The Riches of Gods Love — William Twisse

The Riches of Gods Love · William Twisse

The ſecond inconvenience.

Section 1.

The ſecond inconvenienceis the overthrow of true religion and good goverment among men. To this, this opinion ſeemeth to tend for theſe reaſons.M. Maſon's Addit. pag, 38. 39, 40.

1. Becauſe it maketh ſinne to be no ſinne indeed, but only in opinion. We uſe to ſay neceſſity hath no law; creatures or actions in which neceſſity beares ſway are without ſaw; Lyons are not forbidden to prey, birds to fly, fiſhes to ſwimme, or any bruit creatures to doe according to their kinds, becauſe their actions are naturall and neceſſary; they cannot upon any admonition doe otherwiſe. Among creatures indued with reaſon and liberty, lawes are given to none, but ſuch as can uſe their principles of reaſon and freedome: Fooles, mad-men, and children are ſubject to no law, becauſe they have no liberty. To men that can uſe their liberty, lawes are not given neither, but in thoſe actions which are voluntary. No man is forbidden to be hungry, thirſty, weary, ſleepy, to weepe, tolaugh, to love or to hate; becauſe theſe actions and affections are naturall and neceſſary; the will may governe them, but it cannot ſuppreſſe them.

And ſo, if to deale juſtly, to exerciſe charity &c. with their contraries, be abſolutely, and antecedently neceſſary too, whether this neceſſity flow from a principall within, or a mover without, we are as lawleſſe in theſe and in the other.

Now if neceſſity hath no law…, then actions in themſelves evill, if under the dominion of abſolute neceſſity are tranſgreſſions of no law and conſequently no ſins. For ſin is a tranſgreſſion of the law.

This that I ſay hath been ſaid long agoe. For Juſtin Martyr ſpeaking againſt deſtiny hath theſe words, 1 Jo: 3. 4.If it be by deſtiny (that is by abſolute neceſſity; For that the Fathers doe generally call by the name of deſtiny;) that men are good or bad, they are indeed neither good nor bad. A ſpeech like to this he hath a little Apol: 2. a little beyond the middle.after. It would ſeem, if this be ſo, that vertue and vice are nothing, but things are judged to be good or bad by opinion only, which, as good reaſon teacheth, is very great injuſtice and impiety. And ſurely well might he ſay ſo. For to what purpoſe was the Son of God made man, and being man made a ſacrifice for ſinne? Why was the miniſtry of the word and Sacraments ordained? To what end are heaven and hell propounded? Why are exhortations, diſſwaſions, or any other meanes to hinder men from ſin applied, if ſin be nothing, but a mere opinion?

Chriſt, the Chriſtian faith, the word and Sacraments, and whatſoever according to the Scriptures hath been done for the applying of the pardon of ſinne, are all but mere fables, nay very impoſtures, if ſinne be nothing. And by conſequence it is no matter at all, whether men be Chriſtians, Jewes, Turkes, or Pagans, of what religion, or whether of any religion at all. Now whether tendeth this, but to the ovethrow of religion?

2. Becauſe it taketh away the conſcience of ſinne. Why ſhould men be afraid of any ſinne that pleaſeth or may profit them, if they muſt needs ſinne? Or what reaſon have they to weep and mourne when they have ſinned, ſeeing they have not ſinned truly, becauſe they ſinned neceſſarily?

The Tragedian ſaith, when a man ſinneth, his deſtiny muſt beare the blame. Neceſſity freeth him from Fati iſta culpa eſt: Nemo fit faio nocens.all iniquity. Sins are either the faults of that irreſiſtible decree that cauſeth them, or no faults at all. If either; then ſorrow, feare, or any other act of repentance whatſoever, may as well be ſpared as ſpent. This conceit being once drunke in, religion cannot long continue; For the affections have been the ſtrongeſt planters, and are the ſureſt upholders of it in the world. Primus in orbe Deos fecit timot.

I come to the conſideration of the ſecond inconvenience wherewith our doctrine is Anſwer.charged; And that is nothing inferiour to the former; to wit, The overthrow of true religion and good goverment among'ſt men. With what judgment theſe are termed inconvenices I am to ſeeke, and I wonder what miſcheifes are greater then theſe inconveniences; But I come to conſider how well he makes good his charge.

1. If ſinne be no ſinne certainely the opinion muſt be erroneous that conceives it to be ſin. I had thought there had been no predication more true then that which is Identicall. We are taught that ſinne is a trangreſſion of God's law. That the wages of it, in the juſt judgment and decree of God is no leſſe then death even everlaſting death, both of 1 Jo: 3. 4. Ro: 6. 23.body and ſoule; That God ſent his own Son, and made his ſoule an offering for ſinne; that ſo he might ſet him forth a propitiation for our ſins, through faith in his blood. But let us Eſ: 53. v. 2. Co: 5. 21. Ro: 3. 25.ſee this Authour's reaſon to prove his crimimination. He begins with an axiome, that, Neceſſity hath no law; and hereupon he doth expatiate with his inſtances too too impertinently; a courſe which Bellarmine takes not, whom yet I have anſwered on this very argument in my Vindiciae; leaſt of all doth he offer to make any reply upon any parcell of my anſwer unto Bellarmine. Now this axiome is not applied to Agents unreaſonable, but only reaſonable, by them who treat thereof. As in caſe a man be driven to ſteale, to relieve naturall neceſſity; yet all confeſſe that a man is not only unexecuſable, but alſo not to be pitied, if he hath brought this neceſſity upon him; And never any ſober man that I know, denied ſtealth to be a free action, for all this. It is true Lyons are not forbidden to prey, nor fiſhes to ſwimne, nor bruit creatures to doe according to their kind. For they are unreaſonable, and conſequently not capable of command, otherwiſe then by ſpurre, or goad, or the like; nor capable of admonition, in like ſort, children afore they come to the uſe of reaſon are not capable, of admonition As neither mad men are, nor fooles, ſuch as we call naturall; But this Authour is none ſuch. For then his wit would not ſerve him for oppoſition as it doth. It is true likewiſe, that as man is made after the Image of God, not as touching his part vegetative; nor as touching his part ſenſitive; but only as touching his part reaſonable, conſiſting of an underſtanding, whereby he is enabled to know his ſuperiours, and their commands, and admonitions; and of a will whereby he is able to performe obedience both inward and outward, it having command over all parts of the body to ſet them in motion; whereupon if their Lord command them to come they come, if to goe they goe, if to doe this they doe it; As the Centurion ſignified, to our Saviour the readineſſe of his ſervants to doe their Maſters commands.

At length he comes to conclude that, if to deale juſtly, to exerciſe charitie &c. with their contraries be abſolutely & antecedently neceſſary too, whether this neceſſity flow from a principle within or a mover without, we are as lawleſſe in theſe as in the other, by theſe he meanes acts of the ſoule rationall; by the other, he meanes acts of the ſoule vegetative, or ſenſitive. Now we utterly deny that any of theſe are abſolutely neceſſary; Nay we deny that any thing is of abſolute neceſſity, but the being of the Divine nature; and the internall emanations thereof which conſtitute the diſtinction of perſons in the Trinity. For albeit ſome Agents created are Agents neceſſary, working neceſſarily; yet the works which they bring forth are not of abſolute neceſſity, becauſe they may be hindred in their operations; either by Angells as ſome of them; or at leaſt by the power of God, all of them. And as there are neceſſary Agents working neceſſarily; ſo there are free Agents working contingently and freely; as Angells and men. And albeit a queſtion may be made as touching acts ſupernaturall, whether the creature hath any free power to performe them freely; ſuch as are the acts of the three Theologicall vertues, faith, hope, and charity, and none other, (which yet we doe not deny, but grant upon the infuſion of a ſupernaturall principle into our ſoules, which we count formally the life of grace; the cauſe whereof we take to be the Spirit of God given unto us, and dwelling in our hearts;) yet there deſerves to be no queſtion, but that as touching all actions of morall vertues, and of the contrary vitious actions, that there is a free power in man to performe them naturally; untill ſuch time as by a vitious diſpoſition, procured by a cuſtome in vitious courſes a man is habitually inclined unto evill; whereby he is made a ſlave to vice, and thereby hath deprived himſelfe of a morall liberty unto actions vertuous. For like as a man holding a ſtone in his hand hath power to throw him or no, or to throw him which way he will; but as ſoone as he hath throwne him out of his hand; it is no longer free unto him whether he will throw it or no. In like manner before a vitious habit contracted, man hath freedome morall unto actions vertuous, but not after. This is the doctrine of Ariſtotle, and thus he illuſtrates it. For certainely the habit of vertue is not an indifferent power Eth: l. 3. 5.to doe an act vertuous or vitious, but it is a morall propenſion and inclination only to acts vertuous. So is the habit of juſtice a morall propenſion and inclination to performe only that which is juſt. The like may be ſaid of every morall vertue in ſpeciall. How much more doth ſupernaturall grace conſiſt not in a power to believe, if a man will, to love God if he will, to hope and waite for the joyes of heaven if he will, and if he will to refuſe to performe any of theſe acts, but rather an holy and heavenly habit, or weight wrought in the ſoule of man, moving and ſwaying it only to gracious acts pleaſing & acceptable in the ſight of God, which indeed conſtitutes a ſpirituall liberty from ſinne, and makes a man become the holy ſervant of God, willing to receive direction from him, and delighting to be ordered by him in all our waies. On the other ſide with out grace a man is left in that naturall corruption wherein he was conceived & borne, which makes him a ſlave to ſinne and a vaſſall to Satan led captive by him to doe his will. Yet not withſtanding there remaines in every one his naturall liberty ſtill, which conſiſts only in Eph: 2. 2. 2 Tim: 2. laſt.the choice of meanes conducing to man's end; whereas morall vertue and grace doe order the will a right towards aright end; morall vertues according to the knowledge naturall which he hath of his right end naturall, grace according to the knowledg ſupernaturall, which a man hath of his right end ſupernaturall, which is to be rightly diſpoſed and ordered towards God his maker; So that this naturall liberty ſtill continueth the ſame; As for example, he that it vertuous ſo farre forth as he is vertuous, continueth ſtill free; not as freedome ſignifies an indifferency to performe an act vertuous vitious, but being thereby diſpoſed only to vertuous actions, he is free whether to exerciſe this or that vertuous act, according to occaſiōs offered; or in the ſame kind of a vertuous diſpoſition; whether he will doe this or that in particular, as to give in ſuch a proportion, or in ſuch a ſeaſon, or to ſuch or ſuch perſons, in all which being of a vertuous diſpoſition he is ready to receive directions from the dictates of recta ratio, right reaſon, otherwiſe called wiſedome. In like manner a vitious perſon ſtill keeps his naturall liberty, though he hath loſt his morall, and is become Servus tot dominorum, quot vitiorum, a ſlave to ſo many Lords as there are vices in him, as Auſtin ſomewhere ſpeaketh. I ſay he keeps ſtill his naturall liberty. For let him be a Robber, he ſtill continueth free to make choice of his complices, of places wherein to lye in waite for his prey, of weapons, and the like. Let him be an impure perſon, ſtill he continueth free to chooſe whom he will corrupt, to contrive what courſe he thinks beſt for the ſatisfaction of his luſts. Let him be covetuous or ambitious, ſtill he contintinueh free to make choice of the meanes conducing to the end obtained by him. In like ſort let him be regenerate, a child of God; by this ſpirit of regeneration he is moved only to doe thoſe things which are pleaſing to his heavenly father, but ſtill his naturall liberty continueth the ſame, as whether to exerciſe the grace which God hath given him in one kind or in another, or in the ſame kind in what particular he thinks good. If he thinks good to pray, it is free to him to fall upon the confeſſion of his ſins, or upon thankſgiving, or upon ſupplication, & that either for bleſſings temporall, and the releife of his naturall neceſſities; or for grace, and the reliefe of neceſſities ſpirituall; or to exerciſe himſelfe in every kind of theſe, and that in what order he thinks good. So likewiſe if he give himſelfe to meditation, and make choice of what matter he thinks good, as alſo of time and place, in all this he is free. None of all theſe diſtinctions doth this Authour take notice of, but hand over head talks of freedome to performe, either acts vicious, or vertuous; whereas the vertuous man's will, as he is vertuous, is inclined to vertuous courſes alone; and the vitious man, as he is vitious, is inclined to vitious courſes alone, and not to vertuous. And it was wont to be ſaid, that, Habitus agunt ad modum naturae, habit's (whether vertuous or vitious) they worke after the manner of nature, that is naturally and neceſſary, as before I have declared of a morall neceſſity, which ſtill conſiſts with a naturall liberty; either in vertuous, or vitious exerciſes to make choice of particulars in reſpect of all variety of circūſtances, according as their reaſon ſuggeſts unto them in the uſe of means conducent to the end intended, whether that end be good or bad. No dominion of abſolute neceſſity in all this; Much leſſe is any man good by abſolute neceſſity but by freedome of will accuſtoming himſelfe unto good actions according to the dictates of reaſon. But a man that is dead in ſinne hath no power to regenerate himſelfe; this worke of regeneration is wrought merely by the power of God: Like as the raiſing of a man from death to life, whereunto it is often compared in holy Scripture, as alſo to creation; And by regeneration we are ſaid to be made new creatures, now as God workes this in time, ſo from everlaſting he did decree to worke it; and it was wont to be the generall Tenet of Proteſtant Divines in oppoſition unto Papiſts, that a man in his firſt converſion is merely paſſive, in which particular Roffenſis a Popiſh Biſhop about an hundred yeares agoe oppoſed Martin Luther. As for a ſinfull or a vitious act, that is alwaies an act naturall; For acts ſupernaturall can neither be vitious, nor ſinfull; but merely gracious. And all cōfeſſe that as all men have naturall power to performe any act naturall, ſo have they power alſo to abſtaine from it. Only untill a man is regenerate he cannot but ſinne; yea though he doe that which is good as touching the ſubſtance of the act, or abſtaine from that which is evill in like manner; yet can he not performe the one or abſtaine from the other in a gracious manner, Therefore you heare not God's word, ſaith our Saviour to the Jewes, becauſe ye are not of God. They that are in the fleſh cannot pleaſe Io: 8. Rom: 8.God, That all men are caſt into a neceſſity of ſinning, both Arminius and Corvinus confeſſe, as formerly I have ſhewed. And Doctor Potter acknowledgeth it the doctrine of the Church of England, that no naturall man hath libertatem a peccato, though forthwith he nicks it, in ſaying they have libertatem a neceſſitate, not explicating it that ſo he might cleare himſelfe from contradiction, whereas Doctor Fulke uſually puts the diſtinction between liberty from ſin, and liberty from coaction, and denying the former unto a naturall man, he granteth the latter.

Now truely this Theologue taketh very profitable paines to prove that ſin is not nothing; and exuberates in the proofe hereof to the very ſolid conviction of all thoſe that imagine it to be nothing, if there be any ſuch creatures in terra Auſtrali incognitâ, which is not very likely; but rather in the Lunary world, or in the Joviall world which is waited upon with foure moones, as they that came lately from the diſcovery thereof, have made report unto us. But by the way, I hope he doth not juggle with us, and under colour of making ſin to be ſome thing, labour to draw us to an acknowledgment that it is ſome poſitive thing, as Doctor Iackson in his laſt booke the 8th, as I take it of his Commentaries upon the Creed laboureth to prove with great ſtrength of affections; Like as in the ſame vigour of reſolution he profeſſeth that whether God puniſheth ſinne neceſſarily or no it is not determinable by the wit of man; but he is not over prodigall of his reaſons for either. We are very willing to grant that every ſin as ſin is ſomething privative, and as touching the act ſubſtrate, it is ſomething poſitive alſo; And when the Apoſtle defineth ſin by foreign if in that word the firſt letter be foreign privative, clearely the forme of ſin is made to conſiſt in privation, as much as to ſay an incongruity to the law of God; that is a privation of congruity thereunto. Now we are come to an end of this, let me admoniſh the Reader of the wiſedome of this Authour; All along; he ſuppoſeth that by our doctrine ſinne comes to paſſe by abſolute neceſſity, this I ſay he ſuppoſeth, he proveth it not, though we utterly deny, that any ſuch neceſſity is conſequent to our doctrine. And this himſelfe knowes full well. Alvarez, who maintaines that God determines the creatures will to every act thereof, even to the act of ſin, utterly denies that any abſolute neceſſity of humane acts followeth hereupon; or any neceſſity that ſtands in contradiction to humane liberty. Bradwardine alſo ſometime Arch-Biſhop of Canterbury elect maintaines, that God neceſſitates the will to every act thereof, yet denies peremptorily that humane acts comes to paſſe by abſolute neceſſity, or by any neceſſity that ſtands in oppoſition to the liberty of the creature; Only he ſaith that ſome kind of neceſſity, and that antecedent may well conſiſt with the liberty of the creature. All this, this Author knows; yet takes no paines to diſprove their tenet, or anſwer any one of their arguments; no nor to make good his own conſequence, which is the only thing we deny in this preſent argument of his. As for the other part, namely that in caſe ſin come to paſſe by abſolute neceſſity, and without any free will in the creature, then ſinne is no ſinne, which no man denies; This he proves at large, or at leaſt illuſtrates at large. Secondly obſerve he talkes of things neceſſarily comming to paſſe, not only abſolutely but antecedently; whereby he ſeemes to grant that ſins may come to paſſe neceſſarily, but not ſo abſolutely as antecedently, and takes no paines to explicate theſe his diſtinctions. And in my judgment they have more need of explication, as they are accommodated to ſins comming to paſſe in the world, then as they are acommodated to the eveniency of faith and repentance; Yet I imagine this word Antecedently is brought in of purpoſe in reference to good actions rather then in reference unto evill. And whether he will have this terme Antecedently to be an addition to the former terme Abſolutely, or only of equivalent force, I know not. But it is the common courſe of theſe men to confound their Reader with termes propoſed without all explication. But let us endeavour to boult out the meaning of theſe perplexed diſcourſes as well as we can. Will this Authour have ſaith to come to paſſe neceſſarily and that abſolutely, but not antecedently? Or will he have faith to come to paſſe neceſſarily, but not abſolutely and antecedently? or will he have faith come to paſſe not neceſſarily at all: If not at all neceſſarily to what purpoſe doth he clog his Reader with ſuch unneceſſary complements, of abſolutely and antecedently? If God decrees to beſtow faith upon a man, doth it not, neceſſarily follow hereupon that ſuch a one ſhall believe? dares this Authour deny it? Yet we account not this abſolutely neceſſary, but merely upon ſuppoſition. Neither doth God's decree impoſe neceſſity upon all things; as Aquinas hath long agoe diſputed and proved; but only upon ſome things; that is that ſome Agents ſhall worke neceſſarily; other Agents contingently and freely. In a word God both decreeth things to come to paſſe & the manner of them alſo; that is that ſome things ſhall come to paſſe neceſſarily, other things contingently and freely. But God's decree, we ſay, is abſolute not conditionall, of giving faith. And indeed all his decrees are abſolute as touching the act of God willing; as Bradwardine hath demonſtrated by cleare reaſon; and Piſcator out of the word of God. But the decree of giving faith is not abſolute only as touching the act of God decreeing, but as touching the thing decreed. For faith is not given by God to any upon a condition to be performed by man; For if it were, then faith ſhould be given according unto workes, that is, grace ſhould be conferred according to mens workes. And when I conſider this Authour's compounding of theſe termes abſolutely, and antecedently, I begin to ſuſpect that like as then a thing comes to paſſe antecedently, when it comes to paſſe by an Antecedent decree in this Authour's language, (though moſt abſurd.) So in his language, the things are ſaid to come to paſſe by abſolute neceſſity, when they come to paſſe by an abſolute decree; the decree in his opinion being ſufficient to make a thing come to paſſe neceſſarily; & an abſolute decree to make it come to paſſe abſolutely neceſſarily. This undoubtedly is his meaning, upō which I am ſtūbled are I am aware. Now let the ſober Reader judge how farre theſe odde conceits are from all ſobriety. Did not God decree to make the world, nay did he not abſolutely decree this and antecedently, not conditionally and conſequently? What therefore will it here-hence follow that the world had it's exiſtence neceſſarily, and that by the way of abſolute neceſſity? I had thought this had been the peculiar and incommunicable perfection of God himſelfe, namely to exiſt neceſſarily, and that in the way of abſolute neceſſity. As for all other things which are but God's creatures, they have only a contingent exiſtence derived originally from the free will of God the Creator. For this I take to be the tranſcendent perfection of God, To be moſt neceſſarily; to worke moſt freely; Neceſſity and that abſolute, being the greateſt perfection of being: So that Bradwardine conceives this to be the prime and originall perfection of God, eſſe neceſſario, to be neceſſarily. On the other ſide freedome in the higheſt kind, is the greateſt perfection … operation; and God alone ſo workes, as without ſubordination to any ſuperiour Agent; but no creature, man or Angell ſo workes, as without ſubordination to God the firſt Agent, the firſt cauſe, the firſt free worker. Now I come … the ſecond particular of this ſecond inconvenience. 2. And that is that our doctrine taketh away the conſcience of ſin; and this we willingly grant is conſequent upon the former. For if ſinne be no ſinne, there is no cauſe why any man ſhould be troubled with the conſcience of ſin. But all this being grounded upon a vile and moſt untrue imputation never yet proved, namely that we make all actions both good and evill to come to paſſe by abſolute neceſſity, there can be no more truth in the conſequent then there is in the Antecedent. We ſay that every ſinne that is, or ever was committed in the world is and ever was committed freely, not only voluntarily; much leſſe doth any ſinne come to paſſe by any abſolute neceſſity. For albeit there be ſome things that come to paſſe neceſſarily by neceſſity of nature, as proceeding from Agents naturall, working naturally and neceſſarily. Yet is no worke of nature wrought by any abſolute neceſſity. God being able to ſet an end to nature and the works thereof whenſoever it pleaſeth him; and while nature continueth according to the good pleaſure of God, he reſtraines the courſe thereof, or changeth it as he thinks good. How much leſſe doe the actions of men, not only in reſpect of God's agency, who is the firſt cauſe, but in reſpect of man's agency, a ſecond cauſe, and working deliberately and freely come to paſſe not neceſſarily, but contingently, and freely; So farre off are they from comming to paſſe by abſolute neceſſity; to exiſt by abſolute neceſſity being the incommunicable perfection of God himselfe. But I confeſſe this Authour ſheweth ſome humanity in the proofe of it, to wit, out of the Tragedian very judiciouſly and learnedly. Fati eſt iſta culpa; nemo fit fato nocens. It is the fault of fate or deſtiny, and what comes to paſſe by deſtiny is no fault of man's. Yet Zeno the great Patron of Fate, finding his ſervant in a fault, when his ſervant excuſed himſelfe upon fate, ſaying it was deſtiny that he ſhould ſteale; made a ready anſwer ſaying, Et caedo, it was his deſtiny alſo to be puniſhed; So farre was he from juſtifying or excuſing his ſervant upon any ſuch ground, or forbearing to puniſh him. And doth not this Authour know that Iocaſta for all her acknowledgment of fate governing all things; yet in conſcience of her inceſtuous courſes deſtroyed her ſelfe in the ſame Tragedian? But conſider, indifferent Reader, whether this Authour doth not carry himſelfe, as if he were dealing with little children, and his purpoſe were not to informe them; but to abuſe and mocke them. For is that all waies the faith or opinion of the Tragedian, whatſoever he puts into the mouthes of this or that Actor? Doe not they repreſent the abſurd pretences of ſome, as well as the reaſonable diſcourſes of others? Then againe who are they that maintaine, Fatum, deſtiny? Where hath he found this maintained by any of our divines? Yet I confeſſe this Authour deales ingeniouſly in one thing, to wit, in walking ſo fairely in the ſteps of this forefathers. For thus the Pelagians accuſed the doctrine of Auſtin, not only after he was dead, as appeares by Proſper's Epiſtle ad Ruffinum; but even while he was living as appeares by Auſtin himſelfe; Nec ſub nomine gratiae fatum aſſerimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi: Si autem quibuſdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, Aug: contra duas epiſt. Pe. lag: ad Bonifacium.ſed de verbis contendere non amamus: neither doe we maintain deſtiny under the name of grace, in ſaying grace is not prevented by any merits of man. But if ſome are pleaſed to call the will Allmighty God by the name of fa…e (or deſtiny) we avoid the profane novelties of words but we doe not love to ſtrive about words. Where obſerve how firſt the ſame crimination was made againſt Auſtin's doctrine by the Pelagians, which this Authour makes againſt ours.

2. The doctrine which the Pelagians oppoſed in this crimination was this, Grace is not conferr'd according unto workes. 3ly, Auſtin diſavowes all antecedency of workes to the beſtowing of grace, how much more to the decreeing of grace to be beſtowed on any, which yet is the beloved Helena of this Authour therefore he talkes ſo oft againſt an Antecedent decree. Then againe it is manifeſt that the greateſt maintainers of deſtiny and ſate, did not maintaine it in any oppoſition to the free wills of men. And Auſtin him ſelfe profeſſeth that ſuch a neceſſity as is expreſſed in theſe words, Neceſſe eſt ut fiat, it muſt needs be that ſuch a thing ſhall come to paſſe, containes no inconvenience, nor is any way prejudiciall to the free wills of men. His words are theſe; Sienim neceſſitas noſtra ida dicenda eſt, quae non eſt in noſtra …, …detiamſi nelumus, efficit quod poteſt, ſicut eſt neceſſitas mortis; Manifeſtū eſt … noſtras, quibus recte aut perperam vivitur, ſub tale Auſtin: de civit Dei l. 5. cap. 10.neceſſitate non eſſe, Multa…im …, quae ſi nolemus, non facerimus. Si autem illa deſinitur eſſe neceſſitas, ſecundum quam dicimus neceſſe eſſe ut aliquid ita ſit vel ita fiat, neſcio cur eam timeamus, ne nobis liv… … voluntatis auferat. If that is to be accounted our neceſſity, which is net in our power, but whether we will or no, worketh as it can ſuch as is the neceſſity of death; It is apparent that our wills whereby we live well or ill are not under the the neceſſity of fate. For we doe many things, which if we would not we ſhould not doe them. But if neceſſity be defined to be ſuch a thing as when we ſay it muſt needs be that a thing be thus, or thus come to paſſe; I know not why we ſhould feare leaſt ſuch a neceſſity ſhould bereave us of free will. And this Auſtin delivers to meet with the vaine feares of thoſe, who placed our wills among'ſt thoſe things which are not ſubject to neceſſity, leaſt ſo they ſhould looſe their liberty. Obſerve this well and compare it with the preſent diſcourſe of this poſitive Theologue, who thinks to outface Auſtin with the authority of his bare word. In the words following he manifeſts that he ſpeakes all this while of neceſſity in reſpect of God's decree not ſimply, but conſidered as irreſiſtable; by the way making no bones of avouching ſome decrees of God to be reſiſtable, notwithſtanding the Pſalmiſt's proteſtation Whatſoever the Lord willeth, that hath he done both in heaven and earth; And St. Paul's emphaticall expreſſion of the ſame truth, ſaying, Who hath repſted his will? But this Divine is a brave fellow; and thinks to carry all with his breath. For where hath he given us any reaſon to prove that any decrees of God are of any reſiſtable condition? But let his decrees be never ſo irreſiſtable, and let that be true which Auſtin ſaith, that, Non aliquid fit niſi omnipotens fieri velit; Not any thing comes to paſſe, unleſſe God will have it come to paſſe. Art. 11.And after Auſtin the Church of Ireland in their Articles of religion. Yet if God will have every thing come to paſſe agreeably to the nature & condition thereof thus, neceſſary things neceſſarily, contingent things contingently, as Aquinas hath not only ſaid, 1. p. q. 19. art. 8.but proved; hereby is no impeachment to the liberty of the creature, but an eſtabliſhment thereof rather, as the Arch-Biſhops, Biſhops, and Clergy of Ireland have profeſſed in the foreſaid Article; that I may ſhew ſome authority for my ſayings, as this Authour repreſents none for his, but carrieth himſelfe like a Maſter of Sentences, as if he were in his own ſufficiency of more authority and credit to be believed, then the Pope in a generall Councell: And albeit my ſelfe after many others, and ſome formerly mentioned have ſhewed in a large digreſſion to this purpoſe that neceſſity upon ſuppoſition, may well Vindic: l. 2. digreſ. 5.ſtand with contingency, and liberty ſimply ſo called. And in the firſt place have inſtanced in neceſſity of infallibility conſequent to God's preſcience, which though Cicero thought could not conſiſt with man's liberty, yet Chriſtians have alwaies been of a contrary opinion; untill the Sect of the Socinians aroſe; and Arminians are very apt to ſhew them ſo much courteſy as to beare their bookes after them. Secondly I have proved a neceſſity upon ſuppoſition of God's decree to permit ſinne. For the Lord takes upon him to be the keeper of us from ſinne, as Gen: 20. 6. He profeſſeth as much to Abimilech, that he kept him from ſinning againſt God. In caſe God will not keep a man from ſinne, what can be expected, but that he will undoubtedly ſinne without any prejudice to the liberty of his will, conſidering that of Auſtin; Libertas ſine gratia non eſt libertas ſed contumacia, Liberty without grace, is not liberty but wilfulneſſe. Thirdly and laſtly upon ſuppoſition of God's will; And this I prove evidently to paſſe on every thing which God foreſeeth as future conſidering that contingent things are merely poſſible in their own nature; and cannot paſſe out of the condition of things merely poſſible into the condition of things future, without a cauſe: And no other cauſe of this tranſmigration can be deviſed with any colour of reaſon or probability, ſave only the will of God. Neither doe I find that digreſſion of mine in any the leaſt part weakened, or ſo much as aſſailed by ought that this Authour hath delivered; Who ſheweth himſelfe upon the ſtage, rather to brave his oppoſites with the bare authority of his words, then with ſound argument to diſpute ought.

Sect: 2.

Becauſe it taketh away the deſert and guilt of ſin. Offences if fatall, cannot be juſtly puniſhed. 2. The M. Maſon's Addit. p. 40. 41. 42.reaſon is becauſe thoſe deed for which men are puniſhed or rewarded muſt be their own, under their own power and and ſoveraignty, but ſuch are no fatall acts or events. Neither temporally nor eternally can ſin be-puniſhed, if it be abſolutely neceſſary.

Not temporally, as God himſelfe hath given us to underſtand by that law which he preſcribed the Jewes Deut: 22. 25. Which was that it a Maid commit uncleaneſſe by conſtraint, ſhe ſhould not be puniſhed. His reaſon was becauſe there was no cauſe of death in her; what ſhe yeilded to was through compulſion, being overborne by power; As a man that is wounded to death by his neighbour; ſo was a Virgin in that caſe a ſufferer rather then a doer. This particular law is of univerſall right: No juſt puniſhment can be inſlicted for ſinne, where there is no power in the party to avoid it. The ſpeech of Lipſius is but a mere crorchet contrary to reaſon, (Fatali culpae fatalis poena) fatall faults muſt have fatall puniſhments. Did magiſtrates thinke mens offences unavoidable, they would thinke it bootleſſe, and unreaſonable to puniſh them. Nay not only ſo, but we ſee by dayly experience, that Judges following the direction of reaſon have very remiſſely puniſhed ſuch faults as have been committed through the power of the head ſtrong & exorbitant paſſions. Yea we may read of ſome who have not thought it fit to puniſh ſuch faults at all. Valcrius Maximus telleth that Popilius a Roman Praetor ſitting in judgment on a woman who had in Val: max. l. 8. c. 1. Gell: l. 12. c. 7.a bitter paſſion ſlaine her mother, becauſe ſhe had murthered her children (neque damnavit, neque abſolvit) neither cleared her nor condemned her And Aulus Gellius reporteth of Dolabella the Proconſul of Aſia, that when a woman of Smyrna was brought before him who had poyſoned her husband and ſon for murthering a ſon of hers, which ſhe had by a former husband; he turned her over to the Arcopagus, which was the graveſt and moſt renowned judgment ſeat in the world; The Judges there not daring to acquit her, being ſtained with a double ſlaughter, nor yet to puniſh her being provokt with juſt greife, commanded the accuſer & offender to come before them an hundred yeares after. And ſo neither was the womans fact juſtified, the lawes not allowing of it; Nor yet the woman puniſhed becauſe ſhe was worthy to be pardoned. If wiſe, magiſtrates have ſpared ſuch offenders as have been overſwayed with paſſions, which did but incline, not determine them to their irregular actions; they would never have puniſhed any treſpaſſers, if they had thought them to be ſuch by invincible neceſſity, Or if offenders did thinke that their offences were their deſtinies, and that when they murther, ſteale, commit adultery, make inſurrections, plot treaſons, or practiſe any other outragious villanies, they doe them by the neceſſity of Gods unalterable decree; and can doe no otherwiſe: they would and might comp…aine of their puniſhments as unjuſt, as Zenoes ſervant did; when he was beaten by his maſter for a fault, he told him out of his own grounds that he was unjuſtly beaten. Becauſe he was (…fato coactus peccare) conſtrained to make that fault by his undeclinable fate. The Ad…umctine Monks, miſled by Saint Auſtin Epiſt. 105. ad ſixtum Preſbyterum, (which he calleth a booke wherein he ſetteth downe his opinion concerning Gods grace) did ſo teach grace that they denyed free will. And this Saint Auſtin confuted in his booke De gratia & liberoarbitrio. And thinking the grace of God (as Saint Auſtin taught) to be ſuch as could not ſtand with freedome of will, they thought that no man ſhould be puniſhed for his faults, but rather prayed for that God would give them grace to doe better. Againſt this Auſtin directed his other booke, De correp: & gratiá. In which diſcourſe though it be grace that is ſtill named, yet predeſtination is included. For as Kimedontius ſaith truely in his preface to Luther De ſervo arbitrio. Between grace and predeſtination there is only this difference (as Saint Auſtin teacheth Libro de praedeſt. Sanctorum cap. 10.) that predeſtination is a preparation of grace, and grace a beſtowing of predeſtination. As Zenoes ſervant and theſe Monks did, ſo would all men judge; did they conſiderately thinke that men could not chooſe but offend. And what would be the reſultance of ſuch a perſwaſion, but an inundation of the greateſt inſolencies, and diſſolution of all good goverment.

Indeed if our doctrine make ſin to be no ſin, and therewithall take away the conſcience Anſwer. 3.of ſin; it is not to be marvailed, if it take away the deſert and guilt of ſinne: For as ſinne is no ſinne; ſo likewiſe it is as fit that the deſert and guilt of ſinne, ſhould be the deſert and guilt of no ſinne; and ſo no deſert or guilt at all. This Authour to ſerve his own turne takes great libery of diſcourſe in talking of offences fatall; theſe were called by Auſtin profane novelties of words. Yet elſewhere he profeſſeth that if no other thing were meant hereby then the divine providence. Sententiam teneant, linguā corrigant; let thē hold their orthodoxe meaning, but let thē correct their language Now by providence divine is meant the will of God, working every thing that is good, and permitting every thing that is evill. And without this will of God not any thing comes to paſſe in the judgment of Auſtin. Non aliquid ſit ſaith he, niſi ōnipotens furi velit, vel ſinen…o ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo, Not any thing comes to paſſe, unleſſe Almighty God will have it come to paſſe, either by ſuffering it, or by Enchirid. c. 95.… working of it to wit, if evill, ſuffering it, if good working it; but of each he profeſſeth that God wills it The abominable outrages committed upon the perſon of the holy Son of God, were ſuch as God's hand and God's counſell ſore determined, that is as much Act: 4. 28. Rev: 17. 17.as to ſay, antecedently determined to be done. And the …en Kings in giving their kingdomes to the Beaſt, are ſaid herein to have agreed to dce God's will. Yet this Authour dares not ſay, that theſe actions could not be juſtly puniſhed Yet the maintainets of deſtiny (as I have ſhewed out of Auſtin) denyed that the wills of men were ſubject to deſtiny; while De civit. Dei l. 5. c. 10.this Authour talkes in their language, why doth he not talke in their meaning? And if he talkes in our meaning why doth he not talke in our language? Now Auſtin farther ſaith (is I have ſhewed out of the ſame place) that they who exempted the wills of men from all neceſſity, ſeared a vaine and cauſeleſſe feare; profeſſing that as to ſome neceſſity the will is not ſubject, ſuch as is the neceſſity of death, which befalls us whether we will or no. So to ſome neceſſity it may be ſubject without any danger; and that neceſſity he expreſſeth to be ſuch, as when we ſay, it muſt needs be that ſuch a thing come to paſſe. Now ſuch a neceſſity and no other is granted by us as conſequent to the will of God, ſo that if God will give a man faith, it muſt needs be, ſuch a man ſhall believe; if he will give repentance it muſt needs be, that ſuch a man ſhall repent; If he will keep ſuch a man as Abimelech from ſinning againſt him, it muſt needs be, that ſuch a man ſhall be kept from Gen: 20. 6.ſinning againſt him. If God will not give a man faith, nor repentance, it muſt needs be, that ſuch a man will not believe, will not repent. In like manner if God will not keepe a man from ſinne, but ſuffer him to ſinne; it needs muſt be that ſuch a one ſhall ſinne. If God harden the heart of Pharoah, ſo that he ſhall not ſet Iſrael goe, undoubtedly ſo it ſhall come to paſſe. If God put it into the hearts of the Kings to give up their kingdomes to the Beaſt, they ſhall infallibly give their Kingdomes to the Beaſt. If he gives men over unto a Reprobate mind to doe things inconvenient, undoubtedly being thus proſtituted by God to their own corruption from within, and to the power of Satan from without, they ſhall doe thoſe inconvenient things, be they never ſo abominable; yet not neceſſarily, much leſſe in the way of abſolute neceſſity, (as this Authour wordeth it, affecting to ſpeake with a full mouth (which is a quality naturall to theſe Arminians, and runnes in a blood) but proveth nothing) but contingently and freely, not only with a poſſibility, but alſo with an active power to the contrary. And if freely, then ſurely their works are their own, proceeding from their own power and ſoveraignty, but yet not ſupreame and abſolute dominion and independent in their operation, on God their maker. God muſt have the prerogative ſtill of being the firſt mover, the firſt cauſe, the firſt Agent, the firſt free Agent; So farre off are we from maintaining that the actions of men have their being by abſolute neceſſity; that we utterly deny any thing in the world to have 'its exiſtence by abſolute neceſſity, ſaving God alone, as before I have ſhewed. Sciendum, ſaith Durand, quod loquendo de neceſſitate ſimpliciter, voluntas divina In firſt diſt. 46. quaeſt. 1.nec imponit, nec imponere poteſt rebus neceſſitatem; nec res creatae ſunt capaces talis neceſſitatis. We are to know that ſpeaking of neceſſity ſimply ſo called, the will of God neither doth impoſe, or can impoſe any ſuch neceſſity on things, neither are creatures capable of ſuch neceſſity. But if we ſpeake of ſuch neceſſity as creatures are capable of under the divine liberty, by cauſes intermediate; it is to be ſaid that all things doe not come to paſſe of neceſſity; but ſome doe, and ſome doe not. God will have ſome things come to paſſe by the mediation of cauſes neceſſary, & thoſe come to paſſe neceſſarily; Others come to paſſe by the mediation of cauſes contingent, and thoſe come to paſſe contingently; Whereby, ſaith he, 'tis manifeſt that they ſay not well, who ſay that all things come to paſſe of neceſſity in reference to the Divine will; becauſe, as hath been ſhewed, in reſpect of the Divine will, all things come to paſſe freely; and therefore ſpeaking abſolutely, they may not come to paſſe, although, upon ſuppoſition that they are willed, they cannot but come to paſſe; but this is only neceſſity upon ſuppoſition.

1. Indeed if men did ſinne againſt their wills; and virgins ſometimes are raviſhed, & men are ſlaine by force full ſore againſt their wills, they deſerved no puniſhment. But is it poſſible that a man can will that which is evill againſt his will? Every ordinary Scholar in the Univerſity knowes that axiome, Voluntas non poteſt cogi, the will cannot be forced. Lipſius his ſpeech, fatali culpae fatalis poena, fatall faults have fatall puniſhments, this Authour ſaith, is but a mere crotchet contrary to reaſon. As if he would teach the very maintainers of fate, yea the very firſt to underſtand themſelves. For fate wherewith our doctrine is charged by our oppoſites is commonly called Fate Stoicall. Now Zeno was the father of the Stoicks; yet when his ſervant was taken playing the theife, pleaded for himſelfe, ſaying it was my deſtiny to ſteale. Zeno anſweared him in his own language, that it was his deſtiny to ſmart for it too; right in this ſame ſenſe that Lipſius ſpake. Yet Zeno knew full well that he puniſhed his ſervant freely. And Zeno is well knowne to have been a great Maſter of morality for all this, which could not conſiſt with denying the liberty of man's will, as this Authour well knowes. And Auſtin cenſureth thoſe who feared to ſubject the will to all manner of neceſſity, as men tranſported with vaine and cauſeleſſe feares; manifeſting thereby that ſome neceſſity may very well conſiſt with a man's liberty. Magiſtrates though they believe with Auſtin that, Not any thing comes Artic: 11.to paſſe, unleſſe Allmighty God will have it come to paſſe; And with the Church of Ireland, that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counſell ordaine whatſoever ſhould in time come to paſſe. And with Aquinas that the roote of contingency, is the effectuall will of God; yet may they well thinke it reaſonable enough to puniſh offences; ſeing that God decrees that ſome things, even all the actions of men ſhall come to paſſe contingently; as well as other things ſhall come to paſſe neceſſarily. For to come to paſſe contingently is to come to paſſe avoidably; and if they be the actions of men, freely alſo. It is incredible that any ſober man ſhould remiſſely puniſh faults for the exorbitancy & ſtrength ſake of the paſſions, whereby they were committed, but rather in conſideration of the potent cauſes which raiſed ſuch paſſions in them, under a colour of juſtice. And we commonly ſay the greater the temptation is, the leſſe is the ſin. So Peter ſurpriſed ſuddainly with feare denied his Maſter. Yet what ſaith Ariſtotle. In ſome things no force is ſuffecient Ariſt. l 30. 1.for excuſe; but a man ought to dy rather any manner of death, then commit them. For thoſe things in Euripedes are rediculous, which moved Alcmaeon to kill his mother. Indeed Plato Ibid.maintained that things done through paſſion were not voluntary. But Ariſtotle a better Maſter then he, diſproves it, and by excellent reaſons confirmes the contrary. And whatſoever Popilius the Roman Pretor judged of her, who ſlew her mother, provoked by her Mothers fact in murthering her children; yet let our lawes be conſulted, and the opinion of our Judges in ſuch a caſe; and whether ſuch a one were not to be condemned; and whether Popilius his judgment deſerves to be admitted for the correction of the lawes of our land, and working a reformation in this particular. We ſhould ſoone have a wild world, if every one being provoked by the inſolencies of others ſhould thruſt themſelves into the throne of God for the execution of vengeance; Yet none more unfit for this, then the daughter to execute God's vengeance upon the mother that bare her. Yet it was wont to be held, If I forget not, that poteſtas patria originally was power of life and death. But all is fiſh that comes to this Authour's net; like as her fact who poiſoned her husband and ſon for killing a ſon of hers; deſtroying two for one without all authority moſt unnaturally; and that not haſtily, but in a deliberate way by poiſoning. And doth it become Chriſtians to admire ſuch heatheniſh courſes of men nothing acquainted with the divine providence? And was this ſo doubtfull a caſe, whether ſo wicked a wretch avenging her ſelfe by poiſon ſecretly given upon her husband and ſon for the death of another ſon of hers, that the ſentencing thereof ſhould be put over untill an 100 yeares after? But what of all this? Theſe willfully affect revenge, the execution whereof belongs not to them; but it is juſt with God to puniſh ſinne with ſinne; one man's ſinne by another. As of Senacherib the Lord profeſſeth, that he would cauſe him to fall by the ſword in his own land, this was brought to paſſe by his own children falling upon him furiouſly, and as unnaturally as the actions of any of theſe. How was innocent Naboth uſed, and by publique ſentence condemned to be ſtoned to death, and accordingly executed by the practiſe of wicked Iezabel? Yet Solomon ſpareth not to profeſſe that every man's judgment commeth of the Lord. Never were more abominable courſes executed upon any, then upon the holy ſon of God: Yet theſe were all foredetermined Prov: 28.by the hand of God, and the counſell of God, as the Apoſtles with one voice acknowledge. By the ſame providence was Ioſeph ſold into Egypt, God working thereby the preſervation Act: 4. 28.of them that ſold him; Thus Sihon was hardened, and the Canaanites, and the Egyptians with Pharaoh their King to their own deſtruction. Thus the Lord puniſhed David's foule ſinne by the murther of Amnon contrived by his own brother; and by the ſword of Abſolon riſing up againſt his own father; and by the ſword of Shimei's tongue curſing David; wherein David acknowledged the hand of God. Thus he puniſhed the Idolatry of the Gentiles by giving them over to vile affections, and ſo proſtituting them to abominable courſes. What outrages were committed by Senacherib that proud and blaſphemous wretch upon the people of God; yet is he called the rod of God's wrath and Eſ: 10.the ſtaffe in his hand; is ſaid to be God's indignation. And if God leaves any man to his corruption, and offers occaſions and temptations from without, which are naturally apt to actuate ſuch corruptions; and withall gives them over to the power of Satan; what is to be expected, but that they will breake forth into murther, as in Senacherib's ſons; and the Jewes crucifying the Son of God; into ſtealth ſacrilegious, as in Achan; into adultery and that in an inceſtuous manner as we ſee in Abſalom; into inſurrections, an example whereof we have in the ten Tribes revolting from Rehoboam; into treaſons as Iudas betraying his own Maſter; and into all manner of outragious villanies, whereof the Scripture makes plentifull mention, and of the providence of God therein? As for God's determining to the act, that is nothing at all materiall to the point in hand, though this Authour in his crude conceits, is much intoxicated therewith; For as much as, whether the wicked are exerciſed in actions good for the ſubſtance of them; or in abſtaining from that which is evill, they never a whit the more either performe the one, or abſtaine from the other in a gracious manner; and all for want of grace ſupernaturall, which God is not bound to beſtow on any. All ſides confeſſe that Divine concourſe is neceſſary to every act, as without which the creature cannot move. For in God we move, as well as in him we live, and in him we have our being. And about this concourſe a queſtion is made, to wit, Whether God's influence be only into the act, and that upon condition, modo nos velimus, provided that we will, is as abſurd and contradictious a conceit, as can be deviſed; ſeing the greateſt queſtion is concerning the act of willing: And is it poſſible that God ſhall worke this act upon condition that it be wrought by us? why, if it be wrought by us, what need is there of God's working it? Can the ſame act be the condition of it ſelfe, and ſo both before and after it ſelfe? To avoid this precipice others fly to God's preſcience, that at ſuch an inſtant man will produce ſuch an act of will, provided that God will produce it, which is worſe then the former. For hereby each Agent's operation duplicate page duplicate page is made the condition of the other, whence no operation at all can proceed. Then againe a thing is fained to be foreſeen by God as future, which hath no cauſe of the futurition thereof, being in it's own nature merely poſſible, that is no more future indeed, then not future: And nothing but the will and decree of God can make it paſſe out of the condition of a thing merely poſſible into the condition of a thing future, as is made manifeſt by invincible reaſon. Therefore we ſay the influence of God neceſſarily required to every action, is made into the will it ſelfe moving it agreably to the nature thereof, to doe whatſoever it doth, not voluntarily only, but freely alſo; taking liberty aright and as it ought to be taken, that is in the choice of meanes tending to an end, whether that end be a man's right end or no. For it is confeſſed by Moraliſts that the motion of the will towards it's congruous end, is naturall and neceſſary, not free. But this brave Gentleman carrieth himſelfe aloft, and ſuperciliouſly deſpiſing to enter into any of theſe liſts of argumentation; and as if the matter were concluſum contra Manichaeos, confidently ſuppoſeth, without all proofe, that we maintaine that all humane actions come to paſſe by abſolute neceſſity: Whereas to the contrary 'tis evident that nothing in the world hath it's exiſtence by abſolute neceſſity, ſaving God alone. 'Tis true, God's decree is unalterable, and whatſoever comes to paſſe comes to paſſe by his will ſaith Auſtin: and the Church of Ireland; By the effectuall will of God, ſaith Aquinas, as which, he makes the roote of all contingency; And therefore as neceſſary cauſes worke neceſſarily by the will of God; ſo by the ſame will of God doe contingent Agents worke contingently; and free Agents worke voluntarily and freely. And obſerve the immodeſty of this Authour, he tells us what Zeno's ſervant pleaded for himſelfe with his Maſter; but he doth not tell what Zeno anſwered him, that he conceales; it is enough for him to gull and cheate poore ignorants. The Adrumetine Monks, he ſaith, were miſled by Auſtin; a vile imputation caſt upon that man whoſe memory hath been alwaies honourable in the Church of God; and the memoriall of his oppoſites rots. Did Auſtin miſleade them? did he draw them into errour? If they did miſtake Auſtin, ſhall it be true therefore to ſay they were miſled by him? How many miſtake and miſunderſtand God's word; what then? ſhall we be ſo audacious and blaſphemous, as to ſay they are miſled by the word of God? Why may not ſuch impudent perſons proceed, and ſay they are miſled by the holy Ghoſt? Then that which he ſaith of theſe Monks, as miſled by Auſtin, it is a notorious untruth; Creſconius and Felix that came over to Auſtin of their own heads to complaine of ſome in their Monaſtry; laid to their charge indeed that they ſo taught grace, that they denied freewill; & that this they pretended to have learned out of Auſtin's booke written to Sixtus the Preſbyter. But Auſtin was not haſty to believe this crimination: And therefore he ſaith diſjunctively of that Monke of whom they complained, Aut librum meum non intelligit, aut ipſe non intelligitur; either he underſtands not my booke; or himſelfe is not well underſtood by his brethren. If the information were true, then that Brother of whom they complained miſtooke Auſtin. For Auſtin doth not any where ſo maintaine grace, as to deny free-will. But if that Brother underſtood Auſtin aright in that foreſaid booke of his, then he maintained no ſuch opinion as Creſconius and Felix laid to his charge, but they rather miſunderſtood him. And this appeared to be moſt true afterwards. For Florus was the man whom Creſconius and Felix accuſed, and whom Auſtin deſired of Valentinus the father of them, that he would ſend over unto him, as Coccius acknowledgeth, & accordingly he was ſent over to Auſtin, as appeares in Auſtin's booke De corrept. & gratiâ cap. 1. With whom when Auſtin had conferred, he found him moſt orthodoxe as himſelfe profeſſeth in the chapter mentioned, and therein much rejoyced, and withall ſignifieth to Valentinus that they deſerved rather to be checked who miſunderſtood Florus. And therefore when Auſtin in his Retractations comes to take notice of his booke De gratiâ & libero arbitrio, and the occaſion of writing thereof, he ſets it downe not abſolutely, becauſe of thoſe who ſo doe maintaine grace, as withall they deny free-will, but with a disjunctive addition, thus, or becauſe of thoſe who thinke when grace is maintained, therewithall that free-will is denied. The firſt was delivered in reference to the crimination made before him by Creſconius, and Felix againſt Florus; but the latter was according to Auſtin's ſuſpicion at the firſt, which proved afterwards to be a truth, as appeares by the firſt chapter of Auſtin's booke de correptione & gratiâ; where Florus is juſtified and magnified by St. Auſtin, and his criminators condemned. And ſeing there were none ſuch among the Monks of Adrumetum, as the accuſants pretended, who ſo maintained grace, as to deny free-will; therefore that alſo muſt needs be falſe which followeth in this Authour, when he ſaith that againſt them alſo St. Auſtin wrote his other booke De correptione & gratiâ: And the truth is the whole buiſineſſe was ended and the tumult appeaſed between thoſe Adrumetine Monks, before Florus came over; as appeared by the relation made unto him by Florus concerning the amicable compoſition of all things there. And Auſtin in this very paſſage which this Authour grates upon, profeſſeth that he writes not againſt them; only he anſwereth ſuch an objection (For I conceive it to be no other) more fully which was made by ſome of them formerly againſt Florus, and the doctrine of Auſtin maintained by Florus. The relation whereof was brought unto him by the ſame Florus, as it ſeemes. But of this more at large in This digreſſion in his late book againſt. Corvinius pag. 174. 175. &c.my digreſſion concerning the predeſtinarian hereſy, which I purpoſe to ſubjoine to this. Auſtin ſaith indeed that, Praedeſtinatio eſt gratiae praeparatio, gratia verò ipſa donatio. Predeſtination is the preparation of grace, Grace the gift it ſelfe which was prepared; not the beſtowing of it: How can it be? Can a gift temporall be the beſtowing of a thing eternall? What entertainment Zeno's ſervant found at his Maſters hands (which this Authour conceales) I have often ſhewed who taught no ſuch doctrine as deſtiny as to free a knave from ſtripes; who as ſo great a Philoſopher had a better judgment in the nature of fate then his ſervant; and himſelfe ſo well thought of by the whole State of Athenians. Yet was not Zeno ſo well inſtructed in the myſtery of Divine providence, as we are by the word of God; even from the ſelling of Ioſeph all along to the crucifying of the Son of God; & from thence to the Kings giving up their Kingdomes to the Beaſt, which ſhould come to paſſe in the latter part of the laſt times of the world. But let him make himſelfe mery with Zeno's ſervant, who taken in a theeviſh fact was content to helpe himſelfe with any pretence; but Zeno we know did not approve of his appology, but prepared a Rod for the knaves back in deſpite of that. And as for the Monks, the relation that here he makes is merely a fiction of his own braine without all ground. Thus his foundation being ruined, no marvaile if the houſe he builds thereon muſt needs totter and fall on his ownpate.

Sect: 3.

2. Nor if this be true can ſin be puniſhed eternally, or that tribunall be juſt on which the ſentence of eternall M. Meſons Addit. p 42. 43. 44fire ſhall be denounced againſt the wicked at the laſt day. To this I have the fathers bearing witneſſe generally and plainly. Tertullian hath there words; The recompence of God and evill can with no juſtice be given to him, who is good or evill, not freely but of neceſſity. Saint Hierome ſaith, where neceſſity domineers, lib. 2. contra Maxion: Epiph: adverſus baer: l. 1. haer. 5. uum. 3. Aug: l. 2. contra Fauſt. c. 5. Preſp. ad object. 10. Vinc: Fulg. l. 1. c. 1. ad Moni. c 22. Bern: l. de grat. & lib. arbit. p. 908.there is no place for retribution. Epiphanius ſaith, the ſtars which impoſe upon men a neceſſity of ſinning, may be puniſhed with better juſtice then the men themſelves. We place mens nativities under no fatall conſtell…tions, ſaith Saint Auſtin, that we may free the will by which a man liveth either well or ill, from all bands of neceſſity, becauſe of the righteous judgment of God. Proſper ſpeaking of the judgment of God, by which he decreed to render unto every man according to his works, ſaith, this judgment would never be if men did ſinne by the will and determination of God. Fulgentius alſo ſaith the ſame. It is great injuſtice in God, to puniſh him whom he doth not find, but make an offender. This was Saint Peruards opinion too; it is only a will free from compulſion and neceſſity ſaith he, which maketh a creature capable of reward & puniſhment Out of theſe reſtimonies laid together may be collected three things.

1. That the Ancients did uſe to call a necſſity of humane actions good or bad, by the name of deſtiny, from what externall cauſe ſoever this neceſſity did ariſe.

2. That they did uſe theſe two words (Neceſſity) and (Compulſion) promiſcuouſly; and therefore thought that neceſſity as well as compulſion did take away the wills liberty.

3. (Which is for our preſent purpoſe) that they believed and contended that the judgments of God on ſinners could not be juſt, if they were held by the Adamantine chaines of any abſolute neceſſity, under the power of their ſins.

I will therefore conclude this Argument with the words of Epiphanius writing of the errour of the Phariſ…es, who beleived the immortality of the ſoule, and the reſurrection of the dead, & yet held that all things come to paſſe by neceſſity. It is, ſaith he, a point of extreame ignorance; or madneſſe rather, for him that Epiph. l. 1. adv. haer. 16. p. 35. n. 3.confeſſeth the reſurection of the dead, and the great day appointed for the revelation of God's righteous judgment, to ſay that there is any deſtiny, any neceſſity in mens actions For how can the righteous judgment of God and deſtiny comply and ſtand together? And (let me adde) how can the beliefe of this and true piety ſtand together? For where this perſwaſion that mens ſins are neceſſary, and that therefore there can be no righteous judgment, is rooted in religion will quickly be rooted out.

4. It tendes to religions overthrow; becauſe it makes the whole circle of man's life, but a mere deſtiny. By it all our doings are God's ordinances, all our imaginations branches of his predeſtination; and all events in Kingdomes and commonweales the neceſſary iſſues of the divine decree. All things whatſoever though they ſeem to doe ſomewhat; yet by this opinion, they doe indeed juſt nothing; the beſt lawes reſtrain not one offender the ſweeteſt rewards promote not one vertue, the powerfull'ſt Sermons convert not one ſinner, the humbleſt devotions divert not one calamity; the ſtrongeſt endeavours in things of any nature whatſoever, effect no more then would be done without them, but the neceſſitating, overruling decree of God doth all. And if lawes doe nothing, wherefore are they made? If rules of religion doe nothing, why are they preſcribed? If the wills of men doe nothing, why are men encouraged to one thing, ſcared from another? duplicate page duplicate page ther? and if good endeavours and onſets doe nothing (being excited, continued, limited, controlled and every way governed by an active, abſolute, and Almighty decree, to what purpoſe are they uſed? Who ſeeth not plainly whither theſe things tend? To nothing more then to the ſubverſion of piety and pollicy, religion & lawes, ſociety and government? This did the Romans ſee full well; and therefore they baniſhed (Mathematicos, the teachers & abetters of deſtiny) out of Rome. Theſe and the like inconveniencies which come from the uppper way, did worke ſo with Proſper, as that he calls him no Catholique who is of this opinion. Proſp. ad cap. Gal: Sent. 1.Whoſoever ſaith that men are urged to ſinne, and to be damned by the predeſtination of God, as by a fatall, unavoidable neceſſity, he is no Catholique.

They did alſo make the Arauſican counſell denounce a curſe againſt ſuch. That any are predeſtinated by the divine power to ſinne, we doe not only not believe, but with the greateſt deteſtation that we can▪ we denounce Anathema to ſuch (if there be any ſuch) as will believe ſo great an evill. Thus farre of my …eaſons againſt the upper and more harſh and rigorous way.

2. Undoubtedly if ſin cannot be puniſhed temporally, it cannot be puniſhed eternally. We have no need, I ſhould thinke of the Authority of any fathers to juſtifie this. Where Anſwer.doth this Authour find, that we maintaine that a man is good or evill, not freely but by neceſſity, that Tertullian is brought in as oppoſing us here? Yet we thinke this is worthy of diſtinction: For was not Adam made by God habitually good? Durand. I am ſure, maintaines that in his creation he was endued with all Morall vertues: & this we read in Scripture, that all things which God made were very good: & as other things were made very good in their kind: So I preſume man was made very good in his kind: and how this could be unleſſe he were made vertuous, I cannot conceive. So likewiſe man being brought forth in the corrupt maſſe; when afterwards he is made good either in the way of juſtification, or in the way of regeneration; theſe are no free acts of Man, but rather the free acts of God. I preſume this Authour dares not ſay that man regenerates himſelfe But as for the denomination of goodneſſe and badneſſe in man, that ariſeth from any actions of his, I willingly grant all ſuch goodneſſe or badneſſe is acquired freely, not neceſſarily.

And as Tertullian takes neceſſity, to wit in oppoſition unto liberty; So I preſume doth Hierome too; otherwiſe theſe two Fathers were yoaked together unequally in this place. Now we know no ſuch neceſſity domineering in man, as ſtands in oppoſition to liberty. Much leſſe doe we maintaine any neceſſity over the will of man, depending upon fatall conſtellations; And as Epiphanius, and Auſtin diſcourſe thus of neceſſity in reference to fatall conſtellations; So it ſeemes likely that Hierome and Tertullian did diſcourſe of neceſſity in the ſame ſenſe. To ſinne by the will of God in Proſper is to ſin by the predeſtination of God, as appeares both by the Objection it ſelfe, and Proſper's anſwer thereunto throughout. Now predeſtination in the fathers meaning is of no other things, thē ſuch as God purpoſed to worke. And accordingly we anſwer that no evill in the world, as evill, comes to paſſe by God's will to worke it; but only by God's will to permit it. And it is Auſtin's expreſſe profeſſiō, that Non aliquid fit niſi omnipotens fieri velit. Not any thing comes to paſſe, unles God Almighty will have it come to paſſe; but how? Not all after one manner, but after a different manner; ſome by working them, others by permitting them; vel ſinendo ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo; either by ſuffering it to come to paſſe, in caſe it be evill, or himſelfe working it, in caſe it be good. Fulgentius juſtifies this ſenſe in his ſentence here alleadged. For to ſinne by God's will in Proſper, is all one with being made an offender (or made to ſinne) by God, in Fulgentius. Now we ſay God makes many a man good by regeneration; but he makes none evill; only he doth not cure that naturall or habituall viciouſneſſe, which he finds amongſt men, in all. For He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth; and indeed he is bound to none. St. Bernard clearely maintaines that there is noe liberty from ſinne in any naturall man; and conſequently every naturall man is caſt upon a neceſſity of ſinning; and therefore that liberty from neceſſity which he grants to man, can be no other then liberty from compulſion; And ſo Dr. Fulke uſually makes the diſtinction run between Liberty from ſin, and liberty from coaction; & denying the one he grants the other.

That the Antients did call that neceſſity, which ariſeth from the will of God upon the will of the creature by the name of deſtiny; This Authour brings not the leaſt colour of 1.proofe; neither do I thinke he is able to bring any, ſave only of the Pelagians, who traduced Auſtin's doctrine of predeſtination by the name of deſtiny. And ſo they traduced his doctrine in denying that grace was conferred according to mens workes; whereupon it was that he built his doctrine of predeſtination, as is apparent De bono perſeverantiae. c. 15. In the ſecond I wonder this Author obſerves not how he contradicts himſelfe. For if they uſed theſe words Neceſſity, & compulſion; promiſcuouſly; doth it not evidently follow that 2.they diſtinguiſhed them not? but alwaies tooke them of equivalent ſignification. But I doe not find that Auſtin tooke neceſſity of the ſame ſignification with compulſion; when he diſtinguiſheth of neceſſity; ſaying ſome neceſſity is ſuch, as whereby a thing befalls a man, whether he will or no; as the neceſſity of death; and to ſuch a neceſſity he ſaith, the will is not ſubject. Another neceſſity there is, as when we ſay, It muſt needs be, that this, or that come to paſſe, and he confeſſeth plainly that the will may be ſubject to ſuch a neceſſity, without danger or prejudice to the liberty thereof.

3 And well they might hold that God's judgments were not juſt on ſinners, if they were held by any abſolute neceſſity under the power of their ſins. We ſay that nothing hath either exiſtence, or continuance, by abſolute neceſſity, ſave God alone. But I gueſſe this Authour calls that neceſſity abſolute, which flowes from God's abſolute decree. Now if he will have God's decrees to be conditionall, it ſtands him upon to prove it, not boldly ſuppoſe it. Eſpecially ſeeing Aquinas hath profeſſed that never any man was ſo mad as to ſay that there is any cauſe of God's predeſtination, as touching the act of God's predeſtinating; and that there can be no cauſe hereof he proves becauſe there can be no cauſe of God's will, as touching the act of God willing, as formerly he had proved. And Doctor Iackson in his booke of providence confeſſeth that the diſtinction of God's will, into a will antecedent, and a will conſequent, is not to be underſtood as touching the act of God willing; but as touching the things willed. And accordingly, ſeeing reprobation in it's kind is the will of God, as well as predeſtination in it's kind; it followeth, that as there can be no cauſe of the will of God, as touching the act of God willing; no cauſe of predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating; ſo neither can there be any cauſe of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And looke how mad a thing it is for any man to maintaine that there is ſome cauſe of predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating. So as mad a thing it muſt be every way to avouch that there is a cauſe of Reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And truely the Apoſtle St. Paul plainly manifeſts that upon what ground he proves, that Election is not of good works (namely becauſe before Iacob or Eſau were borne, or had done good or evill, it was ſaid, The elder ſhall ſerve the younger) upon the ſame ground we may be bold to conclude, that Reprobation is not of evill workes. And the ſame reaſon manifeſts that faith and infidelity are excluded from being the cauſes, the one of Election, the other of Reprobation; as well as good and evill workes. And both Piſcator by evidence of Scripture, and Bradwardine by evidence of reaſon have demonſtrated, that no will of God is conditionall, which is to be underſtood, as touching the act of God willing. And it may be evidently further demonſtrated thus; If any thing be the cauſe of God's will, then either by neceſſity of nature, or by the conſtitution of God; Not by neceſſity of nature, as is evident and all confeſſe, there being no colour of truth for that; beſides ſuch an opinion were moſt dangerouſly prejudiciall to God's ſoveraignty, and liberty. If therefore they ſay, it is by the conſtitution of God, maſke I pray what an inſuperable abſurdity followeth hereupon. For ſeing God's conſtitution is his will, it followeth that God did will that upon foreſight of this or that he would will ſuch a man's ſalvation, and ſuch a man's damnation. And thus the act of God's will is made the Object of God's will, even the eternall act of God's will; Whereas to the contrary it is apparent, that the objects of God's will are things temporall, never any thing that is eternall But as touching things willed, we readily grant, it may be ſaid there is a cauſe thereof as School-Divines doe generally acknowledge. And thus Gerardus Voſſius ſpeaks of the conditionall will, which he faith the Fathers doe aſcribe to God. For this is the inſtance which he gives thereof, as for example, when God ordaines to beſtow ſalvation on a man in caſe he believe; here faith is made the condition of Salvation, but not of the will of God And in like manner we willingly grant that reprobation is conditionall, inaſmuch as God intends to inflict damnation on none, but ſuch as die in ſin without repenance But albeit predeſtination, as touching this particular thing willed, may be ſaid to be conditionall according as the School-men explicate their meaning; and reprobation likewiſe as touching the particular of dānatiō mētioned: yet no ſuch thing cā be truely affirmed either of the one or of the other, as touching the particulars of grāting, or denying the grace of règeneratiō, which are intended alſo by the decrees of predeſtinatiō & reprobatiō. For albeit God intends not to beſtow ſalvation on any, but upon condition of faith; nor damnation on any, but upon condition of finall impenitency and infidelity. Yet God intends not to beſtow the grace of regeneration on ſome for the curing of their naturall infidelity and impenitency. Nor to leave the ſame infidelity and impenitency uncured in others, by denying the ſame grace of regeneration unto them. This I ſay God doth not intend to bring to paſſe upon any condition; For if he ſhould, then grace ſhould be conferred according unto works, which was condemned in the Synod of Paleſtine and all along in divers Synods, and Councells againſt the Pelagians. So that albeit God proceeds according to a law in beſtowing ſalvation, and inflicting damnation; yet he proceeds according to no law, in giving or denying the grace of regeneration for the curing of our naturall corruption; but merely according to the pleaſure of his will, as the Apoſtle teſtifies ſaying, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth. And if the conferring and denying of this grace be abſolute; how much more are the decrees hereof to be accounted moſt abſolute? And conſequently that one man is delivered from the power of his ſins, whether originall or habituall; another is not, but ſtill continueth under the power of them; This I ſay, doth, & muſt needs come to paſſe by vertue of Gods abſolute decrees. Yet no abſolute neceſſity followeth hereupon. Firſt becauſe no greater neceſſity then that which is abſolute can be attributed to the exiſtence and continuance of God himſelfe. Secondly God did abſolutely decree to make the world; yet no wiſe man was ever known to affirme that the worlds exiſtence was, and is by abſolute neceſſity. In like ſort, God did abſolutely decree, that Ioſiah ſhould burne the Prophets bones, upon the Altar; That Cyrus ſhould build his Citty and let goe his captives; That no man ſhould deſire the Iſraelites land, when they ſhould come to appeare before the Lord their God thrice in the yeare; That God would circumciſe their hearts, and the hearts of their children to love the Lord their God withall their heart, and with all their ſoule. To put his feare in their hearts, that they ſhould never depart away from him; To cauſe them to walke in his ſtatutes and judgments to doe them. To worke in them both the will and the deed, according to his good pleaſure. Yea to worke in them every thing that is pleaſing in his ſight through Ieſus Chriſt. Likewiſe 1 King: 13. 2. Eſ: 45. 13. Ex, 34. 24.that Abſolom ſhould defile his fathers Concubines, that the Jewes ſhould crucify the Son of God; that ſome through diſobedience ſhould ſtumble at the word; that the Kings ſhould give their kingdomes to the beaſt. Yet theſe actions were done by them as freely as ever they Deut: 30. 6. Jer: 32 40. Ezech: 37. 24. Ezek. 36. 27. Phil: 2. 13. Heb: 13. 21.did ought in their lives; All theſe things I ſay by Scripture evidence were decreed by God to come to paſſe; The good by God's effection the evill by God's permiſſion; and decreed abſolutely on their parts that did them; if not, let it be ſhewed upon what condition on Abſolon's part, he ſhould defile his fathers Concubines; upon what condition on the Jewes part, they ſhould crucify the Son of God; upon what condition on their part, others through diſobedience ſhould ſtumble at God's word; And upon what condition on their part, the Kings ſhould give their kingdomes to the beaſt. And if they take Arminias his way, let them reply upon mine anſwere to Arminius; if Bellarmin's, let them reply upon my anſwer to Bellarmine, that we may not trouble the world with out Tautologies: If a different way from both theſe, I ſhall be glad, to be acquainted with it, & give it ſuch entertainement as according to my judgment it ſhall be found to deſerve.

So that with Epiphanius, though we are ready to concurre in denying deſtiny, which as before we heard out of him was a neceſſity derived from the ſtarres; yet with Auſtin we may ſtill hold that the wills of men need not to be exempted from all neceſſity, to maintaine the liberty thereof, and he gives inſtance in ſuch a neceſſity as whereby we ſay, It moſt needs be that ſuch a thing come to paſſe, as no way prejudiciall to man's liberty. And Arminius confeſſeth, that upon ſuppoſition of God's decree it muſt needs be that the Souldiers ſhould abſtaine from the breaking of Chriſt's bones; yet I nothing doubt, but this action was as as freely performed by them, as any other. For albeit a thing muſt needs come to paſſe which God hath decreed to come to paſſe, yet it is indifferent to come to paſſe neceſſarily or freely; which alſo God determines according to the nature of the things themſelves; namely that neceſſary things ſhall come to paſſe neceſſarily, and contingent things contingently. And to this purpoſe he hath prepared different Agents, as Aquinas obſerveth ſome neceſſary working neceſſarily, ſome contingent Collat: cum Junto pag: 83.working contingently.

4. Still this Author harpes upon the ſame ſtring imputing unto us, that we make the whole Circle af a man's life a mere deſtiny; his meaning is that we take away all liberty, which is moſt untrue. As for deſtiny it is well knowne as before I have ſhewed that this was the uſuall crimination, which the Pelagians caſt upon the doctrine of St. Auſtin; and that, becauſe he maintained that grace was not given according unto man's workes. And what was Auſtin's anſwer hereunto, I have ſhewed before: Si cui voluntatem omnipotentis Dei Fati nomine placet nuncupari, profanas verborum novitates evitamus, ſed de verbis contendere non amamus, If men pleaſe to call the will of Almighty God by the name of deſtiny; we avoid profane novelties of words, but we doe not love to wrangle about words. For God to worke us to faith, to repentance, to every good worke; yea to the very will and the deed, and that according to his good pleaſure (for which we have expreſſe Scripture, both in the old and new Teſtament, as earſt I ſhewed) & abſolutely to decree this is to make the whole circle of man's like, as touching good courſes, but a mere deſtiny, if we believe this Divine; whereas if this be decreed to be done conditionally, then grace muſt be conferred according to works, which is as true Pelagianiſme, as ever dropt from the mouth of Pelagius, & which himſelfe was ſōetimes driven torenounce yet this Pelagianiſme is the only true divinity, if we believe this Author. Againe if non aliquid fit niſi omnipotens fieri velit, Not any thing cōes to paſſe, unleſſe God Almighty will have it come to paſſe; whether good or evill; which was ſometimes delivered by Auſtin; and of late profeſſed by the Church of Ireland in the dayes of King James, this is to make the whole Circle of man's life a mere Deſtiny; if this Author be of any credit ſo farre as to make his words to be received as Oracles; yet God's word is expreſſe from the unanimous conſent of the Apoſtles, that both Herod & Pontius-Pilate, wih the Gentiles and people of Iſrael were gathered together againſt the holy Son of God to do what God's hand & God's counſell had before determined to be done: Yet were they gathered together to doe ſuch acts, as more facinorous were never known to be done ſince the world beganne: And if we believe this Author, all this came to paſſe by meere deſtiny: And if this be to come to paſſe by meere deſtiny, why ſhould we not believe it? Have we better or more compleate teſtimony for ought throughout the whole booke of God, then for this? All things that come to paſſe muſt needs be the iſſues of the divine decree; not only ſuch things as come to paſſe neceſſarily, by neceſſary Agents working neceſſarily; but even ſuch things alſo as come to paſſe freely, by free agents working contingently, and freely, as Aquinas hath proved and Auſtin and the Church of Ireland acknowledged, and the word of God hath juſtified, and cleare reaſon demonſtrated, for as much as otherwiſe no future thing could be foreknowne by God from everlaſting. For nothing can be from everlaſting knowne by God as future, unleſſe from everlaſting it were future. But without the decree of God paſſing upon it, no contingent thing can paſſe out of the condition of a thing merely poſſible (ſuch as it is in it's own nature) into the conditiō of a thing future. So that whoſoever denies God's decree to paſſe upon every thing that comes to paſſe throughout the world, muſt therewithall deny the foreknowledge thereof in the mind of God; Let but this Authour avoid this one argument if he can; but he will never anſwer it while his head is hot… conceive I have had ſufficient experience of his ſtrength already this way, and of the ſhamefull iſſue of his adventure therein. He that ſayd, Non aliquid fit niſi omnipotens fieri velit, Not any thing comes to paſſe, unleſſe the Almighty will have it come to paſſe, ſayd alſo that God ſo workes in every creature, as without all prejudice to their own motions. And when the Apoſtle ſaid, that In God we move, his meaning was not, that the creature did nothing, or moved not at all. All that followeth is of the ſame ſtampe a fardell of unſhamefaſt untruthes. Belike when God ſaith, I will cauſe them to walke in my ſtatutes and to doe them, God cauſed them to doe juſt nothing. In like manner when the holy Prophet expoſtulates with God in the perſon of the Church after this manner, Lord why haſt thou cauſed us to erre from thy waies, and hardened our hearts againſt thy feare, the meaning is, why haſt thou cauſed us to doe juſt nothing. In like manner when God reſtraines offences, he doth it not by his lawes, When he promotes vertue he doth it not by rewards; when he converts ſinners he doth it not by ſermons: when thouſands were converted in one day, it was not by the miniſtry of Peter and his fellow Apoſtles. This Authours meaning ſeemes to be, that unleſſe man converts himſelfe, it is not done by ſermons. But ſee how he overlaſheth; whē carrying the matter ſo as if God's decree neceſſitated and overruled all by our opinion; yet moſt abſurdly he exempts from this divine decree man's endeavours. And who ſeeth not that to overrule is to carry the reaſonable creature on to doe contrary to his own will and judgment. For unleſſe he doth toſſe ſtrenuouſlly he can prevaile nothing with any ſober and indifferent Reader. In like ſort to neceſſitate denotes ſuch a motion whereby the creature is carried to doe a thing neceſſailry but this is not Bradwardines opinion, who alone amongſt Schoole-Divines, that I know, uſeth this phraſe of neceſſitating. For he ſaith that God neceſſitates the creature to his free act, & this neceſſity is but modall, according to that expreſſion of Auſtin neceſſe eſt ut aliquid fiat, which Auſtin confeſſed 1200 years agoe to be no impeachment to man's liberty. But becauſe that phraſe Neceſſitating, is not only of an harſh ſound & apt to be taken in a quite contrary ſenſe to that of the Authour's; therefore other School-Divines, and generally our Divines uſe it not. And how immodeſt a courſe is this to thinke to choake us with other mens phraſes, and that in a quite contrary ſenſe to that wherein the Authour's take it? And as if he had very ſubſtantially concluded the point, that lawes doe nothing, rules of religion, and mens endeavours do nothing, whereas he hath performed no part either of a Philoſopher or of a Divine in all this, but of a mere trifler; he proceeds to demand why the one are made, the other preſcribed; why men are encouraged to ſome things; and ſcared from the other. He might as well aske what meant King Hezechiah to have any care either of his foode or of taking Phyſicke for thoſe 15 yeares which God told him, he had added unto his life? What meant Paul to tell the Maſter of the ſhip, that unleſſe the Mariners were detained in the ſhip they could not be ſaved; what meant ſome to truſt to their ſwimming, others to boards & brokempeeces of the ſhip to get to land, when the Lord by his Angell had told him, that he had given him the lives of all that ſailed with him? In the very daies of Cicero the Stoicks were acquainted with ſuch like arguments made againſt their deſtiny, and knew how readily to anſwer them by diſtinguiſhing between Fatalia and Confatalia, as appeares in Cicero's book de Fato, and Turnebus his anſwer to Ramus thereupon, more at large. Therefore this Authour diſputes not logically, if he did, the vileneſſe of his argumentation would ſoone appeare according to it's proper colours; but carrieth the matter all along in Rhetoricall flouriſhes, as if his wit ſerved him for that beſt, whereat I wonder not a little, that he ſhould forſake that wherein his facultie lieth moſt, according to the reputation that goes of him, & truſt to that wherein his beſt dexterity hath been accounted but inficete. If our doctrine tends to the ſubverſion of policy, religion and lawes, ſociety & goverment In the next place we expect when he will turne ſtarke Atheiſt and profeſſe as much of the word of God, ſeing it is manifeſt our doctrine cheifly is founded upon the word of God even in that which ſounds moſt harſh unto carnall judgment; namely as touching God's ſecret providence in evill, this Authour not accomodating any anſwer to any one of thoſe places whereupon our doctrine is grounded. And as for God's providence in working us unto holineſſe, his contrary doctrine cannot ſtand without maintaining that Grace is given according unto mens works; which is expreſly contradictory to the word of God. 2 Tim: 1. 9. Tit: 3. 5, and oppoſed by the church of God as the ſowre leaven of Pelagianiſme, from the Synod of Paleſtine all along. For aske this Authour wherefore God beſtowes faith upon one & not upon another, & he hath nothing to anſwer, but either by denying plainly, that faith is the gift of God; which hitherto they are not growne ſo impudent as to deny expreſly; though the Remonſtrants in their Cenſura cenſurae come ſo farre, as to deny that Chriſt merited faith and regeneration for any man; Or they muſt anſwer that the reaſon hereof is, becauſe the one by ſome act of his or other hath prepared himſelfe for the reception of divine influences, the other hath not. Or in plaine termes as one hath expreſſed it, that God doth worke in us Credere to believe, modo velimus provided that we will believe. But doth he not worke alſo the very act of willing? Saint Paul ſaith he doth; yea every thing that is pleaſing in his ſight. And how Phil. 3. 13. Heb. 13. 21.doth he worke in us this will? Is it upon condition, that we will? This is the abſurdity whereunto they are driven, ſtill fetching in a priority of mans act to the divine influence, working us to that which is good, yet moſt prepoſterouſly. For what need is there of influence divine to make us to will if of our ſelves we will already? And this alſo utterly overthrowes God's preſcience of things future, which can have no true foundation beſides the divine decree. As for Mathematici which were baniſhed out of Rome, were thoſe Divines, or Aſtrologers rather? If they ſubjected the event of all things to the influence of the ſtars, ſhall Auſtin be blamed or the Church of Ireland for ſubjecting all things to the councell of God's will, and that according to the expreſſe teſtimony of holy Scripture both as touching good and evill; only with this difference; good things to his will of working them, evill things to his will of permitting them. As for Proſper's ſaying in the laſt place, we make no contingent things throughout the world, much leſſe the actions of men to come to paſſe unavoidably, no not upon ſuppoſition of God's decree; but by vertue of his decree both contingent things come to paſſe contingently, that is with a poſſibility of not comming to paſſe; & free things freely, that is joyned with an active power in the Agent, either to ſuſpend his action; or to doe otherwiſe; as well as neceſſary things come to paſſe neceſſarily. This I ſay we avouch with Aquinas, and accordingly with him maintaine the root of contingency to be the effectuall will of God. Againe I have often ſhewed that Predeſtination in the phraſe of the Antients is only of ſuch things as God decreed to bring to paſſe by his effection; notwithſtanding this, Auſtin was bold to profeſſe, that not any thing came to paſſe unleſſe God would have it come to paſſe; but evill things only by ſuffering them; good things by working them, As for compulſion which is Proſper's phraſe, and which this Authour corrupts rendring i… by the urging, which is ambiguous. We deny that man is compelled to acts ſupernaturall; much leſſe doe we grant compulſion to acts naturall; ſuch as are all ſinfull acts; yea too connaturall unto him, compared in Scripture to ſweet morſells which they roule under their tongue, as the booke of Iob reſembles it. By all which we may judge indifferently both of this Authour's ſufficiencie and modeſty. Auſtin never ſaid that God predeſtinated any man to ſinne. For predeſtination with them (as hath been ſaid) was only of ſuch things as God determined to worke. Yet the ſame Auſtin confidently profeſſeth of Enchirid. c. 95.thoſe things which come to paſſe by God's ſufferance (and theſe we all know to be evill things) that they come not to paſſe, unleſſe Almighty God will have them come to paſſe,

Thus farre in anſwer to this Authour's additions to M. Hoord's diſcourſe, and concerning the upper and more harſh and rigorous way which M. Hoord left unproſecuted. pag. 49, there is a paſſage added, a citation out of Peter, but it is of the ſame nature with the reſt, & add's no ſtrength to the argument; and my anſwer ſatisfies it as well as the reſt.

P. 52. &c. Is inſerted a repreſentation, how the doctrine of our Divines fighteth with God's holineſſe.

The Riches of Gods Love, Part 3

p. 116The ſecond inconvenience.

Section 1.

Sect: 2.

Sect: 3.

The ſecond inconvenience.