomething by occaſion of that event: than Gods decree of permitting all actuall ſinnes of his elect, from the firſt to the laſt, is a decree de eventu, and Gods decree to manifeſt his mercy in pardoning actuall ſinnes, is a decree of working ſomething by occaſion of that event; and I cannot but wonder, this being againe and againe put to your conſideration, that you doe not take notice of the equipollency of theſe: whence it manifeſtly followeth, that the decree of pardoning ſinnes ſhall preſuppoſe maſſam corruptam, as well with actuall ſinnes, as ſinnes originall.

Againe, if Gods decree of ſhewing juſtice in puniſhing ſinne, is but a decree of taking occaſion of doing ſomething: then Gods decree of damnation for mens actuall ſinnes, is but a decree of taking occaſion of doing ſomething; and conſequently, by what reaſon the decree of puniſhing ſinne, preſuppoſeth the decree of permitting ſinne originall, by the ſame reaſon, the decree of damnation, ſhall preſuppoſe the decree of permitting not onelyonly ſinne originall; but all actuall ſinnes alſo.

By the ſame reaſon the decree of ſalvation, is but a decree of doing ſomething upon the occaſion of faith, repentance, and good workes. For if ſinne deſerve not to be accounted a cauſe moving God to reſolve to puniſh a man with damnation, but rather an event, by occaſion where of he reſolves to puniſh with damnation: much leſſe ſhall faith, repentance, and good workes be accounted a cauſe moving God to decree to ſave any man, but onelyonly an event, by occaſion whereof, God doth decree ſome mens ſalvation.

Yet looke by what reaſon the decree of puniſhing with damnation doth preſuppoſe the decree of permitting ſinne, by occaſion of which event puniſhment by damnation is decreed, by the ſame reaſon the decree of ſalvation, doth preſuppoſe the decree of giving faith, repentance, and good workes, by occaſion of which events, ſalvation is decreed; for why ſhould not faith, and good workes be accounted an occaſion of the decree of ſalvation, as well as ſinnes are the occaſion of the decree of damnation.

4. The fourth concluſion is this; Gods decree to produce the perſon of Peter, is before his decree to manifeſt his mercy in Peter, by the reaſon aforeſaid, Theſ. 8.

Reſp. That eighth Theſis aforeſaid made no mention of priority in decree or intention, but onelyonly of priority in execution, by vertue of Gods decree: for the words of that eighth Theſis are theſe; God decreeth firſt to produce that ſubject, and afterwards to worke ſuch an effect thereupon. Not that God did firſt decree to produce the ſubject: but onelyonly that God did decree first to produce the ſubject: manifeſting hereby, that your intent is, onelyonly to reaſon from the order of execution, and therehence to inferre the like order in intention, which is the ordinary courſe of Arminians at this day. And you ſignifie your meaning to be this, in that eighth Theſis, though in the iſſue you faile of right accommodating it; for your words are theſe, If any decree be concerning the working of a certaine effect in ſuch a ſubject as cannot poſſibly exist without the producing of that ſubject, then we may ſuppoſe, that he doth firſt decree, (thus you would ſay, though indeed you ſay otherwiſe) to produce that ſubject, and afterwards to worke ſuch an effect thereupon, which in plaine tearmes is to argue thus; The permiſſion of Adams ſinne preſuppoſeth the creation of Adam, therefore the decree of pe… to create Adams ſinne, preſuppoſeth the decree of Adams creation: Now this is the Reſp. …gh way to Arminianiſme, and Pelagianiſme in the higheſt decree, as I ſhewed you in my firſt; the evidence whereof, as it ſeemes, drave you to acknowledge it, and to deviſe ſome other courſe, for maintenance of the Tenet of maſsa p. 185corrupta: yet thro ghout, all the reaſon you give, is reſolved into this: for as there I ſaid, herehence it will follow in like manner, that becauſe damnation preſuppoſeth all actuall ſinnes, therefore the decree of damnation preſuppoſeth the decree of permitting of all actuall ſinnes, and conſequently, the foreſight of them. In like manner, becauſe ſalvation preſuppoſeth all manner of good workes in men of ripe yeeres, therefore the decree of ſalvation, preſuppoſeth the decree of giving effectuall grace, for the performing of all manner of good workes, and the foreſight of them, which is direct Pelagianiſme in the higheſt degree. And theſe conſiderations perſwade me better than heretofore, that the maintainers of maſſa corrupta for the object of predeſtination, muſt be caſt upon the maintenance of Arminianiſme, and Pelagianiſme in the higheſt degree, whether they will or no.

5. Concluſio quinta: Gods decree to permit Peter to ſinne in Adam, is before his decree to manifeſt his mercy in Peter by occaſion of this ſinne, ex Theſ. 9.

Reſp. 1. Your Theſis Nona I have already anſwered.

2. Gods decree to permit Peter to ſinne in Adam, is no more before his decree to manifeſt his mercy by occaſion of that ſinne, than Gods decree to permit Peters perſonall ſinnes all his life long, is before his decree to manifeſt his mercy in pardoning them. And what place you make for theſe decrees whether in election, or out of election, you have no where ſhewed.

3. God doth manifeſt his mercy by occaſion of Peters ſinnes both originall, and actuall, not onelyonly in the way of pardoning ſinne, but in the way of ſaving his perſon, in deſpight of ſinne, whence it followeth by the courſe of your argumentation, that the decree of permitting all Peters ſinnes throughout the whole courſe of his life, precedes the decree of manifeſting Gods mercy in his ſalvation.

4. And becauſe Gods decree of ſaving Peter, is a decree of doing ſomewhat by occaſion of Peters faith, and repentance, and good workes, it followeth by your manner of reaſoning, that the decree of ſaving Peter, preſuppoſeth the decree of giving Peter faith, and repentance, and good workes.

6. Concluſio ſexta: Gods decree to produce the perſon of Judas, is before his decree of manifesting his justice in Judas his perſon. Theſ. 8.

Reſp. This is all one with Concluſio quarta, and admits the ſame refutation.

7. Concluſio ſeptima: Gods decree to permit Judas to ſinne in Adam, is before his decree to manifeſt his juſtice in Judas, by occaſion of that ſinne.

Reſp. 1. This is all one with concluſio quinta, and admits the ſame anſwer:

2. Why doe you ſay by occaſion of that ſinne, and not by reaſon of that ſinne? perhaps you will ſay, becauſe that ſinne is not the cauſe of Judas his damnation (for I cannot deviſe any other reaſon) but this is not ſound, for that ſinne is the meritorious cauſe of Judas his damnation: For though he be damned for actuall ſinnes, yet is he damned for originall alſo? Againe, many thouſand infants are damned onelyonly for originall ſinne.

3. May you not as well ſay, that Gods decree to permit Iudas his perſonall ſinnes, is before his decree to manifeſt his juſtice in Iudas by occaſion of thoſe ſinnes? and conſider I pray how little agreeable that is to your Tenet.

4. And if the decree of permitting Iudas his perſonall ſinnes, be before Gods decree of puniſhing him with damnation, why ſhould not the decree of giving faith, and repentance, and good workes, be before Gods decree of rewarding with ſalvation?

8. Concluſio octava: Gods decree to manifeſt his mercy in Peter, or to make Peter a veſſell of mercy, (which is properly decretum electionis) is before his decree to call Peter, to give him faith, and repentance, &c. becauſe that is a decree de fine, this de medio.

Reſp. 1. I doe not diſlike the order of theſe decrees: but I ſay there is no congruity between them, ſuch as ſhould be between the ends, and the meanes. For there is no ſhew of mercy expreſſed in giving faith and repentance; but onelyonly implyed, in as much as both faith and repentance implies, a ſtate of miſery preceding; the permiſſion whereof alone hath congruous reference to the ſhewing of mercy, as the meanes ſtand in congraity to the end. Faith and repentance and good workes are means tending to another end, namely, to the manifeſting of Gods remunerative juſtice: for as much as God meanes to beſtow ſalvation on men of ripe yeares by way of reward of their faith, repentance and good workes. And it is without all contradiction, that in Peter and every elect, appeares, not onelyonly Gods mercy, but his juſtice alſo, and p. 186that in the higheſt degree, both in the pardoning of their ſinnes, and ſaving of their ſoules for the merits of Chriſt Jeſus. And God hath ordained his ſonne to give ſalvation. Iob. 17. 2.

2. And I wonder not a little, that you ſhould ſubordinate any Medium tending to the demonſtration of Gods mercy, rather than the permiſſion of miſery.

3. Eſpecially conſidering, that God when he purpoſed to ſhew mercy on Peter, he purpoſed to ſhew mercy on him.

1. In pardoning not onelyonly his ſinne originall, but all his actuall ſinnes alſo.

2. In ſaving him not onelyonly in deſpight of ſinne originall, but in deſpight of all his actuall ſinnes alſo.

Neither have you any way to avoid this, but by ſaying, that God made Peter a double veſſell of mercy, and that by two decrees, which I thinke was never heard of ſince the world began.

9. Concluſie Nona; Gods decree to manifeſt his juſtice in Judas, or to make Judas a veſſell of wrath (which is properly the decree of reprobation) is before his decree to deny Judas faith and repentance, &c. by the ſame reaſon.

Reſp. Here againe you erre marvelouſly, in making a Medium moſt incongruous to the end intended. To deny faith and repentance, what is it more, than not to give it, and by faith you meane, I doubt not, faith in Chriſt crucified &c. But it is cleare, that God gave no ſuch faith and repentance unto the elect Angells; yet farre be it from us to thinke, that this was a medium tending to any end of reprobation.

2. The truth is, nothing but permiſſion of ſinne is a congruous meanes to the manifeſting of Gods juſtice. For ſhould God afflict a man or any creature, that is not a ſinner (as Medina maintaines ex communi omuium theologorum ſententia, he can, and that in the higheſt degree) this ſhall not be in the way of Juſtice vindicative, nor as Judex, but as Dominus vitae et mortis; like as man hath power to afflict inferiour creatures, and that in ſuch a manner, non quo illis fiat mitius, ſed quo nobis ſalubrius.

3. Gods juſtice in Judas is manifeſted no way more, than in his damnation, and that for actuall ſinne, as well as originall; and in many thouſand infants onelyonly for originall ſinne; and to make the permiſſion of actuall ſinne onelyonly, ſubordinate to the decree of manifeſting Gods juſtice, and not the permiſſion of ſinne originall, is very ſtrange. And Alvarez that gravis Anibor profeſſeth generally, that permiſſio peccati propter quod quis damnatur, is effectus Reprobationis; and therefore cannot be premiſed before it. And every man that is damned, is damned for originall, as well as actuall ſinnes, and many thouſand infants onelyonly for originall.

As touching the order of decrees ſubjoyned: Had you proceeded thus, God intended firſt to create, then to permit ſinne, then to raiſe ſome, and finally derelinquiſh others, and laſtly to ſave ſome, and damne others, and that to the manifeſtation of his glory in the way of mercy on the one, and juſtice on the other; it had been exactly agreeable to Zanchius his definition of predeſtination. And your ſelfe fall upon ſuch a courſe, ere you are aware, in divers of your Theſes, as I have ſhewed.

2. The firſt being apparently a decree, as concerning the end God aimes at; all the decrees enſuing, ſhould be decrees de mediis, tending either to that end, immediatly or mediatly, which you have not explicated, neither indeed are they capable of any ſuch explication: Nay rather you have already manifeſted your meaning to be, that the end there ſpecified, is onelyonly the end of creation; not ſo much as the end of the things created, much leſſe of the things intended by the ſubſequent degrees: yet it is ſet in the firſt place, as though all the things intended in the decrees following, tended to the end mentioned in this decree, beſides all congruity.

3. As touching the foreſight of God interpoſed; The firſt is myſterious, as would manifeſtly appeare, if the ground of it were opened.

You thinke that Angells were left to themſelves, yet did not God foreſee that hereupon they would fall, nor that hereupon they would not fall; but that ſome would fall, and others not fall: which Auſtin, as I have ſhewed, profeſſeth aroſe from hence; that they which ſtood, had ſuch an adjutorium, as they which fell had not: which if it be true, man alſo, had he received the like adjutorium, had not fallen.

But be it as you will, enquire to what end God ſuffered him to fall, eſpecially this fall of his proving fatall to thouſands; I ſay this fall only; it was fatall to all reprobates, though not onelyonly this fall: for all reprobates are damned for originall ſinne, though not for that onelyonly. The ſecond foreſight is not rightly expreſſed; God cannot p. 187be ſaid to foreſee what he can doe: for onelyonly things to come are ſaid to be foreſeen, things preſent are not: but Gods power whereby he can doe this, or that, is from everlaſting preſent with him.

Now becauſe you ſee that this order of yours is utterly oppoſite to that maxime, Quod prius eſt intentione, poſterius eſt executione; you anſwer, that that maxime holds onelyonly in reſpect of finis & media ad finem; and therein you ſay right: But whereas therewithall you imply, that there is another order in intention than between finis & media, herein you innovate Philoſophy, and bring in an order in intentions, that was never admitted in any Schooles. I am ſure in Aquinas you found no other priority admittable, but between finis & media. And Durand acknowledgeth this priority in Gods intentions, to be onelyonly ſecundum rationem, and that is, quando ratio unius ſumitur ab altero. But where no ſuch priority is found, why ſhould we admit of any priority at all in the decrees of God? yet if you, or any man elſe can make good this new Philoſophy, by any reaſon, I ſhall be ready to yield unto it.

As for the laſt, give me leave to ſay unto you in Homers language foreign. If ever it became you to retract ought, I am perſwaded it well becommeth you to retract this: you were as good to ſay, God did permit Adams ſinne to no end, for you ſpecifie none, and the circumſtances of qualification ſtands you in no ſtead: you may as well ſay of all the ſinnes committed in the world, that God doth permit them to no end, for you ſpecifie none, and the circumſtances of qualification ſtands you in no ſtead: you may as well ſay of all the ſinnes committed in the world, that God doth permit them to no end; yet from Auſtins daies it hath been acknowledged, that God doth both puniſh ſinne with ſinne, and that by ſinne men are brought ſometimes to reformation: Audeo decere (ſaith Auſtin) utile eſt fuperbis in aliquod apertum manifeſtumque cadere peccatum. Were the permiſſion of ſinnes concurring to the crucifying of Chriſt Jeſus to no end? yet never was the permiſſion of any ſinne of greater conſequent, than the permiſſion of Adams ſinne; as whereby the whole race of mankind was corrupted, and way made for that great work, wonderfull both to men and Angels, in the redemption of the world, by the incarnation of the Sonne of God, and his paſſion upon the croſſe. God created even the wicked againſt the day of evill, and that for Gods own ſake, as Solomon teſtifieth: and did he not as well permit him to become wicked, for Gods own ſake, and his glories ſake? Auſtin of old hath acknowledged, that even malum eſse bonumeſt, and Bellarmine after him, Bonum est malum eſse Deo permittente. Nec duhitandum eſt, Deum facere bene, ſaith Auſtin Enchirid. 96. Etiam ſinendo fieri quaecunque ſiunt male: Non enim hoc niſi juſto judicio ſinit. And ſeeing the permiſſion of Adams ſinne could not be juſto judicio, in reſpect of any ſinne precedent (for it was the firſt) therefore it muſt be juſto judicio, in reſpect of ſome good end intended to be conſequent. The very ſinne of David with Bathſheba, and againſt Uriah, Arminius acknowledgeth to have been permitted by God to excellent ends, particular and definite, quo diligentius ſeipſum obſervare…, peccatum ſuum exemplo aliorum defleret, egregium humilitatis, reſipiſeentiaeque ſpecimen, & exemplar praeſtaret, & glorioſius ex peccato reſurgeret Exam. praedeſt. pag. 166, 167. Nay, your ſelfe have acknowledged out of Auſtin, the ends of God in this, when you alledged out of lib. de corrept. & gratia, cap. 10. this paſſage; credimus Deum ſic ordinaſse Angelorum & hominum vitam, ut in ea prius oſtenderet quid p…ſsct eorum liberum arbitrium; deinde quid poſset ſuae gratiae beneficium, juſtitiaeque judicium. Apply this to man, firſt he ſhewed what his free will could do; wherein? but in his fall; Secondly, quid poſset gratiae beneficium juſtitiaeque judicium: how was this ſhewed, but in the rayſing of ſome, and derelinquiſhing others? As for the circumſtances wherewith you charm this ſtrange ſaying, they ſerve you in no ſtead: man is in doubt what end to reſolve on, upon the event or non-event of ſomething, becauſe he knowes not whether it will fall out or no: ſo if God were to ſeek, whether upon his permiſſion of Adam to ſinne, he would ſinne or no; he might be uncertain what to intend. But you ſuppoſe, that before God decreed to permit him to ſinne, he knew he would ſinne if he were permitted. And as for the diſtinction of particular and generall, it cannot be accommodated to ends; for ends intended are onelyonly particulars, for they are intended to be produced, and ſuch things are onelyonly ſingulars: like as by ſingular means they are produced, and actiones verſantur onelyonly circa ſingularia. Again, it is untrue, that Gods decree was negative: For, as Auſtin ſaith, Enchirid. cap. 100. Non utique nelens ſinit ſed volens: And actus volendi is poſitive in God. And again, Cap. 95. Non ergo fit aliquid, niſi omnipotens fieri velit, vel p. 188ſinendo ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo. Your ſelfe, ere you are aware, draw neer to the truth, which breakes forth as loath to be ſuppreſſed; As when you ſay, a man ſuffers an houſe to fall, becauſe he can diſpoſe of it many waies being fallen, to his own behoofe. Apply this to God concerning the fall of Adam, permitted by him. So ſaith Auſtin, Nec ſineret bonus fieri male, niſi omnipotens etiam de malo facere poſſet bene. Here is the generall, de malo facere poſſe bene. What are the ſpecials in the paſſage by your ſelfe alledged, they are two, ut oſtenderet gratiae beneficium, juſtitiaeque judicium. Now conſider I pray, poſse de malo facere bene is not cauſa adaequata, why God ſhould permit fieri male. But onelyonly velle de malo facere bene. For this power of his extends to infinite particular ſinnes, which he doth not permit. And Auſtin acknowledgeth both, not onelyonly the poſſe as you doe, when he ſaith, niſi poſſet de malo facere bene: But the velle alſo, and that according to the ſpecials of gratiae beneficium, juſtitiaeque judicium; As appeares in the paſſage alledged by you. For he ſaith, Deum ſie ordinaſſe hominum vitam, (non quia poſse… oſtendere, ſed) ut oſtenderet quid poſſet gratiae beneficium, juſtitiaeque judicium. So that he plainly manifeſts, that the cauſe moving God ſo to deale with Angels and men, was not his power to ſhew, but his will and reſolution to ſhew both the power of his grace and of his juſtice: which applied to men, is ſhewed in raiſing ſome after they are fallen, and derelinquiſhing others. I conclude as Abigal ſaid to David, Hereafter it ſhall be no griefe unto you, nor offence of mind, that I have been a means to keep thee from running a dangerous courſe in the way of life: So hereafter it may be no regret unto you, that Gods providence hath brought you to this conference, whereby to preſerve you from running dangerous courſes in the way of faith.

You in your Letter acknowledge reprobation abſolute, which is utterly contradictory to your opinion, ſeeing you premiſe before it, the conſideration of that ſinne, for which men are damned: For you premiſe the conſideration of ſinne originall; And many thouſand infants are damned onelyonly for that, and all that are damned are damned for that, though not onelyonly for that.