The Riches of Gods Love, Part 2 · Section 1
Sect. 1.
M. Maſon's Addit. p. 24. 25.Secondly, this opinion chargeth God with mens ſinnes on earth, and makes him the Authour, not of the ſinne only that entred by Adam into the world, but of all other ſinnes, that have been, are, or ſhall be committed to the worlds end. No murthers, robberies, rapes, adulteries, inſurrections, treaſons, blaſphemies, perſecutions, or any other abominations whatſoever fall out at any time, or in any place, but they are the neceſſary productions of God Almightys decrees. The Scripture I am ſure teaches us another leſſon. Thou art not a God, ſaith David that haſt pleaſure in wickedneſſe. And the Prophet Eſay tells the people, that when they did Pſal. 5. 4. Eſ. 66. 4. Iam: 1. 13. 14evill in the ſight of the Lord, they did chooſe the things which he would not. Let no man ſay when he is tempted I am tempted of God. For God cannot be tempted with evill, neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when he is drawen away with his own concupiſcence. And St. John when he had referred all the ſinnes of the world to three heads, the luſt of the fleſh, the luſt of the eyes, and the pride of life; tells us that, they are not of the Father, but of the world. To which ſpeeches let me adde the ſpeech of Stracides (though not of the ſame authority.) Say not 1 Jo: 2. 16.thou it is through the Lord that I fell away; for thou oughteſt not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou he hath Ecclus. 15. 12.cauſed me to erre; for he hath no need of the ſinfull man.
2. Pious antiquity hath conſtantly ſayd the ſame, and preſt it with ſundry reaſons; ſome of which are theſe as follow. If God be the Authour of ſinne, then he is worſe then the Devill; becauſe the devill doth only tempt and perſwade to ſinne, and his action may be reſiſted, but God, by this opinion, doth will and procure Proſper reſp. ad Object. 11. Vincent.by a powerfull and effectuall decree, which cannot be reſiſted. This is Proſpers argument, who to ſome objecting that by St. Auſtin's doctrine, when Fathers defile their own Daughters, and Mothers their own Sonnes, Servants murther their maſters, & men commit any horrible villanies, it cometh to paſſe becauſe God hath ſo decreed. Anſwereth that if this were layd to the Devills charge, he might in ſome ſort cleare himſelfe of the imputation. Quia etſi delectatus eſt furore peccantium, probaret tamen ſc non intuliſſe vim criminum. Becauſe though he be delighted with man's ſinnes yet he doth not, he cannot compell men to ſinne: What a madneſſe therefore is it to impute that to God which cannot be juſtly fathered upon the Divell.
2. He cannot be a puniſher of ſinne: For none can juſtly puniſh thoſe effences of which they are the Reſp. Obi. 4. Vincent l. 1. ad Monim. c. 19. l. 2. cont. Marcion. c. 9 Baſil. Homil. Quod Deus non eſt &c.Authors. This is Proſpers argument too. It is againſt reaſon to ſay that he wich is the damner of the Devill would have any one to be the devills Servant. This reaſon Fulgentius uſeth likewiſe illius rei Deus ultor eſt, cujus Auhor non eſt. Tertullian alſo before them hath ſayd. He is not to be accounted the Author of ſinne, who is the forbidder yea and the condemner of it.
3. He cannot be God, becauſe he ſhould not be juſt, nor holy, nor the Judge of the world, all properties eſſentiall to God. And this is Baſil's reaſon, who hath written a whole Homily againſt this wicked aſſertion. It is all one (ſaith he) to ſay that God is the Author of ſinne, and to ſay he is not God.
3 Upon theſe and the like conſiderations I may well conclude, that, the opinion which chargeth God with the ſinnes of men, is neither good nor true.
It is firſt layd to the charg of our Divines that by this their opinion, they make God the Anſwer.Authour of ſinne; not of the firſt only that entred by Adam into the world, but of all other ſinnes, that have been, are, or ſhall be committed in the world, as murthers, robberies, rapes, adulteries, inſurrections, treaſons, blaſphemies, hereſies, perſecutions, or any other abominatiōs. But in all theſe waſtfull diſcourſes not a word of proofe. The charge is made in the firſt place, the proofe laſt. All that he labours to prove here is, that God is not the Author of ſinne. Bellarmine hath beſtowed, or rather caſt away a whole book on this crimination, to him Arminius referrs Perkins, telling him that he ſhould have anſwered Bellarmine. I have taken ſome paines to performe that taske upon that motion of Arminius. I would I could receive from this Authour a reply to any materiall particular thereof, the rather becauſe I underſtand in part his Zeale for Bellarmine in his age, correcting the harſh exceptions he hath made againſt him in his younger dayes. And let every indifferent Reader compare this Authors diſcourſe, with that diſcourſe of Bellarmine, and judge indifferently what an hungry peece this is in compariſon to that of Bellarmines; And whether his paines had not been better beſtowed in replying upō my anſwer thereunto, then to adde ſuch ſcraps as theſe to that full table of Bellarmin's proviſion; and whether theſe deſerve any anſwer, that whole diſcourſe of Bellarmine being refuted throughout. Bradwardine diſputes the queſtion, Si & quomodo Deus vult & non vult peccatum. I ſay he diſputes it indifferently on both ſides; and let every Schollar judge and weigh, whether it be not a very ponderous argument, and conſider well his reſolution, and where he differrs any thing from our Divines in this Calvin obſerving how frequent the Scripture is in teſtifying God's hand to be operative in abominable courſes, thereupon writes a Treatiſe. De occultâ Dei providentiâ in malo; in all which he exactly conformes himſelfe to Scripture expreſſions. And theſe and ſuch like vile Criminators may as well taxe God's word for making God the Author of ſinne, as Calvin; who moſt accurately conformes himſelfe to the teſtimonies of Divine Scripture. I remember to have heard a diſputation ſometimes at Heidelberge on this Argument, where Copenius the Preſident or Moderator made manifeſt, that look upon what grounds they criminated Calvin for making God the Authour of ſinne; upon the ſame grounds they might criminate the very word of God to make him the Author of ſinne. For Calvine throughout in his expreſſions conformes himſelfe to the language of the holy Ghoſt. Yet, what one of our divines can he produce, affirming that, God takes pleaſure in ſinne. Piſcator confeſſeth that, God taketh no pleaſure in the death of him that dyeth, upon that place in Ezechiel; how much leſſe in wickedneſſe. And he illuſtrates it in this manner: For albeit it cannot be denyed, but that God willeth the death of him that dyeth. For he is the God to whom vengeance belongeth; yet he takes no pleaſure in it. Like as a ſick-man would be content to take a bitter potion for the recovery of his health; yet he takes no pleaſure in that bitter cup. And in like manner, albeit, God hardened Pharaoh's heart that he ſhould not let Iſrael goe; and as the Apoſtle ſpeaks, hardeneth whom he will. Whereby it comes to paſſe infallibly that they doe not obey the Goſpell, as appeareth by the objection following. Why then doth he complaine. For who hath reſiſted his will? And albeit the Saints of God expoſtulate with him in this manner; Why haſt thou cauſed us to erre from thy wayes, Eſ. 63. 17.and hardened our hearts againſt thy feare? Yet we know that God takes no pleaſure in diſobedience, or in the hardneſſe of any mans heart, nor can be the Authour of evill, with Sir Francis Bacons diſtinction in the booke formerly mentioned by this Authour. Non quià non Author, ſed quià non mali. So that albeit he hardens whom he will unto diſobedience, & in the prophet Eſayes phraſe cauſeth men to erre from his wayes. Yet the Lord himſelfe we know is righteous in all his wayes, & holy in all his workes, though we are not able to dive into the gulfe, and ſearch out the bottome of his judgments, and no marvaile. For they are unſearchable; Yet we make no queſtion but through Gods mercy convenient ſatisfaction may be found without any ſuch ſhāefull courſe of diſmēbring ſcripture, and taking notice only of ſuch paſſages as repreſent Gods diſpleaſure againſt ſin Eſ. 63. 17. Rom. 11.& ſinners, and diſſembling all other paſſages which drave Auſtin to confeſſe, occulto Dei judicio, by the ſecret judgement of God, fieri perverſitatem cordis, the perverſity of mans heart hath its courſe, much leſſe by ſetting thē together by the eares. And I nothing doubt but the iſſue will be on the part of ſuch, as are of this Authours ſpirit, either wholly to deny originall ſin, or ſo to emaſculate the vigor of it, as to profeſſe that it is in the power of mā to cure it; or notwithſtāding the ſtrength of it, to beleive & repēt if he will; which Aug: de grat: & lib: arbit.though they pretēd to be wrought by a certain univerſal grace; Yet I nothing doubt but we ſhall be able to prove that ſuch a power is mere nature and no grace. Be it ſo that wicked men in their wicked courſes do choſe the things that God would not, Who would thinke that this Author, who makes ſuch a floriſh ſhould content himſelfe with ſuch beggarly arguments; or that the world ſhould be ſo ſimple as to be terrifyed with ſuch ſcarcrowes? For is it not apparent that in ſcripture phraſe there is voluntas praecepti, a will of Eſ. 66. 24.commandement, as well as voluntas propoſiti, a will ſignifying Gods purpoſe and decree? So thē though they chuſe the things that God willed not in reference to his will of commandement; yet it might be Gods will, that is his purpoſe that even ſuch ſinnes ſhould come to paſſe. For was it not the will of God that Pharaoh ſhould not let Iſrael goe for a while? Did he not harden him to this purpoſe that ſo he might make himſelfe knowne in the land of Egypt by his judgemēts? & did he not reveale this to Moſes to the cōfort of the childrē of Iſrael, & keepe thē from deſpaire in contēplation of the obſtinacy of Pharaoh's Lib. 1. de Amiſſ. gratia.ſpirit, when they were aſſured that God had an hād in hardening Pharaoh to ſtād out? And doth not Bellarmine profeſſe that malū fieri permitt ſin & Deo bonū eſt, it is good that evill ſhould cō to paſſe by Gods permiſſion? And ſhall it be unbecōing the divine nature to will that which is good? And where is it that Bellarmine affirmeth this? even there where he oppoſeth the ſame Doctrine of ours which this Authour doth. but with more learning an 100 fold then this Authour betrayeth, and withall carryeth himſelfe with farre more ingenuity. For he takes notice of thoſe places of Scripture whereupon our Divines do build, and accommodates himſelfe to aſwer them by ſome intepretation that he thinks good to make of them, which this Authour doth not 2. But what if there be no ſuch text as this Authour builds upon? For looke what the word is, uſed in the originall Pſ. 5. 4. the ſame is uſed Eſ. 66 4 Now that in Pſ. 5. 4 This Authour renders not that wouldeſt not iniquity, but that haſt no pleaſure in iniquity And why then ſhall not that Eſ. 66. 4. be accordingly rendred thus. They chooſe the things wherein I had no pleaſure, or wherein I had no delight, and not as he expreſſeth it the things that I would not. Hereupon I imagined our Enliſh tranlation had thus rendred it, but conſulting that, I found the contrary. For thus they render it. They chooſe the things wherein I delighted not. It is true the Geneva renders it thus: But doth it become him to preferre and follow the Geneva tranſlation before the laſt and moſt authenticall tranſlation of the Church of England? In like manner the practiſe of Geneva muſt be of authority to cry us downe in the point of the morality of the fourth commandement. Were not the man well knowne to be ſound at heart, his favourites might well ſuſpect him to praevaricate, in making ſo great a cry, and yet yeilding ſo little wooll. In the next place he alleadgeth that of Iames. Let no man ſay when he is tempted that he is temptedof God. For God tempteth no man: But every man is tempted, when he is drawen away with his owne concupiſcence Ia: 1. 13. 14Now Peter Martyr on the firſt to the Romans deales at large upon this place, and diſputes ſtrangely indiſcourſing of Gods providence in evill. I would this Authour had taken the paines to anſwer him at leaſt, that he might performe ſomewhat tanto dignum hiatu, worthy of the great gaping he makes. It is true Bellarmine hath taken him to taske after a ſort in his eigth chapter of his ſecond book de Amiſſ. gratiae & ſtatu peccati. And I have replyed upon Bellarmine at large in my Vindiciae, in that large digreſſion wherein I take Bellarmine to taske in that book of his, whereunto I referre the Reader. Yet to ſay ſomewhat of this place befor I paſſe. It is apparent that the Apoſtle in this place doth not ſo put off from God the workes of tempting as to caſt it upon Satan; but onelyonly ſo as to ſhew, that whatſoever the divine providence is there about, either by the miniſtry of Satan (who is God's miniſter in hardening men to precip…tate courſes (I Kings the laſt) or otherwiſe, yet ſtill the ſinner is unexcuſable; for as much as he is then only tempted (effectually) For ſo it is to be underſtood; otherwiſe it were not true, as it appeares in the caſe of Joſeph tempted by his Miſtris) when he is drawen away by his own concupiſcence. It is true, the luſt of the fleſh, the luſt of the eyes, and pride of life is not of the Father but of the world, they are the members of that body of ſin which we brought with us into the world. This is propagated unto us all by naturall generation. Col. 2. 11. Gen: 5. 3. Pſ. 51. 5. Ioh. 3. 11.Holy Iacob the Son of holy Iſaak a Patriach, & of holy Rebeccah a Propheteſſe was borne in ſin as well as Eſau; and Seth as well as Cain, and this ſeemeth to be called the image of Adam, after his fall Behold I was ſhapen in wickedneſſe, ſayth David, and in ſin hath my Mother conceived me. And except a man be borne againe he cannot ſee the kingdome of God. This, though a myſtery, yet is nothing ſtrange to us, whom God in mercy hath reſerved unto theſe times or grace; But it was very ſtrange to Nicodemus a Ruler in Iſrael. This hath been the condition of man ever ſince the fall of Adam; and ariſing merely from the withdrawing of God's ſpirit from him, and that moſt juſtly upon their firſt ſin in taſting of the forbidden fruit. So that even this condition proceeded originally, as from the ſin of our firſt parents in the way of a meritorious cauſe, ſo from the juſt judgment of God taking his holy Spirit from him, which God was not bound to doe, as appeares by this, that by vertue of the Covenant of grace which he hath made with us in Chriſt, he doth not take his ſpirit from us, though too often we ſin againſthim. No not from David, notwithſtanding thoſe foule ſinnes committed by him, at appeares by his prayer unto God; that, he would reſtore him to the joy of his ſalvation, ſignifying therereby that he had loſt that. And that God would not take his holy Spirit from him, manifeſting hereby that ſtill he retained that. And conſidering that God proceeded with Adam herein in the way of judgment, Auſtine acknowledgeth Concupiſcence to be a puniſhment of ſinne, as well as ſin, and a cauſe of other ſinnes, in his fifth book againſt Iulian the Pelagian cap. 3 As for that of Siracides, ſay not thou, God hath cauſed me to erre. As it is true that no man muſt caſt the blame of ſinning upon God, & think himſelfe blameleſſe: So it is as true that in conſideratiō of our own inability to ſtād of our ſelves & prones to fall (evē to fall away like water ſpilt upō the ground that cannot be recovered; containe it ſelfe it cannot, but it may eaſily becontained) the Church doth ſometimes expoſtulate with God (ſuch is the liberty and foreign which he vouchſafeth unto his Children) in an holy manner ſaying, Wherefore haſt thou cauſed us to erre from thy waies, and hardened our hearts againſt thy feare; Not that this he doth, infundendo malitiam, by infuſing malice into them but, non infundendo gratiam, by not infuſing ſuch grace into them as to preſerve them from ſin For as Martha ſaid unto Ieſus, Lord if thou had'ſt been here our brother Lazarus had not dyed. So may we ſay if the ſtrēgth of thy grace had been operative in us, we had not ſined in this or that particular. It is true God hath not need of the ſinfull ma: much leſſe of his ſalvation or damnation. But if he will of mere pleaſure manifeſt his own glory, either in the way of mercy pardoning, or of juſtice puniſhing, he muſt permit ſin to enter into the world, & forbeare that providence whereby, as he did keep the Elect Angells, ſo he might have kept man alſo from ſinning. As for the reaſons of p…o…s Antiquity to prove that God cannot be the Authour of ſin, they are very needeleſſe in this controverſy between us & our adverſaries, the queſtion between us not being thereabouts, but rather about the manner of God's providence. Our Adverſaries ſo denying him to be the Author of evill, as withall they deny him to be the Authour of any good in the actions of men. We on the contrary take care, ſo to maintaine that God is not the Author of ſinne, that withall we maintaine that he is the Author of all good, both morall and naturall, and much more ſupernaturall. Yet as I have conſidered the ſeven reaſons of Bellarmine to this purpoſe collected out of the Antients; ſo I am content to take into conſideration the three reaſons produced by this Author. 1. As touching the firſt to manifeſt how ſuperficiarily and abſurdly he carieth himſelfe therein, obſerve the wildneſſe of his reaſoning beſides all rules of ſobriety. If God (ſayth he) be the Author of ſinne, then he is worſe then the Devill, becauſe the Devill doth only tempt and perſwade to ſinne, and his action may be reſiſted. Let all the Univerſities of the world be judge between us of the ſhamefull irregularity of this diſcourſe. His ſyllogiſme is hypotheticall; for the firſt propoſition is hypotheticall and conditionall. Now all ſuch ſyllogiſmes by the rule of all Schooles muſt proceed either from the negation of the conſequent, to the negation of the antecedent; or from the affirmation of the antecedent, to the affirmation of the conſequent; but no ſuch proceſſe is made here. And indeed it ſhould be framed thus to inferre the propoſition undertaken to be proved. If God be the Authour of ſin, then he is worſe then the Divell; but God is not worſe then the Divell; therefore he is not the Authour of ſin. But this Authour diſputes after no ſuch manner. But his affection carrying him all along to caſt ſome foule aſperſion on our Doctrine in ſome particular or other, and being withall in heat of paſſion, he doth moſt ſhamefully involve and entangle himſelfe And indeed quite beſides his preſent purpoſe, he aimes only at this to prove that our doctrine concerning God's powerfull and effectuall decree, doth more make God the Authour of ſin then the Devill, which is utterly aliene from that he propoſed in this place. Yet I am willing to doe him this favour, to help a lame Dogge over the ſtile, and to expedite him in this Argument, whereof he cannot ſo dext'rouſly deliver himſelfe though quite beſides the purpoſe. Thus therefore the argument ſhould proceed according to his irregular intention. If God doth will and procure ſins by a powerfull and effectuall decree, which cannot be reſiſted, then is God worſe then the Devill. But by the doctrine of our Divines God doth will and procure ſins by a powerfull and effectuall decree which cannot be reſiſted; therefore by the doctrine of our Divines, God is worſe then the Devill. Thus have I endeavoured to bring this argument to ſome ſhape, which had no tolerable proportion before. Now let me ſhew the corrupt nature of it, that the Reader may diſcerne what ſpirit he breathes, that is the Authour of it in a mixture both of ignorance and abominable profanenes. And firſt I begin with the major propoſition. And here firſt let the Reader judge whether it be not this Authours opinion, that, God doth will and procure ſin by ſome decree, though not by a powerfull and effectuall decree that cannot be reſiſted. For otherwiſe did he acknowledge every will of God as it ſignifies his decree, to be powerfull, and effctuall and irreſiſtable, what need he cumber his Reader with ſuch unneceſſary Epithites, caſt in like lumber only to trouble the courſe of diſputation? Now if he grants that God doth will and decree ſin by a powerfull and effectuall decree. 1. He muſt contradict himſelfe. For formerly he cited, Eſ. 66. 4, to prove that men in wicked courſes, doe chooſe the things that God would not. 2. If God doth will it, but not by a powerfull and effectuall, & irreſiſtable decree, let him ſhew what that decree is, whereby he wills ſins. Now this is commonly accounted a decree conditionall; and let him ſpeak plainely then & tell us upon what condition it is that God doth will and procure ſin in the world, and I am verily perſwaded he is to ſeek what to anſwer. 3. If God doth will and decree it, it cannot be avoided, but it muſt be, by a powerfull and effectuall decree which cannot be reſiſted; ſeeing the Apoſtle ſaith plainly ſpeaking of his decree, that it cannot be reſiſted. Upon theſe conſiderations I am perſwaded, that this Authour doth utterly deny that God doth at all will ſin, or decree that any ſuch thing ſhall come to paſſe in the world, & that theſe attributes of powerfull, and effectuall, & irreſiſtable, are uſed by him not for diſtinction ſake, but meerly for amplification, that ſo he might ſpeake with a full mouth. Now having brought this Authour home to himſelfe, and delivering himſelfe and his meaning plainely, I am very willing to cope with him on this point. Yet what need I, having ſo fully diſputed the point in a certaine digreſſion in my Vindiciae lib. 2. Digrees. 4. The title whereof is this, Whether the holy one of Iſrael without any blot to his Majeſty may be ſaid to will ſin. And forthwith I anſwer, that, God may be ſaid thus farre to will ſin, in as much as he will have ſin to come to paſſe. And for explication ſake it is added, that whereas God will have all the good things of the world, whether naturall, morall, or ſpirituall come to paſſe by his working of them: Only evill things he will have come to paſſe by his permitting them. But this Authour affects to worke upon the ignorant; and he doth not affect to trouble their braines with anſwering my reaſons, leaſt thereby he ſhould raiſe many ſpirits, and afterwards prove unable to lay them. And this diſcourſe of M. Hord's ſome of that ſect thought good to have it coppied out, and communicated to people in the Country, as accommodated to their capacities, and ſo more fit to promote their edificatiō in the plauſible way of Arminian religion: well therefore in the proofe of this tenet, namely, that God will have ſin come to paſſe by his permiſſion. I prove firſt by Scripture. God hath put in their hearts (that is in the hearts of the 10 Kings) to fulfill his will. Now marke what is the object of God's will, in the words following, and to agree, and give their kingdōes unto the beaſt untill the words of God ſhall be fulfilled: now by giving their Kingdomes unto the beaſt, is not to depoſe or dethrone themſelves, or to part with their Kingdomes, but only to ſubmit their regall authority to the executiō of the beaſts wrath againſt the Saints of God. Like as in the dayes of Popery, when the Saints of God were by Popiſh Prelates condemned for hereſies, then they were delivered into the hands of the ſecular powers, the ſherifes to burne thē at a ſtake. Now this the holy Ghoſt makes the object of Gods will, and their agreement thus to execute the Popes Antichriſtian pleaſure is ſaid to be Gods worke. For God is ſaid to put it into their hearts to doe this evill of his. Of diſobedient perſons the Apoſtle profeſſeth that they are ordained to ſtūble at Gods word, 1 Pet. 2. 8. 2 Theſ. 2. 11. Rom. 1. 24.wherein undoubtedly they ſin. Paul likewiſe teſtified of ſome that God ſends thē ſtrong deluſions, that they ſhould beleive a lye. of others that God gave them up to uncleanes through the luſts of their owne hearts to diſhonour their owne bodyes betweene thēſelves. And to a Reprobate mind, to do thoſe things which are not convenient. Now let every ſober man judge whether when God blinded the eyes of the one and hardned the harts of the other, it were not his will, that thoſe foule things which were committed by them ſhould come to paſſe by his permiſſiō. Then conſider what the Apoſtles with one conſent teſtifie concerning thoſe abominable Acts. 4. 28.acts committed againſt the holy ſon of God, namely that both Herod & Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles & people of Iſrael, were gathered together to doe what Gods hand & his coūſell had before determined to be done. This the Apoſtles deliver to the very face of God in their prayers & holy meditatiōs. And let every Chriſtian conſider, whether it the Scripture had not made mention of this, & any one of us had uſed the like prayer & meditatiō, this Author & all that are of his ſpirit, would not have beene ready to ſpit in our faces & cry us downe for notorious blaſphemers. Yet the Apoſtles indued with the ſpirit of God feared not to be found guilty of violating the Lords holineſſe in all this. Hence I proceeded to the paſſages of the Old Teſtament for the confirmation of the ſame truth. As namely that whereas the deſolatiō of the holy Land begun by the Aſſyrians, finiſhed by the Babylonians, could not cōe to paſſe without many enormous ſins. Who can deny, that it was Gods will that theſe things ſhould come to paſſe, conſidering that Aſſur himſelf is acknowledged by God to be the rod of his wrath and the ſtaffe of his indignation, whom God would ſend againſt an hypocriticall nation, & againſt the people of his wrath would he give him a charge to take the ſpoyle, & to take the prey, & to tread them downe like the mire in the ſtreets? Hence I proceeded to ſhew how that it is Gods uſuall courſe to puniſh ſin with ſin. Now when God exerciſeth his judgments, ſhall not thoſe things juſtly be ſaid to come to paſſe by his will, which are puniſhments of foregoing ſinnes? See the judgment of God denounced againſt Amaziah the Preiſt of Bethell. Thou ſayſt prophecy not againſt Iſrael, & drop not thy word againſt the houſe of Iſaac. Therefore thus ſaith the Lord, Thy wife ſhall be an harlot in the Citties, Amos. 7. 16. 17.& thy ſons & thy daughters ſhall fall by the ſword. And in like manner Solomon ſaith The mouth of a ſtrange woman is a deep pit, he that is abhorred of the Lordſhall fall therein. The inceſt of Abſolom defiling his fathers cōcubines in a ſhameles manner, came it not to paſſe Prov. 22. 14.by the will of God, whoſe word is this; Behold I will raiſe up evill againſt thee, out of thine owne houſe, & I will take thy wives before thine eyes, & give them unto thy neighbour, & he ſhall ly with thy wives in the ſight of this ſun? The defection of the ten tribes frō the houſe of David, came it not to paſſe by the will of God, when God himſelfe teſtifies that it was 2 Sam. 12. 11.his worke, & not his will onelyonly? Thus ſaith the Lord the God of Iſrael, I will rent the kingdome out of the hands of Solomon, & give ten tribes to thee, ſpeaking to Ieroboam; here we have Gods will for it. And againe the word of God came to Semaiah the man of God ſaying, ſpeak to Rehoboā the ſon of Solomon King of Iudah, & unto all the houſe of Iudah & Benjamin, & to the remnant of the people, ſaying, Thus ſaith the Lotd, ye ſhall not goe up, nor fight againſt your brethren, 1 Kings. 11. 31.the children ef Iſrael; returne every man to his houſe; for this thing is from me. Here we have Gods word for it. Who can deny that the hardening of Pharohs heart, that he ſhould not let Iſrael go; the ſelling of Ioſeph into Egypt by the hands of his unnaturall brethren came to paſſe by the will of God? I proceed to prove the ſame truth by evidence of reaſō. Firſt becauſe God permits ſin to come to paſſe as all confeſſe, though he could hinder it, if it pleaſed him, & that without all detriment to the free will of the creature why then doth he permit it? but becauſe he would have it come to paſſe, & accordingly permiſſion is reckoned up by Schoole Divines amongſt the ſinnes of Gods will, like as allſo is Gods commandment. Now what God commandeth if it be done, it is ſaid to come to paſſe by the will of God, albeit the things that God commandeth, ſeldome; the things he permits, allwayes come to paſſe; according to the common tenet of Divines, even Voſtius & Arminius not excepted. Againe it is the common opinion of all, that therefore God permits ſin, becauſe he can and will worke good of it, which plainly ſuppoſeth that ſinne ſhall come to paſſe if God permits it, & conſequently it muſt needes be the will of God, it ſhall come to paſſe. Thirdly it is granted on both ſides that the act of ſin is Gods worke in the way of an efficient cauſe, not the outward act onelyonly which is naturall, but the inward act of the will which is morall, even this as an act is the worke of God: How can it be then but the deformity and vitiouſneſſe of the act, muſt come to paſſe God willing it, though not working it, conſidering that the deformity doth neceſſarily follow the act, in reference to the creatures working it, though not in reſpect of Gods working it? Laſtly all ſides agree that God can give effectuall grace, whereby a man ſhall be preſerved from ſin infallibly. Wherefore as often as God will not give this grace which is in his power to give, doth it not manifeſtly follow that he will not have ſuch a man preſerved frō ſin? To theſe I added the teſtimony of divers; as that of Auſtin. Not any thing comes to paſſe, unleſſe Good Enchiria. cap. 9. 5.will have it come to paſſe, either by ſuffering it to come to paſſe, or himſelfe working it. If good he workes it, if evill permits it, 'tis true of each that he wills it. & cap. 96. It is Good, ſaith Auſtin, that evill ſhould come to paſſe. And Bellarmine himſelfe ſo farre ſubſcribes hereunto, as by profeſſing that It is good that evills ſhoul come to paſſe by Gods permiſſion. The ſame Auſtin confeſſeth that The perverſity of the heart comes to paſſe by the ſecret judgment of God And againe that after a wonderfull and unſpeakable manner, even thoſe things which are committed againſt the will of God (to wit againſt the will of his commandment) do not come to paſſe beſides the will of God; to wit the will of his purpoſe. Anſelme the moſt ancient of ſchoole Divines in his booke of the concord of foreknowledge with free will; Conſidering Cont. Iulian: l. 5. c. 3.ſaith he, that what God willeth cannot but be when he wills, that the will of mā ſhall not be conſtrained by any neceſſity to will or no; and withall will have an effect follow the will of man. In this caſe it muſt needs be that the will of man is free, and that alſo which God willeth ſhall come to paſſe, to wit by that will of man. Now obſerve what in the next place he concludeth hence In theſe caſes therefore it is true that the worke of ſin, which man will doe, muſt needs be, though man doth not will it of neceſſity. And in his concord of predeſtination and free will. In Good things God doth worke, both that they are, and that they are good, in evill things he workes onelyonly that they are, not that they are evill. Hugo de ſancto Victore 1. De ſacr. 4. p. 13. When we ſay God willeth that which is good, it ſounds well; but if we ſay God willeth evill it is harſh to eares, neither doth a pious mind admit of the good God, that he willeth evill, for hereby he thinkes the meaning is that God loves and approves of that which is evill, & therefore the pious mind abhorres it, not becauſe that which is ſaid is not well ſaid, but becauſe that which is well ſaid is not well underſtood. To theſe I adde the teſtimony of Bradwardine at large. A man reputed ſo pious in thoſe dayes, that the Kings prospe ous ſucceſſe in thoſe dayes was cheifly imputed unto his piety; who followed him in his warres in France as Preacher in the camp. In the laſt place I make anſwer to the Sophiſticall arguments of Aquinas and Durandus, and the frothy diſputation of Valentianus, all of them ſtanding to maintaine the contrary. Now let every ſober Chriſtian judge of this Authors propoſition, when he ſaith that If God doth will and procure ſin &c. he is worſe then the Devill. For I have made it evident by variety of Scripture teſtimonyes, by reaſon, and alſo with the concurrence of diverſe learned Divines; that it is Gods will that ſin ſhould come to paſſe, even the horrible outrages committed againſt the holy ſonne of God were before determined by Gods hand and counſell. Now what followes herehence by this Authours dicourſe; but that the holy Apoſtles yea and the Spirit of God do make God worſe then the Devill. So little cauſe have we to be impatient, when ſuch horrible blaſphemyes are layd to our charge, when we conſider what honourable compartners we have in theſe our ſufferings. Yet ſee the vanity of this conſequence repreſented moſt evidently; For albeit the will of Gods decree be powerfull & effectuall and irreſiſtable, and conſequently every thing decreed thereby ſhall come to paſſe powerfully, effectually, irreſiſtibly, yet this reſpects onelyonly the generality of the things eveniency, not the manner how For onelyonly things neceſſary ſhall by this irreſiſtible wil of God, come to paſſe neceſſarily: But as for contingent things, they by the ſame irreſiſtable will of God ſhall come to paſſe alſo; but how? not neceſſarily but contingently; that is with a poſſibility of not comming to paſſe. Now the free actions of men are one ſort of contingent things They therefore ſhall infallibly come to paſſe alſo by vertue of Gods irreſiſtible will; but how? Not neceſſarily but contingently, that is with a poſſibility of not coming to paſſe in generall as they are things contingent: And in ſpeciall they ſhall come to paſſe not contingently onelyonly but freely alſo; that is with a free power in the Agents by whom they are acted to doe otherwiſe. Yet there is another difference according to the morall condition of theſe actions For if they are good and ſo farre as they are goood they come to paſſe by Gods working of them, but if they are evill, and ſo farre as they are evill they come to paſſe onelyonly by Gods permitting; according to that of Auſtin. Non aliquid ſit niſi omnipotēs fieri velit, vel ſinendo ut fiat, vel ipſe faciendo. Not any thing comes to paſſe, but God willing it either by ſuffering it (to wit in caſe it be evill) or himſelfe working it (to wit in caſe it be good.) And according to that eleventh Article of Religion agreed upon by the Arch-Biſhop, and Biſhops, and the reſt of the Clergy in Ireland, which is this; God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counſell ordaine whatſoever ſhould come to paſſe in time; yet ſo as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the ſecond cauſes is taken away but eſtabliſhed rather. Farther conſider it is confeſſed by all, that God concurres in producing the act of ſinne, as an efficient cauſe thereof not morall, but naturall. And Aquinas himſelfe, though he denyes that, Voluntas Dei eſt malorum, Becauſe indeed as Hugo de Sancto Victore obſerves by the will of God is commonly underſtood in this caſe Voluntas approbans; his will approving it, and loving it. And ſo it is juſtly denyed that God doth will evill things, ſpeaking of the evill of ſinne. Yet Aquinas profeſſeth, and diſputes and proves that Actus peccati eſt a Deo, the Act of ſinne is from God. Like as the Act of walking is from the ſoule, though the lamenes in walking ariſeth from ſome diſeaſe in the legge. Now the Devill concurres not in this manner to any act of ſin; neither is the efficient cauſe thereof in the Kinde of a Naturall efficient, but onelyonly Morall by tempting and perſwading. What therefore? ſhall we conclude as this Authour doth without feare or witt or honeſty, that by the confeſſion of all men God is hereby made worſe then the Devill? To what abominable courſes do the wilde witts and profane hearts of theſe men expoſe them? The greateſt works of Satan in moving men to ſin are comprehended under blinding and hardening of them. Now theſe operations are alſo attributed to God. And like enough he doth uſually performe them, not by the miniſtry of his holy Angells, but by the Miniſtry of Satan and his Angells of Darkeneſſe, as we read. 1. Kings 22. v. 21. 22. 23. Ioh: 13. 27. Acts 5. 3. What then ſhall the Devill ſo farre poſſeſſe our hearts as to break forth into ſuch intolerable blaſphemyes as to conclude hereupon that God is bad, or worſe then the Devill. The providence of God I willingly confeſſe is wonderfull, and myſterious in this, like unto the Nature of God, to be adored rather then pryed into. So this providence to be dreaded rather then for ſatisfaction to every wanton and wild witt to be ſearched into. Yet all confeſſe that the Lord could hinder all this if it pleaſed him, and rebuke Satan and reſtraine the power, and ſtop the courſe of ſin, and prevent occaſions leading thereunto, but he will not, and why? But becauſe he knowes it becomes his allmighty power and wiſdome infinite, rather exmalis bene facere, quàm malum eſſe non ſinere, To worke good out of evill, then not at all to ſuffer evill. Laſtly what meanes this Authour to carry himſelfe ſo as to betray ſo ſtrange ignorance in mitigating Satans operation in tempting unto ſin; as if this were not ſufficient to make him the Authour of ſin. Eſpecially conſidering the reaſon that moves him hereunto, which is meerely the delight that he takes in diſhonouring God, and being a deſperate ſpirit himſelfe to make as many as he can partakers of the ſame deſperate condition. For cupiunt perditi perdere, ſayth Cyprian, cum ſint ipſi paenales, quaerunt ſibi ad poenam comites; being damned themſelves they deſire to damne as many as they can: And being bound in chaines and kept to the judgement of the great day, they deſire to have as many companions as they can in drinking of that cup of trembling, and ſucking the very dreggs of that cup of trembling and wringing them out. For as the Hiſtorian obſerves. Maligna eſt calamitas, & cum ſuo ſupplicio crucietur, acquieſcit alieno; Calamity makes a man of a ſpightfull nature, and when himſelfe is tormented, he takes content in this that others ſuffer with him. And as the Oratour obſerves, Nullum adverſarium magis metuas, quàm qui non poteſt vivere, poteſt occidere. No adverſary more to be feared, then he who cannot live himſelfe, yet can kill another. This makes a coward reſolute; when he muſt needs dye, he will fight like a mad man, and kill all he can. I ſay what meanes this Authour to carry the matter hand over head, as if it were without queſtion; That he is not the Authour of ſinne; who onelyonly is a Morall cauſe thereof, but rather he that is the naturall efficient: whereas great Divines carry it to the contrary. As namely Dominicus Soto in his firſt booke of nature and grace chap: 18. Although (ſayth he) there are many that thinke it hard to explicate, how in the hatred of God, which hath an inward and indiviſible malignity, God can be the cauſe of the entity, but not of the fault: Yet this is not ſo hard to be underſtood. Then he proceeds to ſhew how this may be. Firſt laying for his ground what it is to be the cauſe of ſinne, thus; In morall actions he is altogether, and is judged to be the cauſe, who by a law, or help, or counſell or favour or perſwaſion moves any one either to good or evill. Obſerve I pray the doctrine of this School-Divine directly contrary to that which this Authour ſuppoſeth without all proofe. For in the judgement of Dominicus Soto, he onelyonly is to be accounted the cauſe of another mans ſinne, who is the morall cauſe thereof, as by tempting, counſelling, perſwading thereunto, And upon this ground he proceeds to free God from being the Authour of it after this manner. But as for God he by all theſe wayes moves his creatures to that which is good and honeſt, and none at all to evill. Neither is the doctrine of Dominicus Soto alone; but the common doctrine of the Divines of Salamancha, as Molina confeſſeth in his diſputation 23. And albeit Molina the Jeſuite were of another opinion. Yet Vaſquius the Jeſuite profeſſeth that he was ever of the ſame minde with Dominicus Soto and the Divines of Salamancha in this; In his 129 diſputation upon the firſt part of his Summes. As for Proſper he hath no ſuch argument. But firſt obſerve the Objection whereunto he anſwereth, was made againſt the Doctrine of Auſtin; as the Authour acknowledgeth. Whence it followeth that looke how this Authour chargeth our doctrine, after the ſame manner was the doctrine of Auſtin charged above 1200 yeares agoe; let the indifferent hereby take notice of the congruity of our doctrine with the doctrine of Auſtin in this particular, and the congruity of this Authours ſpirit in charging us with the ſpirit of the Semipelagians in charging Auſtin after the ſame manner. Secondly conſider the objection there made t'is this. Quod quando inceſtant Patres filias, & matres filios; vel quando Servi Dominos occidunt ideo fiat, quia ita Deus predeſtinavit, ut fieret. When father commit inceſt with their Daughters, and mothers with their ſonnes. Or when ſervants kill their Lords; therefore this comes to paſſe, becauſe God hath ſo predeſtinated that it ſhould come to paſſe. Conſider, in this objection the fault of theſe abominable courſes is not layd upon thoſe that commit them, but onelyonly upon God; as if Gods predeſtination did worke in ſuch a manner, as to compell men or women to commit ſuch and ſuch abominations. And ſo Proſper conceives the Argument to proceed, as if this were their intention. And accordingly makes anſwer. Si Diabolo objiceretur quòd talium facinorum ipſe Author, ipſe eſſet incentor, were it objected to the Devill that he were the Authour of ſuch ſinnes, and did inflame men to the committing of them (which indeed is the Devills courſe and not Gods) yet I thinke, ſayth he, that the Devill might in ſome ſort diſburthen himſelfe of this crimination, & talium ſcelerum patratores de ipſorum voluntate vinceret, and make it appeare that their owne wills were the committers of ſuch ſinnes. Quia etſi delectatus eſt furore peccantium, probaret tamen ſe non intuliſſe vim criminum. Becauſe though he tooke pleaſure in the fury of ſinners, yet might he juſtifie that he forced no man to ſinne. After the ſame manner proceeded the 11. objection of the Galles; Quod per potentiam Deus homines ad peccata compellit, God by his power compells men to ſin. And as touching the notion of predeſtination it is true the Antients uſed that onelyonly in reference to thoſe thinges which were wrought by God. Nihil ergo talium (to wit of wicked actions) negotiorum Deus predeſtinavit ut fieret. Predeſtination being onelyonly Enchirid: c. 95.of ſuch things, which come to paſſe by Gods working of them. Yet the ſame Auſtin profeſſeth that ſuch things which come to paſſe by Gods permiſſion (of which kind are all manner of ſinnes) even thoſe came to paſſe God willing thē, though not by Gods predeſtinating of them. And as touching Senacherib who was ſlaine by his owne ſonnes; the Lord profeſſeth ſaying, I will cauſe him to fall by the ſword in his owne land. And upon Eſa: 37. 7. Amos. 7. 16.Amaziah the Prieſt of Bethel the judgment was pronounced from the Lord, Thy wife ſhall be an harlot And whatſoever comes to paſſe it is Gods will it ſhould come to paſſe, ſayth Auſtin, how much more that which comes to paſſe in the way of judgment.
2 I come to his ſecond reaſon to examine whether he carryeth himſelfe any thing more handſomly in that. If God be the Authour of ſinne he cannot be the puniſher of ſin. This argument is better ſhaped then the former; but forthwith he tells us that he cannot be in juſtice the puniſher of that whereof himſelfe is the Authour. Wherein are two particulars neither of which were expreſſed in his argument, the one is the application of it to the ſame ſinne whereof he was the Authour, which was not expreſſed in the Argument. And without this application the Argument is of no force. For earthly Magiſtrates are ſinners, yet the puniſhers of ſinne in others, yea of the ſame kind of ſinne. As though a Magiſtrate be a profaner of the name of God, yet he may execute the law on them who doe profane the name of God, and that juſtly. Then what is it that makes a man the Author of ſinne? It is well knowne, that though it be unlawfull for a man to permit ſinne, if it be in his power to hinder it, yet unleſſe God permit ſinne, it cannot be committed by any, Nos certe, ſaith Auſtin, ſieos in quos nobis poteſtas eſt ante oculos noſtros perpetrare Scelera permittamus, rei cum ipſis erimus. Quam vero innumerabilia ille permitit fieri ante oculos ſuos, quae utique ſi voluiſſet nullâ ratione permitteret. Certainely if we ſuffer thoſe, over whom we have power, to commit ſinne, we ſhall be guilty together with them. But how innumerable are the ſinnes which he ſuffers to be committed before his eyes, which if he would, he could hinder, ſo that by no meanes they ſhould cōe to paſſe. Or is he the Authour of ſinne who is the efficient cauſe of the act of ſinne? It is Aquinas his doctrine, that, the act of ſinne is from God, and that in the kind of an efficient cauſe; and it is commonly received to be the firſt cauſe in the kind of efficients, ſubordinate to none, and all other ſubordinate to him. Nay more then this Scotus profeſſeth, and after him the Dominicans, that, God determineth the will to every act thereof (though ſinfull) as touching the ſubſtance thereof, but how? Surely no otherwiſe then to come to paſſe agreeably to their nature; neceſſary acts neceſſarily, free acts freely. So Barwardine maintaines that God neceſſitates the will of the creatue; but how? To performe acts thereof freely. Suppoſe they did maintaine that God in his omnipotency did impoſe a neceſſity upon our wills, as Suarez imputes to our Divines that they ſo teach. Yet in this caſe Suarez the Jeſuite will juſtifie them, that therein they deliver nothing that either doth include contradiction, or De auxil. l. 1. c. 2. num. 7.that doth exceed God's omnipotency. Neither did I ever meet any colour of reaſon, why God might not as wholy determine the will to any free act thereof, as concurre with the will to the producing of the ſame act. And that in the concurrence of God and man to the ſame act, the firſt cauſe ſhould be in ſubordination to the ſecond; or the ſecond cauſe not in ſubordination to the firſt, is againſt all reaſon, and obnoxious to manifold contradiction, as I have ſhewed in my Vindiciae. Whereas for God to move a creature to every lib. 2. Digreſ. 7.act of his congruouſly to his nature, and ſo to determine him, is moſt agreeable to reaſon, and nothing at all obnoxious to contradiction. And yet notwithſtanding I ſee noe ſufficient reaſon to conclude theſe determinations, as touching things naturall, ſuch as is the ſubſtance of every naturall act, there being a power to performe that in a naturall Agent. Of ſupernaturall acts the caſe is different. It ſeemes to me enough, that God will have this or that evill come to paſſe by his permiſſion. For when God created the world out of nothing; what tranſient action of God can be imagined, when there was no matter at all for any ſuch tranſient action to worke upon; God's will was ſufficient to have that to exiſt which before had no being: And why may not the will of God be ſufficient for the exiſtence of the motion of each creature after it hath exiſtence? But ſuppoſing theſe determinations of the creatures wills to be neceſſary, if God will not determine them to good what will follow herence? Surely nothing but evill; unleſſe man can determine himſelfe to that which is good without God. For as for ſimple concurrence without ſubordination in working, as I ſaid before, that cannot be affirmed without palpable and groſſe contradiction, as I have proved in the digreſſion formerly mentioned, proceed we yet farther. I know nothing doth more intimately concerne God's ſecret providence in evill, then the hardning of the creature to diſobedience. Now the Scripture which is the very word of God, and the dictates of the Holy Ghoſt doth plainly and expreſſely teach, that albeit God commanded Pharaoh to let Iſraell goe, yet withall he hardened his heart that he ſhould not let Iſraell goe for a long time, which refuſall of his was wilfull and preſumptuous diſobedience. In like ſort as touching obedience and diſobedience to the Goſpell, the Apoſtle tells us plainly that, God hath mercy on whom he will, to performe the one, and whom he will he hardeneth, thereby expoſing them to the other. And hereupon this objection is made, Why then doth God complaine (to wit, of man's diſobedience) for who hath reſiſted his will? And we know what anſwer the Apoſtle makes hereunto. O man who art thou that diſputeſt with God? ſhall the thing formed ſay to him that formed it, why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power of the clay of the ſame lump to make one veſſell unto honour, another unto diſhonour? Now will any ſober Chriſtian conclude herehence that becauſe, God hardned Pharaoh that he ſhould not let Iſraell goe, therefore he is the Authour of ſinne. The Lord hath bid Shimei to curſe David. Conſider what Auſtine writes upon this. Quomodo dixerit Dominus huic homini maledicere David, quis ſapiens & intelliget? Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur; ſed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio ſuo malam, in hoc peccatum judicio ſuo juſto & occulto inclinarit, ideo dictum eſt, Dixit ei Dominus. How ſaid the Lord to this man that he ſhould curſe David; Who is wiſe and he ſhall underſtand? For he ſaid this not by commanding Shimei ſo to doe, in which caſe his obedience had been commanded; but in as much as Shimei's will through his own vitiouſneſſe being evill, the Lord inclined it to this ſinne by his juſt and ſecret judgment. Thus ſaith he, The Lord uſeth the hearts of the wicked to the praiſe and benefit of the good: ſo he uſed Iudas betraying Chriſt: ſo he made uſe of the Jewes crucifying Chriſt. And how great good did he procure therehence to all believers? Who alſo uſeth the Divell who is worſt of all, yet he makes beſt uſe of him to exerciſe and prove the faith and piety of the godly. So he wrought in the heart of Abſalom to refuſe the counſell of Achitophell, and make choice of that counſell which was nothing profitable. Who may not well tremble in the contemplation of thoſe Divine judgments, whereby the Lord workes in the hearts of wicked men whatſoever he will, yet rendring unto them according to their merits. Then he proceeds to give other inſtances of Scripture to manifeſt God's working in the hearts of men, and when he hath done, he concludes in this manner; His & talibus teſtimoniis divinorum eloquiorum ſatis, quantum exiſtimo, manifeſtatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocun que voluerit ſive ad bona pro ſuâ miſericordiâ, ſive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio uti que ſuo aliquando occulto, ſemper autem juſto. By theſe and ſuch like teſtimonies of Divine Scripture, I take it to be ſufficiently manifeſted, that God doth worke in the hearts of men, to incline their wills whitherſoever he will, either to thoſe things that are good, of his mercy, or to ſuch things that are evill, for their deſerts, in the way of judgment, which is ſometimes known, ſometimes ſecret, but alwaies juſt. And all this he ſhewes, to be wrought by God without prejudice to the freedome of their wills. And why ſhould David pray after this manner. Lord incline mine heart to thy teſtimonies, and not to covetouſneſſe; If it were not in God's power to incline the hearts of men to covetouſneſſe? Yet I truſt no ſober Chriſtian will conclude from this prayer of David, that God by executing ſuch a power is the Author of ſinne. Laſtly this argument is drawne from God's juſtice, ſo is the third, which is to confound rather then to diſtinguiſh the reaſons produced by him. We ſay that God cannot poſſibly be the Author of ſinne, the neceſſity of his nature ſtands in oppoſition thereunto. For firſt ſin hath no cauſe efficient but deficient only, as long agoe it hath been delivered by Auſtin. 2ly, a cauſe deficient or defective is either in a culpable manner, or in a manner nothing culpable. As for example, that Agent is defective culpably, that either omits the doing of that which he ought to doe; or omits to doe it after that manner which he ought to doe it: now I ſay it is impoſſible that the divine nature can be defective either of theſe waies, and conſequently it is impoſſible that he ſhould be the Author of ſin, whereas he ſaith this is Proſper's argument it is untrue. He ſaith indeed it is againſt reaſon, that God who damnes the Devill ſhould will that any man ſhould be a Servant to the Divell: but forthwith he expounds himſelfe. 1. Expounding what that cōdition is of being the Devills ſervants, whereof the objection did proceed. Now the objection was this, That the greateſt part of men were created for this, that they ſhould doe, not the will of God, but the will of the Devill: Now this objection ſaith Proſper proceeds from the Pelagians: Qui Adae peccatum tranſiiſſe in omnes diffitentur, who deny the ſin of Adam to have paſſed unto all. So that, to doe the will not of God, but of the Divell, is to be in the ſtate of naturall corruption, and under the power of originall ſinne, whereby they are not God's ſervants, but the Devills; this is not the condition of God's children in the ſtate of Grace. Now Proſper ſhewes how originall ſinne paſſeth over all, not by the will of God; and ſecondly, how it paſſeth over all by the will of God: Not by the will of God inſtituente; but by the will of God judicante: His words are theſe. Haec ſervitus non eſt inſtitutio Dei, ſed judicium. This ſlavery of ſinne which came upon all by Adam's ſinne is not God's inſtitution but his judgment. As much as to ſay it came not upon a man by God's firſt creation, but by his judgment upon him, becauſe of his firſt trangreſſion; ſo that if divine judgment be the will of God; it is apparent Proſper is ſo farre from denying that ſlavery to have come upon all men by the juſt will of God, as that he expreſly acknowledgeth it. It is true as Fulgentius ſaith, that, God is not the Authour of ſinne, but the revenger of it. And it is as true that it is as juſt with God to puniſh ſinne with ſinne, as Scripture juſtifies; as St. Auſtine obſerves, and improveth at large divers Scriptures to this purpoſe, in his fifth Book againſt Iulian the Pelagian, and third chap. Tertullian in ſaying, he is not to be accounted the Authour of ſin, who is the forbidder, yea the condemner of it, falls directly upon the ſame ground that Dominicus Soto, with the Divines of Salamancha, and Vaſquez the Jeſuites, in explicating what that is which makes me to be the Authour of a morall action; as namely, by commanding, by counſelling it, and perſwading it; and indeed condemnation is but conſequent to a law forbidding this or that. Now it is apparent that God in this reſpect ought to be accounted the Authour of every good action, but of none that is evill. For he commands only that wich is good, and counſelleth and perſwadeth thereunto, but forbiddeth and diſſwadeth every thing that is evill. Of this no notice at all is taken by this Authour, neither taketh he any care to ſhew what that is, that maketh any agent juſtly to be accounted the Authour of ſinne.
3 His third reaſon is all one with the former as drawne from God's juſtice and holineſſe and his being Judge of the world. For it is the property of the Judge to condemne tranſgreſſours, whereupon his former Argument inſiſted, and that allſo was drawne from God's juſtice. But I remember well what the Poet coupleth together when he ſaith,
Acceſſit fervor capiti numeruſ que lucernis.
Honeſty retaines the Creature from being the Authour of ſinne not his nature, he being peccabilis by nature, but ſo is not God; It is impoſſible abſolutely for him to be found defective any way in a culpable manner. He may withhold Grace from any man, I ſpeak of Grace preſervative from ſinne. Neither is he unjuſt herein; for he is bound to none. At length he comes to prove the crimination laid upon his adverſaries, as followeth.