The Riches of Gods Love, Part 4 · Section 1
Sect. 1.
It fighteth with God's holineſſe, and maketh him the principall cauſe of ſin in the greateſt number of men M. Maſons Addit. p 52. 53, 54 55.I know that the defender of it doth not thinke ſo. For the maine reaſon which moved the Synod of Dort, & ſome other Divines before and ſince, to bring downe predeſtination thus low, and begin their Reprobation after the fall, was, that they might maintaine a fatall and abſolute Reprobation of men, and yet avoid this imputation, as Doctor Twiſſe hath noted. But what they intended (for ought that I can ſee) they have not Vindic: grat: l. 1 par: 1. cap. 4. initio.compaſſed. For it followeth evident enough, even from their concluſions too, that of all the ſins of reprobates, which are the greateſt number by many degrees God is the true and principall Authour. Two things they ſay which taken together, methinks, inferre it. 1. That God of his own will and pleaſure hath brought men into an eſtate, in which they cannot avoid ſinne, 2ly. That he leaveth the Reprobate irrecoverably in it.
1. That God of his own will and pleaſure hath brought men into an eſtate in which they cannot poſſibly avoid ſinne; that is into the ſtate of originall ſinne, which conſiſts of two parts.
1. The guilt of Adam's tranſgreſſion. 2. The corruption of nature. In both theſe they ſay mankind is intereſſed, not through the force and efficiency of naturall generation, becauſe we all derive our nature from Adam, as our firſt principle; but by God's free and voluntary order and impuration. It came not to paſſe by any naturall meanes (ſaith Calvin) that all men fell from ſalvation, by the fault of our firſt parem. That all men Inſtit. l. 3. c. 23. Sect: 7.are held under the guilt of eternall death in the perſon of one man; it is the cleare and conſtant voice of Scripture. Now this cannot be aſcribed to any naturall cauſe it muſt therefore come from the wonderfull councell of God. A little after he hath the ſame againe with as great an Emphaſis. How is it that ſo many nations with their children, ſhould be involved in the fall without remedy, but becauſe God would have it ſo. As roundly doth Doctor Twiſſe affirme the ſame. The guilt of originall ſinne is derived unto us only by imputation, the filth only by propagation, and Vindic. grat. l. 1. par. 1. digr. 4. c. 3. propè finemboth theſe only by God's free conſtitution. A little before he hath theſe words; The fault of our nature commeth rom God's free appointment For he doth not cut of any neceſſity but of his mere will only impute the ſinne of Adam to us To this purpoſe he ſpeaketh a great deale more in the ſame place. To theſe ſayings Saint Bernard hath the like ſpeaking of Adam's ſinne he ſaith, Adam's ſinne is anothers, becauſe we knew not of it; and Bern: Serm. 1. Domi: 1 poſt. 8. Epiphan.yet ours, becauſe it was through the juſt though ſecret judgment of God, reputed ours.
And this that they ſay is agreable to reaſon. For if we be fallen into the guilt of the firſt ſinne and the corruption of nature, only becauſe we were in Adam's loines when he ſinned, and derive our being from him, then theſe two things will follow.
1. That we ſtand guilty of all the ſin… which Adam committed from his fall to his lives end. For we were vertually in his loines, as well after his fall as before; and in every paſſage and variation of his life he was ſtill a principle of mankind. But where doe we read that we are guilty of any other of his ſins? To the n…ſt ſin only doth the Scripture entitle that ſin and miſery, which entred into the world and invaded all mankind, as we may ſee. Rom: 5. 15. 16. 17 &c.
2. That children are guilty of the ſins of all their progenitours, eſpecially of their immediate parents. For they were in their loines when they ſinned, and more immediatly then in Adam's. But children are not guilty of their parents faults, nor obnoxious to their puniſhments, becauſe they are their children as we may ſee. Exod: 20. 5. where God ſaying that he will viſit the ſins of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation of them hate him; plainly implyeth that children are not ſimply charged with their fathers ſins but conditionally if they be haters of God, as their fathers were; if by imitating their wicked parents they become partakers of their ſins. In Ezech 18 14 &c. The Lord ſignifieth thus much in his Apology againſt the cavill of the Jewes For firſt he ſaith, that if a wicked man begetteth a ſon that ſeet. his fathers ſins, & doth not the like, he ſhall not die for the iniquiry of his father. This implyeth that the derivation of being Ezek. 18. 20:from the patent doth not render the child obnoxious to the puniſhment of the fathers ſin, nor conſequently to the ſinne. For the good child is not obnoxious, and yet the good child is equally in the fathers loines with the bad, and equally receiveth nature and being from him. And then the Lord tells them expreſly thus much in two propoſitions.
1. Affirmatively, The ſoule that ſinneth it ſhall die. And that it may be known that he ſpeaks excluſively, only the ſoule that ſinneth ſhall dye; he delivers his mind.
2. Negatively, The Son ſhall not beare the iniquity of the father, neither ſhall the father beare the iniquity of her Sonne &c.
Our Saviour in that woefull ſpeech of his to the Phariſees, Fulfill ye alſo the meaſure of your fathers. Behold Mat. 23. 32. 34.I ſend unto you Prophets. &c. them ye ſhall kill and crucifie, that on you may come all the righteous blood. &c. Intimateth apparently, that the Phariſees were not inheritours of their fathers ſins & puniſhments by birth; but by the commiſſion and imitation of their fathers ſins, they came to inherit both their ſins and plagues. Miſerable would our caſe be on whom the ends of the world are cōe, if children ſhould be guilty of all their Anceſtours prevatications. What a world of ſins ſhould we be to anſwer for, perſonall ſins, parents, progenitours ſins, to a thouſand paſt generations? A thing with no reaſon to be imagined. This is the firſt thing
Whereas I am quoted here to give the reaſon which moved the Synod of Dort, and ſome other Divines to begin Reprobation after the fall, namely this, to avoid the imputation Anſwer.of making God the Authour of ſinne I doubt this Authour hath ſo long inured himſelfe to leaſings, that it is growne naturall unto him to deliver untruthes. For firſt I make no mention (in that fourth Digreſ of mine in the matter of predeſtination) of the Synod of Dort; neither indeed were they the Objects of my thoughts in this particular. cap. 4.That Digreſſion of mine is ſpent in anſwering the arguments of thoſe who diſpute againſt Maſſa nondum condita, and ſtand for maſſa corrupta, to be the object of election and reprobation. In the firſt chapter I make anſwer to Mr. Elnathan Parre in an Engliſh tract of his, wherein he deales upon this argument. In the ſecond chap: I deale with others that make choice of the lower way; becauſe it ſeemes to be the eaſieſt way, which I expreſſe in the very words of Mr. Doctor Abbats, Biſhop of Sarisbury ere he died, and I conceived that indeed this motive prevailed with moſt; and therefore I thought good ſo much the more throughly to diſcuſſe that. But doe I ſay they tooke this courſe to free God from the imputation of ſinne? Nothing leſſe; my words are theſe in the Digreſſion cap. 2. Quod plurimos movet, illud eſt, nimirum quod in ſententia illâ de maſſâ nondum conditâ, omnia ſint, ut aiunt, intricata & perplexa, & infinitis difficultatibus involuta; in hac verò de maſſâ corruptà predeſtinationi hominum praeſtruendâ contra clara ſint omnia, & cum Scripturarum autoritate, judicio que antiquitatis planiſſimè conſentientia; where I mention two reaſons that moved them to take this way 1. This, in that opinion concerning the Maſſe of mankind not yet created, all paſſages are intricate, perplext, and intangled with infinite difficulties; but in the opinion concerning the Maſſe corrupt, all things are cleare. 2. This, that in this other opinion, all things are moſt plainly found to agree both with the authority of Scriptures, and with the judgment of antiquity. Now after I had endeavoured to diſcover the inſufficiency of this plea in the ſecond and third chapter of that fourth Digreſſion in the matter of predeſtination. In the fourth chapter I propoſe mine own judgment concerning the true benefit of this way in making the corrupt maſſe of mankind the object of election and reprobation; not the judgment of others, as this Authour carrieth the matter; but mine own judgment. For thus I beginne. Ad extremum, vis liberè pronuntiem, quid unicè proficiatur ex hac noſtrá praedeſtinationis Objecti ſententiae temperatione. Dicàm igitur quid ſentiam. Hinc nimirum efficitur ut à lapſu primorum parentum, decreto praedeſtinationis ſubjiciendo & ſubordinando liberemur huic unicè proviſum eſſe, ab iſtius quaſi mediae & temperatioris opinionis aſſertioribus mihi pluſquam probabile, aut veriſimile videtur, ne ſcililicet alias peccatum fieri ſtatueretur, decernente Deo, tanquam medium ad fines à Deo, in praedeſtinatione ſibi praeſtitutos accommodatum; unde etiam quàm author peccati conſtituendus ſit, nullâ ſolidâ ratione explicari poſſe videtur. In the laſt place, will you give me leave freely to profeſſe, what we profic by thus tempering our opinion touching the object of predeſtination? I will therefore deliver what I thinke. So that herein I purpoſe mine own opinion only, not the opinion of others. Herehence thus we gaine that we are freed from ſubjecting and ſubordinating man's fall unto God's decree of predeſtination. It ſeemes to me more then probable or likely, that the maintainers of this middle and temperate openion doe provide only againſt this inconvenience; (that is their way doth indeed provide againſt this, and againſt no other inconvenience in my opinion) to wit, leaſt otherwiſe the ſinne of Adam ſhould be ſaid to come to paſſe God willing it, as a meanes conducing to thoſe ends which God intended in predeſtination; from whence it followes as it ſeemes, that it cannot be explicated by any ſolid reaſon that God is not made the Authour of ſinne. All which is delivered by me as my opinion, conceiving that others thinke ſo too; namely not that God is hereby made the Authour and principall cauſe of ſinne; but that the contrary cannot be explicated by any ſolid reaſon. Now Cajetan confeſſeth as much, namely that in theſe myſteries, all the diſtinctions that are uſed, doe not quietare intellectum, ſatisfie the underſtanding; and therefore he doth captivate his owne into the obedience of faith. And Alvarez juſtifies him in this, profeſſing herein that he ſpeakes doctiſſimè & piiſſimè, moſt learned and holyly. And in a peculiar diſputation he maintaines that the miſtery of Gods providence and predeſtination, ſtanding with the liberty of our wills, is incomprehenſible by us in this world. Laſtly, conſider, this is delivered only of the firſt ſinne of our firſt parents, which this authour perverts moſt ſhamefully, when he avoucheth that I ſhould acknowledge our Divines, many of them, to embrace this way to avoyd the imputation of making God the principall cauſe, not of Adams ſinne alone, but of ſinne in the greateſt number of men. And to confeſſe a truth, if ſinne be made the meanes for the procuring of the ends which God intends in predeſtination, undoubtedly God himſelfe ſhould be the authour of ſinne. For whoſoever intends any end, he, and none but he, muſt be authour in working the meanes which tend to this end. Therefore I ſaid, only that in this caſe, It ſeemes that the ſinne of Adam was intended by God as the meanes; Whereas in truth and upon due conſideration it appeares that not the creatures ſinne, but Gods permiſſion of the creatures ſinne, is the meanes whereby God brings to paſſe his glorious ends. Yet not the permiſſion of ſinne alone, but joyned together with the pardoning of it, and ſaving his elect in deſpight of it, is the compleat meanes (together with the procuring of Chriſts merits) for the manifeſtation of Gods glory in the way of mercy; And in like manner, not the permitting of ſinne alone, but joyned with the puniſhment of it, is the compleat meanes for the manifeſtation of Gods glory in the way of juſtice vindicative, which in Scripture phraſe is called, the declaration of his wrath. And whereas I ſaid that hereby it ſeemed that it could not by any ſound reaſon be manifeſted, that God was not the Authour Rom: 9. 22.of ſinne, by the firſt way, this Authour avoucheth of the defenders of the lower way which ſeemes moſt temperate, that from their concluſions it followeth evidently, that of all the ſinnes of Reprobates, which are the greateſt number by many degrees, God is the true and principall Authour. Obſerve, this (he ſayth) followeth evidently from their concluſions; and forthwith he tells us that he thinks ſo, or, to his thinking, it doth ſo. And why is he not the Authour of all the ſinnes of the elect alſo? whereas originall ſinne continues in them alſo, they carry about them a body of death, and have cauſe to complaine, of a Rom. 7.law in their numbers that rebelleth againſt the law of their mind, and leadeth them captive to the law of ſinne. Only there is a principle of ſpirituall life in them, that renewes their repentance dayly as their ſinnes are renewed; but they looke not to be freed, from ſinne as long as they live in this world. But let us examine how well he makes good that which he affirmes of the ſinnes of the Reprobate, that God is made the Authour of them by our Cornel: in Ep: ad Rom▪ c. 9. 18.doctrine, of Reprobation. I find that Cornelius a Lapide a Ieſuite ſhapes Calvines doctrine of election and Reprobation, this lower way, and imputes unto him that from Reprobation, according to his doctrine, in Reprobis manat certus & neceſſarius lapſus in peccata quaelibet, A certaine and neceſſary falling into all manner of ſinnes, doth flow in Reprobates. But not from theſe principles mentioned by this Authour, but rather from two other principles. The 1. that God deſtinated Reprobates to everlaſting puniſhment, as to their end; and unto ſinnes, as to the meanes thereof. The 2. is that man doth nothing freely in negotio damnationis ſuae; but that in all things he is driven of God, as a bowle by him that throwes it, as an hatchet by him that hewes with it, and as Clay is moved by the Potter, whom he cannot reſiſt. This he imputes, to the defenders of Reprobation the lower way, and particularly to Calvin. This Cornelius denyes not, for ought I know, that by the juſt judgement of God, though executed according to his will and pleaſure, hath brought all men forth into the world in originall ſinne, or that any man can be recovered out of it whiles he lives in this world. And as for theſe two concluſions which he imputes to Calvin: as they are falſe in themſelves, ſo they are as falſely charged upon Calvin. Haec loquendi ratio, nunquam Calvin. de occult. Dei provid.apud me occurret, finem creationis eſſe aeternum interitum. Calvin expreſly denyes, that God creates any man to this end, that he may damne him; Neither is ſinne any meanes whereby God brings a man to damnation, but the permiſſion of ſinne is Gods meanes, and that together with damning for ſinne, is the compleate meanes, whereby God brings to paſſe his end concerning Reprobates, which is the manifeſtation of his glory in the way of vindicative juſtice, called his wrath upon thoſe Reprobates; and in the way of mercy upon his elect veſſells of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, as S. Paul plainely teacheth us. The other principle which he obtrudes upon Calvin, is as falſe, and as falſely layd to his charge. In good actions he Rom. 9. 22. 23.grants the elect are ſo caryed to that which is good, as not freely. For he takes Liberty to conſiſt in an indifferency to do that which is good, or no; wherein I willingly confeſſe he is in an errour; but that reprobates do not that evill freely, which they do, is no where affirmed by Calvin that I know nor by any learned or ſober Divine. For albeit we all concurre in this with Bernard, that no naturall man hath libertatem a peccato, liberty to keep himſelfe from ſinne: Yet that he is carryed into this or that particular ſinne, we all confeſſe it is done freely. And the reaſon is evident, drawen from the difference betweene gracious actions, and ſinfull actions. Every gracious action is ſupernaturall, either as touching the ſubſtance of the act, ſuch as are the acts of faith, hope, and love; or as touching the manner of performing them, ſuch as are all vertuous actions, which are not acceptable unto God, unleſſe they flow from the former principles, faith, hope, and love: Hereupon there is ſome colour, that ſuch are not performed freely; but there is no ſuch colour, as if man were not free in performing actions vitious; conſidering that all vitious actions are naturall actions, none of them ſupernaturall. And ſurely every naturall man as he hath power to performe any action naturall; ſo hath he power to abſtaine from it. But proceed we along with our preſent Authour.
1 The firſt doctrine, that he obtrudes upon us, is ſuch, that I little thought there had beene any difference betweene him and us thereabouts, conſiſting of two particulars. 1. The one, that God brings all men forth into the world in the corrupt maſſe, or in the ſtate of originall ſinne.
2 The other, that man, in the ſtate of originall ſinne or naturall corruption devoyd of the ſpirit of regeneration, is under the ſervitude of ſinne, hath no liberty from it. Now in theſe particulars I could not imagine that this Authour differed from us, unleſſe with Pelagius he entertaines an affection to deny originall ſinne. For if all men be borne in originall ſinne, ſeing it is God that takes us out of our mothers wombe, and by whom we are brought forth into this world, it cannot be denyed, I ſhould thinke, that God bringeth all men forth into the world, in originall ſinne. As for the ſecond, Doctor Potter confeſſeth it as the doctrine of the Church of England, that man in ſtate of nature hath no liberty from ſinne. It is true, this liberty he diſtinguiſheth from that liberty, which is called, liberty from neceſſity, which he grants to a naturall man; to whom he denyes the former, which cannot ſtand without contradiction. For if a man hath no liberty from ſinne he muſt needs ſinne. And therefore Doctor Fulke upon the Remiſh Teſtament doth uſually diſtinguiſh betweene liberty from ſinne, and liberty from coaction. And both Arminius and Corvinus confeſſe that by the ſinne of Adam all men are caſt upon a neceſſity of ſinning, though God be ready to deliver us from this neceſſity of ſinning upon reaſonable termes to be performed on mans part, which latter doctrine we utterly renounce as manifeſtly breathing the ſpirit of Pelagius, in a particular generally condemned in the Church of God, namely, that grace is conferred according to works or merits. This makes me conceive that this Authour carryeth himſelfe cunningly in the propoſition of this doctrine which he imputes unto us, and that he hath a reach more then every one is aware of. And indeed the phraſe he uſeth of bringing men into an eſtate, is very harſh, though applyed to Adam and Eve our firſt parents, much more applyed to their race and poſterity. For albeit Adam was created in a better ſtate, and afterwards brought into the ſtate of ſinne, and bondage of corruption: yet what ſiniſter judgement moved this Authour to impute this unto God, rather then to Adam himſelfe? what if God tooke his holy ſpirit from them upon their fall, whereupon they found themſelves naked and were aſhamed? was it not juſt with God to do ſo? Doth not M. Hord profeſſe, that it were juſt with God to damne all for originall ſinne, if he would; which doctrine was delivered by this Authour in his Lectures at Magdalen Hall, my ſelfe being an hearer, and a taker of notes from him, upon this very argument. But it may be this is to be accounted amongſt the errours of his youth, miſtaking Bellermine, which now he is to wiſe to correct in his age. Who brings malefactors to the Gallowes, is it the Judge or Sheriffe, and not their ſins rather? Yet this, though abſurd enough, ſatisfies him not, but withall he adds that God doth this of his own will and pleaſure which phraſe is prone to worke a perſwaſion in the Reader, that hereby is ſign…ed that God brought not man in this ſtate in the way of juſtice for his ſinne, but merely of his own will or pleaſure; But what Divine of ours was ever known to maintaine any ſuch prodigious aſſertion? Who can deny but that the Judge condemnes a malefactor unto death, & Sheriffe takes order to execute him. Now if queſtion be made why ſuch a man be hanged, will any wiſe man referre this to the will and pleaſure of the Iudge or Sheriffe, and not rather to the malefactours deſerts? In like ſort it is God that condemnes a man, and inflicts eternall puniſhment upon him, but is there any colour to ſay that he doth this of his will and pleaſure, and not rather that he doth it in the way of juſtice provoked thereunto by mens ſinnes? Laſtly when it is ſaid that God brought him into the ſtate of corruption, who would not thinke that thereby were meant that God was the poſitive Authour of this corruption? whereas it is apparent that man himſelfe averted himſelfe voluntarily and freely from God, the unchangable good; and converted himſelfe unto the creature, which is but a changeable good; And God hereupon taking his Spirit from him and that moſt juſtly; left him where he found him, and that irrecoverably, ſave by the grace of regeneration. Yet this phraſe is more harſh applyed to the race & poſterity of Adam, in whoſe production he hath no other hand, then that which neceſſarily belongs unto him, as the Authour of nature, namely, the quickning of them, and faſhioning of them in the wombe, and bringing them forth into the light of this world. If from a leprous Sire there ſprings a leprous fruit, ſhoud this ſeeme ſtrange? We all derive our nature from Adam fallen from God, and converted unto the creature, and bereaved of God's Spirit moſt juſtly for his tranſgreſſion; why ſhould it ſeeme ſtrange then, that our natures ſhould be no better then Adam's was after his fall? It is true the propagation of originall ſinne, hath alwaies been accounted of a myſterious nature, as touching the manner of it, and very ſtrange and odde conceits have been entertained hereabouts; Some ſaying that the ſoule is derived from the parents a ſtrange conceite even in Philoſophy not only in peculiar reference unto the ſoule reaſonable; but generally I find Philoſophers have entertained peculiar contemplations about Datores formarum, in a more generall way. Others have thought that the ſoule is defiled by the body, as a ſweet and ſoveraigne oyle may be corrupted by a naughty boxe; which is worſe then the former, no marvaile that a bodily thing ſhould corrupt that which is bodily; but that a body ſhould corrupt the ſoule, the one being corporall the other ſpirituall is beyond comprehenſion: Farre more probable or rather without queſtion that the ſoule rather corrupts the body. The poſitive inclination unto evill is that which hath troubled all and made ſome conceive that it could not proceed immediatly from God; For if ſo, then ſurely not impura, but pura. Others and particularly Arimininſis, as remember, that the corruption came from the breath of the ſerpent, others as Johannes Bicconius; that the ſoule though comming pure from God yet knit unto the body, the Lord for the ſinne of Adam gives it over to the power of Satan, who as an univerſall cauſe ſupplies the place of a particular cauſe in the poſitive corrupting of it. This at the firſt ſeemed unto me as very ſingular, ſo a very ſtrange adventure, and that Baccorius is a very rare School-man and more uſed in the Arabian philoſophy then all the reſt, ſave ſuch as were of his own profeſſion. And that I take to be the reaſon, why Aquinas diſcourſeth as he doth of Intellectus Agens, making it a…ticulty of the ſoule; and Durand diſcourſeth in ſuch ſort of that argument, as i… he never underſtood the ſtate of the queſtion; which I take to proceed frō this that they were ſo little acquainted with Averro's philoſophy, wherein Zabarell was well ſeen. And I find him ſometimes congratulating his good fortunes in finding that this Iohannes Bacconius was in ſome particulars of his mind, he doth not ſay, he learnt it of him. But I know no School Divine comparable to him for depth of philoſophicall ſpeculations; yet am I not of his mind in the point of originall ſinne. I willingly confeſſe it is one of the three points wherein ſometimes I perſwaded my ſelfe I never ſhould be ſatiſfied in this world▪ And that which moſt troubled me was the poſitive nature of it. Wherin Cajetan is thought to diſcourſe ſtrangely alſo, even to the palate of Pontificians; And Aquinas his definit on of it, calling it, Habitus corruptus; hath coſt me no ſmall paines in the diſcuſſion thereof. At length I conceive there is no greate cauſe of ſo much pudder to be made about it, ſave that certaine prejudices which we lay for grounds doe caſt us there upon. The harmony of man's nature in all parts, excepting it's due ſubjection unto God, I willingly confeſſe was naturall, but whether it did profluere ex principiis naturae, either ſpecificae, or individualis, or was cauſed and maintained while Adam ſtood in his integrity by the ſpeciall hand of God's providence; as ſome School-men profeſſe finding the difficultie of maintaining the former (which yet might be conſequent naturally to it's due ſubjection unto God for ought I ſee yet to the contrary) I diſpute not. But as for it's due ſubjection unto God in faith and love, and ſuch a love as joyned with the contempt of it ſelfe; I have reaſon to conceive that this was not naturall, as flowing from the principles of nature either ſpecificall or individuall, though this latter I heard ſometimes maintained publiquely in the Univerſity, but rather wrought in man in his creation by vertue of ſupernaturall grace, and the holy Ghoſt's reſidence in him; which ſupernaturall grace, and holy Ghoſt's reſidence had been naturall unto all his poſterity, had Adam continued in his integrity. I call it naturall in as much as it had deſcended unto all his poſterity, after the manner of an inheritance naturall. But Adam by his tranſgreſſion forfeited this bleſſed condition, not to himſelfe only, but to all his poſterity, being juſtly bereaved of the Spirit of God, and left by the Lord where he found him; averted à bono incommutabili, and converted ad bonum communicabile in an inordinate manner, which converſion to the creature is poſitive, and not evill in it ſelfe, but as it is joyned with averſion from God; & this makes it an inordinate converſion to the creature, not for Gods ſake, that it is not out of the love of God to the contempt of himſelfe, which is the character of a child of God but out of the love of himſelfe to the contept of God, which is the charecter of a child of this this world. So that as originall righteouſnes whereunto we are reſtored in part by the grace of regeneration, tranſcends all motall vertues; ſo originall ſin tranſcends all morall vices & is found in the moſt vertuous amongſt heathen men (of whom ſome have been very renowned in this kind, & great maſters of their paſſions) as well as amongſt the moſt vicious. And it is hard to reſolve who have been greateſt enimies to the truth of God and holineſſe; and generally to the holy waies of God, whether the moſt vertuous or the moſt vitious among heathen men. I come to his ſecond poſition, which he caſts upon us, as diſſenting therein from himſelfe; and it is this, That God leaves the Reprobates irrecoverably in it. Now on this point I would gladly know his contrary Tenet in what ſenſe it proceeds, namely, That Reprobates are not left irrecoverably in originall ſinne, or in ſuch ſtate wherein they cannot avoid ſinne. For I cannot comprehend his meaning herein. But it was wont to be ſaid of Africa that, ſemper aliquid apportat novi, alwaies it brings forth ſome new monſter in courſe of nature. So men of this Authour's ſpirit: are alwaies bringing forth ſome new monſter in Divinity. For what thinks he? was ever any Reprobate recovered out of originall ſin? Nay was ever any child of God recovered out of it while he lived upon the face of the earth? Or doth he thinke himſelfe recovered out of it, or is it in his power to avoid it? Perhaps he will ſay though he cannot avoid ſin originall, yet he can avoid ſin actuall; and ſo not only the children of God may if they will, but even Reprobates alſo. But what? may they avoid all ſinne, or ſome only? What one of our Divines denies that a Reprobate hath power to avoid fornication? We ſee heathens doe avoid: it Or ſtealth? For heathens doe ſo. Or murther? Even heathens have been found very morall and that generally. But this we ſay; All men in the ſtate of nature, whether they doe good as touching the ſubſtance of the act; yet they doe it not in a gracious manner; Or whether they abſtaine from that which is evill, they doe not abſtaine from it in a gracious manner; nor can doe. Nay ſince the fall of Adam, who ever lived free from ſinne, the Son of God only excepted? Doth notholy Paul profeſſe of himſelfe ſaying, I doe not the good that I would, but the evill that I would not, that doe I. To will is preſent with me, but I find not to performe: hat which is good. And if God may juſtly damne all for ſinne originall as Mr. Hoord affirmes, why may not God leave all irrecoverably in it; and that juſtly? So that herein I find my ſelfe in a brake, not can deviſe with my ſelfe in what tollerable or colourable ſenſe he can affirme, that Reprobates are not left irrecoverably in the ſtate of originall ſinne; or in ſuch a ſtate, in which they cannot avoid ſinne; I ſay in what ſenſe he can deliver this different from us, I cannot deviſe. For we willingly grant that there is no particular actuall ſinne from which a Reprobate hath not power to abſtaine, though he cannot abſtaine from it in a gracious manner without grace, and that grace we account the grace of regeneration; which is a ſupernaturall principle of gracious actions, both as touching faith in God, and the love of God, to the contempt of our ſelves. Now I gueſſe his meaning is, that no Reprobate is ſo left and abandoned in originall ſinne, but that God gives him grace to believe if he will, to repent if he will, to love God if he will, & that above all things. I gueſſe, I ſay, that this is his meaning; but I would have him expreſſe it, that I might ſee it under his hand. For till then I find noe apparent difference between him & us, as touching theſe two principles from whence he deduceth, that God is thereby made The principall cauſe of ſin in the greateſt number of men. And if once he deliver himſelfe fairely, and comes to this, the iſſue of the queſtion to be debated between us will be faire and cleare; namely about this their univerſall grace, whether all men elect and Reprobate by vertue of ſupernaturall grace given unto them, have power to beleive if they will, repent if they will. And againſt this I will diſpute after this manner. Firſt in all this there is no difference between us excepting that this power is ſaid to be wrought in man by ſupernaturall grace. For we ſay with Auſtin Deo credere, & ab amore temporalium ad divina Auſt de Gen: cont Manich: l. 1, c. 3.praecepta ſervanda ſe convertere, omnes poſſunt ſi velint. All men can believe God, if they will; and from the love of temporall things convert themſelves to the keeping of God's commandements if they will. For all the moment of inclining a man to workes of morallity lyeth in the will of man. And therefore marke what followes in Auſtin, Sed praeparatur voluntas à Domino (ſupple ut velit) tantum que augetur munere charitatis ut poſſit. But the will is prepard by the Lord (to wit to make it willing) and ſo much augmented by the gift of charity as to make it able. And I prove, that looke what I ſupply is according unto Auſtin Enchirid. c. 32.interpreting that of the Apoſtle, ne que volentis, ne que currentis, ſed miſerentis Dei; it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth but of God that ſheweth mercy. For he ſhewes; that the whole both to will and run, is to be aſcribed unto God, qui hominis voluntatem bonam & praeparat adjuvandam, & adjuvat praeparatam; who both prepares the good will of man that after he may helpe it, and helpes it being once prepared; where plainly man swilling that, which is good, is made the fruit of God's preparing it; but becauſe there is in man a will of the fleſh, reſiſting this will of the ſpirit; therefore there is need not of grace preparing only, but of grace adjuvant and helping alſo, to enable it to doe what it hath a will unto, whence immediatly followeth, running as well as willing. And theſe two graces praeparant, and adjuvant, are afterward called by the names of grace prevenient, and ſubſequent, thus; Nolentem praevenit ut velit, volentem ſubſequitur ne fruſtra velit. Him that is unwilling the Lord preventeth to make him willing, and willing he followeth him that he may not will in vaine. And that this double grace is required by reaſon of the reluctancy between the fleſh and the Spirit, I prove out of the ſame Auſtin writing thus, Prima gratiâ eſt, Auſt: de cor: rep: & grat: c. 11.quâ fit ut habeat homo juſtitiam ſi velit; ſecunda ergo plus poteſt, quâ etiam fit ut velit, & tantum velit tanto que ardore diligat, ut carnis voluntatem contraria concupiſcentem voluntate ſpiritus vincat. The firſt grace is that whereby it comes to paſſe that a man is righteous if he will; The ſecond grace therefore is of more power, whereby it comes to paſſe alſo that a man doth will, and that ſo reſolutely, and with ſuch fervency loveth (compare this with that of Auſtin de Gen: contrae Manich: lib. 1. cap: 3.) that by the will of the Spirit, he overcommeth the will of the fleſh fighting againſt it. So that a power to doe good if a man will is one thing; to will that which is good is another thing; and laſtly to be able to doe that which it wills is a third thing; yet both theſe two laſt are comprehended under ſic velle, which Auſtin calls tantum augeri munere charitatis, to have the gift of charity ibid. cap. 12.ſo much increaſed in him, as thus; Tantum Spiritu ſancto accenditur voluntas eorum ut ideo poſſint, quta ſic velint, ideo ſic velint, quia Deus ſic operatur, ut velint. The will of God's children is ſo inflāed by the Holy Ghoſt, that therefore they are able to do good, becauſe they have a will to it in ſuch a manner (that is with ſuch fervency and eagernes) therefore they have a will to it in ſuch a manner, becauſe God ſo workes, as to make them willing; to wit, in ſuch a manner. Secondly we ſay that to believe if a man will, to repent if he will is to be accounted nature, rather then grace, which I prove thus. Supernaturall grace is not inferiour to a morall vertue, but a morall vertue doth more then leave a man indifferent to doe vertuouſly if he will; For it inclines the will to vertuous courſes only, and not vitious; Like as vice inclines the will only to vicious courſes, and not to vertuous; how much more doth ſupernaturall grace not leave a man indifferent to doe good if he will; but inclines the will only to ſuch things as are pleaſing unto God, and not to things diſpleaſing unto him. Againe to have power to believe if we will, is to have power to have faith if we will; But this Auſtin hath expreſſely profeſſed to belong to the nature of man, in diſtinctio fró the grace of the faithfull. Poſſe fidē habere, ſicut poſſe charitatē habere naturae eſt heminū; Auſt: de praedeſt: Sanct: cap. 5.fidē habere, ſicut charitatē habere, gratiaeeſt fideliū. The nature of man makes him to have power, to have faith, to have charity; but the grace of the faithfull makes a man to have faith, to have charity. It may be objected out of the former place taken out of Auſt: deCor: & grat: c. 11, that habere juſtitiam ſi velit, is, gratia prima; to be righteous if he will is the firſt grace. I anſwer, Auſtin there ſpeakes of the grace that Adam had before his fall, which was this, poſſe ſi velit to abſtaine from eating the forbidden fruit. And this firſt grace is called grace in this reſpect, that there was in Adam no fleſh luſting againſt the Spirit; So that if Adam had but a will to abſtaine, he ſhould have no cauſe to complaine as Saint Paul doth, To will is preſent with me, but I find no meanes to performe that which is good; Now ſuch a poſſe ſi velit is not found in any man now a daies, no not in the regenerate. But all men that have a will to doe good by the grace of God, have withall a poſſe ſecundum quid, a power in part a weake power; but this is not ſufficient to denominate them ſimply able to doe that which is good; unleſſe the love of God be increaſed in them, ſo as to overcome the will of the fleſh luſting againſt the ſpirit, as I have repreſented Auſtin thus expounding it. Thirdly whether tends this, that all men have power to believe if they will, to repent if they will? But to maintaine that faith and repentance are not the gifts of God, beſtowed of his free grace on whom he will; but that they are the workes of man's free will, directly contradictory to the word of God expreſly profeſſing that faith is the gift of God, and that not of our ſelves. So repentance is the gift of God; yea that it is God who worketh in us that which is pleaſing in his ſight through Jeſus Chriſt. Heb: 13 21. Eph: 28. Act: 5. & 11. 18. 2 Tim: 2. laſt. Phil. 3. 13.Yea both the will and the deed, and that of his good pleaſure. 4ly. If all reprobates have power to believe and repent if they will, and ſo conſequently to perſevere if they will; how comes it to paſſe that not one of them doth believe, repent, and perſevere; ſeing it is confeſt among Philoſophers that ſuch contingents as depend upon the free will of man, are equally propendent on either ſide to paſſe as often one way, as the other. But proceed we along with this Authour.
1. Here he grants expreſly that the ſtate he ſpeakes of is the ſtate of originall ſin; in which ſtate we acknowledge that man hath not libertatem à peccato, freedome from ſinne. And Doctor Potter towards the end of his anſwer to Charity miſtaken confeſſeth it to be the doctrine of the Church of England. Yet doe not we ſay, but that it is in the power of any man to abſtaine from any particular ſinne, it being but a naturall act, and a man hath free power to performe any naturall act or to abſtaine from it; ſo farre forth as to become very vertuous, as much as any man among the heathen, many of whom have been renowned for vertuous converſation. Calvin in the paſſages here alleadged hath nothing concerning, either the guilt of Adam's tranſgreſſion paſſing upon his poſterity, or the corruption derived therehence unto them; but only of their falling from eternall ſalvation in the one; that all are enthralled to eternall death in the other; And that Adam's fall hath enwrapped all in eternall death in the third. My paſſages quoted, and related out of my Vindiciae are more to the purpoſe: I ſay indeed the guilt of Adam's tranſgreſſion is derived unto us, that is to our perſons by imputation; but that very ſinne of Adam was the ſin of our natures, as Auſtin ſpeaks. Non modo natura facta eſt peccatrix, ſed & genuit peccatores. Not only our humane nature became a ſinner, but alſo begat ſinners. Auguſt: de nuptitis c. 34.And accordingly it is juſtly imputed unto our perſons, otherwiſe how could it be juſt with God to condemne any man for originall ſinne; which yet is expreſly acknowledged by Mr. Hoord. And the Apoſtle ſaith expreſly, that in Adam all have ſinned. And Auſtin gives the reaſon of it. De Adamo omnes peccatum originale trahunt, quia omnes unus fuerunt. All draw originall ſinne from Adam, becauſe all were that one. So that I have noe cauſe to doubt but this Authour is of the ſame opinion untill I find him to avouch the contrary; and ſo much the rather becauſe he finds it is the opinion of Bernard alſo. And that the corruption conſequent is derived to us only by propagation, I thinke it is without doubt amongſt all, who concurre not with Pelagius in maintaining that it is derived unto us by imitation, and ſo only. Yet notwithſtanding it cannot be denied, but that God might have cauſed the puniſhment of Adam's ſinne to reſt upon himſelfe only, and immediately deſtroyed him and created another, and propagated mankind from him. Yea ſuppoſing his ordinance of propagating mankind from him, yet God of his mercy might have derived others from him of his mere grace indued with the holy Ghoſt, if it had pleaſed him; like as whom he juſtly damnes for ſinne, he might have cauſed them to have lived one yeare or more longer, and in that time beſtowed the ſpirit of grace upon them to break off their ſins by repentance, and from grace tranſlated into glory. As for the reaſons here mentioned by Mr. Maſon to juſtifie that which my ſelfe and others have delivered on the former point, I have noe cauſe to juſtifie, becauſe they proceed from a falſe ground, ſuppoſing that the reaſon of this imputation of Adam's ſinne, and propagation of his corruption unto all his poſterity, is merely built upon this foundation that we were in Adam's loynes when he ſinned, which is untrue.
1 In his firſt reaſon he doth miſerably overlaſh; for we could not be guilty of all the ſinnes which were committed by Adam from his fall to his lifes end, no not upon the ground whereon this Authour builds; ſo long we were not in his Ioynes, nor any longer then till he begat Seth; for from Seth ſprang Noah, and we all from him. Neither is it credible that Adam continued to beget children till the laſt yeare, and month, and day of his life. Indeed we no where read that we are guilty of any other of his ſinnes, beſides the firſt; The reaſon whereof ſhall be given in the next place.
2 Therefore I ſay, in anſwer unto them both, that the ground of imputing Adams ſinne unto his poſterity, is not onelyonly becauſe we were in Adams Ioynes, but becauſe the firſt ſinne of Adam was it, that bereaved his nature of Gods image; and ſo brought corruption upon himſelfe by an averſion from the Creator and unchangable good, and converſion unto the Creature, wherein the Lord left him, bereaving him of his ſpirit; and this nature, by this ſinne alone ſo corrupt, is the fountaine of all our natures; Like as if Adam had ſtood, of the ſame fountaine of integrity we had all received incorrupt natures; ſo that the like cannot be ſaid of any other ſinne of Adam afterwards committed by him, nor of the ſinne of any other our progenitours ſucceding him. For as for the wicked, they have no ſuch ſpirit of God to looſe; And as for the Godly, they have indeed the ſpirit of God, but ſo as not to be taken from them by the ſinnes committed by them, any more then it was from David upon the committing of ſo foule ſinnes in the matter of Uriah; neither do any Godly parents propagate their ſtate of grace to their poſterity. And Aquinas is ſo bold hereupon as to profeſſe, that, Impoſſibile eſt, quod aliqua peccata parentum proximorum, vel etiam primi parentis praeter primum, per originem traducantur. 1. 2. q. 81. ant. 2. in corp.It is impoſſible that the ſinnes of our immediate parents, or of our firſt parents, beſides the firſt, ſhould be derived unto poſterity by propagation. For, ſayth he, a man generates the ſame with himſelfe in kinde only; not in individuall. And therefore thoſe things, which pertaine to him as a particular perſon, as acts perſonall, he doth not propagate unto his children. Now to the nature of man, ſomthing may pertain naturally, ſomthing by the gift of grace. And this originall righteouſneſſe as a gift of grace was beſtowed on the whole nature of mankind in our firſt parents, which Adam loſt by his firſt ſinne; ſo that like as originall righteouſneſſe had beene propagated to poſterity together with the humane nature, ſo alſo the oppoſite inordination. But as for other actuall ſinnes, either of our firſt parents, or of others, they do not corrupt the nature of man, as touching that which pertaines to nature, but as touching that which pertaines to his perſon; therefore other ſinnes are not propagated unto poſterity. And this reaſon which Aquinas gives, was long before given by Anſelme, De conceptu virginali & originali peccato, cap. 23.